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Versions: (draft-huston-sidr-res-certs) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 RFC 6487

SIDR                                                           G. Huston
Internet-Draft                                             G. Michaelson
Intended status: Standards Track                              R. Loomans
Expires: May 21, 2009                                              APNIC
                                                       November 17, 2008


             A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates
                      draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-15

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 21, 2009.

Abstract

   This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for
   the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use"
   of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System
   Numbers).  This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization
   of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-
   use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the
   issued certificate.







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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Resource Certificate Fields  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  Serial number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.3.  Signature Algorithm  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.4.  Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.5.  Subject  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.6.  Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.7.  Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.8.  Subject Public Key Info  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.9.  Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields  . . . . .  8
       3.9.1.  Basic Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.2.  Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.3.  Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.9.4.  Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.9.5.  CRL Distribution Points  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       3.9.6.  Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.9.7.  Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.9.8.  Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       3.9.9.  IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       3.9.10. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   4.  Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.1.  Version  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.2.  Issuer Name  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.3.  This Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.4.  Next Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.5.  Signature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     4.6.  Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.6.1.  Serial Number  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.6.2.  Revocation Date  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     4.7.  CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.7.1.  Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       4.7.2.  CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   5.  Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.1.  PCKS#10 Profile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       5.1.1.  PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template
               Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.2.  CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
       5.2.1.  CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields  . . 18
       5.2.2.  Resource Certificate Request Control Fields  . . . . . 19
     5.3.  Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate
           Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   6.  Resource Certificate Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     6.1.  Resource Extension Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22



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     6.2.  Resource Certification Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . 23
     6.3.  Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates  . . . . . . . . . 24
       6.3.1.  Distribution Format of Default Trust Anchor
               Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   7.  Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
     11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
     11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   Appendix A.  Example Resource Certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   Appendix B.  Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 36
   Appendix C.  Cryptographic Message Syntax Profile for RPKI
                Trust Anchor Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
     C.1.  Signed-Data ContentType  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
       C.1.1.  encapContentInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
       C.1.2.  signerInfos  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
     C.2.  RTA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 44






























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1.  Introduction

   This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates
   [X.509] for use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and
   AS Numbers.  Such certificates are termed here "Resource
   Certificates."  Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that
   conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], and also conform to the
   constraints specified in this profile.  Resource Certificates attest
   that the issuer has granted the subject a "right-of-use" for a listed
   set of IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers.

   A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer
   that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject
   of the issued certificate.  The binding is identified by the
   association of the subject's private key with the subject's public
   key contained in the Resource Certificate, as signed by the private
   key of the certificate's issuer.

   In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number
   resources within this context, it is intended that Resource
   Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the
   public number resource distribution function.  Specifically, when a
   number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an
   entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource
   Certificate.  This certificate is issued by the number registry, and
   the subject public key that is certified by the issuer corresponds to
   the public part of a key pair for which the private key is associated
   with the entity who is the recipient of the number assignment or
   allocation.  A critical extension to the certificate enumerates the
   IP Resources that were allocated or assigned by the issuer to the
   entity.  In the context of the public number distribution function,
   this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI structure, where Resource
   Certificates are issued in only one 'direction' and there is a unique
   path of certificates from a certification authority operating at the
   apex of a resource distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate.

   Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can
   be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer-subject certificate
   chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor certification
   authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional
   constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully
   encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject
   certificate chain.  Validation therefore logically corresponds to
   validation of an associated set of assignment or allocation actions
   of IP number resources.

   While this profile describes the structure of a default Trust Anchor
   for this PKI, Relying Parties (RPs) in this PKI are free to select



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   the trust anchors upon which they rely, and thus the PKI as viewed by
   RPs need not match the public resource allocation hierarchy as
   described here.

   Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of
   secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-of-use of an
   IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol,
   allowing relying parties to verify legitimacy and correctness of
   routing information.  Related use contexts include validation of
   Internet Routing Registry objects, validation of routing requests,
   and detection of potential unauthorized use of IP addresses.

   This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource
   Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid.
   Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to
   this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate.

1.1.  Terminology

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet
   Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing
   Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines"
   [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management
   policy documents.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.


2.  Describing Resources in Certificates

   The framework for describing an association between the subject of a
   certificate and the resources currently under the subject's control
   is described in [RFC3779].

   There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in
   this profile:


      1.  RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL
          extension to the X.509 Certificate.  This Resource Certificate
          profile further specifies that the use of this certificate
          extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST
          be marked as CRITICAL.



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      2.  RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a
          resource set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal
          spanning prefix masks as appropriate.  All valid certificates
          in this profile MUST use this sorted canonical form of
          resource description in the resource extension field.

      3.  A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate
          validity includes the condition that the resources described
          in the immediate parent CA certificate in the PKI (the
          certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject)
          has a resource set (called here the "issuer's resource set")
          that MUST encompass the resource set of the issued
          certificate.  In this context "encompass" allows for the
          issuer's resource set to be the same as, or a strict superset
          of, any subject's resource set.

   Certificate validation entails the construction of a sequence of
   valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the subject
   field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next
   certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor to the certificate
   being validated.  Moreover, the resource extensions in this
   certificate sequence from the first CA under the trust anchor to the
   certificate being validated form a sequence of encompassing
   relationships in terms of the resources described in the resource
   extension.


3.  Resource Certificate Fields

   A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate,
   consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields
   listed in this section.  Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL,
   all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST
   NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate.  Where a field value
   is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource
   Certificates.

3.1.  Version

   Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates.  This field
   MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this
   field is 2).

3.2.  Serial number

   The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per
   Issuer.




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3.3.  Signature Algorithm

   This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on
   this certificate.  This profile specifies a default of SHA-256 with
   RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
   SHA-512.  Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the
   OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055].

3.4.  Issuer

   This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the
   certificate.  The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
   Conventions are imposed on Issuer names used in resource
   certificates, as described in [ID.sidr-arch].

   If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of
   the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the
   issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the
   immediate superior certificate.

3.5.  Subject

   This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been
   allocated / assigned.  The value of this field is a valid X.501 name.
   As noted above, conventions are imposed on Subject names used in
   resource certificates, as described in [ID.sidr-arch].

   In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and
   each distinct subordinate CA and EE certified by the issuer MUST be
   identified using a subject name that is unique per issuer.

   In this context "distinct" is defined as an entity and a given public
   key.  An issuer SHOULD use a different subject name if the subject
   entity or the subject entity's key pair has changed.

3.6.  Valid From

   The starting time at which point the certificate is valid.  In this
   profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of
   certificate generation.  As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280],
   Certification Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST
   always encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year
   2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as
   GeneralizedTime.  These two time formats are defined in [RFC5280].

   In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
   this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior
   certificate.  Relying Parties should not attempt to infer from this



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   time information a certificate was valid at a time in the past, or
   will be valid at a time in the future, as the validity of a
   certificate refers to validity at the current time.

3.7.  Valid To

   The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the
   certificate's validity ends.  It represents the anticipated lifetime
   of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the
   issuer and the subject.  As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280], CAs
   conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's
   "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050
   or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime.  These two time formats
   are defined in [RFC5280].

   As noted above, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for
   this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior
   certificate.  The same caveats apply to Relying Party's assumptions
   relating to the certificate's validity at any time other than the
   current time,

   While a CA is typically advised against issuing a certificate with a
   validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's
   certificate that will be used to validate the issued certificate, in
   the context of this profile, it is anticipated that a CA may have
   valid grounds to issue a certificate with a validity interval that
   exceeds the validity interval of its certificate.

3.8.  Subject Public Key Info

   This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with
   which the key is used.  The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and,
   accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is
   1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.  The key size MUST be a minimum size of 2048
   bits.

   It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
   both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken
   when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size noted above.

3.9.  Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields

   As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC5280], each extension in a certificate
   is designated as either critical or non-critical.  A certificate-
   using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical
   extension it does not recognize; however, a non-critical extension
   MAY be ignored if it is not recognized [RFC5280].




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   The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming
   Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise.

3.9.1.  Basic Constraints

   The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the
   certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification
   paths that include this certificate.

   The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set.  If this bit
   is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue
   resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the
   subject is a CA).

   The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST
   NOT be present.

   The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the
   Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the subject is
   a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise.

3.9.2.  Subject Key Identifier

   The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying
   certificates that contain a particular public key.  To facilitate
   certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all
   Resource Certificates.  This extension is non-critical.

   The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in
   the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of
   all certificates issued by this subject.

   The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value
   of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as
   described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280].

3.9.3.  Authority Key Identifier

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key,
   by providing a hash value of the issuer's public key.  To facilitate
   path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource
   Certificates.  The keyIdentifier MUST be present in all Resource
   Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self-signed"
   certificate.  The authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber
   fields MUST NOT be present.  This extension is non-critical.

   The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value



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   of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as
   described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280].

3.9.4.  Key Usage

   This describes the purpose of the certificate.  This is a critical
   extension, and it MUST be present.

   In certificates issued to Certification Authorities only the
   keyCertSign and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE and these MUST be the
   only bits set to TRUE.

   In end-entity certificates the digitalSignature bit MUST be set to
   TRUE and MUST be the only bit set to TRUE.

3.9.5.  CRL Distribution Points

   This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s)
   associated with certificates issued by this Issuer.  This profile
   uses the URI form of object identification.  The preferred URI access
   mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references
   a single inclusive CRL for each issuer.

   In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer,
   implying at the CRLIssuer field MUST be omitted, and the
   distributionPoint field MUST be present.  The Reasons field MUST be
   omitted.

   The distributionPoint MUST contain GeneralNames, and MUST NOT contain
   a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer.  The form of the generalName MUST be of
   type URI.

   In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all
   certificates issued by this CA issuer.

   The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single
   DistributionPointName set.  The DistributionPointName set MAY contain
   more than one URI value.  An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the
   DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of
   this issuer's certificate revocation list.  Other access form URIs
   MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI.

   This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical.  There is one
   exception, namely where a CA distributes its public key in the form
   of a "self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted.






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3.9.6.  Authority Information Access

   This extension (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the
   certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA,
   where this certificate's issuer is the subject.  In this profile a
   single reference object to publication location of the immediate
   superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA
   distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed"
   certificate, in which case the AIA field SHOULD be omitted.

   This profile uses a URI form of object identification.  The preferred
   URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified
   with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers.  The URI MUST
   reference the point of publication of the certificate where this
   issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate).
   Other accessMethod URIs referencing the same object MAY also be
   included in the value sequence of this extension.

   When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate
   certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA
   field.  In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re-
   issuance necessarily implies a requirement to re-issue all
   subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a
   persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates.  This implies
   that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates
   to the same subject in the publication repository, and use the same
   publication name as previously issued certificates.  In this way
   subordinate certificates can maintain a constant AIA field value and
   need not be re-issued due solely to a re-issue of the superior
   certificate.  The issuers' policy with respect to the persistence of
   name objects of issued certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's
   Certification Practice Statement.

   This extension is non-critical.

3.9.7.  Subject Information Access

   This extension (SIA) identifies the location of information and
   services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA
   extension appears.  Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this
   information and service collection will include all current valid
   certificates that have been issued by this subject that are signed
   with the subject's corresponding private key.

   This profile uses a URI form of location identification.  The
   preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be
   specified, with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caRepository when the
   subject of the certificate is a CA.  The RSYNC URI MUST reference an



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   object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a
   trailing '/' in the URI.

   Other accessMethod URIs that reference the same location MAY also be
   included in the value sequence of this extension.  The ordering of
   URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences for
   access methods to be used by parties for retrieval of objects from
   the associated repository publication point, with the first method in
   the accessMethod sequence being the most preferred.

   This extension MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non-
   critical.

   For End Entity (EE) certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this
   extension MAY be present, and is non-critical.  If present, it either
   references the location where objects signed by the private key
   associated with the EE certificate can be accessed, or, in the case
   of single-use EE certificates it references the location of the
   single object that has been signed by the corresponding private key.

   When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes objects signed
   with the matching private key in a repository, the directory where
   these signed objects is published is referenced the id-ad-
   signedObjectRepository OID.

          id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 }

          id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 }

   When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes a single object
   signed with the matching private key, the location where this signed
   object is published is referenced the id-ad-signedObject OID.

          id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 }

   This profile requires the use of repository publication manifests
   [ID.sidr-manifests] to list all signed objects that are deposited in
   the repository publication point associated with a CA or an EE.  The
   publication point of the manifest for a CA or EE is placed in the SIA
   extension of the CA or EE certificate.  This profile uses a URI form
   of manifest identification for the accessLocation.  The preferred URI
   access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified.
   Other accessDescription fields may exist for the id-ad-rpkiManifest
   accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate URI
   access mechanisms for the same manifest object.

          id-ad-rpkiManifest  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 }




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   CA certificates MUST include in the SIA an accessMethod OID of id-ad-
   rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to the
   subject's published manifest object as an object URL.

   When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple
   objects, EE certificate MUST include in the SIA an accessMethod OID
   of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to
   the EE's published manifest object as an object URL.

   When an EE certificate is used to verify a single published object,
   the EE certificate MUST include in the SIA an accessMethod OID of id-
   ad-signedObject, where the associated accessLocation refers to the
   publication point of the single object that is verified using this EE
   certificate.  In this case, the SIA MUST NOT include the accessMethod
   OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest.

3.9.8.  Certificate Policies

   This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using
   the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2".  This field
   MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource
   Certificates.

   No PolicyQualifiers are defined for use with this policy and thus
   none must be included in this extension.

   This extension MUST be present and it is critical.

3.9.9.  IP Resources

   This extension contains the list of IP address resources as per
   [RFC3779].  The value may specify the "inherit" element for a
   particular AFI value.  In the context of resource certificates
   describing public number resources for use in the public Internet,
   the SAFI value MUST NOT be used.  All Resource Certificates MUST
   include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both
   extensions.

   This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.

3.9.10.  AS Resources

   This extension contains the list of AS number resources as per
   [RFC3779], or may specify the "inherit" element.  RDI values are NOT
   supported in this profile and MUST NOT be used.  All Resource
   Certificates MUST include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources
   extension, or both extensions.




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   This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical.


4.  Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile

   Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL),
   consistent with [RFC5280].  The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect
   CRLs are supported in this profile.

   An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one
   regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's
   validity period, as required in [RFC5280].

   This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs.

   The scope of the CRL MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA".
   The contents of the CRL are a list of all non-expired certificates
   that have been revoked by the CA.

   No CRL fields other than those listed here are permitted in CRLs
   issued under this profile.  Unless otherwise indicated, these fields
   MUST be present in the CRL.  Where two or more CRLs issued by a
   single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the
   "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA.

4.1.  Version

   Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the
   integer value of this field is 1).

4.2.  Issuer Name

   The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is
   also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in
   the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer.

4.3.  This Update

   This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued.  The
   value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the
   year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the
   year 2050 or later.

4.4.  Next Update

   This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued.
   The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through
   the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in



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   the year 2050 or later.

4.5.  Signature

   This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL.  This
   profile specifies a default of SHA-256 with RSA
   (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA-
   512.

   It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for
   both the CRL Issuer and relying parties, indicating that care should
   be taken when deciding to use larger than the default key size.

4.6.  Revoked Certificate List

   When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate
   list MUST be absent.

   For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST
   be present.  No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile,
   and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL.

4.6.1.  Serial Number

   The serial number of the revoked certificate.

4.6.2.  Revocation Date

   The time the certificate was revoked.  This time MUST NOT be a future
   date (i.e., a date later than ThisUpdate).  The value of this field
   MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the year 2049, and MUST
   be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year 2050 or later.

4.7.  CRL Extensions

   The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL.  The
   following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be
   present in a CRL.

4.7.1.  Authority Key Identifier

   The authority key identifier extension provides a means of
   identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to
   sign a CRL.  Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier
   method.  The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section
   4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280].

   This extension is non-critical.



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4.7.2.  CRL Number

   The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence
   number of positive integers for a given CA and scope.  This extension
   allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes
   another CRL.  The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs
   issued by the CA with the same scope.

   This extension is non-critical.


5.  Resource Certificate Request Profile

   A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or
   Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF).  A CA Issuer MUST support
   PKCS#10 and a CA Issuer may, with mutual consent of the subject,
   support CRMF.

5.1.  PCKS#10 Profile

   This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to
   Resource Certificates.  A Certificate Request Message object,
   formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a CA as the initial step
   in issuing a certificate.

   This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
   (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject.

   With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is
   permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
   certificate.

5.1.1.  PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields

   This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
   that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo:


      Version
         This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0.

      Subject
         This field is optional.  If present, the value of this field
         SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a
         subject name that is unique in the context of certificates
         issued by this issuer.  If the value of this field is non-
         empty, then the CA MAY consider the value of this field as the
         subject's suggested subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to



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         honor this suggestion, as the subject name MUST be unique per
         subordinate CA and EE in certificates issued by this issuer.

      SubjectPublicKeyInfo
         This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm
         with which the key is used.  The public key algorithm MUST be
         RSA, and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.
         This field also includes a bit-string representation of the
         entity's public key.  For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit
         string contains the DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type
         RSAPublicKey.

      Attributes
         [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where
         the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key.

         The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest
         attribute as defined in [RFC2985].  This attribute contains
         X509v3 Certificate Extensions.  The profile for extensions in
         certificate requests is specified in Section 5.3.

   This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
   that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object:


      signatureAlgorithm
         This profile specifies a default of SHA-256 with RSA
         (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or
         SHA-512.  Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of
         the OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 }
         [RFC4055].

         It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive
         for both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care
         should be taken when deciding to use larger than the default
         key size.

5.2.  CRMF Profile

   This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
   specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates.
   A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the
   CRMF, is passed to a CA as the initial step in issuing a certificate.

   This request MAY be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority
   (RA), acting under the direction of a subject.

   With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is



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   permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding
   certificate.

5.2.1.  CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields

   This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields
   that may appear in a Certificate Request Template:


      Version
         This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a
         Version 3 Certificate.  It SHOULD be omitted.

      SerialNumber
         As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
         omitted in this profile.

      SigningAlgorithm
         As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be
         omitted in this profile.

      Issuer
         This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
         profile.

      Validity
         This field MAY be omitted.  If omitted, the CA will issue a
         Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA.  If
         specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with
         dates as determined by the CA.

      Subject
         This field is optional.  If present, the value of this field
         SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a
         subject name that is unique in the context of certificates
         issued by this issuer.  If the value of this field is non-
         empty, then the CA MAY consider the value of this field as the
         subject's suggested subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to
         honor this suggestion, as the subject name MUST be unique per
         issuer in certificates issued by this issuer.

      PublicKey
         This field MUST be present.








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      extensions
         This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions.  The
         profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in
         Section 5.3.

5.2.2.  Resource Certificate Request Control Fields

   The following control fields are supported in this profile:


      Authenticator Control
         It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the
         subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in
         [RFC4211] is that the Authenticator Control field be used.


5.3.  Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests

   The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate
   Request.  Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate
   Request.  This profile places the following additional constraints on
   these extensions.:


      BasicConstraints
         If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity
         certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in
         the issued certificate.

         The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource
         Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this
         profile.

         The CA MAY honor the SubjectType CA bit set to on.  If this bit
         is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue
         resource certificates within this overall framework.

         The CA MUST honor the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity
         certificate request), in which case the corresponding end
         entity certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints
         extension.

      SubjectKeyIdentifier
         This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
         profile.






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      AuthorityKeyIdentifier
         This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
         profile.

      KeyUsage
         The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign and cRLSign
         if present, as long as this is consistent with the
         BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified.

       SubjectInformationAccess
         This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and the
         field value SHOULD be honored by the CA.  If the CA is not able
         to honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the
         Certificate Request.

         This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and
         services relating to the subject of the certificate in which
         the SIA extension appears.

         Where the subject is a CA in this profile, this information and
         service collection will include all current valid certificates
         that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the
         subject's corresponding private key.

         This profile uses a URI form of location identification.  An
         RSYNC URI MUST be specified, with an accessMethod value of id-
         ad-caRepository when the subject of the certificate is a CA.
         The RSYNC URI MUST reference an object collection rather than
         an individual object and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI.
         Other accessMethod URIs that reference the same location MAY
         also be included in the value sequence of this extension.  The
         ordering of URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's
         relative preferences for access methods, with the first method
         in the sequence being the most preferred by the Subject.

         A request for a CA certificate MUST include in the SIA of the
         request the id-ad-caRepository accessMethod, and also MUST
         include in the SIA of the request the accessMethod OID of id-
         ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to
         the subject's published manifest object as an object URL.

         This field MAY be present when the subject is a EE.  If it is
         present the field value SHOULD be honored by the CA.  If the CA
         is not able to honor the requested field value, then the CA
         MUST reject the Certificate Request.  If it is not present the
         CA SHOULD honor this request and omit the SIA from the issued
         certificate.  If the CA is not able to honor the request to
         omit the SIA, then the CA MUST reject the Certificate Request.



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         When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying
         multiple objects, the certificate request for the EE
         certificate MUST include in the SIA of the request an
         accessMethod OID of id-ad-signedObjectRepository, and also MUST
         include in the SIA of the request an accessMethod OID of id-ad-
         rpkiManifest, where the associated access location refers to
         the publication point of the manifest object describing all
         objects that are verified using this EE certificate.

         When an EE certificate is used to sign a single published
         object, the certificate request for the EE certificate MUST
         include in the SIA of the request an accessMethod OID of id-ad-
         signedObject, where the associated accessLocation refers to the
         publication point of the single object that is verified using
         this EE certificate, and MUST NOT include an id-ad-rpkiManifest
         accessMethod OID in the SIA of the request.

         In the case when the EE certificate is to be used exclusively
         to sign one or more unpublished objects, such that the all
         signed objects will not be published in any RPKI repository,
         then the SIA SHOULD be omitted from the request.

      CRLDistributionPoints
         This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
         profile.

      AuthorityInformationAccess
         This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
         profile.

      CertificatePolicies
         This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this
         profile.


   With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the
   SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any
   requested field.


6.  Resource Certificate Validation

   This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure.
   This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of
   [RFC5280].

   To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other
   things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n



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   certificates) satisfies the following conditions:


      1.  for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is
          the issuer of certificate x+1;

      2.  certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor (Note that a trust
          anchor is NOT a resource certificate in this context and thus
          does not contain RFC 3779 extensions.);

      3.  certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and

      4.  for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid.

6.1.  Resource Extension Validation

   The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical
   extensions for Internet number resources.  These are ASN.1 encoded
   representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a
   prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set.

   Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS
   number resource extension.  In order to validate a Resource
   Certificate the resource extension MUST also be validated.  This
   validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource
   sets:


      more specific
         Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, A
         is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP addresses
         or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is larger
         than range A.

      equal
         Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, A
         is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same
         collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range
         B. The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779] is equivalent
         to this "equality" comparison.

      encompass
         Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X
         "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses
         or AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either
         more specific than or equal to a contiguous range element
         within the set X.




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   Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an
   ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1' is issued by
   a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the
   subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1,
   implies that the resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass"
   the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1, and the resources
   described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources
   described in certificate 1.

6.2.  Resource Certification Path Validation

   Validation of signed resource data using a target resource
   certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or
   'Certification Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a
   certificate that has been issued by a trust anchor, and 'n' is the
   target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions
   hold:


      1.  The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key
          and the signature algorithm

      2.  The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From
          and To values.

      3.  The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and
          contains field values as specified in this profile for all
          field values that MUST be present.

      4.  No field value that MUST NOT be present in this profile is
          present in the certificate.

      5.  The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the
          certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current
          Certificate Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation
          List is itself valid.

      6.  That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the
          resource extension data contained in a valid certificate where
          this Issuer is the Subject (the previous certificate in the
          ordered sequence)

      7.  The Certification Path originates with a certificate issued by
          a trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the
          Certification Path where the Subject of Certificate x in the
          Certification Path matches the Issuer in Certificate x+1 in
          the Certification Path.




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   A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any
   chosen order.

   Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally
   maintained cache, maintained by a regular synchronization across the
   distributed publication repository structure.

   There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that
   are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as
   means of creating a potential DOS attack on a relying party.  Some
   further heuristics may be required to halt the certification path
   validation process in order to avoid some of the issues associated
   with attempts to validate such structures.  It is suggested that
   implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a
   validation failure if the certification path length exceeds a locally
   defined configuration parameter.

6.3.  Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates

   The default trust model for the resource certificate PKI maps to the
   extant public resource allocation system, comprised of IANA, RIRs,
   NIRs (in some regions) and LIRs.  This is a strict hierarchy, in that
   any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has only one
   'parent' issuing registry for that resource.  Moreover, the issuing
   registry is not a direct or indirect subordinate recipient entity of
   the recipient entity in question (i.e., there are no loops in the
   model).

   Nonetheless, as in any PKI, selection of one or more entities as
   trust anchor is a task undertaken by each relying party.  The
   structure of the resource certificate profile admits the same variety
   of trust models as PKIX (and X.509) standards.  There is only one
   additional caveat on the general applicability of trust models,
   namely that in forming a validation path to a CA, the sequence of
   resource certificates MUST preserve the resource extension validation
   property, as described in Section 6.1.  [RFC3779] establishes this
   requirement for certificate path validation when the extensions
   defined therein are employed.  This poses a problem in the RPKI, as
   explained below.

   Based on experience, a top level resource certificate held by a
   registry will change several times a year, in response to receipt of
   additional resource allocations.  This makes such certificates poor
   candidates as trust anchors, since one usually views a trust anchor
   as a long-lived set of data.  Yet [RFC3779] requires that the trust
   anchor used for validation of certificates contains resource
   extensions MUST itself contain such extensions, and the extensions
   must be a superset of extensions contained in subordinate



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   certificates in the path.

   This observation motivates a two-tier trust anchor model for the
   RPKI.  The top tier trust anchor for each RIR (and IANA) will be a
   self-signed certificate that contains no resource extensions.  It is
   a resource certificate as defined in this document, except for that
   one omission.  This certificate will be referred to as a "registry
   root certificate" (RRC) or registry TA certificate.  (Note that the
   term "registry" here is not intended to preclude use of this
   mechanism by other than the RIRs and the IANA.)  Under this
   certificate one EE certificate is issued; that certificate also
   contains no resource extensions.  The EE certificate is used to
   validate a CMS signed object that contains a self-signed certificate
   that itself contains resource extensions, and this self-signed
   certificate acts as a TA for resource certificate path validation.
   This latter certificate will be referred to as an RPKI TA
   (certificate).

   Both the registry TA and the RPKI TA will be represented as self-
   signed certificates, consistent with the wide-spread convention that
   is allowed (thought not mandated) by [RFC5280].  Following this
   convention makes it easier to reuse existing PKI software (e.g.,
   OpenSSL) to process this trust anchor material.

6.3.1.  Distribution Format of Default Trust Anchor Material

   In the RPKI, the certificate framework corresponds to the hierarchies
   of the resource distribution function.  In consideration of this, it
   is reasonable to nominate to relying parties a default set of trust
   anchor pairs (registry TA and RPKI TA) for the RPKI that correspond
   to the entities who operate at the upper levels of the associated
   resource allocation hierarchy.  The corresponding nominated trust
   anchor CA(s) should therefore map, in some fashion, to apex point(s)
   of the hierarchical resource distribution structure.

   The characteristics of a trust anchor framework for the RPKI includes
   the following considerations:


      *  The entity or entities that issue proposed trust anchor
         material for the RPKI should be as close as possible to the
         apex of the associated resource distribution hierarchy.

      *  Such trust anchor material SHOULD be long-lived.  As it can be
         reasonably anticipated that default trust anchor material would
         be distributed with relying party validation software, the
         implication is that the distributed default trust anchor
         material SHOULD remain constant for extended time intervals.



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      *  It is a poor trust model when any entity that issues putative
         trust anchor material claims to be authoritative for
         information or actions of which the entity has no direct
         knowledge, nor is in possession of a current definitive record
         of such actions.  Entities who propose themselves in a role of
         a trust anchor issuer SHOULD be able to point to corroborative
         material supporting the assertion that they are legitimate
         authorities for the information for which they are representing
         themselves as a trust anchor for relying parties.

   An entity offering itself as a putative trust anchor for a part of
   the RPKI is required to regularly publish an RPKI CA certificate at a
   stable URL, and to publish at this URL trust anchor material, as
   follows:


      *  The entity issues a registry root certificate (self-signed).
         This certificate is used to bootstrap validation of an RPKI TA
         (self-signed) certificate, as described below.  The RPKI TA
         certificate MUST meet all of the criteria established in
         Section 3 of this document for a self-signed RPKI certificate.
         This certificate MUST be reissued periodically, prior to its
         expiration, and MUST be reissued upon any change in the
         resource set that has been allocated to the entity operating
         this CA.  The validity interval of this certificate SHOULD
         reflect the anticipated period of changes to the entity's
         resource set .

      *  The entity maintains a trust anchor key pair that is distinct
         from the key pair represented in the RPKI TA certificate noted
         above.

      *  The entity issues a (self-signed) CA certificate that contains
         no RFC 3779 extension.  This is called the RPKI TA certificate.
         This certificate MUST have the keyCertSign sign bit set in the
         key usage extension, and the CA flag set in the basic
         constraints extension, no AIA value and no CRLDP value.  The
         validity period of this certificate should be very long, as is
         the norm for trust anchor material.  The SIA of this
         certificate references a publication point where the CRL and
         the CMS structure defined below are published.

      *  The registry trust anchor issues an EE certificate (a registry
         TA EE certificate) with a validity period identical to the
         validity period of its RPKI TA certificate.  This EE
         certificate MUST have the digitalSignature bit set, and this
         MUST be the only bit set to TRUE in the key usage extension.
         There is no BasicConstraints extension in this certificate.



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         The validity period of this registry TA EE certificate SHOULD
         be aligned to the validity period of the registry TA
         certificate.

      *  The registry TA regularly issues a CRL.  The CRL issuance cycle
         SHOULD be shorter than the validity period for the RPKI TA
         certificate.

      *  Each time an RPKI TA certificate is re-issued, or prior to the
         expiration of the registry TA EE certificate, the registry
         generates a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852]
         signed-data object, the payload of which is an RPKI TA
         certificate.  The object is CMS-signed with the private key
         corresponding to the registry TA EE certificate.  The registry
         TA EE certificate is included as a CMS signed attribute in the
         CMS object.  The registry TA certificate and the associated CRL
         are not to be included in the CMS object.  The format of the
         CMS object is specified in Appendix C.  The CMS object is
         published at the location referenced in the SIA of the TA CA
         certificate.

      *  The entity publicly distributes the registry TA certificate as
         its trust anchor material, in an out-of-band fashion, e.g., as
         part of widely-distributed relying party software.

   Relying Parties can assemble the default trust anchor collection by
   using the registry TA certificate for each nominated trust anchor:

      *  The TA's CRL and CMS objects can be retrieved from the
         publication point referenced by the SIA in the registry TA
         certificate.

      *  The CRL can be verified against the registry TA certificate.

      *  The CMS signature can be verified using the included registry
         TA EE certificate together with the retrieved CRL and the
         (self-signed) TA certificate.

      *  The relying party can then load the enclosed RPKI TA CA
         certificate as a trust anchor for validation fof those
         resources described in the IP Resource extensions [RFC3779] of
         this RPKI certificate.

   Relying Parties SHOULD perform this retrieval and validation
   operation at intervals no less frequent than the nextUpdate time of
   the published TA CA CRL, and SHOULD perform the retrieval operation
   prior to the expiration of the registry TA EE certificate, or upon
   revocation of the registry TA EE certificate that is used to verify



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   the CMS object that holds the trust anchor's current RPKI TA CA
   certificate.

   If a trust anchor chooses to reissue its RPKI TA CA certificate
   before the expiration of that certificate, it MUST perform the follow
   actions: revise the nextUpdate time of the registry TA's CRL to
   reflect the issue date for the new registry TA EE certificate, issue
   a new registry TA EE certificate and a new CMS object with the new
   RPKI TA CA certificate, and revoke the old TA EE certificate at the
   nextUpdate time in the next issued CRL.  This revocation will provide
   an indication to relying parties to perform the retrieval operation
   of the RPKI TA CA certificate at a time earlier than the normal
   update cycle time.


7.  Design Notes

   The following notes provide some additional commentary on the
   considerations that lie behind some of the design choices that were
   made in the design of this certificate profile.  These notes do not
   constitute a formal part of the profile specification, and the
   interpretation of key words as defined in RFC2119 are not applicable
   in this section of the document.

   Certificate Extensions:
         This profile does not permit the use of any other critical or
         non-critical extensions.  The rationale for this restriction is
         that the resource certificate profile is intended for a
         specific use, and in this context it is not seen as being
         appropriate to be in the position of having certificates with
         additional non-critical extensions that relying parties may see
         as valid certificates without understanding the extensions, but
         were the relying party in a position to understand the
         extensions, would contradict or qualify in some way this
         original judgment of validity.  This profile takes the position
         of minimalism over extensibility.  The specific goal for the
         associated Resource Public Key Infrastructure to precisely
         match the IP number resource allocation structure through an
         aligned certificate structure that describes the allocation and
         its context within the number resource distribution hierarchy.
         The profile defines a resource certificate that is structured
         to meet these requirements.

   Certification Authorities and Key Values:
         This profile uses a definition of an instance of a CA as a
         combination of a named entity and a key pair.  Within this
         definition a CA instance cannot rollover a key pair.  However,
         the entity can generate a new instance of a CA with a new key



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         pair and roll over all the signed subordinate products to the
         new CA.

         This has a number of implications in terms of subject name
         management, CRL Scope and repository publication point
         management.

         Subject Name:
               For Subject Names the issuer should ensure that when an
               entity requests a certificate with a new key pair, the CA
               issues a certificate with a new subject name.  One way to
               achieve this is for the issuer to use a mapping of the
               hash of the subject public key value into a character
               string for a CommonName that becomes the CA Subject Name.

         CRL Scope:
               For CRL Scope this profile specifies that a CA issues a
               single CRL sequence, and the scope of the CRL is all
               certificates issued by this CA.  Because the CA instance
               is bound to a single key pair this implies that the CA's
               public key, the key used to validate the CA's CRL, and
               the key used to validate the certificates revoked by that
               CRL are all the same.

         Repository Publication Point:
               The definition of a CA affects the design of the
               repository publication system.  In order to minimize the
               amount of forced re-certification on key rollover events,
               a repository publication regime that uses the same
               repository publication point for all CA instances that
               refers to the same entity, but with different key values
               will minimize the extent of re-generation of certificates
               to only immediate subordinate certificates.

               In order for two or more CA instances to share a single
               repository publication point there needs to be a regime
               of key management into OLD, CURRENT and FUTURE keys and a
               similar regime of OLD, CURRENT and FUTURE CAs.  An OLD CA
               should regularly publish its CRL for as long as the OLD
               CA instance is still valid, and issue EE certificates as
               necessary to maintain a current manifest of all OLD CA
               published products, but it should not sign any other
               products.  The CURRENT CA should publish its CRL, and
               should publish all subordinate products, as well as
               issuing EE certificates as necessary to maintain a
               current manifest of all CURRENT CA published products.
               FUTURE CAs should publish no products at all in the
               repository publication point.  It would be consistent



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               with this repository object name framework for the CRL
               and manifest to be published using object names derived
               from the hash of the public key value of the CA instance.

   Key Rollover:
         As a CA instance is associated with a single key pair, there
         are some considerations regarding the procedure that should be
         followed by an entity performing a key rollover function.  The
         entity will need to create a new CA instance and then use this
         new CA instance to re-issue all subordinate products with the
         new CA instance.

         To perform a key rollover operation the entity will need to:


               1.    Generate a NEW key pair.

               2.    Generate a certificate request with the NEW key
                     pair and pass the request to the entity's issuer.

               3.    Request the entity's issuer to generate and publish
                     a NEW CA certificate, with an issuer-selected
                     subject name that is distinct from the subject name
                     used in conjunction with the previous subject name
                     value for this entity.

               4.    Mark the CURRENT CA as OLD and the NEW CA as
                     CURRENT.

               5.    The CURRENT CA will generate new certificates for
                     all existing subordinate CA and EE certificates,
                     and publish those products in the same repository
                     publication point and with the same repository
                     publication point name as the previous OLD
                     subordinate CA and EE certificates.  The keys in
                     these reissued certificates MUST not change.

               6.    Where the signing structure uses a packaging format
                     that includes the EE certificate within the signed
                     data, signed objects that included OLD EE
                     certificates in their signed data will need to be
                     re-signed using an EE certificate issued by the
                     CURRENT CA.  In the case where the OLD EE
                     certificate is a "single use" EE certificate and
                     the associate private key has been destroyed this
                     will entail the generate of a new key pair, the
                     issuing of an EE certificate by the CURRENT CA.  In
                     the case of a "multi-use" EE certificate, the EE



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                     certificate should issued using the CURRENT CA.
                     The object, together with the issued EE
                     certificate, should be signed with the associated
                     private key, and published in the same repository
                     publication point, using the same repository
                     publication point name, as the previously signed
                     object that it replaces (i.e. overwrite the old
                     signed object).

               7.    Generate a certificate revocation request for the
                     OLD CA certificate and pass it to the entity's
                     issuer.

               8.    Remove all published OLD CA products and destroy
                     the OLD private key.

   Name Uniqueness:
         This profile specifies that subject names must be unique per
         issuer, and does not specify that subject names must be
         globally unique.

         Given that the Resource Certificate PKI is a distributed PKI,
         there is no inherent ability for Certification authorities to
         coordinate PKI-wide unique subject names.  IANA and the RIRs
         SHOULD use multi-attribute, structured Subject names in their
         RPKI certificates.  All other entities (NIRs, LIRs, etc.)  MUST
         be issued certificates in which the Subject name contains a
         single relative distinguished name, consisting of a CommonName
         attribute.  This restriction is motivated by the need to change
         the names of these CAs when key rollover occurs, and to
         minimize liability for issuers in the RPKI.  Also, as the
         publication repository is distributed, and distinct entities
         use distinct repository publication points any potential
         ambiguity is resolved by the distinct publication point.



8.  Security Considerations

   The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] and [RFC3779]apply to
   Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use.

   A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms
   of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in
   the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same
   resource.  If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the
   status of resource allocations and assignments then the information
   conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the



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   allocation and assignment databases.


9.  IANA Considerations

   [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
   considerations stated in this document.]


10.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to particularly acknowledge the valued
   contribution from Stephen Kent in reviewing this document and
   proposing numerous sections of text that have been incorporated into
   the text.  The authors also acknowledge the contributions of Robert
   Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo Patara and Rob Austein
   in the preparation and subsequent review of this document.  The
   document also reflects review comments received from Sean Turner and
   David Cooper.


11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0791]  Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
              September 1981.

   [RFC2050]  Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and
              J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES",
              BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC3852]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 3852, July 2004.

   [RFC4055]  Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              June 2005.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              September 2005.




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   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [X.509]    ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
              Authentication Framework", 2000.

11.2.  Informative References

   [ID.sidr-arch]
              Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", Work in progress: Internet
              Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-arch-03.txt, February 2008.

   [ID.sidr-manifests]
              Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
              "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
              Work in progress: Internet
              Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests-00.txt,
              January 2008.

   [RFC2985]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
              November 2000.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              November 2000.

   [RFC4158]  Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R.
              Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
              Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005.

   [rsync]    Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006,
              <http://samba.anu.edu.au/rsync/>.


Appendix A.  Example Resource Certificate

   The following is an example Resource Certificate.

   Certificate Name: 9JfgAEcq7Q-47IwMC5CJIJr6EJs.cer

   Data:



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     Version: 3 (0x2)
     Serial: 1500 (0x5dc)
     Signature Algorithm: SHA256WithRSEEncryption
     Issuer: CN=APNIC Production-CVPQSgUkLy7pOXdNeVWGvnFX_0s
     Validity
      Not Before: Oct 25 12:50:00 2008 GMT
       Not After : Jan 31 00:00:00 2010 GMT
     Subject: CN=A91872ED
     Subject Public Key Info:
       Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
       RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
       Modulus (2048 bit):
         00:bb:fb:4a:af:a4:b9:dc:d0:fa:6f:67:cc:27:39:
         34:d1:80:40:37:de:88:d1:64:a2:f1:b3:fa:c6:7f:
         bb:51:df:e1:c7:13:92:c3:c8:a2:aa:8c:d1:11:b3:
         aa:99:c0:ac:54:d3:65:83:c6:13:bf:0d:9f:33:2d:
         39:9f:ab:5f:cd:a3:e9:a1:fb:80:7d:1d:d0:2b:48:
         a5:55:e6:24:1f:06:41:35:1d:00:da:1f:99:85:13:
         26:39:24:c5:9a:81:15:98:fb:5f:f9:84:38:e5:d6:
         70:ce:5a:02:ca:dd:61:85:b3:43:2d:0b:35:d5:91:
         98:9d:da:1e:0f:c2:f6:97:b7:97:3e:e6:fc:c1:c4:
         3f:30:c4:81:03:25:99:09:4c:e2:4a:85:e7:46:4b:
         60:63:02:43:46:51:4d:ed:fd:a1:06:84:f1:4e:98:
         32:da:27:ee:80:82:d4:6b:cf:31:ea:21:af:6f:bd:
         70:34:e9:3f:d7:e4:24:cd:b8:e0:0f:8e:80:eb:11:
         1f:bc:c5:7e:05:8e:5c:7b:96:26:f8:2c:17:30:7d:
         08:9e:a4:72:66:f5:ca:23:2b:f2:ce:54:ec:4d:d9:
         d9:81:72:80:19:95:57:da:91:00:d9:b1:e8:8c:33:
         4a:9d:3c:4a:94:bf:74:4c:30:72:9b:1e:f5:8b:00:
         4d:e3
       Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
     X509v3 extensions:
       X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
         F4:97:E0:00:47:2A:ED:0F:B8:EC:8C:0C:0B:90:89:
         20:9A:FA:10:9B

       X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
         keyid:09:53:D0:4A:05:24:2F:2E:E9:39:77:4D:79:
         55:86:BE:71:57:FF:4B

       X509v3 Key Usage: critical
         Certificate Sign, CRL Sign

       X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
         CA:TRUE

       X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
         URI:rsync://rpki.apnic.net/repository/A3C38A24



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             D60311DCAB08F31979BDBE39/CVPQSgUkLy7pOXdNe
             VWGvnFX_0s.crl

       Authority Information Access:
          CA Issuers - URI:rsync://rpki.apnic.net/repos
             itory/8BDFC7DED5FD11DCB14CF4B1A703F9B7/CVP
             QSgUkLy7pOXdNeVWGvnFX_0s.cer

       X509v3 Certificate Policies: critical
          Policy: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2

       Subject Information Access:
          CA Repository - URI:rsync://rpki.apnic.net/mem
              ber_repository/A91872ED/06A83982887911DD81
              3F432B2086D636/
          Manifest - URI:rsync://rpki.apnic.net/member_r
              epository/A91872ED/06A83982887911DD813F432
              B2086D636/9JfgAEcq7Q-47IwMC5CJIJr6EJs.mft

        AutonomousSysNum: critical
          Autonomous System Numbers:
            24021
            38610
            131072
            131074

        IPAddrBlock: critical
          IPv4:
            203.133.248.0/22
            203.147.108.0/23

     Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
       51:4c:77:e4:21:64:80:e9:35:30:20:9f:d8:4b:88:60:b8:1f:
       73:24:9d:b5:17:60:65:6a:28:cc:43:4b:68:97:ca:76:07:eb:
       dc:bd:a2:08:3c:8c:56:38:c6:0a:1e:a8:af:f5:b9:42:02:6b:
       77:e0:b1:1c:4a:88:e6:6f:b6:17:d3:59:41:d7:a0:62:86:59:
       29:79:26:76:34:d1:16:2d:75:05:cb:b2:99:bf:ca:c6:68:1b:
       b6:a9:b0:f4:43:2e:df:e3:7f:3c:b3:72:1a:99:fa:5d:94:a1:
       eb:57:9c:9a:2c:87:d6:40:32:c9:ff:a6:54:b8:91:87:fd:90:
       55:ef:12:3e:1e:2e:cf:c5:ea:c3:4c:09:62:4f:88:00:a0:7f:
       cd:67:83:bc:27:e1:74:2c:18:4e:3f:12:1d:ef:29:0f:e3:27:
       00:ce:14:eb:f0:01:f0:36:25:a2:33:a8:c6:2f:31:18:22:30:
       cf:ca:97:43:ed:84:75:53:ab:b7:6c:75:f7:2f:55:5c:2e:82:
       0a:be:91:59:bf:c9:06:ef:bb:b4:a2:71:9e:03:b1:25:8e:29:
       7a:30:88:66:b4:f2:16:6e:df:ad:78:ff:d3:b2:9c:29:48:e3:
       be:87:5c:fc:20:2b:df:da:ca:30:58:c3:04:c9:63:72:48:8c:
       0a:5f:97:71




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Appendix B.  Example Certificate Revocation List

   The following is an example Certificate Revocation List.
   CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl

   Data:
     Version: 2
     Signature Algorithm:
       Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA
     Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use,
       E=ca@apnic.net
     This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT
     Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT
     Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier:
       ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:
       07:02:51:c2:a9:1c
     Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI):
       q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw
     CRLNumber: 4
     Revoked Certificates: 1
       Serial Number: 1
       Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT
       Serial Number: 2
       Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT
       Serial Number: 4
       Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT
     Signature:
       b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46:
       0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12:
       f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27:
       17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a:
       f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09:
       d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e:
       b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54:
       66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29:
       6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2:
       d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12:
       cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8:
       c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c:
       d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a:
       09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da:
       02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d:
       59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f:
       34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02:
       d9






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Appendix C.  Cryptographic Message Syntax Profile for RPKI Trust Anchor
             Material

   Using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852], a RPKI Trust
   Anchor Object (RTA) is a type of signed-data object.  The general
   format of a CMS object is:

         ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           contentType ContentType,
           content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }

         ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   As a RTA is a signed-data object, it uses the corresponding OID,
   1.2.840.113549.1.7.2.  [RFC3852].

C.1.  Signed-Data ContentType

   According to the CMS specification, the signed-data content type
   shall have ASN.1 type SignedData:

         SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
           version CMSVersion,
           digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
           encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
           certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
           crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
           signerInfos SignerInfos }

         DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier

         SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo

   The elements of the signed-data content type are as follows:

      version
            The version is the syntax version number.  It MUST be 3,
            corresponding to the signerInfo structure having version
            number 3.

      digestAlgorithms
            The digestAlgorithms set MUST include only SHA-256, the OID
            for which is 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1.  [RFC4055].  It MUST
            NOT contain any other algorithms.







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      encapContentInfo
            This element is defined in Appendix C.1.1.

      certificates
            The certificates element MUST be included and MUST contain
            only the single PKI EE certificate needed to validate this
            CMS Object.  The CertificateSet type is defined in section
            10 of [RFC3852]

      crls
            The crls element MUST be omitted.

      signerInfos
            This element is defined in Appendix C.1.2.

C.1.1.  encapContentInfo

   encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type
   identifier and the content itself.

         EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           eContentType ContentType,
           eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }

         ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   The elements of this signed content type are as follows:

      eContentType
            The ContentType for an RTA is defined as id-ct-
            RPKITrustAnchor and has the numerical value of
            1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.33.

               id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
                           us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }

               id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }

               id-ct-RPKITrustAnchor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 33 }

      eContent
            The content of an RTA is an RPKI self-signed CA certificate.
            It is formally defined as:

               id-ct-RPKITrustAnchor ::= Certificate

            The definition of Certificate is taken from [X.509].




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C.1.2.  signerInfos

   SignerInfo is defined under CMS as:

         SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           version CMSVersion,
           sid SignerIdentifier,
           digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
           signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
           signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
           signature SignatureValue,
           unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }

   The content of the SignerInfo element are as follows:

      version
            The version number MUST be 3, corresponding with the choice
            of SubjectKeyIdentifier for the sid.

      sid
            The sid is defined as:

                SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
                    issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
                    subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }

            For a RTA, the sid MUST be a SubjectKeyIdentifier.

      digestAlgorithm
            The digestAlgorithm MUST be SHA-256, the OID for which is
            2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1.  [RFC4055]

      signedAttrs
            The signedAttrs element is defined as:

              SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute

              Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
                attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
                attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }

              AttributeValue ::= ANY

            The signedAttr element MUST be present and MUST include the
            content-type and message-digest attributes.  The signer MAY
            also include the signing-time signed attribute, the binary-
            signing-time signed attribute, or both signed attributes.
            Other signed attributes that are deemed appropriate MAY also



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            be included.  The intent is to allow additional signed
            attributes to be included if a future need is identified.
            This does not cause an interoperability concern because
            unrecognized signed attributes are ignored by the relying
            party.

            The signedAttr MUST include only a single instance of any
            particular attribute.  Additionally, even though the syntax
            allows for a SET OF AttributeValue, in a RTA the attrValues
            must consist of only a single AttributeValue.


                  ContentType Attribute
                        The ContentType attribute MUST be present.  The
                        attrType OID for the ContentType attribute is
                        1.2.840.113549.1.9.3.

                        The attrValues for the ContentType attribute in
                        a RTA MUST be 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24
                        (matching the eContentType in the
                        EncapsulatedContentInfo).

                  MessageDigest Attribute
                        The MessageDigest attribute MUST be present.
                        The attrType OID for the MessageDigest Attribute
                        is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4.

                        The attrValues for the MessageDigest attribute
                        contains the output of the digest algorithm
                        applied to the content being signed, as
                        specified in Section 11.1 of [RFC3852].

                  SigningTime Attribute
                        The SigningTime attribute MAY be present.  If it
                        is present it MUST be ignored by the relying
                        party.  The presence of absence of the
                        SigningTime attribute in no way affects the
                        validation of the RTA.  The attrType OID for the
                        SigningTime attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5.

                        The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is
                        defined as:

                           SigningTime ::= Time

                           Time ::= CHOICE {
                              utcTime UTCTime,
                              generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }



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                        The Time element specifies the time, based on
                        the local system clock, at which the digital
                        signature was applied to the content.

                  BinarySigningTime Attribute
                        The BinarySigningTime attribute MAY be present.
                        If it is present it MUST be ignored by the
                        relying party.  The presence of absence of the
                        BinarySigningTime attribute in no way affects
                        the validation of the RTA.  The attrType OID for
                        the SigningTime attribute is
                        1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2.46.

                        The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is
                        defined as:

                         BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime

                         BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

                        The BinaryTime element specifies the time, based
                        on the local system clock, at which the digital
                        signature was applied to the content.

      signatureAlgorithm
            The signatureAlgorithm MUST be RSA (rsaEncryption), the OID
            for which is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.q

      signature
            The signature value is defined as:

               SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

            The signature characteristics are defined by the digest and
            signature algorithms.

      unsignedAttrs
            unsignedAttrs MUST be omitted.

C.2.  RTA Validation

   Before a relying party can use an RTA, the relying party must first
   validate the RTA by performing the following steps.


      1.  Verify that the RTA syntax complies with this specification.
          In particular, verify the following:




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          a.  The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID
              1.2.840.113549.1.7.2).

          b.  The version of the SignedData object is 3.

          c.  The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData object is SHA-256
              (OID 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).

          d.  The certificates field in the SignedData object is present
              and contains a single EE certificate whose Subject Key
              Identifier (SKI) matches the sid field of the SignerInfo
              object.

          e.  The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted.

          f.  The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is id-ct-
              RPKITrustAnchor (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.[TBD])

          g.  The version of the SignerInfo is 3.

          h.  The digestAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is SHA-256
              (OID 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).

          i.  The signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is RSA
              (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1).

          j.  The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present
              and contains both the ContentType attribute (OID
              1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID
              1.2.840.113549.1.9.4).

          k.  The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is
              omitted.

      2.  Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the
          signature on the RTA.

      3.  Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity
          certificate in the Trust Anchor PKI by validating that the PKI
          CA certificate issued this EE certificate, and the PKI CA's
          CRL has not revoked the EE certificate, and that the PKI CA's
          CRL is valid.









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Authors' Addresses

   Geoff Huston
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: gih@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   George Michaelson
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: ggm@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   Robert Loomans
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre

   Email: robertl@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net






























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Full Copyright Statement

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   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

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   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
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   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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