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Secure Inter-Domain Routing                                   R. Austein
Internet-Draft                                                       ISC
Intended status: Standards Track                               G. Huston
Expires: February 7, 2009                                          APNIC
                                                                 S. Kent
                                                             M. Lepinski
                                                                     BBN
                                                          August 6, 2008


          Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
                 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests-02.txt

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts.

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   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

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   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 7, 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

Abstract

   This document defines a "manifest" for use in the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure.  A "manifest" is a signed object that contains a
   listing of all the signed objects in the repository publication point
   associated with an authority responsible for publishing in the



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   repository.  For each certificate, or other forms of signed objects
   issued by the authority that are published at this repository
   publication point, the manifest contains both the name of the file
   containing the object, and a hash of the file content.  Manifests are
   intended to expose potential attacks against relying parties of the
   RPKI, such as a man-in-the middle withholding repository data or
   replaying stale repository data.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Manifest Scope and Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Manifest Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Manifest Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.2.1.  Signed-Data Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.2.2.  ASN.1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   3.  Manifest Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.1.  CA Manifest Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     3.2.  End Entity Manifest Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     3.3.  Common Considerations for Manifest Generation  . . . . . . 14
   4.  Processing Certificate Requests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   5.  Manifest Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   6.  Relying Party Use of Manifests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     6.1.  Tests for Determining Manifest State . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     6.2.  Missing Manifests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     6.3.  Invalid Manifests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     6.4.  Stale Manifests  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     6.5.  Files Not on Manifests (or Missing from a Publication
           Point) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     6.6.  Hash Values Not Matching Manifests . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   7.  Publication Repositories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
   10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 25












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1.  Introduction

   The Resource PKI (RPKI) [ID.SIDR-ARCH] makes use of a distributed
   repository system [ID.SIDR-REPOSITORY] to make available a variety of
   objects needed by relying parties (RPs) such as Internet service
   providers (ISPs).  Because all of the objects stored in the
   repository system are digitally signed by the entities that created
   them, attacks that modify these objects are detectable by RPs.
   However, digital signatures provide no protection against attacks
   that substitute "stale" versions of signed objects (i.e., objects
   that were valid but have since been superceded) or attacks that
   remove an object that should be present in the repository.  To assist
   in the detection of such attacks, the RPKI repository system will
   make use of a new signed object called a "manifest."

   A manifest is an object that lists of all of the other signed objects
   issued by the authority responsible for a publication point in the
   repository system.  For each certificate, Certificate Revocation List
   (CRL), or other signed object, such as a Route Origination Authority
   (ROA), issued by the authority, the manifest contains both the name
   of the file containing the object, and a hash of the file content.
   Manifests allow a RP to obtain sufficient information to detect
   whether the retrieval of objects from an RPKI repository has been
   compromised by unauthorized object removal, or by the substitution of
   "stale" versions of objects.  Manifests are designed to be used both
   for Certification Authority (CA) publication points in repositories,
   that contain subordinate certificates, CRLs and other signed objects,
   and End Entity (EE) publication points in repositories that contain
   signed objects.

   Manifests are modelled on CRLs, as the issues involved in detecting
   stale manifests, and detection of potential attacks using manifest
   replays, etc are similar to those for CRLs.  The syntax of the
   manifest payload differs from CRLs, since RPKI repositories can
   contain objects not covered by CRLs, such as digitally signed
   objects, such as ROAs.

1.1.  Terminology

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280]and "X.509
   Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.




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2.  Manifest Scope and Syntax

2.1.  Manifest Scope

   In the case of a CA's manifest of its associated publication
   repository in the scope of the Resource Certificate PKI (RPKI), the
   manifest contains the current published certificates issued by this
   CA, the most recent CRLs that are associated with the CA's non-
   revoked keypairs, and all objects that are signed using a "single-
   use" EE certificate, where the EE certificate was issued by this CA.

   In the case where an EE has a defined publication repository, the
   EE's manifest contains all published objects that have been signed by
   the EE's key pair.

2.2.  Manifest Syntax

   A manifest is a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852] signed-
   data object.  The general format of a CMS object is:

      ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           contentType ContentType,
           content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }

      ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

   A Manifest is a signed-data object.  The ContentType used is the
   signed-data type of id-data, namely the id-signedData OID,
   1.2.840.113549.1.7.2.  [RFC3852]

2.2.1.  Signed-Data Content Type

   According to the CMS specification, signed-data content types shall
   have the ASN.1 type SignedData:

      SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
           version CMSVersion,
           digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
           encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
           certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
           crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
           signerInfos SignerInfos }

         DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier

         SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo





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2.2.1.1.  version

   The version is the syntax version number.  It MUST be 3,
   corresponding to the signerInfo structure having version number 3.

2.2.1.2.  digestAlgorithms

   The digestAlgorithms set MUST include only SHA-256, the OID for which
   is 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 [RFC4055].  It MUST NOT contain any other
   algorithms.

2.2.1.3.  encapContentInfo

   encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type
   identifier and the content itself.

        EncapsulatedContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
          eContentType ContentType,
          eContent [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }

        ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

2.2.1.3.1.  eContentType

   The eContentType for a Manifest is defined as id-ct-rpkiManifest, and
   has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26.

         id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
                                   rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }

         id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }

         id-ct-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 26 }

2.2.1.3.2.  eContent

   The content of a Manifest is defined as follows:














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      Manifest ::= SEQUENCE {
           version     [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
           manifestNumber  INTEGER,
           thisUpdate      GeneralizedTime,
           nextUpdate      GeneralizedTime,
           fileHashAlg     OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
           fileList        SEQUENCE OF (SIZE 0..MAX) FileAndHash
       }

       FileAndHash ::=     SEQUENCE {
           file            IA5String
           hash            BIT STRING
       }

2.2.1.3.2.1.  Manifest

   The manifestNumber, thisUpdate, and nextUpdate fields are modelled
   after the corresponding fields in X.509 CRLs (see [RFC5280]).
   Analogous to CRLS, a manifest is nominally valid until the time
   specified in nextUpdate or until a manifest is issued with a greater
   manifest number, whichever comes first.  The revoked EE certificate
   for the previous manifest's signature will be removed from the CRL
   when it expires.

   To prevent needless growth of CRLs, it is RECOMMENDED that the EE
   certificate used to issue a manifest have an validity period that
   coincides with the interval from thisUpdate to nextUpdate.

2.2.1.3.2.1.1.  version

   The version number of the rpkiManifest MUST be 0.

2.2.1.3.2.1.2.  manifestNumber

   The manifestNumber field is a sequence number that is incremented
   each time a new manifest is issued for a given publication point.
   This field is used to allow a RP to detect gaps in a sequence of
   published manifest.

2.2.1.3.2.1.3.  thisUpdate

   The thisUpdate field contains the time when the manifest was created.

2.2.1.3.2.1.4.  nextUpdate

   The nextUpdate field contains the time at which the next scheduled
   manifest will be issued.  The value of nextUpdate MUST be later than
   the value of thisUpdate.  If the authority alters any of the items in



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   the repository publication point, then the authority MUST issue a new
   manifest before the nextUpdate time.  In such a case, when the
   authority issues the new manifest, it MUST also issue a new CRL that
   includes the EE certificate corresponding to the old manifest.

2.2.1.3.2.1.5.  fileHashAlg

   The fileHashAlg field contains the OID of the hash algorithm used to
   hash the files that the authority has placed into the repository.
   The mandatory to implement hash algorithm is SHA-256 and its OID is
   2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1.  [RFC4055].

2.2.1.3.2.1.6.  fileList

   The fileList field contains a sequence of FileAndHash pairs, one for
   each currently valid signed object that has been issued by the
   authority.  Each FileAndHash pair contains the name of the file in
   the repository that contains the object in question, and a hash of
   the file's contents.

2.2.1.4.  certificates

   The certificates field MUST be included, and MUST contain the RPKI
   end entity certificate needed to validate this Manifest in the
   context of the RPKI.

2.2.1.5.  crls

   This field MUST be omitted.

2.2.1.6.  signerInfos

   Signer Infos is defined as a SignerInfo, which is defined under CMS
   as:

         SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           version CMSVersion,
           sid SignerIdentifier,
           digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
           signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
           signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
           signature SignatureValue,
           unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }








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2.2.1.6.1.  version

   The version number MUST be 3, corresponding with the choice of
   SubjectKeyIdentifier for the sid.

2.2.1.6.2.  sid

   The sid is defined as:

         SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
           issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
           subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }

   For a Manifest, the sid MUST be a SubjectKeyIdentifier.

2.2.1.6.3.  digestAlgorithm

   The digestAlgorithm MUST be SHA-256, the OID for which is
   2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1.  [RFC4055]

2.2.1.6.4.  signedAttrs

   The signedAttrs is defined as signedAttributes:

         SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute

         UnsignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute

         Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
           attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
           attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }

         AttributeValue ::= ANY

   The signedAttr element MUST be present and MUST include the content-
   type and message-digest attributes.  The signer MAY also include the
   signing-time signed attribute, the binary-signing-time signed
   attribute, or both signing-time attributes.  Other signed attributes
   that are deemed appropriate MAY also be included.  The intent is to
   allow additional signed attributes to be included if a future need is
   identified.  This does not cause an interoperability concern because
   unrecognized signed attributes are ignored by the relying party.

   The signedAttr MUST include only a single instance of any particular
   attribute.  Additionally, even though the syntax allows for a SET OF
   AttributeValue, in a Manifest the attrValues MUST consist of only a
   single AttributeValue.




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2.2.1.6.4.1.  Content-Type Attribute

   The ContentType attribute MUST be present.  The attrType OID for the
   ContentType attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3.

   The attrValues for the ContentType attribute in a Manifest MUST be
   1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26, matching the eContentType in the
   EncapsulatedContentInfo.

2.2.1.6.4.2.  Message-Digest Attribute

   The MessageDigest Attribute MUST be present.  The attrType OID for
   the MessageDigest Attribute is 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4.

   The attrValues for the MessageDigest attribute contains the output of
   the digest algorithm applied to the content being signed, as
   specified in Section 11.1 of [RFC3852].

2.2.1.6.4.3.  SigningTime Attribute

   The SigningTime attribute MAY be present.  The presence of absence of
   the SigningTime attribute in no way affects the validation of the
   Manifest (as specified in Section 5).

   The attrType OID for the SigningTime attribute is
   1.2.840.113549.1.9.5.

   The attrValues for the SigningTime attribute is defined as:

         id-signingTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
             us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 5 }

         SigningTime ::= Time

         Time ::= CHOICE {
           utcTime UTCTime,
           generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }

   The Time element specifies the time, based on the local system clock,
   at which the digital signature was applied to the content.

2.2.1.6.4.4.  BinarySigningTime Attribute

   The signer MAY include a BinarySigningTime attribute, specifying the
   time at which the digital signature was applied to the content.  If
   both the BinarySigningTime and SigningTime attributes are present,
   the time that is represented by the binary-signing-time attribute
   MUST represent the same time value as the signing-time attribute.



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   The presence or absence of the Binary-SigningTime attribute in no way
   affects the validation of the Manifest (as specified in Section 5).

   The binary-signing-time attribute is defined in [RFC4049] as:

         id-aa-binarySigningTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
             member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
             smime(16) aa(2) 46 }

         BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime

         BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)

2.2.1.6.5.  signatureAlgorithm

   The signatureAlgorithm MUST be RSA (rsaEncryption), the OID for which
   is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1.

2.2.1.6.6.  signature

   The signature value is defined as:

             SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

   The signature characteristics are defined by the digest and signature
   algorithms.

2.2.1.6.7.  unsignedAttrs

   unsignedAttrs MUST be omitted.

2.2.2.  ASN.1

   The following is the ASN.1 specification of the CMS-signed Manifest.

         ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           contentType ContentType,
           content [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType }

         ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

         id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
                                   rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 }

         id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }

         id-ct-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct 26 }




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         Manifest ::= SEQUENCE {
              version     [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
              manifestNumber  INTEGER,
              thisUpdate      GeneralizedTime,
              nextUpdate      GeneralizedTime,
              fileHashAlg     OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
              fileList        SEQUENCE OF (SIZE 0..MAX) FileAndHash}

          FileAndHash ::=     SEQUENCE {
              file            IA5String
              hash            BIT STRING}

         id-signedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
                            us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 2 }

         SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
           version CMSVersion,
           digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
           encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo,
           certificates [0] IMPLICIT CertificateSet OPTIONAL,
           crls [1] IMPLICIT RevocationInfoChoices OPTIONAL,
           signerInfos SignerInfos }

         DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers ::= SET OF DigestAlgorithmIdentifier

         SignerInfos ::= SET OF SignerInfo

         SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
           version CMSVersion,
           sid SignerIdentifier,
           digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
           signedAttrs [0] IMPLICIT SignedAttributes OPTIONAL,
           signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
           signature SignatureValue,
           unsignedAttrs [1] IMPLICIT UnsignedAttributes OPTIONAL }

         SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
           issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
           subjectKeyIdentifier [0] SubjectKeyIdentifier }

         SignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute

         UnsignedAttributes ::= SET SIZE (1..MAX) OF Attribute

         Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
           attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
           attrValues SET OF AttributeValue }




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         AttributeValue ::= ANY

         SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

         id-contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
             us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 3 }

         ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

         id-messageDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
             us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 4 }

         MessageDigest ::= OCTET STRING

         id-signingTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
             us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 5 }

         SigningTime ::= Time

         Time ::= CHOICE {
           utcTime UTCTime,
           generalizedTime GeneralizedTime }

         id-aa-binarySigningTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
             member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
             smime(16) aa(2) 46 }

         BinarySigningTime ::= BinaryTime

         BinaryTime ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)


3.  Manifest Generation

3.1.  CA Manifest Generation

   Each CA in the RPKI publishes the certificates and CRLs it issues at
   a publication point in the RPKI repository system.  To create a
   manifest, each CA MUST perform the following steps:


   1.  Generate a key pair.

   2.  Issue a "single use" EE certificate for this key pair to enable
       relying parties to verify the signature on the manifest.






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       *  This EE certificate has an SIA extension access description
          field with an accessMethod OID value of id-ad-signedobject
          where the associated accessLocation references the publication
          point of the manifest as an object URL.

       *  This EE certificate SHOULD describe its IP number resources
          using the "inherit" attribute rather than explicit description
          of a resource set.

       *  The validity times of the EE certificate SHOULD exactly match
          the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times of the manifest, and MUST
          encompass the interval from thisUpdate to nextUpdate.

   3.  The EE certificate SHOULD NOT be published in the authority's
       repository publication point.


   4.  Construct the Manifest content.  Note that the manifest does not
       include a self reference (i.e., its own file name and hash),
       since it would be impossible to compute the hash of the manifest
       itself prior to it being signed.

   5.  Encapsulate the Manifest content using the CMS SignedData content
       type (as specified in Section 2), sign the manifest using the EE
       certificate, and publish the manifest in repository system
       publication point that is described by the manifest.

   6.  The private key associated with the EE certificate SHOULD now be
       destroyed.


3.2.  End Entity Manifest Generation

   EE repository publication points are only used in conjunction with
   "multi-use" EE Certificates.  In this case the EE Certificate has two
   accessMethods specified in its SIA field.  The id-ad-
   signedObjectRepository accessMethod has an associated accessLocation
   that points to the repository publication point of the objects signed
   by this EE certificate, as specified in [ID.SIDR-CERTPROFILE].  The
   id-ad-rpkiManifest accessMethod has an associated access location
   that points to the manifest object as an object URL, that is
   associated with this repository publication point.  This manifest
   describes all the signed objects that are to be found in that
   publication point that have been signed by this EE certificate, and
   the hash value of each product (excluding the manifest itself).

   To create a manifest, each "multi-use" EE MUST perform the following
   steps:.



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   o  Construct the Manifest content.  Note that the manifest does not
      include a self reference (i.e., its own file name and hash), since
      it would be impossible to compute the hash of the manifest itself
      prior to it being signed.

   o  Encapsulate the Manifest content using the CMS SignedData content
      type (as specified in Section 2), sign the manifest using the EE
      certificate, and publish the manifest in repository system
      publication point that is described by the manifest.


   "Single Use" EE certificates do not have repository publication
   points.  The object signed by the "Single Use" EE certificate is
   published in the repository publication point of the CA certificate
   that issued the EE certificate, and is listed in the corresponding
   manifest for this CA certificate.

3.3.  Common Considerations for Manifest Generation

   o  A new manifest MUST be issued on or before the nextUpdate time.
   o  An authority MUST issue a new manifest in conjunction with the
      finalization of changes made to objects in the publication point.
      An authority MAY perform a number of object operations on a
      publication repository within the scope of a repository change
      before issuing a single manifest that covers all the operations
      within the scope of this change.  Repository operators SHOULD
      implement some form of synchronization function on the repository
      to ensure that relying parties who are performing retrieval
      operations on the repository are not exposed to intermediate
      states during changes to the repository and the associated
      manifest.
   o  Since the manifest object URL is included in the SIA of issued
      certificates then a new manifest MUST NOT invalidate the manifest
      object URL of previously issued certificates.  This implies that
      the manifest's publication name in the repository, in the form of
      an object URL, is one that is unchanged across manifest generation
      cycles.
   o  As the manifest scope is all signed objects associated with an
      authority responsible for a publication point, the manifest must
      persist across key rollover events.  This implies that this
      persistent repository publication name cannot be derived from the
      authority's current public key value in any way.
   o  In the case of a CA publication point manifest, when the CA is
      performing a key rollover, the CA will use its new private key to
      sign an EE certificate for a new manifest.  The new manifest will
      list all products of the CA that have been signed with the new
      private key.  The new manifest will start a new serial number
      sequence.  As long as there are published products that have been



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      signed with the to-be-retired key, the old CA associated with this
      to-be-retired key will continue to generate manifests that
      describe all published products of the to-be-retired key and
      associated CA certificate.  There is no manifest overlap.
   o  In the case of a EE publication point manifest, when the EE
      certificate is re-keyed, a new publication point is established.
      A new EE certificate for manifest validation will be generated by
      the CA that issues the new EE certificate associated with the new
      publication point.  In this case there is no manifest overlap, as
      the new repository publication point will have a distinct
      manifest.


4.  Processing Certificate Requests

   When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple
   objects, the certificate request for the EE certificate MUST include
   in the SIA of the request an access method OID of id-ad-
   signedObjectRepository where the associated access location refers to
   the publication point for objects signed by this EE certificate, and
   MUST include in the SIA of the request an access method OID of id-ad-
   rpkiManifest, where the associated access location refers to the
   publication point of the manifest that is associated with published
   objects that are verified using this EE certificate
   [ID.SIDR-CERTPROFILE].  The issuer SHOULD honour these values in the
   issued certificate or MUST reject the Certificate Request.

   When an EE certificate is used to sign a single object, the
   certificate request for the EE certificate MUST include in the SIA of
   the request an access method OID of id-ad-signedObject, where the
   associated access location refers to the publication point of the
   single object that is verified using this EE certificate.  The
   certificate request MUST NOT include in the SIA of the request the
   access method OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest.  The issuer SHOULD honour
   these values in the issued certificate or MUST reject the Certificate
   Request.

   In accordance with the provisions of [ID.SIDR-CERTPROFILE], all
   certificate issuance requests for a CA certificate SHOULD include in
   the SIA of the request the id-ad-caRepository access method, and also
   the id-ad-rpkiManifest access method that references the intended
   publication point of the manifest in the associated access location
   in the request.  The issuer SHOULD honour these values in the issued
   certificate or MUST reject the Certificate Request.







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5.  Manifest Validation

   To determine whether a manifest is valid, the relying party must
   perform the following checks:

   1.  Verify that the Manifest complies with this specification.  In
       particular, verify the following:

       A.  The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID
           1.2.840.113549.1.7.2)

       B.  The version of the SignedData object is 3.

       C.  The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData object is SHA-256 (OID
           2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).

       D.  The certificates field in the SignedData object is present
           and contains an EE certificate whose Subject Key Identifier
           (SKI) matches the sid field of the SignerInfo object.

       E.  The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted.

       F.  The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is id-ad-
           rpkiManifest (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.26).

       G.  The version of the rpkiManifest is 0.

       H.  In the rpkiManifest, thisUpdate precedes nextUpdate.

       I.  The version of the SignerInfo is 3.

       J.  The digestAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is SHA-256 (OID
           2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1).

       K.  The signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object is RSA (OID
           1.2.840.113549.1.1.1).

       L.  The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present and
           contains both the ContentType attribute (OID
           1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID
           1.2.840.113549.1.9.4).

       M.  The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted.


   2.  Use the public key in the EE certificate to verify the signature
       on the Manifest.




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   3.  Verify that the EE certificate is a valid end-entity certificate
       in the resource PKI by constructing a valid certificate path to a
       trust anchor.  (See [ID.RESCERT] for more details.)


   If the above procedure indicates that the manifest is invalid, then
   the manifest MUST be discarded and treated as though no manifest were
   present.


6.  Relying Party Use of Manifests

   The goal of the relying party is to determine which signed objects to
   use for routing-related tasks, (e.g. which ROAs to use in the
   construction of route filters).  Ultimately, this is a matter of
   local policy.  However, in the following sections, we describe a
   sequence of tests that the relying party should perform to determine
   the manifest state of the given publication point.  We then discuss
   the risks associated with using signed objects in the publication
   point, given the manifest state; and provide suitable warning text
   that should placed in a user-accessible log file.  It is the
   responsibility of the relying party to weigh these risks against the
   risk of routing failure that could occur if valid data is rejected,
   and construct a suitable local policy.  Note that if a certificate is
   deemed unfit for use do to local policy, then any descendent object
   that is validated using this certificate should also be deemed unfit
   for use (regardless of the status of the manifest at its own
   publication point).

6.1.  Tests for Determining Manifest State

   For a given publication point, the relying party should perform the
   following tests to determine the manifest state of the publication
   point:

   1.  Select the manifest having highest manifestNumber among all valid
       manifests (where manifest validity is defined in Section 5).

       *  If the publication point does not contain a valid manifest,
          see Section 6.2.  (Lacking a valid manifest, the following
          tests cannot be performed).

   2.  Check that the current time is between thisUpdate and nextUpdate.

       *  If the current time does not lie in this interval then see
          Section 6.4 (but still continue with the following tests).





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   3.  Check that every file at the publication point appears on the
       manifest, and that every file on the manifest appears at the
       publication point.

       *  If there exists files at the publication point that do not
          appear on the manifest, or files on the manifest that do not
          appear at the publication point then see Section 6.5 (but
          still continue with the following test).

   4.  Check that the hash of every file listed on the manifest matches
       the value obtained by hashing the file in at the publication
       point.

       *  If there exist files at the publication point whose hash does
          not match the hash value listed in the manifest, then see
          Section 6.6.


   For a particular signed object, if (A) the manifest for its
   publication passes all of the above checks; (B) the signed object is
   valid; and (C) the manifests for every certificate on the certificate
   path used to validate the signed object pass all of the above checks;
   then the relying party can conclude that no attack against the
   repository system has compromised the given signed object and the
   signed object MUST be treated as valid.

6.2.  Missing Manifests

   The absence of a valid manifest at a publication could occur due to
   an error by the publisher or due to (malicious or accidental)
   deletion or corruption of all valid manifests.

   When no valid manifest is available, there is no protection against
   attacks that delete signed objects or replay old versions of signed
   objects.  All signed objects at the publication point, and all
   descendent objects that are validated using a certificate at this
   publication point should be viewed as somewhat suspect, but may be
   used by the relying party as per local policy.

   The primary risk in using signed objects at this publication point is
   that a deleted CRL causes the relying party to improperly treat a
   revoked certificate as valid.  This risk is somewhat mitigated if the
   CRL for this publication point has a short time between thisUpdate
   and nextUpdate (and the current time is within this interval).  The
   risk in discarding signed objects at this publication point is that
   the relying party may incorrectly discard a large number of valid
   objects.  This gives significant power to an adversary that is able
   to corrupt all manifests at the publication point.



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   Regardless of whether signed objects from this publication are deemed
   fit for use by the relying party, this situation should result in a
   warning to the effect that: "No manifest is available for <pub point
   name>, and thus there may have been undetected deletions from the
   publication point."

6.3.  Invalid Manifests

   The presence of invalid manifests at a publication point could occur
   due to an error by the publisher or due to (malicious or accidental)
   corruption of a valid manifest.  An invalid manifest MUST never be
   used even if the manifestNumber is greater than that on valid
   manifests.

   There are no risks associated with using signed objects at a
   publication point containing an invalid manifest, provided that a
   valid manifest is also present.

   If an invalid manifest is present at a publication point that also
   contains one or more valid manifests, this situation should result in
   a warning to the effect that: "An invalid manifest was found at <pub
   point name>, this indicates an attack against the publication point
   or an error by the publisher.  Processing for this publication point
   will continue using the most recent valid manifest."

6.4.  Stale Manifests

   A manifest is considered stale if the current time is after the
   nextUpdate time for the manifest.  This could be due to publisher
   failure to promptly publish a new manifest, or due to (malicious or
   accidental) corruption of a more recent manifest.

   All signed objects at the publication point, and all descendent
   objects that are validated using a certificate at this publication
   point should be viewed as somewhat suspect, but may be used by the
   relying party as per local policy.

   The primary risk in using signed objects at this publication point is
   that a newer manifest exists that, if present, would indicate that
   certain objects are have been removed or replaced.  (E.g. the new
   manifest if present might show the existence of a newer CRL and the
   removal of several revoked certificates).  Thus use of objects on a
   stale manifest may cause the relying party to incorrectly treat
   several invalid objects as valid.  The risk is that a stale CRL
   causes the relying party to improperly treat a revoked certificate as
   valid.  This risk is somewhat mitigated if the time between the
   nextUpdate field of the manifest and the current time is short.  The
   risk in discarding signed objects at this publication point is that



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   the relying party may incorrectly discard a large number of valid
   objects.  This gives significant power to an adversary that is able
   to prevent the publication of a new manifest at a given publication
   point.

   Regardless of whether signed objects from this publication are deemed
   fit for use by the relying party, this situation should result in a
   warning to the effect that: "The manifest for <pub point name> is no
   longer current.  It is possible that undetected deletions have
   occurred at this publication point."

   Note that there is also a less common case where the current time is
   before the thisUpdate time for the manifest.  This case is
   necessarily due to publisher error and in such a case this situation
   should result in a warning to the effect that: "The manifest found at
   <pub point name> has an incorrect thisUpdate field.  This is due to
   publisher error, and processing for this publication point will
   continue using this otherwise valid manifest."

6.5.  Files Not on Manifests (or Missing from a Publication Point)

   If there exist otherwise valid signed objects that do not appear on
   any manifest, then provided the manifest is not stale (see Section
   6.4) it is likely that their omission is an error by the publisher.
   (If the objects were intended to be invalid, then they should have
   been revoked using whatever revocation mechanism is appropriate for
   the signed object in question.)  Therefore, there is little risk in
   using such signed objects.  If the manifest in question is stale,
   then there is a greater risk that the objects in question were
   revoked with a missing CRL (whose absence is undetectable since the
   manifest is stale).  In any case, the use of signed objects not
   present on a manifest (or descendent objects that are validated using
   such signed objects) is a matter of local policy.

   Regardless of whether objects not appearing on a manifest are deemed
   fit for use by the relying party, this situation should result in a
   warning to the effect that: "The following files are present in the
   repository at <pub point name>, but are not on the manifest <file
   list>."

   If there exist files listed on the manifest that do not appear in the
   repository, then these objects are likely to have been improperly
   (via malice or accident) deleted from the manifest.  A primary
   purpose of manifests is to detect such deletions.  Therefore, in such
   a case this situation should result in a warning to the effect that:
   "The following files that should have been present in the repository
   at <pub point name>, are missing <file list>.  This indicates an
   attack against this publication point, or the repository, or an error



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   by the publisher."

6.6.  Hash Values Not Matching Manifests

   A file appearing on a manifest with an incorrect hash value could
   occur because of publisher error, but it is likely to indicate that a
   serious error has occurred.

   If an object appeared on a previous valid manifest with a correct
   hash value and now appears with an invalid hash value, then it is
   likely that the object has been superceded by a new (unavailable)
   version of the object.  If the object is used there is a risk that
   the relying party will be treating a stale object as valid.  This
   risk is more significant if the object in question is a CRL.
   Assuming that the object is validated in the RPKI, the use of these
   objects is a matter of local policy.

   If an object appears on a manifest with an invalid hash and has never
   previously appeared on a manifest, then it is unclear whether the
   available version of the object is more or less recent than the
   version whose hash appears in the manifest.  If the manifest is stale
   (see Section 6.4) then it becomes more likely that the available
   version is more recent that the version indicated on the manifest,
   but this is never certain.  Whether to use such objects is a matter
   of local policy.  However, in general, it is better to use a possibly
   outdated version of the object, then to discard the object
   completely.

   Regardless of whether objects with incorrect hashes are deemed fit
   for use by the relying party, this situation should result in a
   warning to the effect that: "The following files at the repository
   <pub point name> appear on a manifest with incorrect hash values
   <file list>.  It is likely that these objects have been superseded by
   a more recent version.  It is very likely that this problem is due to
   an attack on the publication point, although it could be due to a
   publisher error."


7.  Publication Repositories

   The RPKI publication system model requires that every publication
   point be associated with a CA or an EE, and be non-empty.  Upon
   creation of the publication point associated with a CA, the CA MUST
   create and publish a manifest as well as a CRL.  The manifest will
   contain at least one entry, the CRL issued by the CA upon repository
   creation.  Upon the creation of the publication point associated with
   an EE, the EE MUST create and publish a manifest.  The manifest in an
   otherwise empty repository publication point associated with an EE



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   will contain no entries in the manifest's fileList sequence (i.e. a
   sequence of length zero).  [ID.SIDR-REPOSITORY]

   For signed objects EE certificate used in the verification of such
   objects is either a single-use certificate, used to verify a single
   signed object, or a multiple-use certificate.  In the case of a
   single-use EE certificate, the signed object is published in the
   repository publication point of the CA that issued the single use EE
   certificate, and is listed in the manifest associated with that CA
   certificate.  In the case where the EE certificate is used to verify
   multiple objects, signed object is published in the EE certificate's
   repository publication point and listed in the manifest associated
   with the EE certificate.


8.  Security Considerations

   Manifests provide an additional level of protection for users of the
   repository system.  Manifests can assist the user to determine if
   repository objects have been occluded or other removed from view, and
   to determine if an older version of an object has been substituted
   for the current object.

   Manifests cannot repair the effects of such forms of attempted
   corruption of repository retrieval operations, but are capable of
   allowing the user to determine if a locally maintained copy of a
   repository is a complete and up to date copy, even when the
   repository retrieval operation is conduction over an insecure
   channel.  In those cases where the manifest and the retrieved
   repository contents differ, the manifest can assist in determining
   which repository objects form the difference set in terms of missing,
   extraneous or older objects.

   The signing structure of a manifest and the use of next update times
   allows the user to determine if the manifest itself is the subject of
   attempted alteration.  The requirement for all repositories to
   contain manifests allows the user to determine is the manifest itself
   has been occluded from view.  Such attacks against the manifest are
   detectable within the timeframe of the regular schedule of manifest
   updates.  Forms of replay attack within finer-grained timeframes are
   not necessarily detectable by the manifest structure.


9.  IANA Considerations

   [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA
   considerations stated in this version of the document.]




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10.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions from George
   Michaelson and Randy Bush in the preparation of the manifest
   specification.  Additionally, the authors would like to thank Mark
   Reynolds and Christopher Small for assistance in clarifying manifest
   validation and relying party behavior.


11.  Normative References

   [ID.SIDR-ARCH]
              Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and R. Barnes, "An Infrastructure
              to Support Secure Internet Routing", Work in progress:
              Internet Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-arch-03.txt,
              February 2008.

   [ID.SIDR-CERTPROFILE]
              Huston, G., Michaleson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", Work in progress:
              Internet Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-10.txt,
              June 2008.

   [ID.SIDR-REPOSITORY]
              Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaleson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", Work in
              progress: Internet
              Drafts draft-huston-sidr-repos-struct-02.txt, June 2008.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.

   [RFC3852]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
              RFC 3852, July 2004.

   [RFC4049]  Housley, R., "BinaryTime: An Alternate Format for
              Representing Date and Time in ASN.1", RFC 4049,
              April 2005.

   [RFC4055]  Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
              Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in
              the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055,
              June 2005.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List



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              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.


Authors' Addresses

   Rob Austein
   Internet Systems Consortium
   950 Charter St.
   Redwood City, CA  94063
   USA

   Email: sra@isc.org


   Geoff Huston
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
   33 park Rd.
   Milton, QLD  4064
   Australia

   Email: gih@apnic.net
   URI:   http://www.apnic.net


   Stephen Kent
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton St.
   Cambridge, MA  02138
   USA

   Email: kent@bbn.com


   Matt Lepinski
   BBN Technologies
   10 Moulton St.
   Cambridge, MA  02138
   USA

   Email: mlepinski@bbn.com











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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
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   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
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Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





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