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Versions: (RFC 3278) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 RFC 5753

S/MIME WG                                             Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft                                      Dan Brown, Certicom
Intended Status: Informational                            June 30, 2008
Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved)
Expires: December 30, 2008



            Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms
                   in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
                      draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-01.txt


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

Abstract

   This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
   public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).  The
   ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the
   exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content.  The definition



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   of the algorithm processing is based on the ANSI X9.62 standard,
   developed by the ANSI X9F1 working group, the IEEE 1363 standard, and
   the SEC 1 standard.

Discussion

   This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To
   subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the
   single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site
   for the mailing list at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/>.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................2
      1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................3
      1.2. Changes since RFC 3278....................................3
   2. SignedData using ECC...........................................4
      2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................4
   3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................6
      3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............6
      3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................7
   4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC..............9
      4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV......................9
      4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................10
   5. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................10
   6. Certificates using ECC........................................12
   7. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................12
   8. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................15
      8.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................15
      8.2. Other Syntax.............................................18
   9. Security Considerations.......................................19
   10. IANA Considerations..........................................24
   11. References...................................................24
      11.1. Normative...............................................24
      11.2. Informative.............................................26
   Appendix A ASN.1 Modules.........................................27
      Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module................................27
      Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module................................34

1. Introduction

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm
   independent.  This specification defines a profile for the use of
   Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS.
   The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content
   types:



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     -  'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods
        (ECDSA) to sign content

     -  'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
        methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption
        keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content
        encryption

     -  'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
        methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
        encrypt MAC keys used for content authentication and integrity.

   Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public-
   key distribution in support of the specified techniques.

1.1. Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST].

1.2. Changes since RFC 3278

   The following summarizes the changes:

    - Section 2.1 added sentence indicating SHA is used with EDSA.

    - Section 2.1.1 limited the digest algorithm to SHA-1. This document
      expands the allowed algorithms to SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
      SHA-512.

    - Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 - Delete e paragraph and update ANSI X9.42
      references.

    - Section 3.1 - Updates reference to CMS-ALG vice CMS for DH.

    - Section 3.1.1 used SHA1 in the KDF with ECDH std and cofactor
      methods.  This document expands the set of allowed algorithms by
      adding SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.

    - Section 3.2.1 used SHA1 in the KDF with ECMQV. This document
      expands the set of allowed algorithms by adding SHA-224, SHA-256,
      SHA-384, and SHA-512.

    - Section 4.2 was added to address ECMQV use of AuthEnvelopedData.




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    - Section 5 is updated to include requirements for hash algorithms
      and recommendations for matching curves and hash algorithms. It
      also was expanded to indicate which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key
      wrap algorithms, and content encryption algorithms are required
      for each of the content types used in this document..

    - Section 7 is updated to include S/MIME capabilities for ECDSA with
      SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. It was also updated to
      include S/MIME capabilities for ECDH and ECMQV using SHA2
      algorithms as the KDF.

    - Section 8.1 listed the algorithm identifiers for SHA-1 and SHA-1
      with ECDSA. This document adds algorithm identifiers for SHA-224,
      SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-
      384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA. This document also updates the list
      of algorithm identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV
      with SHA2 algorithms as the KDF.

    - Deleted summary paragraph.

    - Updated references.

    - Updated security considerations. Security considerations paragraph
      referring to definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-
      512 is deleted.

    - Added ASN.1 modules.

    - Updated acknowledgements section.

2. SignedData using ECC

   This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
   SignedData format to sign data.

2.1. SignedData using ECDSA

   This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital
   Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData.  ECDSA is specified in
   [X9.62].  The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital
   Signature Algorithm (DSA) [DSS]. ECDSA is used with the Secure Hash
   Algorithm (SHA) [SHS].

   In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the
   following techniques and formats MUST be used.




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2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData

   When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in
   [CMS], but with the following restrictions:

      digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
      algorithm (see Section 8.1) which MUST be one of the following:
      id-sha1 identifies the SHA-1 hash algorithm, id-sha224 identifies
      the SHA-224 hash algorithm, id-sha256 identifies the SHA-256 hash
      algorithm, id-sha384 identifies the SHA-384 algorithm, and id-
      sha512 identifies the SHA-512 algorithm.

      signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier
      (see Section 8.1): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa-
      with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512.

      signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a
      value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 8.2).

   When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the
   certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the
   ECDSA signatures in SignedData.  ECC certificates are discussed in
   Section 6.

2.1.2. Actions of the sending agent

   When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message
   digest calculation process and signature generation process for
   SignedData that are specified in [CMS].  To sign data, the sending
   agent uses the signature method specified in [X9.62, Section 7.3].

   The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the ECDSA-
   Sig-Value syntax (see Section 8.2) and places it in the
   SignerInfosignature field.

2.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent

   When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the
   message digest calculation process and signature verification process
   for SignedData that are specified in [CMS].  To verify SignedData,
   the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified
   in [X9.62, Section 7.3].

   In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the
   integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received
   message.



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3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms

   This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
   EnvelopedData format.

3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH

   This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve
   Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData.
   Ephemeral-static ECDH is specified in [SEC1] and [IEEE1363].
   Ephemeral-static ECDH is the elliptic curve analog of the
   ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm specified
   jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG, Section 4.1.1] and [CMS-DH].

   In an implementation that uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData with key
   agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be used.

3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

   When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as in [CMS], but with the following
   restrictions:

      originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey.  The
      originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey
      object identifier (see Section 8.1) with NULL parameters.  The
      originatorKey publicKey field MUST contain the DER-encoding of a
      value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), which
      represents the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key.

      keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm
      object identifier (see Section 8.1).  The parameters field
      contains KeyWrapAlgorithm.  The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the algorithm
      identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption algorithm used
      to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with the
      key-encryption key (KEK). Algorithm requirements are found in
      paragraph 5.

3.1.2. Actions of the sending agent

   When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending
   agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain
   parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate).  The sending
   agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
   KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
   "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
   Section 8.2).  The sending agent then performs the key deployment and


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   the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
   Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.1].  As a result the sending
   agent obtains:

     -  an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the
       type ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit string and
       placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field, and

     -  a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
       key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].

3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent

   When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving
   agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER
   encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the integer
   "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The
   receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit
   string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type
   ECPoint (see Section 8.2) encapsulated as a bit string.  The
   receiving agent performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic
   Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.1].  As a
   result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K",
   which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.

3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV

   This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
   (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData.  ECMQV is
   specified in [SEC1] and [IEEE1363].  Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-
   KEA], 1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a
   static key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the
   receiving agent.  An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it can
   be used with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData.

   In an implementation that uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData
   with key agreement, the following techniques and formats MUST be
   used.

3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

   When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are:

      originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender.  It
      SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or



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      subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's
      certificates.

      ukm MUST be present.  The ukm field MUST contain an octet string
      which is the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see
      Section 8.2).  The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey

      algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object identifier
      (see Section 8.1) with NULL parameters field.  The
      MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field MUST
      contain the DER-encoding of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section
      8.2) representing the sending agent's ephemeral EC public key.
      The MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm field, if present, SHOULD
      contain an octet string of additional user keying material of the
      sending agent.

      keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the key encryption algorithm
      identifier (see Section 8.1), with the parameters field
      KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric
      encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK
      generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm. Algorithm
      requirements are found in paragraph 5.

3.2.2. Actions of the sending agent

   When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first
   obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters, (e.g.
   from the recipient's certificate) and checks that the domain
   parameters are the same.  The sending agent then determines an
   integer "keydatalen", which is the KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-
   size in bits, and also a bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER
   encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2).  The sending agent
   then performs the key deployment and key agreement operations of the
   Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified in [SEC1, Section 6.2].  As a
   result, the sending agent obtains:

     -  an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type
       ECPoint (see Section 8.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed
       in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field
       (see Section 8.2), and

     -  a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
       key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].

   The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an AuthenticatedData for
   greater efficiency.



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3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent

   When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent
   determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of
   ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 8.2), and the integer "keydatalen"
   from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm.  The receiving
   agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the
   originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in field
   and checks that the domain parameters are the same.  The receiving
   agent then performs the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve
   MQV Scheme [SEC1, Section 6.2].  As a result, the receiving agent
   obtains a shared secret bit string "K" which is used as the pairwise
   key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.

4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC

   This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
   AuthenticatedData format.  AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation,
   and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData.  (For example,
   the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when
   forwarded.)

   This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
   AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV].  AuthEnvelopedData supports
   authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to
   signing and than encrypting data.

4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV

   This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
   (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData.  ECMQV is
   specified in [SEC1].  An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it
   can be used with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
   AuthEnvelopedData.

4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

   The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
   same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.

4.1.2. Actions of the sending agent

   The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
   1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.




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   The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an EnvelopedData for
   greater efficiency.

   Note: if there are multiple recipients, an attack is possible where
   one recipient modifies the content without other recipients noticing
   [BON].  A sending agent who is concerned with such an attack SHOULD
   use a separate AuthenticatedData for each recipient.

4.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent

   The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
   1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.

   Note: see Note in Section 4.1.2.

4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV

   This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
   (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData.  ECMQV is
   specified in [SEC1].  An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it
   can be used with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
   AuthEnvelopedData.

4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

   The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
   same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.

4.2.2. Actions of the sending agent

   The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1-
   Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.

   The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an EnvelopedData for
   greater efficiency.

4.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent

   The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
   1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.

5. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves

   Implementations of this specification MUST implement either
   SignedData with ECDSA or EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH.
   Implementations of this specification SHOULD implement both


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   SignedData with ECDSA and EnvelopedData with ephemeral-static ECDH.
   Implementations MAY implement the other techniques specified, such as
   AuthenticatedData and 1-Pass ECMQV.

   Furthermore, in order to encourage interoperability, implementations
   SHOULD use the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by ANSI
   [X9.62], NIST [DSS] and SECG [SEC2].  It is RECOMMENDED that the
   P-256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be used with
   SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.

   Implementations of this specification MUST implement the SHA-256 hash
   algorithm.  The SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms MAY
   be supported.

   When ECDSA, ECDH, or ECMQV is used, it is RECOMMENDED that the
   P-256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be used with
   SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.

   Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with
   ephemeral-static ECDH standard primitive MUST support the
   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support
   the id-aes128-wrap key wrap and id-aes128-cbc content encryption
   algorithms. The dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
   stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and
   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme algorithms MAY be supported.
   Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap
   key wrap algorithms and the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content
   encryption algorithms MAY be supported.

   Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with
   ephemeral-static ECDH cofactor primitive MUST support the
   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also
   support the id-aes128-wrap key wrap and id-aes128-cbc content
   encryption algorithms. The dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme,
   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-
   sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
   algorithms MAY be supported. Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-
   aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap MAY be supported.

   Implementations of this specification that support EnvelopedData with
   ECMQV MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They
   MUST also support the id-aes128-wrap and id-aes128-cbc algorithms.
   The mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme,
   mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme
   algorithms MAY be supported. Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-
   aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the id-



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   aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms MAY be
   supported.

   Implementations of this specification that support AuthenticatedData
   with ECMQV MUST support the
   mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support the
   id-aes128-wrap key wrap, id-aes128-cbc content encryption, and id-
   hmacWithSHA256 message digest algorithms. The mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-
   scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-
   scheme, and mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme algorithms MAY be
   supported. Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-
   aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-
   cbc content encryption algorithms MAY be supported. The
   id-hmacWithSHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, id-hmacWithSHA384, and id-
   hmacWithSHA512 MAY be supported.

   Implementations of this specification that support AuthEnvelopedData
   with ECMQV MUST support the
   mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme algorithm. They MUST also support the
   id-aes128-wrap key wrap and id-aes128-cbc content encryption
   algorithm. The mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-
   scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-
   scheme algorithms MAY be supported. Likewise, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap,
   id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the id-
   aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms MAY be
   supported.

6. Certificates using ECC

   Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with
   this specification to distribute agents' public keys.  The use of ECC
   algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in
   [PKI-ALG].

7. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC

   A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one
   or more of the ECC algorithms in this document by using the
   SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG, Section 2.5.2].










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   The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for the ECDSA signature
   algorithm is the SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the
   object identifiers ecdsa-with-SHA* object identifiers (where * is 1,
   224, 256, 384, or 512) all with NULL parameters.  The DER encodings
   are:

      ecdsa-with-SHA1:   30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00

      ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 05 00

      ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 05 00

      ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 05 00

      ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 05 00

   The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for
     a)  the standard ECDH key agreement algorithm,
     b)  the cofactor ECDH key agreement algorithm, or
     c)  the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement algorithm
   is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object
   identifier
     a)  dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme,
     b)  dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme, or
     c)  mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme
   respectively (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the
   parameters present.  The parameters indicate the supported key-
   encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.

   Example DER encodings that indicate some capabilities are as follows
   (KA is key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key
   wrap algorithm):

      KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES

        30 1c
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02
              30 0f
                    06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
                    05 00









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      KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES

        30 1c
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03
              30 0f
                    06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
                    05 00

      KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES

         30 1c
               06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10
               30 0f
                     06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
                     05 00


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      KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
                    05 00

      KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
                    05 00

8. ASN.1 Syntax

   The ASN.1 syntax used in this document is gathered in this section
   for reference purposes.

8.1. Algorithm Identifiers

   The following object identifier indicates the hash algorithm used in
   this document [SMIME-SHA2]:

      id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
        algorithm(2) 26 }

      id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
        csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 }

      id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
        csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 }

      id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
        csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 }

      id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
        csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }




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   The following object identifier is used in this document to indicate
   an elliptic curve public key:

      id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 }

   where

      ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
      10045 }

   When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an
   algorithm identifier, the associated parameters contain NULL.

   The following object identifier indicates the digital signature
   algorithm used in this document:

      ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) 1 }

      ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }

      ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }

      ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }

      ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        ansi-x9-62 signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }

   When the object identifiers ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224,
   ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512 are used
   within an algorithm identifier, the associated parameters field
   contains NULL.

   The following object identifiers indicate the key agreement
   algorithms used in this document:

      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        x9-63-scheme 2 }

      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 11 0 }

      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 11 1 }


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      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 11 2 }

      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 11 3 }

      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        x9-63-scheme 3 }

      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 14 0 }

      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 14 1 }

      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 14 2 }

      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 14 3 }

      mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        x9-63-scheme 16 }

      mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 15 0 }

      mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 15 1 }

      mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 15 2 }

      mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 15 3 }

   where

      x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16)
        x9(840) x9-63(63) schemes(0) }

   and

      secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }



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   When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm
   identifier, the associated parameters field contains the CMS
   KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.

8.2. Other Syntax

   The following additional syntax is used here.

   When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using
   the type:

     ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
       r INTEGER,
       s INTEGER }

   ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [X9.62].  Within CMS, ECDSA-Sig-Value
   is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field of SignedData.

   When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData,
   ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using the type ECPoint.

     ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING

   When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData, the
   sending agent's ephemeral public key and additional keying material
   are encoded using the type:

     MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
       ephemeralPublicKey OriginatorPublicKey,
       addedukm [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL  }

   The ECPoint syntax in used to represent the ephemeral public key and
   placed in the ephemeralPublicKey field.  The additional user keying
   material is placed in the addedukm field.  Then the
   MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within a ukm
   field of EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData.

   When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData, the
   key-encryption keys are derived by using the type:

     ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       keyInfo AlgorithmIdentifier,
       entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
       suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING  }





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   The fields of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo are as follows:

      keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption
      algorithm (used to wrap the CEK) and NULL parameters.

      entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material
      supplied by the sending agent.  When used with ECDH and CMS, the
      entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm.  When used with
      ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string addedukm
      (encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial).

      suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits,
      represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH].  (E.g. for 3DES
      it would be 00 00 00 c0.)

   Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to
   the key derivation function, as specified in [SEC1, Section 3.6.1].

   Note that ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in
   [CMS-DH].  Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field
   because the key derivation function specified in [SEC1, Section
   3.6.1] ensures that sufficient keying data is provided.

9. Security Considerations

   Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time.
   Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic
   algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected
   level of security.  The IETF from time to time may issue documents
   dealing with the current state of the art.

   This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-ALG], [CMS-
   AESCG], [X9.62], and [SEC1] and the appropriate security
   considerations of those documents apply.

   In addition, implementors of AuthenticatedData should be aware of the
   concerns expressed in [BON] when using AuthenticatedData to send
   messages to more than one recipient.  Also, users of MQV should be
   aware of the vulnerability in [K].










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   When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
   AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm related choices that need
   to be made:

   1) What is the public key size?
   2) What is the KDF?
   3) What is the key wrap algorithm?
   4) What is the content encryption algorithm?
   5) What is the curve?

   Consideration must be given to strength of the security provided by
   each of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong
   symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of
   security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by
   each are roughly equivalent. The following table provides comparable
   minimum bits of security [NISTSP800-57] for the ECDH/ECMQV key sizes,
   KDFs, key wrapping algorithms, and content encryption algorithms. It
   also lists curves [PKI-ALG] for the key sizes.































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   Minimum  | ECDH or  | Key        | Key      | Content     | Curves
   Bits of  | ECQMV    | Derivation | Wrap     | Encryption  |
   Security | Key Size | Function   | Alg.     | Alg.        |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   80       | 160-223  | SHA1       | 3DES     | 3DES CBC    | sect163k1
            |          | SHA224     | AES-128  | AES-128 CBC | secp163r2
            |          | SHA256     | AES-192  | AES-192 CBC | secp192r1
            |          | SHA384     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC |
            |          | SHA512     |          |             |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
   112      | 224-255  | SHA1       | 3DES     | 3DES CBC    | secp224r1
            |          | SHA224     | AES-128  | AES-128 CBC | sect233k1
            |          | SHA256     | AES-192  | AES-192 CBC | sect233r1
            |          | SHA384     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC |
            |          | SHA512     |          |             |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
   128      | 256-383  | SHA1       | AES-128  | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1
            |          | SHA224     | AES-192  | AES-192 CBC | sect283k1
            |          | SHA256     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC | sect283r1
            |          | SHA384     |          |             |
            |          | SHA512     |          |             |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
   192      | 384-511  | SHA224     | AES-192  | AES-192 CBC | secp384r1
            |          | SHA256     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC | sect409k1
            |          | SHA384     |          |             | sect409r1
            |          | SHA512     |          |             |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
   256      | 512+     | SHA256     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1
            |          | SHA384     |          |             | sect571k1
            |          | SHA512     |          |             | sect571r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------


















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   To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED:

   Minimum  | ECDH or  | Key        | Key      | Content     | Curve
   Bits of  | ECQMV    | Derivation | Wrap     | Encryption  |
   Security | Key Size | Function   | Alg.     | Alg.        |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   80       | 192      | SHA256     | 3DES     | 3DES CBC    | secp192r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   112      | 224      | SHA256     | 3DES     | 3DES CBC    | secp224r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   128      | 256      | SHA256     | AES-128  | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   192      | 384      | SHA384     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC | secp384r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   256      | 512      | SHA512     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------

   When implementing SignedData, there are three algorithm related
   choices that need to be made:

   1) What is the public key size?
   2) What is the hash algorithm?
   3) What is the curve?

   Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each
   of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong
   symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of
   security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by
   each choice are roughly equivalent.  The following table provides
   comparable minimum bits of security [NISTSP800-57] for the ECDSA key
   sizes and message digest algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG]
   for the key sizes.

















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   Minimum  | ECDSA    | Message   | Curve
   Bits of  | Key Size | Digest    |
   Security |          | Algorithm |
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   80       | 160-223  | SHA1      | sect163k1
            |          | SHA224    | secp163r2
            |          | SHA256    | secp192r1
            |          | SHA384    |
            |          | SHA512    |
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   112      | 224-255  | SHA224    | secp224r1
            |          | SHA256    | sect233k1
            |          | SHA384    | sect233r1
            |          | SHA512    |
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   128      | 256-383  | SHA256    | secp256r1
            |          | SHA384    | sect283k1
            |          | SHA512    | sect283r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   192      | 384-511  | SHA384    | secp384r1
            |          | SHA512    | sect409k1
            |          |           | sect409r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   256      | 512+     | SHA512    | secp521r1
            |          |           | sect571k1
            |          |           | sect571r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------

   To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED:

   Minimum  | ECDSA    | Message   | Curve
   Bits of  | Key Size | Digest    |
   Security |          | Algorithm |
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   80       | 192      | SHA256    | sect192r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   112      | 224      | SHA256    | secp224r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   128      | 256      | SHA256    | secp256r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   192      | 384      | SHA384    | secp384r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   256      | 512+     | SHA512    | secp521r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------





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10. IANA Considerations

   None.

11. References

11.1. Normative

   [CMS]          Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC
                  3852, July 2004.

   [CMS-AES]      Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard
                  (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message
                  Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003.

   [CMS-AESCG]    Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated
                  Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
                  (CMS)", RFC 5084, November 2007.

   [CMS-ALG]      Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
                  Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.

   [CMS-AUTHENV]  Housley, R. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
                  Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083,
                  November 2007.

   [CMS-DH]       Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
                  RFC 2631, June 1999.

   [IEEE1363]     IEEE P1363, "Standard Specifications for Public Key
                  Cryptography", Institute of Electrical and
                  Electronics Engineers, 2000.

   [DSS]          FIPS 186-2, "Digital Signature Standard", National
                  Institute of Standards and Technology, January 2000.

   [HMAC-SHA]     Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-
                  SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-
                  512", RFC 4231, December 2005.

   [MUST]         Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
                  Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [MSG]          Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "S/MIME Version 3.2
                  Message Specification", work-in-progress.




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   [PKI]          Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.
                  Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
                  Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
                  List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [PKI-ALG]      Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W.
                  Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
                  Information", work-in-progress.

   [SEC1]         SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for
                  Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000. Available from
                  www.secg.org/collateral/sec1.pdf.

   [SEC2]         SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters",
                  Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.
                  Available from www.secg.org/collateral/sec2.pdf.

   [SHS]          National Institute of Standards and Technology
                  (NIST), FIPS Publication 180-2: Secure Hash Standard,
                  August 2002.

   [SMIME-SHA2]   Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
                  Message Syntax", work-in-progress.

   [X9.62]        ANSI X9.62-2005, "Public Key Cryptography For The
                  Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve
                  Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", American
                  National Standards Institute, 2005.

   [X.208]        ITU-T Recommendation X.208 (1998) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                  1:1998. Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One
                  (ASN.1).

   [X.680]        ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                  1 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                  Notation One.

   [X.681]        ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                  2 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                  Notation One: Information Object Specification.

   [X.682]        ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                  3 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                  Notation One: Constraint Specification.





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   [X.683]        ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                  4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                  Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1
                  Specifications, 2002.

11.2. Informative

   [BON]          D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC",
                  Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000,
                  Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University
                  of Waterloo, 2000.  Paper version available from
                  http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps

   [CMS-KEA]      Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC
                  2876, July 2000.

   [K]            B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1
                  and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998.

   [NISTSP800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology
                  (NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation
                  for Key Management, August 2005.



























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Appendix A ASN.1 Modules

   Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
   [X.208].

   Appendix A.2 provides an informative ASN.1 definitions for the
   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
   [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], [X.683]. This appendix contains the same
   information as Appendix A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1
   notation, however Appendix A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict.

Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module

   SMIMEECCAlgs-1988
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) TBD }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL

   IMPORTS

   -- From [PKI]

   AlgorithmIdentifier
     FROM PKIX1Explicit88
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
         internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0)
         pkix1-explicit(18) }

   -- From [CMS-AES]

   id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV,
   id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes1256-wrap
     FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) }








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   -- From [CMS-AESCG]

   id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters
   id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters
     FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) }

   -- From [CMS]

   OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }

   -- From [CMS-ALG]

   hMAC-SHA1, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) }

   -- From [PKI-ALG]

   id-ecPublicKey, ecdsa-with-SHA1
     FROM PKIXAlgs-1988
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }

   ;

   --
   -- ECDSA with SHA-2 Algorithms
   --

   -- Parameters are NULL

   -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Parameters are NULL

   ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }

   ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }



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   ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }

   ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }

   -- ECDSA Signature Value
   -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING

   ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
     r  INTEGER,
     s  INTEGER
   }

   --
   -- Key Agreement Algorithms
   --

   x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
     x9-63(63) schemes(0) }

   secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }

   --
   -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs
   --

   -- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm


   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 2 }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 0 }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 1 }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 2 }




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   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 3 }

   --
   -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
   --

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 3 }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 0 }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 1 }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 2 }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 3 }

   --
   -- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
   --

   mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 16 }

   mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 0 }

   mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 1 }

   mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 2 }

   mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 3 }









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   --
   -- Key Wrap Algorithms
   --

   -- id-alg-CMS3DESwrap Parameters are NULL
   -- id-aes128-wrap Parameters are ABSENT
   -- id-aes192-wrap Parameters are ABSENT
   -- id-aes256-wrap Parameters are ABSENT

   --
   -- Content Encryption Algorithms
   --

   -- des-ede3-cbc Parameters are CBCParameter
   -- id-aes128-CBC Parameters are AES-IV
   -- id-aes192-CBC Parameters are AES-IV
   -- id-aes256-CBC Parameters are AES-IV
   -- id-aes128-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
   -- id-aes192-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
   -- id-aes256-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
   -- id-aes128-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
   -- id-aes192-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
   -- id-aes256-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters

   --
   -- Message Digest Algorithms
   --

   -- Parameters are NULL

   -- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384,
   -- HMAC with SHA-512 are specified in [HMAC-SHA]

   -- hMACWithSHA1

   id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }

   id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }

   id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }



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   id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }

   --
   -- Originator Public Key Algorithms
   --

   -- id-ecPublicKey Parameters are NULL

   -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys

   ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING

   -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
   -- ECMQV

   MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
     ephemeralPublicKey       OriginatorPublicKey,
     addedukm             [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
   }

   -- Format for ECDH and ECMQV key-encryption keys when using
   -- EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData

   ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
     keyInfo         AlgorithmIdentifier,
     entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
     suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
   }

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities
   --

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA2 Algorithms
   --

   -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Type NULL
   -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Type NULL
   -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Type NULL
   -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Type NULL
   -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Type NULL





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   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard
   --

   -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm


   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Cofactor
   --

   -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECMQV, Single Pass, Standard
   --

   -- mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm
   -- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf Type is the Key Wrap Algorithm

   END

















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Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module

   SMIMEECCAlgs-2008
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) TBD }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL

   IMPORTS

   -- From [PKI-ALG]

   ALGORITHM, algorithmIdentifier, MessageDigestAlgorithms,
   SignatureAlgorithms
   ow-sha1, ow-sha224, ow-sha256, ow-sha384, ow-sha512,
   sa-ecdsaWithSHA1
     FROM PKIXAlgs-2008
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }

   -- From [CMS-AES]

   id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV,
   id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes1256-wrap
     FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) }

   -- From [CMS-AESCG]

   id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters,
   id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters
     FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) }

   -- From [CMS]

   OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }



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   -- From [CMS-ALG]

   hMAC-SHA1, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) }

   ;

   -- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field
   -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field

   MessageDigestAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     ow-sha1   |
     ow-sha224 |
     ow-sha256 |
     ow-sha384 |
     ow-sha512,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field

   SignatureAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA1   |
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 |
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 |
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 |
     sa-ecdsaWithSHA512 ,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   --
   -- ECDSA with SHA-2 Algorithms
   --

   -- Parameters are NULL

   -- sa-ecdsa-withSHA1

   sa-ecdsa-with-SHA224 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID ecdsa-with-SHA224 PARMS NULL }

   ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 }


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   sa-ecdsa-with-SHA256 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID ecdsa-with-SHA256 PARMS NULL }

   ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }

   sa-ecdsa-with-SHA384 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID ecdsa-with-SHA384 PARMS NULL }

   ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }

   sa-ecdsa-with-SHA512 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID ecdsa-with-SHA512 PARMS NULL }

   ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
     ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 }

   -- ECDSA Signature Value
   -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING

   ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
     r  INTEGER,
     s  INTEGER
   }





















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   --
   -- Key Agreement Algorithms
   --

   -- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
   -- keyEncryption Algorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo
   -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo
   -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field

   -- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or
   -- AuthEnvelopedData

   KeyAgreementAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf        |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf   |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf             |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf           |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf           |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf           |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
     x9-63(63) schemes(0) }

   secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }










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   --
   -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs
   --

   -- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 2 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 0 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 1 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 2 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 3 }

   --
   -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
   --

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 3 }




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   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 0 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 1 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 2 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
    PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 3 }

   --
   -- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
   --

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 16 }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 0 }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }



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   mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 1 }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 2 }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf ALGORITHM ::= {
    OID mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme PARMS KeyWrapAlgorithms }

   mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 3 }

   --
   -- Key Wrap Algorithms
   --

   KeyWrapAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     kwa-3des   |
     kwa-aes128 |
     kwa-aes192 |
     kwa-aes256,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   kwa-3des ALGORITHM :: = {
     OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap PARMS NULL }

   kwa-aes128 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes128-wrap PARMS ABSENT }

   kwa-aes192 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes192-wrap PARMS ABSENT }

   kwa-aes256 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes256-wrap PARMS ABSENT }











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   --
   -- Content Encryption Algorithms
   --

   -- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent
   -- field and the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo
   -- contentEncryptionAlgorithm field

   ContentEncryptionAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     cea-des-ede3-cbc |
     cea-aes128-cbc   |
     cea-aes192-cbc   |
     cea-aes256-cbc   |
     cea-aes128-ccm   |
     cea-aes192-ccm   |
     cea-aes256-ccm   |
     cea-aes128-gcm   |
     cea-aes192-gcm   |
     cea-aes256-gcm,
     ... -- Extensible
     }

   -- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and
   -- EncryptedData

   cea-des-ede3-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID des-ede3-cbc PARMS CBCParameter }

   cea-aes128-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes128-CBC PARMS AES-IV }

   cea-aes192-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes192-CBC PARMS AES-IV }

   cea-aes256-cbc ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes256-CBC PARMS AES-IV }

   -- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData

   cea-aes128-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes128-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }

   cea-aes192-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes192-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }

   cea-aes256-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes256-CCM PARMS CCMParameters }


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   -- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData

   cea-aes128-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes128-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }

   cea-aes192-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes192-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }

   cea-aes256-gcm ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-aes256-GCM PARMS GCMParameters }

   --
   -- Message Digest Algorithms
   --

   -- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384,
   -- HMAC with SHA-512 are specified in [HMAC-SHA]

   -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData
   -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData
   -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field

   MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     maca-sha1   |
     maca-sha224 |
     maca-sha256 |
     maca-sha384 |
     maca-sha512,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   maca-sha1 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID hMAC-SHA1 PARMS NULL }

   maca-sha224 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-hmacWithSHA224 PARMS NULL }

   -- Would love to import the HMAC224-512 OIDS but they're not in a
   -- module (that I could find)

   id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }

   maca-sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-hmacWithSHA256 PARMS NULL }


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   id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }

   maca-sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-hmacWithSHA384 PARMS NULL }

   id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }

   maca-sha512 ALGORITHM ::= {
     OID id-hmacWithSHA512 PARMS NULL }

   id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }

   --
   -- Originator Public Key Algorithms
   --

   -- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey
   -- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field

   -- PARMS are NULL

   OriginatorPKAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     opka-ec,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   opka-ec AGLORITHM ::={
     OID id-ecPublicKey PARMS NULL }

   -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys

   ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING

   -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
   -- ECMQV

   MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
     ephemeralPublicKey       OriginatorPublicKey,
     addedukm             [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
   }



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   -- Format for ECDH and ECMQV key-encryption keys when using
   -- EnvelopedData or AuthenticatedData

   ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
     keyInfo         AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithms },
     entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
     suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
   }

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities
   --

   SMIME-CAPS ::= CLASS {
     &Type  OPTIONAL,
     &id    OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE
   }
   WITH SYNTAX {TYPE &Type IDENTIFIED BY &id }

   SMIMECapability ::= SEQUENCE {
     capabilityID  SMIME-CAPS.&id({SMimeCapsSet}),
     parameters    SMIME-CAPS.
                     &Type({SMimeCapsSet}{@capabilityID}) OPTIONAL
   }

























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   SMimeCapsSet SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1                   |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224                 |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256                 |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384                 |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512                 |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf        |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf   |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf             |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf           |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf           |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf           |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA2 Algorithms
   --

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA1 }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA224 }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA256 }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA384 }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY ecdsa-with-SHA512 }







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   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard
   --

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf }

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Cofactor
   --

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf }







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   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECMQV, Single Pass, Standard
   --

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf }

   END





























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Acknowledgements

   The methods described in this document are based on work done by the
   ANSI X9F1 working group.  The authors wish to extend their thanks to
   ANSI X9F1 for their assistance.  The authors also wish to thank Peter
   de Rooij for his patient assistance.  The technical comments of
   Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions.

   Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake-
   Wilson and Paul Lambert.  Without the initial version of RFC3278 this
   version wouldn't exist.

   The authors also wish to thank Alfred Hoenes, Jim Schaad, and Russ
   Housley for their valuable input.



































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Author's Addresses

   Sean Turner

   IECA, Inc.
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
   Fairfax, VA 22031
   USA

   Email: turners@ieca.com

   Daniel R. L. Brown

   Certicom Corp
   5520 Explorer Drive #400
   Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
   CANADA

   Email: dbrown@certicom.com






























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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

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Acknowledgment

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   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





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