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Versions: (RFC 3278) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 RFC 5753

S/MIME WG                                             Sean Turner, IECA
Internet Draft                                      Dan Brown, Certicom
Intended Status: Informational                       September 22, 2008
Obsoletes: 3278 (once approved)
Expires: March 22, 2009



            Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms
                   in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
                      draft-ietf-smime-3278bis-02.txt


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 22, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

Abstract

   This document describes how to use Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
   public-key algorithms in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).  The
   ECC algorithms support the creation of digital signatures and the
   exchange of keys to encrypt or authenticate content.  The definition



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   of the algorithm processing is based on the NIST FIPS 186-3 for
   digital signature, NIST SP800-56A for key agreement, RFC 3565 for key
   wrap and content encryption, NIST FIPS 180-3 for message digest, and
   RFCs 2104 and 4231 for message authentication code standards.

Discussion

   This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To
   subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the
   single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site
   for the mailing list at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-smime/>.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................3
      1.1. Requirements Terminology..................................3
      1.2. Changes since RFC 3278....................................3
   2. SignedData using ECC...........................................5
      2.1. SignedData using ECDSA....................................5
   3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms.............................6
      3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH...............6
      3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV..........................8
   4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC.............11
      4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................11
      4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV.....................12
   5. Certificates using ECC........................................13
   6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC...........................13
   7. ASN.1 Syntax..................................................16
      7.1. Algorithm Identifiers....................................16
      7.2. Other Syntax.............................................19
   8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves....................20
   9. Security Considerations.......................................22
   10. IANA Considerations..........................................27
   11. References...................................................27
      11.1. Normative...............................................27
      11.2. Informative.............................................29
   Appendix A ASN.1 Modules.........................................30
      Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module................................30
      Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module................................37










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1. Introduction

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is cryptographic algorithm
   independent.  This specification defines a profile for the use of
   Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key algorithms in the CMS.
   The ECC algorithms are incorporated into the following CMS content
   types:

     -  'SignedData' to support ECC-based digital signature methods
        (ECDSA) to sign content

     -  'EnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
        methods (ECDH and ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption
        keys to encrypt content-encryption keys used for content
        encryption

     -  'AuthenticatedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
        methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
        encrypt MAC keys used for content authentication and integrity.

     -  'AuthEnvelopedData' to support ECC-based public-key agreement
        methods (ECMQV) to generate pairwise key-encryption keys to
        encrypt MAC keys used for authenticated encryption modes.

   Certification of EC public keys is also described to provide public-
   key distribution in support of the specified techniques.

1.1. Requirements Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [MUST].

1.2. Changes since RFC 3278

   The following summarizes the changes:

     - Abstract: The basis of the document was change to refer to NIST
       FIPP 186-3 and SP800-56A.

     - Section 1: A bullet was added to address AuthEnvelopedData.

     - Section 2.1: A sentence was added to indicate [FIPS180-3] is used
       with ECDSA. Replaced reference to [X9.62] with [FIPS186-3].

     - Section 2.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms were expanded from
       SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.


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     - Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3: The bullet addressing integer "e" was
       deleted.

     - Section 3: Added explanation of why static-static ECDH is not
       included.

     - Section 3.1: The reference for DH was changed from CMS to CMS-
       ALG.  Provided text to indicate fields of EnvelopedData are as
       in CMS.

     - Section 3.1.1: The permitted digest algorithms for use with ECDH
       std and cofactor methods were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-
       224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. Updated to include
       description of all KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields.  Parameters for
       id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL to ABSENT or ECPoint.

     - Section 3.2.1: The permitted digest algorithms for use with ECMQV
       were expanded from SHA-1 to SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384,
       and SHA-512. Updated to include description of all fields.
       Parameters for id-ecPublicKey field changed from NULL to ABSENT
       or ECPoint.

     - Section 4.2: This section was added to address AuthEnvelopedData
       with ECMQV.

     - Section 5: This section was moved to Section 8. The 1st paragraph
       was modified as the requirements are difficult to test. The
       requirements were updated for hash algorithms and
       recommendations for matching curves and hash algorithms. Also
       expanded to indicate which ECDH and ECMQV variants, key wrap
       algorithms, and content encryption algorithms are required for
       each of the content types used in this document.

     - Section 6 (formerly 7): The S/MIME capabilities for ECDSA with
       SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 were added to the list of
       S/MIME Capabilities. Also updated to include S/MIME capabilities
       for ECDH and ECMQV using SHA2 algorithms as the KDF.

     - Section 7.1 (formerly 8.1): Added sub-sections for digest,
       signature, originator public key, key agreement, content
       encryption, and message authentication code algorithms.  SHA-
       224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as well as SHA-224, SHA-256,
       SHA-384, and SHA-512 with ECDSA were added. Also added algorithm
       identifiers for ECDH std, ECDH cofactor, and ECMQV with SHA2
       algorithms as the KDF. Message Authentication Code, Content
       Encryption, Key Wrap.



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     - Section 7.2 (formerly 8.2): Updated to include AuthEnvelopedData.
       Also, added text to address support requirement for compressed
       and uncompressed keys, changed pointers to ANSI X9.61 to PKIX
       (where ECDSA-Sig-Value is imported), changed pointers from SEC1
       to NIST specs, and updated example of suppPubInfo to be AES-256.
       keyInfo's parameters changed from NULL to any associated
       parameters (AES wraps have absent parameters).

     - Section 9: Replaced text, which was a summary paragraph, with an
       updated security considerations section. Paragraph referring to
       definitions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 is
       deleted.

     - Added ASN.1 modules.

     - Updated acknowledgements section.

2. SignedData using ECC

   This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
   SignedData format to sign data.

2.1. SignedData using ECDSA

   This section describes how to use the Elliptic Curve Digital
   Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with SignedData.  ECDSA is specified in
   [FIPS186-3].  The method is the elliptic curve analog of the Digital
   Signature Algorithm (DSA) [FIPS186-3]. ECDSA is used with the Secure
   Hash Algorithm (SHA) [FIPS180-3].

   In an implementation that uses ECDSA with CMS SignedData, the
   following techniques and formats MUST be used.

2.1.1. Fields of the SignedData

   When using ECDSA with SignedData, the fields of SignerInfo are as in
   [CMS], but with the following restrictions:

     - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
       algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be one of the following:
       id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256 identifies, id-sha384, and id-
       sha512.

     - signatureAlgorithm contains the signature algorithm identifier
       (see Section 7.1): ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224, ecdsa-
       with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, or ecdsa-with-SHA512.



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     - signature MUST contain the DER encoding (as an octet string) of a
       value of the ASN.1 type ECDSA-Sig-Value (see Section 7.2).

   When using ECDSA, the SignedData certificates field MAY include the
   certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the generation of the
   ECDSA signatures in SignedData.  ECC certificates are discussed in
   Section 5.

2.1.2. Actions of the sending agent

   When using ECDSA with SignedData, the sending agent uses the message
   digest calculation process and signature generation process for
   SignedData that are specified in [CMS].  To sign data, the sending
   agent uses the signature method specified in [FIPS186-3].

   The sending agent encodes the resulting signature using the
   ECDSA-Sig-Value syntax (see Section 7.2) and places it in the
   SignerInfo.signature field.

2.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent

   When using ECDSA with SignedData, the receiving agent uses the
   message digest calculation process and signature verification process
   for SignedData that are specified in [CMS].  To verify SignedData,
   the receiving agent uses the signature verification method specified
   in [FIPS186-3].

   In order to verify the signature, the receiving agent retrieves the
   integers r and s from the SignerInfo signature field of the received
   message.

3. EnvelopedData using ECC Algorithms

   This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
   EnvelopedData format.

3.1. EnvelopedData using (ephemeral-static) ECDH

   This section describes how to use the ephemeral-static Elliptic Curve
   Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData,
   method C(1, 1, ECC CDH) from [SP800-56A].  Ephemeral-static ECDH is
   the elliptic curve analog of the ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key
   agreement algorithm specified jointly in the documents [CMS-ALG] and
   [CMS-DH].

   In an implementation uses ECDH with CMS EnvelopedData, the following
   techniques and formats MUST be used.


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   The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as ECDH is a key
   agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used.  When
   using ECDH, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY include the
   certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the formation of the
   pairwise key.  ECC certificates are discussed in Section 5.

3.1.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

   When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the fields of
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are as follows:

     - version MUST be 3.

     - originator MUST be the alternative originatorKey.  The
       originatorKey algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey
       object identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters associated
       with id-ecPublicKey MUST be absent or ECPoint.  NOTE: The
       previous version of this document required NULL be present,
       support for this is OPTIONAL.  The originatorKey publicKey field
       MUST contain the value of the ASN.1 type ECPoint (see Section
       7.2), which represents the sending agent's ephemeral EC public
       key.  The ECPoint in uncompressed form MUST be supported.

     - ukm MAY be present or absent. However, message originators SHOULD
       include the ukm. As specified in RFC 3852 [CMS], implementations
       MUST support ukm message recipient processing, so
       interoperability is not a concern if the ukm is present or
       absent.  When present, the ukm is used to ensure that a
       different key-encryption key is generated, even when the
       ephemeral private key is improperly used more than once, by
       using the ECC-Shared-Info as input to in the key derivation
       function (see Section 7.2).

     - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST contain the key encryption algorithm
       object identifier (see Section 7.1).  The parameters field
       contains KeyWrapAlgorithm.  The KeyWrapAlgorithm is the
       algorithm identifier that indicates the symmetric encryption
       algorithm used to encrypt the content-encryption key (CEK) with
       the key-encryption key (KEK) and any associated parameters.
       Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8.

     - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted
       key for each recipient.  The RecipientEncryptedKey
       KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the
       issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or
       the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier
       from the recipient's certificate.  In both cases, the


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       recipient's certificate contains the recipient's static ECDH
       public key.  RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the
       content-encryption key encrypted with the ephemeral-static,
       ECDH-generated pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm
       specified by the KeyWrapAlgorithm.

3.1.2. Actions of the sending agent

   When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the sending
   agent first obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain
   parameters (e.g. from the recipient's certificate).  The sending
   agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
   KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
   "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
   Section 7.2).  The sending agent then performs the key deployment and
   the key agreement operation of the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
   Scheme specified in [SP800-56A].  As a result the sending agent
   obtains:

     - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of the
       type ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string and
       placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field, and

     - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
       key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].

3.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent

   When using ephemeral-static ECDH with EnvelopedData, the receiving
   agent determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER
   encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer
   "keydatalen" from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm. The
   receiving agent retrieves the ephemeral EC public key from the bit
   string KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator, with a value of the type
   ECPoint (see Section 7.2) encapsulated as a bit string, and if
   present original supplied additional user key material from the ukm
   field.  The receiving agent performs the key agreement operation of
   the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Scheme specified in [SP800-56A].
   As a result, the receiving agent obtains a shared secret bit string
   "K", which is used as the pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the
   CEK.

3.2. EnvelopedData using 1-Pass ECMQV

   This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
   (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with EnvelopedData, method
   C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A].  Like the KEA algorithm [CMS-KEA],


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   1-Pass ECMQV uses three key pairs: an ephemeral key pair, a static
   key pair of the sending agent, and a static key pair of the receiving
   agent.  An advantage of using 1-Pass ECMQV is that it can be used
   with both EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData.

   In an implementation uses 1-Pass ECMQV with CMS EnvelopedData, the
   following techniques and formats MUST be used.

   The fields of EnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as 1-Pass ECMQV is a key
   agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used.  When
   using 1-Pass ECMQV, the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY
   include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the
   formation of the pairwise key.  ECC certificates are discussed in
   Section 5.

3.2.1. Fields of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

   When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the fields of
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo are:

     - version MUST be 3.

     - originator identifies the static EC public key of the sender.  It
       SHOULD be one of the alternatives, issuerAndSerialNumber or
       subjectKeyIdentifier, and point to one of the sending agent's
       certificates.

     - ukm MUST be present.  The ukm field MUST contain an octet string
       which is the DER encoding of the type MQVuserKeyingMaterial (see
       Section 7.2).  The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
       algorithm field MUST contain the id-ecPublicKey object
       identifier (see Section 7.1). The parameters associated with id-
       ecPublicKey MUST be abent or ECPoint.  NOTE: The previous
       version of this document required NULL be present, support is
       OPTIONAL.  The MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey
       publicKey field MUST contain the DER-encoding of the ASN.1 type
       ECPoint (see Section 7.2) representing the sending agent's
       ephemeral EC public key.  The MQVuserKeyingMaterial addedukm
       field, if present, SHOULD contain an octet string of additional
       user keying material of the sending agent.

     - keyEncryptionAlgorithm MUST be the key encryption algorithm
       identifier (see Section 7.1), with the parameters field
       KeyWrapAlgorithm. The KeyWrapAlgorithm indicates the symmetric
       encryption algorithm used to encrypt the CEK with the KEK
       generated using the 1-Pass ECMQV algorithm and any associated
       parameters. Algorithm requirements are found in Section 8.


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     - recipientEncryptedKeys contains an identifier and an encrypted
       key for each recipient. The RecipientEncryptedKey
       KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier MUST contain either the
       issuerAndSerialNumber identifying the recipient's certificate or
       the RecipientKeyIdentifier containing the subject key identifier
       from the recipient's certificate. In both cases, the recipient's
       certificate contains the recipient's static ECMQV public key.
       RecipientEncryptedKey EncryptedKey MUST contain the content-
       encryption key encrypted with the 1-Pass ECMQV-generated
       pairwise key-encryption key using the algorithm specified by the
       KeyWrapAlgorithm.

3.2.2. Actions of the sending agent

   When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the sending agent first
   obtains the recipient's EC public key and domain parameters (e.g.
   from the recipient's certificate), and checks that the domain
   parameters are the same, as the sender's domain parameters.  The
   sending agent then determines an integer "keydatalen", which is the
   KeyWrapAlgorithm symmetric key-size in bits, and also a bit string
   "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see
   Section 7.2).  The sending agent then performs the key deployment and
   key agreement operations of the Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme specified
   in [SP800-56A].  As a result, the sending agent obtains:

     - an ephemeral public key, which is represented as a value of type
       ECPoint (see Section 7.2), encapsulated in a bit string, placed
       in an MQVuserKeyingMaterial ephemeralPublicKey publicKey field
       (see Section 7.2), and

     - a shared secret bit string "K", which is used as the pairwise
       key-encryption key for that recipient, as specified in [CMS].

   The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an AuthenticatedData for
   greater efficiency.

3.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent

   When using 1-Pass ECMQV with EnvelopedData, the receiving agent
   determines the bit string "SharedInfo", which is the DER encoding of
   ECC-CMS-SharedInfo (see Section 7.2), and the integer "keydatalen"
   from the key-size, in bits, of the KeyWrapAlgorithm.  The receiving
   agent then retrieves the static and ephemeral EC public keys of the
   originator, from the originator and ukm fields as described in
   Section 3.2.1, and its static EC public key identified in the rid
   field and checks that the domain parameters are the same.  The
   receiving agent then performs the key agreement operation of the


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   Elliptic Curve MQV Scheme [SP800-56A].  As a result, the receiving
   agent obtains a shared secret bit string "K" which is used as the
   pairwise key-encryption key to unwrap the CEK.

4. AuthenticatedData and AuthEnvelopedData using ECC

   This section describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
   AuthenticatedData format.  AuthenticatedData lacks non-repudiation,
   and so in some instances is preferable to SignedData.  (For example,
   the sending agent might not want the message to be authenticated when
   forwarded.)

   This section also describes how to use ECC algorithms with the CMS
   AuthEnvelopedData format [CMS-AUTHENV].  AuthEnvelopedData supports
   authentication and encryption, and in some instances is preferable to
   signing and then encrypting data.

4.1. AuthenticatedData using 1-pass ECMQV

   This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
   (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthenticatedData.  ECMQV is
   method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A].  An advantage of using 1-
   Pass ECMQV is that it can be used with EnvelopedData,
   AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData.

   When using ECMQV with AuthenticatedData, the fields of
   AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], but with the following
   restrictions:

     - macAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the message
       authentication code algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be
       one of the following: id-hmacWithSHA1, id-hmacWITHSHA224, id-
       hmacWITHSHA256, id-hmacWITHSHA384, and id-hmacWITHSHA512.

     - digestAlgorithm MUST contain the algorithm identifier of the hash
       algorithm (see Section 7.1) which MUST be one of the following:
       id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, and id-sha512.

   The fields of AuthenticatedData are as in [CMS], as 1-Pass ECMQV is a
   key agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used.  When
   using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthenticatedData originatorInfo field MAY
   include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the
   formation of the pairwise key.  ECC certificates are discussed in
   Section 5.





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4.1.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

   The AuthenticatedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
   same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.

4.1.2. Actions of the sending agent

   The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
   1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.

   The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an EnvelopedData for
   greater efficiency.

   Note: if there are multiple recipients, an attack is possible where
   one recipient modifies the content without other recipients noticing
   [BON].  A sending agent who is concerned with such an attack SHOULD
   use a separate AuthenticatedData for each recipient.

4.1.3. Actions of the receiving agent

   The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
   1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.

   Note: see Note in Section 4.1.2.

4.2. AuthEnvelopedData using 1-pass ECMQV

   This section describes how to use the 1-Pass elliptic curve MQV
   (ECMQV) key agreement algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData.  ECMQV is
   method C(1, 2, ECC MQV) from [SP800-56A].  An advantage of using 1-
   Pass ECMQV is that it can be used with EnvelopedData,
   AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData.

   The fields of AuthEnvelopedData are as in [CMS], as 1-Pass ECMQV is a
   key agreement algorithm the RecipientInfo kari choice is used.  When
   using 1-Pass ECMQV, the AuthEnvelopedData originatorInfo field MAY
   include the certificate(s) for the EC public key(s) used in the
   formation of the pairwise key.  ECC certificates are discussed in
   Section 5.

4.2.1. Fields of the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo

   The AuthEnvelopedData KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields are used in the
   same manner as the fields for the corresponding EnvelopedData
   KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields of Section 3.2.1 of this document.



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4.2.2. Actions of the sending agent

   The sending agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with 1-
   Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.2 of this document.

   The ephemeral public key can be re-used with an EnvelopedData for
   greater efficiency.

4.2.3. Actions of the receiving agent

   The receiving agent uses the same actions as for EnvelopedData with
   1-Pass ECMQV, as specified in Section 3.2.3 of this document.

5. Certificates using ECC

   Internet X.509 certificates [PKI] can be used in conjunction with
   this specification to distribute agents' public keys.  The use of ECC
   algorithms and keys within X.509 certificates is specified in
   [PKI-ALG].

6. SMIMECapabilities Attribute and ECC

   A sending agent MAY announce to receiving agents that it supports one
   or more of the ECC algorithms in this document by using the
   SMIMECapabilities signed attribute [MSG].

   The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for one of the ECDSA
   signature algorithms is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field
   containing the object identifier ecdsa-with-SHA* object identifiers
   (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) and with NULL parameters.  The
   DER encodings are:

      ecdsa-with-SHA1:   30 0b 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 01 05 00

      ecdsa-with-SHA224: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 01 05 00

      ecdsa-with-SHA256: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 05 00

      ecdsa-with-SHA384: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 03 05 00

      ecdsa-with-SHA512: 30 0c 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 04 05 00








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   The SMIMECapability value to indicate support for
     a)  the standard ECDH key agreement algorithm,
     b)  the cofactor ECDH key agreement algorithm, or
     c)  the 1-Pass ECMQV key agreement algorithm
   is a SEQUENCE with the capabilityID field containing the object
   identifier
     a)  dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha*kdf-scheme,
     b)  dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha*kdf-scheme, or
     c)  mqvSinglePass-sha*kdf-scheme
   respectively (where * is 1, 224, 256, 384, or 512) with the
   parameters present.  The parameters indicate the supported key-
   encryption algorithm with the KeyWrapAlgorithm algorithm identifier.

   Example DER encodings that indicate some capabilities are as follows
   (KA is key agreement, KDF is key derivation function, and Wrap is key
   wrap algorithm):

      KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES

        30 1c
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 02
              30 0f
                    06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 01
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH standard KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0B 02
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
                    05 00









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      KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES

        30 1c
              06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 03
              30 0f
                    06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 01
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
                    05 00

      KA=ECDH cofactor KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0E 02
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
                    05 00

      KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA1 Wrap=3DES

         30 1c
               06 09 2b 81 05 10 86 48 3f 00 10
               30 0f
                     06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 06
                     05 00

      KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA256 Wrap=AES128

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 01
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05
                    05 00

      KA=ECMQV 1-Pass KDF=SHA384 Wrap=AES256

        30 17
              06 06 2b 81 04 01 0F 02
              30 0d
                    06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2D
                    05 00


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7. ASN.1 Syntax

   The ASN.1 syntax used in this document is gathered in this section
   for reference purposes.

7.1. Algorithm Identifiers

   This section provides the object identifiers for the algorithms used
   in this document along with any associated parameters.

7.1.1. Digest Algorithms

   Digest algorithm object identifiers are used in the SignedData
   digestAlgorithms and digestAlgorithm fields, the AuthenticatedData
   digestAlgorithm field, and the AuthEnvelopedData digestAlgorithm
   field.  The digest algorithms used in this document are: SHA-1,
   SHA224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.  The object identifiers and
   parameters associated with these algorithms are found in [SMIME-
   SHA2].

7.1.2. Originator Public Key

   The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator filed use the following object
   identifier to indicate an elliptic curve public key:

      id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        ansi-x9-62 keyType(2) 1 }

   where

      ansi-x9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 }

   When the object identifier id-ecPublicKey is used here with an
   algorithm identifier, the associated parameters MUST be either absent
   or ECPoint. Implementations MUST accept id-ecPublicKey with the
   parameters field with absent, NULL, and ECPoint parameters.  If
   ECPoint is present its value is ignored.  Implementations SHOULD
   generate absent parameters for the id-ecPublicKey object identifier
   in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo originator field.

7.1.3. Signature Algorithms

   Signature algorithm identifiers are used in the SignedData
   signatureAlgorithm and signature field.  The signature algorithms
   used in this document are ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA
   with SHA-256, ECDSA with SHA-384, and ECDSA with SHA-512. The object


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   identifiers and parameters associated with these algorithms are found
   in [PKI-ALG].

7.1.4. Key Agreement Algorithms

   Key agreement algorithms are used in EnvelopedData,
   AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
   keyEncryptionAlgorithm field.  The following object identifiers
   indicate the key agreement algorithms used in this document [SP800-
   56A]:

      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        x9-63-scheme 2 }

      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 11 0 }

      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 11 1 }

      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 11 2 }

      dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 11 3 }

      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        x9-63-scheme 3 }

      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 14 0 }

      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 14 1 }

      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 14 2 }

      dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 14 3 }

      mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        x9-63-scheme 16 }

      mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 15 0 }



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      mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 15 1 }

      mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 15 2 }

      mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        secg-scheme 15 3 }

   where

      x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16)
        x9(840) x9-63(63) schemes(0) }

   and

      secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }

   When the object identifiers are used here within an algorithm
   identifier, the associated parameters field contains KeyWrapAlgorithm
   to indicate the key wrap algorithm and any associated parameters.

7.1.5. Key Wrap Algorithms

   Key wrap algorithms are used as part of the parameters in the key
   agreement algorithm.  The key wrap algorithms used in this document
   are Triple-DES, AES-128, AES-192, AES-256. The object identifier and
   parameters for these algorithms are found in [CMS-ALG] and [CMS-AES].

7.1.6. Content Encryption Algorithms

   Content encryption algorithms are used in EnvelopedData and
   AuthEnvelopedData in the EncryptedContentInfo
   contentEncryptionAlgorithm field.  The content encryption algorithms
   used with EnvelopedData in this document are AES-128 in CBC mode,
   AES-192 in CBC mode, and AES-256 in CBC mode.  The object identifiers
   and parameters associated with these algorithms are found in [CMS-
   AES]. The content encryption algorithms used with AuthEnvelopedData
   in this document are AES-128 in CCM mode, AES-192 in CCM mode, AES-
   256 in CCM mode, AES-128 in GCM mode, AES-192 in GCM mode, and AES-
   256 in GCM mode.  The object identifiers and parameters associated
   with these algorithms are found in [CMS-AESCG].





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7.1.7. Message Authentication Code Algorithms

   Message authentication code algorithms are used in AuthenticatedData
   and AuthEnvelopedData in the macAlgorithm field.  The message
   authentication code algorithms used in this document are HMAC with
   SHA-1, HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-1, HMAC with SHA-1, and HMAC
   with SHA-1.  The object identifiers and parameters associated with
   these algorithms are found in [HMAC-SHA1] and [HMAC-SHA2].

7.2. Other Syntax

   The following additional syntax is used here.

   When using ECDSA with SignedData, ECDSA signatures are encoded using
   the type:

     ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
       r INTEGER,
       s INTEGER }

   ECDSA-Sig-Value is specified in [PKI-ALG].  Within CMS, ECDSA-Sig-
   Value is DER-encoded and placed within a signature field of
   SignedData.

   When using ECDH and ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
   AuthEnvelopedData, ephemeral and static public keys are encoded using
   the type ECPoint. Implementations MUST support uncompressed keys and
   MAY support compressed keys.

     ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING

   When using ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
   AuthEnvelopedData, the sending agent's ephemeral public key and
   additional keying material are encoded using the type:

     MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
       ephemeralPublicKey      OriginatorPublicKey,
       addedukm            [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL  }

   The ECPoint syntax in used to represent the ephemeral public key and
   placed in the ephemeralPublicKey field.  The additional user keying
   material is placed in the addedukm field.  Then the
   MQVuserKeyingMaterial value is DER-encoded and placed within a ukm
   field of EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData.





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   When using ECDH or ECMQV with EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or
   AuthEnvelopedData, the key-encryption keys are derived by using the
   type:

     ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
       keyInfo         AlgorithmIdentifier,
       entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
       suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING  }

   The fields of ECC-CMS-SharedInfo are as follows:

      keyInfo contains the object identifier of the key-encryption
      algorithm (used to wrap the CEK) and associated parameters. In
      this specification, 3DES wrap has NULL parameters while the AES
      wraps have absent parameters.

      entityUInfo optionally contains additional keying material
      supplied by the sending agent.  When used with ECDH and CMS, the
      entityUInfo field contains the octet string ukm.  When used with
      ECMQV and CMS, the entityUInfo contains the octet string addedukm
      (encoded in MQVuserKeyingMaterial).

      suppPubInfo contains the length of the generated KEK, in bits,
      represented as a 32 bit number, as in [CMS-DH] and [CMS-AES].
      (E.g. for AES-256 it would be 00 00 01 00.)

   Within CMS, ECC-CMS-SharedInfo is DER-encoded and used as input to
   the key derivation function, as specified in [SP800-56A].

   Note that ECC-CMS-SharedInfo differs from the OtherInfo specified in
   [CMS-DH].  Here, a counter value is not included in the keyInfo field
   because the key derivation function specified in [SP800-56A] ensures
   that sufficient keying data is provided.

8. Recommended Algorithms and Elliptic Curves

   It is RECOMMEND that implementations of this specification support
   SignedData. Support for EnvelopedData and AuthenticatedData is
   OPTIONAL.

   In order to encourage interoperability, implementations SHOULD use
   the elliptic curve domain parameters specified by [PKI-ALG].

   Implementations that support SignedData with ECDSA:

     - MUST support ECDSA with SHA-256.



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     - MAY support ECDSA with SHA-1, ECDSA with SHA-224, ECDSA with SHA-
       384, and ECDSA with SHA-512.

   When using ECDSA, it is RECOMMENDED that the P-224 curve be used with
   SHA-224, the P-256 curve be used with SHA-256, the P-384 curve be
   used with SHA-384, and the P-521 curve be used with SHA-512.

   If EnvelopedData is supported, then ephemeral-static ECDH standard
   primitive MUST be supported.

   Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static
   ECDH standard primitive:

     - MUST support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme key
       agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and
       the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm

     - MAY support the dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
       stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme and
       dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms,
       the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key
       wrap algorithms and the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content
       encryption algorithms.

   Implementations that support EnvelopedData with the ephemeral-static
   ECDH cofactor primitive:

     - MUST support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme key
       agreement algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and
       the id-aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm.

     - MAY support the dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme,
       dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme, dhSinglePass-
       cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme, and dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-
       sha512kdf-scheme key agreement, the id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-
       aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap algorithms and the id-
       aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content encryption algorithms.

   Implementations that support EnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:

     - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement
       algorithm, the id-aes128-wrap key wrap algorithm, and the id-
       aes128-cbc content encryption algorithm.

     - MAY support mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
       sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and
       mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-


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       alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
       algorithms and the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content
       encryption algorithms.

   Implementations that support AuthenticatedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:

     - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement,
       the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, and the id-aes128-cbc content
       encryption, the id-sha256 message digest, and id-hmacWithSHA256
       message authentication code algorithms.

     - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
       sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
       sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-alg-
       CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
       algorithms, the id-aes192-cbc and id-aes256-cbc content
       encryption algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-sha384, and
       id-sha512, message digest algorithms, and the id-hmacWithSHA1,
       id-hmacWithSHA224, id-hmacWithSHA384, id-hmacWithSHA512 message
       authentication code algorithms.

   Implementations that support AuthEnvelopedData with 1-Pass ECMQV:

     - MUST support the mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme key agreement,
       the id-aes128-wrap key wrap, the id-aes128-ccm authenticated-
       content encryption, the id-sha256 message digest, and the id-
       hmacWithSHA256 message authentication cod algorithms.

     - MAY support the mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-
       sha224kdf-scheme, mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme, and
       mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme key agreement algorithms, the id-
       alg-CMS3DESwrap, id-aes192-wrap, and id-aes256-wrap key wrap
       algorithms, the id-aes192-ccm and id-aes256-ccm authenticated-
       content encryption algorithms, the id-sha1, id-sha224, id-
       sha384, and id-sha512, message digest algorithms, and id-
       hmacWithSHA1, id-hmacWithSHA224, id-hmacWithSHA384, id-
       hmacWithSHA512 message authentication code algorithms.

9. Security Considerations

   Cryptographic algorithms will be broken or weakened over time.
   Implementers and users need to check that the cryptographic
   algorithms listed in this document continue to provide the expected
   level of security.  The IETF from time to time may issue documents
   dealing with the current state of the art.




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   Cryptographic algorithms rely on random number. See [RANDOM] for
   guidance on generation of random numbers.

   Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that
   encrypt messages, need to be cautious of cryptographic processing
   usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys
   larger than those mandated in this specification.  An attacker could
   send certificates with keys which would result in excessive
   cryptographic processing, for example keys larger than those mandated
   in this specification, which could swamp the processing element.
   Agents which use such keys without first validating the certificate
   to a trust anchor are advised to have some sort of cryptographic
   resource management system to prevent such attacks.

   Using secret keys of an appropriate size is crucial to the security
   of a Diffie-Hellman exchange.  For elliptic curve groups, the size of
   the secret key must be equal to the size of n (the order of the group
   generated by the point g).  Using larger secret keys provides
   absolutely no additional security, and using smaller secret keys is
   likely to result in dramatically less security.  (See [SP800-56A] for
   more information on selecting secret keys.)

   This specification is based on [CMS], [CMS-AUTHENV], [CMS-ALG],
   [CMS-AESCG], [X9.62], [SEC1], and [SEC2] and the appropriate security
   considerations of those documents apply.

   In addition, implementors of AuthenticatedData should be aware of the
   concerns expressed in [BON] when using AuthenticatedData to send
   messages to more than one recipient.  Also, users of MQV should be
   aware of the vulnerability in [K].

   When implementing EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, and
   AuthEnvelopedData, there are five algorithm related choices that need
   to be made:

   1) What is the public key size?
   2) What is the KDF?
   3) What is the key wrap algorithm?
   4) What is the content encryption algorithm?
   5) What is the curve?

   Consideration must be given to strength of the security provided by
   each of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong
   symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of
   security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by
   each are roughly equivalent. The following table provides comparable
   minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDH/ECMQV key sizes,


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   KDFs, key wrapping algorithms, and content encryption algorithms. It
   also lists curves [PKI-ALG] for the key sizes.

   Minimum  | ECDH or  | Key        | Key      | Content     | Curves
   Bits of  | ECQMV    | Derivation | Wrap     | Encryption  |
   Security | Key Size | Function   | Alg.     | Alg.        |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   80       | 160-223  | SHA1       | 3DES     | 3DES CBC    | sect163k1
            |          | SHA224     | AES-128  | AES-128 CBC | secp163r2
            |          | SHA256     | AES-192  | AES-192 CBC | secp192r1
            |          | SHA384     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC |
            |          | SHA512     |          |             |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
   112      | 224-255  | SHA1       | 3DES     | 3DES CBC    | secp224r1
            |          | SHA224     | AES-128  | AES-128 CBC | sect233k1
            |          | SHA256     | AES-192  | AES-192 CBC | sect233r1
            |          | SHA384     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC |
            |          | SHA512     |          |             |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
   128      | 256-383  | SHA1       | AES-128  | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1
            |          | SHA224     | AES-192  | AES-192 CBC | sect283k1
            |          | SHA256     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC | sect283r1
            |          | SHA384     |          |             |
            |          | SHA512     |          |             |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
   192      | 384-511  | SHA224     | AES-192  | AES-192 CBC | secp384r1
            |          | SHA256     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC | sect409k1
            |          | SHA384     |          |             | sect409r1
            |          | SHA512     |          |             |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------
   256      | 512+     | SHA256     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1
            |          | SHA384     |          |             | sect571k1
            |          | SHA512     |          |             | sect571r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+---------















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   To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED:

   Minimum  | ECDH or  | Key        | Key      | Content     | Curve
   Bits of  | ECQMV    | Derivation | Wrap     | Encryption  |
   Security | Key Size | Function   | Alg.     | Alg.        |
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   80       | 192      | SHA256     | 3DES     | 3DES CBC    | secp192r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   112      | 224      | SHA256     | 3DES     | 3DES CBC    | secp224r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   128      | 256      | SHA256     | AES-128  | AES-128 CBC | secp256r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   192      | 384      | SHA384     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC | secp384r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------
   256      | 512      | SHA512     | AES-256  | AES-256 CBC | secp521r1
   ---------+----------+------------+----------+-------------+----------

   When implementing SignedData, there are three algorithm related
   choices that need to be made:

   1) What is the public key size?
   2) What is the hash algorithm?
   3) What is the curve?

   Consideration must be given to the bits of security provided by each
   of these choices. Security is measured in bits, where a strong
   symmetric cipher with a key of X bits is said to provide X bits of
   security. It is recommended that the bits of security provided by
   each choice are roughly equivalent.  The following table provides
   comparable minimum bits of security [SP800-57] for the ECDSA key
   sizes and message digest algorithms. It also lists curves [PKI-ALG]
   for the key sizes.

















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   Minimum  | ECDSA    | Message   | Curve
   Bits of  | Key Size | Digest    |
   Security |          | Algorithm |
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   80       | 160-223  | SHA1      | sect163k1
            |          | SHA224    | secp163r2
            |          | SHA256    | secp192r1
            |          | SHA384    |
            |          | SHA512    |
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   112      | 224-255  | SHA224    | secp224r1
            |          | SHA256    | sect233k1
            |          | SHA384    | sect233r1
            |          | SHA512    |
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   128      | 256-383  | SHA256    | secp256r1
            |          | SHA384    | sect283k1
            |          | SHA512    | sect283r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   192      | 384-511  | SHA384    | secp384r1
            |          | SHA512    | sect409k1
            |          |           | sect409r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   256      | 512+     | SHA512    | secp521r1
            |          |           | sect571k1
            |          |           | sect571r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------

   To promote interoperability, the following choices are RECOMMENDED:

   Minimum  | ECDSA    | Message   | Curve
   Bits of  | Key Size | Digest    |
   Security |          | Algorithm |
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   80       | 192      | SHA256    | sect192r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   112      | 224      | SHA256    | secp224r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   128      | 256      | SHA256    | secp256r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   192      | 384      | SHA384    | secp384r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------
   256      | 512+     | SHA512    | secp521r1
   ---------+----------+-----------+-----------





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10. IANA Considerations

   None.

11. References

11.1. Normative

   [CMS]          Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC
                  3852, July 2004.

   [CMS-AES]      Schaad, J., "Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard
                  (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message
                  Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3565, July 2003.

   [CMS-AESCG]    Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated
                  Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
                  (CMS)", RFC 5084, November 2007.

   [CMS-ALG]      Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
                  Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.

   [CMS-ASN]      Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
                  CMS", draft-ietf-smime-new-asn1, work-in-progress.

   [CMS-AUTHENV]  Housley, R. "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
                  Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083,
                  November 2007.

   [CMS-DH]       Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
                  RFC 2631, June 1999.

   [FIPS180-3]    National Institute of Standards and Technology
                  (NIST), FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard,
                  June 2003.

   [FIPS186-3]    National Institute of Standards and Technology
                  (NIST), FIPS Publication 186-3: Digital Signature
                  Standard, March 2006.

   [HMAC-SHA1]    Krawczyk, M., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
                  Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
                  February 1997.

   [HMAC-SHA2]    Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-
                  SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-
                  512", RFC 4231, December 2005.


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   [MUST]         Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
                  Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [MSG]          Ramsdell, B., and S. Turner, "S/MIME Version 3.2
                  Message Specification", draft-ietf-smime-3851bis,
                  work-in-progress.

   [PKI]          Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.
                  Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
                  Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
                  List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [PKI-ALG]      Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and W.
                  Polk, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
                  Information", draft-ietf-pkix-ecc-subpubkeyinfo,
                  work-in-progress.

   [PKI-ASN]      Hoffman, P., and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
                  PKIX", draft-ietf-pkix-new-asn1, work-in-progress.

   [RANDOM]       Eastlake 3rd, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller,
                  "Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 4086,
                  June 2005.

   [RSAOAEP]      Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional
                  Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for
                  use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                  Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
                  Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005.

   [SEC1]         SECG, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for
                  Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000. Available from
                  www.secg.org/collateral/sec1.pdf.

   [SEC2]         SECG, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters",
                  Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, 2000.
                  Available from www.secg.org/collateral/sec2.pdf.

   [SMIME-SHA2]   Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
                  Message Syntax", work-in-progress.

   [SP800-56A]    National Institute of Standards and Technology
                  (NIST), Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation
                  Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
                  Logarithm Cryptography (Revised), March 2007.




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   [X9.62]        American National Standards Institute (ANSI), ANS
                  X9.62-2005: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
                  Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005.

   [X.208]        ITU-T Recommendation X.208 (1988) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                  1:1988. Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One
                  (ASN.1).

   [X.680]        ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                  1 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                  Notation One.

   [X.681]        ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                  2 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                  Notation One: Information Object Specification.

   [X.682]        ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                  3 :2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                  Notation One: Constraint Specification.

   [X.683]        ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-
                  4:2002. Information Technology - Abstract Syntax
                  Notation One: Parameterization of ASN.1
                  Specifications, 2002.

11.2. Informative

   [BON]          D. Boneh, "The Security of Multicast MAC",
                  Presentation at Selected Areas of Cryptography 2000,
                  Center for Applied Cryptographic Research, University
                  of Waterloo, 2000.  Paper version available from
                  http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/mmac.ps

   [CMS-KEA]      Pawling, J., "CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions", RFC
                  2876, July 2000.

   [K]            B. Kaliski, "MQV Vulnerability", Posting to ANSI X9F1
                  and IEEE P1363 newsgroups, 1998.

   [SP800-57]     National Institute of Standards and Technology
                  (NIST), Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation
                  for Key Management, August 2005.







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Appendix A ASN.1 Modules

   Appendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the
   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
   [X.208].

   Appendix A.2 provides an informative ASN.1 definitions for the
   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in
   [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], [X.683]. This appendix contains the same
   information as Appendix A.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1
   notation, however Appendix A.1 takes precedence in case of conflict.

Appendix A.1 1988 ASN.1 Module

   SMIMEECCAlgs-1988
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) TBD }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL

   IMPORTS

   -- From [PKI]

   AlgorithmIdentifier
     FROM PKIX1Explicit88
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
         internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0)
         pkix1-explicit(18) }

   -- From [RSAOAEP]

   id-sha224, id-sha256, id-sha384, id-sha512
     FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
         id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) }








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   -- From [PKI-ALG]

   id-sha1, ecdsa-with-SHA1, ecdsa-with-SHA224,
   ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384, ecdsa-with-SHA512,
   id-ecPublicKey, ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint
     FROM PKIXAlgs-1988
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }

   -- From [CMS]

   OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }

   -- From [CMS-ALG]

   hMAC-SHA1, des-ede3-cbc, id-alg-CMS3DESwrap, CBCParameter
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) }

   -- From [CMS-AES]

   id-aes128-CBC, id-aes192-CBC, id-aes256-CBC, AES-IV,
   id-aes128-wrap, id-aes192-wrap, id-aes256-wrap
     FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) }

   -- From [CMS-AESCG]

   id-aes128-CCM, id-aes192-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, CCMParameters
   id-aes128-GCM, id-aes192-GCM, id-aes256-GCM, GCMParameters
     FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(32) }

   ;

   --
   -- ECDSA with SHA-2 Algorithms
   --

   -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Parameters are NULL



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   -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Parameters are ABSENT

   -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Parameters are ABSENT

   -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Parameters are ABSENT

   -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Parameters are absent

   -- ECDSA Signature Value
   -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING

   -- ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
   --   r  INTEGER,
   --   s  INTEGER
   -- }

   --
   -- Key Agreement Algorithms
   --

   x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
     x9-63(63) schemes(0) }

   secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }

   --
   -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs
   --

   -- Parameters are always present and indicate the key wrap algorithm
   -- with KeyWrapAlgorithm

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 2 }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 0 }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 1 }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 2 }




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   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 3 }

   --
   -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
   --

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 3 }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 0 }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 1 }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 2 }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 3 }

   --
   -- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
   --

   mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 16 }

   mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 0 }

   mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 1 }

   mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 2 }

   mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 3 }









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   --
   -- Key Wrap Algorithms
   --

   KeyWrapAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier

   -- id-alg-CMS3DESwrap Parameters are NULL
   -- id-aes128-wrap Parameters are ABSENT
   -- id-aes192-wrap Parameters are ABSENT
   -- id-aes256-wrap Parameters are ABSENT

   --
   -- Content Encryption Algorithms
   --

   -- des-ede3-cbc Parameters are CBCParameter
   -- id-aes128-CBC Parameters are AES-IV
   -- id-aes192-CBC Parameters are AES-IV
   -- id-aes256-CBC Parameters are AES-IV
   -- id-aes128-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
   -- id-aes192-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
   -- id-aes256-CCM Parameters are CCMParameters
   -- id-aes128-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
   -- id-aes192-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters
   -- id-aes256-GCM Parameters are GCMParameters

   --
   -- Message Digest Algorithms
   --

   -- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384,
   -- HMAC with SHA-512 are specified in [HMAC-SHA2]
   -- Parameters are ABSENT

   -- hMACWithSHA1

   id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }

   id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }

   id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }


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   id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }

   --
   -- Originator Public Key Algorithms
   --

   -- id-ecPublicKey Parameters are NULL

   -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys

   -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING

   -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
   -- ECMQV

   MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
     ephemeralPublicKey       OriginatorPublicKey,
     addedukm             [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
   }

   -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with
   -- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData

   ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
     keyInfo         AlgorithmIdentifier,
     entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
     suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
   }

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities
   --

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA1 and SHA2 Algorithms
   --

   -- ecdsa-with-SHA1 Type NULL
   -- ecdsa-with-SHA224 Type NULL
   -- ecdsa-with-SHA256 Type NULL
   -- ecdsa-with-SHA384 Type NULL
   -- ecdsa-with-SHA512 Type NULL





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   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard
   --

   -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm


   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Cofactor
   --

   -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECMQV, Single Pass, Standard
   --

   -- mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm
   -- mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf Type is the KeyWrapAlgorithm

   END

















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Appendix A.2 2004 ASN.1 Module

   SMIMEECCAlgs-2008
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
       smime(16) modules(0) TBD }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL

   IMPORTS

   -- FROM [PKI-ASN]

   KEY-WRAP, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, ALGORITHM,
   PUBLIC-KEY, MAC-ALGORITHM, CONTENT-ENCRYPTION, KEY-AGREE
     FROM AlgorithmInformation
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
         id-mod-algorithInformation(TBD)}

   -- From [PKI-ASN]

   mda-sha1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA1, sa-ecdsaWithSHA224, sa-ecdsaWithSHA256,
   sa-ecdsaWithSHA384, sa-ecdsaWithSHA512, id-ecPublicKey,
   ECDSA-Sig-Value, ECPoint
     FROM PKIXAlgs-2008
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }

   -- From [PKI-ASN]

   mda-sha224, mda-sha256, mda-sha384, mda-sha512
     FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD }

   -- From [CMS]

   OriginatorPublicKey, UserKeyingMaterial
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }




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   -- From [CMS-ASN]

   maca-hMAC-SHA1, cea-des-ede3-cbc, kwa-3DESWrap, CBCParameter
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntaxAlgorithms
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) cmsalg-2001(16) }

   -- From [CMS-ASN]

   cea-aes128-CBC, cea-aes192-CBC, cea-aes256-CBC, kwa-aes128-wrap,
   kwa-aes192-wrap, kwa-aes256-wrap
     FROM CMSAesRsaesOaep
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-aes(19) }

   -- From [CMS-ASN]

   cea-aes128-ccm, cea-aes192-ccm, cea-aes256-ccm, cea-aes128-gcm,
   cea-aes192-gcm, cea-aes256-gcm
     FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
         smime(16) modules(0) cms-aes-ccm-and-gcm(32) }

   ;

   -- Constrains the SignedData digestAlgorithms field
   -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData digestAlgorithm field

   -- MessageDigestAlgorithms DIGEST-ALGORITHM ::= {
   --  mda-sha1   |
   --  mda-sha224 |
   --  mda-sha256 |
   --  mda-sha384 |
   --  mda-sha512,
   --  ... -- Extensible
   -- }












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   -- Constrains the SignedData SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field

   -- SignatureAlgorithms SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
   --  sa-ecdsaWithSHA1   |
   --  sa-ecdsaWithSHA224 |
   --  sa-ecdsaWithSHA256 |
   --  sa-ecdsaWithSHA384 |
   --  sa-ecdsaWithSHA512 ,
   --  ... -- Extensible
   -- }

   -- ECDSA Signature Value
   -- Contents of SignatureValue OCTET STRING

   ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
     r  INTEGER,
     s  INTEGER
   }

   --
   -- Key Agreement Algorithms
   --

   -- Constrains the EnvelopedData RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo
   -- keyEncryption Algorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData RecipientInfo
   -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData RecipientInfo
   -- KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryption Algorithm field

   -- DH variants are not used with AuthenticatedData or
   -- AuthEnvelopedData

















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   KeyAgreementAlgorithms KEY-AGREE ::= {
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf        |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf      |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf   |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf |
     kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf             |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf           |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf           |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf           |
     kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   x9-63-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
     x9-63(63) schemes(0) }

   secg-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) schemes(1) }

   --
   -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Standard, with KDFs
   --

   -- Parameters are always present and indicate the Key Wrap Algorithm

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 2 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }



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   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 0 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 1 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 2 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 11 3 }

   --
   -- Diffie-Hellman Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
   --

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 3 }







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   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 0 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 1 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 2 }

   kaa-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 14 3 }

   --
   -- MQV Single Pass, Cofactor, with KDFs
   --

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }




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   mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     x9-63-scheme 16 }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 0 }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 1 }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 2 }

   kaa-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf KEY-AGREE ::= {
     IDENTIFIER mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme
     PARAMS TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm ARE required
     UKM IS preferredPresent
   }

   mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf-scheme OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     secg-scheme 15 3 }











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   --
   -- Key Wrap Algorithms
   --

   KeyWrapAlgorithm KEY-WRAP ::= {
     kwa-3des   |
     kwa-aes128 |
     kwa-aes192 |
     kwa-aes256,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   --
   -- Content Encryption Algorithms
   --

   -- Constrains the EnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent
   -- field and the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo
   -- contentEncryptionAlgorithm field

   -- ContentEncryptionAlgorithms CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= {
   --   cea-des-ede3-cbc |
   --   cea-aes128-cbc   |
   --   cea-aes192-cbc   |
   --   cea-aes256-cbc   |
   --   cea-aes128-ccm   |
   --   cea-aes192-ccm   |
   --   cea-aes256-ccm   |
   --   cea-aes128-gcm   |
   --   cea-aes192-gcm   |
   --   cea-aes256-gcm,
   --   ... -- Extensible
   --   }

   -- des-ede3-cbc and aes*-cbc are used with EnvelopedData and
   -- EncryptedData
   -- aes*-ccm are used with AuthEnvelopedData
   -- aes*-gcm are used with AuthEnvelopedData











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   --
   -- Message Digest Algorithms
   --

   -- HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384,
   -- HMAC with SHA-512 are specified in [HMAC-SHA2]

   -- Constrains the AuthenticatedData
   -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field
   -- Constrains the AuthEnvelopedData
   -- MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithm field

   MessageAuthenticationCodeAlgorithms MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
     maca-sha1   |
     maca-sha224 |
     maca-sha256 |
     maca-sha384 |
     maca-sha512,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   -- Would love to import the HMAC224-512 OIDS but they're not in a
   -- module (that I could find)

   maca-sha224 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
     IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA224
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
   }

   id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 8 }

   maca-sha256 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
     IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA256
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
   }

   id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 9 }








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   maca-sha384 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
     IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA384
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
   }

   id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 10 }

   maca-sha512 MAC-ALGORITHM ::= {
     IDENTIFIER id-hmacWithSHA512
     PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE preferredPresent
   }

   id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
     digestAlgorithm(2) 11 }

   --
   -- Originator Public Key Algorithms
   --

   -- Constraints on KeyAgreeRecipientInfo OriginatorIdentifierOrKey
   -- OriginatorPublicKey algorithm field

   -- PARAMS are NULL

   OriginatorPKAlgorithms PUBLIC-KEY ::= {
     opka-ec,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   opka-ec PUBLIC-KEY ::={
     IDENTIFIER id-ecPublicKey
     KEY ECPoint
     PARAMS TYPE CHOICE { n NULL, p ECPoint } ARE preferredAbsent
   }

   -- Format for both ephemeral and static public keys

   -- ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING








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   -- Format of KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm field when used with
   -- ECMQV

   MQVuserKeyingMaterial ::= SEQUENCE {
     ephemeralPublicKey       OriginatorPublicKey,
     addedukm             [0] EXPLICIT UserKeyingMaterial OPTIONAL
   }

   -- 'SharedInfo' for input to KDF when using ECDH and ECMQV with
   -- EnvelopedData, AuthenticatedData, or AuthEnvelopedData

   ECC-CMS-SharedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
     keyInfo         AlgorithmIdentifier { KeyWrapAlgorithm },
     entityUInfo [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
     suppPubInfo [2] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING
   }

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities
   --

   SMIME-CAPS ::= CLASS {
     &Type  OPTIONAL,
     &id    OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE
   }
   WITH SYNTAX {TYPE &Type IDENTIFIED BY &id }

   SMIMECapability ::= SEQUENCE {
     capabilityID  SMIME-CAPS.&id({SMimeCapsSet}),
     parameters    SMIME-CAPS.
                     &Type({SMimeCapsSet}{@capabilityID}) OPTIONAL
   }

















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   SMimeCapsSet SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1                   |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224                 |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256                 |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384                 |
     cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512                 |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf        |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf      |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf   |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf |
     cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf             |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf           |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf           |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf           |
     cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf,
     ... -- Extensible
   }

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDSA with SHA2 Algorithms
   --

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA1 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA1.&id }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA224 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA224.&id }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA256 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA256.&id }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA384 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA384.&id }

   cap-ecdsa-with-SHA512 SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE NULL IDENTIFIED BY sa-ecdsaWithSHA512.&id }







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   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Standard
   --

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf }

   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECDH, Single Pass, Cofactor
   --

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf }

   cap-dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm
     IDENTIFIED BY dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf }







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   --
   -- S/MIME Capabilities: ECMQV, Single Pass, Standard
   --

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha1kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha224kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha256kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha384kdf }

   cap-mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf SMIME-CAPS ::= {
     TYPE KeyWrapAlgorithm IDENTIFIED BY mqvSinglePass-sha512kdf }

   END





























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Acknowledgements

   The methods described in this document are based on work done by the
   ANSI X9F1 working group.  The authors wish to extend their thanks to
   ANSI X9F1 for their assistance.  The authors also wish to thank Peter
   de Rooij for his patient assistance.  The technical comments of
   Francois Rousseau were valuable contributions.

   Many thanks go out to the other authors of RFC 3278: Simon Blake-
   Wilson and Paul Lambert.  Without the initial version of RFC3278 this
   version wouldn't exist.

   The authors also wish to thank Alfred Hoenes, Paul Hoffman, Russ
   Housley, and Jim Schaad for their valuable input.



































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Author's Addresses

   Sean Turner

   IECA, Inc.
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
   Fairfax, VA 22031
   USA

   Email: turners@ieca.com

   Daniel R. L. Brown

   Certicom Corp
   5520 Explorer Drive #400
   Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1
   CANADA

   Email: dbrown@certicom.com






























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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.

Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





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