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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 RFC 5990

S/MIME WG                             James Randall, Randall Consulting
Internet Draft                                        Burt Kaliski, EMC
Intended Status: Standards Track                     John Brainard, RSA
                                                      Sean Turner, IECA
Expires: June 8, 2010                                  December 8, 2009



             Use of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in CMS
                   <draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsa-kem-10.txt>


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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
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Abstract

   The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward)
   mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the
   recipient's RSA public key. This document specifies the conventions
   for using the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm with the Cryptographic
   Message Syntax (CMS). The ASN.1 syntax is aligned with ANS X9.44 and
   ISO/IEC 18033-2.

Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [STDWORDS].

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................3
   2. Use in CMS.....................................................4
      2.1. Underlying Components.....................................4
      2.2. RecipientInfo Conventions.................................5
      2.3. Certificate Conventions...................................5
      2.4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions...................6
   3. Security Considerations........................................7
   4. References.....................................................9
      4.1. Normative References......................................9
      4.2. Informative References....................................9
   Appendix A. RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm......................11
      A.1. Underlying Components....................................11
      A.2. Sender's Operations......................................11
      A.3. Recipient's Operations...................................12
   Appendix B. ASN.1 Syntax.........................................14
      B.2 Selected Underlying Components............................16
         B.2.1. Key Derivation Functions............................16
         B.2.2 Symmetric Key-Wrapping Schemes.......................18
      B.3 ASN.1 module..............................................19


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      B.4 Examples..................................................24
   IANA Considerations..............................................25
   Acknowledgements.................................................25
   Authors' Addresses...............................................26


1. Introduction

   The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward)
   mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the
   recipient's RSA public key.

   Most previous key transport algorithms based on the RSA public-key
   cryptosystem (e.g., the popular PKCS #1 v1.5 algorithm [PKCS1]) have
   the following general form:

    1. Format or "pad" the keying data to obtain an integer m.

    2. Encrypt the integer m with the recipient's RSA public key:

          c = m^e mod n

    3. Output c as the encrypted keying data.

   The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm takes a different approach that
   provides higher security assurance, by encrypting a _random_ integer
   with the recipient's public key, and using a symmetric key-wrapping
   scheme to encrypt the keying data. It has the following form:

    1. Generate a random integer z between 0 and n-1.

    2. Encrypt the integer z with the recipient's RSA public key:

         c = z^e mod n

    3. Derive a key-encrypting key KEK from the integer z.

    4. Wrap the keying data using KEK to obtain wrapped keying data WK.

    5. Output c and WK as the encrypted keying data.

   This different approach provides higher security assurance because
   (a) the input to the underlying RSA operation is effectively a random
   integer between 0 and n-1, where n is the RSA modulus, so it does not
   have any structure that could be exploited by an adversary, and (b)
   the input is independent of the keying data so the result of the RSA
   decryption operation is not directly available to an adversary.  As a


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   result, the algorithm enjoys a "tight" security proof in the random
   oracle model. (In other padding schemes, such as PKCS #1 v1.5, the
   input has structure and/or depends on the keying data, and the
   provable security assurances are not as strong.) The approach is also
   architecturally convenient because the public-key operations are
   separate from the symmetric operations on the keying data. One
   benefit is that the length of the keying data is bounded only by the
   symmetric key-wrapping scheme, not the size of the RSA modulus.

   The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm in various forms is being adopted
   in several draft standards as well as in ANS-X9.44 and ISO/IEC 18033-
   2. It has also been recommended by the NESSIE project [NESSIE].

   For completeness, a specification of the algorithm is given in
   Appendix A of this document; ASN.1 syntax is given in Appendix B.

   NOTE: The term KEM stands for "key encapsulation mechanism" and
   refers to the first three steps of the process above. The
   formalization of key transport algorithms (or more generally,
   asymmetric encryption schemes) in terms of key encapsulation
   mechanisms is described further in research by Victor Shoup leading
   to the development of the ISO/IEC 18033-2 standard [SHOUP].

2. Use in CMS

   The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm MAY be employed for one or more
   recipients in the CMS enveloped-data content type (Section 6 of
   [CMS]), where the keying data processed by the algorithm is the CMS
   content-encryption key.

   The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm SHOULD be considered for new CMS-
   based applications as a replacement for the widely implemented RSA
   encryption algorithm specified originally in PKCS #1 v1.5 (see
   [PKCS1] and Section 4.2.1 of [CMSALGS]), which is vulnerable to
   chosen-ciphertext attacks. The RSAES-OAEP Key Transport Algorithm has
   also been proposed as a replacement (see [PKCS1] and [CMS-OAEP]).
   RSA-KEM has the advantage over RSAES-OAEP of a tighter security
   proof, but the disadvantage of slightly longer encrypted keying data.

2.1. Underlying Components

   A CMS implementation that supports the RSA-KEM Key Transport
   Algorithm MUST support at least the following underlying components:

   o  For the key derivation function, KDF3 (see [IEEE-P1363a]) based on
   SHA-256 (see [FIPS-180-2]). KDF3 is an instantiation of the
   Concatenation Key Derivation Function defined in [NIST-SP800-56A].


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   o  For the key-wrapping scheme, AES-Wrap-128, i.e., the AES Key Wrap
   with a 128-bit key encrypting key (see [AES-WRAP])

   An implementation SHOULD also support KDF2 (see [ANS-X9.44]) based on
   SHA-1 (this function is also specified as the key derivation function
   in [ANS-X9.63]). The Camellia key wrap algorithm (see [CAMELLIA])
   SHOULD be supported, and, if 3DES is supported as a content-
   encryption cipher, then the Triple-DES Key Wrap (see [3DES-WRAP])
   SHOULD also be supported.

   It MAY support other underlying components. When AES or Camellia are
   used the data block size is 128 bits while the key size can be 128,
   192, or 256 bits while Triple DES requires a data block size of 64
   bits and a key size of 112 or 168 bits.

2.2. RecipientInfo Conventions

   When the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is employed for a recipient,
   the RecipientInfo alternative for that recipient MUST be
   KeyTransRecipientInfo. The algorithm-specific fields of the
   KeyTransRecipientInfo value MUST have the following values:

   o  keyEncryptionAlgorithm.algorithm MUST be id-rsa-kem (see Appendix
   B)

   o  keyEncryptionAlgorithm.parameters MUST be a value of type
   GenericHybridParameters, identifying the RSA-KEM key encapsulation
   mechanism (see Appendix B)

   o  encryptedKey MUST be the encrypted keying data output by the
   algorithm, where the keying data is the content-encryption key. (see
   Appendix A)

2.3. Certificate Conventions

   The conventions specified in this section augment RFC 5280 [PROFILE].

   A recipient who employs the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm MAY
   identify the public key in a certificate by the same
   AlgorithmIdentifier as for the PKCS #1 v1.5 algorithm, i.e., using
   the rsaEncryption object identifier [PKCS1]. The fact that the user
   will accept RSA-KEM with this public key is not indicated by the use
   of this identifier.  This may be signed by the use of the appropriate
   SMIME Capabilities either in a message or in the certificate.

   If the recipient wishes only to employ the RSA-KEM Key Transport
   Algorithm with a given public key, the recipient MUST identify the


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   public key in the certificate using the id-rsa-kem object identifier
   (see Appendix B). The parameters are absent.

   Regardless of the AlgorithmIdentifier used, the RSA public key is
   encoded in the same manner in the subject public key information. The
   RSA public key MUST be encoded using the type RSAPublicKey type:

      RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
         modulus            INTEGER, -- n
         publicExponent     INTEGER  -- e
      }

   Here, the modulus is the modulus n, and publicExponent is the public
   exponent e. The DER encoded RSAPublicKey is carried in the
   subjectPublicKey BIT STRING within the subject public key
   information.

   The intended application for the key MAY be indicated in the key
   usage certificate extension (see [PROFILE], Section 4.2.1.3). If the
   keyUsage extension is present in a certificate that conveys an RSA
   public key with the id-rsa-kem object identifier as discussed above,
   then the key usage extension MUST contain the following value:

       keyEncipherment.

   dataEncipherment SHOULD NOT be present. That is, a key intended to be
   employed only with the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm SHOULD NOT
   also be employed for data encryption or for authentication such as in
   signatures. Good cryptographic practice employs a given RSA key pair
   in only one scheme.  This practice avoids the risk that vulnerability
   in one scheme may compromise the security of the other, and may be
   essential to maintain provable security.

2.4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions

   RFC 3851 [MSG], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities signed
   attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs) to be
   used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software
   announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support. When constructing a
   signedData object, compliant software MAY include the
   SMIMECapabilities signed attribute announcing that it supports the
   RSA-KEM Key Transport algorithm.

   The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing the RSA-KEM Key Transport
   Algorithm MUST include the id-rsa-kem object identifier (see Appendix
   B) in the capabilityID field and MUST include a



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   GenericHybridParameters value in the parameters field identifying the
   components with which the algorithm is to be employed.

   The DER encoding of a SMIMECapability SEQUENCE is the same as the DER
   encoding of an AlgorithmIdentifier. Example DER encodings for typical
   sets of components are given in Appendix B.4.

3. Security Considerations

   The security of the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm described in this
   document can be shown to be tightly related to the difficulty of
   either solving the RSA problem or breaking the underlying symmetric
   key-wrapping scheme, if the underlying key derivation function is
   modeled as a random oracle, and assuming that the symmetric key-
   wrapping scheme satisfies the properties of a data encapsulation
   mechanism [SHOUP]. While in practice a random-oracle result does not
   provide an actual security proof for any particular key derivation
   function, the result does provide assurance that the general
   construction is reasonable; a key derivation function would need to
   be particularly weak to lead to an attack that is not possible in the
   random oracle model.

   The RSA key size and the underlying components should be selected
   consistent with the desired symmetric security level for an
   application. Several security levels have been identified in NIST
   FIPS PUB 800-57 [NIST-GUIDELINE]. For brevity, the first three levels
   are mentioned here:

   o  80-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 1024 bits,
   the hash function underlying the KDF SHOULD be SHA-1 or above, and
   the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key Wrap, Triple-DES
   Key Wrap, or Camellia Key Wrap.

   o  112-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 2048 bits,
   the hash function underlying the KDF SHOULD be SHA-224 or above, and
   the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key Wrap, Triple-DES
   Key Wrap, or Camellia Key Wrap.

   o  128-bit security. The RSA key size SHOULD be at least 3072 bits,
   the hash function underlying the KDF SHOULD be SHA-256 or above, and
   the symmetric key-wrapping scheme SHOULD be AES Key Wrap or Camellia
   Key Wrap.

   Note that the AES Key Wrap or Camellia Key Wrap MAY be used at all
   three of these levels; the use of AES or Camellia does not require a
   128-bit security level for other components.



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   Implementations MUST protect the RSA private key and the content-
   encryption key. Compromise of the RSA private key may result in the
   disclosure of all messages protected with that key. Compromise of the
   content-encryption key may result in disclosure of the associated
   encrypted content.

   Additional considerations related to key management may be found in
   [NIST-GUIDELINE].

   The security of the algorithm also depends on the strength of the
   random number generator, which SHOULD have a comparable security
   level. For further discussion on random number generation, please see
   [RANDOM].

   Implementations SHOULD NOT reveal information about intermediate
   values or calculations, whether by timing or other "side channels",
   or otherwise an opponent may be able to determine information about
   the keying data and/or the recipient's private key. Although not all
   intermediate information may be useful to an opponent, it is
   preferable to conceal as much information as is practical, unless
   analysis specifically indicates that the information would not be
   useful.

   Generally, good cryptographic practice employs a given RSA key pair
   in only one scheme.  This practice avoids the risk that vulnerability
   in one scheme may compromise the security of the other, and may be
   essential to maintain provable security.  While RSA public keys have
   often been employed for multiple purposes such as key transport and
   digital signature without any known bad interactions, for increased
   security assurance, such combined use of an RSA key pair is NOT
   RECOMMENDED in the future (unless the different schemes are
   specifically designed to be used together).

   Accordingly, an RSA key pair used for the RSA-KEM Key Transport
   Algorithm SHOULD NOT also be used for digital signatures. (Indeed,
   ASC X9 requires such a separation between key establishment key pairs
   and digital signature key pairs.) Continuing this principle of key
   separation, a key pair used for the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm
   SHOULD NOT be used with other key establishment schemes, or for data
   encryption, or with more than one set of underlying algorithm
   components.

   Parties MAY formalize the assurance that one another's
   implementations are correct through implementation validation, e.g.
   NIST's Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP).




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4. References

4.1. Normative References

   [3DES-WRAP]       Housley, R. Triple-DES and RC2 Key Wrapping. RFC
                     3217. December 2001.

   [AES-WRAP]        Schaad, J. and R. Housley. Advanced Encryption
                     Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm. RFC 3394.
                     September 2002.

   [ANS-X9.63]       American National Standard X9.63-2002: Public Key
                     Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry:
                     Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic
                     Curve Cryptography.

   [CAMELLIA]        Kato, A., Moriai, S., and Kanda, M.: Use of the
                     Camellia Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic
                     Message Syntax. RFC 3657. December 2005.

   [CMS]             Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax. RFC
                     5652. September 20009.

   [CMSALGS]         Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
                     Algorithms. RFC 3370. August 2002.

   [FIPS-180-2]      National Institute of Standards and Technology
                     (NIST). FIPS 180-2: Secure Hash Standard. August
                     2002.

   [MSG]             Ramsdell, B. S/MIME Version 3 Message
                     Specification. RFC 3851. July 2004.

   [PROFILE]         Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen,
                     S., Housley, R., and W. Polk. Internet X.509
                     Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
                     Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. RFC
                     5280. May 2008.

   [STDWORDS]        Bradner, S. Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
                     Requirement Levels. RFC 2119. March 1997.

4.2. Informative References

   [ANS-X9.44]       ASC X9F1 Working Group. American National Standard
                     X9.44: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial



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                     Services Industry -- Key Establishment Using
                     Integer Factorization Cryptography. 2007

   [CMS-OAEP]        Housley, R. Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport
                     Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax
                     (CMS). RFC 3560. July 2003.

   [IEEE-P1363a]     IEEE Std 1363a-2004: Standard Specifications for
                     Public Key Cryptography: Additional Techniques.
                     IEEE, 2004.

   [ISO-IEC-18033-2] ISO/IEC 18033-2:2005 Information technology --
                     Security techniques -- Encryption algorithms --
                     Part 2: Asymmetric Ciphers. ISO/IEC, 2005.

   [NESSIE]          NESSIE Consortium. Portfolio of Recommended
                     Cryptographic Primitives. February 27, 2003.
                     Available via http://www.cryptonessie.org/.

   [NIST-GUIDELINE]  National Institute of Standards and Technology.
                     Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for
                     Pairwise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete
                     Logarithm Cryptography March 2007. Available via:
                     http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/index.html.

   [NIST-SP800-56A]  National Institute of Standards and Technology.
                     Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for
                     Key Management. Part 1: General Guideline. August
                     2005. Available via:
                     http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/index.html.

   [PKCS1]           Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski. PKCS #1: RSA
                     Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1. RFC 3447.
                     February 2003.

   [RANDOM]          Eastlake, D., S. Crocker, and J. Schiller.
                     Randomness Recommendations for Security. RFC 4086.
                     June 2005.

   [SHOUP]           Shoup, V. A Proposal for an ISO Standard for
                     Public Key Encryption. Version 2.1, December 20,
                     2001. Available via http://www.shoup.net/papers/.







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Appendix A. RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm

   The RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is a one-pass (store-and-forward)
   mechanism for transporting keying data to a recipient using the
   recipient's RSA public key.

   With this type of algorithm, a sender encrypts the keying data using
   the recipient's public key to obtain encrypted keying data. The
   recipient decrypts the encrypted keying data using the recipient's
   private key to recover the keying data.

A.1. Underlying Components

   The algorithm has the following underlying components:

   o  KDF, a key derivation function, which derives keying data of a
   specified length from a shared secret value

   o  Wrap, a symmetric key-wrapping scheme, which encrypts keying Data
   using a key-encrypting key

   In the following, kekLen denotes the length in bytes of the key-
   encrypting key for the underlying symmetric key-wrapping scheme.

   In this scheme, the length of the keying data to be transported MUST
   be among the lengths supported by the underlying symmetric key-
   wrapping scheme. (Both the AES and Camellia Key Wraps, for instance,
   require the length of the keying data to be a multiple of 8 bytes,
   and at least 16 bytes.) Usage and formatting of the keying data
   (e.g., parity adjustment for Triple-DES keys) is outside the scope of
   this algorithm. With some key derivation functions, it is possible to
   include other information besides the shared secret value in the
   input to the function. Also, with some symmetric key-wrapping
   schemes, it is possible to associate a label with the keying data.
   Such uses are outside the scope of this document, as they are not
   directly supported by CMS.

A.2. Sender's Operations

   Let (n,e) be the recipient's RSA public key (see [PKCS1] for details)
   and let K be the keying data to be transported.

   Let nLen denote the length in bytes of the modulus n, i.e., the least
   integer such that 2^{8*nLen} > n.

   The sender performs the following operations:



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   1. Generate a random integer z between 0 and n-1 (see Note), and
   convert z to a byte string Z of length nLen, most significant byte
   first:

         z = RandomInteger (0, n-1)

         Z = IntegerToString (z, nLen)

   2. Encrypt the random integer z using the recipient's public key n,e)
   and convert the resulting integer c to a ciphertext C, a byte string
   of length nLen:

        c = z^e mod n

        C = IntegerToString (c, nLen)

   3. Derive a key-encrypting key KEK of length kekLen bytes from the
   byte string Z using the underlying key derivation function:

        KEK = KDF (Z, kekLen)

   4. Wrap the keying data K with the key-encrypting key KEK using the
   underlying key-wrapping scheme to obtain wrapped keying data WK:

        WK = Wrap (KEK, K)

   5. Concatenate the ciphertext C and the wrapped keying data WK to
   obtain the encrypted keying data EK:

        EK = C || WK

   6. Output the encrypted keying data EK.

   NOTE: The random integer z MUST be generated independently at random
   for different encryption operations, whether for the same or
   different recipients.

A.3. Recipient's Operations

   Let (n,d) be the recipient's RSA private key (see [PKCS1]; other
   private key formats are allowed) and let EK be the encrypted keying
   data.

   Let nLen denote the length in bytes of the modulus n.

   The recipient performs the following operations:



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   1. Separate the encrypted keying data EK into a ciphertext C of
     length nLen bytes and wrapped keying data WK:

        C || WK = EK

     If the length of the encrypted keying data is less than nLen
     bytes, output "decryption error" and stop.

   2. Convert the ciphertext C to an integer c, most significant byte
     first. Decrypt the integer c using the recipient's private key
     (n,d) to recover an integer z (see Note):

         c = StringToInteger (C)

         z = c^d mod n

      If the integer c is not between 0 and n-1, output "decryption
      error" and stop.

   3. Convert the integer z to a byte string Z of length nLen, most
   significant byte first (see Note):

        Z = IntegerToString (z, nLen)

   4. Derive a key-encrypting key KEK of length kekLen bytes from the
   byte string Z using the underlying key derivation function (see
   Note):

        KEK = KDF (Z, kekLen)

   5. Unwrap the wrapped keying data WK with the key-encrypting key KEK
      using the underlying key-wrapping scheme to recover the keying
      data K:

        K = Unwrap (KEK, WK)

      If the unwrapping operation outputs an error, output "decryption
      error" and stop.

   6. Output the keying data K.

   NOTE: Implementations SHOULD NOT reveal information about the integer
   z and the string Z, nor about the calculation of the exponentiation
   in Step 2, the conversion in Step 3, or the key derivation in Step 4,
   whether by timing or other "side channels". The observable behavior
   of the implementation SHOULD be the same at these steps for all
   ciphertexts C that are in range. (For example, IntegerToString


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   conversion should take the same amount of time regardless of the
   actual value of the integer z.) The integer z, the string Z and other
   intermediate results MUST be securely deleted when they are no longer
   needed.

Appendix B. ASN.1 Syntax

   The ASN.1 syntax for identifying the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm
   is an extension of the syntax for the "generic hybrid cipher" in
   ISO/IEC 18033-2 [ISO-IEC-18033-2], and is the same as employed in ANS
   X9.44 [ANS-X9.44]. The syntax for the scheme is given in Section B.1.
   The syntax for selected underlying components including those
   mentioned above is given in B.2.

   The following object identifier prefixes are used in the definitions
   below:

     is18033-2 OID ::= { iso(1) standard(0) is18033(18033) part2(2) }

     nistAlgorithm OID ::= {
        joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
        gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
     }

     pkcs-1 OID ::= {
        iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1)
     }

    NullParms is a more descriptive synonym for NULL when an algorithm
   identifier has null parameters:

     NullParms ::= NULL

   The material in this Appendix is based on ANS X9.44.

   B.1. RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm

   The object identifier for the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm is id-
   rsa-kem, which is defined in the draft as:

     id-rsa-kem OID ::= {
        iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
        pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) TBA
     }

   When id-rsa-kem is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters
   MUST employ the GenericHybridParameters syntax. The parameters MUST


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   be absent when used in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field The syntax for
   GenericHybridParameters is as follows:

     GenericHybridParameters ::= {
        kem  KeyEncapsulationMechanism,
        dem  DataEncapsulationMechanism
     }

   The fields of type GenericHybridParameters have the following
   meanings:

   o  kem identifies the underlying key encapsulation mechanism. For the
      RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm, the scheme is RSA-KEM from
      ISO/IEC 18033-2.

      The object identifier for RSA-KEM (as a key encapsulation
      mechanism) is id-kem-rsa, which is defined in ISO/IEC 18033-2 as:

         id-kem-rsa OID ::= {
            is18033-2 key-encapsulation-mechanism(2) rsa(4)
         }

      The associated parameters for id-kem-rsa have type
      RsaKemParameters:

        RsaKemParameters ::= {
           keyDerivationFunction  KeyDerivationFunction,
           keyLength              KeyLength
        }

      The fields of type RsaKemParameters have the following meanings:

      *  keyDerivationFunction identifies the underlying key derivation
      function. For alignment with ANS X9.44, it MUST be KDF2 or KDF3.
      However, other key derivation functions MAY be used with CMS.
      Please see B.2.1 for the syntax for KDF2 and KDF3.

        KeyDerivationFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDFAlgorithms}}

        KDFAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
           kdf2 | kdf3,
           ...  -- implementations may define other methods
        }

      *  keyLength is the length in bytes of the key-encrypting key,
      which depends on the underlying symmetric key-wrapping scheme.



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        KeyLength ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)

   o  dem identifies the underlying data encapsulation mechanism. For
      alignment with ANS X9.44, it MUST be an X9-approved symmetric
      key-wrapping scheme. (See Note.) However, other symmetric key-
      wrapping schemes MAY be used with CMS. Please see B.2.2 for the
      syntax for the AES, Triple-DES, and Camellia Key Wraps.

        DataEncapsulationMechanism ::=
           AlgorithmIdentifier {{DEMAlgorithms}}

        DEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
           X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes,
           Camellia-KeyWrappingSchemes,
           ...  -- implementations may define other methods
        }

        X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
           aes128-Wrap | aes192-Wrap | aes256-Wrap | tdes-Wrap,
           ...   -- allows for future expansion
        }

        Camellia-KeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
           Camellia128-Wrap | Camellia192-Wrap | Camellia256-Wrap
        }

   NOTE: The generic hybrid cipher in ISO/IEC 18033-2 can encrypt
   arbitrary data, hence the term "data encapsulation mechanism". The
   symmetric key-wrapping schemes take the role of data encapsulation
   mechanisms in the RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm.  ISO/IEC 18033-2
   allows only three specific data encapsulation mechanisms, not
   including any of these symmetric key-wrapping schemes. However, the
   ASN.1 syntax in that document expects that additional algorithms will
   be allowed.

B.2 Selected Underlying Components

B.2.1. Key Derivation Functions

   The object identifier for KDF2 (see [ANS X9.44]) is:

     id-kdf-kdf2 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf2(1) }

   The associated parameters identify the underlying hash function. For
   alignment with ANS X9.44, the hash function MUST be an ASC X9-
   approved hash function. However, other hash functions MAY be used
   with CMS.


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     kdf2 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-kdf-kdf2  PARMS KDF2-HashFunction }

     KDF2-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDF2-HashFunctions}}

     KDF2-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
        X9-HashFunctions,
        ...  -- implementations may define other methods
     }

     X9-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
        sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512,
        ...  -- allows for future expansion
     }

   The object identifier for SHA-1 is:

     id-sha1 OID ::= {
        iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
        algorithms(2) sha1(26)
     }

   The object identifiers for SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 are

     id-sha224 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha224(4) }
     id-sha256 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(1) }
     id-sha384 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha384(2) }
     id-sha512 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha512(3) }

   There has been some confusion over whether the various SHA object
   identifiers have a NULL parameter, or no associated parameters. As
   also discussed in [PKCS1], implementations SHOULD generate algorithm
   identifiers without parameters, and MUST accept algorithm identifiers
   either without parameters, or with NULL parameters.

     sha1   ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha1   } -- NULLParms MUST be
     sha224 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha224 } -- accepted for these
     sha256 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha256 } -- OIDs
     sha384 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha384 } -- ""
     sha512 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha512 } -- ""

   The object identifier for KDF3 (see [ANS X9.44]) is:

     id-kdf-kdf3 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf3(2) }

   The associated parameters identify the underlying hash function. For
   alignment with the draft ANS X9.44, the hash function MUST be an ASC



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   X9-approved hash function. (See Note.) However, other hash functions
   MAY be used with CMS.

     kdf3 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-kdf-kdf3  PARMS KDF3-HashFunction }

     KDF3-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier { KDF3-HashFunctions }

     KDF3-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
        X9-HashFunctions,
        ...  -- implementations may define other methods
     }

B.2.2 Symmetric Key-Wrapping Schemes

   The object identifiers for the AES Key Wrap depends on the size of
   the key encrypting key. There are three object identifiers (see [AES-
   WRAP]):

     id-aes128-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes128-Wrap(5) }
     id-aes192-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes192-Wrap(25) }
     id-aes256-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes256-Wrap(45) }

   These object identifiers have no associated parameters.

     aes128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes128-Wrap }
     aes192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes192-Wrap }
     aes256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes256-Wrap }

   The object identifier for the Triple-DES Key Wrap (see [3DES-WRAP])
   is:

     id-alg-CMS3DESwrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
        iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
        smime(16) alg(3) 6
     }

   This object identifier has a NULL parameter.

     tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::=
        { OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap  PARMS NullParms }

   NOTE: As of this writing, the AES Key Wrap and the Triple-DES Key
   Wrap are in the process of being approved by ASC X9.

   The object identifiers for the Camellia Key Wrap depend on the size
   of the key encrypting key. There are three object identifiers:



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     id-camellia128-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
          algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
          camellia128-wrap(2) }

     id-camellia192-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
          algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
          camellia192-wrap(3) }

     id-camellia256-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
        { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
          algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
          camellia256-wrap(4) }

   These object identifiers have no associated parameters.



     camellia128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia128-Wrap }
     camellia192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia192-Wrap }
     camellia256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia256-Wrap }

B.3 ASN.1 module

   CMS-RSA-KEM
     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
       pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-rsa-kem(21) }

   DEFINITIONS ::=

   BEGIN

   -- EXPORTS ALL

   -- IMPORTS None

   -- Useful types and definitions

   OID ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER  -- alias

   -- Unless otherwise stated, if an object identifier has associated
   -- parameters (i.e., the PARMS element is specified), the
   -- parameters field shall be included in algorithm identifier
   -- values. The parameters field shall be omitted if and only if
   -- the object identifier does not have associated parameters
   -- (i.e., the PARMS element is omitted), unless otherwise stated.


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   ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
     &id    OBJECT IDENTIFIER  UNIQUE,
     &Type  OPTIONAL
   }
   WITH SYNTAX { OID &id [PARMS &Type] }

   AlgorithmIdentifier { ALGORITHM:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE {
     algorithm   ALGORITHM.&id( {IOSet} ),
     parameters  ALGORITHM.&Type( {IOSet}{@algorithm} ) OPTIONAL
   }

   NullParms ::= NULL

   -- ISO/IEC 18033-2 arc

   is18033-2 OID ::= { iso(1) standard(0) is18033(18033) part2(2) }

   -- NIST algorithm arc

   nistAlgorithm OID ::= {
     joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)
     gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4)
   }

   -- PKCS #1 arc

   pkcs-1 OID ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1)
   }

   -- RSA-KEM Key Transport Algorithm

   id-rsa-kem OID ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
     pkcs-9(9) smime(16) alg(3) TBA
   }

   GenericHybridParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
     kem  KeyEncapsulationMechanism,
     dem  DataEncapsulationMechanism
   }

   KeyEncapsulationMechanism ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KEMAlgorithms}}

   KEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { kem-rsa, ... }

   kem-rsa ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-kem-rsa PARAMS RsaKemParameters }


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   id-kem-rsa OID ::= {
     is18033-2 key-encapsulation-mechanism(2) rsa(4)
   }

   RsaKemParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
     keyDerivationFunction  KeyDerivationFunction,
     keyLength              KeyLength
   }

   KeyDerivationFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{KDFAlgorithms}}

   KDFAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     kdf2 | kdf3,
     ...  -- implementations may define other methods
   }

   KeyLength ::= INTEGER (1..MAX)

   DataEncapsulationMechanism ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{DEMAlgorithms}}

   DEMAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= {
     X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes |
     Camellia-KeyWrappingSchemes,
     ...  -- implementations may define other methods
   }

   X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
     aes128-Wrap | aes192-Wrap | aes256-Wrap | tdes-Wrap,
     ...   -- allows for future expansion
   }

   X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingScheme ::=
               AlgorithmIdentifier {{ X9-SymmetricKeyWrappingSchemes }}

   Camellia-KeyWrappingSchemes ALGORITHM ::= {
     camellia128-Wrap | camellia192-Wrap | camellia256-Wrap,
     ... -- allows for future expansion
   }

   Camellia-KeyWrappingScheme ::=
                  AlgorithmIdentifier {{ Camellia-KeyWrappingSchemes }}

   -- Key Derivation Functions

   id-kdf-kdf2 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf2(1) }

   -- Base arc


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   x9-44 OID ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) tc68(133) country(16) x9(840)
     x9Standards(9) x9-44(44)
   }

   x9-44-components OID ::= { x9-44 components(1) }

   kdf2 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-kdf-kdf2  PARMS KDF2-HashFunction }

   KDF2-HashFunction ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{ KDF2-HashFunctions }}

   KDF2-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
     X9-HashFunctions,
     ...  -- implementations may define other methods
   }

   id-kdf-kdf3 OID ::= { x9-44-components kdf3(2) }

   kdf3 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-kdf-kdf2  PARMS KDF3-HashFunction }

   KDF3-HashFunction  ::= AlgorithmIdentifier {{ KDF3-HashFunctions }}

   KDF3-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
     X9-HashFunctions,
     ...  -- implementations may define other methods
   }

   -- Hash Functions

   X9-HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::= {
     sha1 | sha224 | sha256 | sha384 | sha512,
     ...  -- allows for future expansion
   }

   id-sha1 OID ::= {
     iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3)
     algorithms(2) sha1(26)
   }

   id-sha224 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(4) }

   id-sha256 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha256(1) }

   id-sha384 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha384(2) }

   id-sha512 OID ::= { nistAlgorithm hashAlgs(2) sha512(3) }



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   sha1   ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha1    } -- NullParms MUST be

   sha224 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha224  } -- accepted for these

   sha256 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha256  } -- OIDs

   sha384 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha384  } -- ""

   sha512 ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-sha512  } -- ""

   -- Symmetric Key-Wrapping Schemes

   id-aes128-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes128-Wrap(5)  }

   id-aes192-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes192-Wrap(25) }

   id-aes256-Wrap OID ::= { nistAlgorithm aes(1) aes256-Wrap(45) }

   aes128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes128-Wrap }

   aes192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes192-Wrap }

   aes256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-aes256-Wrap }

   id-alg-CMS3DESwrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
     iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
     smime(16) alg(3) 6
   }

   tdes-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-alg-CMS3DESwrap  PARMS NullParms }

   id-camellia128-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
       algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
       camellia128-wrap(2) }

   id-camellia192-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
       algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
       camellia192-wrap(3) }

   id-camellia256-Wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
     { iso(1) member-body(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
       algorithm(1) key-wrap-algorithm(3)
       camellia256-wrap(4) }

   camellia128-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia128-Wrap }


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   camellia192-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia192-Wrap }

   camellia256-Wrap ALGORITHM ::= { OID id-camellia256-Wrap }

   END

B.4 Examples

   As an example, if the key derivation function is KDF3 based on SHA-
   256 and the symmetric key-wrapping scheme is the AES Key Wrap with a
   128-bit KEK, the AlgorithmIdentifier for the RSA-KEM Key Transport
   Algorithm will have the following value:

   SEQUENCE {
      id-rsa-kem,                                   -- RSA-KEM cipher
      SEQUENCE {                           -- GenericHybridParameters
         SEQUENCE {                    -- key encapsulation mechanism
            id-kem-rsa,                                    -- RSA-KEM
            SEQUENCE {                            -- RsaKemParameters
               SEQUENCE {                  -- key derivation function
                  id-kdf-kdf3,                                -- KDF3
                  SEQUENCE {                     -- KDF3-HashFunction
                     id-sha256  -- SHA-256; no parameters (preferred)
                  },
               16                              -- KEK length in bytes
               },
         SEQUENCE {                   -- data encapsulation mechanism
            id-aes128-Wrap             -- AES-128 Wrap; no parameters
         }
      }
   }

   This AlgorithmIdentifier value has the following DER encoding (??
   indicates the algorithm number which is to be assigned):

   30 53
        06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 ??         -- id-rsa-kem
        30 44
           30 25
              06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 02 04               -- id-kem-rsa
              30 1a
                 30 16
                    06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 05 02        -- id-kdf-kdf3
                    30 0b
                        06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 -- id-sha256
                  02 10                                   -- 16 bytes



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           30 0b
              06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 01 05     -- id-aes128-Wrap

   The DER encodings for other typical sets of underlying components are
   as follows:

   o KDF3 based on SHA-384, AES Key Wrap with a 192-bit KEK

      30 46 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 ?? 02
      01 02 30 44 30 25 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 02 04 30
      1a 30 16 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 05 02 30 0b 06 09
      60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 02 18 30 0b 06 09 60
      86 48 01 65 03 04 01 19

   o KDF3 based on SHA-512, AES Key Wrap with a 256-bit KEK

      30 46 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 ?? 02
      01 02 30 44 30 25 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 02 04 30
      1a 30 16 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 05 02 30 0b 06 09
      60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 02 20 30 0b 06 09 60
      86 48 01 65 03 04 01 2d

   o KDF2 based on SHA-1, Triple-DES Key Wrap with a 128-bit KEK (two-
   key triple-DES)

      30 46 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 09 10 03 ?? 02
      01 02 30 44 30 21 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 01 04 30
      16 30 12 06 07 28 81 8c 71 02 05 02 30 07 06 05
      2b 0e 03 02 1a 02 10 30 0f 06 0b 2a 86 48 86 f7
      0d 01 09 10 03 06 05 00

IANA Considerations

   Within the CMS, algorithms are identified by object identifiers
   (OIDs). With one exception, all of the OIDs used in this document
   were assigned in other IETF documents, in ISO/IEC standards
   documents, by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
   (NIST), and in Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) documents.
   The one exception is that the ASN.1 module's identifier (see Appendix
   B.3) is assigned in this document. No further action by the IANA is
   necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.

Acknowledgements

   This document is one part of a strategy to align algorithm standards
   produced by ASC X9, ISO/IEC JTC1 SC27, NIST, and the IETF. We would



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   like to thank the members of the ASC X9F1 working group for their
   contributions to drafts of ANS X9.44 which led to this specification.

   Our thanks to Russ Housley as well for his guidance and
   encouragement. We also appreciate the helpful direction we've
   received from Blake Ramsdell and Jim Schaad in bringing this document
   to fruition. A special thanks to Magnus Nystrom for his assistance on
   Appendix B. Thanks also to Bob Griffin and John Linn for both
   editorial direction and procedural guidance.

Authors' Addresses

   James Randall
   Randall Consulting
   55 Sandpiper Drive
   Dover, NH 03820
   USA

   Email: jdrandall@comcast.net

   Burt Kaliski
   EMC
   176 South Street
   Hopkinton, MA 01748
   USA

   Email: kaliski_burt@emc.com

   John Brainard
   RSA, The Security Division of EMC
   174 Middlesex Turnpike
   Bedford, MA  01730
   USA

   Email: jbrainard@rsa.com

   Sean Turner
   IECA, Inc.
   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
   Fairfax, VA 22031
   USA

   Email: turners@ieca.com






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