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TLS                                                         S. Santesson
Internet-Draft                                           3xA Security AB
Intended status: Standards Track                           H. Tschofenig
Expires: March 16, 2013                           Nokia Siemens Networks
                                                      September 12, 2012


      Transport Layer Security (TLS) Cached Information Extension
                   draft-ietf-tls-cached-info-13.txt

Abstract

   Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshakes often include fairly static
   information, such as the server certificate and a list of trusted
   Certification Authorities (CAs).  This information can be of
   considerable size, particularly if the server certificate is bundled
   with a complete certificate path (including all intermediary
   certificates up to the trust anchor public key).

   This document defines an extension that omits the exchange of already
   available information.  The TLS client informs a server of cached
   information, for example from a previous TLS handshake, allowing the
   server to omit the already available information.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 16, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents



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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Cached Information Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Exchange Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.1.  Fingerprint of the Certificate Chain . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.2.  Fingerprint for Trusted CAs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     7.1.  New Entry to the TLS ExtensionType Registry  . . . . . . . 13
     7.2.  New Registry for CachedInformationType . . . . . . . . . . 13
   8.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
























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1.  Introduction

   Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshakes often include fairly static
   information, such as the server certificate and a list of trusted
   Certification Authorities (CAs).  This information can be of
   considerable size, particularly if the server certificate is bundled
   with a complete certificate path (including all intermediary
   certificates up to the trust anchor public key).

   Optimizing the exchange of information to a minimum helps to improve
   performance in environments where devices are connected to a network
   with characteristics like low bandwidth, high latency and high loss
   rate.  These types of networks exist, for example, when smart objects
   are connected using a low power IEEE 802.15.4 radio.  For more
   information about the challenges with smart object deployments please
   see [RFC6574].

   This specification defines a TLS extension that allows a client and a
   server to exclude transmission of cached information from the TLS
   handshake.

   A typical example exchange may therefore look as follows.  First, the
   TLS exchange executes the usual TLS handshake.  It may decide to
   store the certificate provided by the server for a future exchange.
   When the TLS client then connects to the TLS server some time in the
   future, without using session resumption, it then attaches the
   cached_information extension defined in this document to the client
   hello message to indicate that it had cached the certificate, and it
   provides the fingerprint of it.  If the server's certificate had not
   changed then the TLS server does not need to send the full
   certificate to the client again.  In case the information had
   changed, the certificate payload is transmitted to the client to
   allow the client to update it's state information.


















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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "MUST", "MUST NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].














































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3.  Cached Information Extension

   This document defines a new extension type (cached_information(TBD)),
   which is used in client hello and server hello messages.  The
   extension type is specified as follows.



         enum {
              cached_information(TBD), (65535)
         } ExtensionType;

   The extension_data field of this extension, when included in the
   client hello, MUST contain the CachedInformation structure.



         enum {
              certificate_chain(1), trusted_cas(2) (255)
         } CachedInformationType;

         struct {
              CachedInformationType type;
              HashAlgorithm hash;
              opaque hash_value<1..255>;
         } CachedObject;

         struct {
              CachedObject cached_info<1..2^16-1>;
         } CachedInformation;

   When the CachedInformationType identifies a certificate_chain, then
   the hash_value field MUST include the hash calculated over the
   certificate_list element of the Certificate payload provided by the
   TLS server in an earlier exchange, excluding the three length bytes
   of the certificate_list vector.

   When the CachedInformationType identifies a trusted_cas, then the
   hash_value MUST include a hash calculated over the
   certificate_authorities element of the CertificateRequest payload
   provided by the TLS server in an earlier exchange, excluding the two
   length bytes of the certificate_authorities vector.

   The hash algorithm used to calculate hash values is conveyed in the
   'hash' field of the CachedObject element.  The list of registered
   hash algorithms can be found in the TLS HashAlgorithm Registry, which
   was created by RFC 5246 [RFC5246].  The value zero (0) for 'none' is
   not an allowed choice for a hash algorithm and MUST NOT be used.



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   This document establishes a registry for CachedInformationType types
   and additional values can be added following the policy described in
   Section 7.
















































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4.  Exchange Specification

   Clients supporting this extension MAY include the
   "cached_information" extension in the (extended) client hello, which
   MAY contain zero or more CachedObject attributes.

   Server supporting this extension MAY include the "cached_information"
   extension in the (extended) server hello, which MAY contain one or
   more CachedObject attributes.  By returning the "cached_information"
   extension the server indicates that it supports caching of each
   present CachedObject that matches the specified hash value.  The
   server MAY support other cached objects that are not present in the
   extension.

   Note: Clients may need the ability to cache different values
   depending on other information in the Client Hello that modify what
   values the server uses, in particular the Server Name Indication
   [RFC6066] value.

   Following a successful exchange of "cached_information" extensions,
   the server MAY send fingerprints of the cached information in the
   handshake exchange as a replacement for the exchange of the full
   data.  Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 defines the syntax of the
   fingerprinted information.

   The handshake protocol MUST proceed using the information as if it
   was provided in the handshake protocol.  The Finished message MUST be
   calculated over the actual data exchanged in the handshake protocol.
   That is, the Finished message will be calculated over the hash values
   of cached information objects and not over the cached information
   that were omitted from transmission.

   The server MUST NOT include more than one fingerprint for a single
   information element, i.e., at maximum only one CachedObject structure
   per replaced information is provided.

4.1.  Fingerprint of the Certificate Chain

   When an object of type 'certificate_chain' is provided in the client
   hello, the server MAY send a fingerprint instead of the complete
   certificate chain as shown below.

   The original handshake message syntax is defined in RFC 5246
   [RFC5246] and has the following structure:







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         opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>;

         struct {
             ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
         } Certificate;

   By using the extension defined in this document the following
   information is sent:



   struct {
                 CachedObject cached_objects<1..2^24-1>;
   } Certificate;

   The certificate_list vector of opaque ASN.1Cert elements in the
   original syntax is replaced with a vector holding CachedObject
   structures as defined in this document.

   Note: [I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey] allows a PKIX certificate containing
   only the SubjectPublicKeyInfo instead of the full information
   typically found in a certificate.  Hence, when this specification is
   used in combination with [I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey] and the negotiated
   certificate type is a raw public key then the TLS server sends the
   hashed Certificate payload that contains a ASN.1Cert structure of the
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo.

4.2.  Fingerprint for Trusted CAs

   When a hash for an object of type 'trusted_cas' is provided in the
   client hello, the server MAY send a fingerprint instead of the
   complete certificate authorities information as shown below.

   The original handshake message syntax is defined in RFC 5246
   [RFC5246] and has the following structure:



         opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;

         struct {
             ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
             SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
               supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>;
             DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
         } CertificateRequest;

   By using the extension defined in this document the following



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   information is sent:



          struct {
             ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
             SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
               supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>;
             CachedObject cached_objects<1..2^16-1>;
          } CertificateRequest;

   The certificate_authorities vector of opaque DistinguishedName
   elements in the original syntax is replaced with a vector holding
   CachedObject structures as defined in this document.





































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5.  Example

   Figure 1 illustrates an example exchange using the TLS cached info
   extension.  In the normal TLS handshake exchange shown in flow (A)
   the TLS server provides its certificate in the Certificate payload to
   the client, see step [1].  This allows the client to store the
   certificate for future use.  After some time the TLS client again
   interacts with the same TLS server and makes use of the TLS cached
   info extension, as shown in flow (B).  The TLS client indicates
   support for this specification via the cached_information extension,
   see [2], and indicates that it has stored the certificate_chain from
   the earlier exchange.  With [3] the TLS server indicates that it also
   supports this specification and informs the client that it also
   supports caching of other objects beyond the 'certificate_chain',
   namely 'trusted_cas' (also defined in this document), and the 'foo-
   bar' extension (i.e., an imaginary extension that yet needs to be
   defined).  With [4] the TLS server provides the fingerprint of the
   certificate chain as described in Section 4.1.

































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 (A) Initial (full) Exchange

 client_hello  ->
                        <-  server_hello,
                            certificate, // [1]
                            server_key_exchange,
                            server_hello_done

 client_key_exchange,
 change_cipher_spec,
 finished                  ->

                        <- change_cipher_spec,
                           finished

 Application Data        <------->     Application Data


 (B) TLS Cached Extension Usage

 client_hello,
 cached_information=(certificate_chain)   -> // [2]
                        <-  server_hello,
                            cached_information= // [3]
                               (certificate_chain, trusted_cas, foo-bar)
                            certificate, // [4]
                            server_key_exchange,
                            server_hello_done

 client_key_exchange,
 change_cipher_spec,
 finished                  ->

                        <- change_cipher_spec,
                           finished

 Application Data        <------->     Application Data

                    Figure 1: Example Message Exchange












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6.  Security Considerations

   This specification defines a mechanism to reference stored state
   using a fingerprint.  The hash algorithm used in this specification
   is required to have reasonable random properties in order to provide
   reasonably unique identifiers.  There is no requirement that this
   hash algorithm must have strong collision resistance.

   Caching information in an encrypted handshake (such as a renegotiated
   handshake) and sending a hash of that cached information in an
   unencrypted handshake might introduce integrity or data disclosure
   issues as it enables an attacker to identify if a known object (such
   as a known server certificate) has been used in previous encrypted
   handshakes.  Information object types defined in this specification,
   such as server certificates, are public objects and usually not
   sensitive in this regard, but implementers should be aware if any
   cached information are subject to such security concerns and in such
   case SHOULD NOT send a hash over encrypted data in unencrypted
   handshake.
































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7.  IANA Considerations

7.1.  New Entry to the TLS ExtensionType Registry

   IANA is requested to add an entry to the existing TLS ExtensionType
   registry, defined in RFC 5246 [RFC5246], for cached_information(TBD)
   defined in this document.

7.2.  New Registry for CachedInformationType

   IANA is requested to establish a registry for TLS
   CachedInformationType values.  The first entries in the registry are

   o  certificate_chain(1)

   o  trusted_cas(2)

   The policy for adding new values to this registry, following the
   terminology defined in RFC 5226 [RFC5226], is as follows:

   o  0-63 (decimal): Standards Action

   o  64-223 (decimal): Specification Required

   o  224-255 (decimal): reserved for Private Use


























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8.  Acknowledgments

   We would like to thank the following persons for your detailed
   document reviews:

   o  Paul Wouters and Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos (December 2011)

   o  Rob Stradling (February 2012)

   o  Ondrej Mikle in March 2012)

   Additionally, we would like to thank the TLS working group chairs,
   Eric Rescorla and Joe Salowey, as well as the security area
   directors, Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell, for their feedback and
   support.




































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9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3874]  Housley, R., "A 224-bit One-way Hash Function: SHA-224",
              RFC 3874, September 2004.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC6066]  Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
              Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-tls-oob-pubkey]
              Wouters, P., Gilmore, J., Weiler, S., Kivinen, T., and H.
              Tschofenig, "Out-of-Band Public Key Validation for
              Transport Layer Security", draft-ietf-tls-oob-pubkey-04
              (work in progress), July 2012.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

   [RFC6574]  Tschofenig, H. and J. Arkko, "Report from the Smart Object
              Workshop", RFC 6574, April 2012.





















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Authors' Addresses

   Stefan Santesson
   3xA Security AB
   Scheelev. 17
   Lund  223 70
   Sweden

   Email: sts@aaa-sec.com


   Hannes Tschofenig
   Nokia Siemens Networks
   Linnoitustie 6
   Espoo  02600
   Finland

   Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
   URI:   http://www.tschofenig.priv.at































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