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Versions: (draft-rescorla-tls-renegotiation) 00 01 02 03 RFC 5746

Network Working Group                                        E. Rescorla
Internet-Draft                                                RTFM, Inc.
Updates:  RFCs 5246, 4366, 4347,                                  M. Ray
4346, 2246 (if approved)                                     S. Dispensa
Intended status:  Standards Track                            PhoneFactor
Expires:  June 19, 2010                                         N. Oskov
                                                               Microsoft
                                                       December 16, 2009


   Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension
                  draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-02.txt

Abstract

   SSL and TLS renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the
   attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects
   content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from
   a client.  The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a
   renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by
   the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data.
   This specification defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie
   renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over,
   thus preventing this attack.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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   Drafts.

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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 19, 2010.




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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Conventions Used In This Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Extension Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Renegotiation Protection Request Signalling Cipher Suite
       Value  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Requirements for Sending and Receiving . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   6.  Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     6.1.  Client Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     6.2.  Server Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.3.  SSLv3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   9.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
































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1.  Introduction

   TLS [RFC5246] allows either the client or the server to initiate
   renegotiation--a new handshake which establishes new cryptographic
   parameters.  Unfortunately, although the new handshake is carried out
   using the cryptographic parameters established by the original
   handshake, there is no cryptographic connection between the two.
   This creates the opportunity for an attack in which the attacker who
   can intercept a client's transport layer connection can inject
   traffic of his own as a prefix to the client's interaction with the
   server.  The attack [Ray09] proceeds as shown below:

   Client                        Attacker                        Server
   ------                        -------                         ------
                                     <----------- Handshake ---------->
                                     <======= Initial Traffic ========>
   <--------------------------  Handshake ============================>
   <======================== Client Traffic ==========================>

   To start the attack, the attacker forms a TLS connection to the
   server (perhaps in response to an initial intercepted connection from
   the client).  He then sends any traffic of his choice to the server.
   This may involve multiple requests and responses at the application
   layer, or may simply be a partial application layer request intended
   to prefix the client's data.  This traffic is shown with == to
   indicate it is encrypted.  He then allows the client's TLS handshake
   to proceed with the server.  The handshake is in the clear to the
   attacker but encrypted over the attacker's TLS connection to the
   server.  Once the handshake has completed, the client communicates
   with the server over the newly established security parameters with
   the server.  The attacker cannot read this traffic, but the server
   believes that the initial traffic to and from the attacker is the
   same as that to and from the client.

   If certificate-based client authentication is used, the server will
   see a stream of bytes where the initial bytes are protected but
   unauthenticated by TLS and subsequent bytes are authenticated by TLS
   and bound to the client's certificate.  In some protocols (notably
   HTTPS), no distinction is made between pre- and post-authentication
   stages and the bytes are handled uniformly, resulting in the server
   believing that the initial traffic corresponds to the authenticated
   client identity.  Even without certificate-based authentication, a
   variety of attacks may be possible in which the attacker convinces
   the server to accept data from it as data from the client.  For
   instance, if HTTPS [RFC2818] is in use with HTTP cookies [RFC2965]
   the attacker may be able to generate a request of his choice
   validated by the client's cookie.




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   Some protocols--such as IMAP or SMTP--have more explicit transitions
   between authenticated and unauthenticated phases and require that the
   protocol state machine be partly or fully reset at such transitions.
   If strictly followed, these rules may limit the effect of attacks.
   Unfortunately, there is no requirement for state machine resets at
   TLS renegotiation and thus there is still a potential window of
   vulnerability, for instance by prefixing a command which writes to an
   area visible by the attacker with a command by the client that
   includes his password, thus making the client's password visible to
   the attacker (note that this precise attack does not work with
   challenge-response authentication schemes but other attacks may be
   possible).  Similar attacks are available with SMTP and in fact do
   not necessarily require the attacker to have an account on the target
   server.

   It is important to note that in both cases these attacks are possible
   because the client sends unsolicited authentication information
   without requiring any specific data from the server over the TLS
   connection.  Protocols which require a round trip to the server over
   TLS before the client sends sensitive information are likely to be
   less vulnerable.

   These attacks can be prevented by cryptographically binding
   renegotiation handshakes to the enclosing TLS cryptographic
   parameters, thus allowing the server to differentiate renegotiation
   from initial negotiation, as well as preventing renegotiations from
   being spliced in between connections.  An attempt by an attacker to
   inject himself as described above will result in a mismatch of the
   cryptographic binding and can thus be detected.  The data used in the
   extension is similar to, but not the same as, the date used in the
   tls-unique and/or tls-unique-for-telnet channel bindings described in
   [I-D.altman-tls-channel-bindings], however this extension is not a
   general-purpose RFC 5056 [RFC5056] channel binding facility."


2.  Conventions Used In This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


3.  Extension Definition

   This document defines a new TLS extension:  "renegotiation_info",
   which contains a cryptographic binding to the enclosing TLS
   connection (if any) for which the renegotiation is being performed.
   The "extension data" field of this extension contains a



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   "Renegotiation_Info" structure:

             struct {
               opaque renegotiated_connection<0..255>;
             } Renegotiation_Info;

   The contents of this extension are specified as follows.

   o  If this is the initial handshake for a connection, then the
      "renegotiated_connection" field is of zero length in both the
      ClientHello and the ServerHello.  Thus, the entire encoding of the
      extension is:  ff 01 00 01 00.  The first two octets represent the
      extension type, the third and fourth octet the length of the
      extension itself, and the final octet the zero length byte for the
      "renegotiated_connection" field.
   o  For ClientHellos which are renegotiating, this field contains the
      verify_data from the Finished message sent by the client on the
      immediately previous handshake.  For current versions of TLS, this
      will be a 12-byte value.
   o  For ServerHellos which are renegotiating, this field contains the
      concatenation of the verify_data values sent by the client and the
      server (in that order) on the immediately previous handshake.  For
      current versions of TLS, this will be a 24-byte value.

   The above rules apply even when TLS session resumption is used.

   Upon receipt of the "renegotiation_info" extension, both client and
   server implementations which support the extension MUST verify that
   it contains the correct contents as specified above (the previous
   client Finished.verify_data in the ClientHello and the concatenation
   of both Finished.verify_data values in the ServerHello).  If the
   contents are incorrect, then it MUST generate a fatal
   "handshake_failure" alert and terminate the connection.  This allows
   two implementations both of which support the extension to safely
   renegotiate without fear of the above attack.  This requirement to
   validate any received RI extension still applies even after previous
   handshakes on the same the connection or session did not negotiate
   the use of RI.  Every handshake must be treated independently in this
   respect because the attacker may attempt to make an initial handshake
   appear as a renegotiation handshake or vice-versa.

   This extension also can be used with Datagram TLS [RFC4347].
   Although for editorial simplicity this document refers to TLS, all
   requirements in this document apply equally to DTLS.







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4.  Renegotiation Protection Request Signalling Cipher Suite Value

   Both the SSLv3 and TLS 1.0/TLS1.1 specifications require
   implementations to ignore data following the ClientHello (i.e.,
   extensions) if they do not understand it.  However, some SSLv3 and
   TLS 1.0 implementations incorrectly fail the handshake in such case.
   This means that clients which offer "renegotiation_info" may find
   handshake failures.  In order to enhance compatibility with such
   servers, this document defines a second signalling mechanism via a
   special signalling cipher suite value (SCSV)
   "TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST", with code point 0xNN, 0xMM.  This
   SCSV is not a true cipher suite and cannot be negotiated.  It merely
   has exactly the same semantics as an empty "renegotiation_info"
   extension.  Because servers ordinarily ignore unknown cipher suites,
   the SCSV can be added safely on any initial handshake, including
   SSLv2 backward compatibility handshakes.

   Servers MUST treat receipt of TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST exactly
   as if the client had sent an empty "renegotiation_info" extension and
   respond with their own "renegotiation_info" extension.  This is an
   explicit exception to the RFC 5246 Section 7.4.1.4 prohibition on the
   server sending unsolicited extensions and is only allowed because the
   client is signaling its willingness to receive the extension via the
   the TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST SCSV.  TLS implementations MUST
   continue to comply with 7.4.1.4 for all other extensions.  Servers
   MUST NOT select this SCSV in any handshake, as it does not correspond
   to any valid set of algorithms.

   Because the SCSV is equivalent to an empty "renegotiation_info"
   extension, any ClientHello used for secure renegotiation MUST include
   the "renegotiation_info" extension and not the SCSV.  [TODO:  if WG
   consensus is that this applies to legacy negotiation, we will make
   this requirement more pointed. otherwise, we need an explicit
   exception for that case.]

   Note that a minimal client which does not support renegotiation at
   all can simply use the SCSV in all initial handshakes.  Any compliant
   server MUST generate a fatal "handshake_failure" alert and terminate
   the connection when it sees any (apparent) attempt at renegotiation
   by such a client.  Clients which do support renegotiation MUST
   implement Section 3 as well.


5.  Requirements for Sending and Receiving

   TLS clients which support this specification MUST generate either the
   "renegotiation_info" extension or the TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST
   SCSV with every ClientHello, including ClientHellos where session



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   resumption is being offered.

   TLS servers MUST support both the "renegotiation_info" extension and
   the TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST SCSV.  TLS servers which support
   this specification MUST generate the "renegotiation_info" extension
   in the ServerHello in response to any client which offers either
   "renegotiation_info" or TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST in the
   ClientHello.  This includes ServerHellos which resume TLS sessions.

   TLS servers implementing this specification MUST ignore any unknown
   extensions offered by the client and MUST accept version numbers
   higher than its highest version number and negotiate the highest
   common version.  These two requirements reiterate preexisting
   requirements in RFC 5246 and are merely stated here in the interest
   of forward compatibility.


6.  Backward Compatibility

   Existing implementations which do not support this extension are
   widely deployed and in general must interoperate with newer
   implementations which do support it.  This section describes
   considerations for backward compatible interoperation.

6.1.  Client Considerations

   If a client offers the "renegotiation_info" extension or the
   TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST SCSV and the server does not reply with
   "renegotiation_info" in the ServerHello, then this indicates that the
   server does not support secure renegotiation.  Because the above
   attack looks like a single handshake to the client, the client cannot
   determine whether the connection is under attack or not.  Note,
   however, that merely because the server does not acknowledge the
   extension does not mean that it is vulnerable; it might choose to
   reject all renegotiations and simply not signal it.  However, it is
   not possible for the client to determine purely via TLS mechanisms
   whether this is the case or not.

   If clients wish to ensure that such attacks are impossible, they need
   to terminate the connection immediately upon failure to receive the
   extension without completing the handshake.  Such clients MUST
   generate a fatal "handshake_failure" alert prior to terminating the
   connection.  However, it is expected that many TLS servers that do
   not support renegotiation (and thus are not vulnerable) will not
   support this extension either, so in general, clients which implement
   this behavior will encounter interoperability problems.  There is no
   set of client behavior which will guarantee security and achieve
   maximum interoperability during the transition period.  Clients need



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   to choose one or the other preference when dealing with potentially
   unupgraded servers.

   [TODO:  this needs a discussion of what signal to send in legacy
   renegotiation to match the resolution of the paired TODO in Section
   4.]

6.2.  Server Considerations

   If the client does not offer the "renegotiation_info" extension or
   the TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST SCSV then this indicates that the
   client does not support secure renegotiation or is unwilling to use
   it.  However, because the above attack looks like two handshakes to
   the server, the server can safely continue the connection as long as
   it does not allow the client to renegotiate.  If servers wish to
   ensure that such attacks are impossible they need to refuse to
   renegotiate with clients which do not offer the "renegotiation_info"
   extension.  Servers which implement this behavior MUST respond to
   such requests with a "no_renegotiation" alert [RFC 5246 requires this
   alert to be at the "warning" level.]  Servers SHOULD follow this
   behavior.

   In order to enable clients to probe, even servers which do not
   support renegotiation MUST implement the minimal version of the
   extension described in this document for initial handshakes, thus
   signalling that they have been upgraded.

6.3.  SSLv3

   While SSLv3 is not a protocol under IETF change control, it was the
   original basis for TLS and most TLS stacks are also SSLv3 stacks.
   The SCSV and extension defined in this document can also be used with
   SSLv3 with no changes except for the size of the verify_data values,
   which are are 36 bytes long each.  TLS Clients which support SSLv3
   and offer secure renegotiation (either via SCSV or
   "renegotiation_info") MUST accept the "renegotiation_info" extension
   from the server even if the server version is {0x03, 0x00} and behave
   as described in this specification.  TLS Servers which support secure
   renegotation and support SSLv3 MUST accept SCSV or the
   "renegotiation_info" extension and respond as described in this
   specification even if the offered client version is {0x03, 0x00}.


7.  Security Considerations

   The extension described in this document prevents an attack on TLS.
   If this extension is not used, TLS renegotiation is subject to an
   attack in which the attacker can inject their own conversation with



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   the TLS server as a prefix of the client's conversation.  This attack
   is invisible to the client and looks like an ordinary renegotiation
   to the server.  The extension defined in this document allows
   renegotiation to be performed safely.  Servers SHOULD NOT allow
   clients to renegotiate without using this extension.  Many servers
   can mitigate this attack simply by refusing to renegotiate at all.

   While this extension mitigates the man-in-the-middle attack described
   in the overview, it does not resolve all possible problems an
   application may face if it is unaware of renegotiation.  It is
   possible that the authenticated identity of the server or client may
   change as a result of renegotiation.

   [TODO:  This section still needs to be adjusted to match the WG
   discussion.]  By default, TLS implementations conforming to this
   document MUST verify that once the peer has been identified and
   authenticated within the TLS handshake, the identity does not change
   on subsequent renegotiations.  For certificate based cipher suites,
   this means bitwise equality of the end-entity certificate.  If the
   other end attempts to authenticate with a different identity, the
   renegotiation MUST fail.  If the server_name extension is used, it
   MUST NOT change when doing renegotiation.

   A TLS library MAY provide a means for the application to allow
   identity and/or server_name changes across renegotiations, in which
   case the application is responsible for tracking the identity
   associated with data it is processing.  This may require additional
   API facilities in the TLS library.


8.  IANA Considerations

   IANA [shall add/has added] the extension code point XXX [We request
   0xff01, which has been used for prototype implementations] for the
   "renegotiation_info" extension to the TLS ExtensionType values
   registry.

   IANA [shall add/has added] TLS cipher suite number 0xNN,0xMM [We
   request 0x00, 0xff] with name TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST to the
   TLS Cipher Suite registry.


9.  Acknowledgements

   This vulnerability was originally discovered by Marsh Ray. The
   general concept behind the extension described here was independently
   invented by Steve Dispensa, Nasko Oskov, and Eric Rescorla with
   refinements from Nelson Bolyard, Pasi Eronen, Michael D'Errico,



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   Stephen Farrell, Michael Gray, David-Sarah Hopwood, Ben Laurie, Bodo
   Moeller, Martin Rex (who defined TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST),
   Peter Robinson, Jesse Walker, Nico Williams and other members of the
   the Project Mogul team and the TLS WG.  [Note:  if you think your
   name should be here, please speak up.]


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC4347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security", RFC 4347, April 2006.

   [RFC5056]  Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
              Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.

   [I-D.altman-tls-channel-bindings]
              Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
              for TLS", draft-altman-tls-channel-bindings-07 (work in
              progress), October 2009.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [RFC2965]  Kristol, D. and L. Montulli, "HTTP State Management
              Mechanism", RFC 2965, October 2000.

   [Ray09]    Ray, M., "Authentication Gap in TLS Renegotiation".


Authors' Addresses

   Eric Rescorla
   RTFM, Inc.
   2064 Edgewood Drive
   Palo Alto, CA  94303
   USA

   Email:  ekr@rtfm.com




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   Marsh Ray
   PhoneFactor
   7301 W 129th Street
   Overland Park, KS  66213
   USA

   Email:  marsh@extendedsubset.com


   Steve Dispensa
   PhoneFactor
   7301 W 129th Street
   Overland Park, KS  66213
   USA

   Email:  dispensa@phonefactor.com


   Nasko Oskov
   Microsoft
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052
   USA

   Email:  nasko.oskov@microsoft.com


























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