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Versions: (draft-briscoe-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RFC 6040

Transport Area Working Group                                  B. Briscoe
Internet-Draft                                                        BT
Updates: 3168, 4301                                     October 24, 2009
(if approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: April 27, 2010


             Tunnelling of Explicit Congestion Notification
                     draft-ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel-04

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2010.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Abstract

   This document redefines how the explicit congestion notification



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   (ECN) field of the IP header should be constructed on entry to and
   exit from any IP in IP tunnel.  On encapsulation it updates RFC3168
   to bring all IP in IP tunnels (v4 or v6) into line with RFC4301 IPsec
   ECN processing.  On decapsulation it updates both RFC3168 and RFC4301
   to add new behaviours for previously unused combinations of inner and
   outer header.  The new rules propagate the ECN field whether it is
   used to signal one or two severity levels of congestion, whereas
   before they propagated only one.  Tunnel endpoints can be updated in
   any order without affecting pre-existing uses of the ECN field
   (backward compatible).  Nonetheless, operators wanting to support two
   severity levels (e.g. for pre-congestion notification--PCN) can
   require compliance with this new specification.  A thorough analysis
   of the reasoning for these changes and the implications is included.






































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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     1.1.  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   3.  Summary of Pre-Existing RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.1.  Encapsulation at Tunnel Ingress  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.2.  Decapsulation at Tunnel Egress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   4.  New ECN Tunnelling Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     4.1.  Default Tunnel Ingress Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.2.  Default Tunnel Egress Behaviour  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     4.3.  Encapsulation Modes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.4.  Single Mode of Decapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   5.  Updates to Earlier RFCs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     5.1.  Changes to RFC4301 ECN processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     5.2.  Changes to RFC3168 ECN processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     5.3.  Motivation for Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
       5.3.1.  Motivation for Changing Encapsulation  . . . . . . . . 20
       5.3.2.  Motivation for Changing Decapsulation  . . . . . . . . 21
   6.  Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     6.1.  Non-Issues Updating Decapsulation  . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     6.2.  Non-Update of RFC4301 IPsec Encapsulation  . . . . . . . . 24
     6.3.  Update to RFC3168 Encapsulation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   7.  Design Principles for Future Non-Default Schemes . . . . . . . 25
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   10. Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   12. Comments Solicited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   Appendix A.  Early ECN Tunnelling RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   Appendix B.  Design Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
     B.1.  Security Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
     B.2.  Control Constraints  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     B.3.  Management Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
   Appendix C.  Contribution to Congestion across a Tunnel  . . . . . 36
   Appendix D.  Why Losing ECT(1) on Decapsulation Impedes PCN  . . . 37
   Appendix E.  Why Resetting ECN on Encapsulation Impedes PCN  . . . 38
   Appendix F.  Compromise on Decap with ECT(1) Inner and ECT(0)
                Outer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
   Appendix G.  Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40








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Request to the RFC Editor (to be removed on publication):

   In the RFC index, RFC3168 should be identified as an update to
   RFC2003.  RFC4301 should be identified as an update to RFC3168.

Changes from previous drafts (to be removed by the RFC Editor)

   Full text differences between IETF draft versions are available at
   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/tsvwg/draft-ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel/>, and
   between earlier individual draft versions at
   <http://www.briscoe.net/pubs.html#ecn-tunnel>

   From ietf-03 to ietf-04  (current):

      *  Functional changes: none

      *  Structural changes:

         +  Added "Open Issues" appendix

      *  Textual changes:

         +  Section title: "Changes from Earlier RFCs" -> "Updates to
            Earlier RFCs"

         +  Emphasised that change on decap to previously unused
            combinations will propagate PCN encoding.

         +  Acknowledged additional reviewers and updated references

   From ietf-02 to ietf-03:

      *  Functional changes:

         +  Corrected errors in recap of previous RFCs, which wrongly
            stated the different decapsulation behaviours of RFC3168 &
            RFC4301 with a Not-ECT inner header.  This also required
            corrections to the "Changes from Earlier RFCs" and the
            Motivations for these changes.

         +  Mandated that any future standards action SHOULD NOT use the
            ECT(0) codepoint as an indication of congestion, without
            giving strong reasons.

         +  Added optional alarm when decapsulating ECT(1) outer,
            ECT(0), but noted it would need to be disabled for
            2-severity level congestion (e.g.  PCN).




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      *  Structural changes:

         +  Removed Document Roadmap which merely repeated the Contents
            (previously Section 1.2).

         +  Moved "Changes from Earlier RFCs" (Section 5) before
            Section 6 on Backward Compatibility and internally organised
            both by RFC, rather than by ingress then egress.

         +  Moved motivation for changing existing RFCs (Section 5.3) to
            after the changes are specified.

         +  Moved informative "Design Principles for Future Non-Default
            Schemes" after all the normative sections.

         +  Added Appendix A on early history of ECN tunnelling RFCs.

         +  Removed specialist appendix on "Relative Placement of
            Tunnelling and In-Path Load Regulation" (Appendix D in the
            -02 draft)

         +  Moved and updated specialist text on "Compromise on Decap
            with ECT(1) Inner and ECT(0) Outer" from Security
            Considerations to Appendix F

      *  Textual changes:

         +  Simplified vocabulary for non-native-english speakers

         +  Simplified Introduction and defined regularly used terms in
            an expanded Terminology section.

         +  More clearly distinguished statically configured tunnels
            from dynamic tunnel endpoint discovery, before explaining
            operating modes.

         +  Simplified, cut-down and clarified throughout

         +  Updated references.

   From ietf-01 to ietf-02:

      *  Scope reduced from any encapsulation of an IP packet to solely
         IP in IP tunnelled encapsulation.  Consequently changed title
         and removed whole section 'Design Guidelines for New
         Encapsulations of Congestion Notification' (to be included in a
         future companion informational document).




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      *  Included a new normative decapsulation rule for ECT(0) inner
         and ECT(1) outer that had previously only been outlined in the
         non-normative appendix 'Comprehensive Decapsulation Rules'.
         Consequently:

         +  The Introduction has been completely re-written to motivate
            this change to decapsulation along with the existing change
            to encapsulation.

         +  The tentative text in the appendix that first proposed this
            change has been split between normative standards text in
            Section 4 and Appendix D, which explains specifically why
            this change would streamline PCN.  New text on the logic of
            the resulting decap rules added.

      *  If inner/outer is Not-ECT/ECT(0), changed decapsulation to
         propagate Not-ECT rather than drop the packet; and added
         reasoning.

      *  Considerably restructured:

         +  "Design Constraints" analysis moved to an appendix
            (Appendix B);

         +  Added Section 3 to summarise relevant existing RFCs;

         +  Structured Section 4 and Section 6 into subsections.

         +  Added tables to sections on old and new rules, for precision
            and comparison.

         +  Moved Section 7 on Design Principles to the end of the
            section specifying the new default normative tunnelling
            behaviour.  Rewritten and shifted text on identifiers and
            in-path load regulators to Appendix B.1 [deleted in revision
            -03].

   From ietf-00 to ietf-01:

      *  Identified two additional alarm states in the decapsulation
         rules (Figure 4) if ECT(X) in outer and inner contradict each
         other.

      *  Altered Comprehensive Decapsulation Rules (Appendix D) so that
         ECT(0) in the outer no longer overrides ECT(1) in the inner.
         Used the term 'Comprehensive' instead of 'Ideal'.  And
         considerably updated the text in this appendix.




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      *  Added Appendix D.1 (removed again in a later revision) to weigh
         up the various ways the Comprehensive Decapsulation Rules might
         be introduced.  This replaces the previous contradictory
         statements saying complex backwards compatibility interactions
         would be introduced while also saying there would be no
         backwards compatibility issues.

      *  Updated references.

   From briscoe-01 to ietf-00:

      *  Re-wrote Appendix C giving much simpler technique to measure
         contribution to congestion across a tunnel.

      *  Added discussion of backward compatibility of the ideal
         decapsulation scheme in Appendix D

      *  Updated references.  Minor corrections & clarifications
         throughout.

   From briscoe-00 to briscoe-01:

      *  Related everything conceptually to the uniform and pipe models
         of RFC2983 on Diffserv Tunnels, and completely removed the
         dependence of tunnelling behaviour on the presence of any in-
         path load regulation by using the [1 - Before] [2 - Outer]
         function placement concepts from RFC2983;

      *  Added specific cases where the existing standards limit new
         proposals, particularly Appendix E;

      *  Added sub-structure to Introduction (Need for Rationalisation,
         Roadmap), added new Introductory subsection on "Scope" and
         improved clarity;

      *  Added Design Guidelines for New Encapsulations of Congestion
         Notification;

      *  Considerably clarified the Backward Compatibility section
         (Section 6);

      *  Considerably extended the Security Considerations section
         (Section 9);

      *  Summarised the primary rationale much better in the
         conclusions;





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      *  Added numerous extra acknowledgements;

      *  Added Appendix E.  "Why resetting CE on encapsulation harms
         PCN", Appendix C.  "Contribution to Congestion across a Tunnel"
         and Appendix D.  "Ideal Decapsulation Rules";

      *  Re-wrote Appendix B [deleted in a later revision], explaining
         how tunnel encapsulation no longer depends on in-path load-
         regulation (changed title from "In-path Load Regulation" to
         "Non-Dependence of Tunnelling on In-path Load Regulation"), but
         explained how an in-path load regulation function must be
         carefully placed with respect to tunnel encapsulation (in a new
         sub-section entitled "Dependence of In-Path Load Regulation on
         Tunnelling").

1.  Introduction

   Explicit congestion notification (ECN [RFC3168]) allows a forwarding
   element to notify the onset of congestion without having to drop
   packets.  Instead it can explicitly mark a proportion of packets in
   the 2-bit ECN field in the IP header (Table 1 recaps the ECN
   codepoints).

   The outer header of an IP packet can encapsulate one or more IP
   headers for tunnelling.  A forwarding element using ECN to signify
   congestion will only mark the immediately visible outer IP header.
   When a tunnel decapsulator later removes this outer header, it
   follows rules to propagate congestion markings by combining the ECN
   fields of the inner and outer IP header into one outgoing IP header.

   This document updates those rules for IPsec [RFC4301] and non-IPsec
   [RFC3168] tunnels to add new behaviours for previously unused
   combinations of inner and outer header.  It also updates the tunnel
   ingress behaviour of RFC3168 to match that of RFC4301.  The updated
   rules are backward compatible with RFC4301 and RFC3168 when
   interworking with any other tunnel endpoint complying with any
   earlier specification.

   When ECN and its tunnelling was defined in RFC3168, only the minimum
   necessary changes to the ECN field were propagated through tunnel
   endpoints--just enough for the basic ECN mechanism to work.  This was
   due to concerns that the ECN field might be toggled to communicate
   between a secure site and someone on the public Internet--a covert
   channel.  This was because a mutable field like ECN cannot be
   protected by IPsec's integrity mechanisms--it has to be able to
   change as it traverses the Internet.

   Nonetheless, the latest IPsec architecture [RFC4301] considers a



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   bandwidth limit of 2 bits per packet on a covert channel makes it a
   manageable risk.  Therefore, for simplicity, an RFC4301 ingress
   copies the whole ECN field to encapsulate a packet.  It also
   dispenses with the two modes of RFC3168, one which partially copied
   the ECN field, and the other which blocked all propagation of ECN
   changes.

   Unfortunately, this entirely reasonable sequence of standards actions
   resulted in a perverse outcome; non-IPsec tunnels (RFC3168) blocked
   the 2-bit covert channel, while IPsec tunnels (RFC4301) did not--at
   least not at the ingress.  At the egress, both IPsec and non-IPsec
   tunnels still partially restricted propagation of the full ECN field.

   The trigger for the changes in this document was the introduction of
   pre-congestion notification (PCN [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour]) to
   the IETF standards track.  PCN needs the ECN field to be copied at a
   tunnel ingress and it needs four states of congestion signalling to
   be propagated at the egress, but pre-existing tunnels only propagate
   three in the ECN field.

   This document draws on currently unused (CU) combinations of inner
   and outer headers to add tunnelling of four-state congestion
   signalling to RFC3168 and RFC4301.  Operators of tunnels who
   specifically want to support four states can require that all their
   tunnels comply with this specification.  Nonetheless, all tunnel
   endpoint implementations (RFC4301, RFC3168, RFC2481, RFC2401,
   RFC2003) can safely be updated to this new specification as part of
   general code maintenance.  This will gradually add support for four
   congestion states to the Internet.  Existing three state schemes will
   continue to work as before.

   At the same time as harmonising covert channel constraints, the
   opportunity has been taken to draw together diverging tunnel
   specifications into a single consistent behaviour.  Then any tunnel
   can be deployed unilaterally, and it will support the full range of
   congestion control and management schemes without any modes or
   configuration.  Further, any host or router can expect the ECN field
   to behave in the same way, whatever type of tunnel might intervene in
   the path.

1.1.  Scope

   This document only concerns wire protocol processing of the ECN field
   at tunnel endpoints and makes no changes or recommendations
   concerning algorithms for congestion marking or congestion response.

   This document specifies common ECN field processing at encapsulation
   and decapsulation for any IP in IP tunnelling, whether IPsec or non-



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   IPsec tunnels.  It applies irrespective of whether IPv4 or IPv6 is
   used for either of the inner and outer headers.  It applies for
   packets with any destination address type, whether unicast or
   multicast.  It applies as the default for all Diffserv per-hop
   behaviours (PHBs), unless stated otherwise in the specification of a
   PHB.  It is intended to be a good trade off between somewhat
   conflicting security, control and management requirements.

   [RFC2983] is a comprehensive primer on differentiated services and
   tunnels.  Given ECN raises similar issues to differentiated services
   when interacting with tunnels, useful concepts introduced in RFC2983
   are used throughout, with brief recaps of the explanations where
   necessary.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   Table 1 recaps the names of the ECN codepoints [RFC3168].

     +------------------+----------------+---------------------------+
     | Binary codepoint | Codepoint name | Meaning                   |
     +------------------+----------------+---------------------------+
     |        00        | Not-ECT        | Not ECN-capable transport |
     |        01        | ECT(1)         | ECN-capable transport     |
     |        10        | ECT(0)         | ECN-capable transport     |
     |        11        | CE             | Congestion experienced    |
     +------------------+----------------+---------------------------+

     Table 1: Recap of Codepoints of the ECN Field [RFC3168] in the IP
                                  Header

   Further terminology used within this document:

   Encapsulator:  The tunnel endpoint function that adds an outer IP
      header to tunnel a packet (also termed the 'ingress tunnel
      endpoint' or just the 'ingress' where the context is clear).

   Decapsulator:  The tunnel endpoint function that removes an outer IP
      header from a tunnelled packet (also termed the 'egress tunnel
      endpoint' or just the 'egress' where the context is clear).

   Incoming header:  The header of an arriving packet before
      encapsulation.





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   Outer header:  The header added to encapsulate a tunnelled packet.

   Inner header:  The header encapsulated by the outer header.

   Outgoing header:  The header constructed by the decapsulator using
      logic that combines the fields in the outer and inner headers.

   Copying ECN:  On encapsulation, setting the ECN field of the new
      outer header to be a copy of the ECN field in the incoming header.

   Zeroing ECN:  On encapsulation, clearing the ECN field of the new
      outer header to Not-ECT ("00").

   Resetting ECN:  On encapsulation, setting the ECN field of the new
      outer header to be a copy of the ECN field in the incoming header
      except the outer ECN field is set to the ECT(0) codepoint if the
      incoming ECN field is CE ("11").

3.  Summary of Pre-Existing RFCs

   This section is informative not normative, as it recaps pre-existing
   RFCs.  Earlier relevant RFCs that were either experimental or
   incomplete with respect to ECN tunnelling (RFC2481, RFC2401 and
   RFC2003) are briefly outlined inAppendix A.  The question of whether
   tunnel implementations used in the Internet comply with any of these
   RFCs is not discussed.

3.1.  Encapsulation at Tunnel Ingress

   At the encapsulator, the controversy has been over whether to
   propagate information about congestion experienced on the path so far
   into the outer header of the tunnel.

   Specifically, RFC3168 says that, if a tunnel fully supports ECN
   (termed a 'full-functionality' ECN tunnel in [RFC3168]), the
   encapsulator must not copy a CE marking from the inner header into
   the outer header that it creates.  Instead the encapsulator must set
   the outer header to ECT(0) if the ECN field is marked CE in the
   arriving IP header.  We term this 'resetting' a CE codepoint.

   However, the new IPsec architecture in [RFC4301] reverses this rule,
   stating that the encapsulator must simply copy the ECN field from the
   incoming header to the outer header.

   RFC3168 also provided a Limited Functionality mode that turns off ECN
   processing over the scope of the tunnel by setting the outer header
   to Not-ECT ("00").  Then such packets will be dropped to indicate
   congestion rather than marked with ECN.  This is necessary for the



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   ingress to interwork with legacy decapsulators ([RFC2481], [RFC2401]
   and [RFC2003]) that do not propagate ECN markings added to the outer
   header.  Otherwise such legacy decapsulators would throw away
   congestion notifications before they reached the transport layer.

   Neither Limited Functionality mode nor Full Functionality mode are
   used by an RFC4301 IPsec encapsulator, which simply copies the
   incoming ECN field into the outer header.  An earlier key-exchange
   phase ensures an RFC4301 ingress will not have to interwork with a
   legacy egress that does not support ECN.

   These pre-existing behaviours are summarised in Figure 1.
    +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+
    | Incoming Header |             Outgoing Outer Header             |
    | (also equal to  +---------------+---------------+---------------+
    | Outgoing Inner  |  RFC3168 ECN  |  RFC3168 ECN  | RFC4301 IPsec |
    |     Header)     |    Limited    |     Full      |               |
    |                 | Functionality | Functionality |               |
    +-----------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
    |    Not-ECT      |   Not-ECT     |   Not-ECT     |   Not-ECT     |
    |     ECT(0)      |   Not-ECT     |    ECT(0)     |    ECT(0)     |
    |     ECT(1)      |   Not-ECT     |    ECT(1)     |    ECT(1)     |
    |       CE        |   Not-ECT     |    ECT(0)     |      CE       |
    +-----------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+


    Figure 1: IP in IP Encapsulation: Recap of Pre-existing Behaviours

3.2.  Decapsulation at Tunnel Egress

   RFC3168 and RFC4301 specify the decapsulation behaviour summarised in
   Figure 2.  The ECN field in the outgoing header is set to the
   codepoint at the intersection of the appropriate incoming inner
   header (row) and incoming outer header (column).

















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            +---------+------------------------------------------------+
            |Incoming |            Incoming Outer Header               |
            |   Inner +---------+------------+------------+------------+
            |  Header | Not-ECT | ECT(0)     | ECT(1)     |     CE     |
            +---------+---------+------------+------------+------------+
   RFC3168->| Not-ECT | Not-ECT |Not-ECT     |Not-ECT     |   drop     |
   RFC4301->| Not-ECT | Not-ECT |Not-ECT     |Not-ECT     |Not-ECT     |
            |  ECT(0) |  ECT(0) | ECT(0)     | ECT(0)     |     CE     |
            |  ECT(1) |  ECT(1) | ECT(1)     | ECT(1)     |     CE     |
            |    CE   |      CE |     CE     |     CE     |     CE     |
            +---------+---------+------------+------------+------------+
                      |               Outgoing Header                  |
                      +------------------------------------------------+

     Figure 2: IP in IP Decapsulation; Recap of Pre-existing Behaviour

   The behaviour in the table derives from the logic given in RFC3168
   and RFC4301, briefly recapped as follows:

   o  On decapsulation, if the inner ECN field is Not-ECT the outer is
      discarded.  RFC3168 (but not RFC4301) also specified that the
      decapsulator must drop a packet with a Not-ECT inner and CE in the
      outer.

   o  In all other cases, if the outer is CE, the outgoing ECN field is
      set to CE, but otherwise the outer is ignored and the inner is
      used for the outgoing ECN field.

   RFC3168 also made it an auditable event for an IPsec tunnel "if the
   ECN Field is changed inappropriately within an IPsec tunnel...".
   Inappropriate changes were not specifically enumerated.  RFC4301 did
   not mention inappropriate ECN changes.

4.  New ECN Tunnelling Rules

   The standards actions below in Section 4.1 (ingress encapsulation)
   and Section 4.2 (egress decapsulation) define new default ECN tunnel
   processing rules for any IP packet (v4 or v6) with any Diffserv
   codepoint.

   If absolutely necessary, an alternate congestion encapsulation
   behaviour can be introduced as part of the definition of an alternate
   congestion marking scheme used by a specific Diffserv PHB (see S.5 of
   [RFC3168] and [RFC4774]).  When designing such new encapsulation
   schemes, the principles in Section 7 should be followed.  However,
   alternate ECN tunnelling schemes are NOT RECOMMENDED as the
   deployment burden of handling exceptional PHBs in implementations of
   all affected tunnels should not be underestimated.  There is no



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   requirement for a PHB definition to state anything about ECN
   tunnelling behaviour if the default behaviour in the present
   specification is sufficient.

4.1.  Default Tunnel Ingress Behaviour

   Two modes of encapsulation are defined here; `normal mode' and
   `compatibility mode', which is for backward compatibility with tunnel
   decapsulators that do not understand ECN.  Section 4.3 explains why
   two modes are necessary and specifies the circumstances in which it
   is sufficient to solely implement normal mode.  Note that these are
   modes of the ingress tunnel endpoint only, not the whole tunnel.

   Whatever the mode, an encapsulator forwards the inner header without
   changing the ECN field.

   In normal mode an encapsulator compliant with this specification MUST
   construct the outer encapsulating IP header by copying the 2-bit ECN
   field of the incoming IP header.  In compatibility mode it clears the
   ECN field in the outer header to the Not-ECT codepoint.  These rules
   are tabulated for convenience in Figure 3.
            +-----------------+-------------------------------+
            | Incoming Header |     Outgoing Outer Header     |
            | (also equal to  +---------------+---------------+
            | Outgoing Inner  | Compatibility |    Normal     |
            |     Header)     |     Mode      |     Mode      |
            +-----------------+---------------+---------------+
            |    Not-ECT      |   Not-ECT     |   Not-ECT     |
            |     ECT(0)      |   Not-ECT     |    ECT(0)     |
            |     ECT(1)      |   Not-ECT     |    ECT(1)     |
            |       CE        |   Not-ECT     |      CE       |
            +-----------------+---------------+---------------+


              Figure 3: New IP in IP Encapsulation Behaviours

   An ingress in compatibility mode encapsulates packets identically to
   an ingress in RFC3168's limited functionality mode.  An ingress in
   normal mode encapsulates packets identically to an RFC4301 IPsec
   ingress.

4.2.  Default Tunnel Egress Behaviour

   To decapsulate the inner header at the tunnel egress, a compliant
   tunnel egress MUST set the outgoing ECN field to the codepoint at the
   intersection of the appropriate incoming inner header (row) and outer
   header (column) in Figure 4 (the IPv4 header checksum also changes
   whenever the ECN field is changed).  There is no need for more than



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   one mode of decapsulation, as these rules cater for all known
   requirements.
            +---------+------------------------------------------------+
            |Incoming |            Incoming Outer Header               |
            |   Inner +---------+------------+------------+------------+
            |  Header | Not-ECT | ECT(0)     | ECT(1)     |     CE     |
            +---------+---------+------------+------------+------------+
            | Not-ECT | Not-ECT |Not-ECT(!!!)|   drop(!!!)|   drop(!!!)|
            |  ECT(0) |  ECT(0) | ECT(0)     | ECT(1)(!!!)|     CE     |
            |  ECT(1) |  ECT(1) | ECT(1)(!!!)| ECT(1)     |     CE     |
            |    CE   |      CE |     CE     |     CE(!!!)|     CE     |
            +---------+---------+------------+------------+------------+
                      |               Outgoing Header                  |
                      +------------------------------------------------+
             Unexpected combinations are indicated by '(!!!)'

              Figure 4: New IP in IP Decapsulation Behaviour

   This table for decapsulation behaviour is derived from the following
   logic:

   o  If the inner ECN field is Not-ECT the decapsulator MUST NOT
      propagate any other ECN codepoint onwards.  This is because the
      inner Not-ECT marking is set by transports that use drop as an
      indication of congestion and would not understand or respond to
      any other ECN codepoint [RFC4774].  In addition:

      *  If the inner ECN field is Not-ECT and the outer ECN field is
         ECT(1) or CE the decapsulator MUST drop the packet.

      *  If the inner ECN field is Not-ECT and the outer ECN field is
         ECT(0) or Not-ECT the decapsulator MUST forward the outgoing
         packet with the ECN field cleared to Not-ECT.

      *  This specification mandates that any future standards action
         SHOULD NOT use the ECT(0) codepoint as an indication of
         congestion, without giving strong reasons, given the above rule
         forwards an ECT(0) outer as Not-ECT.

   o  In all other cases where the inner supports ECN, the outgoing ECN
      field is set to the more severe marking of the outer and inner ECN
      fields, where the ranking of severity from highest to lowest is
      CE, ECT(1), ECT(0), Not-ECT.  This in no way precludes cases where
      ECT(1) and ECT(0) have the same severity;

   o  Certain combinations of inner and outer ECN fields cannot result
      from any currently used transition in any current or previous ECN
      tunneling specification.  These cases are indicated in Figure 4 by



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      '(!!!)').  In these cases, the decapsulator SHOULD log the event
      and MAY also raise an alarm.  Alarms should be rate-limited so
      that the illegal combinations will not amplify into a flood of
      alarm messages.  It MUST be possible to suppress alarms or
      logging, e.g. if it becomes apparent that a combination that
      previously was not used has started to be used for legitimate
      purposes such as a new standards action.  An example is an ECT(0)
      inner combined with an ECT(1) outer, which is proposed as a legal
      combination for PCN [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding], so an operator
      that deploys support for PCN should turn off logging and alarms in
      this case.

   The above logic allows for ECT(0) and ECT(1) to both represent the
   same severity of congestion marking (e.g. "not congestion marked").
   But it also allows future schemes to be defined where ECT(1) is a
   more severe marking than ECT(0), in particular enabling the simplest
   possible encoding for PCN [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding].  This
   approach is discussed in Appendix D and in the discussion of the ECN
   nonce [RFC3540] in Section 9, which in turn refers to Appendix F.

4.3.  Encapsulation Modes

   Section 4.1 introduces two encapsulation modes, normal mode and
   compatibility mode, defining their encapsulation behaviour (i.e.
   header copying or zeroing respectively).  Note that these are modes
   of the ingress tunnel endpoint only, not the tunnel as a whole.

   A tunnel ingress MUST at least implement `normal mode' and, if it
   might be used with legacy tunnel egress nodes (RFC2003, RFC2401 or
   RFC2481 or the limited functionality mode of RFC3168), it MUST also
   implement `compatibility mode' for backward compatibility with tunnel
   egresses that do not propagate explicit congestion notifications
   [RFC4774].  If the egress does support propagation of ECN (full
   functionality mode of RFC3168 or RFC4301 or the present
   specification), the ingress SHOULD use normal mode, in order to
   support ECN where possible.

   We can categorise the way that an ingress tunnel endpoint is paired
   with an egress as either:

   static:   those paired together by prior configuration or;

   dynamically discovered:  those paired together by some form of tunnel
      endpoint discovery, typically driven by the path taken by arriving
      packets.

   Static: Some implementations of encapsulator might be constrained to
   be statically deployed, and constrained to never be paired with a



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   legacy decapsulator (RFC2003, RFC2401 or RFC2481 or the limited
   functionality mode of RFC3168).  In such a case, only normal mode
   needs to be implemented.

   For instance, RFC4301-compatible IPsec tunnel endpoints invariably
   use IKEv2 [RFC4306] for key exchange, which was introduced alongside
   RFC4301.  Therefore both endpoints of an RFC4301 tunnel can be sure
   that the other end is RFC4301-compatible, because the tunnel is only
   formed after IKEv2 key management has completed, at which point both
   ends will be RFC4301-compliant by definition.  Further, an RFC4301
   encapsulator behaves identically to the normal mode of the present
   specification and does not need to implement compatibility mode as it
   will never interact with legacy ECN tunnels.

   Dynamic Discovery: This specification does not require or recommend
   dynamic discovery and it does not define how dynamic negotiation
   might be done, but it recognises that proprietary tunnel endpoint
   discovery protocols exist.  It therefore sets down some constraints
   on discovery protocols to ensure safe interworking.

   If dynamic tunnel endpoint discovery might pair an ingress with a
   legacy egress (RFC2003, RFC2401 or RFC2481 or the limited
   functionality mode of RFC3168), the ingress MUST implement both
   normal and compatibility mode.  If the tunnel discovery process is
   arranged to only ever find a tunnel egress that propagates ECN
   (RFC3168 full functionality mode, RFC4301 or this present
   specification), then a tunnel ingress can be complaint with the
   present specification without implementing compatibility mode.

   If a compliant tunnel ingress is discovering an egress, it MUST send
   packets in compatibility mode in case the egress it discovers is a
   legacy egress.  If, through the discovery protocol, the egress
   indicates that it is compliant with the present specification, with
   RFC4301 or with RFC3168 full functionality mode, the ingress can
   switch itself into normal mode.  If the egress denies compliance with
   any of these or returns an error that implies it does not understand
   a request to work to any of these ECN specifications, the tunnel
   ingress MUST remain in compatibility mode.

   An ingress cannot claim compliance with this specification simply by
   disabling ECN processing across the tunnel (i.e. only implementing
   compatibility mode).  It is true that such a tunnel ingress is at
   least safe with the ECN behaviour of any egress it may encounter, but
   it does not meet the aim of introducing ECN support to tunnels.

   Implementation note: if a compliant node is the ingress for multiple
   tunnels, a mode setting will need to be stored for each tunnel
   ingress.  However, if a node is the egress for multiple tunnels, none



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   of the tunnels will need to store a mode setting, because a compliant
   egress can only be in one mode.

4.4.  Single Mode of Decapsulation

   A compliant decapsulator only has one mode of operation.  However, if
   a complaint egress is implemented to be dynamically discoverable, it
   may need to respond to discovery requests from various types of
   legacy tunnel ingress.  This specification does not define how
   dynamic negotiation might be done by (proprietary) discovery
   protocols, but it sets down some constraints to ensure safe
   interworking.

   Through the discovery protocol, a tunnel ingress compliant with the
   present specification might ask if the egress is compliant with the
   present specification, with RFC4301 or with RFC3168 full
   functionality mode.  Or an RFC3168 tunnel ingress might try to
   negotiate to use limited functionality or full functionality mode
   [RFC3168].  In all these cases, a decapsulating tunnel egress
   compliant with this specification MUST agree to any of these
   requests, since it will behave identically in all these cases.

   If no ECN-related mode is requested, a compliant tunnel egress MUST
   continue without raising any error or warning as its egress behaviour
   is compatible with all the legacy ingress behaviours that do not
   negotiate capabilities.

   For 'forward compatibility', a compliant tunnel egress SHOULD raise a
   warning alarm about any requests to enter modes it does not
   recognise, but it SHOULD continue operating.

5.  Updates to Earlier RFCs

5.1.  Changes to RFC4301 ECN processing

   Ingress:  An RFC4301 IPsec encapsulator is not changed at all by the
      present specification

   Egress:  The new decapsulation behaviour in Figure 4 updates RFC4301.
      However, it solely updates combinations of inner and outer that
      have never been used on the Internet, even though they were
      defined in RFC4301 for completeness.  Therefore, the present
      specification adds new behaviours to RFC4301 decapsulation without
      altering existing behaviours.  The following specific updates have
      been made:

      *  The outer, not the inner, is propagated when the outer is
         ECT(1) and the inner is ECT(0);



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      *  A packet with Not-ECT in the inner and an outer of ECT(1) or CE
         is dropped rather than forwarded as Not-ECT;

      *  Certain combinations of inner and outer ECN field have been
         identified as currently unused.  These can trigger logging
         and/or raise alarms.

   Modes:  RFC4301 does not need modes and is not updated by the modes
      in the present specification.  The normal mode of encapsulation is
      unchanged from RFC4301 encapsulation and an RFC4301 IPsec ingress
      will never need compatibility mode as explained in Section 4.3
      (except in one corner-case described below).
      One corner case can exist where an RFC4301 ingress does not use
      IKEv2, but uses manual keying instead.  Then an RFC4301 ingress
      could conceivably be configured to tunnel to an egress with
      limited functionality ECN handling.  Strictly, for this corner-
      case, the requirement to use compatibility mode in this
      specification updates RFC4301.  However, this is such a remote
      possibility that in general RFC4301 IPsec implementations are NOT
      REQUIRED to implement compatibility mode.

5.2.  Changes to RFC3168 ECN processing

   Ingress:  On encapsulation, the new rule in Figure 3 that a normal
      mode tunnel ingress copies any ECN field into the outer header
      updates the ingress behaviour of RFC3168.  Nonetheless, the new
      compatibility mode is identical to the limited functionality mode
      of RFC3168.

   Egress:  The new decapsulation behaviour in Figure 4 updates RFC3168.
      However, the present specification solely updates combinations of
      inner and outer that have never been used on the Internet, even
      though they were defined in RFC3168 for completeness.  Therefore,
      the present specification adds new behaviours to RFC3168
      decapsulation without altering existing behaviours.  The following
      specific updates have been made:

      *  The outer, not the inner, is propagated when the outer is
         ECT(1) and the inner is ECT(0);

      *  A packet with Not-ECT in the inner and an outer of ECT(1) is
         dropped rather than forwarded as Not-ECT;

      *  Certain combinations of inner and outer ECN field have been
         identified as currently unused.  These can trigger logging
         and/or raise alarms.





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   Modes:  RFC3168 defines a (required) limited functionality mode and
      an (optional) full functionality mode for a tunnel.  In RFC3168,
      modes applied to both ends of the tunnel, while in the present
      specification, modes are only used at the ingress--a single egress
      behaviour covers all cases.  The normal mode of encapsulation
      updates the encapsulation behaviour of the full functionality mode
      of RFC3168.  The compatibility mode of encapsulation is identical
      to the encapsulation behaviour of the limited functionality mode
      of RFC3168.  The constraints on how tunnel discovery protocols set
      modes in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 are an update to RFC3168.

5.3.  Motivation for Changes

   An overriding goal is to ensure the same ECN signals can mean the
   same thing whatever tunnels happen to encapsulate an IP packet flow.
   This removes gratuitous inconsistency, which otherwise constrains the
   available design space and makes it harder to design networks and new
   protocols that work predictably.

5.3.1.  Motivation for Changing Encapsulation

   The normal mode in Section 4 updates RFC3168 to make all IP in IP
   encapsulation of the ECN field consistent--consistent with the way
   both RFC4301 IPsec [RFC4301] and IP in MPLS or MPLS in MPLS
   encapsulation [RFC5129] construct the ECN field.

   Compatibility mode has also been defined so a non-RFC4301 ingress can
   still switch to using drop across a tunnel for backwards
   compatibility with legacy decapsulators that do not propagate ECN
   correctly.

   The trigger that motivated this update to RFC3168 encapsulation was a
   standards track proposal for pre-congestion notification (PCN
   [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour]).  PCN excess rate marking only
   works correctly if the ECN field is copied on encapsulation (as in
   RFC4301 and RFC5129); it does not work if ECN is reset (as in
   RFC3168).  This is because PCN excess rate marking depends on the
   outer header revealing any congestion experienced so far on the whole
   path, not just since the last tunnel ingress (see Appendix E for a
   full explanation).

   PCN allows a network operator to add flow admission and termination
   for inelastic traffic at the edges of a Diffserv domain, but without
   any per-flow mechanisms in the interior and without the generous
   provisioning typical of Diffserv, aiming to significantly reduce
   costs.  The PCN architecture [RFC5559] states that RFC3168 IP in IP
   tunnelling of the ECN field cannot be used for any tunnel ingress in
   a PCN domain.  Prior to the present specification, this left a stark



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   choice between not being able to use PCN for inelastic traffic
   control or not being able to use the many tunnels already deployed
   for Mobile IP, VPNs and so forth.

   The present specification provides a clean solution to this problem,
   so that network operators who want to use both PCN and tunnels can
   specify that every tunnel ingress in a PCN region must comply with
   this latest specification.

   Rather than allow tunnel specifications to fragment further into one
   for PCN, one for IPsec and one for other tunnels, the opportunity has
   been taken to consolidate the diverging specifications back into a
   single tunnelling behaviour.  Resetting ECN was originally motivated
   by a covert channel concern that has been deliberately set aside in
   RFC4301 IPsec.  Therefore the reset behaviour of RFC3168 is an
   anomaly that we do not need to keep.  Copying ECN on encapsulation is
   anyway simpler than resetting.  So, as more tunnel endpoints comply
   with this single consistent specification, encapsulation will be
   simpler as well as more predictable.

   Appendix B assesses whether copying rather than resetting CE on
   ingress will cause any unintended side-effects, from the three
   perspectives of security, control and management.  In summary this
   analysis finds that:

   o  From the control perspective either copying or resetting works for
      existing arrangements, but copying has more potential for
      simplifying control and resetting breaks at least one proposal
      already on the standards track.

   o  From the management and monitoring perspective copying is
      preferable.

   o  From the traffic security perspective (enforcing congestion
      control, mitigating denial of service etc) copying is preferable.

   o  From the information security perspective resetting is preferable,
      but the IETF Security Area now considers copying acceptable given
      the bandwidth of a 2-bit covert channel can be managed.

   Therefore there are two points against resetting CE on ingress while
   copying CE causes no harm (other than opening a 2-bit covert channel
   that is deemed manageable).

5.3.2.  Motivation for Changing Decapsulation

   The specification for decapsulation in Section 4 fixes three problems
   with the pre-existing behaviours of both RFC3168 and RFC4301:



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   1.  The pre-existing rules prevented the introduction of alternate
       ECN semantics to signal more than one severity level of
       congestion [RFC4774], [RFC5559].  The four states of the 2-bit
       ECN field provide room for signalling two severity levels in
       addition to not-congested and not-ECN-capable states.  But, the
       pre-existing rules assumed that two of the states (ECT(0) and
       ECT(1)) are always equivalent.  This unnecessarily restricts the
       use of one of four codepoints (half a bit) in the IP (v4 & v6)
       header.  The new rules are designed to work in either case;
       whether ECT(1) is more severe than or equivalent to ECT(0).

       As explained in Appendix B.1, the original reason for not
       forwarding the outer ECT codepoints was to limit the covert
       channel across a decapsulator to 1 bit per packet.  However, now
       that the IETF Security Area has deemed that a 2-bit covert
       channel through an encapsulator is a manageable risk, the same
       should be true for a decapsulator.

       As well as being useful for general future-proofing, this problem
       is immediately pressing for standardisation of pre-congestion
       notification (PCN), which uses two severity levels of congestion.
       If a congested queue used ECT(1) in the outer header to signal
       more severe congestion than ECT(0), the pre-existing
       decapsulation rules would have thrown away this congestion
       signal, preventing tunnelled traffic from ever knowing that it
       should reduce its load.

       The PCN working group has had to consider a number of wasteful or
       convoluted work-rounds to this problem (see Appendix D).  But by
       far the simplest approach is just to remove the covert channel
       blockages from tunnelling behaviour--now deemed unnecessary
       anyway.  Then network operators that want to support two
       congestion severity-levels for PCN can specify that every tunnel
       egress in a PCN region must comply with this latest
       specification.

       Not only does this make two congestion severity-levels available
       for PCN standardisation, but also for other potential uses of the
       extra ECN codepoint (e.g.  [VCP]).

   2.  Cases are documented where a middlebox (e.g. a firewall) drops
       packets with header values that were currently unused (CU) when
       the box was deployed, often on the grounds that anything
       unexpected might be an attack.  This tends to bar future use of
       CU values.  The new decapsulation rules specify optional logging
       and/or alarms for specific combinations of inner and outer header
       that are currently unused.  The aim is to give implementers a
       recourse other than drop if they are concerned about the security



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       of CU values.  It recognises legitimate security concerns about
       CU values but still eases their future use.  If the alarms are
       interpreted as an attack (e.g. by a management system) the
       offending packets can be dropped.  But alarms can be turned off
       if these combinations come into use (e.g. a through a future
       standards action).

   3.  While reviewing currently unused combinations of inner and outer,
       the opportunity was taken to define a single consistent behaviour
       for the cases with a Not-ECT inner header but a different outer.
       RFC3168 and RFC4301 had diverged in this respect.  These
       combinations should not result from known Internet protocols.
       So, for safety, it was decided to drop a packet if the outer
       carries codepoints CE or ECT(1) that respectively signal
       congestion or could potentially signal congestion in a scheme
       progressing through the IETF [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding].
       Given an inner of Not-ECT implies the transport only understands
       drop as a signal of congestion, this was the safest course of
       action.

   Problems 2 & 3 alone would not warrant a change to decapsulation, but
   it was decided they are worth fixing and making consistent at the
   same time as decapsulation code is changed to fix problem 1 (two
   congestion severity-levels).

6.  Backward Compatibility

   A tunnel endpoint compliant with the present specification is
   backward compatible when paired with any tunnel endpoint compliant
   with any previous tunnelling RFC, whether RFC4301, RFC3168 (see
   Section 3) or the earlier RFCs summarised in Appendix A (RFC2481,
   RFC2401 and RFC2003).  Each case is enumerated below.

6.1.  Non-Issues Updating Decapsulation

   At the egress, this specification only augments the per-packet
   calculation of the ECN field (RFC3168 and RFC4301) for combinations
   of inner and outer headers that have so far not been used in any IETF
   protocols.

   Therefore, all other things being equal, if an RFC4301 IPsec egress
   is updated to comply with the new rules, it will still interwork with
   any RFC4301 compliant ingress and the packet outputs will be
   identical to those it would have output before (fully backward
   compatible).

   And, all other things being equal, if an RFC3168 egress is updated to
   comply with the same new rules, it will still interwork with any



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   ingress complying with any previous specification (both modes of
   RFC3168, both modes of RFC2481, RFC2401 and RFC2003) and the packet
   outputs will be identical to those it would have output before (fully
   backward compatible).

   A compliant tunnel egress merely needs to implement the one behaviour
   in Section 4 with no additional mode or option configuration at the
   ingress or egress nor any additional negotiation with the ingress.
   The new decapsulation rules have been defined in such a way that
   congestion control will still work safely if any of the earlier
   versions of ECN processing are used unilaterally at the encapsulating
   ingress of the tunnel (any of RFC2003, RFC2401, either mode of
   RFC2481, either mode of RFC3168, RFC4301 and this present
   specification).

6.2.  Non-Update of RFC4301 IPsec Encapsulation

   An RFC4301 IPsec ingress can comply with this new specification
   without any update and it has no need for any new modes, options or
   configuration.  So, all other things being equal, it will continue to
   interwork identically with any egress it worked with before (fully
   backward compatible).

6.3.  Update to RFC3168 Encapsulation

   The encapsulation behaviour of the new normal mode copies the ECN
   field whereas RFC3168 full functionality mode reset it.  However, all
   other things being equal, if RFC3168 ingress is updated to the
   present specification, the outgoing packets from any tunnel egress
   will still be unchanged.  This is because all variants of tunnelling
   at either end (RFC4301, both modes of RFC3168, both modes of RFC2481,
   RFC2401, RFC2003 and the present specification) have always
   propagated an incoming CE marking through the inner header and onward
   into the outgoing header, whether the outer header is reset or
   copied.  Therefore, If the tunnel is considered as a black box, the
   packets output from any egress will be identical with or without an
   update to the ingress.  Nonetheless, if packets are observed within
   the black box (between the tunnel endpoints), CE markings copied by
   the updated ingress will be visible within the black box, whereas
   they would not have been before.  Therefore, the update to
   encapsulation can be termed 'black-box backwards compatible' (i.e.
   identical unless you look inside the tunnel).

   This specification introduces no new backward compatibility issues
   when a compliant ingress talks with a legacy egress, but it has to
   provide similar safeguards to those already defined in RFC3168.
   RFC3168 laid down rules to ensure that an RFC3168 ingress turns off
   ECN (limited functionality mode) if it is paired with a legacy egress



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   (RFC 2481, RFC2401 or RFC2003), which would not propagate ECN
   correctly.  The present specification carries forward those rules
   (Section 4.3).  It uses compatibility mode whenever RFC3168 would
   have used limited functionality mode, and their per-packet behaviours
   are identical.  Therefore, all other things being equal, an ingress
   using the new rules will interwork with any legacy tunnel egress in
   exactly the same way as an RFC3168 ingress (still black-box backward
   compatible).

7.  Design Principles for Future Non-Default Schemes

   This section is informative not normative.

   S.5 of RFC3168 permits the Diffserv codepoint (DSCP)[RFC2474] to
   'switch in' alternative behaviours for marking the ECN field, just as
   it switches in different per-hop behaviours (PHBs) for scheduling.
   [RFC4774] gives best current practice for designing such alternative
   ECN semantics and very briefly mentions that tunnelling should be
   considered.  Here we give additional guidance on designing alternate
   ECN semantics that would also require alternate tunnelling semantics.

   In one word the guidance is "Don't".  If a scheme requires tunnels to
   implement special processing of the ECN field for certain DSCPs, it
   is highly unlikely that every implementer of every tunnel will want
   to add the required exception and that operators will want to deploy
   the required configuration options.  Therefore it is highly likely
   that some tunnels within a network will not implement the required
   special case.  Therefore, designers of new protocols should avoid
   non-default tunnelling schemes if at all possible.

   That said, if a non-default scheme for tunnelling the ECN field is
   really required, the following guidelines may prove useful in its
   design:

   On encapsulation in any new scheme:

      1.  The ECN field of the outer header should be cleared to Not-ECT
          ("00") unless it is guaranteed that the corresponding tunnel
          egress will correctly propagate congestion markings introduced
          across the tunnel in the outer header.

      2.  If it has established that ECN will be correctly propagated,
          an encapsulator should also copy incoming congestion
          notification into the outer header.  The general principle
          here is that the outer header should reflect congestion
          accumulated along the whole upstream path, not just since the
          tunnel ingress (Appendix B.3 on management and monitoring
          explains).



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          In some circumstances (e.g. pseudowires, PCN), the whole path
          is divided into segments, each with its own congestion
          notification and feedback loop.  In these cases, the function
          that regulates load at the start of each segment will need to
          reset congestion notification for its segment.  Often the
          point where congestion notification is reset will also be
          located at the start of a tunnel.  However, the resetting
          function should be thought of as being applied to packets
          after the encapsulation function--two logically separate
          functions even though they might run on the same physical box.
          Then the code module doing encapsulation can keep to the
          copying rule and the load regulator module can reset
          congestion, without any code in either module being
          conditional on whether the other is there.

   On decapsulation in any new scheme:

      1.  If the arriving inner header is Not-ECT it implies the
          transport will not understand other ECN codepoints.  If the
          outer header carries an explicit congestion marking, the
          packet should be dropped--the only indication of congestion
          the transport will understand.  If the outer carries any other
          ECN codepoint the packet can be forwarded, but only as Not-
          ECT.

      2.  If the arriving inner header is other than Not-ECT, the ECN
          field that the tunnel egress forwards should reflect the more
          severe congestion marking of the arriving inner and outer
          headers.

      3.  If a combination of inner and outer headers is encountered
          that is not currently used in known standards, this event
          should be logged and an alarm raised.  This is a preferable
          approach to dropping currently unused combinations in case
          they represent an attack.  The new scheme should try to define
          a way to forward such packets, but only if a safe outgoing
          codepoint can be defined.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

9.  Security Considerations

   Appendix B.1 discusses the security constraints imposed on ECN tunnel
   processing.  The new rules for ECN tunnel processing (Section 4)
   trade-off between information security (covert channels) and
   congestion monitoring & control.  In fact, ensuring congestion



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   markings are not lost is itself another aspect of security, because
   if we allowed congestion notification to be lost, any attempt to
   enforce a response to congestion would be much harder.

   Specialist security issues:

   Tunnels intersecting Diffserv regions with alternate ECN semantics:
      If alternate congestion notification semantics are defined for a
      certain Diffserv PHB, the scope of the alternate semantics might
      typically be bounded by the limits of a Diffserv region or
      regions, as envisaged in [RFC4774] (e.g. the pre-congestion
      notification architecture [RFC5559]).  The inner headers in
      tunnels crossing the boundary of such a Diffserv region but ending
      within the region can potentially leak the external congestion
      notification semantics into the region, or leak the internal
      semantics out of the region.  [RFC2983] discusses the need for
      Diffserv traffic conditioning to be applied at these tunnel
      endpoints as if they are at the edge of the Diffserv region.
      Similar concerns apply to any processing or propagation of the ECN
      field at the edges of a Diffserv region with alternate ECN
      semantics.  Such edge processing must also be applied at the
      endpoints of tunnels with one end inside and the other outside the
      domain.  [RFC5559] gives specific advice on this for the PCN case,
      but other definitions of alternate semantics will need to discuss
      the specific security implications in each case.

   ECN nonce tunnel coverage:  The new decapsulation rules improve the
      coverage of the ECN nonce [RFC3540] relative to the previous rules
      in RFC3168 and RFC4301.  However, nonce coverage is still not
      perfect, as this would have led to a safety problem in another
      case.  Both are corner-cases, so discussion of the compromise
      between them is deferred to Appendix F.

   Covert channel not turned off:  A legacy (RFC3168) tunnel ingress
      could ask an RFC3168 egress to turn off ECN processing as well as
      itself turning off ECN.  An egress compliant with the present
      specification will agree to such a request from a legacy ingress,
      but it relies on the ingress solely sending Not-ECT in the outer.
      If the egress receives other ECN codepoints in the outer it will
      process them as normal, so it will actually still copy congestion
      markings from the outer to the outgoing header.  Referring for
      example to Figure 5 (Appendix B.1), although the tunnel ingress
      'I' will set all ECN fields in outer headers to Not-ECT, 'M' could
      still toggle CE or ECT(1) on and off to communicate covertly with
      'B', because we have specified that 'E' only has one mode
      regardless of what mode it says it has negotiated.  We could have
      specified that 'E' should have a limited functionality mode and
      check for such behaviour.  But we decided not to add the extra



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      complexity of two modes on a compliant tunnel egress merely to
      cater for an historic security concern that is now considered
      manageable.

10.  Conclusions

   This document uses previously unused combinations of inner and outer
   header to augment the rules for calculating the ECN field when
   decapsulating IP packets at the egress of IPsec (RFC4301) and non-
   IPsec (RFC3168) tunnels.  In this way it allows tunnels to propagate
   an extra level of congestion severity.

   This document also updates the ingress tunnelling encapsulation of
   RFC3168 ECN to bring all IP in IP tunnels into line with the new
   behaviour in the IPsec architecture of RFC4301, which copies rather
   than resets the ECN field when creating outer headers.

   The need for both these updated behaviours was triggered by the
   introduction of pre-congestion notification (PCN) onto the IETF
   standards track.  Operators wanting to support PCN or other alternate
   ECN schemes that use an extra severity level can require that their
   tunnels comply with the present specification.  Nonetheless, as part
   of general code maintenance, any tunnel can safely be updated to
   comply with this specification, because it is backward compatible
   with all previous tunnelling behaviours which will continue to work
   as before--just using one severity level.

   The new rules propagate changes to the ECN field across tunnel end-
   points that previously blocked them to restrict the bandwidth of a
   potential covert channel.  But limiting the channel's bandwidth to 2
   bits per packet is now considered sufficient.

   At the same time as removing these legacy constraints, the
   opportunity has been taken to draw together diverging tunnel
   specifications into a single consistent behaviour.  Then any tunnel
   can be deployed unilaterally, and it will support the full range of
   congestion control and management schemes without any modes or
   configuration.  Further, any host or router can expect the ECN field
   to behave in the same way, whatever type of tunnel might intervene in
   the path.  This new certainty could enable new uses of the ECN field
   that would otherwise be confounded by ambiguity.

11.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Anil Agawaal for pointing out a case where it's safe for a
   tunnel decapsulator to forward a combination of headers it does not
   understand.  Thanks to David Black for explaining a better way to
   think about function placement.  Also thanks to Arnaud Jacquet for



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   the idea for Appendix C.  Thanks to Michael Menth, Bruce Davie, Toby
   Moncaster, Gorry Fairhurst, Sally Floyd, Alfred Hoenes, Gabriele
   Corliano, Ingemar Johansson, David Black and Phil Eardley for their
   thoughts and careful review comments.

   Bob Briscoe is partly funded by Trilogy, a research project (ICT-
   216372) supported by the European Community under its Seventh
   Framework Programme.  The views expressed here are those of the
   author only.

12.  Comments Solicited

   Comments and questions are encouraged and very welcome.  They can be
   addressed to the IETF Transport Area working group mailing list
   <tsvwg@ietf.org>, and/or to the authors.

13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2003]                         Perkins, C., "IP Encapsulation
                                     within IP", RFC 2003, October 1996.

   [RFC2119]                         Bradner, S., "Key words for use in
                                     RFCs to Indicate Requirement
                                     Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
                                     March 1997.

   [RFC3168]                         Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D.
                                     Black, "The Addition of Explicit
                                     Congestion Notification (ECN) to
                                     IP", RFC 3168, September 2001.

   [RFC4301]                         Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security
                                     Architecture for the Internet
                                     Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

13.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding]    Briscoe, B. and T. Moncaster, "PCN
                                     3-State Encoding Extension in a
                                     single DSCP",
                                     draft-ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding-00
                                     (work in progress), July 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-state-encoding]   Moncaster, T., Briscoe, B., and M.
                                     Menth, "A PCN encoding using 2
                                     DSCPs to provide 3 or more states",



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                                     draft-ietf-pcn-3-state-encoding-00
                                     (work in progress), April 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding]  Moncaster, T., Briscoe, B., and M.
                                     Menth, "Baseline Encoding and
                                     Transport of Pre-Congestion
                                     Information",
                                     draft-ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding-07
                                     (work in progress), September 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour]  Eardley, P., "Metering and marking
                                     behaviour of PCN-nodes",
                                     draft-ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour-05
                                     (work in progress), August 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-pcn-psdm-encoding]      Menth, M., Babiarz, J., Moncaster,
                                     T., and B. Briscoe, "PCN Encoding
                                     for Packet-Specific Dual Marking
                                     (PSDM)",
                                     draft-ietf-pcn-psdm-encoding-00
                                     (work in progress), June 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour]  Charny, A., Karagiannis, G., Menth,
                                     M., and T. Taylor, "PCN Boundary
                                     Node Behaviour for the Single
                                     Marking (SM) Mode of Operation",
                                     draft-ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour-00
                                     (work in progress), July 2009.

   [I-D.satoh-pcn-st-marking]        Satoh, D., Ueno, H., Maeda, Y., and
                                     O. Phanachet, "Single PCN Threshold
                                     Marking by using PCN baseline
                                     encoding for both  admission and
                                     termination controls",
                                     draft-satoh-pcn-st-marking-02 (work
                                     in progress), September 2009.

   [RFC2401]                         Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security
                                     Architecture for the Internet
                                     Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [RFC2474]                         Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F.,
                                     and D. Black, "Definition of the
                                     Differentiated Services Field (DS
                                     Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6
                                     Headers", RFC 2474, December 1998.

   [RFC2481]                         Ramakrishnan, K. and S. Floyd, "A



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                                     Proposal to add Explicit Congestion
                                     Notification (ECN) to IP",
                                     RFC 2481, January 1999.

   [RFC2983]                         Black, D., "Differentiated Services
                                     and Tunnels", RFC 2983,
                                     October 2000.

   [RFC3540]                         Spring, N., Wetherall, D., and D.
                                     Ely, "Robust Explicit Congestion
                                     Notification (ECN) Signaling with
                                     Nonces", RFC 3540, June 2003.

   [RFC4306]                         Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange
                                     (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 4306,
                                     December 2005.

   [RFC4774]                         Floyd, S., "Specifying Alternate
                                     Semantics for the Explicit
                                     Congestion Notification (ECN)
                                     Field", BCP 124, RFC 4774,
                                     November 2006.

   [RFC5129]                         Davie, B., Briscoe, B., and J. Tay,
                                     "Explicit Congestion Marking in
                                     MPLS", RFC 5129, January 2008.

   [RFC5559]                         Eardley, P., "Pre-Congestion
                                     Notification (PCN) Architecture",
                                     RFC 5559, June 2009.

   [VCP]                             Xia, Y., Subramanian, L., Stoica,
                                     I., and S. Kalyanaraman, "One more
                                     bit is enough", Proc. SIGCOMM'05,
                                     ACM CCR 35(4)37--48, 2005, <http://
                                     doi.acm.org/10.1145/
                                     1080091.1080098>.

Appendix A.  Early ECN Tunnelling RFCs

   IP in IP tunnelling was originally defined in [RFC2003].  On
   encapsulation, the incoming header was copied to the outer and on
   decapsulation the outer was simply discarded.  Initially, IPsec
   tunnelling [RFC2401] followed the same behaviour.

   When ECN was introduced experimentally in [RFC2481], legacy (RFC2003
   or RFC2401) tunnels would have discarded any congestion markings
   added to the outer header, so RFC2481 introduced rules for



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   calculating the outgoing header from a combination of the inner and
   outer on decapsulation.  RC2481 also introduced a second mode for
   IPsec tunnels, which turned off ECN processing in the outer header
   (Not-ECT) on encapsulation because an RFC2401 decapsulator would
   discard the outer on decapsulation.  For RFC2401 IPsec this had the
   side-effect of completely blocking the covert channel.

   In RFC2481 the ECN field was defined as two separate bits.  But when
   ECN moved from the experimental to the standards track [RFC3168], the
   ECN field was redefined as four codepoints.  This required a
   different calculation of the ECN field from that used in RFC2481 on
   decapsulation.  RFC3168 also had two modes; a 'full functionality
   mode' that restricted the covert channel as much as possible but
   still allowed ECN to be used with IPsec, and another that completely
   turned off ECN processing across the tunnel.  This 'limited
   functionality mode' both offered a way for operators to completely
   block the covert channel and allowed an RFC3168 ingress to interwork
   with a legacy tunnel egress (RFC2481, RFC2401 or RFC2003).

   The present specification includes a similar compatibility mode to
   interwork safely with tunnels compliant with any of these three
   earlier RFCs.  However, unlike RFC3168, it is only a mode of the
   ingress, as decapsulation behaviour is the same in either case.

Appendix B.  Design Constraints

   Tunnel processing of a congestion notification field has to meet
   congestion control and management needs without creating new
   information security vulnerabilities (if information security is
   required).  This appendix documents the analysis of the tradeoffs
   between these factors that led to the new encapsulation rules in
   Section 4.1.

B.1.  Security Constraints

   Information security can be assured by using various end to end
   security solutions (including IPsec in transport mode [RFC4301]), but
   a commonly used scenario involves the need to communicate between two
   physically protected domains across the public Internet.  In this
   case there are certain management advantages to using IPsec in tunnel
   mode solely across the publicly accessible part of the path.  The
   path followed by a packet then crosses security 'domains'; the ones
   protected by physical or other means before and after the tunnel and
   the one protected by an IPsec tunnel across the otherwise unprotected
   domain.  We will use the scenario in Figure 5 where endpoints 'A' and
   'B' communicate through a tunnel.  The tunnel ingress 'I' and egress
   'E' are within physically protected edge domains, while the tunnel
   spans an unprotected internetwork where there may be 'men in the



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   middle', M.

                physically       unprotected     physically
            <-protected domain-><--domain--><-protected domain->
            +------------------+            +------------------+
            |                  |      M     |                  |
            |    A-------->I=========>==========>E-------->B   |
            |                  |            |                  |
            +------------------+            +------------------+
                                <----IPsec secured---->
                                        tunnel

                      Figure 5: IPsec Tunnel Scenario

   IPsec encryption is typically used to prevent 'M' seeing messages
   from 'A' to 'B'.  IPsec authentication is used to prevent 'M'
   masquerading as the sender of messages from 'A' to 'B' or altering
   their contents.  But 'I' can also use IPsec tunnel mode to allow 'A'
   to communicate with 'B', but impose encryption to prevent 'A' leaking
   information to 'M'.  Or 'E' can insist that 'I' uses tunnel mode
   authentication to prevent 'M' communicating information to 'B'.
   Mutable IP header fields such as the ECN field (as well as the TTL/
   Hop Limit and DS fields) cannot be included in the cryptographic
   calculations of IPsec.  Therefore, if 'I' copies these mutable fields
   into the outer header that is exposed across the tunnel it will have
   allowed a covert channel from 'A' to M that bypasses its encryption
   of the inner header.  And if 'E' copies these fields from the outer
   header to the inner, even if it validates authentication from 'I', it
   will have allowed a covert channel from 'M' to 'B'.

   ECN at the IP layer is designed to carry information about congestion
   from a congested resource towards downstream nodes.  Typically a
   downstream transport might feed the information back somehow to the
   point upstream of the congestion that can regulate the load on the
   congested resource, but other actions are possible (see [RFC3168]
   S.6).  In terms of the above unicast scenario, ECN effectively
   intends to create an information channel (for congestion signalling)
   from 'M' to 'B' (for 'B' to feed back to 'A').  Therefore the goals
   of IPsec and ECN are mutually incompatible.

   With respect to the DS or ECN fields, S.5.1.2 of RFC4301 says,
   "controls are provided to manage the bandwidth of this [covert]
   channel".  Using the ECN processing rules of RFC4301, the channel
   bandwidth is two bits per datagram from 'A' to 'M' and one bit per
   datagram from 'M' to 'A' (because 'E' limits the combinations of the
   2-bit ECN field that it will copy).  In both cases the covert channel
   bandwidth is further reduced by noise from any real congestion
   marking.  RFC4301 implies that these covert channels are sufficiently



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   limited to be considered a manageable threat.  However, with respect
   to the larger (6b) DS field, the same section of RFC4301 says not
   copying is the default, but a configuration option can allow copying
   "to allow a local administrator to decide whether the covert channel
   provided by copying these bits outweighs the benefits of copying".
   Of course, an administrator considering copying of the DS field has
   to take into account that it could be concatenated with the ECN field
   giving an 8b per datagram covert channel.

   For tunnelling the 6b Diffserv field two conceptual models have had
   to be defined so that administrators can trade off security against
   the needs of traffic conditioning [RFC2983]:

   The uniform model:  where the Diffserv field is preserved end-to-end
      by copying into the outer header on encapsulation and copying from
      the outer header on decapsulation.

   The pipe model:  where the outer header is independent of that in the
      inner header so it hides the Diffserv field of the inner header
      from any interaction with nodes along the tunnel.

   However, for ECN, the new IPsec security architecture in RFC4301 only
   standardised one tunnelling model equivalent to the uniform model.
   It deemed that simplicity was more important than allowing
   administrators the option of a tiny increment in security, especially
   given not copying congestion indications could seriously harm
   everyone's network service.

B.2.  Control Constraints

   Congestion control requires that any congestion notification marked
   into packets by a resource will be able to traverse a feedback loop
   back to a function capable of controlling the load on that resource.
   To be precise, rather than calling this function the data source, we
   will call it the Load Regulator.  This will allow us to deal with
   exceptional cases where load is not regulated by the data source, but
   usually the two terms will be synonymous.  Note the term "a function
   _capable of_ controlling the load" deliberately includes a source
   application that doesn't actually control the load but ought to (e.g.
   an application without congestion control that uses UDP).


                 A--->R--->I=========>M=========>E-------->B


                     Figure 6: Simple Tunnel Scenario

   We now consider a similar tunnelling scenario to the IPsec one just



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   described, but without the different security domains so we can just
   focus on ensuring the control loop and management monitoring can work
   (Figure 6).  If we want resources in the tunnel to be able to
   explicitly notify congestion and the feedback path is from 'B' to
   'A', it will certainly be necessary for 'E' to copy any CE marking
   from the outer header to the inner header for onward transmission to
   'B', otherwise congestion notification from resources like 'M' cannot
   be fed back to the Load Regulator ('A').  But it does not seem
   necessary for 'I' to copy CE markings from the inner to the outer
   header.  For instance, if resource 'R' is congested, it can send
   congestion information to 'B' using the congestion field in the inner
   header without 'I' copying the congestion field into the outer header
   and 'E' copying it back to the inner header.  'E' can still write any
   additional congestion marking introduced across the tunnel into the
   congestion field of the inner header.

   It might be useful for the tunnel egress to be able to tell whether
   congestion occurred across a tunnel or upstream of it.  If outer
   header congestion marking was reset by the tunnel ingress ('I'), at
   the end of a tunnel ('E') the outer headers would indicate congestion
   experienced across the tunnel ('I' to 'E'), while the inner header
   would indicate congestion upstream of 'I'.  But similar information
   can be gleaned even if the tunnel ingress copies the inner to the
   outer headers.  At the end of the tunnel ('E'), any packet with an
   _extra_ mark in the outer header relative to the inner header
   indicates congestion across the tunnel ('I' to 'E'), while the inner
   header would still indicate congestion upstream of ('I').  Appendix C
   gives a simple and precise method for a tunnel egress to infer the
   congestion level introduced across a tunnel.

   All this shows that 'E' can preserve the control loop irrespective of
   whether 'I' copies congestion notification into the outer header or
   resets it.

   That is the situation for existing control arrangements but, because
   copying reveals more information, it would open up possibilities for
   better control system designs.  For instance, Appendix E describes
   how resetting CE marking on encapsulation breaks a proposed
   congestion marking scheme on the standards track.  It ends up
   removing excessive amounts of traffic unnecessarily.  Whereas copying
   CE markings at ingress leads to the correct control behaviour.

B.3.  Management Constraints

   As well as control, there are also management constraints.
   Specifically, a management system may monitor congestion markings in
   passing packets, perhaps at the border between networks as part of a
   service level agreement.  For instance, monitors at the borders of



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   autonomous systems may need to measure how much congestion has
   accumulated so far along the path, perhaps to determine between them
   how much of the congestion is contributed by each domain.

   In this document we define the baseline of congestion marking (or the
   Congestion Baseline) as the source of the layer that created (or most
   recently reset) the congestion notification field.  When monitoring
   congestion it would be desirable if the Congestion Baseline did not
   depend on whether packets were tunnelled or not.  Given some tunnels
   cross domain borders (e.g. consider M in Figure 6 is monitoring a
   border), it would therefore be desirable for 'I' to copy congestion
   accumulated so far into the outer headers, so that it is exposed
   across the tunnel.

Appendix C.  Contribution to Congestion across a Tunnel

   This specification mandates that a tunnel ingress determines the ECN
   field of each new outer tunnel header by copying the arriving header.
   Concern has been expressed that this will make it difficult for the
   tunnel egress to monitor congestion introduced only along a tunnel,
   which is easy if the outer ECN field is reset at a tunnel ingress
   (RFC3168 full functionality mode).  However, in fact copying CE marks
   at ingress will still make it easy for the egress to measure
   congestion introduced across a tunnel, as illustrated below.

   Consider 100 packets measured at the egress.  Say it measures that 30
   are CE marked in the inner and outer headers and 12 have additional
   CE marks in the outer but not the inner.  This means packets arriving
   at the ingress had already experienced 30% congestion.  However, it
   does not mean there was 12% congestion across the tunnel.  The
   correct calculation of congestion across the tunnel is p_t = 12/
   (100-30) = 12/70 = 17%.  This is easy for the egress to measure.  It
   is simply the packets with additional CE marking in the outer header
   (12) as a proportion of packets not marked in the inner header (70).

   Figure 7 illustrates this in a combinatorial probability diagram.
   The square represents 100 packets.  The 30% division along the bottom
   represents marking before the ingress, and the p_t division up the
   side represents marking introduced across the tunnel.












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        ^ outer header marking
        |
   100% +-----+---------+       The large square
        |     |         |       represents 100 packets
        | 30  |         |
        |     |         |   p_t = 12/(100-30)
    p_t +     +---------+       = 12/70
        |     |   12    |       = 17%
      0 +-----+---------+--->
        0    30%       100%  inner header marking

       Figure 7: Tunnel Marking of Packets Already Marked at Ingress

Appendix D.  Why Losing ECT(1) on Decapsulation Impedes PCN

   Congestion notification with two severity levels is currently on the
   IETF's standards track agenda in the Congestion and Pre-Congestion
   Notification (PCN) working group.  The PCN working group requires
   four congestion states (not PCN-enabled, not marked and two
   increasingly severe levels of congestion marking--see [RFC5559]).
   The aim is for the less severe level of marking to stop admitting new
   traffic and the more severe level to terminate sufficient existing
   flows to bring a network back to its operating point after a link
   failure.

   (Note on terminology: wherever this document counts four congestion
   states, the PCN working group would count this as three PCN states
   plus a not-PCN-enabled state.)

   Although the ECN field gives sufficient codepoints for four states,
   pre-existing ECN tunnelling RFCs prevented the PCN working group from
   using four ECN states in case any tunnel decapsulations occur within
   a PCN region.  If a node in a tunnel changes the ECN field to ECT(0)
   or ECT(1), this change would be discarded by a tunnel egress
   compliant with RFC4301 or RFC3168.  This can be seen in Figure 2
   (Section 3.2), where ECT values in the outer header are ignored
   unless the inner header is the same.  Effectively the decapsulation
   rules of RFC4301 and RFC3168 waste one ECT codepoint; they treat the
   ECT(0) and ECT(1) codepoints as a single codepoint.

   As a consequence, the PCN w-g initially took the approach of a
   standards track baseline encoding for three states
   [I-D.ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding] and a number of experimental
   alternatives to add or avoid the fourth state.  Without wishing to
   disparage the ingenuity of these work-rounds, none were chosen for
   the standards track because they were either somewhat wasteful,
   imprecise or complicated.  One uses a pair of Diffserv codepoint(s)
   in place of each PCN DSCP to encode the extra state



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   [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-state-encoding], using up the rapidly exhausting DSCP
   space while leaving an ECN codepoint unused.  Another PCN encoding
   has been proposed that would survive tunnelling without an extra DSCP
   [I-D.ietf-pcn-psdm-encoding], but it requires the PCN edge gateways
   to share state out of band so the egress edge can know which marking
   a packet started with at the ingress edge.  Yet another work-round to
   the ECN tunnelling problem proposes a more involved marking algorithm
   in forwarding elements to encode the three congestion notification
   states using only two ECN codepoints [I-D.satoh-pcn-st-marking].  One
   work-round takes a different approach; it compromises the precision
   of the admission control mechanism in some network scenarios, but
   manages to work with just three encoding states and a single marking
   algorithm [I-D.ietf-pcn-sm-edge-behaviour].

   Rather than require the IETF to bless any of these experimental
   encoding work-rounds, the present specification fixes the root cause
   of the problem so that operators deploying PCN can simply require
   that tunnel end-points within a PCN region should comply with this
   new ECN tunnelling specification.  Universal compliance is feasible
   for PCN, because it is intended to be deployed in a controlled
   Diffserv region.  Assuming tunnels within a PCN region will be
   required to comply with the present specification, the PCN w-g is
   progressing a trivially simple four-state ECN encoding
   [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding].

Appendix E.  Why Resetting ECN on Encapsulation Impedes PCN

   The PCN architecture says "...if encapsulation is done within the
   PCN-domain: Any PCN-marking is copied into the outer header.  Note: A
   tunnel will not provide this behaviour if it complies with [RFC3168]
   tunnelling in either mode, but it will if it complies with [RFC4301]
   IPsec tunnelling.  "

   The specific issue here concerns PCN excess rate marking
   [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour].  The purpose of excess rate marking
   is to provide a bulk mechanism for interior nodes within a PCN domain
   to mark traffic that is exceeding a configured threshold bit-rate,
   perhaps after an unexpected event such as a reroute, a link or node
   failure, or a more widespread disaster.  PCN is intended for
   inelastic flows, so just removing marked packets would degrade every
   flow to the point of uselessness.  Instead, the edge nodes around a
   PCN domain terminate an equivalent amount of traffic, but at flow
   granularity.  As well as protecting the surviving inelastic flows,
   this also protects the share of capacity set aside for elastic
   traffic.  But users are very sensitive to their flows being
   terminated while in progress, therefore no more flows should be
   terminated than absolutely necessary.




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   Re-routes are a common cause of QoS degradation in IP networks.
   After re-routes it is common for multiple links in a network to
   become stressed at once.  Therefore, PCN excess rate marking has been
   carefully designed to ensure traffic marked at one queue will not be
   counted again for marking at subsequent queues (see the `Excess
   traffic meter function' of [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour]).

   However, if an RFC3168 tunnel ingress intervenes, it resets the ECN
   field in all the outer headers.  This will cause excess traffic to be
   counted more than once, leading to many flows being removed that did
   not need to be removed at all.  This is why the an RFC3168 tunnel
   ingress cannot be used in a PCN domain.

   The original reason an RFC3168 encapsulator reset the ECN field was
   to block a covert channel (Appendix B.1), with the overriding aim of
   consistent behaviour between IPsec and non-IPsec tunnels.  But later
   RFC4301 IPsec encapsulation placed simplicity above the need to block
   the covert channel, simply copying the ECN field.

   The ECN reset in RFC3168 is no longer deemed necessary, it is
   inconsistent with RFC4301, it is not as simple as RFC4301 and it is
   impeding deployment of new protocols like PCN.  The present
   specification corrects this perverse situation.

Appendix F.  Compromise on Decap with ECT(1) Inner and ECT(0) Outer

   A packet with an ECT(1) inner and an ECT(0) outer should never arise
   from any known IETF protocol.  Without giving a reason, RFC3168 and
   RFC4301 both say the outer should be ignored when decapsulating such
   a packet.  This appendix explains why it was decided not to change
   this advice.

   In summary, ECT(0) always means 'not congested' and ECT(1) may imply
   the same [RFC3168] or it may imply a higher severity congestion
   signal [RFC4774], [I-D.ietf-pcn-3-in-1-encoding], depending on the
   transport in use.  Whether they mean the same or not, at the ingress
   the outer should have started the same as the inner and only a broken
   or compromised router could have changed the outer to ECT(0).

   The decapsulator can detect this anomaly.  But the question is,
   should it correct the anomaly by ignoring the outer, or should it
   reveal the anomaly to the end-to-end transport by forwarding the
   outer?

   On balance, it was decided that the decapsulator should correct the
   anomaly, but log the event and optionally raise an alarm.  This is
   the safe action if ECT(1) is being used as a more severe marking than
   ECT(0), because it passes the more severe signal to the transport.



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   However, it is not a good idea to hide anomalies, which is why an
   optional alarm is suggested.  It should be noted that this anomaly
   may be the result of two changes to the outer: a broken or
   compromised router within the tunnel might be erasing congestion
   markings introduced earlier in the same tunnel by a congested router.
   In this case, the anomaly would be losing congestion signals, which
   needs immediate attention.

   The original reason for defining ECT(0) and ECT(1) as equivalent was
   so that the data source could use the ECN nonce [RFC3540] to detect
   if congestion signals were being erased.  However, in this case, the
   decapsulator does not need a nonce to detect any anomalies introduced
   within the tunnel, because it has the inner as a record of the header
   at the ingress.  Therefore, it was decided that the best compromise
   would be to give precedence to solving the safety issue over
   revealing the anomaly, because the anomaly could at least be detected
   and dealt with internally.

   Superficially, the opposite case where the inner and outer carry
   different ECT values, but with an ECT(1) outer and ECT(0) inner seems
   to require a similar compromise.  However, because that case is
   reversed, no compromise is necessary; it is best to forward the outer
   whether the transport expects the ECT(1) to mean a higher severity
   than ECT(0) or the same severity.  Forwarding the outer either
   preserves a higher value (if it is higher) or it reveals an anomaly
   to the transport (if the two ECT codepoints mean the same severity).

Appendix G.  Open Issues

   The new decapsulation behaviour defined in Section 4.2 adds support
   for propagation of 2 severity levels of congestion.  However
   transports have no way to discover whether there are any legacy
   tunnels on their path that will not propagate 2 severity levels.  It
   would have been nice to add a feature for transports to check path
   support, but this remains an open issue that will have to be
   addressed in any future standards action to define an end-to-end
   scheme that requires 2-severity levels of congestion.  PCN avoids
   this problem, because it is only for a controlled region, so all
   legacy tunnels can be upgraded by the same operator that deploys PCN.












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Author's Address

   Bob Briscoe
   BT
   B54/77, Adastral Park
   Martlesham Heath
   Ipswich  IP5 3RE
   UK

   Phone: +44 1473 645196
   EMail: bob.briscoe@bt.com
   URI:   http://bobbriscoe.net/







































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