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Versions: (draft-evans-palmer-key-pinning) 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Web Security                                                    C. Evans
Internet-Draft                                                 C. Palmer
Intended status: Standards Track                            Google, Inc.
Expires: June 11, 2012                                  December 9, 2011


                 Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP
                    draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-01

Abstract

   This memo describes an extension to the HTTP protocol allowing web
   host operators to instruct user agents (UAs) to remember ("pin") the
   hosts' cryptographic identities for a given period of time.  During
   that time, UAs will require that the host present a certificate chain
   including at least one Subject Public Key Info structure whose
   fingerprint matches one or more of the pinned fingerprints for that
   host.  By effectively reducing the scope of authorities who can
   authenticate the domain during the lifetime of the pin, pinning may
   reduce the incidence of man-in-the-middle attacks due to compromised
   Certification Authorities and other authentication errors and
   attacks.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 11, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of



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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.













































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1.  Introduction

   We propose a new HTTP header to enable a web host to express to user
   agents (UAs) which Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) structure(s) UAs
   MUST expect to be present in the host's certificate chain in future
   connections using TLS (see [rfc-5246]).  We call this "public key
   pinning".  At least one user agent (Google Chrome) has experimented
   with shipping with a user-extensible embeded set of pins.  Although
   effective, this does not scale.  This proposal addresses the scale
   problem.

   Deploying public key pinning safely will require operational and
   organizational maturity due to the risk that hosts may make
   themselves unavailable by pinning to a SPKI that becomes invalid.
   (See Section 3.)  We believe that, with care, host operators can
   greatly reduce the risk of MITM attacks and other false-
   authentication problems for their users without incurring undue risk.

   We intend for hosts to use public key pinning together with HSTS (as
   defined in [hsts-draft], but is possible to pin keys without
   requiring HSTS.

   This draft is being discussed on the WebSec Working Group mailing
   list, websec@ietf.org.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [rfc-2119].





















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2.  Server and Client Behavior

2.1.  Response Header Field Syntax

   To set a pin, hosts use a new HTTP header field, Public-Key-Pins, in
   their HTTP responses.  Figure 1 describes the syntax of the header
   field.

   Public-Key-Pins = "Public-Key-Pins" ":" LWS directives

   directives      = max-age LWS ";" LWS pins
                     / pins LWS ";" LWS max-age

   max-age         = "max-age" LWS "=" LWS delta-seconds

   pins            = pin
                     / pin LWS ";" LWS pins

   pin             = "pin-" token LWS "=" LWS quoted-string

                                 Figure 1

   In the pin rule, the token is the name of a cryptographic hash
   algorithm, and MUST be either "sha1" or "sha256".  (Future versions
   of this specification may change the hash functions.)  The quoted-
   string is a sequence of base64 digits: a base64-encoded hash.  See
   Section 2.2.

   Figure 2 shows some example response header fields using the pins
   extension (folded for clarity).

   Public-Key-Pins: max-age=500;
       pin-sha1="4n972HfV354KP560yw4uqe/baXc=";
       pin-sha1="IvGeLsbqzPxdI0b0wuj2xVTdXgc="

   Public-Key-Pins: max-age=31536000;
       pin-sha1="4n972HfV354KP560yw4uqe/baXc=";
       pin-sha256="LPJNul+wow4m6DsqxbninhsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ="

   Public-Key-Pins: pin-sha1="4n972HfV354KP560yw4uqe/baXc=";
       pin-sha1="qvTGHdzF6KLavt4PO0gs2a6pQ00=";
       pin-sha256="LPJNul+wow4m6DsqxbninhsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ=";
       max-age=2592000

                                 Figure 2






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2.2.  Semantics of Pins

   The fingerprint is the SHA-1 or SHA-256 hash of the DER-encoded ASN.1
   representation of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo (SPKI) field of the X.509
   certificate.  Figure 3 reproduces the definition of the
   SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure in [rfc-5280].

   SubjectPublicKeyInfo  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
       algorithm            AlgorithmIdentifier,
       subjectPublicKey     BIT STRING  }

   AlgorithmIdentifier  ::=  SEQUENCE  {
       algorithm            OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
       parameters           ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL  }

                                 Figure 3

   The SPKI hash is then encoded in base-64 for use in an HTTP header.
   (See [rfc-4648].)

   We pin public keys, rather than entire certificates, to enable
   operators to generate new certificates containing old public keys
   (see [why-pin-key]).

   See Appendix A for an example non-normative program that generates
   public key fingerprints from SubjectPublicKeyInfo fields in
   certificates.

2.3.  Noting Pins

   Upon receipt of the Public-Key-Pins response header field, the UA
   notes the host as a Pinned Host, storing the pins and their
   associated max-age in non-volatile storage (for example, along with
   the HSTS metadata).  The pins and their associated max-age are
   collectively known as Pinning Metadata.

   The UA MUST observe these conditions when noting a host:

   o  The UA MUST note the pins if and only if it received the Public-
      Key-Pins response header field over an error-free TLS connection.
      The UAs MUST ignore Public-Key-Pins response header fields
      received on HTTP (non-HTTPS) connections.

   o  The UA MUST note the pins if and only if the TLS connection was
      authenticated with a certificate chain containing at least one of
      the SPKI structures indicated by at least one of the given
      fingerprints.  (See Section 2.4.)




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   o  The UA MUST note the pins if and only if the given set of pins
      contains at least one pin that does NOT refer to an SPKI in the
      certificate chain.  (That is, the host must set a Backup Pin; see
      Section 3.1.)

   If the Public-Key-Pins response header field does not meet all four
   of these criteria, the UA MUST NOT note the host as a Pinned Host,
   and MUST discard any previously set Pinning Metadata for that host in
   its non-volatile store.  Public-Key-Pins response header fields that
   meet all these critera are known as Valid Pinning Headers.

   Whenever a UA receives a Valid Pinning Header, it MUST set its
   Pinning Metadata to the exact pins and max-age given in the most
   recently received Valid Pinning Header.

2.3.1.  max-age

   max-age specifies the number of seconds, after the reception of the
   Public-Key-Pins HTTP Response Header, during which the UA regards the
   host as a Pinned Host.  The delta-seconds production is specified in
   [rfc-2616].

   Note that by setting a low or 0 value for max-age, hosts effectively
   instruct UAs to cease regarding them as Pinned Hosts.

2.4.  Validating Pinned Connections

   When a UA connects to a Pinned Host, if the TLS connection has
   errors, the UA MUST terminate the connection without allowing the
   user to proceed anyway.  (This behavior is the same as that required
   by [hsts-draft].

   If the connection has no errors, the UA will then apply a new
   correctness check: Pin Validation.  To perform Pin Validation, the UA
   will compute the fingerprints of the SPKI structures in each
   certificate in the host's validated certificate chain.  (The UA
   ignores superfluous certificates in the chain that do not form part
   of the validating chain.)  The UA will then check that the set of
   these fingerprints intersects the set of fingerprints in that host's
   Pinning Metadata.  If there is set intersection, the UA continues
   with the connection as normal.  Otherwise, the UA MUST treat this Pin
   Failure as a non-recoverable error.

   Note that, although the UA has previously received public key pins at
   the HTTP layer, it can and MUST perform Pin Validation at the TLS
   layer, before beginning an HTTP conversation over the TLS channel.
   The TLS layer thus evaluates TLS connections with pinning information
   the UA received previously, regardless of mechanism: statically



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   preloaded, via HTTP header, or some other means (possibly in the TLS
   layer itself).

2.5.  Interactions With Preloaded Pin Lists

   UAs MAY choose to implement built-in public key pins, alongside any
   built-in HSTS opt-in list.  UAs MUST allow users to override a
   built-in pin list, including turning it off.

   UAs MUST use the newest information -- built-in or set via Valid
   Pinning Header -- when performing Pin Validation for the host.

2.6.  Pinning Self-Signed End Entities

   If UAs accept hosts that authenticate themselves with self-signed end
   entity certificates, they MAY also allow hosts to pin the public keys
   in such certificates.  The usability and security implications of
   this practice are outside the scope of this specification.

































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3.  Security Considerations

   Pinning public keys helps hosts assert their cryptographic identity,
   but there is some risk that a host operator could lose or lose
   control of their host's private key.  In this case, the operator
   would not be able to serve their web site or application in a way
   that UAs would trust for the duration of their pin's max-age.
   (Recall that UAs MUST close the connection to a host upon Pin
   Failure.)

3.1.  Backup Pins

   The primary way to cope with the risk of inadvertant Pin Failure is
   to keep a Backup Pin. A Backup Pin is a fingerprint for the public
   key of a secondary, not-yet-deployed key pair.  The operator keeps
   the backup key pair offline, and sets a pin for it in the Public-Key-
   Pins header.  Then, in case the operator loses control of their
   primary private key, they can deploy the backup key pair.  UAs, who
   have had the backup key pair pinned (when it was set in previous
   Valid Pinning Headers), can connect to the host without error.

   Because having a backup key pair is so important to recovery, UAs
   MUST require that hosts set a Backup Pin. (See Section 2.3.)




























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4.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.
















































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5.  Usability Considerations

   When pinning works to detect impostor Pinned Hosts, users will
   experience denial of service.  UAs MUST explain the reason why, i.e.
   that it was impossible to verify the confirmed cryptographic identity
   of the host.

   UAs MUST have a way for users to clear current pins for Pinned Hosts.
   UAs SHOULD have a way for users to query the current state of Pinned
   Hosts.









































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6.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to Tobias Gondrom, Jeff Hodges, Adam Langley, Nicolas
   Lidzborski, SM, James Manger, and Yoav Nir for suggestions and edits
   that clarified the text.  Thanks to Trevor Perrin for suggesting a
   mechanism to affirmatively break pins ([pin-break-codes]).  Adam
   Langley provided the SPKI fingerprint generation code.












































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7.  What's Changed

   Removed the section on pin break codes and verifiers, in favor the of
   most-recently-received policy (Section 2.3).

   Now using a new header field, Public-Key-Pins, separate from HSTS.
   This allows hosts to use pinning separately from Strict Transport
   Security.

   Explicitly requiring that UAs perform Pin Validation before the HTTP
   conversation begins.

   Backup Pins are now required.

   Separated normative from non-normative material.  Removed tangential
   and out-of-scope non-normative discussion.



































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8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [hsts-draft]
              Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
              Transport Security (HSTS)", October 2011, <http://
              tools.ietf.org/html/
              draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec-03>.

   [rfc-2119]
              Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", March 1997,
              <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt>.

   [rfc-2616]
              Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", June 1999,
              <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt>.

   [rfc-4648]
              Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", October 2006,
              <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4648.txt>.

   [rfc-5246]
              Rescorla, E. and T. Dierks, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", August 2008,
              <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt>.

   [rfc-5280]
              Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", May 2008,
              <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [why-pin-key]
              Langley, A., "Public Key Pinning", May 2011,
              <http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/05/04/pinning.html>.

   [pin-break-codes]
              Perrin, T., "Self-Asserted Key Pinning", September 2011,
              <http://trevp.net/SAKP/>.




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Appendix A.  Fingerprint Generation

   This Go program generates public key fingerprints, suitable for use
   in pinning, from PEM-encoded certificates.  It is non-normative.

   package main

   import (
          "io/ioutil"
          "os"
          "crypto/sha1"
          "crypto/x509"
          "encoding/base64"
          "encoding/pem"
          "fmt"
   )

   func main() {
          if len(os.Args) < 2 {
                  fmt.Printf("Usage: %s PEM-filename\n", os.Args[0])
                  os.Exit(1)
          }
          pemBytes, err := ioutil.ReadFile(os.Args[1])
          if err != nil {
                  panic(err.String())
          }
          block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes)
          if block == nil {
                  panic("No PEM structure found")
          }
          derBytes := block.Bytes
          certs, err := x509.ParseCertificates(derBytes)
          if err != nil {
                  panic(err.String())
          }
          cert := certs[0]
          h := sha1.New()
          h.Write(cert.RawSubjectPublicKeyInfo)
          digest := h.Sum()

          fmt.Printf("Hex: %x\nBase64: %s\n", digest,
                  base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(digest))
   }

                                 Figure 4






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Appendix B.  Deployment Guidance

   This section is non-normative guidance which may smooth the adoption
   of public key pinning.

   o  Operators SHOULD get the backup public key signed by a different
      (root and/or intermediary) CA than their primary certificate, and
      store the backup key pair safely offline.

   o  It is most economical to have the backup certificate signed by a
      completely different signature chain than the live certificate, to
      maximize recoverability in the event of either root or
      intermediary signer compromise.

   o  Operators SHOULD periodically exercise their Backup Pin plan -- an
      untested backup is no backup at all.

   o  Operators SHOULD start small.  Operators SHOULD first deploy
      public key pinning by setting a max-age of minutes or a few hours,
      and gradually increase max-age as they gain confidence in their
      operational capability.






























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Authors' Addresses

   Chris Evans
   Google, Inc.
   1600 Amphitheatre Pkwy
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   US

   Email: cevans@google.com


   Chris Palmer
   Google, Inc.
   1600 Amphitheatre Pkwy
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   US

   Email: palmer@google.com

































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