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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 RFC 6251

Network Working Group                                       S. Josefsson
Internet-Draft                                                       SJD
Intended status: Informational                          December 5, 2008
Expires: June 8, 2009


   Using Kerberos V5 over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol
                 draft-josefsson-kerberos5-starttls-04

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on June 8, 2009.


















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Abstract

   This document specify how the Kerberos V5 protocol can be transported
   over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, to provide
   additional security features.  This document updates RFC 4120.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Kerberos V5 STARTTLS Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Channel Binding Pre-Authentication Data  . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  STARTTLS aware KDC Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 14





























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1.  Introduction and Background

   This document describe how a Kerberos V5 [RFC4120] implementation may
   upgrade communication between clients and Key Distribution Centers
   (KDCs) to use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] protocol.

   The TLS protocol offer integrity and privacy protected exchanges that
   can be authentication using X.509 certificates, OpenPGP keys
   [RFC5081], and user name and passwords via SRP [RFC5054].

   There are several reasons to use Kerberos V5 over TLS.

   o  Prevents downgrade attacks affecting, e.g., encryption types and
      pre-auth data negotiation.  The encryption type field in KDC-REQ,
      and the METHOD-DATA field with the requested pre-auth types from
      the server in KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED errors in KDC-REP, are sent
      without integrity or privacy protection in Kerberos 5.  This
      allows an attacker to replace the encryption type with a
      compromised encryption type, e.g., 56-bit DES, or request that
      clients should use a broken pre-auth type.  Since clients in
      general cannot know the encryption types other servers support, or
      the pre-auth types servers prefer or require, it is difficult for
      the client to detect if there was a man-in-the-middle or if the
      remote server simply did not support a stronger encryption type or
      preferred another pre-auth type.

   o  Kerberos exchanges are privacy protected.  Part of many Kerberos
      packets are transfered without privacy protection (i.e.,
      encryption).  That part contains information, such as the client
      principal name, the server principal name, the encryption types
      supported by the client, the lifetime of tickets, etc.  Revealing
      such information is, in some threat models, considered a problem.

   o  Additional authentication against the KDC.  In some situations,
      users are equipped with smart cards with a RSA authentication key.
      In others, users have a OpenPGP client on their desktop, with a
      public OpenPGP key known to the server.

   o  The TLS protocol has been studied by many parties.  In some threat
      models, the designer prefer to reduce the number of protocols that
      can hurt the overall system security if they are compromised.

   o  Explicit server authentication of the KDC to the client.  In
      traditional Kerberos 5, authentication of the KDC is proved as a
      side effect that the KDC knows your encryption key (i.e., your
      password).

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",



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   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

















































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2.  Kerberos V5 STARTTLS Extension

   The STARTTLS extension uses the Kerberos V5 TCP extension mechanism
   [RFC5021].  The extension uses bit #TBD in the extension bitmask.

   The protocol is as follows.  After the server has sent the 4-octet
   value 0x00000000 to indicate support of this extension, the stream
   will be controlled by the TLS protocol and its framing.  The TLS
   protocol is initiated by the client.

   Typically, the client initiate the TLS handshake protocol by sending
   a client hello, and the server responds, and the handshake continues
   until it either succeed or fails.

   If for any reason the handshake fails, the STARTTLS protocol will
   also fail, and the TLS error is used as the error indication.  In
   this case, no further messages can be exchanged over the same TCP
   session.

   If the handshake succeeds, the Kerberos V5 authentication protocol is
   performed within the protected TLS channel, like a normal TCP
   Kerberos V5 exchange.  In particular, this means that every Kerberos
   V5 packet will be prefixed by a 4-octet length field, that indicate
   the length of the Kerberos V5 packet.  However, to conform with this
   specification, any KDC-REQ (AS-REQ or TGS-REQ) message MUST contain
   the "pa-channel-binding" pre-authentication data.

   When no further Kerberos V5 messages needs to be transferred in the
   TLS session, the TLS session MUST be shut down properly using the
   close_notify alert.  When the TLS session is shut down, the TCP
   connection cannot be re-used to send any furhter data and MUST be
   closed.



















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3.  Channel Binding Pre-Authentication Data

   The pre-authentication structure is defined in RFC 4120 as:

     PA-DATA         ::= SEQUENCE {
             -- NOTE: first tag is [1], not [0]
             padata-type     [1] Int32,
             padata-value    [2] OCTET STRING -- might be encoded AP-REQ
     }

   Here we define a new pre-authentication data, called "pa-channel-
   binding".  It has a padata-type integer value of #TBD.  The contents
   of the padata-value field is the channel binding data, as discussed
   in [RFC5056].





































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4.  Examples

   A complete packet flow for a successful AS-REQ/REP exchange protected
   by this mechanism will be as follows.  The "STARTTLS-bit" is a
   4-octet value with only the bit allocated for this extension set.

       Client                                               Server

        [ Kerberos V5 TCP extension mechanism negotiation starts ]

       [0x70000000 & STARTTLS-bit]  -------->
                                                       [0x00000000]
                                    <--------

                            [ TLS negotiation starts ]


       ClientHello                  -------->
                                                       ServerHello
                                                      Certificate*
                                                ServerKeyExchange*
                                               CertificateRequest*
                                    <--------      ServerHelloDone
       Certificate*
       ClientKeyExchange
       CertificateVerify*
       [ChangeCipherSpec]
       Finished                     -------->
                                                [ChangeCipherSpec]
                                    <--------             Finished

                       [ Kerberos V5 negotiation starts ]

       4 octet length field
       Kerberos V5 AS-REQ           -------->
                                                4 octet length field
                                                Kerberos V5 AS-REP
                                    <--------

       * Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not
         always sent.










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5.  STARTTLS aware KDC Discovery

   Section 7.2.3 of Kerberos V5 [RFC4120] describe how Domain Name
   System (DNS) SRV records [RFC2782] can be used to find the address of
   an KDC.  We define a new Proto of "tls" to indicate that the
   particular KDC is intended to support this STARTTLS extension.  The
   Service, Realm, TTL, Class, SRV, Priority, Weight, Port and Target
   have the same meaning as in RFC 4120.

   For example:

   _kerberos._tls.EXAMPLE.COM. IN SRV 0 0 88 kdc1.example.com.
   _kerberos._tls.EXAMPLE.COM. IN SRV 1 0 88 kdc2.example.com.






































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6.  IANA Considerations

   The IANA is requested to allocate a bit in the "Kerberos TCP
   Extensions" registry for the extension described in this document, as
   per [RFC5021].














































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7.  Acknowledgements

   Jeffrey Hutzelman provided comments that improved the protocol and
   document.















































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8.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations in Kerberos V5, TLS, and the extension
   mechanism framework are inherited.

   Note that TLS does not protect against Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
   attacks unless clients verify the KDC's credentials (X.509
   certificate, OpenPGP key, etc) correctly.

   To protect against the inherent downgrade attack in the extension
   framework, implementations SHOULD offer a policy mode that requires
   this extension to always be successfully negotiated, for a particular
   realm, or generally.  For interoperability with implementations that
   do not support this extension, the policy mode SHOULD be disabled by
   default.




































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9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2782]  Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
              specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
              February 2000.

   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
              July 2005.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC5021]  Josefsson, S., "Extended Kerberos Version 5 Key
              Distribution Center (KDC) Exchanges over TCP", RFC 5021,
              August 2007.

   [RFC5056]  Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
              Channels", RFC 5056, November 2007.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5054]  Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavrogiannopoulos, N., and T. Perrin,
              "Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS
              Authentication", RFC 5054, November 2007.

   [RFC5081]  Mavrogiannopoulos, N., "Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport
              Layer Security (TLS) Authentication", RFC 5081,
              November 2007.

















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Author's Address

   Simon Josefsson
   Simon Josefsson Datakonsult AB
   Hagagatan 24
   Stockholm  113 47
   Sweden

   Email: simon@josefsson.org
   URI:   http://josefsson.org/









































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