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Versions: 00 01 02 03 RFC 6367

Network Working Group                                           S. Kanno
Internet-Draft                                  NTT Software Corporation
Intended status: Informational                                  M. Kanda
Expires: December 11, 2011                                           NTT
                                                            June 9, 2011


Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)
                      draft-kanno-tls-camellia-02

Abstract

   This document specifies forty-two cipher suites for the Transport
   Security Layer (TLS) protocol to additionally support the Camellia
   encryption algorithm as a block cipher.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 11, 2011.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.




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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Proposed Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  HMAC based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  GCM based Cipher Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  PSK based Cipher Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Cipher Suite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.3.  PRFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.4.  PSK cipher suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
































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1.  Introduction

   The Camellia cipher suites are already spcified in RFC5932 [16] with
   SHA-256 based HMAC using asymmetric key encryption.  This document
   proposes the addition of new cipher suites to the Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) [9] protocol to support the Camellia [4] cipher
   algorithm as a block cipher algorithm.  The proposed cipher suites
   include variants using SHA-2 family of cryptographic hash functions
   [14] and Galois counter mode (GCM) [15].  Elliptic curve cipher
   suites and Pre-Shared Key (PSK) [5] cipher suites are also included.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [3].



































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2.  Proposed Cipher Suites

2.1.  HMAC based Cipher Suites

   The eight cipher suites use Camellia [4] in Cipher Block Chaining
   (CBC) [4] mode with a SHA-2 family HMAC using elliptic curves
   cryptosystem:

   CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD};
   CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD};
   CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {TBD,TBD};
   CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {TBD,TBD};
   CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = {TBD,TBD};
   CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   = {TBD,TBD};
   CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
   CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};

2.2.  GCM based Cipher Suites

   The twenty cipher suites use the same asymmetric key algorithms as
   those in the previous section but use the authenticated encryption
   modes defined in TLS 1.2 [9] with the Camellia in GCM [15].

  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256          = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384          = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256  = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384  = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256   = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384   = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     = {TBD,TBD};








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2.3.  PSK based Cipher Suites

   The fourteen cipher suites describe PSK cipher suites.  The first six
   cipher suites use Camellia with GCM and the next eight cipher suites
   use the Camellia with SHA-2 family HMAC using asymmetric key
   encryption or elliptic curves cryptosystem.

    CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256        = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384        = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256        = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384        = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {TBD,TBD};
    CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {TBD,TBD};






























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3.  Cipher Suite Definitions

3.1.  Key Exchange

   The RSA, DHE_RSA, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DH_DSS, ECDH, DH_anon, and ECDHE
   key exchanges are performed as defined in RFC5246 [9].

3.2.  Cipher

   The CAMELLIA_128_CBC cipher suites use Camellia [4] in CBC mode with
   a 128-bit key and 128-bit IV; the CAMELLIA_256_CBC cipher suites use
   a 256-bit key and 128-bit IV.

   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [20] authenticated encryption with
   additional data algorithms, AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM are
   described in RFC5116 [8].  And AES GCM cipher suites for TLS are
   described in RFC5288 [10].  AES and Camellia share common
   characteristics including key sizes and block length.
   CAMELLIA_128_GCM and CAMELLIA_256_GCM are defined according as those
   of AES.

3.3.  PRFs

   The hash algorithms and pseudorandom function (PRF) algorithms for
   TLS 1.2 [9] SHALL be as follows:

   a) The cipher suites ending with _SHA256 use HMAC-SHA-256 [1] as the
   MAC algorithm, The PRF is the TLS PRF [9] with SHA-256 [14] as the
   hash function,
   b) The cipher suites ending with _SHA384 use HMAC-SHA-384 [1] as the
   MAC algorithm, The PRF is the TLS PRF [9] with SHA-384 [14] as the
   hash function.

   When used with TLS versions prior to 1.2 ( TLS 1.0 [2] and TLS 1.1
   [6]), the PRF is calculated as specified in the appropriate version
   of the TLS specification.

3.4.  PSK cipher suites

   PSK cipher suites for TLS are described in RFC4279 [5], RFC4785 [7],
   RFC5487 [12], and RFC5489 [13].










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4.  Security Considerations

   At the time of writing this document there are no known weak keys for
   Camellia.  And no security problem has been found on Camellia (see
   NESSIE [17], CRYPTREC [18], and LNCS 5867[19]).

   The security considerations in previous RFCs (RFC4279 [5], RFC4785
   [7], RFC5116 [8], RFC5288 [10], RFC5289 [11], RFC5487 [12]), and GCM
   [15] apply to this document as well.










































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5.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to allocate the following numbers in the TLS Cipher
   Suite Registry:

  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256          = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384          = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256  = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384  = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256   = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384   = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256          = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384          = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256          = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384          = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384      = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {TBD,TBD};
  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {TBD,TBD};




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6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

   [1]   Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing
         for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.

   [2]   Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
         RFC 2246, January 1999.

   [3]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [4]   Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description of the
         Camellia Encryption Algorithm", RFC 3713, April 2004.

   [5]   Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for
         Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December 2005.

   [6]   Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
         Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.

   [7]   Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites
         with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
         RFC 4785, January 2007.

   [8]   McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
         Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.

   [9]   Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
         Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [10]  Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois Counter
         Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288, August 2008.

   [11]  Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/
         384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289, August 2008.

   [12]  Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/
         384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487, March 2009.

   [13]  Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, "ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport
         Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5489, March 2009.

   [14]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash
         Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180, October 2008, <http://
         csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-3/fips180-3_final.pdf>.




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   [15]  Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
         Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and
         Authentication", April 2006, <http://csrc.nist.gov/
         publications/drafts/Draft-NIST_SP800-38D_Public_Comment.pdf>.

6.2.  Informative References

   [16]  Kato, A., Kanda, M., and S. Kanno, "Camellia Cipher Suites for
         TLS", RFC 5932, June 2010.

   [17]  "The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures,
         Integrity and Encryption)",
         <http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/nessie/>.

   [18]  Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), "Cryptography
         Research and Evaluation Committees",
         <http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/index-e.html>.

   [19]  Mala, H., Shakiba, M., and M. Dakhil-alian, "New Results on
         Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round
         Camellia-128", November 2009,
         <http://www.springerlink.com/content/e55783u422436g77/>.

   [20]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
         Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001,
         <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>.

























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Authors' Addresses

   Satoru Kanno
   NTT Software Corporation

   Phone: +81-45-212-9803
   Fax:   +81-45-212-9800
   Email: kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp


   Masayuki Kanda
   NTT

   Phone: +81-422-59-3456
   Fax:   +81-422-59-4015
   Email: kanda.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jp



































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