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Versions: 00 01 RFC 4406

   Internet Draft                                               J. Lyon
   Category: Experimental                                Microsoft Corp
   Document: draft-lyon-senderid-core-01.txt                    M. Wong
                                                              pobox.com
                                                               May 2005


                     Sender ID: Authenticating E-Mail


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts.

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       http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html

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Abstract

   Internet mail suffers from the fact that much unwanted mail is sent
   using spoofed addresses -- "spoofed" in this case means the address
   is used without the permission of the domain owner.  This document
   describes a family of tests by which SMTP servers can determine
   whether an e-mail address in a received message was used with the
   permission of the owner of the domain contained in that e-mail
   address.








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Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................3
   2. Problem Statement..............................................3
   3. SPF Records....................................................4
      3.1 Version and Scope..........................................4
      3.2 Multiple Records...........................................5
      3.3 Positional Modifiers.......................................4
      3.4 Compatibility..............................................7
   4. Decision Model.................................................7
      4.1 Arguments..................................................8
      4.2 Results....................................................8
      4.3 Record Lookup..............................................8
      4.4 Record Selection...........................................8
   5. Actions Based on the Decision..................................9
      5.1 Neutral, None, SoftFail or PermError.......................9
      5.2 Pass.......................................................9
      5.3 Fail......................................................10
      5.4 TempError.................................................10
   6. Security Considerations.......................................11
      6.1 DNS Attacks...............................................11
      6.2 TCP Attacks...............................................11
      6.3 Forged Sender Attacks.....................................11
      6.4 Address Space Hijacking...................................12
      6.5 Malicious DNS attacks on third-parties....................12
   7. Implementation Guidance.......................................13
      7.1 Simple E-mailers..........................................13
      7.2 E-Mail Forwarders.........................................13
      7.3 Mailing List Servers......................................14
      7.4 Third-Party Mailers.......................................14
      7.5 MUA Implementers..........................................15
   8. IANA Considerations...........................................15
   9. Acknowledgements..............................................16
   10. References...................................................16
      10.1 Normative References.....................................16
      10.2 Informative References...................................16
   11. Authors' Addresses...........................................17

Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].








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1. Introduction

   Today, a huge majority of unwanted e-mail contains headers that lie
   about the origin of the mail.  This is true of most spam and
   substantially all of the virus e-mail that is sent.

   This document describes a mechanism such that receiving MTAs, MDAs
   and/or MUAs can recognize mail in the above category and take
   appropriate action.  For example, an MTA might refuse to accept a
   message, an MDA might discard a message rather than placing it into a
   mailbox, and an MUA might render that message in some distinctive
   fashion.

   In order to avoid further fragmentation of the Internet e-mail
   system, it is desirable that the Internet community as a whole come
   to a consensus as to what mail senders should do to make their mail
   appear non-spoofed, and how mail receivers should determine whether
   mail is spoofed.  On the other hand, it is not necessary to reach a
   consensus regarding the actions that various parties take once a
   message has been determined to be spoofed.  This can be done one
   unilaterally -- agent might decide to discard a spoofed message while
   another decides to add a disclaimer.

   This document defines a pair of closely-related tests.  One validates
   a message's Purported Responsible Address (PRA) as defined in [PRA].
   The other validates a message's Reverse-Path (also known as MAIL-FROM
   address) as defined in [SPF].

   An e-mail sender complying with this specification SHOULD publish
   information for both tests, and SHOULD arrange that any mail that is
   sent will pass both tests.  An e-mail receiver complying with this
   specification SHOULD perform at least one of these tests.


2. Problem Statement

   Briefly stated, the mechanisms of this document allow one to answer
   the following question:

      When a message is transferred via SMTP between two unrelated
      parties, does the SMTP client host have permission to send mail
      on behalf of a mailbox referenced by the message?

   As seen from the question, this mechanism applies to unrelated
   parties:  it is useful at the point where a message passes across the
   Internet from one organization to another.  It is beyond the scope of
   this document to describe authentication mechanisms that can be
   deployed within an organization.



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   The PRA version of the test seeks to authenticate the mailbox
   associated with the most recent introduction of a message into the
   mail delivery system.  In simple cases, this is who the mail is from.
   However, in the case of a third-party mailer, a forwarder or a
   mailing list server, the address being authenticated is that of the
   third party, the forwarder or the mailing list.

   On the other hand, the MAIL-FROM version of the test seeks to
   authenticate the mailbox that would receive Delivery Status
   Notifications (DSNs, or bounces) for the message. In simple cases,
   this too is who the mail is from.  However, third-party mailers,
   forwarders and mailing list servers MUST specify an address under
   their control, and SHOULD arrange that DSNs received at this address
   are forwarded to the original bounce address.

   In both cases, the domain associated with an e-mail address is what
   is authenticated; no attempt is made to authenticate the local-part.
   A domain owner gets to determine which SMTP clients speak on behalf
   of addresses within the domain; a responsible domain owner should not
   authorize SMTP clients that will lie about local parts.

   In the long run, once the domain of the sender is authenticated, it
   will be possible to use that domain as part of a mechanism to
   determine the likelihood that a given message is spam, using, for
   example, reputation and accreditation services. (These services are
   not the subject of the present mechanism, but it should enable them.)


3. SPF 2.0 Records

   Domains declare which hosts are and are not authorized to transmit
   e-mail messages on their behalf by publishing Sender Policy Framework
   records in the Domain Name System.  [SPF] defines a format for these
   records identified by the version prefix "v=spf1".  This section
   defines an amended format, identified by the version prefix
   "spf2.0", that allows sending domains to explicitly specify how their
   records should be interpreted, and provides for additional
   extensibility.  Sending domains MAY publish either or both formats.

   Since the two formats are identical in most respects, the following
   sub-sections define the "spf2.0" format relative to [SPF].

3.1 Version and Scope

   Under Sender ID, receiving domains may perform a check of either the
   PRA identity or the MAIL-FROM identity.  Sending domains therefore
   require a method for declaring whether their published list of
   authorized outbound e-mail servers can be used for the PRA check,
   the MAIL-FROM check or both.


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   This section replaces section 4.5 of [SPF] and adds the concept of
   SPF record scopes.

   SPF records begin with a version identifier and may also include a
   scope:

      record      = version terms *SP
      version     = "v=spf1" | ( "spf2." ver-minor scope)
      ver-minor   = 1*DIGIT
      scope       = "/" scope-id *( "," scope-id )
      scope-id    = "mfrom" / "pra" / name

   For example, the SPF record:

          spf2.0/mfrom,pra +mx +ip4:192.168.0.100 -all

   defines an SPF record that can be used for either MAIL FROM or PRA
   checks.

   This document only defines the existence of two scopes: "mfrom" and
   "pra".  The details of these two scopes are defined in other
   documents: "mfrom" is defined in [SPF], "pra" is defined in [PRA].

   Other scopes may be defined by future documents only.  There is no
   registry for scopes.  A scope definition must define what it
   identifies as the sending mailbox for a message, how to extract that
   information from a message, how to determine the initial arguments
   for the check_host() function, and what the compliant responses to
   the result are.  This ensures that domains with published records and
   mail receiver agree on the semantics of the scope.

   A compliant domain SHOULD publish authorizations for every defined
   scope.

3.1.1 Minor Version

   All published records that use the "spf2" version identifier MUST
   start with "spf2.0".  This document only specifies records with a
   minor version of "0".

   Future versions of this document may define other minor versions to
   be used.

3.2 Multiple Records

   A domain MAY publish multiple SPF 2.0 records, provided that each
   scope appears in at most one SPF 2.0 record.  In addition, a domain
   MAY also publish an SPF record that uses the "v=spf1" version
   identifier defined in [SPF].  The selection rules in Section 4.4
   define the precedence of these records.

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3.3 Positional Modifiers

   This section replaces section 4.6.3 of [SPF] and adds the concept of
   positional modifiers.

   Modifiers are key/value pairs that affect the evaluation of the
   check_host() function.

   Modifiers are either global or positional:

     Global modifiers MAY appear anywhere in the record, but SHOULD
     appear at the end, after all mechanisms and positional modifiers.

     Positional modifiers apply only to the mechanism they follow.  It
     is a syntax error for a positional modifier to appear before the
     first mechanism.

   Modifiers of either type are also either singular or multiple:

     Singular modifiers may appear only once in the record if they are
     global, or once after each mechanism if they are positional.

     Multiple modifiers may appear multiple times in the record if they
     are global or multiple times after each mechanism if they are
     positional.

   A modifier is not allowed to be defined as both global and
   positional.

   The modifiers "redirect" and "exp" described in section 5 of [SPF]
   are global and singular.

   Ordering of modifiers does not matter, except:
   1)     positional modifiers must appear after the mechanism they
          affect and before any subsequent mechanisms.
   and 2) when a multiple modifier appears more than one time, the
          ordering of the appearances may be significant to the
          modifier.
   Other than these constraints, implementations MUST treat different
   orders of modifiers the same.  An intended side effect of these rules
   is modifiers cannot be defined that modify other modifiers.

   These rules allow an implementation to correctly pre-parse a record.
   Furthermore, they are crafted to allow the parsing algorithm to be
   stable, even when new modifiers are introduced.

   Modifiers which are unrecognized MUST be ignored.  This allows older
   implementations to handle records with modifiers that were defined
   after they were written.


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3.4 Compatibility

   Domain administrators complying with this specification are required
   to publish information in DNS regarding their authorized outbound
   e-mail servers.  [SPF] describes a format for this information
   identified by the version prefix "v=spf1".  Many domains have
   published information in DNS using this format.  In order to
   provide compatibility for these domains, Sender ID implementations
   SHOULD interpret the version prefix "v=spf1" as equivalent to
   "spf2.0/mfrom,pra", provided no record starting with "spf2.0" exists.

   Administrators who have already published "v=spf1" records SHOULD
   review these records to determine whether they are also valid for use
   with PRA checks.  If the information in a "v=spf1" record is not
   correct for a PRA check, administrators SHOULD publish either an
   "spf2.0/pra" record with correct information, or an "spf2.0/pra ?all"
   record indicating that the result of a PRA check is explicitly
   inconclusive.


4. Decision Model

   Sender ID enables receiving e-mail systems to answer the question:

   Given an e-mail message, and given an IP address from which it has
   been (or will be) received, is the SMTP client at that IP address
   authorized to send that e-mail message?

   This question will usually be asked by an SMTP server as part of
   deciding whether to accept an incoming mail message.  However, this
   question could also be asked later by a different party.  An MUA, for
   example, could use the result of this question to determine how to
   file or present a message.

   There are three steps to answering this question:

   (1)  From an e-mail message, extract the address to verify.  The PRA
       variant of this test does so as specified in [PRA], or
       alternatively, using the submitter address as specified in
       [Submitter].  The MAIL FROM variant of this test does so as
       specified in [SPF].

   (2)  Extract the domain part of the address determined in step (1).

   (3)  Call the check_host() function defined in [SPF] and modified by
        the following sub-sections.





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   If the Sender ID check is being performed by an MTA as part of
   receiving an e-mail message, and it cannot determine an address in
   step (1) above (because the message or address is malformed), then
   the message SHOULD be rejected with error "550 5.7.1 Missing
   Purported Responsible Address" or error "550 5.7.1 Missing Reverse-
   Path address".


4.1 Arguments

   Sender ID modifies the check_host() function by the addition of a
   scope parameter.  Thus, for Sender ID the check_host() function is
   called passing the following parameters:
         a. A scope of "pra" (for the PRA variant of the test), or
            "mfrom" (for the MAIL FROM variant of the test).
         b. The IP address (either IPv4 or IPv6) from which the message
            is being or has been received.
         c. The domain from step (2) above.
         d. The address from step (1) above.


4.2 Results

   The result of the check_host() function is one of the values
   "Neutral", "Pass", "Fail", "SoftFail", "None", "TempError" or
   "PermError".  Section 5 describes how these results are used by MTAs
   receiving messages.  This specification imposes no requirements on
   parties performing this test in other environments.


4.3 Record Lookup

   SPF records are looked up in DNS in accordance with section 4.4 of
   [SPF}.

   When performing the PRA version of the test, if the DNS query returns
   "non-existent domain" (RCODE 3), then check_host() exits immediately
   with the result "Fail".


4.4 Record Selection

   This section replaces the record selection steps described in section
   4.5 of [SPF].

   Starting with the set of records that were returned by the lookup,
   record selection proceeds in these steps:

   1. If any records of type SPF are in the set, then all records of
      type TXT are discarded.

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   2. Records that do not begin with proper version and scope sections
      are discarded.  The version section for "spf2" records contains a
      ver-minor field that is for backward compatible future
      extensions.  This field must be well-formed for a record to be
      retained, but is otherwise ignored.

   3. Records that use the "spf2" version identifier and do not have a
      scope-id that matches <scope> are discarded.  Note that this is a
      complete string match on the scope-id tokens: If <scope> is "pra",
      then the record starting "spf2.0/mfrom,prattle,fubar" would be
      discarded, but a record starting "spf2.0/mfrom,pra,fubar" would be
      retained.

   4. If the lookup returned two records, one containing the "v=spf1"
      version identifier and the other containing the "spf2"
      version identifier, the "spf2" version takes precedence for the
      desired scope-id.  If the "spf2" record does not contain the
      desired scope-id, then the "v=spf1" record is selected.

   5. If an "spf2" record does not contain the desired scope-id and
      there is no "v=spf1" record for the domain, then no record is
      selected.

   After the above steps, there should be one record remaining and
   evaluation can proceed.  If there are two or more records remaining,
   then check_host() exits immediately with the error "PermError".

   If the PRA version of the test is being performed and no records
   remain, the requirement in [SPF] to find the Zone Cut and repeat the
   above steps is OPTIONAL.

   If there are no matching records remaining after the initial DNS
   query or any subsequent optional DNS queries, then check_host()
   exits immediately with the result "None".


5. Actions Based on the Decision

   When the Sender ID test is used by an SMTP server as part of
   receiving a message, the server should take the actions described by
   this section.

   The check_host() function returns one of the following results. See
   [SPF] for the meaning of these results.


5.1 Neutral, None, SoftFail or PermError

   An SMTP server receiving one of these results SHOULD NOT reject the
   message for this reason alone, but MAY subject the message to

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   heightened scrutiny by other measures, and MAY reject the message as
   a result of this heightened scrutiny.

   Such additional security measures MAY take into account that a
   message for which the result is "SoftFail" is less likely to be
   authentic than a message for which the result is "Neutral".


5.2 Pass

   An SMTP server receiving this result SHOULD treat the message as
   authentic.  It may accept or reject the message depending on other
   policies.


5.3 Fail

   When performing the Sender-ID test during an SMTP transaction, an MTA
   receiving this result SHOULD reject the message with a "550 5.7.1
   Sender ID (xxx) yyy - zzz" SMTP error, where "xxx" is replaced with
   "PRA" or "MAIL FROM", "yyy" is replaced with the additional reason
   returned by the check_host() function and "zzz" is replaced with the
   explanation string returned by the check_host() function.

   When performing the Sender-ID test after accepting an e-mail message
   for delivery, an MTA receiving this result SHOULD not deliver the
   message. Instead, it should create a DSN message, consistent with the
   usual rules for DSN messages.


5.4 TempError

   An SMTP server receiving this result MAY reject the message with a
   "450 4.4.3 Sender ID check is temporarily unavailable" error code.
   Alternatively, an SMTP server receiving this result MAY accept a
   message and optionally subject it to heightened scrutiny by other
   anti-spam measures.














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6. Security Considerations

   This entire document describes a new mechanism for mitigating spoofed
   e-mail, which is today a pervasive security problem in the Internet.

   Assuming that this mechanism is widely deployed, the following
   sections describe counter-attacks that could be used to defeat this
   mechanism.


6.1 DNS Attacks

   The new mechanism is entirely dependent on DNS lookups, and is
   therefore only as secure as DNS.  An attacker bent on spoofing
   messages could attempt to get his messages accepted by sending forged
   answers to DNS queries.

   An MTA could largely defeat such an attack by using a properly
   paranoid DNS resolver.  DNSSEC may ultimately provide a way to
   completely neutralize this class of attacks.


6.2 TCP Attacks

   This mechanism is designed to be used in conjunction with SMTP over
   TCP.  A sufficiently resourceful attacker might be able to send TCP
   packets with forged from-addresses, and thus execute an entire SMTP
   session that appears to come from somewhere other than its true
   origin.

   Such an attack requires guessing what TCP sequence numbers an SMTP
   server will use. It also requires transmitting completely in the
   blind - the attack will be unable hear any of the server's side of
   the conversation.

   Attacks of this sort can be ameliorated if IP gateways refuse to
   forward packets when the source address is clearly bogus.


6.3 Forged Sender Attacks

   This mechanism chooses an address to validate either from one of a
   number of message headers or from the RFC2821 MAIL command, and then
   uses that address for validation. A message with a true Resent-From
   header or Return-Path, but a forged From header will be accepted.
   Since many MUAs do not display all of the headers of received
   messages, the message will appear to be forged when displayed.




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   In order to neutralize this attack, MUAs will need to start
   displaying at least the address that was verified.  In addition MTAs
   could subject messages to heightened scrutiny when the validated
   address differs from the From header.


6.4 Address Space Hijacking

   This mechanism assumes the integrity of IP address space for
   determining whether a given client is authorized to send messages
   from a given PRA.  In addition to the TCP attack given in section
   6.2, a sufficiently resourceful attacker might be able to alter the
   IP routing structure to permit two-way communication using a
   specified IP address.  It would then be possible to execute an SMTP
   session that appears to come from an authorized address, without the
   need to guess TCP sequence numbers or transmit in the blind.

   Such an attack might occur if the attacker obtained access to a
   router which participates in external BGP routing.  Such a router
   could advertise a more specific route to a rogue SMTP client,
   temporarily overriding the legitimate owner of the address.


6.5 Malicious DNS attacks on third-parties

   There is class of attacks in which an attacker A can entice a
   participant P to send a malicious message to a victim V.

   These attacks are undertaken by A citing the address of V in the SMTP
   MAIL FROM request and then by causing P to generate (or invoke the
   generation of) a Delivery Status Notification 'bounce' message
   (RFC3464), which is sent to the victim V.

   The attacker relies upon it being common practice to copy the
   original message into the 'bounce' report, thereby causing the malice
   to be sent onwards to V.

   This mode of attack has the advantages (to the attacker) of
   obfuscating the location of the host from which the attack was
   mounted, and of possibly damaging the reputation of P by making it
   appear that P originated or was an active participant in the sending
   of the malicious message.

   In current practice, A causes P to cause the 'bounce' by addressing
   the original message to a non-existent recipient.

   Sender-ID enables a new variant of this attack.




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   In this variant the attacker A sends a message whose PRA (section 4)
   is selected by the attacker to be such that, when P undertakes the
   Sender-ID test, a 'Fail' will result (section 5.3).

   The message will be rejected (as the attacker intended) and a
   malicious 'bounce' message may be generated and sent to the victim V.


7. Implementation Guidance

   This section describes the actions that certain members of the
   Internet e-mail ecosystem must take to be compliant with this
   specification.


7.1 Simple E-mailers

   A domain that injects original e-mail into the Internet, using its
   own name in From headers, need do nothing to be compliant.  However,
   such domains SHOULD publish records in DNS as defined by [SPF] and
   this specification.

   In the majority of cases, the domain's published information will be
   the same for both the PRA and MAIL FROM variants of this test.  In
   this case, domains SHOULD publish their information using an SPF
   record with the prefix "v=spf1".  Doing so will render their
   published information usable by the older SPF protocol, too.  (See
   [SPF] for information on the SPF protocol.)


7.2 E-Mail Forwarders

   In order to pass the PRA variant of the test, a program that forwards
   received mail to other addresses MUST add an appropriate header that
   contains an e-mail address that it is authorized to use.  Such
   programs SHOULD use the Resent-From header for this purpose.

   In order to pass the MAIL FROM variant of the test, a program that
   forwards received mail to other addresses MUST alter the MAIL FROM
   address to an address under its control.  Should that address
   eventually receive a DSN relating to the original message, that DSN
   SHOULD be forwarded to the original MAIL FROM address.  However, if
   this altered address receives any messages other than DSNs related to
   the original message, these messages MUST NOT be forwarded to the
   original MAIL FROM address; they SHOULD be refused during an SMTP
   transaction.





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   Additionally, e-mail forwarders SHOULD publish Sender ID records for
   their domains, and SHOULD use MTAs for which the Sender ID check
   yields a "pass" result.

   Some of today's forwarders already add an appropriate header
   (although many of them use Sender rather than Resent-From.) Most of
   them do not perform the address-rewriting specified above.

   Note that an e-mail forwarder might receive a single message for two
   or more recipients, each of whom requests forwarding to a new
   address.  In this case, the forwarder's MTA SHOULD transmit the
   message to each new recipient individually, with each copy of the
   message containing a different newly inserted Resent-From header
   field.


7.3 Mailing List Servers

   In order to pass the PRA variant of the test, a mailing list server
   MUST add an appropriate header that contains an e-mail address that
   it is authorized to use.  Such programs SHOULD use the Resent-From
   header for this purpose.

   In order to pass the MAIL FROM variant of the test, a mailing list
   server MUST alter the MAIL FROM address to an address under its
   control.

   Additionally, mailing list servers SHOULD publish Sender ID records
   for their domains, and SHOULD use MTAs for which the Sender ID check
   yields a "pass" result.

   Most of today's mailing list software already adds an appropriate
   header (although most of them use Sender rather than Resent-From),
   and most of them already alter the MAIL FROM address.


7.4 Third-Party Mailers

   In order to pass the PRA variant of this test, a program that sends
   mail on behalf of another user MUST add an appropriate header that
   contains an e-mail address that it is authorized to use.  Such
   programs SHOULD use the Sender header for this purpose.

   In order to pass the MAIL FROM variant of this test, a program that
   sends mail on behalf of another user MUST use a MAIL FROM address
   that is under its control.  Defining what the program does with any
   mail received at that address is beyond the scope of this document.




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   Additionally, third-party mailers servers SHOULD publish Sender ID
   records for their domains, and SHOULD use MTAs for which the Sender
   ID check yields a "pass" result.

   Many, but not all, of today's third-party mailers are already
   compliant with the PRA variant of the test.  The extent to which
   mailers are already compliant with the MAIL FROM variant of this test
   is unknown.


7.5 MUA Implementers

   When displaying a received message, an MUA SHOULD display the
   purported responsible address as defined by this document whenever
   that address differs from the RFC 2822 From address.  This display
   SHOULD be in addition to the RFC 2822 From address.

   When a received message contains multiple headers that might be used
   for the purported responsible address determination, an MUA should
   consider displaying all of them. That is, if a message contains
   several Resent-From's, a Sender and a From, an MUA should consider
   displaying all of them.

   Sender ID also does not validate the display name that may be
   transmitted along with an e-mail address.  The display name is also
   vulnerable to spoofing and other forms of attacks.  In order to
   reduce the occurrence and effectiveness of such attacks, MUA
   implementers should consider methods to safeguard the display name.
   This could include:

   * Not presenting the display name to the user at all, or not
     presenting the display name unless the corresponding e-mail
     address is listed in the user's address book.

   * Treating as suspicious any e-mail where the display name is itself
     in the form of an e-mail address, especially when it differs from
     the actual e-mail address in the header.

   * Making it clear to users that the e-mail address has been checked
     rather than the display name.


8. IANA Considerations

   This document contains no actions for IANA.






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9. Acknowledgements

   This design is based on earlier work published in 2003 in [RMX] and
   [DMP] drafts (by Hadmut Danisch and Gordon Fecyk respectively).  The
   idea of using a DNS record to check the legitimacy of an e-mail
   address traces its ancestry to "Repudiating Mail From" draft by Paul
   Vixie [Vixie] (based on suggestion by Jim Miller) and to "Domain-
   Authorized SMTP Mail" draft by David Green [Green] who first
   introduced this idea on namedroppers mailing list in 2002.

   The current document borrows heavily from each of the above, and
   incorporates ideas proposed by many members of the MARID working
   group.  The contributions of each of the above are gratefully
   acknowledged.


10. References

10.1 Normative References

   [PRA]       J. Lyon, "Purported Responsible Address in E-Mail
               Messages", draft-lyon-senderid-pra-01.  Work in progress.

   [RFC2119]   S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", RFC 2119.

   [SPF]       M. Wong and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework:
               Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail", draft-
               schlitt-spf-classic-00.  Work in progress.

   [Submitter] E. Allman and H. Katz, "SMTP Service Extension for
               Indicating the Responsible Submitter of an E-mail
               Message", draft-katz-submitter-00.  Work in progress.

10.2 Informative References

   [CallerID]  Microsoft Corporation, Caller ID for E-Mail Technical
               Specification,
               http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/privacy/spam_callerid
               .mspx.

   [Green}     David Green, "Mail-Transmitter RR",
               http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2002/
               msg00656.html, June 2002.

   [RMX]       H. Danisch, "The RMX DNS RR and method for lightweight
               SMTP sender authorization", draft-danisch-dns-rr-smtp-04.
               Work in progress.



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   [Vixie]     Paul Vixie, "Repudiating Mail From",
               http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2002/
               msg00658.html, June 2002.


11. Authors' Addresses

   Jim Lyon
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA 98052
   USA
   jimlyon@microsoft.com

   Meng Weng Wong
   Singapore
   mengwong@dumbo.pobox.com
































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