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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 draft-ietf-nsis-nslp-auth

Network Working Group                                          J. Manner
Internet-Draft                                                       TKK
Intended status: Standards Track                          M. Stiemerling
Expires: January 3, 2009                                             NEC
                                                           H. Tschofenig
                                                  Nokia Siemens Networks
                                                                R. Bless
                                                      Univ. of Karlsruhe
                                                            July 2, 2008


            Authorization for NSIS Signaling Layer Protocols
                   draft-manner-nsis-nslp-auth-04.txt

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).









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Abstract

   Signaling layer protocols in the NSIS working group may rely on GIST
   to handle authorization.  Still, the signaling layer protocol itself
   may require separate authorization to be performed when a node
   receives a request for a certain kind of service or resources.  This
   draft presents a generic model and object formats for session
   authorization within the NSIS Signaling Layer Protocols.  The goal of
   session authorization is to allow the exchange of information between
   network elements in order to authorize the use of resources for a
   service and to coordinate actions between the signaling and transport
   planes.







































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Table of Contents

   1.  Conventions used in this document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Session Authorization Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.1.  Session Authorization Object format  . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  Session Authorization Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.2.1.  Authorizing Entity Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.2.2.  Source Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
       3.2.3.  Destination Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       3.2.4.  Start time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       3.2.5.  End time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       3.2.6.  NSLP Object List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       3.2.7.  Authentication data  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   4.  Integrity of the AUTH_SESSION policy element . . . . . . . . . 18
     4.1.  Shared symmetric keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       4.1.1.  Operational Setting using shared symmetric keys  . . . 18
     4.2.  Kerberos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     4.3.  Public Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       4.3.1.  Operational Setting for public key based
               authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     4.4.  HMAC Signed  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   5.  Framework  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     5.1.  The Coupled Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     5.2.  The associated model with one policy server  . . . . . . . 24
     5.3.  The associated model with two policy servers . . . . . . . 25
     5.4.  The non-associated model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   6.  Message Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     6.1.  Generation of the AUTH_SESSION by the authorizing
           entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     6.2.  Processing within the QoS NSLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
       6.2.1.  Message Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
       6.2.2.  Message Reception  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
       6.2.3.  Authorization (QNE/PDP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
       6.2.4.  Error Signaling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     6.3.  Processing with the NAT/FW NSLP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
       6.3.1.  Message Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
       6.3.2.  Message Reception  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
       6.3.3.  Authorization (Router/PDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
       6.3.4.  Error Signaling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
     6.4.  Integrity Protection of NSLP messages  . . . . . . . . . . 30
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
   9.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36



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   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 37


















































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1.  Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
   [RFC2119].

   The term "NSLP node" (NN) is used to refer to an NSIS node running an
   NSLP protocol that can make use of the authorization object discussed
   in this document.  Currently, this node would run either the QoS or
   the NAT/FW NSLP service.








































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2.  Introduction

   The NSIS working group is specifying a suite of protocols for the
   next generation in Internet signaling [RFC4080].  The design is based
   on a generalized transport protocol for signaling applications, the
   General Internet Signaling Transport (GIST) [I-D.ietf-nsis-ntlp], and
   various kinds of signaling applications.  Two signaling applications
   and their NSIS Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP) have been designed, a
   Quality of Service application (QoS NSLP) [I-D.ietf-nsis-qos-nslp]
   and a NAT/firewall application (NAT/FW) [I-D.ietf-nsis-nslp-natfw].

   The security architecture is based on a chain-of-trust model, where
   each GIST hop may chose the appropriate security protocol, taking
   into account the signaling application requirements.  This model is
   appropriate for a number of different use cases, and allows the
   signaling applications to leave the handling of security to GIST.

   Yet, in order to allow for finer-grain per-session or per-user
   admission control, it is necessary to provide a mechanism for
   ensuring that the use of resources by a host has been properly
   authorized before allowing the signaling application to commit the
   resource request, e.g., a QoS reservation or mappings for NAT
   traversal.  In order to meet this requirement,there must be
   information in the NSLP message which may be used to verify the
   validity of the request.  This can be done by providing the host with
   a session authorization policy element which is inserted into the
   message and verified by the network.

   This document describes a generic NSLP layer session authorization
   policy object (AUTH_SESSION) used to convey authorization information
   for the request.  The scheme is based on third-party tokens.  A
   trusted third party provides authentication tokens to clients and
   allows verification of the information by the network elements.  The
   requesting host inserts its authorization information acquired from
   the trusted third party into the NSLP message to allow verification
   of the network resource request.  Network elements verify the request
   and then process the resource reservation message based on admission
   policy.  This work is based on RFC 3520 [RFC3520] and RFC 3521
   [RFC3521].

   The default operation of the authorization is to add one
   authorization policy object.  Yet, in order to support end-to-end
   signaling and request authorization from different networks, a host
   initiating an NSLP signaling session may add more than one
   AUTH_SESSION object in the message.  The identifier of the
   authorizing entity can be used by the network elements to use the
   third party they trust to verify the request.




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3.  Session Authorization Object

   This section presents a new NSLP layer object called session
   authorization (AUTH_SESSION).  The AUTH_SESSION object can be used in
   the currently specified and future NSLP protocols.

   The authorization attributes follow the format and specification
   given in RFC3520 [RFC3520].

3.1.  Session Authorization Object format

   The AUTH_SESSION object contains a list of fields which describe the
   session, along with other attributes.  The object header follows the
   generic NSLP object header.


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |A|B|r|r|         Type          |r|r|r|r|        Length         |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   +                                                               +
   //         Session Authorization Attribute List                //
   +                                                               +
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+


   The value for the Type field comes from shared NSLP object type
   space.  The Length field is given in units of 32 bit words and
   measures the length of the Value component of the TLV object (i.e. it
   does not include the standard header).

   The bits marked 'A' and 'B' are extensibility flags, and used to
   signal the desired treatment for objects whose treatment has not been
   defined in the protocol specification (i.e. whose Type field is
   unknown at the receiver).  The following four categories of object
   have been identified, and are described here.

   AB=00 ("Mandatory"): If the object is not understood, the entire
   message containing it MUST be rejected with a "Object Type Error"
   message with subcode 1 ("Unrecognised Object").  In the NATFW NSLP
   case it MUST be rejected with an error response of class 'Protocol
   error' (0x3) with error code 'Unknown object present' (0x06).

   AB=01 ("Ignore"): If the object is not understood, it MUST be deleted
   and the rest of the message processed as usual.

   AB=10 ("Forward"): If the object is not understood, it MUST be



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   retained unchanged in any message forwarded as a result of message
   processing, but not stored locally.

   AB=11 ("Refresh"): If the object is not understood, it should be
   incorporated into the locally stored signaling application state for
   this flow/session, forwarded in any resulting message, and also used
   in any refresh or repair message which is generated locally.  In the
   NATFW NSLP this combination AB=11 MUST NOT be used and an error
   response of class 'Protocol error' (0x3) with error code 'Invalid
   Flag-Field combination' (0x09) MUST be generated.

   The remaining bits marked 'r' are reserved.  The extensibility flags
   follow the definition in the GIST specification.  The AUTH_SESSION
   object defines in this specification MUST have the AB-bits set to
   "10".  An NN may use the authorization information if it is
   configured to do so, but may also just skip the object.

   Type: 0x0a (TBD by IANA)

   Length: Variable

   Session Authorization Attribute List: variable length

      The session authorization attribute list is a collection of
      objects which describes the session and provides other information
      necessary to verify the resource reservation request.  An initial
      set of valid objects is described in Section 3.2.

3.2.  Session Authorization Attributes

   A session authorization attribute may contain a variety of
   information and has both an attribute type and subtype.  The
   attribute itself MUST be a multiple of 4 octets in length, and any
   attributes that are not a multiple of 4 octets long MUST be padded to
   a 4-octet boundary.  All padding bytes MUST have a value of zero.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |    X-Type     |   SubType     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   //                           Value ...                         //
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+

   Length: 16 bits






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      The length field is two octets and indicates the actual length of
      the attribute (including Length, X-Type and SubType fields) in
      number of octets.  The length does NOT include any bytes padding
      to the value field to make the attribute a multiple of 4 octets
      long.

   X-Type: 8 bits

      Session authorization attribute type (X-Type) field is one octet.
      IANA acts as a registry for X-Types as described in Section 7,
      IANA Considerations.  Initially, the registry contains the
      following X-Types:

   1.  AUTH_ENT_ID The unique identifier of the entity that authorized
       the session.

   2.  SOURCE_ADDR Address specification for the signaling session
       initiator, i.e., the source address of the signaling message
       originator.

   3.  DEST_ADDR Address specification for the signaling session end-
       point.

   4.  START_TIME The starting time for the session.

   5.  END_TIME The end time for the session.

   6.  AUTHENTICATION_DATA Authentication data of the session
       authorization policy element.

   SubType: 8 bits

      Session authorization attribute sub-type is one octet in length.
      The value of the SubType depends on the X-Type.

   Value: variable length

      The attribute specific information.

3.2.1.  Authorizing Entity Identifier

   AUTH_ENT_ID is used to identify the entity which authorized the
   initial service request and generated the session authorization
   policy element.  The AUTH_ENT_ID may be represented in various
   formats, and the SubType is used to define the format for the ID.
   The format for AUTH_ENT_ID is as follows:





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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |    X-Type     |   SubType     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   //                        OctetString ...                      //
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+


   Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

   X-Type: AUTH_ENT_ID

   SubType:

      The following sub-types for AUTH_ENT_ID are defined.  IANA acts as
      a registry for AUTH_ENT_ID sub-types as described in Section 7,
      IANA Considerations.  Initially, the registry contains the
      following sub-types of AUTH_ENT_ID:

   1.   IPV4_ADDRESS IPv4 address represented in 32 bits

   2.   IPV6_ADDRESS IPv6 address represented in 128 bits

   3.   FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name as defined in RFC 1034 as an
        ASCII string.

   4.   ASCII_DN X.500 Distinguished name as defined in RFC 2253 as an
        ASCII string.

   5.   UNICODE_DN X.500 Distinguished name as defined in RFC 2253 as a
        UTF-8 string.

   6.   URI Universal Resource Identifier, as defined in RFC 2396.

   7.   KRB_PRINCIPAL Fully Qualified Kerberos Principal name
        represented by the ASCII string of a principal followed by the @
        realm name as defined in RFC 1510 (e.g., johndoe@nowhere).

   8.   X509_V3_CERT The Distinguished Name of the subject of the
        certificate as defined in RFC 2253 as a UTF-8 string.

   9.   PGP_CERT The PGP digital certificate of the authorizing entity
        as defined in RFC 2440.

   10.  HMAC_SIGNED Indicates that the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute
        contains a self-signed HMAC signature [RFC2104] that ensures the
        integrity of the NSLP message.  The HMAC is calculated over all



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        NSLP objects given in the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute that MUST
        also be present.  The AUTH_ENT_ID contains the Hash Algorithm
        that is used for calculation of the HMAC as Transform ID from
        Transform Type 3 of the IKEv2 registry [RFC4306].

   OctetString: Contains the authorizing entity identifier.

3.2.2.  Source Address

   SOURCE_ADDR is used to identify the source address specification of
   the authorized session.  This X-Type may be useful in some scenarios
   to make sure the resource request has been authorized for that
   particular source address and/or port.


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |    X-Type     |   SubType     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   //                        OctetString ...                      //
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+


   Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

   X-Type: SOURCE_ADDR

   SubType:

      The following sub types for SOURCE_ADDR are defined.  IANA acts as
      a registry for SOURCE_ADDR sub-types as described in Section 7,
      IANA Considerations.  Initially, the registry contains the
      following sub types for SOURCE_ADDR:

   1.  IPV4_ADDRESS IPv4 address represented in 32 bits

   2.  IPV6_ADDRESS IPv6 address represented in 128 bits

   3.  UDP_PORT_LIST list of UDP port specifications, represented as 16
       bits per list entry.

   4.  TCP_PORT_LIST list of TCP port specifications, represented as 16
       bits per list entry.

   5.  SPI Security Parameter Index represented in 32 bits

   OctetString: The OctetString contains the source address information.



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   In scenarios where a source address is required (see Section 5), at
   least one of the subtypes 1 or 2 MUST be included in every Session
   Authorization Data Policy Element.  Multiple SOURCE_ADDR attributes
   MAY be included if multiple addresses have been authorized.  The
   source address of the request (e.g., a QoS NSLP RESERVE) MUST match
   one of the SOURCE_ADDR attributes contained in this Session
   Authorization Data Policy Element.

   At most, one instance of subtype 3 MAY be included in every Session
   Authorization Data Policy Element.  At most, one instance of subtype
   4 MAY be included in every Session Authorization Data Policy Element.
   Inclusion of a subtype 3 attribute does not prevent inclusion of a
   subtype 4 attribute (i.e., both UDP and TCP ports may be authorized).

   If no PORT attributes are specified, then all ports are considered
   valid; otherwise, only the specified ports are authorized for use.
   Every source address and port list must be included in a separate
   SOURCE_ADDR attribute.

3.2.3.  Destination Address

   DEST_ADDR is used to identify the destination address of the
   authorized session.  This X-Type may be useful in some scenarios to
   make sure the resource request has been authorized for that
   particular destination address and/or port.


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |    X-Type     |   SubType     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   //                        OctetString ...                      //
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+


   Length: Length of the attribute in number of octects, which MUST be >
   4.

   X-Type: DEST_ADDR

   SubType:

      The following sub types for DEST_ADDR are defined.  IANA acts as a
      registry for DEST_ADDR sub-types as described in Section 7, IANA
      Considerations.  Initially, the registry contains the following
      sub types for DEST_ADDR:




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   1.  IPV4_ADDRESS IPv4 address represented in 32 bits

   2.  IPV6_ADDRESS IPv6 address represented in 128 bits

   3.  UDP_PORT_LIST list of UDP port specifications, represented as 16
       bits per list entry.

   4.  TCP_PORT_LIST list of TCP port specifications, represented as 16
       bits per list entry.

   5.  SPI Security Parameter Index represented in 32 bits

   OctetString: The OctetString contains the destination address
   specification.

   In scenarios where a destination address is required (see Section 5),
   at least one of the subtypes 1 or 2 MUST be included in every Session
   Authorization Data Policy Element.  Multiple DEST_ADDR attributes MAY
   be included if multiple addresses have been authorized.  The
   destination address field of the resource reservation datagram (e.g.,
   QoS NSLP Reserve) MUST match one of the DEST_ADDR attributes
   contained in this Session Authorization Data Policy Element.

   At most, one instance of subtype 3 MAY be included in every Session
   Authorization Data Policy Element.  At most, one instance of subtype
   4 MAY be included in every Session Authorization Data Policy Element.
   Inclusion of a subtype 3 attribute does not prevent inclusion of a
   subtype 4 attribute (i.e., both UDP and TCP ports may be authorized).

   If no PORT attributes are specified, then all ports are considered
   valid; otherwise, only the specified ports are authorized for use.

   Every destination address and port list must be included in a
   separate DEST_ADDR attribute.

3.2.4.  Start time

   START_TIME is used to identify the start time of the authorized
   session and can be used to prevent replay attacks.  If the
   AUTH_SESSION policy element is presented in a resource request, the
   network SHOULD reject the request if it is not received within a few
   seconds of the start time specified.









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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |    X-Type     |   SubType     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   //                        OctetString ...                      //
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+


   Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

   X-Type: START_TIME

   SubType:

   The following sub types for START_TIME are defined.  IANA acts as a
   registry for START_TIME sub-types as described in Section 7, IANA
   Considerations.  Initially, the registry contains the following sub
   types for START_TIME:

   1.  1 NTP_TIMESTAMP NTP Timestamp Format as defined in RFC 1305.

   OctetString: The OctetString contains the start time.

3.2.5.  End time

   END_TIME is used to identify the end time of the authorized session
   and can be used to limit the amount of time that resources are
   authorized for use (e.g., in prepaid session scenarios).


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |    X-Type     |   SubType     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   //                        OctetString ...                      //
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+


   Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.

   X-Type: END_TIME

   SubType:

   The following sub types for END_TIME are defined.  IANA acts as a
   registry for END_TIME sub-types as described in Section 7, IANA



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   Considerations.  Initially, the registry contains the following sub
   types for END_TIME:

   1.  NTP_TIMESTAMP NTP Timestamp Format as defined in RFC 1305.

   OctetString: The OctetString contains the end time.

3.2.6.  NSLP Object List

   The NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute contains a list of NSLP objects types
   that are used in the keyed-hash computation whose result is given in
   the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute.  This allows for an integrity
   protection of NSLP PDUs.  If an NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute has been
   included in the AUTH_SESSION policy element, an AUTHENTICATION_DATA
   attribute MUST also be present.

   The creator of the this attribute lists every NSLP object type whose
   NSLP PDU object was included in the computation of the hash.  The
   receiver can verify the integrity of the NSLP PDU by computing a hash
   over all NSLP objects that are listed in this attribute including all
   the attributes of the authorization object.  Since all NSLP object
   types are unique over all different NSLPs, this will work for any
   NSLP.

   Basic NTLP/NSLP objects like the session ID, the NSLPID and the MRI
   MUST be always included in the HMAC.  Since they are not carried
   within the NSLP itself, but only within GIST, they must be delivered
   via the GIST API and normalized to their network representation from
   [I-D.ietf-nsis-ntlp] again before calculating the hash.  These values
   are hashed first, before any other NSLP object values that are
   included in the hash computation.

   A summary of the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST attribute format is described
   below.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +---------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
   | Length                        | NSLP_OBJ_LIST |     zero      |
   +---------------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+
   | No of signed NSLP objects = n |  rsv  |  NSLP object type (1) |
   +-------+-------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+
   |  rsv  | NSLP object type (2)  |             .....            //
   +-------+-------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
   |  rsv  | NSLP object type (n)  |     (padding if required)     |
   +--------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+

   Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.



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   X-Type: NSLP_OBJECT_LIST

   SubType: No sub types for NSLP_OBJECT_LIST are currently defined.
   This field MUST be set to 0.

   OctetString: The OctetString contains the authentication data of the
   AUTH_SESSION.

   No of signed NSLP objects: The number n of NSLP object types that
   follow. n=0 is allowed, i.e., only a padding field is contained then.

   rsv: reserved bits and must be set to 0 (zero).

   NSLP object type: the NSLP 12-bit object type identifier of the
   object that was included in the hash calculation.  The NSLP object
   type values comprise only 12 bit, so four bits per type value are
   currently not used within the list.  Depending on the number of
   signed objects, a corresponding padding word of 16 bit must be
   supplied.

   padding: padding is required if the number of NSLP objects is even.
   The padding field MUST be 16 bit set to 0.

3.2.7.  Authentication data

   The AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute contains the authentication data of
   the AUTH_SESSION policy element and signs all the data in the policy
   element up to the AUTHENTICATION_DATA.  If the AUTHENTICATION_DATA
   attribute has been included in the AUTH_SESSION policy element, it
   MUST be the last attribute in the list.  The algorithm used to
   compute the authentication data depends on the AUTH_ENT_ID SubType
   field.  See Section 4 entitled Integrity of the AUTH_SESSION policy
   element.

   A summary of AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute format is described below.


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |    X-Type     |   SubType     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   //                        OctetString ...                      //
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+


   Length: Length of the attribute, which MUST be > 4.




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   X-Type: AUTHENTICATION_DATA

   SubType: No sub types for AUTHENTICATION_DATA are currently defined.
   This field MUST be set to 0.

   OctetString: The OctetString contains the authentication data of the
   AUTH_SESSION.












































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4.  Integrity of the AUTH_SESSION policy element

   This section describes how to ensure the integrity of the policy
   element is preserved.

4.1.  Shared symmetric keys

   In shared symmetric key environments, the AUTH_ENT_ID MUST be of
   subtypes: IPV4_ADDRESS, IPV6_ADDRESS, FQDN, ASCII_DN, UNICODE_DN or
   URI.  An example AUTH_SESSION object is shown below.


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |1|0|0|0| Type = AUTH_SESSION   |0|0|0|0|    Object   Length    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |   AUTH_ENT_ID | IPV4_ADDRESS  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   OctetString ...   (The authorizing entity's Identifier)     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |   AUTH_DATA   |     zero      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                            KEY_ID                             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   OctetString ...   (Authentication data)                     |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+


4.1.1.  Operational Setting using shared symmetric keys

   This assumes both the Authorizing Entity and the Network router/PDP
   are provisioned with shared symmetric keys and with policies
   detailing which algorithm to be used for computing the authentication
   data along with the expected length of the authentication data for
   that particular algorithm.

   Key maintenance is outside the scope of this document, but
   AUTH_SESSION implementations MUST at least provide the ability to
   manually configure keys and their parameters.  The key used to
   produce the authentication data is identified by the AUTH_ENT_ID
   field.  Since multiple keys may be configured for a particular
   AUTH_ENT_ID value, the first 32 bits of the AUTH_DATA field MUST be a
   key ID to be used to identify the appropriate key.  Each key must
   also be configured with lifetime parameters for the time period
   within which it is valid as well as an associated cryptographic
   algorithm parameter specifying the algorithm to be used with the key.
   At a minimum, all AUTH_SESSION implementations MUST support the HMAC-



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   MD5-128 [RFC1321] [RFC2104] cryptographic algorithm for computing the
   authentication data.

   It is good practice to regularly change keys.  Keys MUST be
   configurable such that their lifetimes overlap allowing smooth
   transitions between keys.  At the midpoint of the lifetime overlap
   between two keys, senders should transition from using the current
   key to the next/longer-lived key.  Meanwhile, receivers simply accept
   any identified key received within its configured lifetime and reject
   those that are not.

4.2.  Kerberos

   RFC 3520 provides a mechanism to secure the authorization token using
   Kerberos.  Kerberos, however, has not seen deployment in this context
   and is not well applicable for this particular usage scenario.
   Hence, Kerberos support will not be provided by this specification.

4.3.  Public Key

   In a public key environment, the AUTH_ENT_ID MUST be of the subtypes:
   X509_V3_CERT or PGP_CERT.  The authentication data is used for
   authenticating the authorizing entity.  An example of the public key
   AUTH_SESSION policy element is shown below.


    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |1|0|0|0| Type = AUTH_SESSION   |0|0|0|0|    Object   Length    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |   AUTH_ENT_ID |   PGP_CERT    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   OctetString ...   (Authorizing entity Digital Certificate)  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |   AUTH_DATA   |     zero      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |   OctetString ...   (Authentication data)                     |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+


4.3.1.  Operational Setting for public key based authentication

   Public key based authentication assumes the following:

   o  Authorizing entities have a pair of keys (private key and public
      key).




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   o  Private key is secured with the authorizing entity.

   o  Public keys are stored in digital certificates and a trusted
      party, certificate authority (CA) issues these digital
      certificates.

   o  The verifier (PDP or router) has the ability to verify the digital
      certificate.

   Authorizing entity uses its private key to generate
   AUTHENTICATION_DATA.  Authenticators (router, PDP) use the
   authorizing entity's public key (stored in the digital certificate)
   to verify and authenticate the policy element.

4.3.1.1.  X.509 V3 digital certificates

   When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type X509_V3_CERT, AUTHENTICATION_DATA
   MUST be generated following these steps:

   o  A Signed-data is constructed as defined in RFC3852 [RFC3852] .  A
      digest is computed on the content (as specified in Section 6.1)
      with a signer-specific message-digest algorithm.  The certificates
      field contains the chain of authorizing entity's X.509 V3 digital
      certificates.  The certificate revocation list is defined in the
      crls field.  The digest output is digitally signed following
      Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447], using the signer's private key.

   When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type X509_V3_CERT, verification MUST be
   done following these steps:

   o  Parse the X.509 V3 certificate to extract the distinguished name
      of the issuer of the certificate.

   o  Certification Path Validation is performed as defined in Section 6
      of RFC 3280.

   o  Parse through the Certificate Revocation list to verify that the
      received certificate is not listed.

   o  Once the X.509 V3 certificate is validated, the public key of the
      authorizing entity can be extracted from the certificate.

   o  Extract the digest algorithm and the length of the digested data
      by parsing the CMS signed-data.

   o  The recipient independently computes the message digest.  This
      message digest and the signer's public key are used to verify the
      signature value.



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   This verification ensures integrity, non-repudiation and data origin.

4.3.1.2.  PGP digital certificates

   When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type PGP_CERT, AUTHENTICATION_DATA MUST be
   generated following these steps:

   o  AUTHENTICATION_DATA contains a Signature Packet as defined in
      Section 5.2.3 of RFC 2440.  In summary:

   o  Compute the hash of all data in the AUTH_SESSION policy element up
      to the AUTHENTICATION_DATA.

   o  The hash output is digitally signed following Section 8 of RFC
      3447, using the signer's private key.

   When the AUTH_ENT_ID is of type PGP_CERT, verification MUST be done
   following these steps:

   o  Validate the certificate.

   o  Once the PGP certificate is validated, the public key of the
      authorizing entity can be extracted from the certificate.

   o  Extract the hash algorithm and the length of the hashed data by
      parsing the PGP signature packet.

   o  The recipient independently computes the message digest.  This
      message digest and the signer's public key are used to verify the
      signature value.

   This verification ensures integrity, non-repudiation and data origin.

4.4.  HMAC Signed

   An AUTH_SESSION object that carries an AUTH_ENT_ID of HMAC_SIGNED is
   used as integrity protection for NSLP messages.  The AUTH_SESSION
   object MUST contain the following attributes:

   o  SOURCE_ADDR the source address of the entity that created the HMAC

   o  START_TIME the timestamp when the HMAC signature was calculated.
      This MUST be different for any two messages in sequence in order
      to prevent replay attacks.  Since the NTP timestamp provides
      currently a resolution of 200 pico seconds this should be
      sufficient.





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   o  NSLP_OBJECT_LIST this attribute lists all NSLP objects that are
      included into HMAC calculation.

   o  AUTHENTICATION_DATA this attribute contains the Key-ID that is
      used for HMAC calculation as well as the HMAC data itself
      [RFC2104].

   The key used for HMAC calculation must be exchanged securely by some
   other means, e.g., a Kerberos Ticket or pre-shared manual
   installation etc.  The Key-ID in the AUTHENTICATION_DATA allows to
   refer to the appropriate key and also to change signing keys.  The
   key length MUST be 64-bit at least, but it is ideally longer in order
   to defend against brute force attacks.  It is recommended to use a
   per-user key for signing NSLP messages.

   Figure 12 shows an example of an object that is used for integrity
   protection of NSLP messages.


































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    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |1|0|0|0| Type = AUTH_SESSION   |0|0|0|0|    Object   Length    |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |   AUTH_ENT_ID | HMAC_SIGNED   |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                   reserved                    | Transform ID  |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             | SOURCE_ADDR   |  IPV4_ADDRESS |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                IPv4 Source Address of NSLP sender             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             |  START_TIME   | NTP_TIME_STAMP|
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                        NTP Time Stamp (1)                     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                        NTP Time Stamp (2)                     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |            Length             | NTLP_OBJ_LIST |     zero      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | No of signed NSLP objects = n |  rsv  |  NSLP object type (1) |
   +-------+-------+---------------+-------+-------+---------------+
   |  rsv  | NSLP object type (2)  |             .....            //
   +-------+-------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
   |  rsv  | NSLP object type (n)  |     (padding if required)     |
   +--------------+----------------+---------------+---------------+
   |            Length             |   AUTH_DATA   |     zero      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                            KEY_ID                             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |          Message Authentication Code HMAC Data                |
   +---------------------------------------------------------------+


   Example for an AUTH_SESSION_OBJECT that provides integrity protection
   for NSLP messages

                                 Figure 12












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5.  Framework

   RFC3521 [RFC3521] describes a framework in which the AUTH_SESSION
   policy element may be utilized to transport information required for
   authorizing resource reservation for media flows.  RFC3521 introduces
   4 different models:

   1.  The coupled model

   2.  The associated model with one policy server

   3.  The associated model with two policy servers

   4.  The non-associated model.

   The fields that are required in an AUTH SESSION policy element
   dependent on which of the models is used.

5.1.  The Coupled Model

   In the coupled model, the only information that MUST be included in
   the policy element is the SESSION_ID; it is used by the Authorizing
   Entity to correlate the resource reservation request with the media
   authorized during session set up.  Since the End Host is assumed to
   be untrusted, the Policy Server SHOULD take measures to ensure that
   the integrity of the SESSION_ID is preserved in transit; the exact
   mechanisms to be used and the format of the SESSION_ID are
   implementation dependent.

5.2.  The associated model with one policy server

   In this model, the contents of the AUTH_SESSION policy element MUST
   include:

   o  A session identifier - SESSION_ID.  This is information that the
      authorizing entity can use to correlate the resource request with
      the media authorized during session set up.

   o  The identity of the authorizing entity - AUTH_ENT_ID.  This
      information is used by an NN to determine which authorizing entity
      (Policy Server) should be used to solicit resource policy
      decisions.

   In some environments, an NN may have no means for determining if the
   identity refers to a legitimate Policy Server within its domain.  In
   order to protect against redirection of authorization requests to a
   bogus authorizing entity, the AUTH_SESSION MUST also include:




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      AUTHENTICATION_DATA.  This authentication data is calculated over
      all other fields of the AUTH_SESSION policy element.

5.3.  The associated model with two policy servers

   The content of the AUTH_SESSION Policy Element is identical to the
   associated model with one policy server.

5.4.  The non-associated model

   In this model, the AUTH_SESSION MUST contain sufficient information
   to allow the Policy Server to make resource policy decisions
   autonomously from the authorizing entity.  The policy element is
   created using information about the session by the authorizing
   entity.  The information in the AUTH_SESSION policy element MUST
   include:

   o  Calling party IP address or Identity (e.g., FQDN) - SOURCE_ADDR
      X-TYPE

   o  Called party IP address or Identity (e.g., FQDN) - DEST_ADDR
      X-TYPE

   o  The characteristics of (each of) the media stream(s) authorized
      for this session - RESOURCES X-TYPE

   o  The authorization lifetime - START_TIME X-TYPE

   o  The identity of the authorizing entity to allow for validation of
      the token in shared symmetric key and Kerberos schemes -
      AUTH_ENT_ID X-TYPE

   o  The credentials of the authorizing entity in a public-key scheme -
      AUTH_ENT_ID X-TYPE

   o  Authentication data used to prevent tampering with the
      AUTH_SESSION policy element - AUTHENTICATION_DATA

   Furthermore, the AUTH_SESSION policy element MAY contain:

   o  The lifetime of (each of) the media stream(s) - END_TIME X-TYPE

   o  Calling party port number - SOURCE_ADDR X-TYPE

   o  Called party port number - DEST_ADDR X-TYPE

   All AUTH_SESSION fields MUST match with the resource request.  If a
   field does not match, the request SHOULD be denied.



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6.  Message Processing Rules

   This section discusses the message processing related to the
   AUTH_SESSION object.  We describe the details of the QoS NSLP and
   NAT/FW NSLP.  New NSLP protocols should use the same logic in making
   use of the AUTH_SESSION object.

6.1.  Generation of the AUTH_SESSION by the authorizing entity

   1.  Generate the AUTH_SESSION policy element with the appropriate
       contents as specified in Section 3.

   2.  If authentication is needed, the entire AUTH_SESSION policy
       element is constructed, excluding the length, type and subtype
       fields of the AUTH_SESSION field.  Note that the message MUST
       include a START_TIME to prevent replay attacks.  The output of
       the authentication algorithm, plus appropriate header
       information, is appended as AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute to the
       AUTH_SESSION policy element.

6.2.  Processing within the QoS NSLP

   The AUTH_SESSION object may be used with QoS NSLP QUERY and RESERVE
   messages to authorize the query operation for network resources, and
   a resource reservation request, respectively.

   Moreover, the AUTH_SESSION object may also be used with RESPONSE
   messages in order to indicate that the authorizing entity changed the
   original request.  For example, the session start or end times may
   have been modified, or the client may have requested authorization
   for all ports, but the authorizing entity only allowed the use of
   certain ports.

   If the QoS NSIS Initiator (QNI) receives a RESPONSE message with an
   AUTH_SESSION object, the QNI MUST inspect the AUTH_SESSION object to
   see what authentication attribute was changed by an authorizing
   entity.  The QNI SHOULD also silently accept AUTH_SESSION objects in
   RESPONSE message which do not indicate any change to the original
   authorization request.

6.2.1.  Message Generation

   A QoS NSLP message is created as specified in
   [I-D.ietf-nsis-qos-nslp].

   1.  The policy element received from the authorizing entity MUST be
       copied without modification into the AUTH_SESSION object.




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   2.  The AUTH_SESSION object (containing the policy element) is
       inserted in the NSLP message in the appropriate place.

6.2.2.  Message Reception

   The QoS NSLP message is processed as specified in
   [I-D.ietf-nsis-qos-nslp] with following modifications.

   1.  If the QNE is policy aware then it SHOULD use the Diameter QoS
       application or the RADIUS QoS protocol to communicate with the
       PDP.  To construct the AAA message it is necessary to extract the
       AUTH_SESSION object and the QoS related objects from the QoS NSLP
       message and to craft the respective RADIUS or Diameter message.
       The message processing and object format is described in the
       respective RADIUS or Diameter QoS protocol, respectively.  If the
       QNE is policy unaware then it ignores the policy data objects and
       continues processing the NSLP message.

   2.  If the response from the PDP is negative the request must be
       rejected.  A negative response in RADIUS is an Access-Reject and
       in Diameter is based on the 'DIAMETER_SUCCESS' value in the
       Result-Code AVP of the QoS-Authz-Answer (QAA) message.  The QNE
       must contruct and send a RESPONSE message with the status of
       authorization failure as specified in [I-D.ietf-nsis-qos-nslp].

   3.  Continue processing the NSIS message.

6.2.3.  Authorization (QNE/PDP)

   1.  Retrieve the policy element from the AUTH_SESSION object.  Check
       the PE type field and return an error if the identity type is not
       supported.

   2.  Verify the message integrity.

       *  Shared symmetric key authentication: The QNE/PDP uses the
          AUTH_ENT_ID field to consult a table keyed by that field.  The
          table should identify the cryptographic authentication
          algorithm to be used along with the expected length of the
          authentication data and the shared symmetric key for the
          authorizing entity.  Verify that the indicated length of the
          authentication data is consistent with the configured table
          entry and validate the authentication data.

       *  Public Key: Validate the certificate chain against the trusted
          Certificate Authority (CA) and validate the message signature
          using the public key.




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       *  Kerberos based usage is not provided by this document.

   3.  Once the identity of the authorizing entity and the validity of
       the service request has been established, the authorizing router/
       PDP MUST then consult its authorization policy in order to
       determine whether or not the specific request is authorized
       (e.g., based on available credits, information in the
       subscriber's database).  To the extent to which these access
       control decisions require supplementary information, routers/PDPs
       MUST ensure that supplementary information is obtained securely.

   4.  Verify the requested resources do not exceed the authorized QoS.

6.2.4.  Error Signaling

   When the PDP (e.g., a RADIUS or Diameter server) fails to verify the
   policy element then the appropriate actions described the respective
   AAA document need to be taken.

   The QNE node MUST return a RESPONSE message with the INFO_SPEC error
   code Authorization Failure as defined in the QoS NSLP specification.
   The QNE MAY include an INFO_SPEC Object Value Info to indicate which
   AUTH_SESSION attribute created the error.

6.3.  Processing with the NAT/FW NSLP

   This section presents processing rules for the NAT/FW NSLP
   [I-D.ietf-nsis-nslp-natfw].

6.3.1.  Message Generation

   A NAT/FW NSLP message is created as specified in
   [I-D.ietf-nsis-nslp-natfw].

   1.  The policy element received from the authorizing entity MUST be
       copied without modification into the AUTH_SESSION object.

   2.  The AUTH_SESSION object (containing the policy element) is
       inserted in the NATFW NSLP message in the appropriate place.

6.3.2.  Message Reception

   The NAT/FW NSLP message is processed as specified in
   [I-D.ietf-nsis-nslp-natfw] with following modifications.

   1.  If the router is policy aware then it SHOULD use the Diameter
       application or the RADIUS protocol to communicate with the PDP.
       To construct the AAA message it is necessary to extract the



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       AUTH_SESSION element and the NATFW policy rule related objects
       from the NSLP message and to craft the respective RADIUS or
       Diameter message.  The message processing and object format is
       described in the respective RADIUS or Diameter protocols,
       respectively.  If the router is policy unaware then it ignores
       the policy data objects and continues processing the NSLP
       message.

   2.  Reject the message if the response from the PDP is negative.  A
       negative response in RADIUS is an Access-Reject and in Diameter
       is based on the 'DIAMETER_SUCCESS' value in the Result-Code AVP.

   3.  Continue processing the NSIS message.

6.3.3.  Authorization (Router/PDP)

   1.  Retrieve the AUTH_SESSION object and the policy element.  Check
       the PE type field and return an error if the identity type is not
       supported.

   2.  Verify the message integrity.

       *  Shared symmetric key authentication: The Network router/PDP
          uses the AUTH_ENT_ID field to consult a table keyed by that
          field.  The table should identify the cryptographic
          authentication algorithm to be used along with the expected
          length of the authentication data and the shared symmetric key
          for the authorizing entity.  Verify that the indicated length
          of the authentication data is consistent with the configured
          table entry and validate the authentication data.

       *  Public Key: Validate the certificate chain against the trusted
          Certificate Authority (CA) and validate the message signature
          using the public key.

       *  Kerberos based usage is not provided by this document.

   3.  Once the identity of the authorizing entity and the validity of
       the service request has been established, the authorizing router/
       PDP MUST then consult its authorization policy in order to deter
       mine whether or not the specific request is authorized.  To the
       extent to which these access control decisions require
       supplementary information, routers/PDPs MUST ensure that
       supplementary information is obtained securely.







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6.3.4.  Error Signaling

   When the PDP (e.g., a RADIUS or Diameter server) fails to verify the
   AUTH_SESSION element then the appropriate actions described the
   respective AAA document need to be taken.  The NATFW NSLP node MUST
   return an error message of class 'Permanent failure' (0x5) with error
   code 'Authorization failed' (0x02).

6.4.  Integrity Protection of NSLP messages

   The AUTH_SESSION object can also be used to provide an integrity
   protection for every NSLP signaling message, thereby also authorizing
   requests or responses.  Assume that a user has deposited a shared key
   at some NN.  This NN can then verify the integrity of every NSLP
   message sent by the user to the NN, thereby authorizing actions like
   resource reservations or opening firewall pinholes according to
   policy decisions earlier made.

   The sender of an NSLP message creates an AUTH_SESSION object that
   contains AUTH_ENT_ID attribute set to HMAC_SIGNED (cf. Section 4.4)
   and hashes with the shared key over all NSLP objects that need to be
   protected and lists them in the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST.  The AUTH_SESSION
   object itself is also protected by the HMAC.  By inclusion of the
   AUTH_SESSION object into the NSLP message, the receiver of this NSLP
   message can verify its integrity if it has the suitable shared key
   for the HMAC.  Any response to the sender should also be protected by
   inclusion of an AUTH_SESSION object in order to prevent attackers
   sending unauthorized responses on behalf of the real NN.

   If an AUTH_SESSION object is present that has an AUTH_ENT_ID
   attribute set to HMAC_SIGNED, the integrity of all NSLP elements
   listed in the NSLP_OBJECT_LIST has to be checked, including the
   AUTH_SESSION object contents itself.  The key that is used to
   calculate the HMAC is referred to by the Key ID included in the
   AUTH_DATA attribute.  If the provided timestamp in START_TIME is not
   recent enough or the calculated HMAC differs from the one provided in
   AUTH_DATA the message must be discarded silently and an error should
   be logged locally.













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7.  Security Considerations

   This document describes a mechanism for session authorization to
   prevent theft of service.  There are three types of security issues
   to consider: protection against replay attacks, integrity of the
   AUTH_SESSION object, and the choice of the authentication algorithms
   and keys.

   The first issue, replay attacks, MUST be prevented.  In the non-
   associated model, the AUTH_SESSION object MUST include a START_TIME
   field and the Policy Servers MUST support NTP to ensure proper clock
   synchronization.  Failure to ensure proper clock synchronization will
   allow replay attacks since the clocks of the different network
   entities may not be in synch.  The start time is used to verify that
   the request is not being replayed at a later time.  In all other
   models, the SESSION_ID is used by the Policy Server to ensure that
   the resource request successfully correlates with records of an
   authorized session.  If a AUTH_SESSION object is replayed, it MUST be
   detected by the policy server (using internal algorithms) and the
   request MUST be rejected.

   The second issue, the integrity of the policy element, is preserved
   in untrusted environments by including the AUTHENTICATION_DATA
   attribute.  Therefore, this attribute MUST always be included.

   In environments where shared symmetric keys are possible, they should
   be used in order to keep the AUTH_SESSION policy element size to a
   strict minimum, e.g., when wireless links are used.  A secondary
   option would be PKI authentication, which provides a high level of
   security and good scalability.  However, it requires the presence of
   credentials in the AUTH_SESSION policy element which impacts its
   size.

   Further security issues are outlined in RFC 4081 [RFC4081].

















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8.  IANA Considerations

   This specification makes the following request to IANA:

   1.  Assign a new object value for the AUTH_SESSION object from the
       shared NSLP object value space.

   2.  All AUTH_SESSION object internal values and numbers should be
       taken from the allocations already done for RFC 3520 [RFC3520].
       Yet, this specification does make use of two X-types introduced
       by RFC3520: Session_ID and Resources.








































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9.  Acknowledgments

   This document is based on the RFC 3520 [RFC3520] and credit therefore
   goes to the authors of RFC 3520, namely Louis-Nicolas Hamer, Brett
   Kosinski, Bill Gage and Hugh Shieh.  Part of this work was funded by
   Deutsche Telekom Laboratories within the context of the ScaleNet
   project.












































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10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-nsis-nslp-natfw]
              Stiemerling, M., Tschofenig, H., Aoun, C., and E. Davies,
              "NAT/Firewall NSIS Signaling Layer Protocol (NSLP)",
              draft-ietf-nsis-nslp-natfw-18 (work in progress),
              February 2008.

   [I-D.ietf-nsis-ntlp]
              Schulzrinne, H. and R. Hancock, "GIST: General Internet
              Signalling Transport", draft-ietf-nsis-ntlp-15 (work in
              progress), February 2008.

   [I-D.ietf-nsis-qos-nslp]
              Manner, J., Karagiannis, G., and A. McDonald, "NSLP for
              Quality-of-Service Signaling", draft-ietf-nsis-qos-nslp-16
              (work in progress), February 2008.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.

   [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
              April 1992.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [RFC3520]  Hamer, L-N., Gage, B., Kosinski, B., and H. Shieh,
              "Session Authorization Policy Element", RFC 3520,
              April 2003.

   [RFC3521]  Hamer, L-N., Gage, B., and H. Shieh, "Framework for
              Session Set-up with Media Authorization", RFC 3521,
              April 2003.

   [RFC3852]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",



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              RFC 3852, July 2004.

   [RFC4080]  Hancock, R., Karagiannis, G., Loughney, J., and S. Van den
              Bosch, "Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS): Framework",
              RFC 4080, June 2005.

   [RFC4081]  Tschofenig, H. and D. Kroeselberg, "Security Threats for
              Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS)", RFC 4081, June 2005.











































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Authors' Addresses

   Jukka Manner
   Helsinki University of Technology (TKK)
   P.O. Box 3000
   Espoo  FI-02015 TKK
   Finland

   Phone: +358 9 451 2481
   Email: jukka.manner@tkk.fi


   Martin Stiemerling
   Network Laboratories, NEC Europe Ltd.
   Kurfuersten-Anlage 36
   Heidelberg  69115
   Germany

   Phone: +49 (0) 6221 4342 113
   Email: stiemerling@nw.neclab.eu
   URI:   http://www.stiemerling.org


   Hannes Tschofenig
   Nokia Siemens Networks
   Linnoitustie 6
   Espoo  02600
   Finland

   Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
   Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
   URI:   http://www.tschofenig.priv.at


   Roland Bless
   Institute of Telematics, Universitaet Karlsruhe (TH)
   Zirkel 2, Building 20.20
   Karlsruhe  76131
   Germany

   Phone: +49 721 608 6413
   Email: bless@tm.uka.de
   URI:   http://www.tm.uka.de/~bless








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