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Extended Incident Handling Working Group            Kathleen M. Moriarty
Internet-draft                         RSA, The Security Division of EMC
Intended status: Standards Track                       Brian H. Trammell
draft-moriarty-post-inch-rid-soap-05.txt        CERT Network Situational
Expires: August 25, 2008                                       Awareness
                                                       February 25, 2008


                           IODEF/RID over SOAP

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Drafts.

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   reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
        http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
        http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.


Abstract

    Documents intended to be shared among multiple constituencies must
    share a common format and transport mechanism.  The Incident Object
    Description Exchange Format (IODEF) defines a common XML format for
    document exchange.  This draft outlines the SOAP wrapper for all
    IODEF documents and extensions to facilitate an interoperable and
    secure communication of documents.  The SOAP wrapper allows for
    flexibility in the selection of a transport protocol.  The
    transport protocols will be provided through existing standards and
    SOAP binding, such as SOAP over HTTP/TLS and SOAP over BEEP.












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                           TABLE OF CONTENTS


Status of this Memo ................................................   1

Abstract ...........................................................   1

Terminology ........................................................   3

1. Introduction ....................................................   3

2. SOAP Wrapper ....................................................   3

3. Transport Protocol Bindings .....................................   4
    3.1 SOAP over HTTP/TLS .........................................   4
    3.2 SOAP over BEEP .............................................   5

4. Examples ........................................................   6
        4.1. Example TraceRequest message ..........................   6
    4.2 RequestAuthorization Message Example .......................   9
    4.3 Result Message Example .....................................  10
    4.4 Example InvestigationRequest Message .......................  13
    4.5 Example Report .............................................  14
    4.6 Example IncidentQuery ......................................  17

5. Security Considerations .........................................  17
    5.1 Privacy and Confidentiality ................................  17
    5.2 Authentication and Identification ..........................  18

6. IANA Considerations .............................................  18

7. Summary .........................................................  18

8. Informative References ..........................................  18
    8.1 Normative References .......................................  18
    8.2 Acknowledgments ............................................  19
    8.3 Author Information .........................................  19

Intellectual Property Statement ....................................  20

Full Copyright Statement ...........................................  20

Sponsor Information ................................................  20










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Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1. Introduction

    The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFCXXXX]
    describes an XML document format for the purpose of exchanging data
    between Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) or those
    responsible for security incident handling for network providers
    (NPs).  The defined document format provides an easy way for CSIRTs
    to exchange data in a way which can be easily parsed.  In order for
    the IODEF documents to be shared between entities, a uniform method
    for transport is necessary. SOAP [2] will provide a layer of
    abstraction and enable the use of multiple transport protocol
    bindings.  IODEF documents and extensions will be contained in an
    XML Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) [RFCYYYY] envelope
    inside the body of a SOAP message.

    HTTP with TLS v1.1 [RFC4346] has been selected as the REQUIRED SOAP
    binding for exchanging IODEF/RID messages.  The primary reason for
    selecting HTTP/TLS is due to the existence of multiple successful
    implementations of SOAP over HTTP/TLS, and to its being widely
    understood, despite the additional overhead associated with this
    combination.  The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
    [RFC4346] MUST be followed for the implementation and deployment
    of this protocol.  Excellent tool support exists to ease the
    development of applications using SOAP over HTTP.  BEEP may
    optionally be supported following the SOAP over BEEP standard
    [RFC4227].

2. SOAP Wrapper

    IODEF/RID documents, including all supported extensions, intended
    to be shared between CSIRTS or NPs MUST use a SOAP wrapper, along
    with a supported transport protocol binding, for transport.  The
    transport is independent of the wrapper.  SOAP will be used to
    provide the messaging framework and can make distinctions as to how
    messages should be handled by each participating system.  SOAP has
    been selected because of the flexibility it provides for binding
    with transport protocols, which can be independent of the IODEF/RID
    messaging system.

    The SOAP body of the message will contain the appropriate contents
    for the respective RID message type and will be structured
    according to the SOAP messaging specifications [3].  The SOAP
    header contains information pertinent to all participating systems
    that receive the message, including the ultimate destination, any
    intermediate hosts, and message processing policy information and
    is provided through RIDPolicy in the RID schema [RFCYYYY].


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    Depending on the message or document being transported, there may
    be a case, such as with RID messages, in which a host may only
    need to view the SOAP header and not the SOAP body and is,
    therefore, acting as a SOAP intermediary node.  An example of this
    would be if one RID system was sending a communication to a RID
    system for which there was no direct trust relationship, an
    intermediate RID system may be used to provide the trusted path
    between the communicating systems.  This intermediate system may
    not need to see the contents of the SOAP body.  Therefore, the
    elements or classes needed by all participating systems MUST be in
    the SOAP header, specifically the RIDPolicy class.  Each
    participating system receiving an incident handling IODEF/RID
    document is an ultimate destination and has to parse and view the
    entire IODEF/RID document to make necessary decisions.

    The SOAP specifications for intermediate and ultimate nodes MUST be
    Followed; for example, a message destined for an intermediate node
    would contain the attribute env:role with the value
    http://www.w3c.org/2003/05/soap-envelope/role/next.  Also in
    accordance with the SOAP specifications, the attribute of
    env:mustUnderstand has a value of "true" to ensure each node
    processes the header blocks consistent with the specifications for
    IODEF/RID.

    SOAP messages are typically a one-way conversation. Transmittal of
    incident information to another RID host in the form of a Report
    message is the single case within RID where a one way communication
    is specified.  The arrival of an IODEF Report document in a RID
    message is simply an assertion that a described incident occurred.
    In the case of other RID message types, two or more SOAP messages
    may be exchanged to enable bi-directional communication.
    Request/response pairs defined by RID include:
        TraceRequest/TraceAuthorization/Result,
        Investigation/Result, and
        IncidentQuery/Report.

3. Transport Protocol Bindings

    The SOAP binding will be used for message transport.  One agreed-
    upon protocol, HTTP/TLS, MUST be implemented by all RID systems and
    other protocols are optional.  The use of a single transport
    binding supported by all systems sending and receiving RID messages
    and will enable interoperability between participating CSIRTS and
    NPs.  Other protocol bindings may be defined in separate documents.

3.1 SOAP over HTTP/TLS

    SOAP over HTTP/TLS is widely supported, as are ancillary tools such
    as the Web Services Description Language (WSDL), hence the
    selection of SOAP over HTTP/1.1 over TLS as Mandatory for transport
    of RID communications.  Security is provided through the RID
    specification.  TLS offers additional security at the transport


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    layer to ensure the integrity of the session.

    BCP 56 [RFC3205] contains a number of important considerations when
    using HTTP for application protocols.  These include the size of
    the payload for the application, whether the application will use a
    web browser, whether the protocol should be defined on a port other
    than 80, and if the security provided through HTTP/TLS suits the
    needs of the new application.

    It is acknowledged within the scope of these concerns that HTTP/TLS
    is not ideally suited for IODEF/RID transport, as the former is a
    client-server protocol and the latter a message-exchange protocol;
    however, the ease of implementation for services based on SOAP over
    HTTP outweighs these concerns. Consistent with BCP 56, IODEF/RID
    over SOAP over HTTP/TLS will require its own TCP port assignment
    from IANA.

    Every RID system participating in a consortium MUST listen for
    HTTP/TLS connections on the assigned port, as the requests and
    responses in a RID message exchange transaction may be
    significantly separated in time. If a RID message is answered
    immediately, or within a generally accepted HTTP client timeout
    (about thirty seconds), the listening system SHOULD return the
    reply message in the HTTP response body; otherwise, it must
    initiate a connection to the requesting system and send its reply
    in an HTTP request.

    If the HTTP response body sent in reply to a RID message does not
    contain a RID message itself, the response body SHOULD be empty,
    and RID clients MUST ignore any response body that is not an
    expected RID message. This provision applies ONLY to HTTP response
    bodies; unsolicited HTTP requests (such as Reports not preceded by
    an IncidentQuery) are handled according to the message exchange
    pattern described in RID.

    RID systems SHOULD use HTTP/1.1 persistent connections as described
    in [RFC2616] to minimize TCP connection setup overhead. RID systems
    SHOULD support chunked transfer encoding on the HTTP server side to
    allow the implementation of clients that do not need to
    precalculate message sizes before constructing HTTP headers.

3.2 SOAP over BEEP

    SOAP over BEEP is an optional transport binding for IODEF/RID. A
    RID system supporting BEEP [RFC3080] MAY attempt to use SOAP over
    BEEP on first connection with a peer; if the peer does not support
    SOAP over BEEP, the initiating peer MUST fall back to SOAP over
    HTTPS, and SHOULD note that the peer does not support BEEP, to
    avoid attempting to use BEEP in future communications. The state
    table for the support of alternate protocols may be maintained for
    a period of one week or less depending on system resources.  The
    duration and size of the state table should be a configurable


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    option.

    BEEP has certain implementation advantages over HTTP/TLS for this
    application; however, the protocol has not been widely implemented.
    Communication between participating RID systems is on a server-to-
    server basis, for which BEEP is better suited than HTTP.   Incident
    handling may at times require immediate action; thus, a protocol
    with low overhead and minimum bandwidth requirements is desirable.

    To provide equivalent transport-layer security to HTTP/TLS, the
    BEEP TLS profile MUST be supported if BEEP is implemented and
    SHOULD be used.

4. Examples

    The examples below, parallel to the examples in section 4.5 of RID,
    demonstrate how the structure of RID messages fit into SOAP
    containers as outlined in this document for each message type. Of
    particular note in each is the use of the RID policy information in
    the SOAP header.  The RID schema was designed to enable the use of
    RIDPolicy to stand alone in the SOAP header and to enable the use of
    the RID class, RequestStatus to stand alone in the SOAP body
    without the need for an IODEF document.  When the RID class called
    IncidentSource is used, it is combined with an associated IODEF
    document in the SOAP body to provide all of the necessary
    information in response to an incident handling request.  The first
    example includes the full IODEF/RID message and associated
    IODEF-Document; following examples omit the IODEF-Document and
    Refer to it in a comment. Where indicated, the IODEF-Document must
    be present, following the requirements listed in the IODEF and RID
    specifications.

    Note: for each example listed below, [RFC3330] addresses were used.
    Assume each IP address listed is actually a separate network range
    held by different NPs.  Addresses were used from /27 network
    ranges.

4.1. Example TraceRequest message

   This TraceRequest is identical to the TraceRequest example in
   Section 4.5.1.1 of RID and would be sent from a CSIRT
   reporting a denial-of-service attack in progress to its upstream
   NP. This request asks the upstream to continue the trace and to
   rate-limit traffic closer to the source.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
 xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="TraceRequest"
                           MsgDestination="RIDSystem">


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        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.3</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
    </iodef-rid:RID>
  </SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <SOAP-ENV:Body>
    <iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
           xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="traceback">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
      </iodef:IncidentID>
      <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-02T22:49:24+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
      <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-02T22:19:24+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
      <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-02T23:20:24+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
      <iodef:Description>Host involved in DOS attack</iodef:Description>
      <iodef:Assessment>
      <iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed" type="dos"/>
      </iodef:Assessment>
      <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
          <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
          </iodef:ContactName>
          <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@192.0.2.35</iodef:Email>
      </iodef:Contact>
        <iodef:EventData>
          <iodef:Flow>
           <iodef:System category="source">
             <iodef:Node>
               <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
                </iodef:Address>
             </iodef:Node>
             <iodef:Service>
               <iodef:port>38765</iodef:port>
             </iodef:Service>
           </iodef:System>
            <iodef:System category="target">
             <iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
                </iodef:Address>
             </iodef:Node>
             <iodef:Service>
               <iodef:port>80</iodef:port>
             </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
          </iodef:Flow>
          <iodef:Expectation severity="high" action="rate-limit-host">


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            <iodef:Description>
              Rate limit traffic close to source
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:Expectation>
          <iodef:Record>
            <iodef:RecordData>
              <iodef:Description>
              The IPv4 packet included was used in the described attack
              </iodef:Description>
              <iodef:RecordItem dtype="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
                0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
                4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
                6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
                46432e0a
              </iodef:RecordItem>
            </iodef:RecordData>
          </iodef:Record>
        </iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:History>
          <iodef:HistoryItem>
            <iodef:DateTime>2001-09-14T08:19:01+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
            <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
              CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
            </iodef:IncidentID>
            <iodef:Description>
              Notification sent to next upstream NP closer to 192.0.2.35
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:HistoryItem>
        </iodef:History>
      </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  </SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
<!-- Digital signature accompanied by above RID and IODEF -->
<Envelope xmlns="urn:envelope"
          xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
          xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0">
  <iodef:IODEF-Document>
    <iodef:Incident>
      <iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:Record>
          <iodef:RecordData>
            <iodef:RecordItem type="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
             0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
             4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
             6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
             46432e0a
            </iodef:RecordItem>
          </iodef:RecordData>
        </iodef:Record>
      </iodef:EventData>
    </iodef:Incident>


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  </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
    <SignedInfo>
      <CanonicalizationMethod
       Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-
                 20010315#WithComments"/>
      <SignatureMethod
       Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#dsa-sha1"/>
      <Reference URI="">
        <Transforms>
          <Transform Algorithm=
           "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
        </Transforms>
        <DigestMethod
         Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
        <DigestValue>KiI5+6SnFAs429VNwsoJjHPplmo=</DigestValue>
      </Reference>
    </SignedInfo>
    <SignatureValue>
      VvyXqCzjoW0m2NdxNeToXQcqcSM80W+JMW+Kn01cS3z3KQwCPeswzg==
    </SignatureValue>
    <KeyInfo>
      <KeyValue>
        <DSAKeyValue>
          <P>/KaCzo4Syrom78z3EQ5SbbB4sF7ey80etKII864WF64B81uRpH5t9j
             QTxeEu0ImbzRMqzVDZkVG9xD7nN1kuFw==</P>
          <Q>li7dzDacuo67Jg7mtqEm2TRuOMU=</Q>
          <G>Z4Rxsnqc9E7pGknFFH2xqaryRPBaQ01khpMdLRQnG541Awtx/XPaF5
             Bpsy4pNWMOHCBiNU0NogpsQW5QvnlMpA==</G>
          <Y>VFWTD4I/aKni4YhDyYxAJozmj1iAzPLw9Wwd5B+Z9J5E7lHjcAJ+bs
             HifTyYdnj+roGzy4o09YntYD8zneQ7lw==</Y>
        </DSAKeyValue>
      </KeyValue>
    </KeyInfo>
  </Signature>
</Envelope>

4.2 RequestAuthorization Message Example

    This RequestAuthorization is identical to the RequestAuthorization
    example in section 4.5.1.2 of the RID specification and is
    sent in response to the TraceRequest to approve the request.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
   xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
     <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="RequestAuthorization"
                           MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
        <iodef:Node>


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          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
      <iodef-rid:RequestStatus AuthorizationStatus="Approved"/>
    </iodef-rid:RID>
  </SOAP-ENV:Header>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>

4.3 Result Message Example

    This Result message is identical to the Result example in section
    4.5.1.3 of the RID.  This message is the final response from the
    TraceRequest that has completed to notify the requestor of the
    results and actions taken from the request.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
   xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Result"
                           MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
      <iodef-rid:IncidentSource>
        <iodef-rid:SourceFound>true</iodef-rid:SourceFound>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.37</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
      </iodef-rid:IncidentSource>
    </iodef-rid:RID>
  </SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <SOAP-ENV:Body>
    <iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
           xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="traceback">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
        <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-02T22:49:24+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
        <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-02T22:19:24+00:00</iodef:StartTime>


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        <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-02T23:20:24+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
        <iodef:Description>Host involved in DOS attack
          </iodef:Description>
        <iodef:Assessment>
          <iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed" type="dos"/>
        </iodef:Assessment>
        <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
          <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
       </iodef:ContactName>
          <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@192.0.2.35</iodef:Email>
        </iodef:Contact>
        <iodef:EventData>
          <iodef:Contact role="admin" type="organization">
            <iodef:ContactName>Admin-contact for 192.0.2.35
            </iodef:ContactName>
            <iodef:Email>Admin-contact@192.0.2.35</iodef:Email>
          </iodef:Contact>
          <iodef:Flow>
            <iodef:System category="intermediate">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
          </iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
            </iodef:System>
          </iodef:Flow>
          <iodef:EventData>
            <iodef:Contact role="admin" type="organization">
              <iodef:ContactName>Admin-contact for 192.0.2.3
              </iodef:ContactName>
              <iodef:Email>Admin-contact@192.0.2.3</iodef:Email>
            </iodef:Contact>
            <iodef:Flow>
              <iodef:System category="intermediate">
                <iodef:Node>
                  <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.3
                    </iodef:Address>
                </iodef:Node>
              </iodef:System>
            </iodef:Flow>
          </iodef:EventData>
        </iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:EventData>
          <iodef:Flow>
            <iodef:System category="source">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
                  </iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>38765</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>


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            <iodef:System category="target">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
                  </iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>80</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
          </iodef:Flow>
          <iodef:Expectation severity="high" action="rate-limit-host">
            <iodef:Description>
              Rate limit traffic close to source
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:Expectation>
          <iodef:Record>
            <iodef:RecordData>
              <iodef:Description>
              The IPv4 packet included was used in the described attack
              </iodef:Description>
              <iodef:RecordItem dtype="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
                0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
                4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
                6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
                46432e0a
              </iodef:RecordItem>
            </iodef:RecordData>
          </iodef:Record>
        </iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:History>
          <iodef:HistoryItem>
            <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-02T22:53:01+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
            <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
              CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
            </iodef:IncidentID>
            <iodef:Description>
              Notification sent to next upstream NP closer to 192.0.2.35
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:HistoryItem>
          <iodef:HistoryItem action="rate-limit-host">
            <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-02T23:07:21+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
            <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-NP3">
              CSIRT-FOR-NP3#3291-1
            </iodef:IncidentID>
            <iodef:Description>
              Host rate limited for 24 hours
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:HistoryItem>
        </iodef:History>
      </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  </SOAP-ENV:Body>


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</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>

4.4 Example InvestigationRequest Message

    This InvestigationRequest is identical to the InvestigationRequest
    example in section 4.5.2.1 of the RID specification and would be
    sent in a situation similar to that of example 4.1, when the source
    of the attack is known.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
   xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Investigation"
                           MsgDestination="SourceOfIncident">
        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.98</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
    </iodef-rid:RID>
  </SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <SOAP-ENV:Body>
    <iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
           xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="other">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
        <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-05T08:13:33+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
        <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-05T08:13:31+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
        <iodef:EndTime>2004-02-05T08:13:33+00:00</iodef:EndTime>
        <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-05T08:13:35+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
        <iodef:Description>Host involved in DOS attack
          </iodef:Description>
        <iodef:Assessment>
         <iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed" type="recon"/>
        </iodef:Assessment>
        <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
          <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
       </iodef:ContactName>
          <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@192.0.2.35</iodef:Email>
        </iodef:Contact>
        <iodef:EventData>
          <iodef:Flow>
            <iodef:System category="source">
              <iodef:Node>


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                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
                  </iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>41421</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
            <iodef:System category="target">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
                  </iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>80</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
          </iodef:Flow>
          <iodef:Expectation severity="high" action="investigate">
            <iodef:Description>
              Investigate whether source has been compromised
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:Expectation>
        </iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:History>
          <iodef:HistoryItem>
            <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-05T08:19:01+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
            <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
              CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
            </iodef:IncidentID>
            <iodef:Description>
              Investigation request sent to NP for 192.0.2.35
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:HistoryItem>
        </iodef:History>
      </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  </SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>

4.5 Example Report

    This Report is identical to the Report example in section 4.5.3.1
    of the RID specification.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
   xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Report" MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
        <iodef:Node>


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          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.3</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
    </iodef-rid:RID>
  </SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <SOAP-ENV:Body>
    <iodef:IODEF-Document version="1.00"
           xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="reporting">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
        <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-05T10:21:08+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
        <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-05T10:21:05+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
        <iodef:EndTime>2004-02-05T10:35:00+00:00</iodef:EndTime>
        <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-05T10:27:38+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
        <iodef:Description>Host illicitly accessed admin account
        </iodef:Description>
        <iodef:Assessment>
          <iodef:Impact severity="high" completion="succeeded"
                 type="admin"/>
          <iodef:Confidence rating="high"/>
        </iodef:Assessment>
        <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
          <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
       </iodef:ContactName>
          <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@192.0.2.35</iodef:Email>
        </iodef:Contact>
        <iodef:EventData>
          <iodef:Flow>
            <iodef:System category="source">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
                  </iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>32821</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>
            <iodef:System category="target">
              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
                  </iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Service>
                <iodef:port>22</iodef:port>
              </iodef:Service>
            </iodef:System>


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          </iodef:Flow>
        </iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:History>
          <iodef:HistoryItem>
            <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-05T10:28:00+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
            <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
              CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
            </iodef:IncidentID>
            <iodef:Description>
              Incident report sent to NP for 192.0.2.35
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:HistoryItem>
        </iodef:History>
      </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
  </SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>





































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4.6 Example IncidentQuery

    This IncidentQuery is identical to the IncidentQuery example in
    Section 4.5.4.1 of the RID specification.

<SOAP-ENV:Envelope
   xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://www.w3.org/2001/12/soap-envelope">
 <SOAP-ENV:Header>
  <iodef-rid:RID xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-1.0"
                   xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
      <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="IncidentQuery"
                           MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
        <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
        <iodef:Node>
          <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.3</iodef:Address>
        </iodef:Node>
        <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#210-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
    </iodef-rid:RID>
 </SOAP-ENV:Header>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>


5. Security Considerations

    All security considerations of related documents MUST be
    considered, including those in the following documents:
    the Incident Object Description Exchange (IODEF), [RFCXXXX]
    and Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) [RFCYYYY].
    The SOAP wrappers described herein are built upon the
    foundation of these documents; the security considerations
    contained therein are incorporated by reference.

5.1 Privacy and Confidentiality

    For transport confidentiality, TLS (whether HTTP/TLS or the BEEP
    TLS profile) MUST be supported and SHOULD be used.

    Since multiple bindings for transport may be implemented, RID
    implementations MUST support XML encryption [4] to encrypt the SOAP
    body. Since XML encryption is performed at the IODEF document
    level, not only is the transport encrypted when a document is
    sensitive or contains sensitive elements, but the stored document
    is also encrypted.  Note that this encryption applies only to the
    SOAP body; policy information in the SOAP header should remain
    unencrypted if it is necessary for the intermediate node to
    dispatch the message.   XML encryption protects the IODEF/RID
    document in the SOAP body from being viewed by any involved SOAP
    intermediary node.


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5.2 Authentication and Identification

    For transport authentication and identification, TLS (whether
    HTTP/TLS or the BEEP TLS profile) with mutual authentication
    MUST be supported and SHOULD be used. Each RID consortium SHOULD
    use a trusted public key infrastructure (PKI) to manage
    identities for TLS connections.  The public/private key pairs
    used for XML encryption and digital signatures provide
    authentication for the RID message [RFC3275], [1].  The session
    encryption keys are also used to identify the communicating
    hosts and provide integrity for the session.

    Since multiple bindings for transport may be implemented, RID
    implementations MUST support XML digital signatures [RFC3275],[5]
    to sign the SOAP body; the rationale and implementation here is
    parallel to that for XML encryption discussed in section 5.1.

6. IANA Considerations

    The IANA is requested to assign TCP ports in the Registered Port
    Numbers set for RID over SOAP over HTTPS and for RID over SOAP
    over BEEP.

7. Summary

    SOAP provides the wrapper to facilitate the exchange of RID
    messages.  The IETF and W3C standards provide detailed
    implementation details for SOAP and SOAP protocol bindings.  The
    use of existing standards assists with development and
    interoperability between RID systems exchanging IODEF documents for
    incident handling purposes.  HTTP/TLS is the mandatory transport
    binding for SOAP to be implemented and BEEP with a TLS profile is
    optional.

8. Informative References

    [RFC3330] "Special-Use IPv4 Addresses." IANA. September 2002.

    [1] XML-Signature Syntax and Processing, W3C Recommendation,
    M. Bartel, J. Boyer, B. Fox, B. LaMacchia, and E. Simon, February
    2002. http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/#sec-Design

8.1 Normative References

    [RFC2119] "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
    Levels," S. Bradner, March 1997.

    [RFC2616] "Hypertext Transfer Protocol - HTTP/1.1," R. Fielding, J.
    Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Masinter, P. Leach, and T. Berners-Lee, June
    1999.

    [RFC3080] "The Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol Core," M. Rose.


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    March 2001.

    [RFC3205] "On the Use of HTTP as a Substrate," K. Moore, February
    2002. (BCP56)

    [RFC3275] "(Extensible Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and
    Processing", D. Eastlake 3rd, J. Reagle, D. Solo. March 2002.

    [RFC4227] "Using the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) in Blocks
    Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP)," E. O'Tuathail, and M. Rose,
    January 2006. http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc4227.html

    [RFC4346] "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version
    1.1," T. Dierks, E. Rescorla. April 2006.

    [RFCXXXX] "The Incident Object Data Exchange Format Data Model and
    XML Implementation," J. Meijer, R. Danyliw, and Y. Demchenko,
    August 2006.
    http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-inch-iodef-14.txt

    [RFCYYYY] "Real-time Inter-network Defense," K. Moriarty,
    December 2007. http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
    draft-moriarty-post-inch-rid-02.txt

    [2] SOAP Version 1.2 Part 0: Primer,  W3C Recommendation,
    http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12-part0/, 27 April 2007.

    [3] SOAP Version 1.2 Part 1:Messaging Framework.  W3C
    Recommendation, http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12-part1/ 27 April 2007.

    [4] XML Encryption Syntax and Processing, W3C Recommendation.
    T. Imamura, B. Dillaway, and E. Simon, December 2002.

    [5] XML-Signature Syntax and Processing, W3C Recommendation,
    M. Bartel, J. Boyer, B. Fox, B. LaMacchia, and E. Simon, February
    2002. http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/#sec-Design

8.2 Acknowledgments

    Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
    Internet Society.

8.3 Author Information

    Kathleen M. Moriarty
    RSA, The Security Division of EMC
    174 Middlesex Turnpike
    Bedford, MA 01730
    Email: Kathleen.Moriarty@RSA.com

    Brian H. Trammell
    CERT Network Situational Awareness


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    4500 Fifth Avenue
    Pittsburgh, PA 15213
    Email: bht@cert.org

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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
   REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE
   IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL
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Sponsor Information


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    This work was sponsored by the Air Force under Air Force
    Contract FA8721-05-C-0002 while Kathleen worked at MIT Lincoln
    Laboratory.

    "Opinions, interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations
     are those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed
     by the United States Government."















































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