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Internet Draft                                                 J. Morris
Document: draft-morris-geopriv-core-02.txt          Center for Democracy
Expires December 2003                                     and Technology

                                                             D. Mulligan
                                              Samuelson Law, Technology,
                                                and Public Policy Clinic

                                                              J. Cuellar
                                                              Siemens AG

                                                               June 2003

                      Core Privacy Protections for
                        Geopriv Location Object


Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
        http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
        http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.


Abstract

   The working group has generally agreed that the Geopriv Location
   Object MUST be able to contain a limited set of Privacy Rules.   This
   Internet-Draft suggests the set of Privacy Rules that the authors
   believe should be includable in the Location Object.


   Morris, Mulligan, Cuellar                                         1
                       Core Privacy Protections               June 2003

Table of Contents

    1. Overview and Notes on Revisions ................................2
    2. Conventions used in this document ..............................3
    3. Privacy Rules to be Includable in a Geopriv Location Object ....3
       3.1. Widely Distributable Privacy Elements and Rules ...........3
       3.2. LS-to-LS Privacy Elements and Rules .......................4
    4. Additional Discussion of Proposed Privacy Elements and Rules ...6
    5. Reasons to Include Privacy Rules in Location Object ............7
    6. Additional Suggested Requirement for Location Object ...........8
    7. Security Considerations ........................................8
    8. Acknowledgements ...............................................9
    9. References .....................................................9
    10. Author's Addresses ............................................9
    11. Full Copyright Statement ......................................9



1. Overview and Notes on Revisions

   The authors believe that there exists working group consensus that
   that the Geopriv Location Object (LO) MUST be able to contain a
   limited set of Privacy Rules.  This document suggests the set of
   Privacy Rules that the authors believe should be includable in the
   Location Object.

   The threshold question of whether the LO should contain any Privacy
   Rules was discussed at IETF-55 in Atlanta.  A brief explanation as to
   why a limited set of Privacy Rules should be includable in the LO is
   set out in Section 5 below.

   The -00 version of this document was discussed at IETF-55 in Atlanta.
   The -01 version significantly reorganized the proposed rules, and was
   discussed at IETF-56 in San Francisco.  This -02 version refines the
   Privacy Rules proposal based on in person and mailing list
   discussion.  The main changes from the -01 version are:

        * the prior draft placed the proposed privacy elements into two
   categories:  "Human- AND Machine-Readable Privacy" (including
   elements that can be distributed to any of the entities in a Geopriv
   transaction) and "Machine-Readable Privacy Elements" (including
   elements that can only be sent from one Location Server to another
   Location Server).  Concern was raised by the idea of "human readable"
   elements, and these categories have been changed to respond to the
   concerns raised.

        * the prior draft proposed that rules could be made specific to
   individuals (Element D, for example, "give my location to my mother
   at any time, but give my location to my boss only at these certain
   times), AND, separately, specific to presenters of a credential

   Morris, Mulligan, Cuellar                                         2
                       Core Privacy Protections               June 2003
   (Element E, for example, "give my location to anyone who presents XYZ
   credential).  A concern was expressed about the difficultly of
   establishing identity independent of a credential.  In other words,
   assuming the absence of a credential (which is permitted with Element
   E), verifying an identity (as in Element D) would be very difficult.
   To address this concern, the old Element D has been eliminated.  The
   old Element E has been modified to suggest that in designing the
   Location Object, it is possible that a concept of "identity" may be
   used merely as an index into a table of credentials, but such a use
   of "identity" would not be a requirement for the Location Object.


2. Conventions used in this document

   Terms with initial capitals (such as, for example, "Location Object,"
   "Privacy Rule," and "Viewer") have the same meaning as defined in the
   Geopriv Requirements document, draft-ietf-geopriv-reqs-03.txt.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [1].


3. Privacy Rules to be Includable in a Geopriv Location Object

   This section details two groups of core elements of Privacy Rules
   that should be expressible in the Geopriv Location Object.  For each
   of the core elements (designated as Elements A through L), a more
   precisely stated "rule" is also provided, with Elements D through L
   being stated in a permissions table as part of a single rule.
   Section 4 below contains some additional substantive discussion of
   these elements.

   Note that some of the elements and rules discussed below are phrased
   in terms of prohibitions ("do not disclose except to . . ."), but
   could probably as effectively be phrased in terms of permissions
   ("permitted to disclosed only to . . . ").


3.1. Widely Distributable Privacy Elements and Rules

   This first group of privacy elements and resulting rules represent
   the most basic Privacy Rules, and can be transmitted between and
   among any of the entities in a Geopriv transaction.

   Two different forms of this first group would be defined - a compact
   form suitable for low bandwidth applications, and a more verbose
   default form that could possibly be transmitted to the Viewer (i.e.,
   the final recipient of Location Information).  This latter approach
   would permit, for example, the return of a Location Object in
   response to a HTTP request from a web browser.



   Morris, Mulligan, Cuellar                                         3
                       Core Privacy Protections               June 2003
   The three privacy elements in this group are:

      Element A:  Requirement that external privacy rules be followed

      Element B:  Limitation on length of data retention

      Element C:  Limitation on any retransmission or further
                  disclosure

   The following expresses these three broad elements in more precise
   language:

      Rule 1:     Do not retransmit or further disclose my location
                  information except in full compliance with the
                  privacy rules located at [url/uri]. (Element A)

      Rule 2:     Do not retain my location information [past xyz
                  time+date OR longer than xyz duration]. (Element B)

      Rule 3:     Do not retransmit or further disclose my location
                  information. (Element C)


3.2. LS-to-LS Privacy Elements and Rules

   The second group of Privacy Rules that can be contained in a LO is
   intended for use in transmissions between Location Servers.

   The authors believe that, taken together, Elements A - L would allow
   the expression of a very high percentage of users' complete set of
   Privacy Rules, and thus in many cases could obviate the need for
   reference to any external set of Privacy Rules.

   The privacy elements in this group are:

      Element D:  [deleted]

      Element E:  Permission to disclose only to someone presenting a
                  specified key (for instance, a shared key or the
                  private key corresponding to a particular public
                  key), or a special type of credential (an e-token to
                  be defined).

      Element F:  Requirement that the granularity/precision of
                  location information be reduced

      Element G:  The ability to provide additional Privacy Rules for
                  specific requestors or groups of requestors

      Element H:  The ability to define a time until which a permission
                  is valid



   Morris, Mulligan, Cuellar                                         4
                       Core Privacy Protections               June 2003
      Element I:  The ability to define a geographical area for which
                  the permission is valid ("if I am in area x then you
                  can tell y my location")

      Element J:  The ability to define a repeatable time window (such
                  as weekdays during office hours) during which a
                  permission is valid

      Element K:  The ability to require that express consent of the
                  Target/Rule Maker be obtained prior to disclosing
                  location

      Element L:  The ability to require that notice be provided to the
                  Target if location is provided


   Elements E through L can be expressed in the form of a single
   permissions table:

      Rule 4:     Do not retransmit or further disclose my location
                  information EXCEPT in accordance to the following
                  permissions table:

   |Credent/Ident|Accuracy|Policy|Valid|LocRes|TimeRes|Consent|Notice|
   |             |        |      |     |      |       |       |      |
   | xyz1 [id1]  |  uvw1  |  p1  | v1  |  r1  |  t1   |  c1   |  n1  |
   | xyz2 [id2]  |  uvw2  |  p2  | v2  |  r2  |  t2   |  c2   |  n2  |
   | xyz3 [id3]  |  uvw3  |  p3  | v3  |  r3  |  t3   |  c3   |  n3  |
   | xyz4 [id4]  |  uvw4  |  p4  | v4  |  r4  |  t4   |  c4   |  n4  |

                  where

        xyz     Credential: allows for wildcards and "no additional
                credential required beyond [abc] identity" (Element E)

        [id]    A non-required possible identity label that can be used
                to provide an index into the credential table (for
                example, "here is my xyz credential, and you will locate
                that credential indexed by [id] in your table")

        uvw     Accuracy: has one of the following values (Element F):
                A = no granularity change required
                B = 10 kilometer radius (or within lat/long quadrant)
                C = 100 kilometer radius (or within larger quadrant)
                D = local or municipal civil designation (e.g., city)
                E = state or regional civil designation (e.g., state)
                F = national designation (e.g., country)
                G = time zone

        p       Policy: pointer to the privacy rules/policy that must be
                followed for this specific Location Seeker (Element G)



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                       Core Privacy Protections               June 2003
        v       Validity: this permission is valid until time v (Element
                H)

        r       Location Restriction:  r represents a region where this
                permission applies (for instance, if I am in Munich,
                then it is OK to pass this information) (Element I)

        t       Time Restriction: this permission is only valid within
                the recurring time window t (for instance, only during
                working hours may my boss obtain my location) (Element
                J)

        c       Consent Bit: ask me for permission in real time (and let
                the Location Seeker abc wait until I tell you) (Element
                K)

        n       Notification Bit: send me a notification if you send
                this Location Information to Location Seeker abc
                (Element L)


4. Additional Discussion of Proposed Privacy Elements and Rules

   The following are additional comments and explanations of the above
   privacy elements and rules:

        a.  Rules 1 - 3 should be expressible in both a compact form
   and a form that would be intelligible to a human viewer.  Rule 4 is
   primarily intended to be read by Location Servers that have
   sufficient intelligence to process the rules.  When sending Location
   Information to an ultimate Viewer, it is possible that the Geopriv
   Location Object (LO) itself would need to contain human-readable
   information (for example, if the LO is sent to a Viewer using SMTP or
   HTTP).  This approach is analogous to the full and compact versions
   of privacy policies under P3P.

        b.  Element C and Rule 3 could possibly be omitted as a separate
   flag or field, because a "do not distribute" instruction should be a
   fundamental default for the Geopriv Location Object.  Nevertheless,
   there is value in having an express "do not redistribute" indicator,
   especially to emphasize that instruction to an ultimate Viewer (who,
   as discussed above, may well be a human receiving the LO essentially
   directly).

        c.  To be clear, the proposal of making specific Privacy Rules
   includable in a Location Object does NOT mean that all of the
   proposed privacy rules would be transmitted in every Location Object
   within a given location transaction.  It is quite possible that a LO
   at an early stage of a location transaction might carry full
   specifics on Rules 1 - 4.  But a later stage of the same location
   transaction (say, from a Location Server to an ultimate Viewer) might



   Morris, Mulligan, Cuellar                                         6
                       Core Privacy Protections               June 2003
   only carry Rules 1 - 3 (which would be the only rules directly
   applicable to the Viewer).


5. Reasons to Include Privacy Rules in Location Object

   It is not the purpose of this Internet-Draft to explain in full the
   reasons why a limited set of Privacy Rules should be includable in
   the Location Object.  A brief discussion, however, may assist a
   reader who is unfamiliar with past working group discussions on the
   topic.

   A critical question that faced the Geopriv working group was whether
   the Location Object (LO) to be designed should include fields for
   particular privacy-protecting rules, or instead should simply refer
   to an external set of privacy rules.  The three most plausible
   answers to this question would be:

        (1)  "Entirely External" -- the LO should only contain a URI
             reference to an external set of privacy rules that must be
             followed by any recipient of the LO.

        (2)  "Limited Internal" -- the LO should contain a limited set
             of rules that cover the great bulk of likely privacy
             situations (as well as the ability to include a URI
             reference to an external set of privacy rules if more
             robust rules are needed, or external rule storage is
             preferred).

        (3)  "Full Internal" -- the LO should be defined to be able to
             contain a full, robust, and potentially complex set of
             privacy rules.

   The "Full Internal" option would yield the most complex LO, would be
   the most complex to define and implement, and may not be consistent
   with the goal of enabling the use of the Geopriv LO on constrained
   devices or with limited bandwidth.

   The "Entirely External" approach would be the quickest for the
   working group to accomplish, and if fully implemented in the
   marketplace this approach could give end users a great deal of
   control and flexibility in the protection of Location Information.
   Under this approach, however, privacy protection would heavily depend
   on marketplace developments wholly external to the work of Geopriv,
   and thus may not fulfill the mission of the working group as defined
   by its charter.

   Certain working group participants (including the authors here)
   argued that the most effective way to ensure that users have some
   privacy control is for the Location Object to be able to carry a
   limited number of privacy rules.  In discussions at IETF-55 in
   Atlanta, the working group agreed to pursue the "Limited Internal"


   Morris, Mulligan, Cuellar                                         7
                       Core Privacy Protections               June 2003
   approach, although the group did not determine the precise elements
   to be included in a "Limited Internal" approach.  It is to this
   latter question that this document is addressed.

   Note that the "Limited Internal" approach is effectively a superset
   of the "Entirely External" approach, so that both of those models
   could be implemented in appropriate situations even if the LO can
   carry a larger set of rules.  Thus, where a particular location
   service application in fact offers users robust and effective means
   to create and maintain an external set of privacy rules, that
   application could simply transmit the URI/URL of those external rules
   in the Location Object.  But where an application lacks robust and
   effective external rule servers, the "Limited Internal" approach
   would allow a core set of rules to be carried with the LO.


6. Additional Suggested Requirement for Location Object

   This section is retained here to avoid losing track of the proposal
   made below (which could be incorporated in the definition of the LO).

   The -00 version of this document proposed one element (the original
   Element G described below) that was decided to be useful, but not
   actually a "privacy rule."  The apparent consensus was to instead
   designate the proposed functionality simply as a feature to be
   included in a final definition of a Geopriv Location Object.  The
   resulting proposal is that the LO should be able to contain the
   following instruction:

        Promptly transmit my location to [abc] individual or entity,
        along with [xyz] instruction (where the contents of [xyz] are
        NOT defined by Geopriv except for technical parameters such as
        maximum size).

   Although this proposal does not itself directly advance a privacy
   objective, it would greatly facilitate the future development of
   privacy protecting (and other) business models.  It would also
   promote the ability of a Target to bypass the location services
   offered by a Location Generator (such as a wireless carrier) in favor
   of location services offered by a competitive third party.


7. Security Considerations

   Security is, of course, is a core goal of the Geopriv working group.
   The questions addressed in this Internet-Draft -- what privacy rules
   should be includable in the Geopriv Location Object -- have
   significant security implications, most directly on the security of
   the privacy rules themselves.  The inappropriate disclosure of some
   privacy rules could itself harm privacy, and thus a decision to
   include some privacy rules in the Location Object could expose those
   rules to a higher chance of security (and thus privacy) violation.


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                       Core Privacy Protections               June 2003
   On the other hand, if including rules in the Location Object
   increases the likelihood that those privacy rules would in fact be
   known and followed, then the added security risk of transmitting
   those rules may be outweighed by the added privacy protection
   afforded.


8. Acknowledgements

   We wish to thank Jon Peterson for his constructive criticism of the
   proposals advanced in the prior version of this document.


9. References

   [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
          Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.


10. Author's Addresses

   John B. Morris, Jr.
   Director, Internet Standards, Technology & Policy Project
   Center for Democracy and Technology
   1634 I Street NW, Suite 1100
   Washington, DC 20006                         Email:  jmorris@cdt.org
   USA                                               http://www.cdt.org

   Deirdre K. Mulligan
   Samuelson Law, Technology and Public Policy Clinic
   Boalt Hall School of Law
   University of California
   Berkeley, CA 94720-7              Email:  dmulligan@law.berkeley.edu
   USA

   Jorge R Cuellar
   Siemens AG
   Corporate Technology
   CT IC 3
   81730 Munich                       Email:  Jorge.Cuellar@siemens.com
   Germany


11. Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date).  All Rights Reserved.

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   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are


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                       Core Privacy Protections               June 2003
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
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   Morris, Mulligan, Cuellar                                        10


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