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Internet Engineering Task Force                               D. M'Raihi
Internet-Draft                                            Verisign, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                              S. Machani
Expires: July 9, 2009                                   Diversinet Corp.
                                                                  M. Pei
                                                          Verisign, Inc.
                                                               J. Rydell
                                                          Portwise, Inc.
                                                         January 5, 2009


              TOTP: Time-based One-time Password Algorithm
                   draft-mraihi-totp-timebased-01.txt

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 9, 2009.

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Abstract

   This document describes an extension of one-time password algorithm
   HOTP as defined in [RFC4226] to support time based moving factor.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Notation and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Algorithm Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   4.  TOTP Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     4.1.  Notations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     4.2.  Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     5.1.  General  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     5.2.  Validation and Time-step Size  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   6.  Resynchronization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     9.1.  Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   Appendix A.  TOTP Algorithm: Reference Implementation  . . . . . .  8
   Appendix B.  Test Vectors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12























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1.  Introduction

1.1.  Scope

   This document describes an extension of one-time password algorithm
   HOTP as defined in [RFC4226] to support time based moving factor.

1.2.  Background

   As defined in [RFC4226] the HOTP algorithm is based on the HMAC-SHA-1
   algorithm, as specified in [RFC2104] applied to an increasing counter
   value representing the message in the HMAC computation.

   Basically, the output of the HMAC-SHA-1 calculation is truncated to
   obtain user-friendly values:

   HOTP(K,C) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-1(K,C))

   where Truncate represents the function that can convert an HMAC-SHA-1
   value into an HOTP value.


   TOTP is the time-based variant of this algorithm where a value T
   derived from a time reference and a time step replaces the counter C
   in the HOTP computation.


2.  Notation and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]


3.  Algorithm Requirements

   This section summarizes the requirements taken into account for
   designing the TOTP algorithm.

   R1 - The prover (e.g. token, soft token) and verifier (authentication
   or validation server) MUST have access to the Unix Time

   R2 - The prover and verifier MUST either share a same secret or the
   knowledge of a secret transformation to generate a shared secret

   R3 - The algorithm MUST use HOTP [RFC4226] as a key building block.

   R4 - The prover and verifier MUST use the same time step value X.



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   R5 - There MUST be a unique secret (key) for each prover.

   R6 - The keys SHOULD be randomly generated or derived using a key
   derivation algorithms.

   R7 - The keys MAY be stored in a tamper-resistant device and SHOULD
   be protected against unauthorized access and usage.

   R8 - The TOTP algorithm SHOULD be used for online application.


4.  TOTP Algorithm

   This variant of the HOTP algorithm specifies the calculation of a
   one-time password value, based on a representation of the counter as
   a time factor.

4.1.  Notations

   - X represents the time step in seconds (default value X = 30
   seconds) and is a system parameter;

   - T0 is the Unix time to start counting time steps (default value is
   0, Unix epoch) and is also a system parameter.

4.2.  Description

   Basically, we define TOTP as TOTP = HOTP(K, T) where T is an integer
   and represents the number of time steps between the initial counter
   time T0 and the current Unix time (i.e. the number of seconds elapsed
   since midnight UTC of January 1, 1970).

   More specifically T = (Current Unix time - T0) / X where:

   - X represents the time step in seconds (default value X = 30
   seconds) and is a system parameter;

   - T0 is the Unix time to start counting time steps (default value is
   0, Unix epoch) and is also a system parameter.


5.  Security Considerations

5.1.  General

   The security and strength of this algorithm depends on the properties
   of the underlying building block HOTP, which is a construction based
   on HMAC [RFC2104] using SHA-1 as the hash function.



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   The conclusion of the security analysis detailed in [RFC4226] is
   that, for all practical purposes, the outputs of the dynamic
   truncation on distinct inputs are uniformly and independently
   distributed strings.

   The analysis demonstrates that the best possible attack against the
   HOTP function is the brute force attack.

   As indicated in the algorithm requirement section, keys SHOULD be
   chosen at random or using a cryptographically strong pseudo-random
   generator properly seeded with a random value.

   We RECOMMEND following the recommendations in [RFC1750] for all
   pseudo-random and random generations.  The pseudo-random numbers used
   for generating the keys SHOULD successfully pass the randomness test
   specified in [CN] or a similar well-recognized test.

   All the communications SHOULD take place over a secure channel e.g.
   SSL/TLS, IPsec connections.

   We also RECOMMEND storing the keys securely in the validation system,
   and more specifically encrypting them using tamper-resistant hardware
   encryption and exposing them only when required: for example, the key
   is decrypted when needed to verify an OTP value, and re-encrypted
   immediately to limit exposure in the RAM for a short period of time.

   The key store MUST be in a secure area, to avoid as much as possible
   direct attack on the validation system and secrets database.
   Particularly, access to the key material should be limited to
   programs and processes required by the validation system only.

5.2.  Validation and Time-step Size

   An OTP generated within the same Time-step will be the same.  When an
   OTP is received at a validation system, it doesn't know a client's
   exact timestamp when an OTP was generated.  The validation system may
   typically use the timestamp when an OTP is received for OTP
   comparison.  Due to the network latency for an OTP to transmit from a
   requesting application to a validation system and user's actual input
   time of an OTP to a receiving system, such timestamp gap between the
   actual OTP generation time and server's receiving time may be large.
   The receiving time at the validation system and the actual OTP
   generation may not fall within the same Time-step window that produce
   the same OTP.  When an OTP is generated at the end of a Time-step
   window, the receiving time most likely falls into the next Time-step
   window.  A validation system SHOULD typically set a policy for an
   acceptable OTP transmission delay window for validation.  The
   validation system should compare OTPs not only with the receiving



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   timestamp but also the past timesteps that are within the
   transmission delay.  A larger acceptable delay window would introduce
   some OTP attack window.  We RECOMMEND that at most one time step is
   allowed as the network delay.

   The Time-step size has impact on both security and usability.  A
   larger Time-step size means larger validity window for an OTP to be
   accepted by a validation system.  There are the following
   implications with a larger Time-step size.

   At first, a larger Time-step size exposes larger window for attack.
   When an OTP is generated and exposed to a third party before it is
   consumed, the third party can consume the OTP within the Time-step
   window.

   We RECOMMEND default Time-step size for 30 seconds.

   Secondly, the next different OTP must be generated in the next Time-
   step window.  A user must wait till the clock moves to the next Time-
   step window from the last submission.  The waiting time may not be
   exactly the length of Time-step depending on when the last OTP was
   generated.  For example, if the last OTP was generated at the half
   way in a Time-step window, the waiting time for the next OTP is half
   of length of Time-step.  In general, a larger Time-step window means
   larger waiting time for a user to get the next valid OTP after the
   last successfully OTP validation.  A too large window, for example 10
   minutes, most probably won't be suitable for typical internet login
   use cases; a user may not be able to get the next OTP within 10
   minutes and therefore re-login back to the same site in 10 minutes.
   The default Time-step size 30 seconds is recommended.


6.  Resynchronization

   Because of possible clock drifts between a client and a validation
   server, we RECOMMEND that the validator be set with a specific limit
   to the number of time steps a prover can be 'out of synch' before
   being not validated/rejected.

   This limit can be set both forward and backwards from the calculated
   time step on receipt of the OTP value.  If the time step is 30
   seconds as recommended, and the validator is set to only accept 2
   time step backwards then the maximum elapsed time drift would be
   around 89 seconds, i.e. 29 seconds in the calculated time step and 60
   for two backward time steps.

   This would mean the validator could perform a validation against the
   current time and then further two validations for each backward step



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   (for a total of 3 validations).  Upon successful validation, the
   validation server can record the detected clock drift for the token
   in terms of number of Time-step.  When a new OTP is received after
   this step, the validator can validate the OTP with current timestamp
   adjusted with recorded number of Time-step clock drifts for the
   token.

   Also, it is important to note that the longer a prover has not sent
   an OTP to a validation system, the longer (potentially) the
   accumulated clock drift between the prover and the verifier.  In such
   cases, the default synchronization may not be proper when the drift
   exceeds beyond allowed threshold.  Additional authentication measures
   SHOULD be used for the validation system to safely authenticate the
   prover.


7.  IANA Considerations

   The OTP algorithm defined in this document can be referred by a URI
   defined in a separate document.  There is no registration needed in
   this document.


8.  Acknowledgements

   The authors of this draft would like to thank the following people
   for their contributions and support to make this a better
   specification: Jonathan Tuliani, David Dix, Siddharth Bajaj, Stu
   Veath, Shuh Chang, Oanh Hoang, John Huang, and Siddhartha Mohapatra.


9.  References

9.1.  Normative references

   [RFC1750]  Eastlake, D., Crocker, S., and J. Schiller, "Randomness
              Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994,
              <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1750.txt>.

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997, <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt>.

   [RFC2119]  "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
              Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt>.

   [RFC4226]  M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and



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              O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password
              Algorithm", RFC 4226, December 2005,
              <http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4226.txt>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [CN]       Coron, J. and D. Naccache, "An accurate evaluation of
              Maurer's universal test", LNCS 1556, February 1999, <http:
              //www.gemplus.com/smart/rd/publications/pdf/CN99maur.pdf>.


Appendix A.  TOTP Algorithm: Reference Implementation


import java.lang.reflect.UndeclaredThrowableException;
import java.security.GeneralSecurityException;
import java.text.DateFormat;
import java.text.SimpleDateFormat;
import java.util.Calendar;
import java.util.Date;
import javax.crypto.Mac;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
import java.math.BigInteger;
import java.util.TimeZone;

/**
 * This an example implementation of the OATH TOTP algorithm.
 * Visit www.openauthentication.org for more information.
 *
 * @author Johan Rydell, PortWise
 */
public class TOTP {

    private TOTP() {}

    /**
     * This method uses the JCE to provide the crypto
     * algorithm.
     * HMAC computes a Hashed Message Authentication Code with the
     * crypto hash algorithm as a parameter.
     *
     * @param crypto     the crypto algorithm (HmacSHA1, HmacSHA256, HmacSHA512)
     * @param keyBytes   the bytes to use for the HMAC key
     * @param text       the message or text to be authenticated.
     */
    public static byte[] hmac_sha1(String crypto, byte[] keyBytes, byte[] text)
    {
        try {



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            Mac hmac;
            hmac = Mac.getInstance(crypto);
            SecretKeySpec macKey =
                new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "RAW");
            hmac.init(macKey);
            return hmac.doFinal(text);
        } catch (GeneralSecurityException gse) {
            throw new UndeclaredThrowableException(gse);
        }
    }


    private static final int[] DIGITS_POWER
    // 0 1  2   3    4     5      6       7        8
    = {1,10,100,1000,10000,100000,1000000,10000000,100000000 };

    /**
     * This method generates an TOTP value for the given
     * set of parameters.
     *
     * @param key          the shared secret, HEX encoded
     * @param time         a value that reflects a time
     * @param returnDigits number of return digits
     *
     * @return A numeric String in base 10 that includes
     * {@link truncationDigits} digits
     */
    static public String generateTOTP(String key,
            String time,
            String returnDigits)
    {
        int codeDigits = Integer.decode(returnDigits);
        String crypto = "HmacSHA1";
        String result = null;
        byte[] bArray;

        byte[] msg = new byte[8];
        // Put the bytes of "time" to the message
        // Input is the HEX value of "time"
        if(time.length() > 0){
            bArray = new BigInteger(time,16).toByteArray();
            if(bArray.length == 9){
                // First byte is the "sign" byte
                for (int i = 0; i < 8 && i < bArray.length ; i++) {
                    msg[i + 8 - bArray.length] = bArray[i+1];
                }
            }
            else {



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                for (int i = 0; i < 8 && i < bArray.length ; i++) {
                    msg[i + 8 - bArray.length] = bArray[i];
                }
            }
        }

        byte[] hash;
        bArray = new BigInteger(key,16).toByteArray();
        if(bArray[0] == 0){
            byte[] b = new byte[bArray.length - 1];
            for(int i = 0 ; i < b.length; i++)
                b[i]=bArray[i+1];
            hash = hmac_sha1(crypto, b, msg);
        }
        else{
            // compute hmac hash
            hash = hmac_sha1(crypto, bArray, msg);
        }

        // put selected bytes into result int
        int offset = hash[hash.length - 1] & 0xf;

        int binary =
            ((hash[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) | ((hash[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) |
            ((hash[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) | (hash[offset + 3] & 0xff);

        int otp = binary % DIGITS_POWER[codeDigits];

        result = Integer.toString(otp);
        while (result.length() < codeDigits) {
            result = "0" + result;
        }
        return result;
    }

    public static void main(String[] args) {

        String seed = "3132333435363738393031323334353637383930";
        String time = "0";

        Date myDate = Calendar.getInstance().getTime();
        BigInteger b = new BigInteger("0");
        DateFormat df = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss");
        df.setTimeZone(TimeZone.getTimeZone("UTC"));
        try {
            System.out.println("+------------+-----------------------+------------------+--------+");
            System.out.println("| Unix Time  |       UTC Time        |    Value of T    |  OTP   |");
            System.out.println("+------------+-----------------------+------------------+--------+");



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            myDate.setTime(Long.parseLong("1000000000000"));
            System.out.print("| " + myDate.getTime()/1000 + " |  " + df.format(myDate) +  "  |");

            b = new BigInteger("0" + myDate.getTime());
            b = b.divide(new BigInteger("30000"));
            time = b.toString(16).toUpperCase();
            while(time.length() < 16) time = "0" + time;
            System.out.print(" " + time + " | ");
            System.out.println(generateTOTP(seed, time, "6") + " |");

            System.out.println("+------------+-----------------------+------------------+--------+");

            myDate.setTime(Long.parseLong("1111111111000"));
            System.out.print("| " + myDate.getTime()/1000 + " |  " + df.format(myDate) +  "  |");

            b = new BigInteger("0" + myDate.getTime());
            b = b.divide(new BigInteger("30000"));
            time = b.toString(16).toUpperCase();
            while(time.length() < 16) time = "0" + time;
            System.out.print(" " + time + " | ");
            System.out.println(generateTOTP(seed, time, "6") + " |");

            System.out.println("+------------+-----------------------+------------------+--------+");

            myDate.setTime(Long.parseLong("1234567890000"));
            System.out.print("| " + myDate.getTime()/1000 + " |  " + df.format(myDate) +  "  |");

            b = new BigInteger("0" + myDate.getTime());
            b = b.divide(new BigInteger("30000"));
            time = b.toString(16).toUpperCase();
            while(time.length() < 16) time = "0" + time;
            System.out.print(" " + time + " | ");
            System.out.println(generateTOTP(seed, time, "6") + " |");

            System.out.println("+------------+-----------------------+------------------+--------+");

            myDate.setTime(Long.parseLong("2000000000000"));
            System.out.print("| " + myDate.getTime()/1000 + " |  " + df.format(myDate) +  "  |");

            b = new BigInteger("0" + myDate.getTime());
            b = b.divide(new BigInteger("30000"));
            time = b.toString(16).toUpperCase();
            while(time.length() < 16) time = "0" + time;
            System.out.print(" " + time + " | ");
            System.out.println(generateTOTP(seed, time, "6") + " |");

            System.out.println("+------------+-----------------------+------------------+--------+");




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        }catch (final Exception e){
            System.out.println("Error : " + e);
        }
    }
}


Appendix B.  Test Vectors

   This section provides test values that can be used for HOTP time-
   based variant algorithm interoperability test.

   The test token shared secret uses the ASCII string value
   "12345678901234567890".  With Time Step X = 30, and Unix epoch as
   initial value to count time steps where T0 = 0, the HOTP time based
   algorithm will display the following OTP values for corresponding
   timestamps.

     +------------+---------------------+------------------+--------+
     |  Unix Time |       UTC Time      |    Value of C    |   OTP  |
     +------------+---------------------+------------------+--------+
     | 1111111111 | 2005-03-18T01:58:31 | 00000000023523ED | 050471 |
     | 1234567890 | 2009-02-13T23:31:30 | 000000000273EF07 | 005924 |
     | 2000000000 | 2033-05-18T03:33:20 | 0000000003F940AA | 279037 |
     +------------+---------------------+------------------+--------+

                            Table 1: OTP Table


Authors' Addresses

   David M'Raihi
   Verisign, Inc.
   685 E. Middlefield Road
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   USA

   Email: dmraihi@verisign.com


   Salah Machani
   Diversinet Corp.
   2225 Sheppard Avenue East, Suite 1801
   Toronto, Ontario  M2J 5C2
   Canada

   Email: smachani@diversinet.com




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   Mingliang Pei
   Verisign, Inc.
   685 E. Middlefield Road
   Mountain View, CA  94043
   USA

   Email: mpei@verisign.com


   Johan Rydell
   Portwise, Inc.
   275 Hawthorne Ave, Suite 119
   Palo Alto, CA  94301
   USA

   Email: johan.rydell@portwise.com



































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