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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 07 08 09 10 11 12 RFC 2554

Network Working Group                                           J. Myers
Internet Draft: SMTP Authentication                      Carnegie Mellon
Document: draft-myers-smtp-auth-00.txt                        April 1995


                         SMTP Service Extension
                           for Authentication
Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet Draft.  Internet Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its Areas,
   and its Working Groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet Drafts.

   Internet Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months.  Internet Drafts may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by
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   ``working draft'' or ``work in progress``.

   To learn the current status of any Internet-Draft, please check the
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   Directories on ds.internic.net, nic.nordu.net, ftp.isi.edu, or
   munnari.oz.au.

   A revised version of this draft document will be submitted to the RFC
   editor as a Proposed Standard for the Internet Community.  Discussion
   and suggestions for improvement are requested.  This document will
   expire before 15 Oct 1995.  Distribution of this draft is unlimited.


1. Introduction

   This document defines an extension to the SMTP service whereby an
   SMTP client may indicate an authentication mechanism to the server,
   perform an authentication protocol exchange, and optionally negotiate
   a protection mechanism for subsequent protocol interactions.  The
   authentication and protection mechanisms used by the the SMTP AUTH
   extension are those used by the IMAP4 protocol.  A mechanism is also
   provided for a client to transfer envelope authentication of
   individual messages.










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2. The Authentication service extension


   (1) the name of the SMTP service extension is "Authentication"

   (2) the EHLO keyword value associated with this extension is "AUTH"

   (3) no parameter is used with the AUTH EHLO keyword

   (4) a new SMTP verb "AUTH" is defined

   (5) an optional parameter using the keyword "AUTH" is added to the
       MAIL FROM command.


3. The AUTH command

   AUTH mechanism

     Arguments:
         a string identifying an IMAP4 authentication mechanism, such as
         defined by [IMAP4-AUTH].  Any use of the string "imap" used in
         a server authentication identity in the definition of an
         authentication mechanism is replaced with the string "smtp".

     Restrictions:
         after an AUTH command has successfully completed, no more AUTH
         commands may be issued in the same session.  After a successful
         AUTH command completes, a server MUST reject any further AUTH
         commands with a 503 reply.

     Discussion:
         The AUTH command indicates an authentication mechanism to the
         server.  If the server supports the requested authentication
         mechanism, it performs an authentication protocol exchange to
         authenticate and identify the user.  Optionally, it also
         negotiates a protection mechanism for subsequent protocol
         interactions.  If the requested authentication mechanism is not
         supported, the server should reject the AUTH command with a 504
         reply.

         The authentication protocol exchange consists of a series of
         server challenges and client answers that are specific to the
         authentication mechanism.  A server challenge, otherwise known
         as a ready response, is a 334 reply with the text part
         containing a BASE64 encoded string.  The client answer consists
         of a line containing a BASE64 encoded string.  If the client
         wishes to cancel an authentication exchange, it should issue a



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         line with a single "*".  If the server receives such an answer,
         it must reject the AUTH command by sending a 501 reply.

         If the server cannot BASE64 decode the argument, it should
         reject the AUTH command with a 501 reply.  If the server
         rejects the authentication data, it should reject the AUTH
         command with a 535 reply.  Should the client successfully
         complete the authentication exchange, the SMTP server issues a
         235 reply.

         A protection mechanism provides integrity and privacy
         protection to the protocol session.  If a protection mechanism
         is negotiated, it is applied to all subsequent data sent over
         the connection.  The protection mechanism takes effect
         immediately following the CRLF that concludes the
         authentication exchange for the client, and the CRLF of the
         success reply for the server.  Once the protection mechanism is
         in effect, the stream of command and response octets is
         processed into buffers of ciphertext.  Each buffer is
         transferred over the connection as a stream of octets prepended
         with a four octet field in network byte order that represents
         the length of the following data.  The maximum ciphertext
         buffer length is defined by the protection mechanism.

         The server is not required to support any particular
         authentication mechanism, nor are authentication mechanisms
         required to support any protection mechanisms.  If an AUTH
         command fails, the client may try another authentication
         mechanism by issuing another AUTH command.  In other words, the
         client may request authentication types in decreasing order of
         preference.

         The BASE64 string may in general be arbitrarily long.  Clients
         and servers must be able to support challenges and responses
         that are as long as are generated by the authentication
         mechanisms they support, independent of any line length
         limitations the client or server may have in other parts of its
         protocol implementation.













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     Examples:
         S: 220 smtp.andrew.cmu.edu ESMTP server ready
         C: EHLO jgm.pc.cc.cmu.edu
         S: 250-smtp.andrew.cmu.edu
         S: 250 AUTH
         C: AUTH FOOBAR
         S: 504 Unrecognized authentication type
         C: AUTH SKEY
         S: 334
         C: c21pdGg=
         S: 334 OTUgUWE1ODMwOA==
         C: BsAY3g4gBNo=
         S: 235 S/Key authentication successful



3. The AUTH parameter to the MAIL FROM command

   AUTH=addr-spec

         Arguments:
             an addr-spec containing the identity which submitted the
             message to the delivery system.  [[length limit?  the 64@64
             limit of 821 seems a bit small]]

         Discussion:
             The optional AUTH parameter to the MAIL FROM command allows
             cooperating agents in a trusted environment to communicate
             the authentication of individual messages.

             If the server trusts the authenticated identity of the
             client to assert that the message was originally submitted
             by the supplied addr-spec, then the server SHOULD supply
             the same addr-spec in an AUTH parameter when relaying the
             message to any server which supports the AUTH extension.

             If the server does not sufficiently trust the authenticated
             identity of the client, or if the client is not
             authenticated, then the server MUST behave as if no AUTH
             parameter was supplied.  The server MAY, however, place the
             value of the AUTH parameter in a comment in the inserted
             Received: header and/or write it to a log file.

             A server MAY treat expansion of a mailing list as a new
             submission, setting the AUTH parameter to the mailing list
             address or mailing list administration address when
             relaying the message to list subscribers.




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             [[encoding spaces or equal signs in the addr-spec?]]


















































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5. Formal Syntax

   The following syntax specification uses the augmented Backus-Naur
   Form (BNF) notation as specified in RFC 822.

   Except as noted otherwise, all alphabetic characters are case-
   insensitive.  The use of upper or lower case characters to define
   token strings is for editorial clarity only.  Implementations MUST
   accept these strings in a case-insensitive fashion.

   ATOM_CHAR       ::= <any CHAR except atom_specials>

   atom_specials   ::= "(" / ")" / "{" / SPACE / CTLs / "%" / "*" /
                       <"> / "\"

   auth_command    ::= "AUTH" SPACE auth_type *(CRLF base64) CRLF

   auth_param      ::= "AUTH=" addr-spec
                       ;; addr-spec may not contain SPACE, "="
                       ;; or CTL characters.

   auth_type       ::= 1*ATOM_CHAR

   base64          ::= *(4base64_CHAR) [base64_terminal]

   base64_char     ::= "A" / "B" / "C" / "D" / "E" / "F" / "G" / "H" /
                       "I" / "J" / "K" / "L" / "M" / "N" / "O" / "P" /
                       "Q" / "R" / "S" / "T" / "U" / "V" / "W" / "X" /
                       "Y" / "Z" /
                       "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f" / "g" / "h" /
                       "i" / "j" / "k" / "l" / "m" / "n" / "o" / "p" /
                       "q" / "r" / "s" / "t" / "u" / "v" / "w" / "x" /
                       "y" / "z" /
                       "0" / "1" / "2" / "3" / "4" / "5" / "6" / "7" /
                       "8" / "9" / "+" / "/"
                       ;; Case-sensitive

   base64_terminal ::= (2base64_char "==") / (3base64_char "=")

   CHAR            ::= <any 7-bit US-ASCII character except NUL,
                        0x01 - 0x7f>

   continue_req    ::= "334" SPACE base64 CRLF

   CR              ::= <ASCII CR, carriage return, 0x0C>

   CRLF            ::= CR LF




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   CTL             ::= <any ASCII control character and DEL,
                        0x00 - 0x1f, 0x7f>

   LF              ::= <ASCII LF, line feed, 0x0A>

   SPACE           ::= <ASCII SP, space, 0x20>



4. References

   [IMAP4-AUTH]  Myers, J., "IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms", RFC 1731,
   Carnegie Mellon, December 1994.



5. Security Considerations

   Security issues are discussed throughout this memo.

   If a client uses this extension to get an encrypted tunnel through an
   insecure network to a cooperating server, it needs to be configured
   to never send mail to that server when the connection is not mutually
   authenticated and encrypted.  Otherwise, an attacker could steal the
   client's mail by hijacking the SMTP connection and either pretending
   the server does not support the Authentication extension or causing
   all AUTH commands to fail.

   This extension does not provide a defined mechanism for
   authentication using a plaintext password.  This omission is
   intentional.

   This extension is not intended to replace or be used instead of end-
   to-end message signature and encryption systems such as PEM or PGP.
   This extension addresses a different problem than end-to-end systems;
   it has the following key differences:

   (1) it is generally useful only within a trusted enclave

   (2) it protects the entire envelope of a message, not just the
       message's body.

   (3) it authenticates the message submission, not authorship of the
       message content

   (4) it can give the sender some assurance the message was delivered
       to the next hop




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6. Author's Address:

   John G. Myers
   Carnegie-Mellon University
   5000 Forbes Ave
   Pittsburgh, PA 15213

   EMail: jgm+@cmu.edu











































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