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Versions: 00 01 02 03 draft-ietf-v6ops-tunnel-loops

Network Working Group                                         G. Nakibly
Internet-Draft                                    National EW Research &
Intended status: Informational                         Simulation Center
Expires: November 13, 2010                                    F. Templin
                                            Boeing Research & Technology
                                                            May 12, 2010


Routing Loop Attack using IPv6 Automatic Tunnels: Problem Statement and
                          Proposed Mitigations
                draft-nakibly-v6ops-tunnel-loops-02.txt

Abstract

   This document is concerned with security vulnerabilities in IPv6-in-
   IPv4 automatic tunnels.  These vulnerabilities allow an attacker to
   take advantage of inconsistencies between a tunnel's overlay IPv6
   routing state and the native IPv6 routing state.  The attack forms a
   routing loop which can be abused as a vehicle for traffic
   amplification to facilitate DoS attacks.  The first aim of this
   document is to inform on this attack and its root causes.  The second
   aim is to present some possible mitigation measures.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
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   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 13, 2010.

Copyright Notice




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   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  A Detailed Description of the Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Proposed Mitigation Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Destination and Source Address Checks  . . . . . . . . . .  5
       3.1.1.  Known IPv6 Prefix Check  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     3.2.  Verification of end point existence  . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.2.1.  Neighbor Cache Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       3.2.2.  Known IPv4 Address Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       3.2.3.  Neighbor Reachability Check  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.3.  Architectural Modifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       3.3.1.  IPv4 Protocol Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

















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1.  Introduction

   IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels are an essential part of many migration plans
   for IPv6.  They allow two IPv6 nodes to communicate over an IPv4-only
   network.  Automatic tunnels form a category of tunnels in which a
   packet's egress node's IPv4 address is derived from the destination
   IPv6 address of the packet.  Recent research [USENIX09] has pointed
   out the existence of a vulnerability in the design of IPv6 automatic
   tunnels.  All tunnel end points operate on the implicit assumption
   that once a packet arrives at the tunnel, its destination is indeed
   part of the tunnel.  This assumption poses a security vulnerability
   since it may result in an inconsistency between a tunnel's overlay
   IPv6 routing state and the native IPv6 routing state there by
   allowing a routing loop to be formed.

   An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by crafting a packet which
   is routed over a tunnel to a node that is not participating in that
   tunnel.  This node may forward the packet out of the tunnel to the
   native IPv6 network.  There the packet is routed back to the ingress
   point that forwards it back into the tunnel.  Consequently, the
   packet loops in and out of the tunnel.  The loop terminates only when
   the Hop Limit field in the IPv6 header of the packet is zeroed out.

   Unless proper security measures are in place all IPv6 automatic
   tunnels that are based on protocol-41 encapsulation are vulnerable to
   such an attack, in particular, ISATAP [RFC5214], 6to4 [RFC3056] and
   6rd [RFC5569].  The aim of this document is to shed light on the
   routing loop attack and present some possible mitigation measures
   that should be considered by operators of current IPv6 automatic
   tunnels and by designers of future ones.


2.  A Detailed Description of the Attack

   In this section we shall denote an IPv6 address of a tunnel's node by
   the prefix of the tunnel and the IPv4 address of the node, i.e.,
   Addr(Prefix, IPv4).  Note that the IPv4 address may or may not be
   part of the prefix (depending on the specification of the tunnel's
   protocol).  The IPv6 address may be dependent on additional bits in
   the interface ID, however for our discussion their exact value is not
   important.

   The two victims of this attack are routers - R1 and R2 - of two
   different tunnels - T1 and T2.  Both routers have the capability to
   forward IPv6 packets in and out of their respective tunnels.  The two
   tunnels need not be based on the same tunnel protocol.  The only
   condition is that the two tunnel protocols be based on protocol-41
   encapsulation.  The IPv4 address of R1 is IP1, while the prefix of



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   its tunnel is Prf1.  IP2 and Prf2 are the respective values for R2.
   We assume that IP1 and IP2 belong to the same address realm, i.e.,
   they are either both public or both private and belong to the same
   internal network.

   The attack is depicted in Figure 1.  It is initiated by sending an
   IPv6 packet (packet 0 in Figure 1) destined to an end point in T2
   having IP1 as its IPv4 address, i.e., Addr(Prf2, IP1).  The source
   address of the packet is a T1 address with Prf1 as the prefix and IP2
   as the embedded IPv4 address, i.e., Addr(Prf1, IP2).  As the prefix
   of the destination address is Prf2, the packet will be routed over
   the IPv6 network to T2.

   We assume that R2 is the packet's entry point to T2.  R2 receives the
   packet through its IPv6 interface and forwards it over its T2
   interface encapsulated with an IPv4 header having a destination
   address derived from the IPv6 destination, i.e., IP1.  The source
   address is the address of R2, i.e., IP2.  The packet (packet 1 in
   Figure 1.) is routed over the IPv4 network to R1, which receives the
   packet on its IPv4 interface.  It processes the packet as a packet
   that originates from one of the end nodes of T1.

   Since the IPv4 source address corresponds to the IPv6 source address,
   R1 will decapsulate the packet.  Since the packet's IPv6 destination
   is outside of T1, R1 will forward the packet onto a native IPv6
   interface.  The forwarded packet (packet 2 in Figure 1) is identical
   to the original attack packet.  Hence, it is routed back to R2, in
   which the loop starts again.

   R1               R2
   |                |   0
   |        1       |<------
   |<===============|
   |        2       |
   |--------------->|
   |        .       |
   |        .       |

   1  - IPv4: IP2 --> IP1
        IPv6: Addr(Prf1,IP2) --> Addr(Prf2,IP1)
   0,2- IPv6: Addr(Prf1,IP2) --> Addr(Prf2,IP1)

   Legend: ====> - tunneled IPv6, ---> - native IPv6

        Figure 1: Routing loop attack between two tunnels' routers

   The crux of the attack is as follows.  The attacker exploits the fact
   that R2 does not know that R1 does not take part of T2 and that R1



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   does not know that R2 does not take part of T1.  Hence, the packet is
   repeatedly forwarded by both routers.

   The loop will stop when the Hop Limit field of the packet reaches
   zero.  After a single loop the Hop Limit field is decreased by the
   number of IPv6 routers on path from R1 and R2.  Therefore, the number
   of loops is inversely proportional to the number of IPv6 hops between
   R1 and R2.

   The tunnel pair T1 and T2 may be any combination of automatic tunnel
   types, e.g., ISATAP, 6to4 and 6rd.  This has the exception that both
   tunnels can not be of type 6to4, since two 6to4 routers can not
   belong to different tunnels (there is only one 6to4 tunnel in the
   Internet).  For example, if the attack were to be launched on an
   ISATAP router (R1) and 6to4 relay (R2), then the destination and
   source addresses of the attack packet would be 2002:IP1:* and Prf1::
   0200:5EFE:IP2, respectively.


3.  Proposed Mitigation Measures

   This section presents some possible mitigation measures for the
   attack described above.  For each measure we shall discuss its
   advantages and disadvantages.

   The proposed measures fall under the following three categories:

   o  Destination and source addresses checks

   o  Verification of end point existence

   o  Architectural modifications

3.1.  Destination and Source Address Checks

   Tunnel routers can use a source address check mitigation when they
   forward an IPv6 packet into a tunnel interface with an IPv6 source
   address that embeds one of the router's configured IPv4 addresses.
   Similarly, tunnel routers can use destination address check
   mitigation when they receive an IPv6 packet on a tunnel interface
   with an IPv6 destination address that embeds one of the router's
   configured IPv4 addresses.  These checks should correspond to both
   tunnels' IPv6 address formats, regardless of the type of tunnel the
   router employs.

   For example, if tunnel router R1 (of any tunnel protocol) forwards a
   packet into a tunnel interface with an IPv6 source address that
   matches the 6to4 prefix 2002:IP1::/48, the router discards the packet



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   if IP1 is one of its own IPv4 addresses.  In a second example, if
   tunnel router R2 receives an IPv6 packet on a tunnel interface with
   an IPv6 destination address with an off-link prefix but with an
   interface identifier that matches the ISATAP address suffix ::0200:
   5EFE:IP2, the router discards the packet if IP2 is one of its own
   IPv4 addresses.

   Hence a tunnel router can avoid the attack by performing the
   following simple checks:

   o  When the router forwards an IPv6 packet into a tunnel interface,
      it discards the packet if the IPv6 source address has an off-link
      prefix but embeds one of the router's configured IPv4 addresses.

   o  When the router receives an IPv6 packet on a tunnel interface, it
      discards the packet if the IPv6 destination address has an off-
      link prefix but embeds one of the router's configured IPv4
      addresses.

   This approach has the advantage that it is easy to implement and that
   no ancillary state is required, since checking is through static
   lookup in the lists of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses belonging to the
   router.  However, this approach has some inherit limitations:

   o  The checks incur an overhead which is proportional to the number
      of IPv4 addresses assigned to the router.  If a router is assigned
      many addresses, the additional processing overhead for each packet
      may be unacceptable.

   o  The checks should be performed for the IPv6 address formats of
      every existing automatic IPv6 tunnel protocol (which uses
      protocol-41 encapsulation).  Hence, the checks must be updated as
      new protocols are defined.

   o  Before the checks can be performed the format of the address must
      be recognized.  There is no guarantee that this can be generally
      done.  For example, one can not determine if an IPv6 address is a
      6rd one.

   o  The checks cannot be performed if the embedded IPv4 address is a
      private one [RFC1918] since it is ambiguous in scope.  Namely, the
      private address may be legitimately allocated to another node in
      another routing region.

   The last limitation may be relieved if the router has some
   information that allows it to unambiguously determine the scope of
   the address.  The check in the following subsection is one example
   for this.



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3.1.1.  Known IPv6 Prefix Check

   A router may be configured with the full list of IPv6 subnet prefixes
   assigned to the tunnels attached to its current IPv4 routing region.
   In such a case it can use the list to determine when static
   destination and source address checks are possible.  By keeping track
   of the list of IPv6 prefixes assigned to the tunnels in the IPv4
   routing region, a router can perform the following checks on an
   address which embeds a private IPv4 address:

   o  When the router forwards an IPv6 packet into its tunnel with a
      source address that embeds a private IPv4 address and matches an
      IPv6 prefix in the prefix list, it determines whether the packet
      should be discarded or forwarded by performing the source address
      check specified in Section 3.1.  Otherwise, the router forwards
      the packet.

   o  When the router receives an IPv6 packet on its tunnel interface
      with a destination address that embeds a private IPv4 address and
      matches an IPv6 prefix in the prefix list, it determines whether
      the packet should be discarded or accepted by performing the
      destination address check specified in Section 3.1.  Otherwise,
      the router accepts the packet.

   The disadvantage of this approach is the administrative overhead for
   maintaining the list of IPv6 subnet prefixes associated with an IPv4
   routing region may become unwieldy should that list be long and/or
   frequently updated.

3.2.  Verification of end point existence

   The routing loop attack relies on the fact that a router does not
   know whether there is an end point in its tunnel having the source or
   destination address of the packet.  This category includes mitigation
   measures which aim to verify that there is a node which participate
   in the tunnel and its address corresponds to the packet's destination
   or source addresses, as appropriate.

3.2.1.  Neighbor Cache Check

   One way to verify that an end point exists in a tunnel is by checking
   whether a valid entry exists for it in the Neighbor Cache of the
   corresponding tunnel interface.  A valid entry may exist in the
   Neighbor Cache for legitimate end hosts if they generate traffic
   towards the router upon startup.  For example, an initial RS/RA
   exchange to facilitate Stateless Address Auto configuration (as in
   the ISATAP case).  This allows the router to keep valid Neighbor
   Cache entry for each legitimate end host in the tunnel.



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   By keeping track of the legitimate hosts in the tunnel via the
   Neighbor Cache, a router can perform the following simple checks:

   o  When the router forwards a packet into the tunnel with an IPv6
      destination address that matches an on-link prefix and that embeds
      the IPv4 address IP1, it discards the packet if there is no
      corresponding neighbor cache entry.

   o  When the router receives a packet on the tunnel's interface with
      an IPv6 source address that matches an on-link prefix and embeds
      the IPv4 address IP2, it discards the packet if there is no
      corresponding neighbor cache entry.

   This approach is easy to implement, and naturally leverages the fact
   that an end host must successively send RSs in order to refresh
   configuration information as on-link prefix information.  However,
   this requires the router to retain entries for a duration that is at
   least as long as the router's advertised prefix lifetimes.  This may
   require an implementation to adjust its garbage-collection interval
   for stale neighbor cache entries.

   Finally, this approach assumes that the neighbor cache will remain
   coherent and not subject to malicious attack, which must be confirmed
   based on specific deployment scenarios.  One possible way for an
   attacker to subvert the neighbor cache is to send false RS messages
   with a spoofed source address.

3.2.2.  Known IPv4 Address Check

   Another approach that enables a router to verify that an end host
   indeed exists in the tunnel is simply by pre-configuring the router
   with the set of IPv4 addresses that are authorized to use the
   tunnel's subnet.  Upon this configuration the router can perform the
   following simple checks:

   o  When the router forwards an IPv6 packet into the tunnel interface
      with a destination address that matches an on-link prefix and that
      embeds the IPv4 address IP1, it discards the packet if IP1 does
      not belong to the configured list of IPv4 addresses.

   o  When the router receives an IPv6 packet on the tunnel's interface
      with a source address that matches a on-link prefix and that
      embeds the IPv4 address IP2, it discards the packet if IP2 does
      not belong to the configured list of IPv4 addresses.







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3.2.3.  Neighbor Reachability Check

   Yet another approach that allows a router to verify the existence of
   an end host in the tunnel is by performing an initial reachability
   confirmation, e.g., as specified in the second paragraph of Section
   8.4 of [RFC5214].  This procedure parallels the address resolution
   specifications in Section 7.2 of [RFC4861], i.e., the router
   maintains a small queue of packets waiting for reachability
   confirmation to complete.  If confirmation succeeds, the router
   discovers that a legitimate neighbor responds to the address and
   packets may be forwarded to it.  Otherwise, the router returns ICMP
   destination unreachable indications as specified in Section 7.2.2 of
   [RFC4861].

3.3.  Architectural Modifications

   This category includes a measure that change the architecture of the
   tunnel protocol specifications.

3.3.1.  IPv4 Protocol Values

   The routing loop attack leverages the fact that a router can not
   determine whether a given packet originated from an end node in its
   own type of tunnel.  If the router was able to determine that a
   packet originated from an end node which employs a tunnel of
   different type than the router's, the router would discard the
   packet.  This approach proposes doing this by changing the semantics
   of the IPv4 Protocol field to denote the type of tunnel protocol and
   not just identify the IPv6 layer.  Namely, the field will carry
   different values for different automatic tunnel types.  Using this
   approach a router can drop packets in which the IPv4 Protocol field
   does not correspond to its own tunnel type.

   This approach can eliminate routing loops between two routers that
   employ different types of tunneling protocols.  However, it does not
   mitigate the attack when they are both of the same type.


4.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA considerations.


5.  Security Considerations

   This document aims at presenting possible solutions to the routing
   loop attack which involves automatic tunnels' routers.  It contains
   various checks that aim to recognize and drop specific packets that



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   have strong potential to cause a routing loop.  These checks do not
   introduce new security threats.


6.  Acknowledgments

   This work has benefited from discussions on the V6OPS, 6MAN and
   SECDIR mailing lists.  Remi Despres, Christian Huitema and Dmitry
   Anipko are acknowledged for their contributions.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
              E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC3056]  Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
              via IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              September 2007.

   [RFC5214]  Templin, F., Gleeson, T., and D. Thaler, "Intra-Site
              Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP)", RFC 5214,
              March 2008.

   [RFC5569]  Despres, R., "IPv6 Rapid Deployment on IPv4
              Infrastructures (6rd)", RFC 5569, January 2010.

7.2.  Informative References

   [USENIX09]
              Nakibly, G. and M. Arov, "Routing Loop Attacks using IPv6
              Tunnels", USENIX WOOT, August 2009.













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Authors' Addresses

   Gabi Nakibly
   National EW Research & Simulation Center
   P.O. Box 2250 (630)
   Haifa  31021
   Israel

   Email: gnakibly@yahoo.com


   Fred L. Templin
   Boeing Research & Technology
   P.O. Box 3707 MC 7L-49
   Seattle, WA  98124
   USA

   Email: fltemplin@acm.org

































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