[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

Network Working Group                                        P. Nikander
Internet-Draft                                                  J. Melen
Expires: February 6, 2009                  Ericsson Research Nomadic Lab
                                                          August 5, 2008


             A Bound End-to-End Tunnel (BEET) mode for ESP
                    draft-nikander-esp-beet-mode-09

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 6, 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).














Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009                [Page 1]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


Abstract

   This document specifies a new mode, called Bound End-to-End Tunnel
   (BEET) mode, for IPsec ESP.  The new mode augments the existing ESP
   tunnel and transport modes.  For end-to-end tunnels, the new mode
   provides limited tunnel mode semantics without the regular tunnel
   mode overhead.  The mode is intended to support new uses of ESP,
   including mobility and multi-address multi-homing.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Conventions used in this document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.1.  Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Use scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1.  NAT traversal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.2.  Mobile IP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       4.2.1.  Mobile IPv4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       4.2.2.  Mobile IPv4 route optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.2.3.  Mobile IPv6  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     4.3.  End-node multi-address multi-homing  . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     4.4.  Host Identity Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   5.  Protocol definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.1.  Changes to Security Association data structures  . . . . . 13
     5.2.  Packet format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.3.  Cryptographic processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     5.4.  IP header processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     5.5.  Handling of outgoing packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.6.  Handling of incoming packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     5.7.  IPv4 options handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   6.  Policy considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   7.  PF_KEY extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   8.  New requirements on Key Management protocols . . . . . . . . . 21
   9.  Implementing the functionality with other means  . . . . . . . 22
   10. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   11. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   12. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     13.1. Normative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     13.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   Appendix A.  Implementation experiences  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   Appendix B.  Garden beets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 32




Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009                [Page 2]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


1.  Introduction

   The current IPsec ESP specification [5] defines two modes of
   operation: tunnel mode and transport mode.  The tunnel mode is mainly
   intended for non-end-to-end use where one or both of the ends of the
   ESP Security Associations (SAs) are located in security gateways,
   separate from the actual end-nodes.  The transport mode is intended
   for end-to-end use, where both ends of the security association are
   terminated at the end-nodes themselves.

   This document defines a new mode for ESP, called Bound End-to-End
   Tunnel (BEET) mode.  The purpose of the mode is to provide limited
   tunnel mode semantics without the overhead associated with the
   regular tunnel mode.  As the name states, the BEET mode is intended
   solely for end-to-end use.  It provides tunnel mode semantics in the
   sense that the IP addresses seen by the applications and the IP
   addresses used on the wire are distinct from each other, providing
   the illusion that the application level IP addresses are tunneled
   over the network level IP addresses.  However, the mode does not
   support full tunnel semantics.  More specifically, the IP addresses
   as seen by the application are strictly bound, and only one pair of
   bound inner addresses can be used on any given BEET mode Security
   Association.  This is in contrast to the regular tunnel mode, where
   the inner IP addresses can be any addresses from a defined range.

   A BEET mode Security Associations records two pairs of IP addresses,
   called inner addresses and outer addresses.  The inner addresses are
   what the applications see.  The outer addresses are what appear on
   the wire.  Since the inner addresses are fixed for the lifetime of
   the Security Association, they need not to be sent in individual
   packets.  Instead, they are set up as the Security Associations are
   created, they are verified when packets are sent, and they are
   restored as packets are received.

   This all gives the BEET mode the efficiency of transport mode with a
   limited set of end-to-end tunnel semantics.  The efficiency is
   accomplished by removing the inner IP header from the packet that is
   transported on the wire.  Due to removal of inner IP header, the TTL
   of tunneled packet is reduced by every router on the path as the TTL
   value is copied from inner to outer header by the sender and vice
   versa by the receiver.  The semantics of BEET mode is limited in the
   sense that only one fixed pair of inner addresses are allowed.  The
   outer addresses may change over the life time of the SA, but the
   inner addresses cannot.  If a new pair of inner addresses is needed,
   a new pair of BEET mode Security Associations must be established, or
   the regular tunnel mode must be used.  However, in the cases
   considered, a single pair of security associations is usually
   sufficient between any single pair of nodes.



Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009                [Page 3]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


2.  Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [2].

   This document contains both normative and informative sections.  The
   normative sections define the BEET mode.  The informative sections
   provide background information that aim to motivate the need for the
   new mode.  Whenever it may not be clear from the context whether a
   given major section is normative or informative, it is defined in the
   beginning of the section.

2.1.  Terminology

   In this section we define the terms specific to this document.  This
   section is normative.

   Inner IP address
      An IP address as seen by applications, stored in TCB or other
      upper layer data structures, and processed by the IP stack prior
      to ESP processing in the output side and after ESP processing in
      the input side.


   Outer IP address
      An IP address seen in the wire and processed by the IP stack after
      ESP processing in the output side and before ESP processing in the
      input side.


   Inner IP header
      An IP header that contains inner IP addresses.  In some cases an
      inner IP header may be represented as an internal data structure
      containing the data equivalent to an IP header.


   Outer IP header
      An IP header that contains outer IP addresses.  In some cases an
      outer IP header may be represented as an internal data structure
      containing the data equivalent to an IP header.










Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009                [Page 4]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


3.  Background

   For a number of years people have been talking about using IPsec for
   other purposes than VPN.  In fact, the current specifications do
   provide support for end-to-end protection of data.  However, that
   mode is rarely used, for a number of reasons [6], [7].  One of the
   reasons, though, seems to be address agility.  That is, due to NAT,
   mobility, multi-address multi-homing, etc., the addresses that are
   used actually on the wire do not necessarily match with the addresses
   that the applications expect to see.  In the NAT case the addresses
   are changed on the fly, thereby invalidating any transport mode
   checksums (unless, of course, a tunnel is used).  Mobile nodes change
   their addresses periodically, and the existing applications rarely
   survive the address changes without some help, e.g., Mobile IP.
   Multi-addressing based multi-homed nodes would prefer to keep their
   connections active even when the primary (or currently used) IP
   address becomes unusable in the face of an network outage.

   Based on the reasons above, there is clearly a need for a mode of
   communication where the addresses that the applications see are
   distinct from the addresses that are actually used in the wire.  The
   current IPsec tunnel mode provides the required functionality, but at
   the cost of additional overhead in terms of larger packets and more
   complicated processing.

3.1.  Related work

   The basic idea captured by this draft has been floating around for a
   long time.  Steven Bellovin's HostNAT talk [8] at the Los Angeles
   IETF is an early example.  After that, basically the same idea has
   surfaced several times.  Perhaps the most concrete current proposal
   is the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [11], where BEET mode ESP
   processing is an integral part of the overall protocol.


















Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009                [Page 5]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


4.  Use scenarios

   In this section we describe a number of possible use scenarios.  None
   of these use scenarios are meant to be complete specifications on how
   exactly to support the functionality.  Separate specifications are
   needed for that.  Instead, the purpose of this section is to discuss
   the overall benefits of the BEET mode, and to lay out a road map for
   possible future documents.  This section is informative.

4.1.  NAT traversal

   NAT traversal is currently a major problem in IPsec.  It is not
   sufficient to encapsulate the packets into UDP; additionally, tunnel
   mode must be used.  Tunnel mode is required since the outer IP
   addresses at the ends of the protected connection differ.  If
   transport mode was used, the differing IP addresses would lead to
   failing upper layer TCP/UDP checksums.

   The BEET mode provides sufficient tunnel mode semantics without the
   packet overhead of the tunnel mode.  A pair of BEET mode SAs can be
   effectively used to "un-NAT" packets that have been NATed during
   their travel through the network.  Figure 1 illustrates the process.

                         Packet contents on a client -> server packet
  +--------+
  | Client |             src = 131.160.175.2 dst = 129.15.6.1 clear text
  +--------+          ^
      | 10.0.0.1      |
      |               |  src = 10.0.0.1      dst = 129.15.6.1 ESP
      |               |
   +-----+            |
   | NAT |           SAs
   +-----+            |
      | 131.160.175.2 |
      |               |  src = 131.160.175.2 dst = 129.15.6.1 ESP
      | 129.15.5.1    |
  +--------+          v
  | Server |             src = 131.160.175.2 dst = 129.15.6.1 clear text
  +--------+ address from unicast SA lookup

                                 Figure 1

   A drawback in this scheme is that the Client must either know its
   public IP address, or it must rely on the Server to tell what address
   to use.  It must be noticed that if the NAT box is mapping several
   internal IP addresses into a single public address, the public
   address cannot be directly used.  In that case the client and server
   need to agree on a unique address, to be used to internally represent



Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009                [Page 6]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


   the client.  It must be pointed out that such an address is
   semantically very similar to a Mobile IP home address.  The details
   of such address agreement are beyond the scope of this document.

4.2.  Mobile IP

   In Mobile IP, the BEET mode could be used instead of the currently
   defined wire formats.  If the hosts would be using end-to-end ESP
   anyway, this has the benefit of saving the space that would otherwise
   be taken by the standard Mobile IP wire formats.  Furthermore, in
   BEET the inner IP header does not actually appear in the wire format.
   Effectively, this makes BEET as space efficient for mobile nodes as
   the standard ESP transport mode is today between fixed hosts.

   Instead of having a separate Binding Cache, the nodes could include
   the address translation information into a pair of BEET mode security
   associations.

4.2.1.  Mobile IPv4

   In the current Mobile IPv4, two different wire formats are used,
   depending on whether there is a NAT device between the communicating
   hosts or not.  See Figure 2, below.


   Mobile IPv4 wire format without NAT traversal

     IP(CoA->HA) | IP(HoA->CN) | payload

   Mobile IPv4 wire format with NAT traversal

     IP(CoA->HA) | UDP(any->434) | MIP header | IP(HoA->CN) | payload

   (where the MIP header is a minimal 4 octet header)

        [Figure courtesy to Sami Vaarala.]

                                 Figure 2

   It is required that the inner address representing the mobile node,
   as seen by the application, is always the home address.  That is,
   from the application point of view, the packets flow between the home
   address and the correspondent node address.

   If IPsec is used to protect the traffic between the Mobile Node and
   the Correspondent node, ESP transport mode can be used.  However, the
   transport mode ESP packet is enclosed into an IP-over-IP wrapper at
   the home agent, see Figure 3.



Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009                [Page 7]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


   Current Mobile IPv4 wire format with end-to-end ESP transport mode:

     CN -> HA:               IP(CN->HoA) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
     HA -> MN: IP(HA->CoA) | IP(CN->HoA) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer

     MN -> HA: IP(CoA->HA) | IP(HoA->CN) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
     HA -> CN:               IP(HoA->CN) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer

   Proposed Mobile IPv4 wire format with ESP BEET mode:

     CN -> HA:               IP(CN->HoA) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
     HA -> MN: IP(HA->CoA)               | ESP | payload | ESP trailer

     MN -> HA: IP(CoA->HA)               | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
     HA -> CN:               IP(HoA->CN) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer


                                 Figure 3

   In this scenario, the correspondent node does not need to be aware
   that the security association is in fact using the BEET mode.  If the
   home agent and the mobile node co-operate, and the mobile node
   implements the BEET semantics, the change could be implemented
   transparently to the correspondent node.

   The SPI towards the MN MUST be selected so that the HA can
   differentiate MNs from each other if they are communicating towards
   the same CN.  As the SA is anyway end-to-end the HA MAY check during
   the key exchange that the selected SPI will not collide with other
   MNs.

   As multiple CNs may choose same SPI for receiving data from HA, the
   HA must implement SPINAT [9] towards MN.  Thus, the SPI used to
   receive packets from MN at HA would uniquely identify the real
   destination CN.  The SPI must be negotiated per CN basis but as it is
   assumed that there would be a end-to-end SA anyway the amount of
   signaling doesn't need to be increased

   It should be noticed that the space savings are even larger in the
   NAT traversal situation, as is illustrated in Figure Figure 4, below.











Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009                [Page 8]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


Current Mobile IPv4 NAT-traversal wire format with end-to-end transport ESP:


  CN -> HA:                           IP(CN->HoA) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
  HA -> MN: IP(HA->CoA) | UDP | MIP | IP(CN->HoA) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer

  MN -> HA: IP(CoA->HA) | UDP | MIP | IP(HoA->CN) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
  HA -> CN:                           IP(HoA->CN) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer

Proposed Mobile IPv4 NAT-traversal wire format with BEET ESP:

  CN -> HA: IP(CN->HoA)       | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
  HA -> MN: IP(HA->CoA) | UDP | ESP | payload | ESP trailer

  MN -> HA: IP(CoA->HA) | UDP | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
  HA -> CN: IP(HoA->CN)       | ESP | payload | ESP trailer




Current Mobile IPv4 NAT-traversal wire format with end-to-end transport ESP:


  CN -> HA:                           IP(CN->HoA) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
  HA -> MN: IP(HA->CoA) | UDP | MIP | IP(CN->HoA) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer

  MN -> HA: IP(CoA->HA) | UDP | MIP | IP(HoA->CN) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
  HA -> CN:                           IP(HoA->CN) | ESP | payload | ESP trailer

Proposed Mobile IPv4 NAT-traversal wire format with BEET ESP:

  CN -> HA: IP(CN->HoA)       | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
  HA -> MN: IP(HA->CoA) | UDP | ESP | payload | ESP trailer

  MN -> HA: IP(CoA->HA) | UDP | ESP | payload | ESP trailer
  HA -> CN: IP(HoA->CN)       | ESP | payload | ESP trailer


                                 Figure 4

   In the NAT traversal case the HA doesn't have to implement the SPINAT
   because the CN MAY be piggy packed in the UDP source and destination
   IP and port information.  Two separate UDP connections MAY not have
   the same source and destination IP and port pairs thus the UDP
   connection will identify the CN uniquely.






Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009                [Page 9]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


4.2.2.  Mobile IPv4 route optimization

   BEET can be used for route optimization purposes as the outer IP
   address can always be set to as the current CoA of the MN.  Likewise
   the MN can set the outer address as the address of the CN instead of
   the HA's address, although this would require that both ends support
   BEET mode.  Binding updates would be sent to the CN as well instead
   of just updating the location on HA.  Revealing MN's real location to
   the CN might not always be desirable.

4.2.3.  Mobile IPv6

   Triangular routing in Mobile IPv6 is similar to that of Mobile IPv4.
   However, the tunnel between the home agent and the mobile node is an
   ESP tunnel instead of being a plain IP-over-IP tunnel.  However, if
   BEET mode was used between the correspondent node and the mobile
   node, the ESP tunnel between the home agent and the mobile node would
   not bring any additional protection to the payload data.  Thus, in
   that case BEET could replace the ESP tunnel, similar to the IPv4
   case, illustrated in Figure 3 above.

   Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization uses a Type 2 Routing Header (RH) and
   Home Address Option (HAO) in the packet wire format.  However, it can
   be argued that the semantics of these options is equivalent to a
   optimized point-to-point tunnel.  That is, the Type 2 RH defines the
   real destination address of a packet, thereby effectively creating a
   partial tunnel where the inner and outer source addresses are
   identical but the destination addresses differ.  Similarly, the Home
   Address Option defines the real source address of the packet, again
   creating a partial tunnel.  The only difference is that this time the
   inner and outer destination addresses are identical but the source
   addresses differ.

   Thus, for Mobile IPv6, BEET mode would define a different wire format
   for the payload packets.  Instead of using Type 2 RH and HAO, the
   packets could be encapsulated into a BEET mode ESP tunnel.  In the
   case that ESP is used anyway, this has the advantage that the
   standard Mobile IPv6 extra headers are not needed, thereby saving
   octets in the headers.  Compared to tunnel mode ESP, BEET mode has
   the advantage that the inner IP header is not needed.

   In Mobile IPv6, mobility management can be implemented just as
   before, using the HoTI/CoTI, HoT/CoT and Binding Update (BU)
   messages.  The difference would lay in handling Binding Updates.  If
   BEET mode was used, processing Binding Updates would change the outer
   IP addresses in the BEET mode Security Associations instead of
   changing the Binding Cache.




Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 10]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


4.3.  End-node multi-address multi-homing

   The BEET mode provides for limited end-node multi-address multi-
   homing.  It semantically provides a tunnel between the end-hosts,
   with fixed inner IP addresses.  This allows a multi-homed host to use
   different outer IP addresses in different packets, without any notice
   by the upper layer protocols.  The upper layer protocols see the
   inner IP address at all times.  Thus, this limited form of multi-
   homing has no affect on the applications, which seemingly communicate
   over fixed IP addresses all the time.

   Implementing this kind of limited multi-homing support would require
   a small change to the current IPsec SPD and SA implementations.
   Currently the incoming SA selection is based on the SPI and
   destination address, with the implicit assumption that there is only
   one possible destination address for each incoming SA.  In a multi-
   homed host it would be desirable to have multiple destination
   addresses associated with the SA, thereby allowing the same SA to be
   used independent on the actual destination address in the packets.
   Removing the destination address from unicast SA lookup is already
   being proposed in the current ESP draft [5].

   If it is considered undesirable to change the implementations to
   support multiple alternative destination addresses, it would still be
   possible to support limited multi-homing by creating several parallel
   SAs, one for each destination address.  Each of these SAs would have
   identical inner addresses.  Effectively, this would distribute the
   tunnel over multiple SAs.

   In this latter implementation, the outgoing SA processing becomes
   more complex.  Selecting the outgoing SA does not depend only on the
   inner IP addresses but also on the outer destination address.
   Selecting the outer destination address depends on the current multi-
   homing situation.  This creates a situation where the SA processing
   must be deferred after selecting the actual outer address to be used.
   This might be difficult in some implementations.

4.4.  Host Identity Protocol

   The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) is a piece of more recent
   development.  Its aim is to explore the possibilities created by
   separating the end-host identifier and locator of IP addresses.
   There are currently five implementations, and the specifications are
   being finalized. [10] [11]

   In HIP, the TCP and UDP sockets are not bound to IP addresses but to
   Host Identifiers (HI).  The Host Identifiers create a new independent
   name space.



Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 11]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


   The BEET mode supports HIP by defining the inner tunnel in terms of
   Host Identifiers and the outer tunnel in terms of standard IP
   addresses.  In that way all processing prior to outgoing ESP and
   after incoming ESP uses Host Identifiers.  The wire format packets
   use standard IP addresses and ESP transport packet format.














































Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 12]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


5.  Protocol definition

   In this section we define the exact protocol formats and operations.
   This section is normative.

5.1.  Changes to Security Association data structures

   A BEET mode Security Association contains the same data as a regular
   tunnel mode Security Association, with the exception that the inner
   selectors must be single addresses and cannot be subnets.  The data
   includes the following:

      A pair of inner IP addresses.

      A pair of outer IP addresses.

      Cryptographic keys and other data as defined in RFC2401 [4]
      Section 4.4.3.

   A conforming implementation MAY store the data in a way similar to a
   regular tunnel mode Security Association.

   Note that in a conforming implementation the inner and outer
   addresses MAY belong to different address families.  All
   implementations that support both IPv4 and IPv6 SHOULD support both
   IPv4-over-IPv6 and IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling.

5.2.  Packet format

   The wire packet format is identical to the ESP transport mode wire
   format as defined in [5] Section 3.1.1.  However, the resulting
   packet contains outer IP addresses instead of the inner IP addresses
   received from the upper layer.  The construction of the outer headers
   is defined in RFC2401 [4] Section 5.1.2.  The following diagram
   illustrates ESP BEET mode positioning for typical IPv4 and IPv6
   packets.


   IPv4 INNER ADDRESSES
   --------------------

         BEFORE APPLYING ESP
    ------------------------------
    | inner IP hdr  |     |      |
    |               | TCP | Data |
    ------------------------------

         AFTER APPLYING ESP, OUTER v4 ADDRESSES



Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 13]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


    ----------------------------------------------------
    | outer IP hdr  |     |     |      |   ESP   | ESP |
    | (any options) | ESP | TCP | Data | Trailer | ICV |
    ----------------------------------------------------
                          |<---- encryption ---->|
                    |<-------- integrity ------->|

         AFTER APPLYING ESP, OUTER v6 ADDRESSES
    ------------------------------------------------------
    | outer  | new ext |     |     |      |  ESP   | ESP |
    | IP hdr | hdrs.   | ESP | TCP | Data | Trailer| ICV |
    ------------------------------------------------------
                             |<--- encryption ---->|
                       |<------- integrity ------->|

   IPv4 INNER ADDRESSES with options
   ---------------------------------

         BEFORE APPLYING ESP
    ------------------------------
    | inner IP hdr  |     |      |
    |  + options    | TCP | Data |
    ------------------------------

         AFTER APPLYING ESP, OUTER v4 ADDRESSES
    ----------------------------------------------------------
    | outer IP hdr  |     |     |     |      |   ESP   | ESP |
    | (any options) | ESP | PH  | TCP | Data | Trailer | ICV |
    ----------------------------------------------------------
                          |<------- encryption ------->|
                    |<----------- integrity ---------->|

         AFTER APPLYING ESP, OUTER v6 ADDRESSES
    ------------------------------------------------------------
    | outer  | new ext |     |     |     |      |  ESP   | ESP |
    | IP hdr | hdrs.   | ESP | PH  | TCP | Data | Trailer| ICV |
    ------------------------------------------------------------
                             |<------ encryption ------->|
                       |<---------- integrity ---------->|

                               PH    Pseudo Header for IPv4 options

   IPv6 INNER ADDRESSES
   --------------------

         BEFORE APPLYING ESP
    ------------------------------------------
    |              |  ext hdrs  |     |      |



Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 14]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


    | inner IP hdr | if present | TCP | Data |
    ------------------------------------------

         AFTER APPLYING ESP, OUTER v6 ADDRESSES
    --------------------------------------------------------------
    | outer  | new ext |     | dest |     |      |  ESP    | ESP |
    | IP hdr | hdrs.   | ESP | opts.| TCP | Data | Trailer | ICV |
    --------------------------------------------------------------
                                    |<---- encryption ---->|
                                |<------- integrity ------>|

         AFTER APPLYING ESP, OUTER v4 ADDRESSES
    ----------------------------------------------------
    | outer  |     | dest |     |      |  ESP    | ESP |
    | IP hdr | ESP | opts.| TCP | Data | Trailer | ICV |
    ----------------------------------------------------
                   |<------- encryption -------->|
             |<----------- integrity ----------->|

5.3.  Cryptographic processing

   The outgoing packets MUST be protected exactly as in ESP transport
   mode [5].  That is, the upper layer protocol packet is wrapped into
   an ESP header, encrypted, and authenticated exactly as if regular
   transport mode was used.  The resulting ESP packet is subject to IP
   header processing as defined in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5.  The
   incoming ESP protected messages are verified and decrypted exactly as
   if regular transport mode was used.  The resulting clear text packet
   is subject to IP header processing as defined in Section 5.4 and
   Section 5.6.

5.4.  IP header processing

   The biggest difference between the BEET mode and the other two modes
   is in IP header processing.  In the regular transport mode the IP
   header is kept intact.  In the regular tunnel mode an outer IP header
   is created on output and discarded on input.  In the BEET mode the IP
   header is replaced with another one on both input and output.

   On the BEET mode output side, the IP header processing MUST first
   ensure that the IP addresses in the original IP header contain the
   inner addresses as specified in the SA.  This MAY be ensured by
   proper policy processing, and it is possible that no checks are
   needed at the SA processing time.  Once the IP header has been
   verified to contain the right IP inner addresses, it is discarded.  A
   new IP header is created, using the discarded inner header as a hint
   for other fields but the IP addresses.  The IP addresses in the new
   header MUST be the outer tunnel addresses.



Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 15]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


   On input side, the received IP header is simply discarded.  Since the
   packet has been decrypted and verified, no further checks are
   necessary.  A new IP header, corresponding to a tunnel mode inner
   header, is created, using the discarded outer header as a hint for
   other fields but the IP addresses.  The IP addresses in the new
   header MUST be the inner addresses.

   As the outer header fields are used as hint for creating inner
   header, it must be noted that inner header differs as compared to
   tunnel-mode inner header.  In BEET mode the inner header will have
   the TTL, DF-bit and other option values from the outer header.  The
   TTL, DF-bit and other option values of the inner header MUST be
   processed by the stack.

5.5.  Handling of outgoing packets

   The outgoing BEET mode packets are processed as follows:

   1.  The system MUST verify that the IP header contains the inner
       source and destination addresses, exactly as defined in the SA.
       This verification MAY be explicit, or it MAY be implicit, for
       example, as a result of prior policy processing.  Note that in
       some implementations there may be no real IP header at this time
       but the source and destination addresses may be carried out-of-
       band.  In case the source address is still unassigned, it SHOULD
       be ensured that the designated inner source address would be
       selected at a later stage.

   2.  The IP payload (the contents of the packet beyond the IP header)
       is wrapped into an ESP header as defined in [5] Section 3.3.

   3.  A new IP header is constructed, replacing the original one.  The
       new IP header MUST contain the outer source and destination
       addresses, as defined in the SA.  Note that in some
       implementations there may be no real IP header at this time but
       the source and destination addresses may be carried out-of-band.
       In the case where the source address must be left unassigned, it
       SHOULD be made sure that the right source address is selected at
       a later stage.  Other than the addresses, it is RECOMMENDED that
       the new IP header copies the fields from the original IP header.

   4.  If there are any IPv4 options in the original packet, it is
       RECOMMENDED that they are discarded.  If the inner header
       contains one or more options that need to be transported between
       the tunnel end-points, sender MUST encapsulate the options as
       defined in Section 5.7

   Instead of literally discarding the IP header and constructing a new



Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 16]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


   one, a conforming implementation MAY simply replace the addresses in
   an existing header.  However, if the RECOMMENDED feature of allowing
   the inner and outer addresses from different address families is
   used, this simple strategy does not work.

5.6.  Handling of incoming packets

   The incoming BEET mode packets are processed as follows:

   1.  The system MUST verify and decrypt the incoming packet
       successfully, as defined in [5] section 3.4.  If the verification
       or decryption fails, the packet MUST be discarded.

   2.  The original IP header is simply discarded, without any checks.
       Since the ESP verification succeeded, the packet can be safely
       assumed to have arrived from the right sender.

   3.  A new IP header is constructed, replacing the original one.  The
       new IP header MUST contain the inner source and destination
       addresses, as defined in the SA.  If the sender has set the ESP
       next protocol field to 94 and included the pseudo header as
       described in Section 5.7, the receiver MUST include the options
       after the constructed IP header.  Note, that in some
       implementations the real IP header may have already been
       discarded and the source and destination addresses are carried
       out-of-band.  In such case the out-of-band addresses MUST be the
       inner addresses.  Other than the addresses, it is RECOMMENDED
       that the new IP header copies the fields from the original IP
       header.

   Instead of literally discarding the IP header and constructing a new
   one a conforming implementation MAY simply replace the addresses in
   an existing header.  However, if the RECOMMENDED feature of allowing
   the inner and outer addresses from different address families is
   used, this simple strategy does not work.

5.7.  IPv4 options handling

   In BEET mode, if IPv4 options are transported inside the tunnel, the
   sender MUST include a pseudo-header after ESP header.  The pseudo-
   header identifies that IPv4 options from the original packet are to
   be applied on the packet on input side.

   The sender MUST set the next protocol field on the ESP header as 94.
   The resulting pseudo header including the IPv4 options MUST be padded
   to 8 octet boundary.  The padding length is expressed in octets,
   valid padding lengths are 0 or 4 octets as the original IPv4 options
   are already padded to 4 octet boundary.  The padding MUST be filled



Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 17]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


   with NOP options as defined in Internet Protocol [1] section 3.1
   Internet header format.  The padding is added in front of the
   original options to ensure that the receiver is able to reconstruct
   the original IPv4 datagram.  The Header Length field contains the
   length of the IPv4 options, and padding in 8 octets units.

  0                   1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |  Next Header  |   Header Len  |    Pad Len    |   Reserved    |
 +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
 |                       Padding (if needed)                     |
 +---------------------------------------------------------------+
 |                            IPv4 options ...                   |
 |                                                               |
 +---------------------------------------------------------------+

    Next Header          Identifies the data following this header
    Length in octets     8-bit unsigned integer.  Length of the pseudo
                         header in 8-octet units, not including the first
                         8 octets.

   The receiver MUST remove this pseudo-header and padding as a part of
   BEET processing, in order reconstruct the original IPv4 datagram.
   The IPv4 options included into the pseudo-header MUST be added after
   the reconstructed IPv4 (inner) header on the receiving side.

























Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 18]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


6.  Policy considerations

   In this section we describe how the BEET mode affects on IPsec policy
   processing.  This section is normative.

   A BEET Security Association SHOULD NOT be used with NULL
   authentication.

   On the output side, the IPsec policy processing mechanism SHOULD take
   care that only packets with IP addresses matching with the inner
   addresses of a Security Association are passed to that Security
   Association.  If the policy mechanism do not provide full assurance
   on this, the SA processing MUST check the addresses.  Further policy
   distinction may be specified based on IP version, upper layer
   protocol, and ports.  If such restrictions are defined, they MUST be
   enforced.

   On the output side, the policy rules SHOULD prevent any packets
   containing the inner IP addresses pair from escaping to the wire in
   clear text.

   On the input side, there is no policy processing necessary on
   encrypted packets.  The SA is found based on the SPI and destination
   address.  A single SA MAY be associated with several destination
   addresses.  Since the outer IPsec addresses are discarded, and since
   the packet authenticity and integrity is protected by ESP, there is
   no need to check the outer addresses.  Since the inner addresses are
   fixed and restored from the SA, there is no need to check them.
   There MAY be further policy rules specifying allowed upper layer
   protocols and ports.  If such restrictions are defined, they MUST be
   enforced.

   On the input side, there SHOULD be a policy rule that filters out
   clear text packets that contain the inner addresses.

















Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 19]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


7.  PF_KEY extensions

   This section defines the necessary extensions to the PF_KEYv2 API [3]
   to support the BEET mode.  This section is informative.

   A BEET mode Security Association is created by specifying the inner
   IP addresses in the PF_KEYv2 Identity extensions, using two new
   identity types.  The identity types of the source and destination
   identity extensions MUST be identical, i.e. either IPv4 or IPv6.

    #define SADB_X_IDENTTYPE_ADDR            4
    #define SADB_IDENTTYPE_MAX               4

   When this new identity type is used, the contents of the identity
   field in the PF_KEY messages MUST be a socket address.

   For SADB_X_IDENTTYPE_ADDR the length of AF_INET type of identity MUST
   be the length of struct sockaddr_in.  Thus the length for AF_INET6
   type of identity MUST be the length of struct sockaddr_in6.

   Additionally, a new IPsec mode is defined in ipsec.h, and used in the
   unspecified but commonly used the PF_KEY extension SADB_X_EXT_SA2
   field sadb_x_sa2_mode.

    #define IPSEC_MODE_BEET 4

   If an SA is specified using SADB_X_EXT_SA2, if the sadb_x_sa2_mode is
   IPSEC_MODE_BEET, and if the source and destination identities are
   defined in terms of SADB_IDENTTYPE_ADDR, then the BEET mode MUST be
   used.  If an SA is specified using SADB_X_EXT_SA2, if the
   sadb_x_sa2_mode is IPSEC_MODE_BEET, and if the identities are defined
   in terms (other than the new type defined above) that exactly match
   to single IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, then the BEET mode SHOULD be used.


















Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 20]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


8.  New requirements on Key Management protocols

   In this section we discuss the requirements that the new mode places
   upon existing and new key management protocols.  This section is
   informative.

   In order to provide support for the BEET mode, key agreement protocol
   implementations must understand the existence of such a mode.  In
   some situations it is sufficient that the BEET mode is implemented at
   the IPsec ESP level only at one end as long as the key management is
   aware of its usage.  For example, the NAT scenario described in
   Section 4.1 does not require a BEET ESP implementation at the server
   end.  It is sufficient that the client implements the BEET mode; in
   fact, if the client somehow knows its public IP address it may be
   able to set up the BEET mode security associations without any
   explicit concent on the server end.  On the other hand, if the client
   does not know its public IP address, it needs help from the server in
   order to determine it.

   More generally, one can get benefit from the BEET mode only to the
   extend the key management protocol supports it.  If the key
   management protocol is fully aware of mobility and multi-homing
   issues, and provides facilities for signaling changes in the current
   connectivity situation, it is relatively easy to implement end-node
   mobility and multi-address multi-homing with BEET.  An example of
   such usage is HIP [11].

























Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 21]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


9.  Implementing the functionality with other means

   It is currently possible to implement the equivalent of BEET mode by
   using transport mode ESP and explicit network address translation at
   the end-hosts themselves.  In this section we briefly compare BEET
   mode and transport mode ESP with explicit network address translation
   alternatives.  The purpose of this section is to give background
   information for security considerations.  This section is
   informative.

   In an implementation using the BEET mode, the input side IP address
   translation is integrated with the decryption and integrity
   verification processing.  The packet is passed and given the inner
   addresses if and only if it is correctly decrypted and verified.  A
   typical IPsec SPD implementation would prohibit receiving unprotected
   IP packets that use the inner addresses on the wire, as it is done in
   the regular tunnel mode.  At the same time, any other uses of the
   outer addresses would be trivial; passing a packet to the SA requires
   both that the packet has an ESP header and that the SPI matches.

   In an implementation based on explicit network address translation
   and transport mode ESP, the address translation and cryptographic
   processing are completely separate.  In practise, the host must
   translate the outer IP address into the inner IP addresses before the
   packet is passed to IPsec.  (The other way around may not be secure,
   since there would be no way for the address translation process to
   know if the packet was received through IPsec processing or if it was
   received via some other means.)  Using the outer addresses for other
   purposes may be hard, depending on the implementation of the address
   translation mechanism.  In particular, using the outer addresses on
   other ESP SAs may be hard, since the typical address translation
   mechanisms are only configured on protocol level ESP or not ESP and
   typically do not understand SPIs.

   At the output side, a BEET mode implementation takes care of
   translating the inner addresses to outer addresses, as a part of the
   encryption process.  The IPsec SPD contains necessary entries that
   make sure that the inner addresses never leak.

   In an implementation based on transport mode ESP and explicit network
   address translation, the output packets would be passed with inner
   addresses from IPsec to the address translation mechanism.  The
   address translation mechanism will then translate the inner addresses
   to outer addresses.  While this does not prevent usage of the outer
   addresses for other purposes, the configuration is brittle and error
   prone.  If there are mistakes at the IPsec configuration, the address
   translation mechanism may translate unprotected packets, leading to
   potential confusion.  If there are mistakes at the address



Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 22]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


   translation side, the inner addresses may leak to the network.


















































Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 23]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


10.  Security Considerations

   In this section we discuss the security properties of the BEET mode,
   discussing some limitations [12].  This section is normative.

   There are no known new vulnerabilities that the introduction of the
   BEET mode would create.

   It is currently possible to implement the equivalent of BEET mode by
   using transport mode ESP and explicit network address translation at
   the end-hosts themselves.  However, such an implementation is more
   complex, less flexible, and potentially more vulnerable to security
   problems that are caused by misconfigurations; see Section 9.

   The main security benefit is an operational one.  To implement the
   same functionality without the BEET mode typically requires
   configuring three different, unrelated components in the hosts.


      The transport mode ESP SAs must be configured.


      A host based NAT function must be configured to properly translate
      between the inner and outer addresses.


      A host firewall must be configured to properly filter out packets
      so that inner addresses do not leak in or out.


   While it may be possible to configure these components to achieve the
   same functionality, such a configuration is error prone, increasing
   the probability of security vulnerabilities.  An integrated BEET mode
   implementation is less prone to configuration mistakes.  Furthermore,
   it would be fairly hard to implement portable key management
   protocols that would be able to configure all of the required
   components at the same time.  On the other hand, it would be easy to
   provide a portable key management protocol implementation that would
   be able to configure BEET mode SAs through the specified PF_KEY
   extensions.

   Since the BEET security associations have the semantics of a fixed,
   point-to-point tunnel between two IP addresses, it is possible to
   place one or both of the tunnel end points into other nodes but those
   that actually "possess" the inner IP addresses, i.e., to implement a
   BEET mode proxy.  However, since such usage defeats the security
   benefits of combined ESP and hostNAT processing, as discussed above,
   the implementations SHOULD NOT support such usage.



Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 24]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


   As in the BEET mode the outer header source address is not checked at
   the input handling, there is the potential possibility a DoS attack
   where the attacker sends random packets that match with the SPI of
   some BEET mode SA.  This kind of attack would cause the victim to
   perform unnecessary integrity checks that would result in a failure.
   If this kind of behaviour is detected, the node may request rekeying
   from the Key Management Protocol, and after rekeying, if the attacker
   was not on the path, the new SPI value would not be known by the
   attacker.










































Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 25]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


11.  IANA Considerations

   The PF_KEYv2 interface should probably have an IANA registry.
















































Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 26]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


12.  Acknowledgments

   During the 56th IETF meeting in San Francisco and afterwards, the
   following people made comments on the ideas, helping the author to
   write the draft: Jari Arkko, Steven Bellovin, Charlie Kaufman, Tero
   Kivinen, Cheryl Madson, Andrew McGrecor, Robert Moskowitz, Michael
   Richardson, Timothy Shepard, Jukka Ylitalo, Sami Vaarala, Petri
   Jokela, Herbert Xu, Miika Komu.

   The author ows special thanks to Derek Atkins and Steve Kent, who
   strongly opposed the idea during the San Francisco IETF, and thereby
   forced writing a high quality initial draft.







































Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 27]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


13.  References

13.1.  Normative references

   [1]   Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
         September 1981.

   [2]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [3]   McDonald, D., Metz, C., and B. Phan, "PF_KEY Key Management
         API, Version 2", RFC 2367, July 1998.

   [4]   Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
         Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [5]   Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303,
         December 2005.

13.2.  Informative references

   [6]   Arkko, J. and P. Nikander, "Limitations in IPsec Policy",
         Security Protocols 11th International Workshop,  Cambridge, UK,
         April 2-4, 2003, LNCS to be published,  Springer, April 2003.

   [7]   Ionnadis, J., "Why we still don't have IPsec", Network and
         Distributed Systems Security Symposium (NDSS'03),  Internet
         Society, February 2003.

   [8]   Bellovin, S., "EIDs, IPsec, and HostNAT", IETF 41th,
         March 1998.

   [9]   Ylitalo, J., Melen, J., Nikander, P., and V. Torvinen, "Re-
         thinking Security in IP based Micro-Mobility", 7th Information
         Security Conference (ISC'04) ,  Palo Alto, September 27-29,
         2004,  to be published,  Springer, September 2004.

   [10]  Moskowitz, R. and P. Nikander, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
         Architecture", RFC 4423, May 2006.

   [11]  Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
         "Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008.

   [12]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on
         Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July 2003.






Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 28]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


Appendix A.  Implementation experiences

   We have implemented the BEET mode to the FreeBSD 5.3 KAME stack.  Our
   implementation uses the PF_KEYv2 identity extension, as described in
   Section 7.

   The current implementation is based on four hooks placed at the
   strategical locations at the ESP and ip_output processing.  We
   support full IPv4/IPv6 conversions, allowing both IPv4-over-IPv6 and
   IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling.  The number of lines changed in the KAME
   policy processing is 36 lines; these changes were necessary to fully
   support the identity extension, which was partly unimplemented in the
   KAME stack.  The hooks themselves take 83 lines, and the protocol
   processing code is 450 lines long.  About 90% of the protocol
   processing code was copied and pasted from the IPsec tunnel mode and
   transport mode routines, with minimal changes.  About 70% of the code
   is needed to implement v4-over-v6 and v6-over-v4 tunneling.  The
   number of actual functional lines for the simple v4-over-v4 and v6-
   over-v6 cases is mere 62 lines.  The implementation effort took three
   days from two programmers, including writing simple test cases and
   performing rudimentary testing on the implementation to see that it
   works.

   The current implementation is tailored for experimentation.  A more
   proper implementation would implement all of the processing as an
   integral part of the IPsec processing.  The current KAME code
   supports only two modes.  Once the necessary cleanups, such as
   replacing "if" statements with "switch" statements, we expect the
   extra protocol processing code required by the BEET mode to take less
   than 100 lines.





















Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 29]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


Appendix B.  Garden beets

   Commonly known as the garden beet, this firm, round root vegetable
   has leafy green tops, which are also edible and highly nutritious.
   The most common color for beets (called "beetroots" in the British
   Isles) is a garnet red.  However, they can range in color from deep
   red to white, the most intriguing being the Chioggia (also called
   "candy cane"), with its concentric rings of red and white.  Beets are
   available year-round and should be chosen by their firmness and
   smooth skins.









































Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 30]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


Authors' Addresses

   Pekka Nikander
   Ericsson Research Nomadic Lab
   JORVAS  FIN-02420
   FINLAND

   Phone: +358 9 299 1
   Email: pekka.nikander@nomadiclab.com


   Jan Melen
   Ericsson Research Nomadic Lab
   JORVAS  FIN-02420
   FINLAND

   Phone: +358 9 299 1
   Email: jan.melen@nomadiclab.com

































Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 31]

Internet-Draft                ESP BEET MODE                  August 2008


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.


Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





Nikander & Melen        Expires February 6, 2009               [Page 32]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.109, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/