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Versions: 00 01

Network Working Group                                           R. Sayre
Internet-Draft
Expires: October 8, 2006                                     A. Melnikov
                                                              Isode Ltd.
                                                           April 6, 2006


               HMAC Digest Access Authentication for HTTP
                  draft-sayre-http-hmac-digest-01.txt

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
   This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not
   be created, except to publish it as an RFC and to translate it into
   languages other than English.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 8, 2006.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This document specifies an HTTP authentication scheme based on
   cryptographic hashes.

Editor's Note



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   To discuss this draft, please join the ietf-http-auth mailing
   list [1].  Membership is open to all.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  WWW-Authenticate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Authorization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  The Request Digest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Header Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   9.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   Appendix A.  Example Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     A.1.  Example Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     A.2.  Example Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Appendix B.  Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15






























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1.  Introduction

   This document specifies an HTTP authentication scheme similar to the
   Digest scheme [RFC2617].  It borrows heavily from that scheme's
   specifcation, but there are substantive differences.  Most
   importantly, the algorithm is based on a hash of the user password,
   rather than the password itself.  In addition, the scheme defined in
   this document allows for additional message integrity checks on HTTP
   request headers.  It omits quality-of-protection options and
   Authentication-Info headers from the server.  Like Digest
   authentication, the scheme specified in this document suffers from
   many known weaknesses, and is only intended to improve on Basic
   authentication [RFC2617].

   This specification is a companion to the HTTP/1.1 specification
   [RFC2616].  It uses the augmented BNF section 2.1 of that document,
   and relies on both the non-terminals defined in that document and
   other aspects of the HTTP/1.1 specification.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].


2.  WWW-Authenticate

   When a server a recieves a request for an access-protected object
   without an acceptable Authorization header, it responds with a "401
   Unauthorized" status code, and a WWW-Authenticate header [RFC2617].
   For the HMAC Digest scheme, the value of the header is as follows:


      challenge         = "HMACDigest" digest-challenge
      digest-challenge  = 1#( realm | snonce | [domain] | [reason] |
                          [algorithm] | [pw-algorithm] |
                          [salt] | [auth-param] )
      realm             = "realm" "=" quoted-string
      snonce            = "snonce" "=" quoted-string
      domain            = "domain" "=" <"> URI *( 1*SP URI ) <">
      URI               = absoluteURI | abs_path
      reason            = "reason" "=" ("unauthorized" | "integrity" |
                           token)
      algorithm         = "algorithm" "=" ( "HMAC-SHA-1" | "HMAC-MD5" |
                           token )
      pw-algorithm      = "pw-algorithm" "=" ( "SHA-1" | "MD5" |
                           token )
      salt              = "salt" "=" quoted-string




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   realm: A string to be displayed to users so they know which username
      and password to use.  This string should contain at least the name
      of the host performing the authentication and might additionally
      indicate the collection of users who might have access.  An
      example might be "registered_users@gotham.news.com".

   snonce: A server-specified data string which should be uniquely
      generated each time a 401 response is made.  It is recommended
      that this string be base64 or hexadecimal data.  Specifically,
      since the string is passed in the header lines as a quoted string,
      the double-quote character is not allowed.

      The contents of the snonce are implementation dependent and opaque
      to the client.  The quality of the implementation depends on a
      good choice.  An snonce might, for example, be constructed as the
      base64 encoding of

        time-stamp hash(time-stamp ":" ETag ":" private-key)

      where time-stamp is a server-generated time or other non-repeating
      value, ETag is the value of the HTTP ETag header associated with
      the requested entity, and private-key is data known only to the
      server.  With an snonce of this form, a server would recalculate
      the hash portion after receiving the client authentication header
      and reject the request if it did not match the snonce from that
      header or if the time-stamp value is not recent enough.  In this
      way, the server can limit the time of the snonce's validity.[@
      Eliminate replay text?]  The inclusion of the ETag prevents a
      replay request for an updated version of the resource.  (Note:
      including the IP address of the client in the snonce would appear
      to offer the server the ability to limit the reuse of the snonce
      to the same client that originally got it.  However, that would
      break proxy farms, where requests from a single user often go
      through different proxies in the farm.  Also, IP address spoofing
      is not that hard.)

   domain: A quoted, space-separated list of URI references [RFC3986]
      that define the protection space.  If a URI is an abs_path, it is
      relative to the canonical root URL [RFC2617] of the server being
      accessed.  An absoluteURI in this list may refer to a different
      server than the one being accessed.  The client can use this list
      to determine the set of URIs for which the same authentication
      information may be sent: any URI that has a URI in this list as a
      prefix (after both have been made absolute) may be assumed to be
      in the same protection space.  If this directive is omitted or its
      value is empty, the client should assume that the protection space
      consists of all URIs on the responding server.




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   reason: The value of this directive indicates the reason for the
      rejection of the previous client request. "unauthorized" indicates
      that the request did not contain a valid digest. "stale" indicates
      that the previous request from the client was rejected because the
      snonce value was stale.  The client may wish to simply retry the
      request with a new encrypted response, without reprompting the
      user for a new username and password. "integrity" indicates that
      the request contained unverified content that the server requires
      be included in the calculation of the digest.  If the directive is
      not present, or a value other than "integrity" or "stale", the
      client should behave as though its value were "unauthorized".

   algorithm: This directive indicates the HMAC construction to be used
      [RFC2104].  If not present, it is assumed to be "HMAC-SHA-1".

   pw-algorithm: This directive indicates the algorithm to be used when
      preparing an HMAC key.  If not present, it is assumed to be
      "SHA-1".

   salt: If present, this directive indicates a value that is appended
      to the password before the initial hash function is applied.


3.  Authorization

   The Authorization request header contains client credentials
   generated according to the directives recieved in a WWW-Authenticate
   response header.


      credentials      = "HMACDigest" digest-response
      digest-response  = 1#( username | realm | cnonce | snonce |
                         digest-uri | created | response | [headers] |
                         [auth-param] )
      username         = "username" "=" quoted-string
      cnonce           = "cnonce" "=" quoted-string
      digest-uri       = "uri" "=" request-uri
      response         = "response" "=" request-digest
      request-digest   = <"> *LHEX <">
      LHEX             =  "0" | "1" | "2" | "3" |
                          "4" | "5" | "6" | "7" |
                          "8" | "9" | "a" | "b" |
                          "c" | "d" | "e" | "f"
      headers          = "headers" "=" header-list
      header-list      = <"> field-name *( 1*SP field-name ) <">






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   username: The user's name in the specified realm.

   cnonce: The cnonce value is an opaque quoted string value provided by
      the client and used by both client and server to avoid chosen
      plaintext attacks, to provide mutual authentication, and to
      provide some message integrity protection.

   digest-uri: The URI from Request-URI of the Request-Line; duplicated
      here because proxies are allowed to change the Request-Line in
      transit.

   response: The response value is a string containing hexadecimal data.
      The two HMAC constructions listed by this specification will
      produce strings of 32 or 40 characters in length.

   created: The created value is an RFC3339 timestamp [RFC3339].

   headers: The headers value is a space-separated list of HTTP headers
      used to calculate the request-digest.


4.  The Request Digest

   This section describes the process a client uses to calculate the
   request digest, and how the server can verify it.

   1.  The client applies the algorithm specified by the pw-algorithm
       directive to the user password.  If present, the value of the
       salt directive is appended to the password prior to calculation.

   2.  The client applies the algorithm specified by the pw-algorithm
       directive to the concatenation of the username, a colon, the
       lowercased hexadecimal digest of the result of step 1, a colon,
       and the value of the realm directive.  The lowercased hexadecimal
       digest of the result serves as the HMAC key.

   3.  The client generates a cnonce, a data string which should be
       uniquely generated each time a request is made.  It is
       recommended that this string be base64 or hexadecimal data.
       Specifically, since the string is passed in the header lines as a
       quoted string, the double-quote character is not allowed.  A
       combination of a timestamp and a random number is sufficient for
       many purposes.

   4.  The client forms a list of request headers it wishes to include
       in the digest calculation.  The most useful headers to include
       are entity headers such as Content-Type, Content-Length, and
       Content-MD5 (see Section 5).



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   5.  The client generates a timestamp using the current time.

   6.  The client concatenates the request method, a colon, the request
       URI, a colon, the cnonce, a colon, the snonce, a colon, and the
       value of each applicable header in the header list (see
       Section 5).  This value is the message data.

   7.  The client applies the HMAC construction specified by the
       algorithm directive to the key and the message data.  The
       lowercased hexadecimal digest of this calculation is the value of
       the response directive.

   8.  The client then uses the relevant values to compose an
       Authorization header, and sends the request.

   When the server receives a request containing an Authorization header
   using the HMAC Digest scheme, it can validate it value using the
   procedure listed below.

   1.  The server should already have the hash of the user's password
       available, using the algorithm it instructed the client to use in
       the WWW-Authenticate header.

   2.  The server uses the realm and username directives supplied in the
       Authorization header to check for a candidate key.

   3.  The server concatenates the request method, a colon, the value of
       the uri directive, a colon, the value of the nonce directive, a
       colon, the value of the created directive, a colon, and the value
       of each header in the headers directive (see Section 5).  This
       value is the message data.

   4.  The server uses the key to calculate the HMAC for the message
       data.  If the hexadecimal digest of this calculation matches the
       value provided in the response directive, the request is valid.


5.  Header Handling

   When selecting headers for inclusion in the Digest calculation,
   clients SHOULD NOT include hop-by-hop headers.  HTTP 1.1 [RFC2616]
   defines eight hop-by-hop headers: Connection, Keep-Alive, Proxy-
   Authenticate, Proxy-Authorization, TE, Trailers, Transfer-Encoding,
   and Upgrade.  HTTP 1.1 also requires that extension hop-by-hop
   headers are listed in the Connection header.

   When creating or verifying a digest, leading whitespace in the header
   values MUST be stripped and header unfolding MUST NOT be done.  If a



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   header in the header list appears multiple times, those values are be
   combined in order.  For example, if a client specifies headers="A B",
   and the request contains A,B,A headers (in that order), both sides
   MUST calculate the digest using header values in the order A,A,B.


6.  Acknowledgements

   This document is largely based on the Digest section of "HTTP
   Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication" [RFC2617],
   and includes some sections of that document verbatim.

   The technique of including header values in the digest calculation
   was originally proposed by James Undery for the SIP protocol.


7.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.


8.  Security Considerations

   [TBD... depends on how much needs to be repeated from RFC2617.]

9.  Normative References

   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
              Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
              February 1997.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2616]  Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [RFC2617]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
              Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
              Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
              RFC 2617, June 1999.

   [RFC3339]  Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
              Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,



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              RFC 3986, January 2005.

   [1]  <http://lists.osafoundation.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/
        ietf-http-auth>

   [2]  <http://www.python.org>


Appendix A.  Example Implementations

   This section provides example implementations in the Python [2]
   programming language, version 2.4.

A.1.  Example Server

   The example server program responds to all request URIs with the same
   response, and knows of only one user.  If the server program is saved
   in the file "hmac-digest-server.py", it can be started by typing
   "python hmac-digest-server.py".


   import BaseHTTPServer, cgi, urllib2
   import time
   import hmac, sha, md5, base64

   PORT = 8888
   user = "user"
   password = "password"
   salt = 'xyzzy'
   realm = "HMACDigest Sample"
   algo = "HMAC-SHA-1"
   pw_algo = "MD5"
   key_str = "%s:%s:%s" % (user,
                           md5.new(password+salt).hexdigest(),
                           realm)
   key = md5.new(key_str).hexdigest()

   secret_key = "moo"
   digest_header = 'HMACDigest realm="%s", '
   digest_header += 'snonce="%s", '
   digest_header += 'reason="%s", '
   digest_header += 'domain="/ http://www.example.com/", '
   digest_header += 'algorithm="%s", '
   digest_header += 'pw-algorithm="%s", '
   digest_header += 'salt="%s"'

   class HMACDigestHandler(BaseHTTPServer.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
       def do_GET(self):



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           auth = self.headers.getheader('authorization')
           result = self.check(auth)
           if result is False:
               self.send_401()
           elif result == 'stale':
               self.send_401(reason='stale')
           else:
               self.send_response(200)
               self.send_header('Content-type','text/plain')
               self.end_headers()
               self.wfile.write("\nAuthentication Successful!\n")

       def check(self, auth):
           if auth is None:
               return False
           token, fields = auth.split(' ', 1)
           if token != 'HMACDigest':
               return False
           cred = urllib2.parse_http_list(fields)
           cred = urllib2.parse_keqv_list(cred)
           if cred['username'] != user or cred['realm'] != realm:
               return False
           snonce = cred['snonce']
           nonce_time,s_hash = base64.b64decode(snonce).split()
           test_hash = md5.new(nonce_time +
                               ":fake_etag:" + secret_key).hexdigest()
           if s_hash != test_hash:
               return False
           now = time.mktime(time.gmtime())
           # allow 10 minute old nonces... this is arbitrary
           if now - float(nonce_time) > 600:
               return "stale"
           names = cred.get('headers','').split()
           vals = ''.join([self.headers.getheader(h) for h in names])
           msg = "%s:%s:%s:%s:%s" % (self.command, self.path,
                                     cred['cnonce'], snonce,
                                     vals)
           the_hmac = hmac.new(key, msg, sha).hexdigest()
           if cred['response'] == the_hmac:
               return True
           else:
               return False

       def send_401(self, reason="unauthorized"):
           auth_header = digest_header % (realm, self.snonce(),
                                          reason, algo, pw_algo, salt)
           self.send_response(401)
           self.send_header('WWW-Authenticate', auth_header)



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           self.send_header('Content-type', 'text/plain')
           self.end_headers()
           self.wfile.write('\nUnauthorized\n')

       def snonce(self):
           now = str(time.mktime(time.gmtime()))
           print now
           h = md5.new(now+":fake_etag:"+secret_key).hexdigest()
           return base64.b64encode(now + " " + h)

   httpd = BaseHTTPServer.HTTPServer(("", PORT), HMACDigestHandler)
   print "Serving at port", PORT
   httpd.serve_forever()


A.2.  Example Client

   The example client program makes one request to the example server
   without an authorization header, examines the WWW-Authenticate header
   returned in the 401 response, and then creates an Authorization
   header to make a second (successful) request.


   import httplib, urllib2, md5, sha, hmac, time, random, os

   PORT = 8888
   username = "user"
   password = "password"
   params = {}
   headers = {"accept": "text/X-Oh-Several-Things+xml, */*",
              "user-agent": "libwww-perl/5.803",
              "x-hopbyhop": "some proxy information",
              "x-fooproxy": "some more proxy info",
              "x-freedom-is-what-you-think-it-is":
              "But there ain't no train to Stockholm",
              "connection": "close, x-hopbyhop, x-fooproxy"}

   # Make an initial request
   conn = httplib.HTTPConnection("localhost",PORT)
   conn.request("GET","",params,headers)
   response = conn.getresponse()
   data = response.read()

   # Print the rejection letter
   print "First request:",data

   # Get the challenge
   wa = response.getheader('WWW-Authenticate')



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   token, kv = wa.split(' ', 1)
   challenge = urllib2.parse_keqv_list(urllib2.parse_http_list(kv))
   realm = challenge['realm']
   snonce = challenge['snonce']
   algorithm = challenge.get('algorithm', 'HMAC-SHA-1')
   pw_algorithm = challenge.get('pw-algorithm', 'SHA-1')
   salt = challenge.get('salt','')

   # Choose our HMAC construct
   if algorithm == 'HMAC-SHA-1':
       hashmod = sha
   elif algoritm == 'HMAC-MD5':
       hashmod = md5

   # Choose our password algorithm
   if pw_algorithm == 'SHA-1':
       pwhashmod = sha
   elif pw_algorithm == 'MD5':
       pwhashmod = md5

   # Make the key
   key = "%s:%s:%s" % (username,
                       pwhashmod.new(password+salt).hexdigest(),
                       realm)
   key = pwhashmod.new(key).hexdigest()

   # Put together the headers
   keys = set(headers.keys())
   hop_by_hops = set(['connection', 'keep-alive', 'proxy-authenticate',
                      'proxy-authorization', 'te', 'trailers',
                      'transfer-encoding', 'upgrade'])
   if 'connection' in keys:
       ext_hop_heads = urllib2.parse_http_list(headers['connection'])
       ext_hop_heads.remove('close')
       hop_by_hops = hop_by_hops.union(ext_hop_heads)
   keys = keys.difference(hop_by_hops)
   keylist = ''.join(["%s " % k for k in keys])
   header_vals = ''.join([headers[k] for k in keys])

   # Make a cnonce
   created = time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M%SZ',time.gmtime())
   cnonce = sha.new(str(random.getrandbits(512))+created).hexdigest()

   # Calculate the HMAC
   msg = "%s:%s:%s:%s:%s" % ("GET", "/", cnonce, snonce, header_vals)
   response = hmac.new(key, msg, hashmod).hexdigest()

   # Compose the Authorization header



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   auth = 'username="%s", realm="%s", cnonce="%s", uri="%s", ' \
          'snonce="%s", response="%s", headers="%s"'
   auth = auth % (username, realm, cnonce, "/",
                  snonce, response, keylist)
   headers['Authorization'] = "HMACDigest " + auth

   # wait a few seconds
   time.sleep(2)
   conn.request("GET","/",params,headers)
   response = conn.getresponse()
   data = response.read()

   # Print the successful response
   print "Second request:",data
   conn.close()



Appendix B.  Change Log

   01:  Add server nonce, remove client timestamp.

      Specify header handling more extensively.

      Add RFC2119 terms for header handling.

      Demo client excludes hop-by-hop headers.
























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Authors' Addresses

   Robert Sayre

   Email: rfsayre@boswijck.com


   Alexey Melnikov
   Isode Ltd.

   Email: Alexey.Melnikov@isode.com








































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Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.




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