[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 RFC 5759

INTERNET-DRAFT                                                J. Solinas
Intended Status: Informational                                L. Zieglar
                                                                     NSA
Expires January 1, 2009                                     July 1, 2009

                  Suite B Certificate and Certificate
                     Revocation List (CRL) Profile
               <draft-solinas-suiteb-cert-profile-04.txt>

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with
   the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as
   Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
   months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
   documents at any time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts
   as reference material or to cite them other than as
   "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your
   rights and restrictions with respect to this document.










Solinas, Zieglar             Expires January 1, 2009            [Page 1]

INTERNET-DRAFT    Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile          July 2009


Abstract

   This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and
   X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use with the United
   States National Security Agency's Suite B Cryptography. The reader
   is assumed to have familiarity with RFC 5280, "Internet X.509 Public
   Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
   (CRL) Profile."


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
   2.  Requirements Terminology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
   3.  Requirements and Assumptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.1.  Implementing Suite B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.2.  Suite B Object Identifiers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   4.  Suite B Certificates and Certificate Extensions Profile . . . 4
     4.1.  signatureAlgorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     4.2.  signatureValue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     4.3.  Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     4.4.  SubjectPublicKeyInfo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     4.5.  Certificate Extensions for Particular Types of
           Certificates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
         4.5.1.  Suite B Self-Signed CA Certificates . . . . . . . . 7
         4.5.2   Suite B Non-Self-Signed CA Certificates . . . . . . 7
         4.5.3.  Suite B End Entity Signature and Key Establishment.
                 Certificates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   5.  Suite B CRL and CRL Extensions Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
   8.  References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
     8.1  Normative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
     8.2  Informative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9


1. Introduction

   This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and
   X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use by applications
   that support the United States National Security Agency's Suite B
   Cryptography.

   The reader is assumed to have familiarity with [RFC5280].  This
   Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile is a profile of RFC 5280.
   All MUST-level requirements of RFC 5280 apply throughout this
   profile and are generally not repeated here.  In cases where a
   MUST-level requirement is repeated for emphasis, the text notes




Solinas, Zieglar             Expires January 1, 2009            [Page 2]

INTERNET-DRAFT    Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile          July 2009


   the requirement is "in adherence with [RFC5280]."  This profile
   contains changes that elevate some MAY-level options in RFC 5280 to
   SHOULD-level and MUST-level in this profile; this profile also
   contains changes that elevate some SHOULD-level options in RFC 5280
   to MUST-level for this profile.  All options from RFC 5280 that are
   not listed in this profile remain at the requirements level of
   RFC 5280.

   The reader is also assumed to have familiarity with [RFC5480],
   which specifies the syntax and semantics for the Subject Public
   Key Information field in certificates that support Elliptic Curve
   Cryptography and [sha2-dsa-ecdsa] which specifies algorithm
   identifiers for ECDSA.


2. Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in
   this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


3. Requirements and Assumptions

   The goal of this document is to define a base set of certificate and
   CRL formats to support interoperability among Suite B solutions.
   Specific communities, such as the US National Security Systems, may
   define community profiles which further restrict certificate and CRL
   formats by mandating the presence of extensions which are optional in
   this base profile, defining new optional or critical extension types,
   or restricting the values and/or presence of fields within existing
   extensions.  However, communications between distinct communities
   MUST use the formats specified in this document when interoperability
   is desired.  (Applications may add additional non-critical extensions
   to these formats but they MUST NOT assume that a remote peer will be
   able to process them.)

3.1 Implementing Suite B

   Every Suite B certificate MUST use the X.509 v3 format, and contain
   either:

      * An ECDSA capable signing key, using curve P-256 or P-384; or
      * An ECDH capable key establishment key, using curve P-256 or
        P-384.






Solinas, Zieglar             Expires January 1, 2009            [Page 3]

INTERNET-DRAFT    Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile          July 2009


   Every Suite B certificate and CRL MUST be signed using ECDSA.  The
   signing Certification Authority's  (CA's) key MUST be on the curve
   P-256 or P-384 if the certificate contains a key on the curve P-256.
   If the certificate contains a key on the curve P-384, the signing
   CA's key MUST be on the curve P-384.  Any certificate and CRL MUST be
   hashed using SHA-256 or SHA-384, matched to the size of the signing
   CA's key.

3.2  Suite B Object Identifiers

   The primary OID structure for Suite B is as follows per [x9.62],
   [SEC2], [RFC5480] and [sha2-dsa-ecdsa].

      ansi-X9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 }

      certicom-arc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) }

      id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         ansi-X9-62 keyType(2) 1 }

      id-ecDh OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         certicom-arc schemes(1) ecdh(12) }

      secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         ansi-X9-62 curves(3) prime(1) 7 }

      secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         certicom-arc curve(0) 34 }

      id-ecSigType OBJECT IDENTIFER ::= {
         ansi X9-62 signatures(4) }

      ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         id-ecSigType ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 }

      ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
         id-ecSigType ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 }


4. Suite B Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile

   This Suite B certificate profile is a profile of [RFC5280].
   The changes in the requirements from RFC 5280 are listed here.
   Note that RFC 5280 has varying mandates for marking extensions as
   critical or non-critical.  This profile changes some of those
   mandates for extensions that are included in Suite B certificates.



Solinas, Zieglar             Expires January 1, 2009            [Page 4]

INTERNET-DRAFT    Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile          July 2009


4.1.  signatureAlgorithm

   The two algorithm identifiers used by Suite B are:
   1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 for ecdsa-with-SHA256 and
   1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 for ecdsa-with-SHA384, as described in
   [sha2-dsa-ecdsa] AND [x9.62].

   The parameters MUST be absent as per [sha2-dsa-ecdsa].

4.2.  signatureValue

   ECDSA digital signature generation is described in [FIPS 186-3]. An
   ECDSA signature value is comprised of two unsigned integers, denoted
   as r and s.  r and s MUST be represented as ASN.1 INTEGERs.  If the
   high order bit of the unsigned integer is a 1, an octet with the
   value 0x00 MUST be prepended to the binary representation before
   enconding it as an ASN.1 INTEGER.  Unsigned integers for the P-256
   and P-384 curves can be a maximum of 32 and 48 bytes, respectively.
   Therefore, converting each r and s to an ASN.1 INTEGER will result in
   a maximum of 33 bytes for the P-256 curve and 49 bytes for the P-384
   curve.

   The ECDSA signatureValue in an X.509 certificate is encoded as a BIT
   STRING value of a DER encoded SEQUENCE of the two INTEGERS.  As per
   [RFC5480], the structure, included for convenience, is as follows:

     ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
         r  INTEGER,
         s  INTEGER
       }

   For example, in a signature using P-256 and hex notation:

   r=  52e3f7b7 27fba9e8 eddb1d08 3b75c188
       2517e6dc 63ded9c0 524f8f9a 45dc8661

   s=  b8930438 de8d33bd ab12c3a2 bdad9795
       92a1fd65 76d1734c 3eb0af34 0456aef4

   r represented as a DER encoded INTEGER:
      022052e3 f7b727fb a9e8eddb 1d083b75
      c1882517 e6dc63de d9c0524f 8f9a45dc
      8661

   s represented as a DER encoded INTEGER:
      022100b8 930438de 8d33bdab 12c3a2bd
      ad979592 a1fd6576 d1734c3e b0af3404
      56aef4



Solinas, Zieglar             Expires January 1, 2009            [Page 5]

INTERNET-DRAFT    Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile          July 2009


   Representation of SEQUENCE of r and s:
      30450220 52e3f7b7 27fba9e8 eddb1d08
      3b75c188 2517e6dc 63ded9c0 524f8f9a
      45dc8661 022100b8 930438de 8d33bdab
      12c3a2bd ad979592 a1fd6576 d1734c3e
      b0af3404 56aef4

   Representation of resulting signatureValue:
      03480030 45022052 e3f7b727 fba9e8ed
      db1d083b 75c18825 17e6dc63 ded9c052
      4f8f9a45 dc866102 2100b893 0438de8d
      33bdab12 c3a2bdad 979592a1 fd6576d1
      734c3eb0 af340456 aef4

4.3. Version

   For this profile, Version MUST be 3, which means the value MUST be
   set to 2.

4.4. SubjectPublicKeyInfo

   For ECDSA signing keys, the algorithm ID, id-ecPublicKey, MUST be
   used.  For ECDH key establishment keys, either the algorithm ID,
   id-ecPublicKey, or the algorithm ID, id-ecDh, MAY be used, as
   described in [RFC5480]. However, for interoperability
   purposes all relying parties MUST be prepared to process the
   algorithm ID id-ecPublicKey.

   The parameters of the AlgorithmIdentifier in this field MUST use
   the namedCurve option. The specifiedCurve and implicitCurve options
   described in [RFC5480] MUST NOT be used.  The namedCurve
   MUST be either the OID for secp256r1 (curve P-256) or secp384r1
   (curve P-384) [RFC5480].

   The elliptic curve public key, ECPoint, SHALL be the OCTET STRING
   representation of an elliptic curve point following the conversion
   routine in section 2.2 of [RFC5480] and sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2
   of [SEC1].

   Suite B implementations MAY use either the uncompressed form or the
   compressed form of the elliptic curve point [RFC5480].  For
   interoperability purposes, all relying parties MUST be prepared to
   process the uncompressed form.

   The elliptic curve public key (an ECPoint which is an OCTET STRING)
   is mapped to a subjectPublicKey (a BIT STRING) as follows:  the most
   significant bit of the OCTET STRING becomes the most significant bit
   of the BIT STRING and the least significant bit of the OCTET STRING
   becomes the least significant bit of the BIT STRING [RFC5480].


Solinas, Zieglar             Expires January 1, 2009            [Page 6]

INTERNET-DRAFT    Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile          July 2009


   An octet string representation of a P-256 uncompressed elliptic curve
   point:

      046cc93a 2cdb0308 47fa0734 2bc8e130
      4c77f04f 63557372 43f3a5d7 f51baa82
      23d21ebf b87d9944 f7ec170d 64f9924e
      9ce20e4d 361c2db5 f1d52257 4259edad
      5e

   A DER encoded bit string representation of the subject public key:

      03420004 6cc93a2c db030847 fa07342b
      c8e1304c 77f04f63 55737243 f3a5d7f5
      1baa8223 d21ebfb8 7d9944f7 ec170d64
      f9924e9c e20e4d36 1c2db5f1 d5225742
      59edad5e

   A DER encoded representation of the AlgorithmIdentifier:

      30130607 2a8648ce 3d020106 082a8648
      ce3d0301 07

   A DER encoded representation of the subjectPublicKeyInfo using the
   P-256 curve:

      30593013 06072a86 48ce3d02 0106082a
      8648ce3d 03010703 4200046c c93a2cdb
      030847fa 07342bc8 e1304c77 f04f6355
      737243f3 a5d7f51b aa8223d2 1ebfb87d
      9944f7ec 170d64f9 924e9ce2 0e4d361c
      2db5f1d5 22574259 edad5e


4.5. Certificate Extensions for Particular Types of Certificates

   Different types of certificates in this profile have different
   required and recommended extensions.  Those are listed in this
   section.  Those extensions from RFC 5280 not explicitly listed
   in this profile remain at the requirement levels of RFC 5280.

4.5.1. Suite B Self-Signed CA Certificates

   In adherence with [RFC5280], self-signed CA certificates in this
   profile MUST contain the subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, and
   basicConstraints extensions.

   The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical.  The keyCertSign
   and cRLSign bits MUST be set.  The digitalSignature and
   nonRepudiation bits MAY be set.  All other bits MUST NOT be set.


Solinas, Zieglar             Expires January 1, 2009            [Page 7]

INTERNET-DRAFT    Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile          July 2009


   In adherence with [RFC5280], the basicConstraints extension MUST be
   marked as critical.  The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the
   subject is a CA and the pathLenConstraint MUST NOT be present.

4.5.2. Suite B Non-Self-Signed CA Certificates

   Non-self-signed CA Certificates in this profile MUST contain the
   authorityKeyIdentifier, subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage,
   basicConstraints and certificatePolicies extensions.

   The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical.  The keyCertSign
   and CRLSign bits MUST be set. The digitalSignature and
   nonRepudiation bits MAY be set.  All other bits MUST NOT be set.

   In adherence with [RFC5280], the basicConstraints extension MUST be
   marked as critical.  The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the
   subject is a CA and the pathLenConstraint subfield is OPTIONAL.

   If a policy is asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST be
   marked as non-critical, MUST contain the OIDs for the applicable
   certificate policies and SHOULD NOT use the policyQualifiers option.
   If a policy is not asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST
   be omitted.

   Relying party applications conforming to this profile MUST be
   prepared to process the policyMappings, policyConstraints and
   inhibitAnyPolicy extensions, regardless of criticality, following
   the guidance in [RFC5280] when they appear in non-self-signed CA
   certificates.

4.5.3.  Suite B End Entity Signature and Key Establishment Certificates

   In adherence with [RFC5280], end entity certificates in this profile
   MUST contain the authorityKeyIdentifier, keyUsage and
   certificatePolicies extensions. End entity certificates SHOULD
   contain the subjectKeyIdentifier extension.

   The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical.

   For end entity digital signature certificates, the keyUsage extension
   MUST be set for digitalSignature. The nonRepudiation bit MAY be set.
   All other bits in the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be set.

   For end entity key establishment certificates, the keyUsage extension
   MUST BE set for keyAgreement. The encipherOnly or decipherOnly bit
   MAY be set. All other bits in the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be
   set.





Solinas, Zieglar             Expires January 1, 2009            [Page 8]

INTERNET-DRAFT    Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile          July 2009


   If a policy is asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST be
   marked as non-critical, MUST contain the OIDs for the applicable
   certificate policies and SHOULD NOT use the policyQualifiers option.
   If a policy is not asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST
   be omitted.


5. Suite B CRL and CRL Extensions Profile

   This Suite B CRL profile is a profile of [RFC5280].  There are
   changes in the requirements from [RFC5280] for the signatures on
   CRLs of this profile.

   The signatures on CRLs in this profile MUST follow the same rules
   from this profile that apply to signatures in the certificates, see
   section 4.


6. Security Considerations

   The security considerations in [RFC5280], [RFC5480],
   and [sha2-dsa-ecdsa] apply.

   A single key pair SHOULD NOT be used for both signature and key
   establishment per [SP-800-57].

   The Suite B algorithms provide significantly improved performance
   when compared to equivalent-strength cryptography that does not
   employ elliptic curve cryptography.  Where performance has previously
   been an impediment, use of Suite B may permit employment of PKI-based
   cryptographic security mechanisms.


7. IANA Considerations

   This document makes extensive use of object identifiers to register
   public key types, elliptic curves, and algorithms.  Most of them are
   registered in the ANSI X9.62 arc with the exception of some of the
   curves, which are in the Certicom, Inc. arc (these curves have been
   adopted by ANSI and NIST). Extensions in certificates and CRLs are
   identified using the object identifiers defined in an arc delegated
   by IANA to the PKIX working group. No further action by IANA is
   necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.








Solinas, Zieglar             Expires January 1, 2009            [Page 9]

INTERNET-DRAFT    Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile          July 2009


8. References

8.1  Normative

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
      Requirement Levels", BCP 14, March 1997.

   [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S. Farrell., S., Boeyen, S.,
      Housley, R., Polk, W., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
      Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",
      May 2008.

8.2  Informative

   [FIPS 186-3] "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", June 2009.

   [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., Polk, T.,
      "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information",
      March 2009.

   [SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography, "SEC1: Elliptic
      Curve Cryptography", September 2000.

   [SEC2] Standards for Efficient Cryptography, "SEC 2: Recommended
      Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", September 2000.

   [sha2-dsa-ecdsa] Dang, Q., Moriarty, K., Brown, D., Polk, T.,
      "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Additional Algorithms
      and Identifiers for DSA and ECDSA",
      draft-ietf-pkix-sha2-dsa-ecdsa-06.txt., work-in-progress, March
      2009.

   [SP-800-57] Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W. Smid, M.,
      "NIST SP-800-57:Recommendation for Key Management-Part 1:
      General", March 2007.

   [X9.62] ANS X9.62, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
      Services Industry; The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
      Algorithm (ECDSA)", December 2005.

   [X9.63] ANS X9.63, "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial
      Services Industry; Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic
      Curve Cryptography", December 2001.








Solinas, Zieglar             Expires January 1, 2009           [Page 10]

INTERNET-DRAFT    Suite B Certificate and CRL Profile          July 2009


Author's Address

   Solinas, J.
   National Information Assurance Research Laboratory
   National Security Agency
   Email: jasolin@orion.ncsc.mil

   Zieglar, L.
   National Information Assurance Research Laboratory
   National Security Agency
   Email: llziegl@tycho.ncsc.mil









































Solinas, Zieglar             Expires January 1, 2009           [Page 11]

Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.109, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/