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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 RFC 5210

Network Working Group                                              J. Wu
Internet-Draft                                                     J. Bi
Intended status: Experimental                                      X. Li
Expires: April 14, 2008                                           G. Ren
                                                                   K. Xu
                                                     Tsinghua University
                                                             M. Williams
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                            Oct 12, 2007


                  SAVA Testbed and Experiences to Date
                  draft-wu-sava-testbed-experience-03

Status of this Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 14, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).









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Abstract

   Since the Internet uses destination-based packet forwarding,
   malicious attacks have been launched using spoofed source addresses.
   In an effort to enhance the Internet with IP source address
   validation, we prototyped an implementation of the IP Source Address
   Validation Architecture (SAVA) and conducted the evaluation on an
   IPv6 network.  This document reports our prototype implementation and
   the test results, as well as the lessons and insights gained from our
   experimentation.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4

   2.  A Prototype SAVA Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.1.  Solution Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  IP Source Address Validation in the Access Network . . . .  6
     2.3.  IP Source Address Validation at Intra-AS/Ingress Point . .  8
     2.4.  IP Source Address Validation in Inter-AS Case
           (Neighboring AS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.5.  IP Source Address Validation in Inter-AS Case
           (Non-Neighboring AS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

   3.  SAVA Testbed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     3.1.  CNGI-CERNET2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     3.2.  SAVA Testbed on CNGI-CERNET2 Infrastructure  . . . . . . . 14

   4.  Test Experience and Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.1.  Test Experience  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     4.2.  Test Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

   5.  Design Limitation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

   6.  Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

   9.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25



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   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 27


















































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1.  Introduction

   By design the Internet forwards data packets solely based on the
   destination IP address.  The source IP address is not checked during
   the forwarding process in most cases.  This makes it easy for
   malicious hosts to spoof the source address of the IP packet.  We
   believe that it would be useful to enable the Internet security to
   enforce the validity of the source IP address for all the packets
   being forwarded. .

   Enforcing the source IP address validity can help us achieve the
   following goals:

   o The packets which carry spoofed source addresses will not be
   forwarded, making it impossible to launch network attacks with
   spoofed source addresses.

   o The packets which hold a correct source address can be traced back
   accurately.  This can benefit network diagnosis, management,
   accounting and applications.

   As part of the effort in developing a Source Address Validation
   Architecture (SAVA), we have implemented a SAVA prototype on an
   operational network, a native IPv6 backbone network of the China Next
   Generation Internet project, and conducted evaluation experiments.
   In this document we first describe our prototype solutions and then
   report our experimental results.  We hope that this document can
   provide useful insights to those interested in the subject, and can
   serve as an initial input to future IETF effort in the same area.

   In recent years there have been a number of research and engineering
   efforts to design IP source address validation mechanisms, such
   as[RFC2827][Park01][Li02][Brem05][Snoe01].  Our SAVA prototype
   implementation was inspired by some of the schemes from the proposed
   or existing solutions.  The prototype implementation and experimental
   results presented in this report serve only as an input, and by no
   means pre-empt any solution development that may be carried out by
   future IETF effort.













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2.  A Prototype SAVA Implementation

2.1.  Solution Overview

   In the Internet at large, it is unrealistic to expect any single IP
   source address validation mechanism to be universally supported.
   Different operators and vendors may choose to deploy/develop
   different mechanisms to achieve the same end, and there need to be
   different mechanisms to solve the problem at different places in the
   network.  Furthermore, implementation bugs or configuration errors
   can also render the intended implementation in-effective.  Therefore
   our prototype SAVA implementation is a combination of multiple
   coexisting and cooperating mechanisms.  More specifically, we
   implement source IP address validation at three levels: access
   network source address validation; intra-AS source address
   validation; and inter-AS source address validation, as shown in
   Figure 1.The system details can be found in[WRL2007].
                  __ ____                          __ ____
              .-''       `':                   .-''       `':
              |             |                  |             |
              |   +-+----+  |   Inter-AS SAV   |   +-+----+  |
              |   |Router+--+------------------+---|Router+  +
              |   +--.---+  |                  |   +--.---+  |
   Intra-AS   |      |      |       Intra-AS   |      |      |
      SAV     |   +--+---+  |          SAV     |   +--+---+  |
              |   |Router|  |                  |   |Router|  |
              '_  +--.---+  _                  '_  +--.---+  _
                `'---|---'''                     `'---|---'''
                 _.--|-----.                      _.--|-----.
             ,-''    |      `--.              ,-''    |      `--.
           |'+-----------------+`|          |'+-----------------+`|
           | |     Router      | |          | |     Router      | |
           | ++----------------+ |          | ++----------------+ |
    Access |  |      |        |  |   Access |  |      |        |  |
    Network|  | +------++------+ |   Network|  | +------++------+ |
     SAV   |  | |Switch||Router| |    SAV   |  | |Switch||Router| |
           |  | +------++------+ |          |  | +------++------+ |
           |  |      |        |  |          |  |      |        |  |
           |+-+--+ +----+ +----+ |          |+-+--+ +----+ +----+ |
           ||Host| |Host| |Host| |          ||Host| |Host| |Host| |
           `.----+ +----+ +----+,'          `.----+ +----+ +----+,'
             `--.           _.-'              `--.           _.-'
                 `--------''                      `--------''
   Key: SAV== Source Address Validation

                        Figure 1: Solution Overview

   It is important to enforce IP source address validity at the access



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   network.  That is, when an IP packet is sent from a host, the
   routers, switches or other devices ( if you implement the functions
   in a special device ) should check to make sure that the packet
   carries a legally assigned source IP address.  If this access network
   source address validation is missing, then a host may be able to
   spoof the source IP address which belongs to another local host.

   We use the term "intra-AS source address validation" to mean the IP
   source address validation at the attachment point of an access
   network to its provider network, also called the ingress point.  IP
   source address validation at ingress points can enforce the source IP
   address correctness at the IP prefix level, assuming the access
   network owns one or more IP address blocks.  This practice has been
   adopted as the Internet Best-Current-Practice [RFC2827][RFC3704].
   Even in the absence of the access network source address checking,
   this ingress checking can still prevent the hosts within one access
   network from spoofing IP addresses belonging to other networks.

   In theory, everyone would do validation in the access network level
   and again at the intra-AS level.  In reality, some packets will get
   validated and some will not get validated.  As a result, the Intra-AS
   validation level will also need to be able to preserve validation
   status learnt from the Inter-AS validation level (see below) from
   ingress to egress for transit traffic.  This is a topic for further
   study.

   Inter-AS IP source address validation refers to mechanisms that
   enforce packet source address correctness at AS boundaries .  The
   first two steps of source address validation utilize the network
   physical connectivity of the access network and the ingress points.
   Because the global Internet has a mesh topology, and because
   different networks belong to different administrative authorities, IP
   source address validation at Inter-AS level becomes more challenging.
   Nevertheless we believe this third level of protection is necessary
   to detect packets with spoofed source addresses, when the first two
   levels of source address validation are missing or ineffective .

   In the rest of this section we describe the specific mechanisms
   implemented at each of the three levels in detail.

2.2.  IP Source Address Validation in the Access Network

   At the access network level, the solution will make sure the host
   inside the access network could not use the source address of other
   host.  The host address should be legally assigned to the host in a
   static way or a dynamic way.  A layer-3 source address validation
   device (SAVA Device) for access network (the device can be a function
   inside the CPE router or a separate device) is deployed at the exit



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   of the access network.  Some source address validation agents (SAVA
   Agent) are deployed inside the access network, these agents can be a
   function inside the first hop router/switch that connected to hosts.
   Some layer-3 protocols are designed between the host, SAVA Agent and
   SAVA Device.  Only a packet originating from the host that owns the
   valid source address can finally pass through the SAVA Agent and SAVA
   Device.  Therefore, there are two parts: host-to-agent and agent-to-
   device (in case that there is no agent can be deployed, the protocol
   is between the host and SAVA device directly, so we denote it as
   "host/agent-device part" in the following sections).

   The main idea of the first-hop part (host-to-agent) is to create a
   dynamic binding between a switch port and valid source IP address, or
   a binding between MAC address, source IP address and switch port.
   For host/agent-device part, we develop a method using source address
   authentication using session key and hash digest algorithms, and
   prevent replay attack by combining a sequence number method with a
   timestamp method.

   The host-to-agent part has three main modules: Source Address Request
   Client (SARC) on the host, Source Address Validation Proxy (SAVP) on
   the switch, and Source Address Management Server (SAMS).  The
   solution has the following basic steps:

   1.  The SARC on the end host sends an IP address request.  The SAVP
       on the switch relays this request to the SAMS and records the MAC
       address and incoming port.  If the address has already been
       predetermined by the end host, the end host still needs to put
       that address in the request message for verification by SAMS.

   2.  After the SAMS receives the IP address request then allocates a
       source address for that SARC based on the address allocation and
       management policy of the access network, it stores the allocation
       of the IP address in the history database of SAMS for traceback,
       then sends response message containing the allocated address to
       the SARC.

   3.  After the SAVP on the access switch receives the response, it
       binds the IP address and the former stored MAC address of the
       request message with the switch port on the binding table.  Then,
       it forwards the issued address to SARC on the end host.

   4.  The access switch begins to filter packets sent from the end
       host.  Packets which do not conform to the tuple (IP address,
       Switch Port) are discarded.

   For the case that IP address was staticly assigned to the host, if
   the address has been predetermined by the end host, it still needs to



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   put it in the request datagram for acceptance from SAMS.

   The host/agent-to-device part includes the following steps (the
   mechanism details can be found in [XBW07]):

   1.  When a host wants to access the Internet, it should firstly carry
       out the access authentication.

   2.  Then the SAVA Agent generates a session key S and sends it to the
       SAVA Device via a key exchange mechanisms.  The SAVA Device binds
       the session key and the host's IP address.

   3.  When the host sends packet M to somewhere outside the access
       network, the SAVA Agent needs to generate one signature for each
       packet using the hash digest algorithm (e.g.  MD5).  Then the
       signature H[M||S] is carried in a new IPv6 extension header,
       named 'source address validation header'.

   4.  The SAVA Device uses the session key to authenticate the
       signature carried in the packet so that it can validate the
       source address.

   5.  The SAVA Device identifies the replay packets by checking whether
       the sequence number of the packet is increasing within the
       admission time window T (T is set up by timestamp mechanism).

   6.  In case there is no SAVA Agent deployed, the host is installed a
       software to do the above work (exchanging session key and
       inserting the signature into the packets) by the host itself.

2.3.  IP Source Address Validation at Intra-AS/Ingress Point

   We adopted the solution of the source address validation of IP
   packets at ingress points described in [RFC2827]and[RFC3704]; the
   latter describes source address validation at the ingress points of
   multi-homed access networks.

2.4.  IP Source Address Validation in Inter-AS Case (Neighboring AS)

   Our design for the Inter-AS Source Address Validation aimed at the
   following characteristics: It should cooperate among different ASes
   with different administrative authorities and different interests.
   It should be light-weight to support high throughput and not to
   influence forwarding efficiency.

   The inter-AS level of SAVA can be classified into two sub-cases:

   o Two SAVA-compliant ASes exchanging traffic are directly connected;



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   o Two SAVA-compliant ASes are separated by one or more intervening,
   SAVA-non-compliant providers.
                                        ---------
                                        | AIMS   |
                                         ------|-
                                               |
   --------------                   -----------|-----
   |  AS-4       |--------  --------|    AS-1  |    |-------     Global
   | ------      |ASBR,VE|->|ASBR,VE|    ------|-   |ASBR,VE|--->IPv6
   | |VRGE|      |--------  --------|    | VRGE |   |-------     Network
   | ------      |                  |    --------   |
   ---------------            ----- -----------------
                              |ASBR,VE|    |ASBR,VE|
                              ---------    ---------
                               /             |
                              /              |
                             /               |
                            /                |
                        ----------        --------
                        |ASBR, VE|        |ASBR,VE|
                   ---------------      -------------
                   |   AS-2      |      |  AS-3     |
                   |  -----      |      |   -----   |
                   |  |VRGE|     |      |  |VRGE|   |
                   |  -----      |      |  ------   |
                   ---------------      -------------

   Key: AIMS == AS-IPv6 prefix Mapping Server, VRGE == Validation Rule
   Generating Engine, VE == Validating Engine, ASBR = AS Border Router,
   VR==Validation Rule

               Figure 2: Inter-ISP (Neighboring AS) Solution

   An AS relation based mechanism is proposed for neighboring SAVA-
   compliant ASes.  The basic ideas of this AS-relation based mechanism
   are as follows.  It builds a VR table that associates each incoming
   interface of the router with a set of valid source address blocks,
   and then uses it to filter spoofed packets.  The VR is generated from
   the AS relation of neighboring SAVA-compliant ASes.

   In the solution implemented on the testbed, the solution for the
   validation of IPv6 prefixes is separated into three functional
   modules: The Validation Rule Generating Engine (VRGE), the Validation
   Engine (VE) and the the AS-IPv6 prefix Mapping Server(AIMS).
   Validation rules (VR) that are generated by the VRGE are expressed as
   IPv6 address prefixes.

   The VRGE generates validation rules which are derived according to



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   the table shown in figure 3, and each AS has a VRGE.  The VE loads
   validation rules generated by VRGE to filter packets passed between
   ASes (in the case of Figure 2, from neighboring ASes into AS-1).  In
   the SAVA testbed, the VE is implemented as a simulated L2 device on a
   Linux-based machine inserted into the data path just outside each
   ASBR interface that faces a neighboring AS, but in a real-world
   implementation, it would probably be implemented as a packet
   filtering set on the ASBR.  The AS-IPv6 prefix mapping server is also
   implemented on a Linux machine and derives a mapping between IPv6
   prefix and the AS number of that prefix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   \Export| Own        | Customer's| Sibling's | Provider's | Peer's     |
|To  \     | Address    | Address   | Address   | Address    | Address    |
|-----\-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Provider |      Y     |    Y      |     Y     |            |            |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Customer |      Y     |    Y      |     Y     |     Y      |     Y      |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Peer     |      Y     |    Y      |     Y     |            |            |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Sibling  |      Y     |    Y      |     Y     |     Y      |     Y      |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              Figure 3: AS-Relation Based Inter-AS Filtering

   Different ASes exchange and transmit VR information using the AS-
   Relation Based Export Rules in the VRGE.  As per Figure 3, an AS
   exports the address prefixes of its own, its customers, its
   providers, its siblings and its peers to its customers and siblings
   as valid prefixes, while it only exports the address prefixes of its
   own, its customers and its siblings to its providers and peers as
   valid prefixes.  With the support of AS Number to IPv6 Address
   Mapping service, only AS numbers of valid address prefixes are
   transferred between ASes and the AS number is mapped to address
   prefixes at the VRGE.  Only changes of AS relation and changes of IP
   address prefixes belonging to an AS require the generation of VR
   updates.

   The procedure's principle steps are as follows (Seeing from AS-1 in
   Figure 2):

   1.  When the VRGE has initialized, it reads its neighboring SAVA-
       compliant AS table and establishes connections to all the VEs in
       its own AS.

   2.  The VRGE initiates a VR renewal.  According to its exporting
       table, it sends its own originated VR to VRGEs of neighboring
       ASes.  In this process, VR are expressed as AS numbers.



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   3.  When a VRGE receives the new VR from its neighbor, it uses its
       own export table to decide whether it should accept the VR and,
       if it accepts a VR, whether or not it should re-export the VR to
       other neighboring ASes.

   4.  If the VRGE accepts a VR, it uses the AIMS to transform AS-
       expressed VR into IPv6 prefix-expressed VR.

   5.  The VRGE pushes the VR to all the VEs in its AS.

   The VEs use these prefix-based VRs to validate the source IP
   addresses of incoming packets.

2.5.  IP Source Address Validation in Inter-AS Case (Non-Neighboring AS)

   In the case where two ASes do not exchange packets directly, it is
   not possible to deploy a solution like that in the previous section.
   However, it is highly desirable for non-neighboring ISPs to be able
   to form a trust alliance such that packets leaving one AS will be
   recognized by the other and inherit the validation status they
   possessed on leaving the first AS.  There is more than one way to do
   this.  For the SAVA experiments to date, a signature method has been
   used.  This solution is inspired by the work [Brem05].  The basic
   ideas of this light-weight signature based mechanism are as follows.
   For every two SAVA-compliant ASes, there is a pair of unique
   temporary signatures.  All SAVA-compliant ASes form SAVA AS Alliance.
   When a packet is leaving its own AS, if the destination IP address
   belongs to an AS in the SAVA AS Alliance, the edge router of this AS
   looks up for the signature based on the destination AS number, and
   tags a signature to the packet.  When a packet is arriving at the
   destination AS, if the source address of the packet belongs to an AS
   in the SAVA AS Alliance, the edge router of the destination AS looks
   up for the signature based on the source AS number, and the signature
   carried in the packet is verified and removed.  This particular
   method uses a light-weight signature.  For every packet forwarded,
   the signature can be put in an IPv6 hop-by-hop extension header.  We
   can use a 128-bit shared random number as the signature, instead of
   using cryptographic method to generate the signature.













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                                +-----+
              .-----------------+.REG |-----------------.
              |                 +-----+                 |
              |                                         |
        ,-----+--------                          ,------+-------
      ,'     `|        `.                      ,'     ` |       `.
     /        |         \                     /         |         \
    /         |          \                   /          |          \
   ;       +--'--+      +----+             +----+     +-----+       ;
   |       | ASC +------+ASBR|             |ASBR+-----+ ASC |       |
   :       +--.--+      +----+`            +----+     +--+--+       :
    \         |__________________________________________|         /
     \                   /                    \                   /
      `.               ,'                      `.               ,'
        '-------------'                          '-------------'
             AS-1                                     AS-2
   KEY: REG == Registration Server, ASC == AS Control Server, ASBR == AS
   Border Router.

             Figure 4: Inter-AS (Non-neighboring AS) Solution

   There are three major components in the system: the Registration
   Server (REG), the AS Control Server (ASC), and the AS Border Router
   (ASBR).

   The Registration Server is the "center" of the trust alliance (TA) .
   It maintains a member list for the TA.  It performs two major
   functions:

   o Processes requests from the AS Control Server, to get the member
   list for the TA.

   o When the member list is changed, notifies each AS Control Server.

   Each AS deploying the method has an AS Control Server.  The AS
   Control Server has three major functions:

   o Communicates with the Registration Server, to get the up-to-date
   member list of TA.

   o Communicates with the AS Control Server in other member AS in the
   TA, to exchange updates of prefix ownership information, and to
   exchange signatures.

   o Communicates with all AS Border routers of the local AS, to
   configure the processing component on the AS Border routers.

   The AS Border Router does the work of adding signature to the packet



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   at the sending AS, and the work of verifying and removing the
   signature at the destination AS.

   In the design of this system, in order to decrease the burden on the
   REG, most of the control traffic happens between ASCs.

   The signature needs to be changed frequently, Although the overhead
   of maintaining and exchanging signatures between AS pairs is not
   O(N^2), but O(N), the traffic and processing overhead increase as the
   number of ASes increases.  Therefore an automatic signature changing
   method is utilized in this solution.








































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3.  SAVA Testbed

3.1.  CNGI-CERNET2

   The prototypes of our solutions for SAVA are implemented and tested
   on CNGI-CERNET2.  CNGI-CERNET2 is one of the China Next Generation
   Internet (CNGI) backbones.  CNGI-CERNET2 connects 25 core nodes
   distributed in 20 cities in China at speeds of 2.5-10 Gb/s.  The
   CNGI-CERNET2 backbones are IPv6-only networks, not a mixed IPv4/IPv6
   infrastructure.  The CNGI-CERNET2 backbones, CNGI-CERNET2 CPNs, and
   CNGI-6IX all have globally unique AS numbers.  Thus a multi-AS
   testbed environment is provided.

3.2.  SAVA Testbed on CNGI-CERNET2 Infrastructure

   It is intended that eventually the SAVA testbed will be implemented
   directly on the CNGI-CERNET2 backbone, but in the early stages the
   testbed has been implemented across 12 universities connected to
   CNGI-CERNET2.  This is because first, some of the algorithms need to
   be implemented in the testbed routers themselves and to date they
   have not been implemented on any of the commercial routers forming
   the CNGI-CERNET2 backbone.  Second, since CNGI-CERNET2 is a
   operational backbone, any new protocols and networking techniques
   need to be tested in a non- disruptive way.



























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                               __
                             ,'  \                            _,...._
                            ,'    \____---------------+     ,'Beijing`.
                            /      \  | Inter-AS SAV  |-----| Univ    |
    +---------------+     |         | +---------------+     `-._____,'
    | Inter-AS SAV  +-----|         |
    +------.--------+     |  CNGI-  |                         _,...._
           |              | CERNET2 |__---------------+     ,Northeast`.
           |              |         | |Inter-AS SAV   |-----| Univ    |
   Tsinghua|University    | Backbone| +---------------+     `-._____,'
        ,,-|-._           |         |
      ,'   |   `.         |         |
    ,'+---------+\        |         |
   |  |Intra-AS | |       |         |      ...
   |  |   SAV   | |       |         |
   |  +---------+ |       |         |
   |       |      |       |         |                         _,...._
   |  +---------+ |       |         |__---------------+     ,Chongqing`.
   |  | Access  | |       |         | |Inter-AS SAV   |-----|Univ     |
   |  | Network | |       |         | +---------------+     `-._____,'
   |  |  SAV    | |       |         |
    \ +---------+.'        \       .'
     \          ,'          \      |
      `.      ,'             \    /
        ``---'                -_,'
   KEY: SAV=Source Address Validation

                    Figure 5: CNGI-CERNET2 SAVA Testbed

   Notwithstanding the aforementioned restrictions on the early testbed,
   the testbed is fully capable of functional testing of solutions for
   all parts of the SAVA solutions.  Namely, it is possible to test
   procedures for ensuring the validity of IPv6 source addresses in the
   access network and in packets sent from the access network to an IPv6
   service provider, packets sent within one service provider's network,
   packets sent between neighboring service providers and packets sent
   between service providers separated by an intervening transit
   network.

   The testbed is distributed across 12 universities connected to CNGI-
   CERNET2, namely Tsinghua University, Beijing University, Beijing
   University of Post and Telecommunications, Shanghai Jiaotong
   University, Huazhong University of Science and Technology in Wuhan,
   Southeast University in Nanjing, and South China University of
   Technology in Guangzhou, Northeast University in Shenyang, Xi'an
   Jiaotong University, Shandong University in Jinan, University of
   Electronic Science and Technology of China in Chengdu and Chongqing
   University.



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   Each of the university installations is connected to the CNGI-CERNET2
   backbone through a set of inter-AS Source Address Validation
   prototype equipment and traffic monitoring equipment for test result
   display.

   Of the installations, the installation at Tsinghua University is the
   most fully-featured, with inter-AS, intra-AS and access network level
   validation all able to be tested.  In addition, a suite of
   applications that could be subject to spoofing attacks or which can
   be subverted to carry out spoofing attacks are installed on a variety
   of servers.








































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4.  Test Experience and Results

   The solutions outlined in section 2 have been implemented on the
   testbed described in section 3.  Successful testing of all solutions
   has been carried out, as detailed in the following sections.

4.1.  Test Experience

   We have test in Tsinghua University and tests between Tsinghua
   University and other universities.  We have Inter-AS (non-neighboring
   AS) SAVA solution test, Inter-AS (neighboring AS) SAVA solution test,
   Intra-AS SAVA solution test, and Access Network SAVA solution test.

   For each one of the test scenarios, we have tested many cases.
   Taking Inter-AS (non-neighboring AS) SAVA solution test as an
   example, we classified the test cases into three classes: normal
   class, dynamic class and anti-spoofing class.

   1.  For normal class, there are three cases: Adding Signature Test,
       Removing Signature Test and Forwarding packets with valid source
       address.

   2.  For dynamic class, there are four cases: Updating the signature
       between ASes, The protection for newly joined member AS, Adding
       address space and Deleting address space.

   3.  For anti-spoofing class, there is one case: Filtering of packets
       with forged IP address.

   As is shown in Fig.5, we have "multiple-fence" design for our SAVA
   testbed.  If source address validation is deployed in the access
   network, we can get a host granularity validation.  If source address
   validation is deployed at intra-AS level, we can guarantee that the
   packets sent from this point have a correct IP prefix.  If source
   address validation is deployed at inter-AS level, we can guarantee
   that the packets sent from this point are from a correct AS.

4.2.  Test Results

   1.  The test results are consistent with the expected ones.  For an
       AS which has fully-featured SAVA deployment with inter-AS,
       intra-AS and access network level validation, packets that do not
       hold an authenticated source address will not be forwarded in
       network.  As a result, it is not possible to launch network
       attacks with spoofed source addresses.  Moreover, the traffic in
       the network can be traced back accurately.





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   2.  For the Inter-AS (non-neighboring AS) SAVA solution, during the
       period of signature update, the old and the new signature are
       both valid for source address validation, thus there are no
       packet loss.

   3.  For the Inter-AS (non-neighboring AS) SAVA solution, the
       validation function is implemented in software on a device
       running Linux, which simulates the source address validation
       functions of a router line card interface.  It is a layer-two
       device because it has to be transparent to router interface,
       During the test, If the devices were connected directly, it could
       achieve a normal line rate forwarding.  If the devices were
       connected with routers from another vendor, it could only achieve
       a very limited line speed.  The reason is that the signatures are
       added on the IPv6 hop-by-hop option header and the network
       devices from other vendors handled the hop-by-hop options just by
       software.


































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5.  Design Limitation

   There are several design limitations for the solutions deployed in
   CNGI-CERNET2 testbed.

   1.  For the Inter-AS (non-neighboring AS) SAVA solution, the
       difficulty for guessing the signature between two AS members was
       discussed in [Brem05].  It is relatively difficult and we can
       increase the difficulty of guess by increasing the length of the
       signature.  In current CNGI-CERNET2 SAVA testbed, a 128-bit
       signature is designed in IPv6 hop-by-hop option header.  The size
       of the packets increases with the signatures.  Because this IPv6
       hop-by-hop option has to be looked at by all intervening routers,
       it still needs further discussion whether the IPv6 hop-by-hop
       option is the right tool for the task.  Although the overhead is
       relatively low, the addition of the option and the calculation of
       the signature can consume valuable resources on the forwarding
       path.

   2.  The Inter-AS (neighboring AS) SAVA solution is based on AS
       relation, thus it can not synchronized with the dynamics of route
       changes very quickly.

   3.  The first hop solution in access network needs to be widely
       deployed in the access network switches.  For the environment
       where source address validation is not deployed in the access
       network, because we have a "multiple-fence" design for SAVA, we
       can still get a source address validation by the SAVA Device at
       the exit of the access network.  Currently we use an
       authentication based method for host/agent-to-device part.  The
       performance of current solution also needs to be further studied.

   4.  Given that a large fraction of current denial-of-service attacks
       are employing legitimate IP addresses belonging to botnet
       clients, even universal deployment of better source address
       validation techniques would be unable to prevent these attacks.
       However, tracing these attacks would be easier given that there
       would be more reliance on the validity of source address.













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6.  Conclusion

   Several conclusions can be made from the test experience and results.

   It is possible to devise a loosely-coupled, and "multiple-fence"
   design for SAVA.  This provides for different granularities of
   authenticity of source IP addresses.  It also allows for different
   providers to use different solutions, and the coupling of components
   at different levels of granularity of authenticity can be loose
   enough to allow component substitution.

   Incremental deployment is another design principle for SAVA.  The
   tests have demonstrated that benefit is derived even when deployment
   is incomplete, which gives providers an incentive to be early
   adopters of the framework.  Some DiffServ mechanism could also be
   considered.  That is, traffic from SAVA-compliant ASes could be given
   a higher priority, especially when attacks happening.

   Access network source address validation is an important part of SAVA
   to achieve an authenticity of host IP granularity.  There are
   multiple access cases: local subnet in enterprise networks,
   residential broadband, and wireless mobile, etc.  For enterprise
   networks, there are multiple solutions from the research and
   engineering community.  Focusing on the appropriate framework and
   solutions for access network source address validation could be a
   valuable initial step for solving the source address spoofing problem
   in IETF.

   SAVA must be capable of scaling to the size of the global Internet.
   The scalability of SAVA still needs further consideration.  CNGI-
   CERNET2 testbed merely provides an initial testbed for SAVA.  To
   study the scalabity of the current solutions, we need to extend the
   scale of the testbed.


















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7.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no request of IANA.

   Note to RFC Editor: this section may be removed on publication as an
   RFC.













































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8.  Security Considerations

   The purpose of the draft is to report experimental results.  The
   security considerations of the solution mechanisms of testbed are not
   mentioned in this document.














































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9.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Jari Arkko and Lixia Zhang for their
   detailed review comments on this draft, and thank Paul Ferguson and
   Ron Bonica for their valuable advices on the solution development and
   the testbed implementation.













































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10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2827]  Paul, F. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.

   [RFC3704]  Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
              Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, 2004.

10.2.  Informative References

   [Brem05]   Bremler-Barr, A. and H. Levy, "Spoofing Prevention
              Method", INFOCOM 2005.

   [Li02]     Li,, J., Mirkovic, J., Wang, M., Reiher, P., and L.
              Zhang, "SAVE: Source Address Validity Enforcement
              Protocol", INFOCOM  2002.

   [Park01]   Park, K. and H. Lee, "On the effectiveness of route-based
              packet filtering for distributed DoS attack prevention in
              power-law internets", SIGCOMM 2001.

   [Snoe01]   Snoeren, A., Partridge, C., Sanchez, L., and C.
              Jones......, "A Hash-based IP traceback", SIGCOMM 2001.

   [WRL2007]  Wu, J., Ren, G., and X. Li, "Source Address Validation:
              Architecture and Protocol Design", ICNP 2007.

   [XBW07]    Xie, L., Bi, J., and J. Wu, "An Authentication based
              Source Address Spoofing Prevention Method Deployed in IPv6
              Edge Network", ICCS 2007.


















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Authors' Addresses

   Jianping Wu
   Tsinghua University
   Computer Science, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   China

   Email: jianping@cernet.edu.cn


   Jun Bi
   Tsinghua University
   Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   China

   Email: junbi@cernet.edu.cn


   Xing Li
   Tsinghua University
   Electronic Engineering, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   China

   Email: xing@cernet.edu.cn


   Gang Ren
   Tsinghua University
   Computer Science, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   China

   Email: rg03@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn


   Ke Xu
   Tsinghua University
   Computer Science, Tsinghua University
   Beijing  100084
   China

   Email: xuke@csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn






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   Mark I. Williams
   Juniper Networks
   Suite 1508, W3 Tower, Oriental Plaza, 1 East Chang'An Ave
   Dong Cheng District, Beijing  100738
   China

   Email: miw@juniper.net












































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Full Copyright Statement

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