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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 RFC 6189

Network Working Group                                      P. Zimmermann
Internet-Draft                                             Zfone Project
Intended status: Informational                          A. Johnston, Ed.
Expires: August 28, 2008                                           Avaya
                                                               J. Callas
                                                         PGP Corporation
                                                       February 25, 2008


             ZRTP: Media Path Key Agreement for Secure RTP
                      draft-zimmermann-avt-zrtp-05

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 28, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

Abstract

   This document defines ZRTP, a protocol for media path Diffie-Hellman
   exchange to agree on a session key and parameters for establishing
   Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) sessions.  The ZRTP
   protocol is media path keying because it is multiplexed on the same
   port as RTP and does not require support in the signaling protocol.



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   ZRTP does not assume a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or require the
   complexity of certificates in end devices.  For the media session,
   ZRTP provides confidentiality, protection against man-in-the-middle
   (MITM) attacks, and, in cases where a secret is available from the
   signaling protocol, authentication.  ZRTP can utilize two Session
   Description Protocol (SDP) attributes to provide discovery and
   authentication through the signaling channel.  To provide best effort
   SRTP, ZRTP utilizes normal RTP/AVP profiles.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Media Security Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.1.  Key Agreement Modes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.1.1.  Diffie-Hellman Mode  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       4.1.2.  Multistream Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       4.1.3.  Preshared Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.1.  Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     5.2.  Commit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     5.3.  Shared Secret Determination  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       5.3.1.  Responder Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       5.3.2.  Initiator Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       5.3.3.  Handling a Shared Secret Cache Mismatch  . . . . . . . 14
     5.4.  Secret Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       5.4.1.  Diffie-Hellman Mode  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       5.4.2.  Multistream Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       5.4.3.  Preshared Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     5.5.  Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     5.6.  Confirmation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
     5.7.  Termination  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
     5.8.  Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     5.9.  ZID and Cache Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   6.  ZRTP Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     6.1.  ZRTP Message Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
       6.1.1.  Message Type Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
       6.1.2.  Hash Type Block  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
       6.1.3.  Cipher Type Block  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
       6.1.4.  Auth Tag Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
       6.1.5.  Key Agreement Type Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
       6.1.6.  SAS Type Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
       6.1.7.  Signature Type Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     6.2.  Hello message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     6.3.  HelloACK message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
     6.4.  Commit message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36



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     6.5.  DHPart1 message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
     6.6.  DHPart2 message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
     6.7.  Confirm1 and Confirm2 messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
     6.8.  Conf2ACK message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
     6.9.  Error message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
     6.10. ErrorACK message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
     6.11. GoClear message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
     6.12. ClearACK message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
     6.13. SASrelay message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
     6.14. RelayACK message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
   7.  Retransmissions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
   8.  Short Authentication String  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
     8.1.  SAS Verified Flag  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
     8.2.  Signing the SAS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
     8.3.  Relaying the SAS through a PBX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
       8.3.1.  PBX Enrollment and the PBX Enrollment Flag . . . . . . 57
     8.4.  Rendering SAS for Multiple Media Streams . . . . . . . . . 58
   9.  Signaling Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
     9.1.  Tying the media stream to the signaling layer via the
           Hello Hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
     9.2.  Deriving the signaling secret (sigs) from the
           signaling layer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
     9.3.  Deriving the SRTP secret (srtps) from the signaling
           layer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
     9.4.  Using the signaling path to check the SAS  . . . . . . . . 62
   10. False ZRTP Packet Rejection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
   11. Intermediary ZRTP Devices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
   12. The ZRTP Disclosure flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
     12.1. Guidelines on Proper Implementation of the Disclosure
           Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
   13. RTP Header Extension Flag for ZRTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
   14. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
     14.1. IANA Registration of a=zrtp-hash SDP attribute . . . . . . 70
     14.2. IANA Registration of a=zrtp-sas SDP attribute  . . . . . . 71
   15. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
   16. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
   17. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
     17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
     17.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 79










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1.  Introduction

   ZRTP is a key agreement protocol which performs Diffie-Hellman key
   exchange during call setup in the media path, and is transported over
   the same port as the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [2] media
   stream which has been established using a signaling protocol such as
   Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [24].  This generates a shared
   secret which is then used to generate keys and salt for a Secure RTP
   (SRTP) [3] session.  ZRTP borrows ideas from PGPfone [19].  A
   reference implementation of ZRTP is available as Zfone [20].

   The ZRTP protocol has some nice cryptographic features lacking in
   many other approaches to media session encryption.  Although it uses
   a public key algorithm, it does not rely on a public key
   infrastructure (PKI).  In fact, it does not use persistent public
   keys at all.  It uses ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH) with hash
   commitment, and allows the detection of man-in-the-middle (MITM)
   attacks by displaying a short authentication string for the users to
   read and compare over the phone.  It has Perfect Forward Secrecy,
   meaning the keys are destroyed at the end of the call, which
   precludes retroactively compromising the call by future disclosures
   of key material.  But even if the users are too lazy to bother with
   short authentication strings, we still get reasonable authentication
   against a MITM attack, based on a form of key continuity.  It does
   this by caching some key material to use in the next call, to be
   mixed in with the next call's DH shared secret, giving it key
   continuity properties analogous to SSH.  All this is done without
   reliance on a PKI, key certification, trust models, certificate
   authorities, or key management complexity that bedevils the email
   encryption world.  It also does not rely on SIP signaling for the key
   management, and in fact does not rely on any servers at all.  It
   performs its key agreements and key management in a purely peer-to-
   peer manner over the RTP packet stream.

   If the endpoints have a mechanism for knowing or retrieving the other
   endpoint's signature key, the short authentication string can be
   authenticated by exchanging a signature over the short authentication
   string.

   ZRTP can be used and discovered without being declared or indicated
   in the signaling path.  This provides a best effort SRTP capability.
   Also, this reduces the complexity of implementations and minimizes
   interdependency between the signaling and media layers.  When ZRTP is
   indicated in the signaling and the SDP attribute extensions are used,
   ZRTP has additional useful properties.  When the signaling path has
   end-to-end integrity protection, the short authentication string can
   be compared automatically by the ZRTP endpoints.  By sending a hash
   of the ZRTP Hello message in the signaling, ZRTP provides a useful



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   binding between the signaling and media paths.

   The next section discusses how ZRTP meets every requirement for media
   security protocols documented in the IETF.  Following sections
   provide an overview of the ZRTP protocol, describe the key agreement
   algorithm and RTP message formats.


2.  Terminology

   In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
   "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
   and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 and
   indicate requirement levels for compliant implementations [1].


3.  Media Security Requirements

   This section discuses how ZRTP meets all RTP security requirements
   discussed in the SIP Working Group's Media Security Requirements [16]
   document without any dependencies on other protocols or extensions.

      R-FORK-RETARGET is met since ZRTP is a media path key agreement
      protocol.

      R-DISTINCT is met since ZRTP uses ZIDs and allows multiple
      independent ZRTP exchanges to proceed.

      R-REUSE is met using the Multistream and Preshared modes.

      R-AVOID-CLIPPING is met since ZRTP is a media path key agreement
      protocol

      R-RTP-VALID is met since the ZRTP packet format does not pass the
      RTP validity check

      R-ASSOC is met using the a=zrtp-hash SDP attribute in INVITEs and
      responses.

      R-NEGOTIATE is met using the Commit message.

      R-PSTN is met since ZRTP can be implemented in Gateways.

      R-PFS is met using ZRTP Diffie-Hellman key agreement methods.

      R-COMPUTE is met using the Hello/Commit ZRTP exchange.





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      R-CERTS is met using the optional signature field in ZRTP Confirm
      messages.

      R-FIPS is met since ZRTP uses algorithms that allow FIPS
      certification.

      R-DOS is met since ZRTP does not introduce any new denial of
      service attacks.

      R-EXISTING is met since ZRTP can support the use of certificates
      or keys.

      R-AGILITY is met since the set of hash, cipher, authentication tag
      length, key agreement method, SAS type, and signature type can all
      be extended and negotiated.

      R-DOWNGRADE is met since ZRTP has protection against downgrade
      attacks.

      R-PASS-MEDIA is met since ZRTP prevents a passive adversary with
      access to the media path from gaining access to keying material
      used to protect SRTP media packets.

      R-PASS-SIG is met since ZRTP prevents a passive adversary with
      access to the signaling path from gaining access to keying
      material used to protect SRTP media packets.

      R-SIG-MEDIA is met using the a=zrtp-hash and a=zrtp-sas SDP
      attributes in INVITEs and responses.

      R-ID-BINDING is met using the a=zrtp-hash and a=zrtp-sas SDP
      attributes.

      R-ACT-ACT is met using the a=zrtp-hash and a=zrtp-sas SDP
      attributes in INVITEs and responses.

      R-BEST-SECURE is met since ZRTP utilizes the RTP/AVP profile and
      hence best effort SRTP in every case.

      R-OTHER-SIGNALING is met since ZRTP can utilize modes in which
      there is no dependency on the signaling path.

      R-RECORDING is met using the ZRTP Disclosure flag.

      R-TRANSCODER is met if the transoder operates as a trusted MitM
      (i.e. a PBX).




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4.  Overview

   This section provides a description of how ZRTP works.  This
   description is non-normative in nature but is included to build
   understanding of the protocol.

   ZRTP is negotiated the same way a conventional RTP session is
   negotiated in an offer/answer exchange using the standard AVP/RTP
   profile.  The ZRTP protocol begins after two endpoints have utilized
   a signaling protocol such as SIP and are ready to exchange media.  If
   ICE [31] is being used, ZRTP begins after ICE has completed its
   connectivity checks.

   ZRTP is multiplexed on the same ports as RTP.  It uses a unique
   header that makes it clearly differentiable from RTP or STUN.

   In environments in which sending ZRTP packets to non-ZRTP endpoints
   might cause problems and signaling path discovery is not an option,
   ZRTP endpoints can include the RTP header extension flag for ZRTP in
   normal RTP packets sent at the start of a session as a probe to
   discover if the other endpoint supports ZRTP.  If the flag is
   received from the other endpoint, ZRTP messages can then be
   exchanged.

   A ZRTP endpoint initiates the exchange by sending a ZRTP Hello
   message to the other endpoint.  The purpose of the Hello message is
   to confirm the endpoint supports the protocol and to see what
   algorithms the two ZRTP endpoints have in common.

   The Hello message contains the SRTP configuration options, and the
   ZID.  Each instance of ZRTP has a unique 96-bit random ZRTP ID or ZID
   that is generated once at installation time.  ZIDs are discovered
   during the Hello message exchange.  The received ZID is used to look
   up retained shared secrets from previous ZRTP sessions with the
   endpoint.

   A response to a ZRTP Hello message is a ZRTP HelloACK message.  The
   HelloACK message simply acknowledges receipt of the Hello.  Since RTP
   commonly uses best effort UDP transport, ZRTP has retransmission
   timers in case of lost datagrams.  There are two timers, both with
   exponential backoff mechanisms.  One timer is used for
   retransmissions of Hello messages and the other is used for
   retransmissions of all other messages after receipt of a HelloACK.

   If an integrity protected signaling channel is available, a hash of
   the Hello message can be sent.  This allows rejection of false
   injected ZRTP Hello messages by an attacker.




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   Hello and other ZRTP messages also contain a hash image that is used
   to link the messages together.  This allows rejection of false
   injected ZRTP messages during an exchange.

4.1.  Key Agreement Modes

   After both endpoints exchange Hello and HelloACK messages, the key
   agreement exchange can begin with the ZRTP Commit message.  ZRTP
   supports a number of key agreement modes including both Diffie-
   Hellman and non-Diffie-Hellman modes as described in the following
   sections.

   The Commit message may be sent immediately after both endpoints have
   completed the Hello/HelloAck discovery handshake.  Or it may be
   deferred until later in the call, after the participants engage in
   some unencrypted conversation.  The Commit message may be manually
   activated by a user interface element, such as a GO SECURE button,
   which becomes enabled after the Hello/HelloAck discovery phase.  This
   emulates the user experience of a number of secure phones in the PSTN
   world [22].  However, it is expected that most simple ZRTP user
   agents will omit such buttons and proceed directly to secure mode by
   sending a Commit message immediately after the Hello/HelloAck
   handshake.

   In all key agreement modes, the initiator sends no RTP media after
   sending the Commit message, and begins sending SRTP media only after
   receiving the Conf2Ack. The responder sends no RTP media after
   receiving the Commit message, and begins sending SRTP media only
   after receiving the Confirm2 message.

4.1.1.  Diffie-Hellman Mode

   An example ZRTP call flow is shown in Figure 1 below.  Note that the
   order of the Hello/HelloACK exchanges in F1/F2 and F3/F4 may be
   reversed.  That is, either Alice or Bob might send the first Hello
   message.  Note that the endpoint which sends the Commit message is
   considered the initiator of the ZRTP session and drives the key
   agreement exchange.  The Diffie-Hellman public values are exchanged
   in the DHPart1 and DHPart2 messages.  SRTP keys and salts are then
   calculated.











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   Alice                                                Bob
     |                                                   |
     |      Alice and Bob establish a media session.     |
     |         They initiate ZRTP on media ports         |
     |                                                   |
     | F1 Hello (version, options, Alice's ZID)          |
     |-------------------------------------------------->|
     |                                       HelloACK F2 |
     |<--------------------------------------------------|
     |            Hello (version, options, Bob's ZID) F3 |
     |<--------------------------------------------------|
     | F4 HelloACK                                       |
     |-------------------------------------------------->|
     |                                                   |
     |             Bob acts as the initiator             |
     |                                                   |
     |               Commit (Bob's ZID, options, hvi) F5 |
     |<--------------------------------------------------|
     | F6 DHPart1 (pvr, shared secret hashes)            |
     |-------------------------------------------------->|
     |            DHPart2 (pvi, shared secret hashes) F7 |
     |<--------------------------------------------------|
     |                                                   |
     |     Alice and Bob generate SRTP session key.      |
     |                                                   |
     |                    SRTP begins                    |
     |<=================================================>|
     |                                                   |
     | F8 Confirm1 (HMAC, D,A,V,E flags, sig)            |
     |-------------------------------------------------->|
     |            Confirm2 (HMAC, D,A,V,E flags, sig) F9 |
     |<--------------------------------------------------|
     | F10 Conf2ACK                                      |
     |-------------------------------------------------->|

    Figure 1. Establishment of an SRTP session using ZRTP

   ZRTP authentication uses a Short Authentication String (SAS) which is
   ideally displayed for the human user.  Alternatively, the SAS can be
   transported over the signaling channel in the SDP and compared
   automatically, provided the signaling has end-to-end integrity
   protection.  Or, the SAS can be authenticated by exchanging a digital
   signature (sig) over the short authentication string in the Confirm1
   or Confirm2 messages.

   The ZRTP Confirm1 and Confirm2 messages are sent for a number of
   reasons, not the least of which is they confirm that all the key
   agreement calculations were successful and thus the encryption will



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   work.  They also carry other information such as the Disclosure flag
   (D), the Allow Clear flag (A), the SAS Verified flag (V), and the PBX
   Enrollment flag (E).  All flags are encrypted to shield them from a
   passive observer.

4.1.2.  Multistream Mode

   Multistream mode is an alternative key agreement method when two
   endpoints have an established SRTP media stream between them and
   hence an active ZRTP Session key.  ZRTP can derive multiple SRTP keys
   from a single DH exchange.  For example, an established secure voice
   call that adds a video stream could use Multistream mode to quickly
   initiate the video stream without a second DH exchange.

   When Multistream mode is indicated in the Commit message, a call flow
   similar to Figure 1 is used, but no DH calculation is performed by
   either endpoint and the DHPart1 and DHPart2 messages are omitted.
   The Confirm1, Confirm2, and Conf2Ack messages are still sent.  Since
   the cache is not affected during this mode, multiple Multistream ZRTP
   exchanges can be performed in parallel between two endpoints.

   When adding additional media streams to an existing call, Multistream
   mode SHOULD be used.  Only one DH operation should be performed, just
   for the first media stream.  The DH exchange must be completed for
   the first media stream before Multistream mode is used to add any
   other media streams.

4.1.3.  Preshared Mode

   In the Preshared Mode, endpoints can skip the DH calculation if they
   have a shared secret from a previous ZRTP session.  Preshared mode is
   indicated in the Commit message and results in the same call flow as
   Multistream mode.  The principal difference between Multistream mode
   and Preshared mode is that Preshared mode uses a previously cached
   shared secret, rs1, instead of an active ZRTP Session key, ZRTPSess,
   as the initial keying material.

   This mode could be useful for slow processor endpoints so that a DH
   calculation does not need to be performed every session.  Or, this
   mode could be used to rapidly re-establish an earlier session that
   was recently torn down or interrupted without the need to perform
   another DH calculation.  Since the cache is not affected during this
   mode, multiple Preshared mode exchanges can be processed at a time
   between two endpoints.

   A major drawback to Preshared mode is that it lacks Perfect Forward
   Secrecy (PFS).  For this reason, Preshared mode is not recommended
   for establishing a second media stream.  Multistream mode is designed



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   for that role, without sacrificing PFS.

   Because of the loss of PFS, Preshared mode should be used sparingly,
   if used at all.  Preshared mode is only included in this
   specification to meet the R-REUSE requirement in the Media Security
   Requirements [16] document.  A series of preshared-keyed calls
   between two ZRTP endpoints should use a DH key exchange periodically
   to replace the cached key material, to limit the interval of exposure
   from no PFS.


5.  Protocol Description

   ZRTP MUST be multiplexed on the same ports as the RTP media packets.

   To support best effort encryption [16], ZRTP uses normal RTP/AVP
   profile (AVP) media lines in the initial offer/answer exchange.  The
   ZRTP SDP attribute flag a=zrtp-hash defined in Section 9 SHOULD be
   used in all offers and answers to indicate support for the ZRTP
   protocol.  The Secure RTP/AVP (SAVP) profile MAY be used in
   subsequent offer/answer exchanges after a successful ZRTP exchange
   has resulted in an SRTP session, or if it is known the other endpoint
   supports this profile.

      The use of the RTP/SAVP profile has caused failures in negotiating
      best effort SRTP due to the limitations on negotiating profiles
      using SDP.  This is why ZRTP supports the RTP/AVP profile and
      includes its own discovery mechanisms.

5.1.  Discovery

   During the ZRTP discovery phase, a ZRTP endpoint discovers if the
   other endpoint supports ZRTP and the supported algorithms and
   options.  This information is transported in a Hello message.

   ZRTP endpoints SHOULD include the SDP attribute a=zrtp-hash in offers
   and answers, as defined in Section 9.  ZRTP MAY use an RTP [2]
   extension field as a flag to indicate support for the ZRTP protocol
   in RTP packets as described in Section 13.

   The Hello message includes the ZRTP version, hash type, cipher type,
   authentication method and tag length, key agreement type, and Short
   Authentication String (SAS) algorithms that are supported.  The Hello
   message also includes a hash image as described in Section 10.  In
   addition, each endpoint sends and discovers ZIDs.  The received ZID
   is used to retrieve previous retained shared secrets, rs1 and rs2.
   If the endpoint has other secrets, then they are also collected.
   Details on how to derive the signaling secret, sigs, and SRTP secret,



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   srtps, are in Section 9.

   Additional shared secrets can be defined and used as other_secret.
   For example, the trusted man in the middle key is used for
   other_secret in PBX cases as described in Section 8.3.  If no secret
   of a given type is available, a random value is generated and used
   for that secret to ensure a mismatch in the hash comparisons in the
   DHPart1 and DHPart2 messages.  This prevents an eavesdropper from
   knowing how many shared secrets are available between the endpoints.

   A Hello message can be sent at any time, but is usually sent at the
   start of an RTP session to determine if the other endpoint supports
   ZRTP, and also if the SRTP implementations are compatible.  A Hello
   message is retransmitted using timer T1 and an exponential backoff
   mechanism detailed in Section 7 until the receipt of a HelloACK
   message or a Commit message.

   The use of the a=zrtp-hash SDP attribute to authenticate the Hello
   message is described in Section 9.1.

5.2.  Commit

   After both parties have received Hello messages, a Commit message can
   be sent to begin the ZRTP key exchange.  The endpoint that sends the
   Commit is known as the initiator, while the receiver of the Commit is
   known as the responder.

   If both sides send Commit messages initiating a secure session at the
   same time the following rules are used to break the tie.  If one
   Commit is for a DH mode while the other is for a non-DH mode, then
   the non-DH Commit is discarded and the DH Commit proceeds.  If the
   Commits are either both DH modes or both non-DH modes, then the
   Commit message with the lowest hvi value is discarded and the other
   side is the initiator.

   Because the DH exchange affects the state of the retained shared
   secret cache, only one in-process ZRTP DH exchange may occur at a
   time between two ZRTP endpoints.  Otherwise, race conditions and
   cache integrity problems will result.  When multiple media streams
   are established in parallel between the same pair of ZRTP endpoints
   (determined by the ZIDs in the Hello Messages), only one can be
   processed.  Once that exchange completes with Confirm2 and Conf2ACK
   messages, another ZRTP DH exchange can begin.  This constraint does
   not apply when Multistream mode key agreement is used since the
   cached shared secrets are not affected.

   In the event that Commit messages are sent by both ZRTP endpoints at
   the same time, but are received in different media streams, the same



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   resolution rules apply as if they were received on the same stream.
   The media stream in which the Commit will proceed through the ZRTP
   exchange while the media stream with the discarded Commit must wait
   for the completion of the other ZRTP exchange.

5.3.  Shared Secret Determination

   The following sections describe how ZRTP endpoints generate the set
   of shared secrets s1, s2, s3, s4, and s5 through the exchange of the
   DHPart1 and DHPart2 messages.

5.3.1.  Responder Behavior

   The responder calculates an HMAC keyed hash using the first retained
   shared secret, rs1, as the key on the string "Responder" which
   generates a retained secret ID, rs1IDr, which is truncated to the
   leftmost 64 bits.  HMACs are calculated in a similar way for
   additional shared secrets:

      rs1IDr = HMAC(rs1, "Responder")
      rs2IDr = HMAC(rs2, "Responder")
      sigsIDr = HMAC(sigs, "Responder")
      srtpsIDr = HMAC(srtps, "Responder")
      other_secretIDr = HMAC(other_secret, "Responder")

   The set of keyed hashes (HMACs) are included by the responder in the
   DHPart1 message.

   The HMACs of the possible shared secrets received in the DHPart2 can
   be compared against the HMACs of the local set of possible shared
   secrets.

   The expected HMAC values of the shared secrets are calculated (using
   the string "Initiator" instead of "Responder") as in Section 5.3.2
   and compared to the HMACs received in the DHPart2 message.  The
   secrets corresponding to matching HMACs are kept while the secrets
   corresponding to the non-matching ones are replaced with a null,
   which is assumed to have a zero length for the purposes of hashing
   them later.  The set of up to five actual shared secrets are then s1,
   s2, s3, s4, and s5 - the order is that chosen by the initiator.

5.3.2.  Initiator Behavior

   The initiator calculates an HMAC keyed hash using the first retained
   shared secret, rs1, as the key on the string "Initiator" which
   generates a retained secret ID, rs1IDi, which is truncated to the
   leftmost 64 bits.  HMACs are calculated in a similar way for
   additional shared secrets:



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      rs1IDi = HMAC(rs1, "Initiator")
      rs2IDi = HMAC(rs2, "Initiator")
      sigsIDi = HMAC(sigs, "Initiator")
      srtpsIDi = HMAC(srtps, "Initiator")
      other_secretIDi = HMAC(other_secret, "Initiator")

   These HMACs are included by the initiator in the DHPart2 message.

   The initiator then calculates the set of secret IDs that are expected
   to be received from the responder in the DHPart1 message by
   substituting the string "Responder" instead of "Initiator" as in
   Section 5.3.1.

   The HMACs of the possible shared secrets received are compared
   against the HMACs of the local set of possible shared secrets.

   The secrets corresponding to matching HMACs are kept while the
   secrets corresponding to the non-matching ones are replaced with a
   null, which is assumed to have a zero length for the purposes of
   hashing them later.  The set of up to five actual shared secrets are
   then s1, s2, s3, s4, and s5 - the order is that chosen by the
   initiator.

   For example, consider two ZRTP endpoints who share secrets rs1, rs2,
   and other_secret, which is a hash of a secret passphrase.  During the
   comparison, rs1ID, rs2ID, and other_secretID will match but sigsID
   and srtpsID will not.  As a result, s1 = rs1, s2 = rs2, s5 =
   other_secret, while s3 and s4 will be nulls.

5.3.3.  Handling a Shared Secret Cache Mismatch

   If one party has a cached shared secret and the other party does not,
   this indicates one of two possible situations.  Either there is a
   man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, or one of the legitimate parties has
   lost their cached shared secret by some mishap.  Perhaps they
   inadvertently deleted their cache, or their cache was lost or
   disrupted due to restoring their disk from an earlier backup copy.
   The party that has the surviving cache entry can easily detect that a
   cache mismatch has occurred, because they expect their own cached
   secret to match the other party's cached secret, but it does not
   match.  It is possible for both parties to detect this condition if
   both parties have surviving cached secrets that have fallen out of
   sync, due perhaps to one party restoring from a disk backup.

   If either party discovers a cache mismatch, the user agent who makes
   this discovery must treat this as a possible security event and MUST
   alert their own user that there is a heightened risk of a MiTM
   attack, and that the user should verbally compare the SAS with the



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   other party to ascertain that no MiTM attack has occurred.  If a
   cache mismatch is detected and it is not possible to compare the SAS,
   either because the user interface does not support it or because one
   or both endpoints are unmanned devices, and no other SAS comparison
   mechanism is available, the session MAY be terminated.

   The session need not be terminated on a cache mismatch event if any
   mechanism is available to determine if the SAS matches.  This would
   require either circumstances that allow human verbal comparisons of
   the SAS, or by using the optional digital signature feature on the
   SAS hash, as described in section 8.2.  Even if the user interface
   does not permit an SAS compare, the human user MUST be warned, and
   may elect to proceed with the call at their own risk.

   Here is a non-normative example of a cache-mismatch alert message
   from a ZRTP user agent (specifically, Zfone [20]), designed for a
   desktop PC graphical user interface environment.  It is by no means
   required that the alert be this detailed:

      "We expected the other party to have a shared secret cached from a
      previous call, but they don't have it.  This may mean your partner
      simply lost his cache of shared secrets, but it could also mean
      someone is trying to wiretap you.  To resolve this question you
      must check the authentication string with your partner.  If it
      doesn't match, it indicates the presence of a wiretapper."

5.4.  Secret Generation

   The next step is the generation of a secret for deriving SRTP keying
   material.  ZRTP uses Diffie-Hellman and two non-Diffie-Hellman modes,
   described in the following sections.

5.4.1.  Diffie-Hellman Mode

   The purpose of the Diffie-Hellman (either Finite Field Diffie-Hellman
   or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) exchange is for the two ZRTP
   endpoints to generate a new shared secret, s0.  In addition, the
   endpoints discover if they have any shared secrets in common.  If
   they do, this exchange allows them to discover how many and agree on
   an ordering for them: s1, s2, etc.

5.4.1.1.  Hash Commitment

   From the intersection of the algorithms in the sent and received
   Hello messages, the initiator chooses a hash, cipher, auth tag, key
   agreement type, and SAS type to be used.

   A Diffie-Hellman mode is selected by setting the Key Agreement Type



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   to one of the DH or ECDH values in Table 5 in the Commit.  In this
   mode, the key agreement begins with the initiator choosing a fresh
   random Diffie-Hellman (DH) secret value (svi) based on the chosen key
   agreement type value, and computing the public value.  (Note that to
   speed up processing, this computation can be done in advance.)  For
   guidance on generating random numbers, see the section on Random
   Number Generation.  The Diffie-Hellman secret value, svi, SHOULD be
   twice as long as the AES key length.  This means, if AES 128 is used,
   the DH secret value SHOULD be 256 bits long.  If AES 256 is used, the
   secret value SHOULD be 512 bits long.

      pvi = g^svi mod p

   where g and p are determined by the key agreement type value.  The
   pvi value is formatted as a big-endian octet string, fixed to the
   width of the DH prime, and leading zeros MUST NOT be truncated.

   The hash commitment is performed by the initiator of the ZRTP
   exchange.  The hash value of the initiator, hvi, includes a hash of
   the entire DHPart2 message as shown in Figure 7 (which includes the
   Diffie-Hellman public value, pvi), and the responder's Hello message:

      hvi = hash(initiator's DHPart2 message | responder's Hello
      message)

   Note that the Hello message includes the fields shown in Figure 3.

   The information from the responder's Hello message is included in the
   hash calculation to prevent a bid-down attack by modification of the
   responder's Hello message.

   The initiator sends hvi in the Commit message.

5.4.1.2.  Responder Behavior

   Upon receipt of the Commit message, the responder generates its own
   fresh random DH secret value, svr, and computes the public value.
   (Note that to speed up processing, this computation can be done in
   advance.)  For guidance on random number generation, see the section
   on Random Number Generation.  The Diffie-Hellman secret value, svr,
   SHOULD be twice as long as the AES key length.  This means, if AES
   128 is used, the DH secret value SHOULD be 256 bits long.  If AES 256
   is used, the secret value SHOULD be 512 bits long.

      pvr = g^svr mod p

   The pvr value is formatted as a big-endian octet string, fixed to the
   width of the DH prime, and leading zeros MUST NOT be truncated.



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   Upon receipt of the DHPart2 message, the responder checks that the
   initiator's public DH value is not equal to 1 or p-1.  An attacker
   might inject a false DHPart2 packet with a value of 1 or p-1 for
   g^svi mod p, which would cause a disastrously weak final DH result to
   be computed.  If pvi is 1 or p-1, the user should be alerted of the
   attack and the protocol exchange MUST be terminated.  Otherwise, the
   responder computes its own value for the hash commitment using the
   public DH value (pvi) received in the DHPart2 packet and its Hello
   packet and compares the result with the hvi received in the Commit
   packet.  If they are different, a MITM attack is taking place and the
   user is alerted and the protocol exchange terminated.

   The responder then calculates the Diffie-Hellman result:

      DHResult = pvi^svr mod p

5.4.1.3.  Initiator Behavior

   Upon receipt of the DHPart1 message, the initiator checks that the
   responder's public DH value is not equal to 1 or p-1.  An attacker
   might inject a false DHPart1 packet with a value of 1 or p-1 for
   g^svr mod p, which would cause a disastrously weak final DH result to
   be computed.  If pvr is 1 or p-1, the user should be alerted of the
   attack and the protocol exchange MUST be terminated.

   The initiator then sends a DHPart2 message containing the initiator's
   public DH value and the set of calculated retained secret IDs as
   described in 5.3.2.

   The initiator calculates the same Diffie-Hellman result using:

      DHResult = pvr^svi mod p

5.4.1.4.  Shared Secret Calculation

   A hash of the received and sent ZRTP messages in the current ZRTP
   exchange in the following order is calculated:

      total_hash = hash(Hello of responder | Commit | DHPart1 | DHPart2)

   Note that only the ZRTP message (Figures 3, 5, 6, and 7), not the
   entire ZRTP packets, are included in the total_hash.

   For both the initiator and responder, the DHResult is formatted as a
   big-endian octet string, fixed to the width of the DH prime, and
   leading zeros MUST NOT be truncated.  For example, for a 3072-bit p,
   DHResult would be a 384 octet value, with the first octet the most
   significant.



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   The calculation of the final shared secret, s0, is in compliance with
   the recommendations in sections 5.8.1 and 6.1.2.1 of NIST SP 800-56A
   [7].  This is done by hashing a concatenation of a number of items,
   including the DHResult, the ZID's of the initiator (ZIDi) and the
   responder (ZIDr), the total_hash, and the set of non-null shared
   secrets as described in 5.2.

   In section 5.8.1 of NIST SP 800-56A [7], NIST requires certain
   parameters to be hashed together in a particular order, which NIST
   refers to as: Z, AlgorithmID, PartyUInfo, PartyVInfo, SuppPubInfo,
   and SuppPrivInfo.  In our implementation, our DHResult corresponds to
   Z, "ZRTP-HMAC-KDF" corresponds to AlgorithmID, our ZIDi and ZIDr
   correspond to PartyUInfo and PartyVInfo, our total_hash corresponds
   to SuppPubInfo, and s1 through s5 corresponds to SuppPrivInfo.  NIST
   also requires a 32-bit big-endian integer counter to be included in
   the hash each time the hash is computed, which we have set to the
   fixed value of 1, because we only compute the hash once.

      s0 = hash( counter | DHResult | "ZRTP-HMAC-KDF" | ZIDi | ZIDr |
      total_hash | len(s1) | s1 | len(s2) | s2 | len(s3) | s3 | len(s4)
      | s4 | len(s5) | s5 )

   The length of the DHResult field was implicitly agreed to by the
   negotiated DH prime size.  The length of total_hash is implicitly
   determined by the negotiated hash algorithm.  All of the explicit
   length fields, len(), in the above hash are 32-bit big-endian
   integers, giving the length in octets of the field that follows.
   Some of the shared secrets s1 through s5 may have lengths of zero if
   they are null (not shared), and are each preceded by a 4-octet length
   field.  For example, if s4 is null, len(s4) is 0x00000000, and s4
   itself would be absent from the hash calculation, which means len(s5)
   would immediately follow len(s4).  While inclusion of ZIDi and ZIDr
   may be redundant, because they are implicitly included in the
   total_hash, we explicitly include them here to follow NIST SP800-56A.
   The string "ZRTP-HMAC-KDF" (not null-terminated) identifies what
   purpose the resulting s0 will be used for, which is to serve as the
   master key for the ZRTP HMAC-based key derivation function defined in
   Section 5.5.

   A new rs1 is calculated from s0:

      rs1 = HMAC(s0,"retained secret")

   After a successful exchange of Confirm1 and Confirm2 messages
   described later in this document, both sides discard the rs2 value
   and store rs1 as rs2.

   A ZRTP Session Key is generated which then allows the ZRTP



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   Multistream mode to be used to generate SRTP key and salt pairs for
   additional concurrent media streams between this pair of ZRTP
   endpoints.  If a ZRTP Session Key has already been generated between
   this pair of endpoints and is available, no new ZRTP Session Key is
   calculated.

      ZRTPsess = HMAC(s0,"ZRTP Session Key")

   The ZRTPsess key is kept for the duration of the call signaling
   session between the two ZRTP endpoints.  That is, if there are two
   separate calls between the endpoints (in SIP terms, separate SIP
   dialogs), then a ZRTP Session Key MUST NOT be used across the two
   call signaling sessions.  At the end of the call signaling session,
   ZRTPSess is destroyed.

5.4.2.  Multistream Mode

   The Multistream key agreement mode can be used to generate SRTP keys
   and salts for additional media streams established between a pair of
   endpoints.  Multistream mode cannot be used unless there is an active
   SRTP session established between the endpoints which means a ZRTP
   Session key is active.  This ZRTP Session key can be used to generate
   keys and salts without performing another DH calculation.  In this
   mode, the retained shared secret cache is not used or updated.  As a
   result, multiple ZRTP Multistream mode exchanges can be processed in
   parallel between two endpoints.

   Multistream mode is selected by the initiator setting the Key
   Agreement Type to "Mult" in the Commit message.  The Cipher Type and
   Auth Tag Length in Multistream mode MUST be set by the initiator to
   the same as the values as in the initial DH Mode Commit.  These
   values in the Multistream commit packet SHOULD be ignored by the
   responder, and SHOULD be assumed to be the same as the values in the
   previous DH commit message.  The SAS Type is ignored as there is no
   SAS authentication in this mode.

   In place of hvi in the Commit, a random nonce of length 4-words (16
   octets) is chosen.  Its value MUST be unique for all nonce values
   chosen for active ZRTP sessions between a pair of endpoints.  If a
   Commit is received with a reused nonce value, the ZRTP exchange MUST
   be immediately terminated.

   Note: Since the nonce is used to calculate different SRTP key and
   salt pairs for each media stream, a duplication will result in the
   same key and salt being generated for the two media streams, which
   would have disastrous security consequences.

   If a Commit is received selecting Multistream mode, but the responder



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   does not have a ZRTP Session Key available, the exchange MUST be
   terminated.

   In Multistream mode, both the DHPart1 and DHPart2 messages are not
   sent.  After receiving the Commit message from the initiator, the
   responder sends the Confirm1 message after calculating this stream's
   SRTP keys, as described below.

5.4.2.1.  Shared Secret Calculation

   A hash of the received and sent ZRTP messages in the current ZRTP
   exchange for the current media stream is calculated:

      total_hash = hash(Hello of responder | Commit )

   This refers to the Hello and Commit messages for the current media
   stream which is using Multistream mode, not the original media stream
   that included a full DH key agreement.  Note that only the ZRTP
   message (Figures 3 and 5), not the entire ZRTP packets, are included
   in the hash.

   The SRTP keys and salts for the initiator and responder are
   calculated using the ZRTP Session Key ZRTPSess and the nonce from the
   Commit message.  The nonce from the Commit message is implicitly
   included in the total_hash, which hashed the entire Commit message
   and the other party's Hello message.  For the nth media stream:

      s0n = HMAC(ZRTPSess, total_hash)

   Note that the responder's Hello message, included in the total_hash,
   includes some unique nonce-derived material of its own (the H3 hash
   image), thereby ensuring that each of the two parties can
   unilaterally force the resulting s0n shared secret to be unique for
   each media stream, even if one party by some error fails to produce a
   unique nonce.  Note also that the ZRTPSess key is derived from
   material that also includes a different and more inclusive total_hash
   from the entire packet sequence that performed the original DH
   exchange for the first media stream in this ZRTP session.

   At this point in Multistream mode, the two endpoints begin key
   generation as described in Section 5.5 using s0n in place of s0 in
   the key generation formulas for this media stream.

5.4.3.  Preshared Mode

   The Preshared key agreement mode can be used to generate SRTP keys
   and salts without a DH calculation, instead relying on a shared
   secret from previous DH calculations between the endpoints.



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   This key agreement mode is useful to rapidly re-establish a secure
   session between two parties who have recently started and ended a
   secure session that has already performed a DH key agreement, without
   performing another lengthy DH calculation, which may be desirable on
   slow processors in resource-limited environments.  Preshared mode
   MUST NOT be used for adding additional media streams to an existing
   call.  Multistream mode SHOULD be used, since it is designed for that
   role, without sacrificing PFS.

5.4.3.1.  Commitment

   Preshared mode is selected by setting the Key Agreement Type to
   Preshared in the Commit message.  This results in the same call flow
   as Multistream mode.  The principal difference between Multistream
   mode and Preshared mode is that Preshared mode uses a previously
   cached shared secret, rs1, instead of an active ZRTP Session key,
   ZRTPSess, as the initial keying material.

   The Commit message is sent by the initiator of the ZRTP exchange.
   From the intersection of the algorithms in the sent and received
   Hello messages, the initiator chooses a hash, cipher, auth tag, key
   agreement type, and SAS type to be used.

   In place of hvi in the Commit, two smaller fields are inserted by the
   initiator:

      - A random nonce of length 4-words (16 octets).
      - A keyID = HMAC(key, "Prsh") truncated to 64 bits.

   The above HMAC key is the cached shared secret rs1, if one is
   available or alternatively it could be the PBX trustemitmkey.  If no
   such shared key is available in the cache, Preshared mode cannot be
   used.

   The responder uses the received keyID to search for matching key
   material in its cache, comparing it with hashes of rs1, rs2, or the
   PBX trustedmitmkey.

   When it finds the appropriate shared key, it is used to derive s0 and
   a new ZRTPSess key, as described in the next section on Shared Secret
   Calculation.

   If the responder determines that it does not have a cached shared
   secret from a previous DH exchange, it MAY respond with its own DH
   Commit message.  This would reverse the roles and the responder would
   become the initiator, because the DH Commit must always "trump" the
   Preshared Commit message as described in Section 5.2.  The key
   exchange would then proceeds using DH mode.



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   Because Preshared mode depends on having a reliable shared secret in
   its cache, it is RECOMMENDED that Preshared mode only be used when
   the SAS Verified flag has been previously set.

   If both sides send Preshared Commit messages initiating a secure
   session at the same time, the Commit message with the lowest nonce
   value is discarded and the other side is the initiator.  This breaks
   the tie, allowing the protocol to proceed from this point with a
   clear definition of who is the initiator and who is the responder.

5.4.3.2.  Shared Secret Calculation

   A hash of the received and sent ZRTP messages in the current ZRTP
   exchange for the current media stream is calculated:

      total_hash = hash(Hello of responder | Commit )

   Note that only the ZRTP message (Figures 3 and 5), not the entire
   ZRTP packets, are included in the hash.  The nonce from the Commit
   message is implicitly included in the total_hash, which hashed the
   entire Commit message and the other party's Hello message.

      s0 = HMAC(rs1, total_hash) [use rs1, rs2, or whatever matched the
      keyID]
      ZRTPsess = HMAC(s0,"ZRTP Session Key")

   Note that the responder's Hello message, included in the total_hash,
   includes some unique nonce-derived material of its own (the H3 hash
   image), thereby ensuring that each of the two parties can
   unilaterally force the resulting s0 shared secret to be unique for
   each media stream, even if one party by some error fails to produce a
   unique nonce.

   Note: Since the nonce is used to calculate different SRTP key and
   salt pairs for each media stream, a duplication will result in the
   same key and salt being generated for the two media streams, which
   would have disastrous security consequences.

   At this point in Preshared mode, the two endpoints begin key
   generation as described in Section 5.5, now that there is a defined
   s0 and ZRTPSess key.  The ZRTPSess key allows the later use of
   Multistream mode for adding additional media streams.

5.5.  Key Generation

   The following calculations derive a set of keys from s0.  For the
   original media stream that calculated s0 from the DH exchange, s0
   means the original s0.  For any additional media streams that were



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   activated in Multistream mode, s0 means s0n, for the n-th media
   stream.

   Various keys, such as those used by SRTP, must be derived from the
   shared secret s0.  To do this, ZRTP uses an HMAC-based key derivation
   function, keyed by s0, instead of simply drawing subkey material
   directly from s0, as defined in NIST SP800-56A. The possibly greater
   noninvertability of HMAC may add an extra measure of isolation for
   the derived keys.

   The SRTP master key and master salt are derived from s0.  Separate
   SRTP keys and salts are used in each direction for each media stream.
   Unless otherwise specified, ZRTP uses SRTP with no MKI, 32 bit
   authentication using HMAC-SHA1, AES-CM 128 or 256 bit key length, 112
   bit session salt key length, 2^48 key derivation rate, and SRTP
   prefix length 0.

   The ZRTP initiator encrypts and the ZRTP responder decrypts packets
   by using srtpkeyi and srtpsalti, while the ZRTP responder encrypts
   and the ZRTP initiator decrypts packets by using srtpkeyr and
   srtpsaltr.  These are generated by:

      srtpkeyi = HMAC(s0,"Initiator SRTP master key")
      srtpsalti = HMAC(s0,"Initiator SRTP master salt")
      srtpkeyr = HMAC(s0,"Responder SRTP master key")
      srtpsaltr = HMAC(s0,"Responder SRTP master salt")

   The SRTP key and salt values are truncated (taking the leftmost bits)
   to the length determined by the chosen SRTP algorithm.

   The HMAC keys are the same length as the output of the underlying
   hash function, and are thus generated without truncation by:

      hmackeyi = HMAC(s0,"Initiator HMAC key")
      hmackeyr = HMAC(s0,"Responder HMAC key")

   Note that these HMAC keys are used only by ZRTP and not by SRTP.

   Note: Different HMAC keys are needed for the initiator and the
   responder to ensure that GoClear messages in each direction are
   unique and can not be cached by an attacker and reflected back to the
   endpoint.

   ZRTP keys are generated for the initiator and responder to use to
   encrypt the Confirm1 and Confirm2 messages.  They are truncated to
   the same size as the negotiated SRTP key size.





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      zrtpkeyi = HMAC(s0,"Initiator ZRTP key")
      zrtpkeyr = HMAC(s0,"Responder ZRTP key")

   After s0 has been used to calculate all the subkeys that are derived
   from it, it MUST be erased from memory.  All other key material,
   especially the SRTP keys and salts, MUST also be erased from memory
   when they are no longer used, no later than the end of the call.  The
   only exceptions are the retained shared secrets, or other cached
   secrets needed for future calls.

   The Short Authentication String (SAS) value is calculated from the
   HMAC of a fixed string, keyed with the ZRTPSess key derived from the
   DH key agreement.  This means the same SAS is used for all media
   streams which are derived from a single DH key agreement in a ZRTP
   session.

      sashash = HMAC(ZRTPSess,"SAS")
      sasvalue = sashash [truncated to leftmost 32 bits]

5.6.  Confirmation

   The Confirm1 and Confirm2 messages contain the cache expiration
   interval for the newly generated retained shared secret.  The
   flagoctet is an 8 bit unsigned integer made up of the PBX Enrollment
   flag (E), Disclosure flag (D), Allow clear flag (A), SAS Verified
   flag (V):

      flagoctet = E * 2^3 + V * 2^2 + A * 2^1 + D * 2^0

   Part of the Confirm1 and Confirm2 messages are encrypted using full-
   block Cipher Feedback Mode, and contain a 128-bit random CFB
   Initialization Vector (IV).  The Confirm1 and Confirm2 messages also
   contain an HMAC covering the encrypted part of the Confirm1 or
   Confirm2 message which includes a string of zeros, the signature
   length, flag octet, cache expiration interval, signature type block
   (if present) and signature block (if present).  For the responder

      hmac = HMAC(hmackeyr, encrypted part of Confirm1)

   For the initiator:

      hmac = HMAC(hmackeyi, encrypted part of Confirm2)

   The Conf2ACK message sent by the responder completes the exchange.







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5.7.  Termination

   The Error message is used to terminate an in-progress ZRTP exchange
   due to an error.  The Error message contains an integer Error Code
   for debugging purposes.  The termination of a ZRTP key agreement
   exchange results in no updates to the cached shared secrets and
   deletion of all crypto context.

   The ZRTP Session key is only deleted if the ZRTP session in which it
   was generated and all ZRTP sessions which are using it are
   terminated.

   The GoClear message is used to switch from SRTP to RTP, usually
   because the user has chosen to do that by pressing a button.  The
   GoClear uses an HMAC of the Message Type Block sent in the GoGlear
   Message computed with the hmackey derived from the shared secret.
   When sent by the initiator:

      clear_hmac = HMAC(hmackeyi, "GoClear ")

   When sent by the responder:

      clear_hmac = HMAC(hmackeyr, "GoClear ")

   A GoClear message which does not receive a ClearACK response must be
   resent.  If a GoClear message is received with a bad HMAC, it must be
   ignored, and no ClearACK is sent.

   A ZRTP endpoint MAY choose to accept GoClear messages after the
   session has switched to SRTP, allowing the session to revert to RTP.
   This is indicated in the Confirm1 or Confirm2 messages by setting the
   Allow Clear flag (A).  If both endpoints set the Allow Clear (A) flag
   in their Confirm message, GoClear messages MAY be sent.

   A ZRTP endpoint that receives a GoClear authenticates the message by
   checking the clear_hmac.  If the message authenticates, the endpoint
   stops sending SRTP packets, generates a ClearACK in response, and
   deletes all the crypto key material for the SRTP session.  Until
   confirmation from the user is received (e.g. clicking a button,
   pressing a DTMF key, etc.), the ZRTP endpoint MUST NOT resume sending
   RTP packets.  The endpoint then renders an indication that the media
   session has switched to clear mode to the user and waits for
   confirmation from the user.  To prevent pinholes from closing or NAT
   bindings from expiring, the ClearACK message MAY be resent at regular
   intervals (e.g. every 5 seconds) while waiting for confirmation from
   the user.  After confirmation of the notification is received from
   the user, the sending of RTP packets may begin.




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   After sending a GoClear message, the ZRTP endpoint stops sending SRTP
   packets.  When a ClearACK is received, the ZRTP endpoint deletes the
   crypto context for the SRTP session and may then resume sending RTP
   packets.

   In the event a ClearACK is not received before the retransmissions of
   GoClear are exhausted, the key material is deleted.

   After the users have transitioned from SRTP media back to RTP media
   (clear mode), they may decide later to return to secure mode by
   manual activation, usually by pressing a GO SECURE button.  In that
   case, a new secure session is initiated by the party that presses the
   button, by sending a new Commit packet, leadng to a new session key
   negotiation.  It is not necessary to send another Hello packet, as
   the two parties have already done that at the start of the call and
   thus have already discovered each other's ZRTP capabilities.  It is
   possible for users to toggle back and forth between clear and secure
   modes multiple times in the same call, just as they could in the old
   days of secure PSTN phones.

5.8.  Random Number Generation

   The ZRTP protocol uses random numbers for cryptographic key material,
   notably for the DH secret exponents and nonces, which must be freshly
   generated with each session.  Whenever a random number is needed, all
   of the following criteria must be satisfied:

   It MUST be freshly generated, meaning that it must not have been used
   in a previous calculation.

   When generating a random number k of L bits in length, k MUST be
   chosen with equal probability from the range of [1 < k < 2^L].

   It MUST be derived from a physical entropy source, such as RF noise,
   acoustic noise, thermal noise, high resolution timings of
   environmental events, or other unpredictable physical sources of
   entropy.  For a detailed explanation of cryptographic grade random
   numbers and guidance for collecting suitable entropy, see RFC 4086
   [18] and Chapter 10 of Practical Cryptography [17].  The raw entropy
   must be distilled and processed through a deterministic random bit
   generator (DRBG).  Examples of DRBGs may be found in NIST SP 800-90
   [6], and in [17].

5.9.  ZID and Cache Operation

   Each instance of ZRTP has a unique 96-bit random ZRTP ID or ZID that
   is generated once at installation time.  It is used to look up
   retained shared secrets in a local cache.  A single global ZID for a



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   single installation is the simplest way to implement ZIDs.  However,
   it is specifically not precluded for an implementation to use
   multiple ZIDs, up to the limit of a separate one per callee.  This
   then turns it into a long-lived "association ID" that does not apply
   to any other associations between a different pair of parties.  It is
   a goal of this protocol to permit both options to interoperate
   freely.

   Each time a new s0 is calculated, a new retained shared secret rs1 is
   generated and stored in the cache, indexed by the ZID of the other
   endpoint.  The previous retained shared secret is then renamed rs2
   and also stored in the cache.  For the new retained shared secret,
   each endpoint chooses a cache expiration value which is an unsigned
   32 bit integer of the number of seconds that this secret should be
   retained in the cache.  The time interval is relative to when the
   Confirm1 message is sent or received.

   The cache intervals are exchanged in the Confirm1 and Confirm2
   messages.  The actual cache interval used by both endpoints is the
   minimum of the values from the Confirm1 and Confirm2 messages.  A
   value of 0 seconds means the newly-computed shared secret SHOULD NOT
   be stored in the cache, and if a cache entry already exists from an
   earlier call, the stored cache interval should be set to 0.  A value
   of 0xffffffff means the secret should be cached indefinitely and is
   the recommended value.  If the ZRTP exchange results in no new shared
   secret generation (i.e.  Multistream Mode), the field in the Confirm1
   and Confirm2 is set to 0xffffffff and ignored, and the cache is not
   updated.

   The expiration interval need not be used to force the deletion of a
   shared secret from the cache when the interval has expired.  It just
   means the shared secret MAY be deleted from that cache at any point
   after the interval has expired without causing the other party to
   note it as an unexpected security event when the next key negotiation
   occurs between the same two parties.  This means there need not be
   perfectly synchronized deletion of expired secrets from the two
   caches, and makes it easy to avoid a race condition that might
   otherwise be caused by clock skew.


6.  ZRTP Messages

   All ZRTP messages use the message format defined in Figure 2.  All
   word lengths referenced in this specification are 32 bits or 4
   octets.  All integer fields are carried in network byte order, that
   is, most significant byte (octet) first, commonly known as big-
   endian.




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     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |0 0 0 1|Not Used (set to zero) |         Sequence Number       |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                  ZRTP Magic Cookie (0x5a525450)               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                        Source Identifier                      |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    |           ZRTP Message (length depends on Message Type)       |
    |                            . . .                              |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                          CRC (1 word)                         |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

    Figure 2. ZRTP Packet Format

   The Sequence Number is a count that is incremented for each ZRTP
   packet sent.  The count is initialized to a random value.  This is
   useful in estimating ZRTP packet loss and also detecting when ZRTP
   packets arrive out of sequence.

   The ZRTP Magic Cookie is a 32 bit string that uniquely identifies a
   ZRTP packet, and has the value 0x5a525450.

   Source Identifier is the SSRC number of the RTP stream that this ZRTP
   packet relates to.  For cases of forking or forwarding, RTP and hence
   ZRTP may arrive at the same port from several different sources -
   each of these sources will have a different SSRC and may initiate an
   independent ZRTP protocol session.

   This format is clearly identifiable as non-RTP due to the first two
   bits being zero which looks like RTP version 0, which is not a valid
   RTP version number.  It is clearly distinguishable from STUN since
   the magic cookies are different.  The 12 not used bits are set to
   zero and MUST be ignored when received.

   The ZRTP Messages are defined in Figures 3 to 11 and are of variable
   length.

   The ZRTP protocol uses a 32 bit CRC checksum in each ZRTP packet as
   defined in RFC 3309 [5] to detect transmission errors.  ZRTP packets
   are typically transported by UDP, which carries its own built-in 16-
   bit checksum for integrity, but ZRTP does not rely on it.  This is
   because of the effect of an undetected transmission error in a ZRTP
   message.  For example, an undetected error in the DH exchange could
   appear to be an active man-in-the-middle attack.  The psychological



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   effects of a false announcement of this by ZTRP clients can not be
   overstated.  The probability of such a false alarm hinges on a mere
   16-bit checksum that usually protects UDP packets, so more error
   detection is needed.  For these reasons, this belt-and-suspenders
   approach is used to minimize the chance of a transmission error
   affecting the ZRTP key agreement.

   The CRC is calculated across the entire ZRTP packet shown in Figure
   2, including the ZRTP Header and the ZRTP Message, but not including
   the CRC field.  If a ZRTP message fails the CRC check, it is silently
   discarded.

6.1.  ZRTP Message Formats

   ZRTP messages are designed to simplify endpoint parsing requirements
   and to reduce the opportunities for buffer overflow attacks (a good
   goal of any security extension should be to not introduce new attack
   vectors).

   ZRTP uses 8 octets (2 words) blocks to encode Message Type. 4 octets
   (1 word) blocks are used to encode Hash Type, Cipher Type, and Key
   Agreement Type, and Authentication Tag. The values in the blocks are
   ASCII strings which are extended with spaces (0x20) to make them the
   desired length.  Currently defined block values are listed in Tables
   1-6 below.

   Additional block values may be defined and used.

   ZRTP uses this ASCII encoding to simplify debugging and make it
   "Wireshark (Ethereal) friendly".

6.1.1.  Message Type Block

   Currently 14 Message Type Blocks are defined - they represent the set
   of ZRTP message primitives.  ZRTP endpoints MUST support the Hello,
   HelloACK, Commit, DHPart1, DHPart2, Confirm1, Confirm2, Conf2ACK,
   SASrelay, RelayACK, Error and ErrorACK block types.  ZRTP endpoints
   MAY support the GoClear and ClearACK messages.  Additional messages
   may be defined in extensions to ZRTP.












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    Message Type Block   |  Meaning
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "Hello   "           |  Hello Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.2
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "HelloACK"           |  HelloACK Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.3
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "Commit  "           |  Commit Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.4
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "DHPart1 "           |  DHPart1 Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.5
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "DHPart2 "           |  DHPart2 Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.6
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "Confirm1"           |  Confirm1 Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.7
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "Confirm2"           |  Confirm2 Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.7
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "Conf2ACK"           |  Conf2ACK Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.8
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "Error   "           |  Error Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.9
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "ErrorACK"           |  ErrorACK Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.10
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "GoClear "           |  GoClear Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.11
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "ClearACK"           |  ClearACK Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.12
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "SASrelay"           |  SASrelay Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.13
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "RelayACK"           |  RelayACK Message
                         |  defined in Section 6.14
    ---------------------------------------------------

    Table 1. Message Block Type Values





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6.1.2.  Hash Type Block

   Only one Hash Type is currently defined, SHA256, and all ZRTP
   endpoints MUST support this hash.  Additional Hash Types can be
   registered and used.

    Hash Type Block      |  Meaning
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "S256"               |  SHA-256 Hash defined in [SHA-256]
    ---------------------------------------------------

    Table 2. Hash Block Type Values

6.1.3.  Cipher Type Block

   All ZRTP endpoints MUST support AES-128 (AES1) and MAY support AES-
   256 (AES3). or other Cipher Types.  Also, if AES-128 is used, DH3k
   should be used.  If AES-256 is used, the public key echange algorithm
   should be one of EC38, EC52, or DH4k.

   Note: DH4k may be deprecated in the future in favor of elliptic curve
   algorithms.

     Cipher Type Block    |  Meaning
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "AES1"                |  AES-CM with 128 bit keys
                          |  as defined in RFC 3711
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "AES3"                |  AES-CM with 256 bit keys
                          |  as defined in RFC 3711
    ---------------------------------------------------

    Table 3. Cipher Block Type Values

6.1.4.  Auth Tag Block

   All ZRTP endpoints MUST support HMAC-SHA1 authentication, 32 bit and
   80 bit length tags as defined in RFC 3711.

    Auth Tag Block        |  Meaning
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "HS32"                |  HMAC-SHA1 32 bit authentication
                          |  tag as defined in RFC 3711
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "HS80"                |  HMAC-SHA1 80 bit authentication
                          |  tag as defined in RFC 3711
    ---------------------------------------------------




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    Table 4. Auth Tag Values

6.1.5.  Key Agreement Type Block

   All ZRTP endpoints MUST support DH3k and Multistream, SHOULD support
   Preshared, and MAY support EC25, EC38, EC52, or DH4k.  For DH3k or
   DH4k, ZRTP endpoints MUST use the DH generator g=2.

   If Elliptic Curve DH is used, the ECDH algorithm and key generation
   is from NIST SP 800-56A [7].  The curves used are from NSA Suite B
   [8], which uses the same curves as ECDSA defined by FIPS 186-3 [10],
   and can also be found in RFC 4753 [9], sections 3.1 through 3.3.  The
   validation procedures are from NIST SP 800-56A [7] section 5.6.2.6,
   method 3, ECC Partial Validation.  Both the X and Y coordinates of
   the point on the curve are sent, in the first and second half of the
   ECDH public value, respectively.

   The choice of AES key length is coupled to the choice of key
   agreement type.  If AES 128 is chosen, DH3k SHOULD be used.  If AES
   256 is chosen, one of EC38, EC52, or DH4k SHOULD be used.  ZRTP also
   defines a non-DH mode, Multistream, which MUST be supported.  In
   Multistream mode, the SRTP key is derived from a shared secret and
   some nonce material.

   Note: DH4k may be deprecated in the future in favor of elliptic curve
   algorithms.

   Table 5 lists the pv length in words and DHPart1 and DHPart2 message
   length in words for each Key Agreement Type Block.






















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    Key Agreement |  pv   | message | Meaning
    Type Block    | words |  words  |
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "DH3k"        |   96  |   119   |  DH mode with p=3072 bit prime
                  |       |         |  as defined in RFC 3526
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "DH4k"        |  128  |   151   |  DH mode with p=4096 bit prime
                  |       |         |  as defined in RFC 3526
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "Prsh"        |    -  |     -   |  Preshared Non-DH mode
                  |       |         |
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "Mult"        |    -  |     -   |  Multistream Non-DH mode
                  |       |         |
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "EC25"        |   16  |    39   |  Elliptic Curve DH, P-256
                  |       |         |  per RFC 4753, Section 3.1
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "EC38"        |   24  |    47   |  Elliptic Curve DH, P-384
                  |       |         |  per RFC 4753, Section 3.2
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "EC52"        |   33  |    56   |  Elliptic Curve DH, P-521
                  |       |         |  per RFC 4753, Section 3.3
    ---------------------------------------------------

    Table 5. Key Agreement Block Type Values

6.1.6.  SAS Type Block

   All ZRTP endpoints MUST support the base32 and MAY support base256
   Short Authentication String scheme, and other SAS rendering schemes.
   The ZRTP SAS is described in Section 7.

     SAS Type Block       |  Meaning
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "B32 "                |  Short Authentication String using
                          |  base32 encoding defined in Section 8.
    ---------------------------------------------------
    "B256"                |  Short Authentication String using
                          |  base256 encoding defined in Section 8.
    ---------------------------------------------------

    Table 6. SAS Block Type Values

   The SAS Type determines how the SAS is rendered to the user so that
   the user may compare it with his partner over the voice channel.
   This allows detection of a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.




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6.1.7.  Signature Type Block

   The signature type block is a 4 octet (1 word) block used to
   represent the signature algorithm.  Suggested signature algorithms
   and key lengths are a future subject of standardization.

6.2.  Hello message

   The Hello message has the format shown in Figure 3.  The Hello ZRTP
   message begins with the preamble value 0x505a then a 16 bit length in
   32 bit words.  This length includes only the ZRTP message (including
   the preamble and the length) but not the ZRTP header or CRC.

   Next is the Message Type Block and a 4 character string containing
   the version (ver) of the ZRTP protocol, currently "0.83" (when this
   specification reaches RFC status, the protocol version will become
   "1.00").  Next is the Client Identifier string (cid) which is 4 words
   long and identifies the vendor and release of the ZRTP software.  The
   256-bit hash image H3 is defined in Section 10.  The next parameter
   is the ZID, the 96 bit long unique identifier for the ZRTP endpoint.

   The next four bits contains flag bits.  The Passive flag (P) is a
   Boolean normally set to False.  A ZRTP endpoint which is configured
   to never initiate secure sessions is regarded as passive, and would
   set the P bit to True.  The next 8 bits are unused.  They should be
   set to zero when sent and ignored on receipt.

   Next is a list of supported Hash algorthms, Cipher algorithms, SRTP
   Auth Tag types, Key Agreement types, and SAS types.  The number of
   listed algorithms are listed for each type: hc=hash count, cc=cipher
   count, ac=auth tag count, kc=key agreement count, and sc=sas count.
   The values for these algorithms are defined in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, and
   6.  A count of zero means that only the mandatory to implement
   algorithms are supported.  Mandatory algorithms MAY be included in
   the list.  The order of the list indicates the preferences of the
   endpoint.  If a mandatory algorithm is not included in the list, it
   is added to the end of the list for preference.

   Note: Implementers are encouraged to keep these algorithm lists small
   - the list does not need to include every cipher and hash supported,
   just the ones the endpoint would prefer to use for this ZRTP
   exchange.

   The 64-bit HMAC at the end of the message is computed across the
   whole message, not including the HMAC, of course.  The HMAC key is
   the sender's H2 (defined in Section 10), and thus cannot be checked
   by the receiving party until the sender's H2 value is known to the
   receiving party.



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     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|             length            |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |            Message Type Block="Hello   " (2 words)            |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                   version="0.83" (1 word)                     |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    |                Client Identifier (4 words)                    |
    |                                                               |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    |                   Hash image H3 (8 words)                     |
    |                             . . .                             |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                                                               |
    |                         ZID  (3 words)                        |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |0|0|0|P| unused (zeros)|  hc   |  cc   |  ac   |  kc   |  sc   |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                 hash algorthms (0 to 7 values)                |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |               cipher algorthms (0 to 7 values)                |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                  auth tag types (0 to 7 values)               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |               key agreement types (0 to 7 values)             |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                    SAS types (0 to 7 values)                  |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |                         HMAC (2 words)                        |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

    Figure 3. Hello message format

6.3.  HelloACK message

   The HelloACK message is used to stop retransmissions of a Hello
   message.  A HelloACK is sent regardless if the version number in the
   Hello is supported or the algorithm list supported.  The receipt of a
   HelloACK stops retransmission of the Hello message.  The format is



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   shown in Figure 4 below.  Note that a Commit message can be sent in
   place of a HelloACK by an Initiator.

     0                   1                   2                   3
     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|         length=3 words        |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
    |              Message Type Block="HelloACK" (2 words)          |
    |                                                               |
    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

    Figure 4. HelloACK message format

6.4.  Commit message

   The Commit message is sent to initiate the key agreement process
   after both sides have received a Hello message, which means it can
   only be sent after receiving both a Hello message and a HelloACK
   message.  The Commit message contains the Initiator's ZID and a list
   of selected algorithms (hash, cipher, auth tag type, key agreement,
   sas type), the ZRTP mode, and hvi, a hash of the DHPart2 of the
   Initiator and the algorithm list from the Responder's Hello message.
   The hash image H2 is defined in Section 10.  The Commit Message
   formats are shown in Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c.

   The 64-bit HMAC at the end of the message is computed across the
   whole message, not including the HMAC, of course.  The HMAC key is
   the sender's H1 (defined in Section 10), and thus cannot be checked
   by the receiving party until the sender's H1 value is known to the
   receiving party.




















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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|        length=29 words        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              Message Type Block="Commit  " (2 words)          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                   Hash image H2 (8 words)                     |
       |                             . . .                             |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                         ZID  (3 words)                        |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                       hash algorihm                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                      cipher algorihm                          |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                       auth tag type                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                     key agreement type                        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         SAS type                              |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                       hvi (8 words)                           |
       |                           . . .                               |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         HMAC (2 words)                        |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 5a. DH Commit message format














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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|        length=25 words        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              Message Type Block="Commit  " (2 words)          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                   Hash image H2 (8 words)                     |
       |                             . . .                             |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                         ZID  (3 words)                        |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                       hash algorihm                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                      cipher algorihm                          |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                       auth tag type                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                  key agreement type = "Multi"                 |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         SAS type                              |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                       nonce (4 words)                         |
       |                           . . .                               |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         HMAC (2 words)                        |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 5b. Multistream Commit message format














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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|        length=27 words        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              Message Type Block="Commit  " (2 words)          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                   Hash image H2 (8 words)                     |
       |                             . . .                             |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                         ZID  (3 words)                        |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                       hash algorihm                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                      cipher algorihm                          |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                       auth tag type                           |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                   key agreement type = "Prsh"                 |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         SAS type                              |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                        nonce (4 words)                        |
       |                                                               |
       |                             . . .                             |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                       key-ID (2 words)                        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         HMAC (2 words)                        |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 5c. Preshared Commit message format

6.5.  DHPart1 message

   The DHPart1 message begins the DH exchange.  The format is shown in
   Figure 5 below.  The DHPart1 message is sent by the Responder if a
   valid Commit message is received from the Initiator.  The length of
   the pvr value and the length of the DHPart1 message depends on the
   Key Agreement Type chosen.  This information is contained in Table 5.
   Note that for Multistream mode, no DHPart1 or DHPart2 message will be



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   sent.

   The 256-bit hash image H1 is defined in Section 10.

   The next five parameters are HMACs of potential shared secrets used
   in generating the ZRTP secret.  The first two, rs1IDr and rs2IDr, are
   the HMACs of the responder's two retained shared secrets, truncated
   to 64 bits.  Next is sigsIDr, the HMAC of the responder's signaling
   secret, truncated to 64 bits.  Next is srtpsIDr, the HMAC of the
   responder's SRTP secret, truncated to 64 bits.  The last parameter is
   the HMAC of an additional shared secret.  For example, if multiple
   SRTP secrets are available or some other secret is used, it can be
   used as the other_secret.  The Message format for the DHPart1 message
   is shown in Figure 6.

   The 64-bit HMAC at the end of the message is computed across the
   whole message, not including the HMAC, of course.  The HMAC key is
   the sender's H0 (defined in Section 10), and thus cannot be checked
   by the receiving party until the sender's H0 value is known to the
   receiving party.































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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|   length=depends on KA Type   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              Message Type Block="DHPart1 " (2 words)          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                   Hash image H1 (8 words)                     |
       |                             . . .                             |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                        rs1IDr (2 words)                       |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                        rs2IDr (2 words)                       |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                        sigsIDr (2 words)                      |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                       srtpsIDr (2 words)                      |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                    other_secretIDr (2 words)                  |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                  pvr (length depends on KA Type)              |
       |                               . . .                           |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         HMAC (2 words)                        |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 6. DHPart1 message format

6.6.  DHPart2 message

   The DHPart2 message completes the DH exchange.  A DHPart2 message is
   sent by the Initiator if a valid DHPart1 message is received from the
   Responder.  The length of the pvr value and the length of the DHPart2
   message depends on the Key Agreement Type chosen.  This information
   is contained in Table 5.  Note that for Multistream mode, no DHPart1
   or DHPart2 message will be sent.




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   The 256-bit hash image H1 is defined in Section 10.

   The next five parameters are HMACs of potential shared secrets used
   in generating the ZRTP secret.  The first two, rs1IDi and rs2IDi, are
   the HMACs of the initiator's two retained shared secrets, truncated
   to 64 bits.  Next is sigsIDi, the HMAC of the initiator's signaling
   secret, truncated to 64 bits.  Next is srtpsIDi, the HMAC of the
   initiator's SRTP secret, truncated to 64 bits.  The last parameter is
   the HMAC of an additional shared secret.  For example, if multiple
   SRTP secrets are available or some other secret is used, it can be
   included.  The message format for the DHPart2 message is shown in
   Figure 7.

   The 64-bit HMAC at the end of the message is computed across the
   whole message, not including the HMAC, of course.  The HMAC key is
   the sender's H0 (defined in Section 10), and thus cannot be checked
   by the receiving party until the sender's H0 value is known to the
   receiving party.

































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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|   length=depends on KA Type   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              Message Type Block="DHPart2 " (2 words)          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                   Hash image H1 (8 words)                     |
       |                             . . .                             |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                        rs1IDi (2 words)                       |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                        rs2IDi (2 words)                       |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                        sigsIDi (2 words)                      |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                       srtpsIDi (2 words)                      |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                    other_secretIDi (2 words)                  |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                  pvi (length depends on KA Type)              |
       |                               . . .                           |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         HMAC (2 words)                        |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 7. DHPart2 message format

6.7.  Confirm1 and Confirm2 messages

   The Confirm1 message is sent by the Responder in response to a valid
   DHPart2 message after the SRTP session key and parameters have been
   negotiated.  The Confirm2 message is sent by the Initiator in
   response to a Confirm1 message.  The format is shown in Figure 8
   below.  The message contains the Message Type Block "Confirm1" or
   "Confirm2".  Next is the HMAC, a keyed hash over encrypted part of
   the message (shown enclosed by "===" in Figure 8.)  The next 16



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   octets contain the CFB Initialization Vector.  The rest of the
   message is encrypted using CFB and protected by the HMAC.

   The first field inside the encrypted region is the hash pre-image H0,
   which is defined in detail in Section 10.

   The next 16 bits are not used.  They SHOULD be set to zero and MUST
   be ignored in received Confirm1 or Confirm2 messages.

   The next 8 bits contain the signature length.  If no SAS signature
   (described in Section 8.2) is present, all bits are set to zero.  The
   signature length is in words and includes the signature type block.
   If the calculated signature octet count is not a multiple of 4, zeros
   are added to pad it out to a word boundary.  If no signature block is
   present, the overall length of the Confirm1 or Confirm2 Message will
   be set to 15 words.

   The next 8 bits are used for flags.  Undefined flags are set to zero
   and ignored.  Four flags are currently defined.  The Disclosure Flag
   (D) is a Boolean bit defined in Section 12.  The Allow Clear flag (A)
   is a Boolean bit defined in Section 5.11.  The SAS Verified flag (V)
   is a Boolean bit defined in Section 8.1.  The PBX Enrollment flag (E)
   is a Boolean bit defined in Section 8.3.  The cache expiration
   interval is an unsigned 32 bit integer of the number of seconds that
   the newly generated cached shared secret, rs1, should be stored.

   If the signature length (in words) is non-zero, a signature type
   block will be present along with a signature block.  Next is the
   signature block.  The signature block includes the key used to
   generate the signature.

   CFB [11] mode is applied with a feedback length of 128-bits, a full
   cipher block, and the final block is truncated to match the exact
   length of the encrypted data.  The CFB Initialization Vector is a 128
   bit random nonce.  The block cipher algorithm and the key size is the
   same as what was negotiated for the media encryption.  CFB is used to
   encrypt the part of the Confirm1 message beginning after the CFB IV
   to the end of the message (the encrypted region is enclosed by
   "======" in Figure 8).

   The responder uses the zrtpkeyr to encrypt the Confirm1 message.  The
   initiator uses the zrtpkeyi to encrypt the Confirm2 message.









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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|         length=variable       |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |      Message Type Block="Confirm1" or "Confirm2" (2 words)    |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         HMAC (2 words)                        |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                CFB Initialization Vector (4 words)            |
       |                                                               |
       |                                                               |
       +===============================================================+
       |                                                               |
       |                 Hash pre-image H0 (8 words)                   |
       |                             . . .                             |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       | Unused (Set to zero, ignored) |  sig length   |0 0 0 0|E|V|A|D|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              cache expiration interval (1 word)               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |      optional signature type block (1 word if present)        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |           optional signature block (variable length)          |
       |                            . . .                              |
       |                                                               |
       |                                                               |
       +===============================================================+

       Figure 8. Confirm1 and Confirm2 message format

6.8.  Conf2ACK message

   The Conf2ACK message is sent by the Responder in response to a valid
   Confirm2 message.  The message format for the Conf2ACK is shown in
   Figure 9.  The receipt of a Conf2ACK stops retransmission of the
   Confirm2 message.









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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|         length=3 words        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              Message Type Block="Conf2ACK" (2 words)          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 9. Conf2ACK message format

6.9.  Error message

   The Error message is sent to terminate an in-process ZRTP key
   agreement exchange due to an error.  The format is shown in Figure 10
   below.  The use of the Error message is described in Section 5.11.

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|        length=4 words         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              Message Type Block="Error   " (2 words)          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |               Integer Error Code (1 word)                     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 10. Error message format

   Defined hexadecimal values for the Error Code are listed in Table 7.




















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   Error Code |  Meaning
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x10      | Malformed packet (CRC OK, but wrong structure)
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x20      | Critical software error
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x30      | Unsupported ZRTP version
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x40      | Hello components mismatch
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x51      | Hash type not supported
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x52      | Cipher type not supported
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x53      | Public key exchange not supported
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x54      | SRTP auth. tag not supported
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x55      | SAS scheme not supported
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x61      | DH Error: bad pvi or pvr ( == 1, 0, or p-1)
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x62      | DH Error: hvi != hashed data
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x63      | Received relayed SAS from untrusted MiTM
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x70      | Auth. Error: Bad Confirm pkt HMAC
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x80      | Nonce reuse
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x90      | Equal ZIDs in Hello
   ---------------------------------------------------
    0x100     | GoClear packet received, but not allowed
   ---------------------------------------------------

   Table 7. ZRTP Error Codes

6.10.  ErrorACK message

   The ErrorACK message is sent in response to an Error message.  The
   format is shown in Figure 11 below.










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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|        length=3 words         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              Message Type Block="ErrorACK" (2 words)          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 11. ErrorACK message format

6.11.  GoClear message

   The optional GoClear message is sent to switch from SRTP to RTP.  The
   format is shown in Figure 12 below.  The clear_hmac is used to
   authenticate the GoClear message so that bogus GoClear messages
   introduced by an attacker can be detected and discarded.  The use of
   GoClear is described in Section 5.11.

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|        length=5 words         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              Message Type Block="GoClear " (2 words)          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                       clear_hmac (2 words)                    |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 12. GoClear message format

6.12.  ClearACK message

   The optional ClearACK message is sent to acknowledge receipt of a
   GoClear.  A ClearACK is only sent if the clear_hmac from the GoClear
   message is authenticated.  Otherwise, no response is returned.  The
   format is shown in Figure 13.












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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|        length=3 words         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              Message Type Block="ClearACK" (2 words)          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 13. ClearACK message format

6.13.  SASrelay message

   The SASrelay message is sent by a trusted Man in The Middle (MiTM),
   most often a PBX.  It is not sent as a response to a packet, but is
   sent as a self-initiated packet by the trusted MiTM.  It can only be
   sent after the rest of the ZRTP key negotiations have completed,
   after the Confirm packets and their ACKs.  It can only be sent after
   the trusted MiTM has finished key negotiations with the other party,
   because it is the other party's SAS that is being relayed.  It is
   sent with retry logic until a RelayACK message (Figure 15) is
   received or the retry schedule has been exhausted.  The SASrelay
   message format is shown in Figure 14 below.  The message contains the
   Message Type Block "SASrelay".  Next is the HMAC, a keyed hash over
   encrypted part of the message (shown enclosed by "===" in Figure 14.)
   The next 16 octets contain the CFB Initialization Vector.  The rest
   of the message is encrypted using CFB and protected by the HMAC.

   The next 16 bits are not used.  They SHOULD be set to zero and MUST
   be ignored in received SASrelay messages.

   The next 8 bits contain the signature length.  The trusted MiTM MAY
   compute a digital signature on the SAS hash, as described in section
   8.2, using a persistant signing key owned by the trusted MiTM.  If no
   SAS signature is present, all bits are set to zero.  The signature
   length is in words and includes the signature type block.  If the
   calculated signature octet count is not a multiple of 4, zeros are
   added to pad it out to a word boundary.  If no signature block is
   present, the overall length of the SASrelay Message will be set to 12
   words.

   The next 8 bits are used for flags.  Undefined flags are set to zero
   and ignored.  Three flags are currently defined.  The Disclosure Flag
   (D) is a Boolean bit defined in Section 12.  The Allow Clear flag (A)
   is a Boolean bit defined in Section 5.11.  The SAS Verified flag (V)
   is a Boolean bit defined in Section 8.1.  These flags are updated
   values to the same flags provided earlier in the Confirm packet, but
   they are updated to reflect the new flag information relayed by the



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   PBX from the other party.

   The next 32 bit word contains the rendering scheme for the relayed
   sasvalue, which will be the same rendering scheme used by the other
   party on the other side of the trusted MiTM.  Section 8.3 describes
   how the PBX determines whether the ZRTP client regards the PBX as a
   trusted MiTM.  If the PBX determines that the ZRTP client trusts the
   PBX, the next 32 bit word contains the binary sasvalue relayed from
   the other party.  If this SASRelay packet is being sent to a ZRTP
   client that does not trust this MiTM, the next 32 bit word will be
   ignored by the recipient and should be set to zero by the PBX.

   If the signature length (in words) is non-zero, a signature type
   block will be present along with a signature block.  Next is the
   signature block.  The signature block includes the key used to
   generate the signature.

   CFB [11] mode is applied with a feedback length of 128-bits, a full
   cipher block, and the final block is truncated to match the exact
   length of the encrypted data.  The CFB Initialization Vector is a 128
   bit random nonce.  The block cipher algorithm and the key size is the
   same as what was negotiated for the media encryption.  CFB is used to
   encrypt the part of the SASrelay message beginning after the CFB IV
   to the end of the message (the encrypted region is enclosed by
   "======" in Figure 14).

   Depending on whether the trusted MiTM had taken the role of the
   initiator or the responder during the ZRTP key negotiation, the
   SASrelay message is encrypted with zrtpkeyi or zrtpkeyr.






















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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|         length=variable       |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |             Message Type Block="SASrelay" (2 words)           |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                         HMAC (2 words)                        |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                CFB Initialization Vector (4 words)            |
       |                                                               |
       |                                                               |
       +===============================================================+
       | Unused (Set to zero, ignored) |  sig length   |0 0 0 0|0|V|A|D|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |         rendering scheme of relayed sasvalue (1 word)         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |            Trusted MITM relayed sasvalue (1 word)             |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |      optional signature type block (1 word if present)        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |           optional signature block (variable length)          |
       |                            . . .                              |
       |                                                               |
       |                                                               |
       +===============================================================+

       Figure 14. SASrelay message format

6.14.  RelayACK message

   The RelayACK message is sent in response to a valid SASrelay message.
   The message format for the RelayACK is shown in Figure 15.  The
   receipt of a RelayACK stops retransmission of the SASrelay message.

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|         length=3 words        |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |              Message Type Block="RelayACK" (2 words)          |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+




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       Figure 15. RelayACK message format


7.  Retransmissions

   ZRTP uses two retransmission timers T1 and T2.  T1 is used for
   retransmission of Hello messages, when the support of ZRTP by the
   other endpoint may not be known.  T2 is used in retransmissions of
   all the other ZRTP messages with the exception of GoClear.

   All message retransmissions MUST be identical to the initial message
   including nonces, public values, etc; otherwise, hashes of the
   message sequences may not agree.

   Practical experience has shown that RTP packet loss at the start of
   an RTP session can be extremely high.  Since the entire ZRTP message
   exchange occurs during this period, the defined retransmission scheme
   is defined to be aggressive.  Since ZRTP packets with the exception
   of the DHPart1 and DHPart2 messages are small, this should have
   minimal effect on overall bandwidth utilization of the media session.

   ZRTP endpoints MUST NOT exceed the bandwidth of the resulting media
   session as determined by the offer/answer exchange.

   Hello ZRTP requests are retransmitted at an interval that starts at
   T1 seconds and doubles after every retransmission, capping at 200ms.
   A Hello message is retransmitted 20 times before giving up.  T1 has a
   recommended value of 50 ms.  Retransmission of a Hello ends upon
   receipt of a HelloACK or Commit message.

   Non-Hello ZRTP requests are retransmitted only by the initiator -
   that is, only Commit, DHPart2, Confirm2, and GoClear are
   retransmitted if the corresponding message from the responder,
   DHPart1, Confirm1, Conf2ACK, and ClearACK, are not received.  Non-
   Hello ZRTP messages are retransmitted at an interval that starts at
   T2 seconds and doubles after every retransmission, capping at 600ms.
   Only the ZRTP initiator performs retransmissions.  Each message is
   retransmitted 10 times before giving up and resuming a normal RTP
   session.  T2 has a default value of 150ms.  Each message has a
   response message that stops retransmissions, as shown in Table 8.
   The high value of T2 means that retransmissions will likely only
   occur with packet loss.









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       Message      Acknowledgement Message
       -------      -----------------------
       Hello        HelloACK or Commit
       Commit       DHPart1 or Confirm1
       DHPart2      Confirm1
       Confirm1     Confirm2
       Confirm2     Conf2ACK
       GoClear      ClearACK
       Error        ErrorACK
       SASrelay     RelayACK

      Table 8. Retransmitted ZRTP Messages and Responses


8.  Short Authentication String

   This section will discuss the implementation of the Short
   Authentication String, or SAS in ZRTP.  The SAS can be verbally
   verified by the human users reading the string aloud, exchanging and
   comparing over an integrity-protected signaling channel using the
   a=zrtp-sas attribute, or validating a digital signature exchanged in
   the Confirm1 or Confirm2 messages.

   The rendering of the SAS value to the user depends on the SAS Type
   agreed upon in the Commit message.  For the SAS Type of base32, the
   leftmost 20 bits of the 32-bit sasvalue are rendered as a form of
   base32 encoding known as z-base-32 [12].  The purpose of z-base-32 is
   to represent arbitrary sequences of octets in a form that is as
   convenient as possible for human users to manipulate.  As a result,
   the choice of characters is slightly different from base32 as defined
   in RFC 3548.  The leftmost 20 bits of the sasvalue results in four
   base32 characters which are rendered to both ZRTP endpoints.  For the
   SAS Type of base256, the leftmost 16 bits of the 32-bit sasvalue are
   rendered using the PGP Wordlist [13], [14].  Other SAS Types may be
   defined to render the SAS value in other ways.

   The SAS SHOULD be rendered to the user for authentication.  In
   addition, the SAS SHOULD be sent in a subsequent offer/answer
   exchange (a re-INVITE in SIP) after the completion of ZRTP exchange
   using the ZRTP SAS SDP attributes defined in Section 9.

   The SAS is not treated as a secret value, but it must be compared to
   see if it matches at both ends of the communications channel.  The
   two users read it aloud to their partners to see if it matches.  This
   allows detection of a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.






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8.1.  SAS Verified Flag

   The SAS Verified flag (V) is set based on the user indicating that
   SAS comparison has been successfully performed.  The SAS Verified
   flag is exchanged securely in the Confirm1 and Confirm2 messages of
   the next session.  In other words, each party sends the SAS Verified
   flag from the previous session in the Confirm message of the current
   session.  It is perfectly reasonable to have a ZRTP endpoint that
   never sets the SAS Verified flag, because it would require adding
   complexity to the user interface to allow the user to set it.  The
   SAS Verified flag is not required to be set, but if it is available
   to the client software, it allows for the possibility that the client
   software could render to the user that the SAS verify procedure was
   carried out in a previous session.

   Regardless of whether there is a user interface element to allow the
   user to set the SAS Verified flag, it is worth caching a shared
   secret, because doing so reduces opportunities for an attacker in the
   next call.

   If at any time the users carry out the SAS comparison procedure, and
   it actually fails to match, then this means there is a very
   resourceful man-in-the-middle.  If this is the first call, the MITM
   was there on the first call, which is impressive enough.  If it
   happens in a later call, it also means the MITM must also know the
   cached shared secret, because you could not have carried out any
   voice traffic at all unless the session key was correctly computed
   and is also known to the attacker.  This implies the MITM must have
   been present in all the previous sessions, since the initial
   establishment of the first shared secret.  This is indeed a
   resourceful attacker.  It also means that if at any time he ceases
   his participation as a MITM on one of your calls, the protocol will
   detect that the cached shared secret is no longer valid -- because it
   was really two different shared secrets all along, one of them
   between Alice and the attacker, and the other between the attacker
   and Bob. The continuity of the cached shared secrets make it possible
   for us to detect the MITM when he inserts himself into the ongoing
   relationship, as well as when he leaves.  Also, if the attacker tries
   to stay with a long lineage of calls, but fails to execute a DH MITM
   attack for even one missed call, he is permanently excluded.  He can
   no longer resynchronize with the chain of cached shared secrets.

   Some sort of user interface element (maybe a checkbox) is needed to
   allow the user to tell the software the SAS verify was successful,
   causing the software to set the SAS Verified flag (V), which
   (together with our cached shared secret) obviates the need to perform
   the SAS procedure in the next call.  An additional user interface
   element can be provided to let the user tell the software he detected



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   an actual SAS mismatch, which indicates a MITM attack.  The software
   can then take appropriate action, clearing the SAS Verified flag, and
   erase the cached shared secret from this session.  It is up to the
   implementer to decide if this added user interface complexity is
   warranted.

   If the SAS matches, it means there is no MITM, which also implies it
   is now safe to trust a cached shared secret for later calls.  If
   inattentive users don't bother to check the SAS, it means we don't
   know whether there is or is not a MITM, so even if we do establish a
   new cached shared secret, there is a risk that our potential attacker
   may have a subsequent opportunity to continue inserting himself in
   the call, until we finally get around to checking the SAS.  If the
   SAS matches, it means no attacker was present for any previous
   session since we started propagating cached shared secrets, because
   this session and all the previous sessions were also authenticated
   with a continuous lineage of shared secrets.

8.2.  Signing the SAS

   The SAS MAY be signed and the signature sent using the Confirm1,
   Confirm2, or SASrelay messages.  The signature algorithm is also sent
   in the Confirm1, Confirm2, or SASrelay message, along with the length
   of the signature.  The key types and signature algorithms are for
   future study.  The signature is calculated over the entire SAS hash
   result (sashash) that was truncated down to derive the sasvalue.  The
   signatures exchanged in the encrypted Confirm1, Confirm2, or SASrelay
   messages MAY be used to authenticate the ZRTP exchange.

8.3.  Relaying the SAS through a PBX

   ZRTP is designed to use end-to-end encryption.  The two parties'
   verbal comparison of the short authentication string (SAS) depends on
   this assumption.  But in some PBX environments, such as Asterisk,
   there are usage scenarios that have the PBX acting as a trusted man-
   in-the-middle (MiTM), which means there are two back-to-back ZRTP
   connections with separate session keys and separate SAS's.

   For example, imagine that Bob has a ZRTP-enabled VoIP phone that has
   been registered with his company's PBX, so that it is regarded as an
   extension of the PBX.  Alice, whose phone is not associated with the
   PBX, might dial the PBX from the outside, and a ZRTP connection is
   negotiated between her phone and the PBX.  She then selects Bob's
   extension from the company directory in the PBX.  The PBX makes a
   call to Bob's phone (which might be offsite, many miles away from the
   PBX through the Internet) and a separate ZRTP connection is
   negotiated between the PBX and Bob's phone.  The two ZRTP sessions
   have different session keys and different SAS's, which would render



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   the SAS useless for verbal comparison between Alice and Bob. They
   might even mistakenly believe that a wiretapper is present because of
   the SAS mismatch, causing undue alarm.

   ZRTP has a mechanism for solving this problem by having the PBX relay
   the Alice/PBX SAS to Bob, sending it through to Bob in a special
   SASrelay packet as defined in Section 6.13, which is sent after the
   PBX/Bob ZRTP negotiation is complete, after the Confirm packets.
   Only the PBX, acting as a special trusted MiTM (trusted by the
   recipient of the SAS relay packet), will relay the SAS.  The SASrelay
   packet protects the relayed SAS from tampering via an included HMAC,
   similar to how the Confirm packet is protected.  Bob's ZRTP-enabled
   phone accepts the relayed SAS for rendering only because Bob's phone
   had previously been configured to trust the PBX.  This special
   trusted relationship with the PBX can be established through a
   special security enrollment procedure.  After that enrollment
   procedure, the PBX is treated by Bob as a special trusted MiTM.  This
   results in Alice's SAS being rendered to Bob, so that Alice and Bob
   may verbally compare them and thus prevent a MiTM attack by any other
   untrusted MiTM.

   A real bad-guy MiTM cannot exploit this protocol feature to mount a
   MiTM attack and relay Alice's SAS to Bob, because Bob has not
   previously carried out a special registration ritual with the bad
   guy.  The relayed SAS would not be rendered by Bob's phone, because
   it did not come from a trusted PBX.  The recognition of the special
   trust relationship is achieved with the prior establishment of a
   special shared secret between Bob and his PBX, which is called the
   trusted MiTM key.

   The trusted MiTM key can be stored in a special cache at the time of
   the initial enrollment (which is carried out only once for Bob's
   phone), and Bob's phone associates this key with the ZID of the PBX,
   while the PBX associates it with the ZID of Bob's phone.  After the
   enrollment has established and stored this trusted MiTM key, it can
   be detected during subsequent ZRTP call negotiations between the PBX
   and Bob's phone, because the PBX and the phone SHOULD pass the hash
   of the trusted MiTM key in the other_secret (s5) position in the DH
   packet.  It is then used as part of the key agreement to calculate
   s0.

   The PBX can determine whether it is trusted by the ZRTP user agent of
   the caller or callee.  The presence of a shared trusted MiTM key in
   the key negotiation sequence indicates that the phone has been
   enrolled with this PBX and therefore trusts it to act as a trusted
   MiTM.  The PBX SHOULD relay the SAS from the other party in this
   case.




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   The relayed SAS fields contain the SAS rendering type and the binary
   32-bit sasvalue.  The receiver absolutely MUST NOT render the relayed
   SAS if it does not come from a specially trusted ZRTP endpoint.  The
   security of the ZRTP protocol depends on not rendering a relayed SAS
   from an untrusted MiTM, because it may be relayed by a MiTM attacker.
   See the SASrelay packet definition (Figure 14) for further details.

   To ensure that both Alice and Bob will use to the same SAS rendering
   scheme after the keys are negotiated, the PBX also sends the SASrelay
   message to the unenrolled party (which does not regard this PBX as a
   trusted MiTM), conveying the SAS rendering scheme, but not the SAS
   value, which it sets to zero.  The unenrolled party will ignore the
   relayed SAS field, but will use the specified SAS rendering scheme.

   The next section describes the initial enrollment procedure that
   establishes a special shared secret between the PBX and Bob's phone,
   a trusted MiTM key, so that the phone will learn to recognize the PBX
   as a trusted MiTM.

8.3.1.  PBX Enrollment and the PBX Enrollment Flag

   Both the PBX and the endpoint need to know when enrollment is taking
   place.  One way of doing this is to setup an enrollment extension on
   the PBX which a newly configured endpoint would call and establish a
   ZRTP session.  The PBX would then play audio media that offers the
   user an opportunity to configure his phone to trust this PBX as a
   trusted MiTM.  The PBX calculates and stores the trusted MiTM key in
   its cache and associates it with this phone, indexed by the phone's
   ZID.  The key is calculated this way:

      trustedmitmkey = HMAC(ZRTPSess,"Trusted MiTM key")

   The PBX signals the enrollment process by setting the PBX Enrollment
   flag (E) in the Confirm message.  This flag is used to trigger the
   ZRTP endpoint's user interface to prompt the user if they want to
   trust this PBX and calculate and store the trustedmitmkey in the
   cache.  If the user decides to respond by activating the appropriate
   user interface element (a menu item, checkbox, or button), his ZRTP
   user agent calculates trustedmitmkey using the same formula and saves
   it in a special cache entry associated with this PBX.

   If the user elects not to enroll, perhaps because he dialed a wrong
   number or does not yet feel comfortable with this PBX, he can simply
   hang up and not save the trustedmitmkey in his cache.  The PBX will
   have it saved in the PBX cache, but that will do no harm.  The
   SASrelay scheme does not depend on the PBX trusting the phone.  It
   only depends on the phone trusting the PBX.  It is the phone (the
   user) who is at risk if the PBX abuses its MiTM privileges.



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   After this enrollment process, the PBX and the ZRTP-enabled phone
   both share a secret that enables the phone to recognize the PBX as a
   trusted MiTM in future calls.  This means that when a future call
   from an outside ZRTP-enabled caller is relayed through the PBX to
   this phone, the phone will render a relayed SAS from the PBX.  If the
   SASrelay packet comes from a MiTM which does not know the
   trustedmitmkey, the phone treats it as a "bad guy" MiTM, and refuses
   to render the relayed SAS.  Regardless of which party initiates any
   future phone calls through the PBX, the enrolled phone or the outside
   phone, the PBX will relay the SAS to the enrolled phone.

   There are other ways that ZRTP user agents can be configured to trust
   a PBX.  Perhaps the trustedmitmkey can be configured into the phone
   by some automated process in large IT environments.  This
   specification does not require that products be configured solely by
   this enrollment process.  Any process that results in a
   trustedmitmkey to be computed and shared between the PBX and the
   phone will suffice.  This is one such method that has been shown to
   work.

8.4.  Rendering SAS for Multiple Media Streams

   There is only one SAS value computed per call.  That is the SAS value
   for the first media stream established, which computes the ZRTPSess
   key, using DH mode.  The ZRTPSess key is used to compute the SAS, as
   well as the SRTP session keys for each additional media stream in
   Multistream mode.  This SAS applies to all media streams for the same
   call.


9.  Signaling Interactions

   This section discusses how ZRTP, SIP, and SDP work together.

   Note that ZRTP may be implemented without coupling with the SIP
   signaling.  For example, ZRTP can be implemented as a "bump in the
   wire" or as a "bump in the stack" in which RTP sent by the SIP UA is
   converted to ZRTP.  In these cases, the SIP UA will have no knowledge
   of ZRTP.  As a result, the signaling path discovery mechanisms
   introduced in this section should not be definitive - they are a
   hint.  Despite the absence of an indication of ZRTP support in an
   offer or answer, a ZRTP endpoint SHOULD still send Hello messages.

   ZRTP endpoints which have control over the signaling path include a
   ZRTP SDP attributes in their SDP offers and answers.  The ZRTP
   attribute, a=zrtp-hash is used to indicate support for ZRTP and to
   convey a hash of the Hello message.  There are a number of potential
   uses for this attribute.  It is useful when signaling elements would



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   like to know when ZRTP may be utilized by endpoints.  It is also
   useful if endpoints support multiple methods of SRTP key management.
   The ZRTP attribute can be used to ensure that these key management
   approaches work together instead of against each other.  For example,
   if only one endpoint supports ZRTP but both support another method to
   key SRTP, then the other method will be used instead.  When used in
   parallel, an SRTP secret carried in an a=keymgt [27] or a=crypto [26]
   attribute can be used as a shared secret for the srtp_secret.  The
   ZRTP attribute is also used to signal to an intermediary ZRTP device
   not to act as a ZRTP endpoint, as discussed in Section 11.

   The a=zrtp-hash attribute can only be included at a media level since
   Hello messages sent in different media streams will have unique
   hashes.

9.1.  Tying the media stream to the signaling layer via the Hello Hash

   It is desirable to tie the media stream to the signaling channel to
   prevent a third party from inserting false media packets.  If the
   signaling channel is properly integrity protected, and the signaling
   layer contains information that ties it to the media stream, false
   media streams can be rejected.

   To accomplish this, a SHA-256 hash is computed across the entire ZRTP
   Hello message (as shown in Figure 3).  This hash image is made
   available to the signaling layer, where it is transmitted as a
   hexadecimal value in the SIP channel using the SDP attribute, a=zrtp-
   hash defined in this specification.  Each media stream (audio or
   video) will have a separate Hello packet, and thus will require a
   separate a=zrtp-hash in an SDP attribute.  The recipient of the SIP/
   SDP message can then use this hash image to detect and reject false
   Hello packets in the media channel, as well as identify which media
   stream is associated with this SIP call.  Each Hello packet hashes
   uniquely, because it contains the H3 field derived from a random
   nonce, defined in Section 10.

   This is an optional feature, because some ZRTP endpoints do not have
   the ability to add SDP attributes to the signaling.  For example, if
   ZRTP is implemented in a hardware bump-in-the-wire device, it might
   only have the ability to modify the media packets, not the SIP
   packets, especially if the SIP packets are integrity protected and
   thus cannot be modified on the wire.  If the SDP has no hash image of
   the ZRTP Hello packet, the recipient's ZRTP user agent cannot check
   it, and thus will not be able to reject Hello packets based on this
   hash.

   After the Hello Hash is used to properly identify the ZRTP Hello
   packet as belonging to this particular SIP call, the rest of the ZRTP



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   packet sequence is protected from false packet injection by other
   protection mechanisms.  For example, the use of the total_hash in the
   shared secret calculation, and also the hash chaining mechanism
   defined in Section 10.

   An attacker who controls only the signaling layer, such as an
   uncooperative VoIP service provider, may be able to deny service by
   corrupting the hash of the Hello packet in the SDP attribute, which
   would force ZRTP to reject perfectly good Hello packets.  If there is
   reason to believe this is happening, the ZRTP endpoint MAY allow
   Hello packets to be accepted that do not match the hash image in the
   SDP attribute.

   The inclusion of the a=zrtp-hash as an SDP attribute becomes
   especially useful if the SDP is protected by SIP Identity (RFC 4474)
   [30] or better still, Dan Wing's SIP Identity using Media Path [33].
   This creates a chain of authentication from the media SRTP auth tag,
   back to the ZRTP session key negotiation, back to the a=zrtp-hash in
   the SDP, back to the SIP Identity Media mechanism.

   If and only if the signaling path and the SDP is protected by some
   form of integrity protection, such as one of the abovementioned
   mechanisms, so that it can guarantee delivery of the a=zrtp-hash
   attribute without any tampering by a third party, and if there is
   good reason to trust the signaling layer to protect the interests of
   the end user, it is possible to authenticate the key exchange and
   prevent a MiTM attack without requiring the users to verbally compare
   the SAS.  To do this, the hash chaining mechanism defined in Section
   10 is used to provide a series of HMAC keys that protect the entire
   ZRTP key exchange.  The following mechanism is used.

   The Hello packet is protected by a 64-bit HMAC, keyed by H2.  The
   Commit packet is protected by a 64-bit HMAC keyed by H1.  The DHPart1
   or DHPart2 packets are protected by a 64-bit HMAC keyed by H0.  The
   HMAC protecting the Confirm packets are computed by a different HMAC
   key derived from the key agreement, not from the hash chain.  Each
   packet's HMAC is checked when the HMAC key is received in the next
   packet.  If a bad HMAC is discovered, it MUST be treated as a
   security exception indicating a MiTM attack, perhaps by logging or
   alerting the user.  It must not be treated as a random error.  Random
   errors are already discovered and quietly rejected by bad CRCs.

   Without an authenticated mechanism in the signaling layer to
   guarantee delivery of the a=zrtp-hash SDP attribute without
   modification by a third party, these HMACs alone will not prevent a
   MiTM attack.  In that case, the SAS will still have to be used to
   authenticate the key exchange.  At the time of this writing, very few
   deployed VoIP clients offer a fully implemented SIP stack that



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   provides integrity protection for the delivery of SDP attributes end-
   to-end.  Thus, real-world implementations of ZRTP endpoints will
   continue to depend on SAS authentication for quite some time.  Even
   after there is widespread availability of SIP user agents that offer
   integrity protected delivery of SDP attributes, many users will still
   be faced with the fact that the signaling path may be controlled by
   institutions that do not have the best interests of the end user in
   mind.  In those cases, SAS authentication will remain the gold
   standard for the prudent user.

   Some potential ZRTP users have expressed a desire to use a PKI if
   they already have one up and running, to authenticate the ZRTP
   exchange.  This is expressed by the R-EXISTING requirement in the
   Media Security Requirements [16] document.  This requirement can be
   fully met by leveraging a certificate-backed PKI in the signaling
   layer to integrity protect the delivery of the a=zrtp-hash SDP
   attribute.  This enables authentication of the entire ZRTP key
   exchange through the use of ZRTP's hash chains to key the HMACs in
   the ZRTP packets.  A trustworthy PKI in the signaling can be
   leveraged to protect the media against a MiTM attack without
   requiring the user to check the SAS, without adding any explicit
   signatures or signature keys to the ZRTP key exchange, without any
   extra public key operations, without any extra packets, and offering
   the same level of assurance as the authentication in the signaling
   layer, no more, no less.

   This use of hash chains to key HMACs is similar to Adrian Perrig's
   TESLA protocol [21].

9.2.  Deriving the signaling secret (sigs) from the signaling layer

   The shared secret calculations defined in Section 5.3 make use of the
   signaling secret (sigs), if it is provided by the signaling layer.

   The signaling secret can be derived from SIP signaling and passed
   from the signaling protocol used to establish the RTP session to
   ZRTP.  It's the dialog identifier of a Secure SIP (sips) session: a
   string composed of Call-ID and the local and remote tags.  It can be
   considered a secret because it is always transported using TLS and is
   randomly generated for each SIP call.  The local and remote tags are
   sorted in ascending order in the hash.  From the definitions in RFC
   3261 [24]:

      sigs = hash(call-id | tag1 | tag2)

   Note: the dialog identifier of a non-secure SIP session should not be
   considered a signaling secret as it has no confidentiality
   protection.



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   Note: The signaling secret may not be regarded as having adequate
   entropy for cryptographic protection without augmentation by key
   material from other sources.

9.3.  Deriving the SRTP secret (srtps) from the signaling layer

   The shared secret calculations defined in Section 5.3 make use of the
   SRTP secret (srtps), if it is provided by the signaling layer.

   It is desirable for only one SRTP key negotiation protocol to be
   used, and that protocol should be ZRTP.  But in the event the
   signaling layer negotiates its own SRTP master key and salt, using
   the RFC 4568 (SDES) [26] or [27], it can be passed from the signaling
   to the ZRTP layer and mixed into ZRTP's own shared secret
   calculations, without compromising security by creating a dependency
   on the signaling for media encryption.

   ZRTP computes srtps from the SRTP master key and salt parameters
   provided by the signaling layer in this manner:

      srtps = hash(SRTP master key | SRTP master salt)

9.4.  Using the signaling path to check the SAS

   In some scenarios, it is desirable for a signaling intermediary to be
   able to validate the SAS on behalf of the user.  This could be due to
   an endpoint which has a user interface unable to render the SAS.  Or,
   this could be a protection by an organization against lazy users who
   never check the SAS.  Using either the ZRTP SAS or ZRTP SASvalue
   attribute, the SAS check can be performed without requiring the human
   users to speak the SAS.  Note that this check can only be relied on
   if the signaling path has end-to-end integrity protection.

   The ZRTP SAS attribute a=zrtp-sas is a Media level SDP attribute that
   can be used to carry the SAS string and value.  The string is
   identical to that rendered to the user while contents of the string
   passed depends on the negotiated SAS Type.  The value is the leftmost
   64 bits of the SAS hash result (sashash) encoded as hex.  Since the
   SAS is not known at the start of a session, the a=zrtp-sas attribute
   will never be present in the initial offer/answer exchange.  After
   the ZRTP exchange has completed, the SAS is known and can be
   exchanged over the signaling using a second offer/answer exchange (a
   re-INVITE in SIP terms).  Note that the SAS is not treated as a
   secret and as such does not need confidentiality protection when sent
   over the signaling path.

   The ABNF for the ZRTP attribute is as follows:




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        zrtp-attribute        = "a=zrtp-hash:" zrtp-hash-value

        zrtp-hash-value       = 1*(HEXDIG)

   The ABNF for the ZRTP SAS attribute is as follows:

        zrtp-sas-attribute    = "a=zrtp-sas:" sas-string sas-value

        sas-string            = non-ws-string

        non-ws-string         = 1*(VCHAR/%x80-FF)
                               ;string of visible characters

        sas-value             = 1*(HEXDIG)

   Example of the ZRTP attribute in an initial SDP offer or answer used
   at the session level:

   v=0
   o=bob 2890844527 2890844527 IN IP4 client.biloxi.example.com
   s=
   c=IN IP4 client.biloxi.example.com
   t=0 0
   m=audio 3456 RTP/AVP 97 33
   a=rtpmap:97 iLBC/8000
   a=rtpmap:33 no-op/8000
   a=zrtp-hash:fe30efd02423cb054e50efd0248742ac7a52c8f91bc2df881ae642c371ba46df

   An Example of the ZRTP SAS attribute in a subsequent SDP offer or
   answer used at the media level:

      v=0
      o=bob 2890844527 2890844528 IN IP4 client.biloxi.example.com
      s=
      c=IN IP4 client.biloxi.example.com
      t=0 0
      m=audio 3456 RTP/AVP 97 33
      a=rtpmap:97 iLBC/8000
      a=rtpmap:33 no-op/8000
      a=zrtp-sas: opzf 5e017f3a6563876a

   Another example showing a second media stream being added to the
   session.  A second DH exchange is performed (instead of using the
   Preshared mode) resulting in a second ZRTP SAS attribute.







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      v=0
      o=bob 2890844527 2890844528 IN IP4 client.biloxi.example.com
      s=
      c=IN IP4 client.biloxi.example.com
      t=0 0
      m=audio 3456 RTP/AVP 97 33
      a=rtpmap:97 iLBC/8000
      a=rtpmap:33 no-op/8000
      a=zrtp-sas: opzf 5e017f3a6563876a
      m=video 51372 RTP/AVP 31 33
      a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000
      a=rtpmap:33 no-op/8000
      a=zrtp-sas: gwif e1027fa9f865221c


10.  False ZRTP Packet Rejection

   An attacker who is not in the media path may attempt to inject false
   ZRTP protocol packets, possibly to effect a denial of service attack,
   or to inject his own media stream into the call.  VoIP by its nature
   invites various forms of denial of service attacks and requires
   protocol features to reject such attacks.  While bogus SRTP packets
   may be easily rejected via the SRTP auth tag field, that can only be
   applied after a key agreement is completed.  During the ZRTP key
   negotiation phase, other false packet rejection mechanisms are
   needed.  One such mechanism is the use of the total_hash in the final
   shared secret calculation, but that can only detect false packets
   after performing the computationally expensive Diffie-Hellman
   calculation.

   The VoIP developer community expects to see a lot of denial of
   service attacks, especially from attackers who are not in the media
   path.  Such an attacker might inject false ZRTP packets to force a
   ZRTP endpoint to engage in an endless series of pointless and
   expensive DH calculations.  To detect and reject false packets
   cheaply and rapidly as soon as they are received, ZRTP uses a hash
   chain, which is a series of successive hash images.  Before each
   session, the following values are computed:

      H0 = 256-bit random nonce (different for each party)
      H1 = hash (H0)
      H2 = hash (H1)
      H3 = hash (H2)

   The hash function is defined to be SHA-256.  Each 256-bit hash image
   is the pre-image of the next, and the sequence of images is sent in
   reverse order in the ZRTP packet sequence.  The hash image H3 is sent
   in the Hello packet, H2 is sent in the Commit packet, H1 is sent in



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   the DHPart1 or DHPart2 packets, and H0 is sent in the Confirm1 or
   Confirm2 packets.  The initial random H0 nonces that each party
   generates MUST be unpredictable to an attacker and unique within a
   ZRTP call, which thereby forces the derived hash images H1-H3 to also
   be unique and unpredictable.

   The recipient checks if the packet has the correct hash pre-image, by
   hashing it and comparing the result with the hash image for the
   preceding packet.  Packets which contain an incorrect hash pre-image
   MUST NOT be used by the recipient, but MAY be processed as security
   exceptions, perhaps by logging or alerting the user.

   Because these hash images alone do not protect the rest of the
   contents of the packet they reside in, this scheme assumes the
   attacker cannot modify the packet contents from a legitimate party,
   which is a reasonable assumption for an attacker who is not in the
   media path.  This covers an important range of denial-of-service
   attacks.  For dealing with the remaining set of attacks that involve
   packet modification, other mechanisms are used, such as the
   total_hash in the final shared secret calculation, and the hash
   commitment in the Commit packet.

   If and only if an authenticated signaling channel is available, this
   hash chaining scheme can be used to key HMACs to authenticate the
   entire ZRTP key exchange.  See Section 9.1 for details.

   Some ZRTP user agents allow the user to manually switch to clear mode
   (via the GoClear packet) in the middle of a secure call, and then
   later initiate secure mode again.  Many consumer client products will
   omit this feature, but those that allow it will use Multistream mode
   to return to secure mode again in the same media stream.  Although
   the same chain of hash images will be re-used and thus rendered
   ineffective the second time, no harm is done because the new SRTP
   session keys will be derived from new nonce material and ZRTPSess,
   which was safely protected from the MiTM in the first DH exchange.

   False Hello packets may be detected and rejected by the mechanism
   defined in Section 9.1.  This mechanism requires that each Hello
   packet be unique, and the inclusion of the H3 hash image meets that
   requirement.


11.  Intermediary ZRTP Devices

   This section discusses the operation of a ZRTP endpoint which is
   actually an intermediary.  For example, consider a device which
   proxies both signaling and media between endpoints.  There are three
   possible ways in which such a device could support ZRTP.



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   An intermediary device can act transparently to the ZRTP protocol.
   To do this, a device MUST pass RTP header extensions and payloads (to
   allow the ZRTP Flag) and non-RTP protocols multiplexed on the same
   port as RTP (to allow ZRTP and STUN).  This is the RECOMMENDED
   behavior for intermediaries as ZRTP and SRTP are best when done end-
   to-end.

   An intermediary device could implement the ZRTP protocol and act as a
   ZRTP endpoint on behalf of non-ZRTP endpoints behind the intermediary
   device.  The intermediary could determine on a call-by-call basis
   whether the endpoint behind it supports ZRTP based on the presence or
   absence of the ZRTP SDP attribute flag (a=zrtp-hash).  For non-ZRTP
   endpoints, the intermediary device could act as the ZRTP endpoint
   using its own ZID and cache.  This approach MUST only be used when
   there is some other security method protecting the confidentiality of
   the media between the intermediary and the inside endpoint, such as
   IPSec or physical security.

   The third mode, which is NOT RECOMMENDED, is for the intermediary
   device to attempt to back-to-back the ZRTP protocol.  The only
   exception to this case is where the intermediary device is a trusted
   element providing services to one of the endpoints - e.g. a Private
   Branch Exchange or PBX.  In this mode, the intermediary would attempt
   to act as a ZRTP endpoint towards both endpoints of the media
   session.  This approach MUST NOT be used except as described in
   Section 8.3 as it will always result in a detected man-in-the-middle
   attack and will generate alarms on both endpoints and likely result
   in the immediate termination of the session.

   In cases where centralized media mixing is taking place, the SAS will
   not match when compared by the humans.  However, this situation is
   known in the SIP signaling by the presence of the isfocus feature tag
   [32].  As a result, when the isfocus feature tag is present, the SAS
   can only be verified by comparison in the signaling or by validating
   signatures in the Confirm or SASrelay messages.  For example,
   consider a audio conference call with three participants Alice, Bob,
   and Carol hosted on a conference bridge in Dallas.  There will be
   three ZRTP encrypted media streams between each participant and
   Dallas.  Each will have a different SAS.  Each participant will be
   able to validates their SAS with the conference bridge using a=zrtp-
   sas or Confirm messages containing signatures.

   SIP feature tags can also be used to detect if a session is
   established with an automaton such as an IVR, voicemail system, or
   speech recognition system.  The display of SAS strings to users
   should be disabled in these cases.

   It is possible that an intermediary device acting as a ZRTP endpoint



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   might still receive ZRTP Hello and other messages from the inside
   endpoint.  This could occur if there is another inline ZRTP device
   which does not include the ZRTP SDP attribute flag.  If this occurs,
   the intermediary MUST NOT pass these ZRTP messages if it is acting as
   the ZRTP endpoint.


12.  The ZRTP Disclosure flag

   There are no back doors defined in the ZRTP protocol specification.
   The designers of ZRTP would like to discourage back doors in ZRTP-
   enabled products.  However, despite the lack of back doors in the
   actual ZRTP protocol, it must be recognized that a ZRTP implementer
   might still deliberately create a rogue ZRTP-enabled product that
   implements a back door outside the scope of the ZRTP protocol.  For
   example, they could create a product that discloses the SRTP session
   key generated using ZRTP out-of-band to a third party.  They may even
   have a legitimate business reason to do this for some customers.

   For example, some environments have a need to monitor or record
   calls, such as stock brokerage houses who want to discourage insider
   trading, or special high security environments with special needs to
   monitor their own phone calls.  We've all experienced automated
   messages telling us that "This call may be monitored for quality
   assurance".  A ZRTP endpoint in such an environment might
   unilaterally disclose the session key to someone monitoring the call.
   ZRTP-enabled products that perform such out-of-band disclosures of
   the session key can undermine public confidence in the ZRTP protocol,
   unless we do everything we can in the protocol to alert the other
   user that this is happening.

   If one of the parties is using a product that is designed to disclose
   their session key, ZRTP requires them to confess this fact to the
   other party through a protocol message to the other party's ZRTP
   client, which can properly alert that user, perhaps by rendering it
   in a graphical user interface.  The disclosing party does this by
   sending a Disclosure flag (D) in Confirm1 and Confirm2 messages as
   described in Section 6.7.

   Note that the intention here is to have the Disclosure flag identify
   products that are designed to disclose their session keys, not to
   identify which particular calls are compromised on a call-by-call
   basis.  This is an important legal distinction, because most
   government sanctioned wiretap regulations require a VoIP service
   provider to not reveal which particular calls are wiretapped.  But
   there is nothing illegal about revealing that a product is designed
   to be wiretap-friendly.  The ZRTP protocol mandates that such a
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   You might be using a ZRTP-enabled product with no back doors, but if
   your own graphical user interface tells you the call is (mostly)
   secure, except that the other party is using a product that is
   designed in such a way that it may have disclosed the session key for
   monitoring purposes, you might ask him what brand of secure telephone
   he is using, and make a mental note not to purchase that brand
   yourself.  If we create a protocol environment that requires such
   back-doored phones to confess their nature, word will spread quickly,
   and the "invisible hand" of the free market will act.  The free
   market has effectively dealt with this in the past.

   Of course, a ZRTP implementer can lie about his product having a back
   door, but the ZRTP standard mandates that ZRTP-compliant products
   MUST adhere to the requirement that a back door be confessed by
   sending the Disclosure flag to the other party.

   There will be inevitable comparisons to Steve Bellovin's 2003 April
   fool's joke, when he submitted RFC 3514 [29] which defined the "Evil
   bit" in the IPV4 header, for packets with "evil intent".  But we
   submit that a similar idea can actually have some merit for securing
   VoIP.  Sure, one can always imagine that some implementer will not be
   fazed by the rules and will lie, but they would have lied anyway even
   without the Disclosure flag.  There are good reasons to believe that
   it will improve the overall percentage of implementations that at
   least tell us if they put a back door in their products, and may even
   get some of them to decide not to put in a back door at all.  From a
   civic hygiene perspective, we are better off with having the
   Disclosure flag in the protocol.

   If an endpoint stores or logs SRTP keys or information that can be
   used to reconstruct or recover SRTP keys after they are no longer in
   use (i.e. the session is active), or otherwise discloses or passes
   SRTP keys or information that can be used to reconstruct or recover
   SRTP keys to another application or device, the Disclosure flag D
   MUST be set in the Confirm1 or Confirm2 message.

12.1.  Guidelines on Proper Implementation of the Disclosure Flag

   Some implementers have asked for guidance on implementing the
   Disclosure Flag.  Some people have incorrectly thought that a
   connection secured with ZRTP cannot be used in a call center, with
   voluntary voice recording, or even with a voicemail system.
   Similarly, some potential users of ZRTP have overconsidered the
   protection that ZRTP can give them.  These guidelines clarify both
   concerns.

   The ZRTP Disclosure Flag only governs the ZRTP/SRTP stream itself.
   It does not govern the underlying RTP media stream, nor the actual



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   media itself.  Consequently, a PBX that uses ZRTP may provide
   conference calls, call monitoring, call recording, voicemail, or
   other PBX features and still say that it does not disclose the ZRTP
   key material.  A video system may provide DVR features and still say
   that it does not disclose the ZRTP key material.  The ZRTP Disclosure
   Flag, when not set, means only that the ZRTP cryptographic key
   material stays within the bounds of the ZRTP subsystem.

   If an application has a need to disclose the ZRTP cryptographic key
   material, the easiest way to comply with the protocol is to set the
   flag to the proper value.  The next easiest way is to overestimate
   disclosure.  For example, a call center that commonly records calls
   might choose to set the disclosure flag even though all recording is
   an analog recording of a call (and thus outside the ZRTP scope)
   because it sets an expectation with clients that their calls might be
   recorded.

   Note also that the ZRTP Disclosure Flag does not require an
   implementation to preclude hacking or malware.  Malware that leaks
   ZRTP cryptographic key material does not create a liability for the
   implementor from non-compliance with the ZRTP specification.

   A user of ZRTP should note that ZRTP is not a panacea against
   unauthorized recording.  ZRTP does not and cannot protect against an
   untrustworthy partner who holds a microphone up to the speaker.  It
   does not protect against someone else being in the room.  It does not
   protect against analog wiretaps in the phone or in the room.  It does
   not mean your partner has not been hacked with spyware.  It does not
   mean that the software has no flaws.  It means that the ZRTP
   subsystem is not knowingly leaking ZRTP cryptographic key material.


13.  RTP Header Extension Flag for ZRTP

   This specification defines a new RTP header extension used only for
   discovery of support for ZRTP.  No ZRTP data is transported in the
   extension.  When used, the X bit is set in the RTP header to indicate
   the presence of the RTP header extension.

   Section 5.3.1 in RFC 3550 defines the format of an RTP Header
   extension.  The Header extension is appended to the RTP header.  The
   first 16 bits are an identifier for the header extension, and the
   following 16 bits are length of the extension header in 32 bit words.
   The ZRTP flag RTP header extension has the value of 0x505A and a
   length of 0.  The format of the header extension is as shown in
   Figure 16.





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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0|0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0|
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

       Figure 16. RTP Extension header format for ZRTP Flag

   ZRTP endpoints SHOULD include the ZRTP Flag in RTP packets sent at
   the start of a session.  For example, and endpoint may decide to
   include the flag in the first 1 second of RTP packets sent.  The
   inclusion of the flag MAY be ended if a ZRTP message (such as Hello)
   is received.


14.  IANA Considerations

   This specification defines two new SDP [15] attributes in Section 9.

14.1.  IANA Registration of a=zrtp-hash SDP attribute

   Contact name:          Philip Zimmermann <prz@mit.edu>

   Attribute name:        "zrtp-hash".

   Type of attribute:     Media level.

   Subject to charset:    Not.

   Purpose of attribute:  The 'zrtp-hash' indicates that a UA supports the
                          ZRTP protocol and provides a hash of the ZRTP Hello
                          message.

   Allowed attribute values:  Hex.

















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14.2.  IANA Registration of a=zrtp-sas SDP attribute

   Contact name:          Philip Zimmermann <prz@mit.edu>

   Attribute name:        "zrtp-sas".

   Type of attribute:     Media level.

   Subject to charset:    Yes.

   Purpose of attribute:  The 'zrtp-sas' is used to convey the ZRTP SAS
                          string and value.  The string is identical to that
                          rendered to the users.  The value is the 64 bit SAS
                          encoded as hex.

   Allowed attribute values:  String and Hex.


15.  Security Considerations

   This document is all about securely keying SRTP sessions.  As such,
   security is discussed in every section.

   Most secure phones rely on a Diffie-Hellman exchange to agree on a
   common session key.  But since DH is susceptible to a man-in-the-
   middle (MITM) attack, it is common practice to provide a way to
   authenticate the DH exchange.  In some military systems, this is done
   by depending on digital signatures backed by a centrally-managed PKI.
   A decade of industry experience has shown that deploying centrally
   managed PKIs can be a painful and often futile experience.  PKIs are
   just too messy, and require too much activation energy to get them
   started.  Setting up a PKI requires somebody to run it, which is not
   practical for an equipment provider.  A service provider like a
   carrier might venture down this path, but even then you have to deal
   with cross-carrier authentication, certificate revocation lists, and
   other complexities.  It is much simpler to avoid PKIs altogether,
   especially when developing secure commercial products.  It is
   therefore more common for commercial secure phones in the PSTN world
   to augment the DH exchange with a Short Authentication String (SAS)
   combined with a hash commitment at the start of the key exchange, to
   shorten the length of SAS material that must be read aloud.  No PKI
   is required for this approach to authenticating the DH exchange.  The
   AT&T TSD 3600, Eric Blossom's COMSEC secure phones [22], PGPfone
   [19], and CryptoPhone [23] are all examples of products that took
   this simpler lightweight approach.

   The main problem with this approach is inattentive users who may not
   execute the voice authentication procedure, or unattended secure



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   phone calls to answering machines that cannot execute it.

   Additionally, some people worry about voice spoofing.  But it is a
   mistake to think this is simply an exercise in voice impersonation
   (perhaps this could be called the "Rich Little" attack).  Although
   there are digital signal processing techniques for changing a
   person's voice, that does not mean a man-in-the-middle attacker can
   safely break into a phone conversation and inject his own short
   authentication string (SAS) at just the right moment.  He doesn't
   know exactly when or in what manner the users will choose to read
   aloud the SAS, or in what context they will bring it up or say it, or
   even which of the two speakers will say it, or if indeed they both
   will say it.  In addition, some methods of rendering the SAS involve
   using a list of words such as the PGP word list, in a manner
   analogous to how pilots use the NATO phonetic alphabet to convey
   information.  This can make it even more complicated for the
   attacker, because these words can be worked into the conversation in
   unpredictable ways.  Remember that the attacker places a very high
   value on not being detected, and if he makes a mistake, he doesn't
   get to do it over.  Some people have raised the question that even if
   the attacker lacks voice impersonation capabilities, it may be unsafe
   for people who don't know each other's voices to depend on the SAS
   procedure.  This is not as much of a problem as it seems, because it
   isn't necessary that they recognize each other by their voice, it's
   only necessary that they detect that the voice used for the SAS
   procedure matches the voice in the rest of the phone conversation.

   A popular and field-proven approach is used by SSH (Secure Shell)
   [25], which Peter Gutmann likes to call the "baby duck" security
   model.  SSH establishes a relationship by exchanging public keys in
   the initial session, when we assume no attacker is present, and this
   makes it possible to authenticate all subsequent sessions.  A
   successful MITM attacker has to have been present in all sessions all
   the way back to the first one, which is assumed to be difficult for
   the attacker.  All this is accomplished without resorting to a
   centrally-managed PKI.

   We use an analogous baby duck security model to authenticate the DH
   exchange in ZRTP.  We don't need to exchange persistent public keys,
   we can simply cache a shared secret and re-use it to authenticate a
   long series of DH exchanges for secure phone calls over a long period
   of time.  If we read aloud just one SAS, and then cache a shared
   secret for later calls to use for authentication, no new voice
   authentication rituals need to be executed.  We just have to remember
   we did one already.

   If one party ever loses this cached shared secret, it is no longer
   available for authentication of DH exchanges.  This cache mismatch



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   situation is easy to detect by the party that still has a surviving
   shared secret cache entry.  If it fails to match, either there is a
   MiTM attack or one side has lost their shared secret cache entry.
   The user agent that discovers the cache mismatch MUST alert the user
   that a cache mismatch has been detected, and that he must do a verbal
   comparison of the SAS to distinguish if the mismatch is because of a
   MiTM attack or because of the other party losing her cache.  From
   that point on, the two parties start over with a new cached shared
   secret.  Then they can go back to omitting the voice authentication
   on later calls.

   A particularly compelling reason why this approach is attractive is
   that SAS is easiest to implement when a graphical user interface or
   some sort of display is available, which raises the question of what
   to do when a display is less conveniently available.  For example,
   some devices that implement ZRTP might have a graphical user
   interface that is only visible through a web browser, such as a PBX
   or some other nearby device that implements ZRTP as a "bump-in-the-
   wire".  If we take an approach that greatly reduces the need for a
   SAS in each and every call, we can operate in products without a
   graphical user interface with greater ease.  Then the SAS can be
   compared less frequently through a web browser, or it might even be
   presented as needed to the local user through a locally generated
   voice prompt, which the local user hears and verbally repeats and
   compares with the remote party.

   It's a good idea to force your opponent to have to solve multiple
   problems in order to mount a successful attack.  Some examples of
   widely differing problems we might like to present him with are:
   Stealing a shared secret from one of the parties, being present on
   the very first session and every subsequent session to carry out an
   active MITM attack, and solving the discrete log problem.  We want to
   force the opponent to solve more than one of these problems to
   succeed.

   ZRTP can use different kinds of shared secrets.  Each type of shared
   secret is determined by a different method.  All of the shared
   secrets are hashed together to form a session key to encrypt the
   call.  An attacker must defeat all of the methods in order to
   determine the session key.

   First, there is the shared secret determined entirely by a Diffie-
   Hellman key agreement.  It changes with every call, based on random
   numbers.  An attacker may attempt a classic DH MITM attack on this
   secret, but we can protect against this by displaying and reading
   aloud a SAS, combined with adding a hash commitment at the beginning
   of the DH exchange.




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   Second, there is an evolving shared secret, or ongoing shared secret
   that is automatically changed and refreshed and cached with every new
   session.  We will call this the cached shared secret, or sometimes
   the retained shared secret.  Each new image of this ongoing secret is
   a non-invertable function of its previous value and the new secret
   derived by the new DH agreement.  It's possible that no cached shared
   secret is available, because there were no previous sessions to
   inherit this value from, or because one side loses its cache.

   There are other approaches for key agreement for SRTP that compute a
   shared secret using information in the signaling.  For example, [27]
   describes how to carry a MIKEY (Multimedia Internet KEYing) [28]
   payload in SDP [15].  Or RFC 4568 (SDES) [26] describes directly
   carrying SRTP keying and configuration information in SDP.  ZRTP does
   not rely on the signaling to compute a shared secret, but If a client
   does produce a shared secret via the signaling, and makes it
   available to the ZRTP protocol, ZRTP can make use of this shared
   secret to augment the list of shared secrets that will be hashed
   together to form a session key.  This way, any security weaknesses
   that might compromise the shared secret contributed by the signaling
   will not harm the final resulting session key.

   There may also be a static shared secret that the two parties agree
   on out-of-band in advance.  A hashed passphrase would suffice.

   The shared secret provided by the signaling (if available), the
   shared secret computed by DH, and the cached shared secret are all
   hashed together to compute the session key for a call.  If the cached
   shared secret is not available, it is omitted from the hash
   computation.  If the signaling provides no shared secret, it is also
   omitted from the hash computation.

   No DH MITM attack can succeed if the ongoing shared secret is
   available to the two parties, but not to the attacker.  This is
   because the attacker cannot compute a common session key with either
   party without knowing the cached secret component, even if he
   correctly executes a classic DH MITM attack.  Mixing in the cached
   shared secret for the session key calculation allows it to act as an
   implicit authenticator to protect the DH exchange, without requiring
   additional explicit HMACs to be computed on the DH parameters.  If
   the cached shared secret is available, a MITM attack would be
   instantly detected by the failure to achieve a shared session key,
   resulting in undecryptable packets.  The protocol can easily detect
   this.  It would be more accurate to say that the MITM attack is not
   merely detected, but thwarted.

   When adding the complexity of additional shared secrets beyond the
   familiar DH key agreement, we must make sure the lack of availability



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   of the cached shared secret cannot prevent a call from going through,
   and we must also prevent false alarms that claim an attack was
   detected.

   An small added benefit of using these cached shared secrets to mix in
   with the session keys is that it augments the entropy of the session
   key.  Even if limits on the size of the DH exchange produces a
   session key with less than 256 bits of real work factor, the added
   entropy from the cached shared secret can bring up all the subsequent
   session keys to the full 256-bit AES key strength, assuming no
   attacker was present in the first call.

   We could have authenticated the DH exchange the same way SSH does it,
   with digital signatures, caching public keys instead of shared
   secrets.  But this approach with caching shared secrets seemed a bit
   simpler, requiring less CPU time for low-powered mobile platforms
   because it avoids an added digital signature step.

   The ZRTP SDP attributes convey information through the signaling that
   is already available in clear text through the media path.  For
   example, the ZRTP flag is equivalent to sending a ZRTP Hello message.
   The SAS is calculated from a hash of material from ZRTP messages sent
   over the media path.  As a result, none of the ZRTP SDP attributes
   require confidentiality from the signaling.

   The ZRTP SAS attributes can use the signaling channel as an out-of-
   band authentication mechanism.  This authentication is only useful if
   the signaling channel has end-to-end integrity protection.  Note that
   the SIP Identity header field [30] provides middle-to-end integrity
   protection across SDP message bodies which provides useful protection
   for ZRTP SAS attributes.


16.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Bryce Wilcox-O'Hearn for his
   contributions to the design of this protocol, and to thank Jon
   Peterson, Colin Plumb, Hal Finney, Colin Perkins, and Dan Wing for
   their helpful comments and suggestions.  Also thanks to David McGrew,
   Roni Even, Viktor Krikun, Werner Dittmann, Allen Pulsifer, Klaus
   Peters, and Abhishek Arya for their feedback and comments.


17.  References







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17.1.  Normative References

   [1]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [2]   Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. Jacobson,
         "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications", STD 64,
         RFC 3550, July 2003.

   [3]   Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
         Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
         RFC 3711, March 2004.

   [4]   Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponential (MODP)
         Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
         RFC 3526, May 2003.

   [5]   Stone, J., Stewart, R., and D. Otis, "Stream Control
         Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Checksum Change", RFC 3309,
         September 2002.

   [6]   Barker, E. and J. Kelsey, "Recommendation for Random Number
         Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators", NIST
         Special Publication 800-90 (Revised) March 2007.

   [7]   Barker, E., Johnson, D., and M. Smid, "Recommendation for Pair-
         Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
         Cryptography", NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 1,
         March 2007.

   [8]   "Fact Sheet NSA Suite B Cryptography", NSA Information
         Assurance Directorate Fact Sheet NSA Suite B.

   [9]   Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "ECP Groups For IKE and IKEv2",
         RFC 4753, January 2007.

   [10]  "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS PUB 186-3 Draft,
         March 2006.

   [11]  Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher: Methods and
         Techniques", NIST Special Publication 800-38A 2001 Edition.

   [12]  Wilcox, B., "Human-oriented base-32 encoding",
         http://zooko.com/repos/z-base-32/base32/DESIGN .

   [13]  Juola, P. and P. Zimmermann, "Whole-Word Phonetic Distances and
         the PGPfone Alphabet",  Proceedings of the International
         Conference of Spoken Language Processing (ICSLP-96) .



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   [14]  "PGP Wordlist", http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PGP_Words .

   [15]  Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
         Description Protocol", RFC 4566, July 2006.

17.2.  Informative References

   [16]  Wing, D., Fries, S., Tschofenig, H., and F. Audet,
         "Requirements and Analysis of Media Security Management
         Protocols", draft-ietf-sip-media-security-requirements-03 (work
         in progress), February 2008.

   [17]  Ferguson, N. and B. Schneier, "Practical Cryptography", Wiley
         Publishing 2003.

   [18]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
         Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [19]  Zimmermann, P., "PGPfone",
         http://www.pgpi.org/products/pgpfone/ .

   [20]  Zimmermann, P., "Zfone", http://www.philzimmermann.com/zfone .

   [21]  Perrig, A., Canetti, R., Tygar, J., and D. Song, "The TESLA
         Broadcast Authentication Protocol", http://www.ece.cmu.edu/
         ~adrian/projects/tesla-cryptobytes/tesla-cryptobytes.pdf .

   [22]  Blossom, E., "The VP1 Protocol for Voice Privacy Devices
         Version 1.2", http://www.comsec.com/vp1-protocol.pdf .

   [23]  "CryptoPhone", http://www.cryptophone.de/ .

   [24]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
         Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
         Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.

   [25]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
         Architecture", RFC 4251, January 2006.

   [26]  Andreasen, F., Baugher, M., and D. Wing, "Session Description
         Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media Streams",
         RFC 4568, July 2006.

   [27]  Arkko, J., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., Norrman, K., and E.
         Carrara, "Key Management Extensions for Session Description
         Protocol (SDP) and Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP)",
         RFC 4567, July 2006.




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   [28]  Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and K.
         Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
         August 2004.

   [29]  Bellovin, S., "The Security Flag in the IPv4 Header", RFC 3514,
         April 1 2003.

   [30]  Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for Authenticated
         Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
         RFC 4474, August 2006.

   [31]  Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A
         Protocol for Network Address  Translator (NAT) Traversal for
         Offer/Answer Protocols", draft-ietf-mmusic-ice-19 (work in
         progress), October 2007.

   [32]  Johnston, A. and O. Levin, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
         Call Control - Conferencing for User Agents", BCP 119,
         RFC 4579, August 2006.

   [33]  Wing, D. and H. Kaplan, "SIP Identity using Media Path",
         draft-wing-sip-identity-media-02 (work in progress),
         February 2008.


Authors' Addresses

   Philip Zimmermann
   Zfone Project

   Email: prz@mit.edu


   Alan Johnston (editor)
   Avaya
   St. Louis, MO  63124

   Email: alan@sipstation.com


   Jon Callas
   PGP Corporation

   Email: jon@pgp.com







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