[Docs] [txt|pdf] [draft-ietf-geopri...] [Diff1] [Diff2] [IPR]

Updated by: 6280 INFORMATIONAL

Network Working Group                                         J. Cuellar
Request for Comments: 3693                                    Siemens AG
Category: Informational                                        J. Morris
                                       Center for Democracy & Technology
                                                             D. Mulligan
                        Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic
                                                             J. Peterson
                                                                 NeuStar
                                                                 J. Polk
                                                                   Cisco
                                                           February 2004


                          Geopriv Requirements

Status of this Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   Location-based services, navigation applications, emergency services,
   management of equipment in the field, and other location-dependent
   services need geographic location information about a Target (such as
   a user, resource or other entity).  There is a need to securely
   gather and transfer location information for location services, while
   at the same time protect the privacy of the individuals involved.

   This document focuses on the authorization, security and privacy
   requirements for such location-dependent services.  Specifically, it
   describes the requirements for the Geopriv Location Object (LO) and
   for the protocols that use this Location Object.  This LO is
   envisioned to be the primary data structure used in all Geopriv
   protocol exchanges to securely transfer location data.











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Table of Contents

   1.  Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Conventions Used in this Document. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Primary Geopriv Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Further Geopriv Terminology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       5.1.  Location Information and Sighting. . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       5.2.  The Location Object and Using Protocol . . . . . . . . .  9
       5.3.  Trusted vs. Non-trusted Data Flows . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       5.4.  Further Geopriv Principals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
       5.5.  Privacy Rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       5.6.  Identifiers, Authentication and Authorization. . . . . . 13
   6.  Scenarios and Explanatory Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   7.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       7.1.  Location Object. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
       7.2.  The Using Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
       7.3.  Rule based Location Data Transfer. . . . . . . . . . . . 21
       7.4.  Location Object Privacy and Security . . . . . . . . . . 22
             7.4.1.  Identity Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
             7.4.2.  Authentication Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . 23
             7.4.3.  Actions to be secured. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
       7.5.  Non-Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   8.  Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       8.1.  Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       8.2.  Securing the Privacy Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       8.3.  Emergency Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       8.4.  Identities and Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       8.5.  Unintended Target. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   9.  Protocol and LO Issues for later Consideration . . . . . . . . 26
       9.1.  Multiple Locations in one LO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
       9.2.  Translation Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
       9.3.  Truth Flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
       9.4.  Timing Information Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
       9.5.  The Name Space of Identifiers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
   10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
       11.1. Normative Reference  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
       11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   12. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
   13. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30










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1.  Overview

   Location-based services (applications that require geographic
   location information as input) are becoming increasingly common.  The
   collection and transfer of location information about a particular
   Target can have important privacy implications.  A key goal of the
   protocol described in this document is to facilitate the protection
   of privacy pursuant to Privacy Rules set by the "user/owner of the
   Target" (or, more precisely in the terminology of this document given
   in Section 3 and 5.4 below, the "Rule Maker").

   The ability to gather and generate a Target's location, and access to
   the derived or computed location, are key elements of the location-
   based services privacy equation.  Central to a Target's privacy are
   (a) the identity of entities that have access to raw location data,
   derive or compute location, and/or have access to derived or computed
   location information, and (b) whether those entities can be trusted
   to know and follow the Privacy Rules of the user.

   The main principles guiding the requirements described in this
   document are:

   1) Security of the transmission of Location Object is essential to
      guarantee the integrity and confidentiality of the location
      information.  This includes authenticating the sender and receiver
      of the Location Object, and securing the Location Object itself.

   2) A critical role is played by user-controlled Privacy Rules, which
      describe the restrictions imposed or permissions given by the
      "user" (or, as defined below, the "Rule Maker").  The Privacy
      Rules specify the necessary conditions that allow a Location
      Server to forward Location Information to a Location Recipient,
      and the conditions and purposes for which the Location Information
      can be used.

   3) One type of Privacy Rules specify how location information should
      be filtered, depending on who the recipient is.  Filtering is the
      process of reducing the precision or resolution of the data.  A
      typical rule may be of the form: "my location can only be
      disclosed to the owner of such credentials in such precision or
      resolution" (e.g., "my co-workers can be told the city I am
      currently in").

   4) The Location Object should be able to carry a limited but core set
      of Privacy Rules.  The exact form or expressiveness of those Rules
      in the core set or in the full set is not further discussed in
      this document, but will be discussed more extensively in future
      documents produced by this working group.



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   5) Whenever appropriate, the location information should not be
      linked to the real identity of the user or a static identifier
      easily linked back to the real identity of the user (i.e.,
      Personally Identifiable Information such as a name, mailing
      address, phone number, social security number, or email address or
      username).  Rather, the user should be able to specify which local
      identifier, unlinked pseudonym, or private identifier is to be
      bound to the location information.

   6) The user may want to hide the real identities of himself and his
      partners, not only to eavesdroppers but also to other entities
      participating in the protocol.

   Although complete anonymity may not be appropriate for some
   applications because of legal constraints or because some location
   services may in fact need explicit identifications, most often the
   location services only need some type of authorization information
   and/or perhaps anonymous identifiers of the entities in question.

2.  Conventions Used in this Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   Note that the requirements discussed here are requirements on the
   generic Location Object and on using protocols for location services.
   Thus, for the most part, the requirements discussed in this document
   refer to capabilities that are mandatory-to-implement.  For example,
   requiring that implementations support integrity is not the same
   thing as requiring that all protocol traffic be authenticated.  In
   contrast, an example of a mandatory-to-use (not just mandatory-to-
   implement) requirement might be one that states that the user always
   receives a notice when his location data was not authenticated.  This
   practice is mandatory-to-use, not just to implement.

3.  Glossary

   For easy reference and readability, below are basic terms that will
   be defined more formally and fully later in this document.

      Location Generator (LG): The entity that initially determines or
         gathers the location of the Target and creates Location Objects
         describing the location of the Target.







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      Location Object (LO): An object conveying location information
         (and possibly privacy rules) to which Geopriv security
         mechanisms and privacy rules are to be applied.

      Location Recipient (LR): The entity that receives location
         information.  It may have asked for this location explicitly
         (by sending a query to a location server), or it may receive
         this location asynchronously.

      Location Server (LS): The entity to which a LG publishes location
         objects, the recipient of queries from location receivers, and
         the entity that applies rules designed by the rule maker.

      Precision: The number of significant digits to which a value has
         been reliably measured.

      Principal: The holder/subject of the credentials, e.g., a
         workstation user or a network server.

      Resolution: The fineness of detail that can be distinguished in a
         measured area.  Applied to Geopriv this means the finite area
         within provided and closed borders (ex. Latitude and Longitude
         boundaries).

      Rule Holder: The entity that provides the rules associated with a
         particular target for the distribution of location information.
         It may either 'push' rules to a location server, or a location
         server may 'pull' rules from the Rule Holder.

      Rule Maker: The authority that creates rules governing access to
         location information for a target (typically, this it the
         target themselves).

      Rule, or Privacy Rule: A directive that regulates an entity's
         activities with respect to location information, including the
         collection, use, disclosure, and retention of location
         information.

      Target: A person or other entity whose location is communicated by
         a Geopriv Location Object.

      Using Protocol: A protocol that carries a Location Object.

      Viewer: A Principal that consumes location information that is
         communicated by a Geopriv Location Object, but does not pass
         this information further.





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   Resolution and Precision are very close terms.  Either quality can be
   'reduced' to coarsen location information: 'resolution' by defining a
   off-center perimeter around a user's location or otherwise enlarging
   the area in consideration (from state to country, say) and
   'precision' by discarding significant digits of positioning
   information (rounding off longitude and latitude from seconds to
   minutes, say).  Another WG document discusses this topic in much more
   detail.

4.  Primary Geopriv Entities

   The following picture shows the primary Geopriv entities in a simple
   and basic architecture, without claim of completeness or any
   suggestion that the entities identified must in all cases be
   physically separate entities.

                              +----------+
                              |  Rule    |
                              | Holder   |
                              |          |
                              +----+-----+
                                   |
                               rule|interface
                                   V
   +----------+               +----------+               +----------+
   |Location  |  publication  | Location |  notification |Location  |
   |Generator +-------------->| Server   +-------------->|Recipient |
   |          |  interface    |          |  interface    |          |
   +----------+               +----------+               +----------+

   The four primary Entities are described as follows:

      Location Generator (LG):  The entity that initially determines or
         gathers the location of the Target and creates Location Objects
         describing that location.  LGs publish Location Objects to
         Location Servers.  The manner in which the Location Generator
         learns of Location Information is outside the scope of the
         Geopriv Protocol.

      Location Server (LS): The LS is an element that receives
         publications of Location Objects from Location Generators and
         may receive subscriptions from Location Recipients.  The LS
         applies the rules (which it learns from the Rule Holder) to LOs
         it receives from LGs, and then notifies LRs of resulting LOs as
         necessary.






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      Location Recipient (LR): The LR is an element that receives
         notifications of Location Objects from Location Servers.  The
         LR may render these LOs to a user or automaton in some fashion.

      Rule Holder (RH): The RH is an element that houses Privacy Rules
         for receiving, filtering and distributing Location Objects for
         specific Targets.  An LS may query an RH for a set of rules, or
         rules may be pushed from the RH to an LS.  The rules in the
         Rule Holder are populated by the Rule Maker.

   Thus Location Generation is the process of gathering Location
   Information, perhaps from multiple sources, at an IP-based Geopriv
   Entity, the LG, which communicates with other Geopriv Entities.

   Rules MUST be authenticated and protected.  How this is done and in
   particular how to distribute the keys to the RM and other authorities
   is outside of the scope of this document.  See also Section 8.2,
   "Securing the Privacy Rules".

   The interfaces between the Geopriv entities are not necessarily
   protocol interfaces; they could be internal interfaces within a
   single composed device.  In some architectures, the Location
   Generator, Rule Holder, and Location Server might all be implemented
   in the same device.  There may be several Rule Holders that enforce
   the Privacy Rules at a particular Location Server.

5.  Further Geopriv Terminology

   The terminology and definitions detailed below include both terms
   that, besides the primary Geopriv entities, (1) are used in the
   requirements section of this document, and (2) provide additional
   detail about the usage model envisioned for the Geopriv Location
   Object.  These latter terms will be utilized in a separate scenarios
   document and elsewhere.

5.1.  Location Information and Sighting

   The focus of the Geopriv working group is on information about a
   Target's location that is NOT based on generally or publicly
   available sources, but instead on private information provided or
   created by a Target, a Target's Device, or a Target's network or
   service provider.  Notwithstanding this focus on private location
   information, the Geopriv Location Object could certainly be used to
   convey location information from publicly available sources.

      Location Information: A relatively specific way of describing
         where a Device is located.




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   This Location Information may have been determined in many different
   ways, including:

   (a) derived or computed from information generally not available to
   the general public (such as information mainly available to a network
   or service provider), (b) determined by a Device that may not be
   generally publicly addressable or accessible, or (c) input or
   otherwise provided by a Target.

   As examples, the Location Information could include (a) information
   calculated by triangulating on a wireless signal with respect to cell
   phone towers, (b) longitude and latitude information determined by a
   Device with GPS (global positioning satellite) capabilities, (c)
   information manually entered into a cell phone or laptop by a Target
   in response to a query, or (d) automatically delivered by some other
   IP protocol, such as at device configuration via DHCP.

   Excluded from this definition is the determination of location
   information wholly without the knowledge or consent of the Target (or
   the Target's network or access service provider), based on generally
   available information such as an IP or e-mail address.  In some
   cases, information like IP address can enable someone to estimate (at
   least roughly) a location.  Commercial services exist that provide
   rough location information based on IP addresses.  Currently, this
   type of location information is typically less precise than the type
   of location information addressed in this document.  Although this
   type of location computation still raises significant potential
   privacy and public privacy concerns, such scenarios are generally
   outside the scope of this document.

   Within any given location-based transaction, the INITIAL
   determination of location (and thus the initial creation of Location
   Information) is termed a Sighting:

      Sighting:
         The initial determination of location based on non-public
         information (as discussed in the definition of Location
         Information), and the initial creation of Location Information.

   Some variant of the sighting information is included in the Location
   Object.  Abstractly, it consists of two separate data fields:

            (Identifier, Location)








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   where Identifier is the identifier assigned to a Target being
   sighted, and Location is the current position of that Target being
   sighted.  Not all entities may have access to exactly the same piece
   of sighting information.  A sighting may be transformed to a new
   sighting pair:

            (Identifier-1, Location-1)

   before it is provided by a Location Generator or Location Server to
   Location Recipient.  In this case, Identifier-1 may be a Pseudonym,
   and Location-1 may have less precision or resolution than the
   original value.

5.2.  The Location Object and Using Protocol

   A main goal of the Geopriv working group is to define a Location
   Object (LO), to be used to convey both Location Information and basic
   privacy-protecting instructions:

      Location Object (LO): This data contains the Location Information
         of the Target, and other fields including an identity or
         pseudonym of the Target, time information, core Privacy Rules,
         authenticators, etc.  Most of the fields are optional,
         including the Location Information itself.

   Nothing is said about the semantics of a missing field.  For
   instance, a partially filled object MAY be understood implicitly as a
   request to complete it.  Or, if no time information is included, this
   MAY implicitly mean "at the current time" or "at a very recent time",
   but it could be interpreted in a different way, depending on the
   context.

   The "using protocol" is the protocol that uses (reads or modifies)
   the Location Object.  A protocol that just transports the LO as a
   string of bits, without looking at them (like an IP storage protocol
   could do), is not a using protocol, but only a transport protocol.
   Nevertheless, the entity or protocol that caused the transport
   protocol to move the LO is responsible for the appropriate
   distribution, protection, usage, retention, and storage of the LO
   based on the rules that apply to that LO.

   The security and privacy enhancing mechanisms used to protect the LO
   are of two types: First, the Location Object definition MUST include
   the fields or mechanisms used to secure the LO as such.  The LO MAY
   be secured, for example, using cryptographic checksums or encryption
   as part of the LO itself.  Second, the using protocol may also
   provide security mechanisms to securely transport the Location
   Object.



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   When defining the LO, the design should observe that the security
   mechanisms of the Location Object itself are to be preferred.  Thus
   the definition of the LO MUST include some minimal crypto
   functionality (Req. 14 and 15).  Moreover, if the RM specifies the
   use of a particular LO security mechanism, it MUST be used (Req. 4).

5.3.  Trusted vs. Non-trusted Data Flows

   Location information can be used in very different environments.  In
   some cases, the participants will have longstanding relationships,
   while in others the participants may have discrete interactions with
   no prior contractual or other contact.

   The different relationships raise different concerns for the
   implementation of privacy rules, including the need to communicate
   Privacy Rules.  A public Rule Holder, for example, may be unnecessary
   in a trusted environment where more efficient methods of addressing
   privacy issues exist.  The following terms distinguish between the
   two basic types of data flows:

      Trusted Data Flow:
         A data flow that is governed by a pre-existing contractual
         relationship that addresses location privacy.

      Non-trusted Data Flow:
         The data flow is not governed by a pre-existing contractual
         relationship that addresses location privacy.

5.4.  Further Geopriv Principals

      Target:
         The entity whose location is desired by the Location Recipient.
         In many cases the Target will be the human "user" of a Device
         or an object such as a vehicle or shipping container to which
         the Device is attached.  In some instances the Target will be
         the Device itself.

      Device:
         The technical device whereby the location is tracked as a proxy
         for the location of a Target.

   A Device might, for example, be a cell phone, a Global Positioning
   Satellite (GPS) receiver, a laptop equipped with a wireless access
   Device, or a transmitter that emits a signal that can be tracked or
   located.  In some situations, such as when a Target manually inputs
   location information (perhaps with a web browser), the Target is
   effectively performing the function of a Device.




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      Rule Maker (RM):
         The individual or entity that has the authorization to set the
         applicable Privacy Rules for a potential Geopriv Target.  In
         many cases this will be the owner of the Device, and in other
         cases this may be the user who is in possession of the Device.
         For example, parents may control what happens to the location
         information derived from a child's cell phone.  A company, in
         contrast, may own and provide a cell phone to an employee but
         permit the employee to set the privacy rules.

         There are four scenarios in which some form of constraint or
         override might be placed on the Privacy Rules of the Rule
         Maker:

         1. In the case of emergency services (such as E911 within the
            United States), local or national laws may require that
            accurate location information be transmitted in certain
            defined emergency call situations.  The Geopriv Working
            Group MUST facilitate this situation.

         2. In the case of legal interception, the RM may not be aware
            of an override directive imposed by a legal authority.  It
            is not the expectation of the Working Group that a
            particular accommodation will be made to facilitate this
            situation.

         3. In the context of an employment relationship or other
            contractual relationship, the owner of a particular location
            (such as a corporate campus) may impose constraints on the
            use of Privacy Rules by a Rule Maker.  It is not the
            expectation of the Working Group that a particular
            accommodation will be made to facilitate this situation.

         4. It is conceivable that a governmental authority may seek to
            impose constraints on the use of Privacy Rules by a Rule
            Maker in non-emergency situations.  It is not the
            expectation of the Working Group that a particular
            accommodation will be made to facilitate this situation.

      Viewer:
         An individual or entity who receives location data about a
         Target and does not transmit the location information or
         information based on the Target's location (such as driving
         directions to or from the Target) to any party OTHER than the
         Target or the Rule Maker.






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      Data Transporter:
         An entity or network that receives and forwards data without
         processing or altering it.  A Data Transporter could
         theoretically be involved in almost any transmission between a
         Device and a Location Server, a Location Server and a second
         Location Server, or a Location Server and a Viewer.  Some
         location tracking scenarios may not involve a Data Transporter.

      Access Provider (AP):
         The domain that provides the initial network access or other
         data communications services essential for the operation of
         communications functions of the Device or computer equipment in
         which the Device operates.  Often, the AP -- which will be a
         wireless carrier, an Internet Service Provider, or an internal
         corporate network -- contains the LG.  Sometimes the AP has a
         "dumb" LG, one that transmits Geopriv LOs but does not use any
         part of the Geopriv Location Object.  Other cases may not
         involve any AP, or the AP may only act as a Data Transporter.

      Location Storage:
         A Device or entity that stores raw or processed Location
         Information, such as a database, for any period of time longer
         than the duration necessary to complete an immediate
         transaction regarding the Location Information.

   The existence and data storage practices of Location Storage is
   crucial to privacy considerations, because this may influence what
   Location Information could eventually be revealed (through later
   distribution, technical breach, or legal processes).

5.5.  Privacy Rules

   Privacy Rules are rules that regulate an entity's activities with
   respect to location and other information, including, but not limited
   to, the collection, use, disclosure, and retention of location
   information.  Such rules are generally based on fair information
   practices, as detailed in (for example) the OECD Guidelines on the
   Protection of Privacy and Transporter Flows of Personal Data [OECD].

      Privacy Rule:
         A rule or set of rules that regulate an entity's activities
         with respect to location information, including the collection,
         use, disclosure, and retention of location information.  In
         particular, the Rule describes how location information may be
         used by an entity and which transformed location information
         may be released to which entities under which conditions.
         Rules must be obeyed; they are not advisory.




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   A full set of Privacy Rules will likely include both rules that have
   only one possible technical meaning, and rules that will be affected
   by a locality's prevailing laws and customs.  For example, a
   distribution rule of the form "my location can only be disclosed to
   the owner of such credentials and in such precision or resolution"
   has clear-cut implications for the protocol that uses the LO.  But
   other rules, like retention or usage Rules, may have unclear
   technical consequences for the protocol or for the involved entities.
   For example, the precise scope of a retention rule stating "you may
   not store my location for more than 2 days" may in part turn on local
   laws or customs.

5.6.  Identifiers, Authentication and Authorization

   Anonymity is the property of being not identifiable (within a set of
   subjects).  Anonymity serves as the base case for privacy: without
   the ability to remain anonymous, individuals may be unable to control
   their own privacy.  Unlinkability ensures that a user may make
   multiple uses of resources or services without others being able to
   link these uses to each other.  Unlinkability requires that entities
   be unable to determine whether the same user caused certain specific
   operations in the system. [ISO99]  A pseudonym is simply a bit string
   which is unique as an ID and is suitable to be used for end-point
   authentication.

      Unlinked Pseudonym:
         A pseudonym where the linking between the pseudonym and its
         holder is, at least initially, not known to anybody with the
         possible exception of the holder himself or a trusted server of
         the user.  See [Pfi01] (there the term is called Initially
         Unlinked Pseudonym).

   The word authentication is used in different manners.  Some require
   that authentication associates an entity with a more or less well-
   known identity.  This basically means that if A authenticates another
   entity B as being "id-B", then the label "id-B" is a well-known, or
   at least a linkable identity of the entity.  In this case, the label
   "id-B" is called a publicly known identifier, and the authentication
   is "explicit":

      Explicit Authentication:
         The act of verifying a claimed identity as the sole originator
         of a message (message authentication) or as the end-point of a
         channel (entity authentication).  Moreover, this identity is
         easily linked back to the real identity of the entity in
         question, for instance being a pre-existing static label from a
         predefined name space (telephone number, name, etc.)




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      Authorization:
         The act of determining if a particular right, such as access to
         some resource, can be granted to the presenter of a particular
         credential.

   Depending on the type of credential, authorization may or may not
   imply Explicit Authentication.












































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6.  Scenarios and Explanatory Discussion

   In this subsection we introduce short scenarios to illustrate how
   these terms and attributes describe location information
   transactions.  Additional illustrative scenarios are discussed in a
   separate document.

   SCENARIO 1: GPS Device with Internal Computing Power: Closed System

   In this example, the Target wishes to know his/her location using the
   Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Device is capable of
   independently processing the raw data to determine its location.  The
   location is derived as follows: the Device receives transmissions
   from the GPS satellites, internally computes and displays location.
   This is a closed system.  For the purpose of this and subsequent
   examples, it is assumed that the GPS satellite broadcasts some
   signal, and has no information about the identity or whereabouts of
   Devices using the signal.

         GPS Satellite
                 |
                 | Sighting (not a Geopriv Interface)
                 |
                 |
                 |
                 V             GPS Device
          --------------------------------------------------
         /                                                  \
         |  Location     -----  Location  -----  Location   |
         |  Generator            Server            Storage  |
         \                                           |      /
          -------------------------------------------|------
                                                     |
                                                     | Notification
                                                     | Interface
                                                     |
                                         ------------|------
                                        /            V      \
                                       / Target    Location  \
                                       |          Recipient   |
                                       |                      |
                                       \    Rule Maker       /
                                        \                   /
                                         -------------------

   In this scenario the GPS Device is both the AP and the LG.  The
   interaction occurs in a Trusted environment because it occurs in the
   Rule Maker's Device.



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   SCENARIO 2:  Cell Phone Roaming

   In this example, a cell phone is used outside its home service area
   (roaming).  Also, the cell phone service provider (cell phone Corp 2)
   outsourced the accounting of cell phone usage.  The cell phone is not
   GPS-enabled.  Location is derived by the cell phone network in which
   the Target and Device are roaming.  When the Target wishes to use the
   cell phone, cell phone Corp 1 (AP) provides the roaming service for
   the Target, which sends the raw data about usage (e.g., duration of
   call, location in the roaming network, etc.) to cell phone Corp 2,
   the home service provider.  Cell phone Corp 2 submits the raw data to
   the accounting company, which processes the raw data for the
   accounting statements.  Finally, the raw data is sent to a data
   warehouse where the raw data is stored in a Location Server (e.g.,
   computer server).

                  Cell Phone Corp 1                Cell Phone Corp 2
                  -----------------               -----------------
        Sighting /                 \  Publish    /                 \
   Device ----- | Data Transporter | ---------  | Data Transporter |
   Target        \                 / Interface   \                 /
                  -----------------              / -----------------
                                                /       |
                                               /        | Notification
                                              /         | Interface
                                   -----------          |
                                  /                     V
                ------------     /                  ----------
               /            \   /                  /          \
              /   Location   \ /                  |  Location  |
              |   Storage     |   Location Info   |  Storage   |
              |               |<----------------- |            |
              |   Location    |                   |  Location  |
              |  Recipient    |                   | Recipient  |
               \             /                     \          /
                -------------                       ----------

   Here, cell phone Corp 1 is the AP and the LG.  In this scenario, Cell
   phone Corp 2 is likely to be a Trusted entity, but cell phone Corp 1
   may be Non-trusted.











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   SCENARIO 3:  Mobile Communities and Location-Based Services

   The figure below shows a common scenario, where a user wants to find
   his friends or colleagues or wants to share his position with them or
   with a Location-Based Service Provider.  Some of the messages use a
   Location Object to carry, for instance, identities or pseudonyms,
   credentials and proof-of-possession of them, Rules and Location Data
   Information, including Data Types and Precision or Resolution.
   Messages that do not use the Location Object and are outside of the
   scope of the Geopriv WG, but should be mentioned for
   understandability, are shown in the figure as starred arrows
   ("***>").

         +---------+                      +------------+
         |         |                      |            |
         | Location|<**                   |   Public   |
         |Generator|    *                 | Rule Holder|
         |         |      *               |            |
         +---------+\       *             +------------+
                      \        *3     1a*        *
                        \        *    *          *
                          \        **            *
                            \    *  *            *1a
                              \*      *          *
                             *  \       *        *
                           *      \       *      *
                         *          \4      *    *
                       *              \       *  V
                     *                  \->+-----------+
         +----------+           1          | Location  |
         |   Rule   |--------------------->| Server +  |
         |   Maker  |                      | Private   |
         +----------+                      |Rule Holder|
                                           +-----------+
                                                ^  |
                                               3|  |5
                                                |  V
                                            +----------+
                                            | Location |
                                            | Recipient|
                                            +----------+

   Assume that the Rule Maker and the Target are registered with the
   Location Server.  The RM has somehow proven to the LS that he indeed
   is the owner of the privacy rights of the Target (the Target is
   usually a Device owned by the Rule Maker).  The Rule Maker and the
   Location Server have agreed on the set of keys or credentials and
   cryptographic material that they will use to authenticate each other,



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   and in particular, to authenticate or sign the Rules.  How this has
   been done is outside of the scope of the document.

      1: Rule Transfer:
         The Rule Maker sends a Rule to the Location Server.  This Rule
         may or may not be a field in a Location Object.

      1a:Signed Rule:
         As an alternative, the Rule Maker may write a Rule and place it
         in a Public Rule Holder.  The entities access the repository to
         read the signed Rules.

      2: Location Information Request:
         The Location Recipient requests location information for a
         Target.  In this request, the Location Recipient may select
         which location information data type it prefers.  One way of
         requesting Location Information MAY be sending a partially
         filled Location Object, including only the identities of the
         Target and Location Recipient and the desired Data Type and
         precision or resolution, and providing proof of possession of
         the required credentials.  But whether or not the using
         protocol understands this partially filled object as a request
         MAY depend on the using protocol or on the context.  The
         Location Recipient could also specify the need for periodic
         location information updates, but this is probably out of the
         scope of Geopriv.

      3: Locate:
         When a Location Server receives a Location Information Request
         for a Target which has no current location information, the
         server may ask the Location Generator to locate the Target.

      4: Location Information:
         The Location Generator sends the "full" location information to
         the Location Server.  This Location Information may or may not
         be embedded in a Location Object.

      5: Filtered Location Information:
         The Location Server sends the location information to the
         Location Recipient.  The information may be filtered in the
         sense that in general a less precise or a computed version of
         the information is being delivered.









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7.  Requirements

7.1.  Location Object

   Remember that this document is primarily specifying requirements on
   the definition of the LO.  Some Requirements read like this:  "The LO
   definition MUST contain Field 'A' as an optional field."  This
   requirement states that

   o  the document that defines the LO MUST define the LO field 'A',

   o  the field 'A' MUST be defined as optional to use (an instance of a
      LO MAY or may not contain the field 'A').

   Some Requirements read like this: "The LO definition MUST contain
   Field 'A', which MAY be an optional field."  This requirement states
   that

   o  the document that defines the LO MUST define the LO field 'A',

   o  the field 'A' MAY be defined as optional or not to use.  If it is
      defined as optional to use, any instance of an LO MAY or may not
      contain the field 'A'; if it is not optional, all instances of LOs
      MUST contain the field 'A'.

   Req. 1.  (Location Object generalities)

      1.1) Geopriv MUST define one Location Object (LO) -- both in
      syntax and semantics -- that must be supported by all Geopriv
      entities.

      1.2) Some fields of the Location Object MAY be optional.  This
      means that an instance of a Location Object MAY or may not contain
      the fields.

      1.3) Some fields of the Location Object MAY be defined as
      "extensions".  This means that the syntax or semantics of these
      fields is not fully defined in the basic Location Object
      definition, but their use may be private to one or more of the
      using protocols.

      1.4) The Location Object MUST be extensible, allowing the
      definition of new attributes or fields.

      1.5) The object MUST be suitable for requesting and receiving a
      location.





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      1.6) The object MUST permit (but not require) the Privacy Rules to
      be enforced by a third party.

      1.7) The object MUST be usable in a variety of protocols, such as
      HTTP and SIP, as well as local APIs.

      1.8) The object MUST be usable in a secure manner even by
      applications on constrained devices.

   Req. 2.  (Location Object fields) The Location Object definition MUST
      contain the following Fields, which MAY be optional to use:

      2.1) Target Identifier

      2.2) Location Recipient Identity
      This identity may be a multicast or group identity, used to
      include the Location Object in multicast-based using protocols.

      2.3) Location Recipient Credential

      2.4) Location Recipient Proof-of-Possession of the Credential

      2.5) Location Field

      2.5.1) Motion and direction vectors.  This field MUST be optional.

      2.6) Location Data Type

      When transmitting the Location Object, the sender and the receiver
      must agree on the data type of the location information.  The
      using protocol may specify that the data type information is part
      of the Location Object or that the sender and receiver have agreed
      on it before the actual data transfer.

      2.7) Timing information:
      (a) When was the Location Information accurate? (sighting time)
      (b) Until when considered current?  TTL (Time-to-live) (This is
      different than a privacy rule setting a limit on data retention)

      2.8) Rule Field: this field MAY be a referral to an applicable
      Rule (for instance, a URI to a full Rule), or it MAY contain a
      Limited Rule (see Req. 11), or both.

      2.9) Security-headers and -trailers (for instance encryption
      information, hashes, or signatures) (see Req. 14 and 15).

      2.10) Version number




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   Req. 3.  (Location Data Types)

      3.1) The Location Object MUST define at least one Location Data
      Type to be supported by all Geopriv receivers (entities that
      receive LOs).

      3.2) The Location Object SHOULD define two Location Data Types:
      one for latitude / longitude / altitude coordinates and one for
      civil locations (City, Street, Number) supported by all Geopriv
      receivers (entities that receive LOs).

      3.3) The latitude / longitude / altitude Data Type SHOULD also
      support a delta format in addition to an absolute one, used for
      the purpose of reducing the size of the packages or the security
      and confidentiality needs.

      3.4) The Location Object definition SHOULD agree on further
      Location Data Types supported by some Geopriv entities and defined
      by other organizations.

7.2.  The Using Protocol

   Req. 4.  The using protocol has to obey the privacy and security
      instructions coded in the Location Object and in the corresponding
      Rules regarding the transmission and storage of the LO.

   Req. 5.  The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys
      associated with the credentials are transported to the respective
      parties, that is, key establishment is the responsibility of the
      using protocol.

   Req. 6.  (Single Message Transfer)  In particular, for tracking of
      small target devices, the design should allow a single
      message/packet transmission of location as a complete transaction.

   Other requirements on the using protocol are out of the scope of this
   document, but might be the subject of future efforts from this
   working group.  See also Section 9 (Protocol and LO Issues for later
   Consideration).

7.3.  Rule based Location Data Transfer

   Req. 7.  (LS Rules) The decision of a Location Server to provide a
      Location Recipient access to Location Information MUST be based on
      Rule Maker-defined Privacy Rules.






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   It is outside of our scope how Privacy Rules are managed and how a
   Location Server has access to the Privacy Rules.  Note that it might
   be that some rules contain private information not intended for
   untrusted parties.

   Req. 8.  (LG Rules) Even if a Location Generator is unaware of and
      lacks access to the full Privacy Rules defined by the Rule Maker,
      the Location Generator MUST transmit Location Information in
      compliance with instructions set by the Rule Maker.  Such
      compliance MAY be accomplished by the Location Generator
      transmitting the LO only to a URI designated by the Rule Maker.

   Req. 9.  (Viewer Rules) A Viewer does not need to be aware of the
      full Rules defined by the Rule Maker (because a Viewer SHOULD NOT
      retransmit Location Information), and thus a Viewer SHOULD receive
      only the subset of Privacy Rules necessary for the Viewer to
      handle the LO in compliance with the full Privacy Rules (such as,
      instruction on the time period for which the LO can be retained).

   Req. 10.  (Full Rule language) Geopriv MAY specify a Rule language
      capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules concerning
      location information.  This Rule language MAY be an existing one,
      an adaptation of an existing one or a new Rule language, and it
      SHOULD be as simple as possible.

   Req. 11.  (Limited Rule language) Geopriv MUST specify a limited Rule
      language capable of expressing a limited set of privacy rules
      concerning location information.  This Rule language MAY be an
      existing one, an adaptation of an existing one or a new Rule
      language.  The Location Object MUST include sufficient fields and
      data to express the limited set of privacy rules.

7.4.  Location Object Privacy and Security

7.4.1.  Identity Protection

   Req. 12.  (Identity Protection) The Location Object MUST support use
      of Unlinked Pseudonyms in the corresponding identification fields
      of Rule Maker, Target, Device, and Location Recipient.  Since
      Unlinked Pseudonyms are simply bit strings that are not linked
      initially to a well-known identity, this requirement boils down to
      saying that the name space for Identifiers used in the LO has to
      be large enough to contain many unused strings.








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7.4.2.  Authentication Requirements

   Req. 13.  (Credential Requirements) The using protocol and the
      Location Object SHOULD allow the use of different credential
      types, including privacy-enhancing credentials (for instance those
      described in [Bra00] or [Cha85]).

7.4.3.  Actions to be secured

   Req. 14.  (Security Features) The Location Object MUST support fields
      suitable for protecting the Object to provide the following
      security features:

      14.1)     Mutual end-point authentication: the using protocol is
      able to authenticate both parties in a Location Object
      transmission,

      14.2)     Data object integrity: the LO is secured from
      modification by unauthorized entities during transmission and
      storage,

      14.3)     Data object confidentiality: the LO is secured from
      eavesdropping (unauthorized reading) during transmission and
      storage, and

      14.4)     Replay protection: an old LO may not be replayed by an
      adversary or by the same entity that used the LO itself (except
      perhaps during a small window of time that is configurable or
      accepted by the Rule Maker).

   Req. 15.  (Minimal Crypto)

      15.1)     Geopriv MUST specify a minimum mandatory to implement
      Location Object security, including mandatory to implement crypto
      algorithms for digital signature algorithms and encryption
      algorithms.

      15.2)     It MAY also define further mandatory to implement
      Location Object security mechanisms for message authentication
      codes (MACs) or other purposes.

      15.3)     The protocol SHOULD allow a bypass if authentication
      fails in an emergency call.

   The issue addressed in the last point is that an emergency call in
   some unfavorable situations may not be completed if the minimal
   authentication fails.  This is probably not what the user would like
   to happen.  The user may prefer an unauthenticated call to an



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   unauthenticated emergency server over no call completion at all, even
   at the risk that he is talking to an attacker or that his information
   is not secured.

7.5.  Non-Requirements

   Non-Req. 1. (Bridging to non-IP networks) The Geopriv specification
      SHOULD NOT specify the bridging to non-IP networks (PSTN, etc).

8.  Security Considerations

   The purpose of the Geopriv Location Object and the requirements on
   the using protocol are to allow a Privacy Rule-controlled disclosure
   of location information for location services.

8.1.  Traffic Analysis

   The information carried within the Location Object is secured in a
   way compliant with the privacy and security Rules of the Rule Maker,
   but other information, carried in other objects or headers are in
   general not secured in the same way.  This means that Geopriv may not
   as a general matter, secure the Target against general traffic
   analysis attacks or other forms of privacy violations.

8.2.  Securing the Privacy Rules

   The Privacy Rules of the Rule Maker regarding the location of the
   Target may be accessible to a Location Server in a public or non-
   public Rule Holder, or they may be carried by the Location Object, or
   they may be presented by the Location Recipient as capabilities or
   tokens.  Each type of Rule has to be secured its own particular way.

   The rules in a non-public Rule Holder are typically authenticated
   using a MAC (Message Authentication Code) or a signature, depending
   on the type of keys used.  The rules in a public Rule Holder (one
   that in principle may be accessed directly by several entities, for
   instance several Location Servers) are typically digitally signed.
   Rule Fields in an LO are secured as part of the LO itself.  A Geopriv
   Token (a token or ticket issued by the Rule Maker to a Location
   Recipient, expressing the explicit consent of the Rule Maker to
   access his location information) is authenticated or signed.

8.3.  Emergency Case

   Let us consider the situation where the authentication fails in an
   emergency call because the authentication center fails to
   authenticate itself.  In this case, one way of implementing the




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   authentication bypass for emergency calls (mentioned in Req 15.3) is
   to let the user have the choice of writing a Rule that says:

   -  "If the emergency server does not authenticate itself, send the
      location information anyway", or

   -  "If the emergency server does not authenticate itself, let the
      call fail".

   Second, in the case where the authentication of the emergency call
   fails because the user may not authenticate itself, the question
   arises: whose Rule to use?  It is reasonable to use a default one:
   this location information can only be sent to an emergency center.

   The third situation, which should be studied in more detail, is:
   what to do if not only the user fails to authenticate itself, but
   also the emergency center is not authenticable?  It is reasonable to
   send the Location Information anyway, but are there any security
   threats that must be considered?

8.4.  Identities and Anonymity

   The use of Unlinked Pseudonyms is necessary to obtain anonymity.

   The purpose of the use of Unlinked Pseudonyms is the following: the
   using protocol should be able to hide the real identity of the Rule
   Maker, the Target, and the Device, from Location Servers or Location
   Recipients, if required by the RM.  Also, the using protocol SHOULD
   be able to hide the real identity of the Location Recipient from the
   Location Server.

   In this last case, the Target is not concerned about the Server
   identifying him and knowing his location, but identifying his
   business partners, and therefore his habits, etc.  Reasons for hiding
   the real identities of the Location Recipients include (a) that this
   knowledge may be used to infer the identity of the Target, (b) that
   knowledge of the identity of the Location Recipient may embarrass the
   Target or breach confidential information, and (c) that the dossier
   telling who has obtained a Target's location information over a long
   period of time can give information on habits, movements, etc.  Even
   if the location service providers agree to respect the privacy of the
   user, are compelled by laws or regulations to protect the privacy of
   the user, and misbehavior or negligence of the Location Server can be
   ruled out, there is still risk that personal data may become
   available to unauthorized persons through attacks from outsiders,
   unauthorized access from insiders, technical or human errors, or
   legal processes.




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   On some occasions, a Location Server has to know who is supplying the
   Privacy Rules for a particular Target, while in other situations it
   could be enough to know that the supplier of the Rules is authorized
   to do so.

8.5.  Unintended Target

   An Unintended Target is a person or object tracked by proximity to
   the Target.  This special case most frequently occurs if the Target
   is not a person.  For example, the Target may be a rental car
   equipped with a GPS Device, used to track car inventory.  The rental
   company may not care about the driver's location, but the driver's
   privacy is implicitly affected.

   Geopriv may or may not protect or affect the privacy of Unintended
   Targets, but the impact on Unintended Targets should be acknowledged.

9.  Protocol and LO Issues for later Consideration

   This section briefly discusses issues relating to the Location Object
   or the protocol that have emerged during the discussion of earlier
   versions of this document.

9.1.  Multiple Locations in one LO

   A location Field is intended to represent one point or one region in
   space (either 1, 2, or 3 dimensionally).  The possibility of
   inclusion of multiple locations is discussed in another document.
   The current rough consensus is the following: the LO definition MAY
   allow the Location Field to be optional, to appear exactly one time
   or to occur several times.  Each Location Field may contain one or
   more "Location Representations", each of which is intended to
   represent a different measurement or a different formatting of the
   same position.  But there are other possibilities for using multiple
   Location Fields and multiple representations: maybe several Location
   Fields would be used to report the same sighting in different
   formats, or multiple sightings at different times, or multiple sensor
   locations for the same device, or other purposes, which could also
   depend on the using protocol.  This is all for further discussion.

9.2.  Translation Fields

   It is possible to include fields to indicate that one of the
   locations is a translation of another.  If this is done, it is also
   possible to have a field to identify the translator, as identity and
   method.





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9.3.  Truth Flag

   Geopriv MUST be silent on the truth or lack-of-truth of the location
   information contained in the LO.  Thus, the LO MUST NOT provide an
   attribute in object saying "I am (or am not) telling you the whole
   truth."

9.4.  Timing Information Format

   The format of timing information is out of the scope of this
   document.

9.5.  The Name Space of Identifiers

   Who defines the Identities: can the using protocol define the
   Identifiers or must the using protocol use and authenticate
   Pseudonyms proposed by the Rules, chosen independently of the using
   protocol?  Of course, if the using protocol has an appropriate
   namespace, containing many unused names that may be used as
   pseudonyms and may be replaced by new ones regularly, then the
   Location Object may be able to use the name space.  For this purpose,
   the user would probably have to write his Rules using this name
   space.  Note that it is necessary to change the used pseudonyms
   regularly, because identifying the user behind an unlinked pseudonym
   can be very simple.

   There are several advantages in letting the using protocol define the
   name space:

   o  the embedded authentication would be easier, as the using protocol
      often already has the credentials for the authentication identity
      in place and the "embedded" authentication would be independent on
      the form of Identifiers,

   o  the size of the names would be fixed.

   On the other hand, the benefits of the Rule choosing the identifiers
   are:

   o  the user has a control of his anonymity, and

   o  the interworking of multiple systems with Location object across
      protocol boundaries is facilitated.








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10.  Acknowledgements

   We wish to thank the members of the IETF Geopriv WG for their
   comments and suggestions.  Aaron Burstein, Mehmet Ersue, Allison
   Mankin, Randall Gellens, and the participants of the Geopriv meetings
   in San Diego and Yokohama provided detailed comments or text.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative Reference

   [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
   Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

11.2.  Informative References

   [Bra00]   Stefan A.: Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and
             Digital Certificates : Building in Privacy, MIT Press;
             ISBN:  0262024918; 1st edition, August, 2000

   [Cha85]   Chaum, David: Security without Identification, Card
             Computers to make Big Brother Obsolete.  Original Version
             appeared in: Communications of the ACM, vol. 28 no. 10,
             October 1985 pp. 1030-1044. Revised version available at
             http://www.chaum.com/articles/

   [ISO99]   ISO99: ISO IS 15408, 1999, http://www.commoncriteria.org/.

   [OECD]    OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
             Transborder Flows of Personal Data, http://www.oecd.org.

   [Pfi01]   Pfitzmann, Andreas; Koehntopp, Marit: Anonymity,
             Unobservability, and Pseudonymity - A Proposal for
             Terminology; in: H Federrath (Ed.): Designing Privacy
             Enhancing Technologies; Proc.  Workshop on Design Issues in
             Anonymity and Unobservability; LNCS 2009; 2001; 1-9.  Newer
             versions available at
             http://www.koehntopp.de/marit/pub/anon













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12.  Authors' Addresses

   Jorge R Cuellar
   Siemens AG
   Corporate Technology
   CT IC 3
   81730 Munich, Germany

   EMail: Jorge.Cuellar@siemens.com


   John B. Morris, Jr.
   Director, Internet Standards, Technology & Privacy Project
   Center for Democracy & Technology
   1634 I Street NW, Suite 1100
   Washington, D.C. 20006 USA

   EMail: jmorris@cdt.org
   URI: http://www.cdt.org


   Deirdre K. Mulligan
   Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic
   Boalt Hall School of Law
   University of California
   Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

   EMail: dmulligan@law.berkeley.edu
   URI: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/cenpro/samuelson/

   Jon Peterson
   NeuStar, Inc.
   1800 Sutter St
   Suite 5707
   Concord, CA 94520 USA

   EMail: jon.peterson@neustar.biz
   URI: http://www.neustar.biz/


   James M. Polk
   Cisco Systems
   2200 East President George Bush Turnpike
   Richardson, Texas 75082 USA

   EMail: jmpolk@cisco.com





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13.  Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78 and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
   REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE
   INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR
   IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Intellectual Property

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Cuellar, et al.              Informational                     [Page 30]


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