[Docs] [txt|pdf] [draft-ietf-midcom...] [Diff1] [Diff2]

INFORMATIONAL

Network Working Group                                     M. Barnes, Ed.
Request for Comments: 4097                               Nortel Networks
Category: Informational                                        June 2005


        Middlebox Communications (MIDCOM) Protocol Evaluation

Status of This Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

Abstract

   This document provides an evaluation of the applicability of SNMP
   (Simple Network Management Protocol), RSIP (Realm Specific Internet
   Protocol), Megaco, Diameter, and COPS (Common Open Policy Service) as
   the MIDCOM (Middlebox Communications) protocol.  A summary of each of
   the proposed protocols against the MIDCOM requirements and the MIDCOM
   framework is provided.  Compliancy of each of the protocols against
   each requirement is detailed.  A conclusion summarizes how each of
   the protocols fares in the evaluation.

Table of Contents

   Overview..........................................................  2
   Conventions Used in This Document.................................  3
   1.  Protocol Proposals............................................  3
       1.1.  SNMP....................................................  3
       1.2.  RSIP....................................................  5
       1.3.  Megaco..................................................  7
       1.4.  Diameter................................................  8
       1.5.  COPS.................................................... 10
   2.  Item Level Compliance Evaluation.............................. 11
       2.1.  Protocol Machinery...................................... 11
       2.2.  Protocol Semantics...................................... 20
       2.3.  General Security Requirements........................... 27
   3.  Conclusions................................................... 29
   4.  Security Considerations....................................... 30
   5.  References.................................................... 31
       5.1.  Normative References.................................... 31
       5.2.  Informative References.................................. 33
   6.  Acknowledgements.............................................. 33



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   Appendix A - SNMP Overview........................................ 34
   Appendix B - RSIP with Tunneling.................................. 35
   Appendix C - Megaco Modeling Approach............................. 37
   Appendix D - Diameter IPFilter Rule............................... 39
   Contributors ..................................................... 42

Overview

   This document provides an evaluation of the applicability of SNMP
   (Simple Network Management Protocol), RSIP (Realm Specific Internet
   Protocol), Megaco, Diameter and COPS (Common Open Policy Service) as
   the MIDCOM (Middlebox Communications) protocol.  This evaluation
   provides overviews of the protocols and general statements of
   applicability based upon the MIDCOM framework [2] and requirements
   [1] documents.

   The process for the protocol evaluation was fairly straightforward as
   individuals volunteered to provide an individual document evaluating
   a specific protocol.  Thus, some protocols that might be considered
   as reasonably applicable as the MIDCOM protocol are not evaluated in
   this document since there were no volunteers to champion the work.
   The individual protocol documents for which there were volunteers
   were submitted for discussion on the list with feedback being
   incorporated into an updated document.  The updated versions of these
   documents formed the basis for the content of this WG document.

   Section 1 contains a list of the proposed protocols submitted for the
   purposes of the protocol evaluation with some background information
   on the protocols and similarities and differences with regards to the
   applicability to the framework [2] provided.

   Section 2 provides the item level evaluation of the proposed
   protocols against the Requirements [1].

   Section 3 provides a summary of the evaluation.  A table containing a
   numerical breakdown for each of the protocols, with regards to its
   applicability to the requirements, for the following categories is
   provided: Fully met, Partially met through the use of extensions,
   Partially met through other changes to the protocol, or Failing to be
   met.  This summary is not meant to provide a conclusive statement of
   the suitability of the protocols, but rather to provide information
   to be considered as input into the overall protocol decision process.

   In order for this document to serve as a complete evaluation of the
   protocols, some of the background information and more detailed
   aspects of the proposals documenting enhancements and applications of
   the protocols to comply with the MIDCOM framework and requirements
   are included in Appendices.



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Conventions Used in this Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [4].

1.  Protocol Proposals

   The following protocols were submitted to the MIDCOM WG for
   consideration:

   o  SNMP
   o  RSIP
   o  Megaco
   o  Diameter
   o  COPS

   The following provides an overview of each of the protocols and the
   applicability of each protocol to the MIDCOM framework.

1.1.  SNMP

   This section provides a general statement with regards to the
   applicability of SNMP as the MIDCOM protocol.  A general overview and
   some specific details of SNMP are provided in Appendix A.  This
   evaluation of SNMP is specific to SNMPv3, which provides the security
   required for MIDCOM usage.  SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c would be inappropriate
   for MIDCOM since they have been declared Historic, and because their
   messages have only trivial security.  Some specifics with regards to
   existing support for NAT and Firewall Control are provided in section
   1.1.2.  The differences between the SNMP framework and the MIDCOM
   framework are addressed in section 1.1.3.

1.1.1.  SNMP General Applicability

   The primary advantages of SNMPv3 are that it is a mature, well
   understood protocol, currently deployed in various scenarios, with
   mature toolsets available for SNMP managers and agents.

   Application intelligence is captured in MIB modules, rather than in
   the messaging protocol.  MIB modules define a data model of the
   information that can be collected and configured for a managed
   functionality.  The SNMP messaging protocol transports the data in a
   standardized format without needing to understand the semantics of
   the data being transferred.  The endpoints of the communication
   understand the semantics of the data.





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   Partly due to the lack of security in SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c, and partly
   due to variations in configuration requirements across vendors, few
   MIB modules have been developed that enable standardized
   configuration of managed devices across vendors.  Since monitoring
   can be done using only a least-common-denominator subset of
   information across vendors, many MIB modules have been developed to
   provide standardized monitoring of managed devices.  As a result,
   SNMP has been used primarily for monitoring rather than for
   configuring network nodes.

   SNMPv3 builds upon the design of widely-deployed SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c
   versions.  Specifically, SNMPv3 shares the separation of data
   modeling (MIBs) from the protocol to transfer data, so all existing
   MIBs can be used with SNMPv3.  SNMPv3 also uses the SMIv2 standard,
   and it shares operations and transport with SNMPv2c.  The major
   difference between SNMPv3 and earlier versions is the addition of
   strong message security and controlled access to data.

   SNMPv3 uses the architecture detailed in RFC 3411 [5], where all SNMP
   entities are capable of performing certain functions, such as the
   generation of requests, response to requests, the generation of
   asynchronous notifications, the receipt of notifications, and the
   proxy-forwarding of SNMP messages.  SNMP is used to read and
   manipulate virtual databases of managed-application-specific
   operational parameters and statistics, which are defined in MIB
   modules.

1.1.2.  SNMP Existing Support for NAT and Firewall Control

   For configuring NATs, a NAT MIB module [16] has been developed.  The
   NAT MIB module meets all of the MIDCOM requirements concerning NAT
   control with the exception of grouping of policy rules (requirement
   2.2.3.).  In order to support this, an additional grouping table in
   the NAT MIB module is required.

   Existing work for firewall control with SNMP only considered the
   monitoring of firewalls and not the configuration.  Further work is
   required towards the development of MIBs for configuring firewalls.

1.1.3.  Architectural Differences between SNMP and MIDCOM

   The SNMP management framework provides functions equivalent to those
   defined by the MIDCOM framework, although there are a few
   architectural differences.

   Traditionally, SNMP entities have been called Manager and Agent.
   Manager and agent are now recognized as entities designed to support
   particular configurations of SNMPv3 functions.  A traditional manager



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   is an entity capable of generating requests and receiving
   notifications, and a traditional agent is an entity capable of
   responding to requests and generating notifications.  The SNMP use of
   the term agent is different from its use in the MIDCOM framework: The
   SNMP Manager corresponds to the MIDCOM agent and the SNMP Agent
   corresponds to the MIDCOM PDP.  The SNMP evaluation assumes that the
   MIDCOM PDP (SNMP Agent) is physically part of the middlebox, which is
   allowed by the MIDCOM framework as described in section 6.0 of [2].
   Thus, for the purpose of this evaluation, the SNMP agent corresponds
   to the Middlebox.

   While this evaluation is based on the assumption that the SNMP agent
   corresponds to the middlebox, SNMP does not force such a restriction.

   Proxy means many things to many people.  SNMP can be deployed using
   intermediate entities to forward messages, or to help distribute
   policies to the middlebox, similar to the proxy capabilities of the
   other candidate protocols.  Since proxy adds configuration and
   deployment complexity and is not necessary to meet the specified
   MIDCOM requirements, the use of a proxy agent or mid-level manager is
   not considered in this evaluation.  Further details on SNMP proxy
   capabilities are provided in Appendix A.

   Although the SNMP management framework does not have the concept of a
   session, session-like associations can be established through the use
   of managed objects.  In order to implement the MIDCOM protocol based
   on SNMP, a MIDCOM MIB module is required.  All requests from the
   MIDCOM agent to the Middlebox would be performed using write access
   to managed objects defined in the MIDCOM MIB module.  Replies to
   requests are signaled by the Middlebox (SNMP agent), by modifying the
   managed objects.  The MIDCOM agent (SNMP manager) can receive this
   information by reading or polling, if required, the corresponding
   managed object.

1.2.  RSIP

   The RSIP framework and detailed protocol are defined in RFC 3102 [17]
   and RFC 3103 [18] respectively.

1.2.1.  Framework Elements in Common to MIDCOM and RSIP

   The following framework elements are common to MIDCOM and RSIP listed
   by their MIDCOM names, with the RSIP name indicated in parenthesis:

   o  Hosts
   o  Applications
   o  Middleboxes (RSIP gateways)
   o  Private domain (private realm)



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   o  External domain (public realm)
   o  Middlebox communication protocol (RSIP)
   o  MIDCOM agent registration (host registration)
   o  MIDCOM session (RSIP session)
   o  MIDCOM Filter (local / remote address and port number(s) pairs)

1.2.2.  MIDCOM Framework Elements Not Supported by RSIP

   The following MIDCOM framework elements are not supported by RSIP:

   o  Policy actions and rules.  RSIP always implicitly assumes a permit
      action.  To support MIDCOM, a more general and explicit action
      parameter would have to be defined.  RSIP requests specifying
      local / remote address and port number(s) pairs would have to be
      extended to include an action parameter, in MIDCOM rules.

   o  MIDCOM agents.  RSIP makes no distinction between applications and
      agents; address assignment operations can be performed equally by
      applications and agents.

   o  Policy Decision Points.  RSIP assumes that middleboxes grant or
      deny requests with reference to a policy known to them; the policy
      could be determined jointly by the middlebox and a policy decision
      point; such joint determination is not addressed by the RSIP
      framework, nor is it specifically precluded.

1.2.3.  RSIP Framework Elements Not Supported by MIDCOM

   The following elements are unique to the RSIP framework.  If RSIP
   were adopted as the basis for the MIDCOM protocol, they could be
   added to the MIDCOM framework:

   o  RSIP client: that portion of the application (or agent) that talks
      to the RSIP gateway using RSIP.

   o  RSIP server: that portion of an RSIP gateway that talks to
      applications using RSIP.

   o  Realm Specific Address IP (RSA-IP) and Realm Specific Address and
      Port IP (RSAP-IP): RSIP distinguishes between filters that include
      all ports on an IP address and those that do not.

   o  Demultiplexing Fields: Any set of packet header or payload fields
      that an RSIP gateway uses to route an incoming packet to an RSIP
      host.  RSIP allows a gateway to perform, and an application to
      control, packet routing to hosts in the private domain based on
      more than IP header fields.




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   o  Host-to-middlebox tunnels: RSIP assumes that data communicated
      between a private realm host and a public realm host is
      transferred through the private realm by a tunnel between the
      inner host and the middle box, where it is converted to and from
      native IP based communications to the public realm host.

1.2.4.  Comparison of MIDCOM and RSIP Frameworks

   RSIP with tunneling, has the advantage that the public realm IP
   addresses and port numbers are known to the private realm host
   application, thus no translation is needed for protocols such as SDP,
   the FTP control protocol, RTSP, SMIL, etc.  However, this does
   require that an RSIP server and a tunneling protocol be implemented
   in the middlebox and an RSIP client and the tunneling protocol be
   implemented in the private realm host.  The host modifications can
   generally be made without modification to the host application or
   requiring the implementation of a host application agent.  This is
   viewed as a significant advantage over NAT (Network Address
   Translation).

   Further details on the evaluation of RSIP with regards to tunneling
   in the context of NAT support are available in Appendix B of this
   document.

1.3.  Megaco

1.3.1.  Megaco Architectural Model

   Megaco is a master-slave, transaction-oriented protocol defined in
   RFC 3015 [20] in which Media Gateway Controllers (MGC) control the
   operation of Media Gateways (MG).  Originally designed to control IP
   Telephony gateways, it is used between an application-unaware device
   (the Media Gateway) and an intelligent entity (the Media Gateway
   Controller) having application awareness.

   The Megaco model includes the following key concepts:

   1. Terminations: Logical entities on the MG that act as sources or
      sink of packet streams.  A termination can be physical or
      ephemeral and is associated with a single MGC.

   2. Context: An association between Terminations for sharing media
      between the Terminations.  Terminations can be added, subtracted
      from a Context and can be moved from one Context to another.  A
      Context and all of its Terminations are associated with a single
      MGC.





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   3. Virtual Media Gateways: A physical MG can be partitioned into
      multiple virtual MGs allowing multiple Controllers to interact
      with disjoint sets of Contexts/Terminations within a single
      physical device.

   4. Transactions/Messages: Each Megaco command applies to one
      Termination within a Context and generates a unique response.
      Commands may be replicated implicitly so that they act on all
      Terminations of a given Context through wildcarding of Termination
      identifiers.  Multiple commands addressed to different Contexts
      can be grouped in a Transaction structure.  Similarly, multiple
      Transactions can be concatenated into a Message.

   5. Descriptors/Properties: A Termination is described by a number of
      characterizing parameters or Properties, which are grouped in a
      set of Descriptors that are included in commands and responses.

   6. Events and signals: A Termination can be programmed to perform
      certain actions or to detect certain events and notify the Agent.

   7. Packages: Packages are groups of properties, events, etc.
      associated with a Termination.  Packages are simple means of
      extending the protocol to serve various types of devices or
      Middleboxes.

1.3.2.  Comparison of the Megaco and MIDCOM Architectural Frameworks

   In the MIDCOM architecture, the Middlebox plays the role of an
   application-unaware device being controlled by the application-aware
   Agent.  In the Megaco architecture, the Media Gateway controller
   serves a role similar to the MIDCOM Agent (MA) and the Media Gateway
   serves a role similar to the Middlebox (MB).  One major difference
   between the Megaco model and the MIDCOM protocol requirements is that
   MIDCOM requires that the MIDCOM Agent establish the session.
   Whereas, the Megaco definition is that a MG (Middlebox) establishes
   communication with an MGC (MIDCOM Agent).

1.4.  Diameter

1.4.1.  Diameter Architecture

   Diameter is designed to support AAA for network access.  It is meant
   to operate through networks of Diameter nodes, which both act upon
   and route messages toward their final destinations.  Endpoints are
   characterized as either clients, which perform network access
   control, or servers, which handle authentication, authorization and
   accounting requests for a particular realm.  Intermediate nodes
   perform relay, proxy, redirect, and translation services.  Design



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   requirements for the protocol include robustness in the face of
   bursty message loads and server failures, resistance to specific DOS
   attacks and protection of message contents, and extensibility
   including support for vendor-specific attributes and message types.

   The protocol is designed as a base protocol in RFC 3588 [24] to be
   supported by all implementations, plus extensions devoted to specific
   applications.  Messages consist of a header and an aggregation of
   "Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs)", each of which is a tag-length-value
   construct.  The header includes a command code, which determines the
   processing of the message and what other AVP types must or may be
   present.  AVPs are strongly typed.  Some basic and compound types are
   provided by the base protocol specification, while others may be
   added by application extensions.  One of the types provided in the
   base is the IPFilterRule, which may be sufficient to express the
   Policy Rules that MIDCOM deals with.

   Messaging takes the form of request-answer exchanges.  Some exchanges
   may take multiple round-trips to complete.  The protocol is
   connection-oriented at both the transport and application levels.  In
   addition, the protocol is tied closely to the idea of sessions, which
   relate sequences of message exchanges through use of a common session
   identifier.  Each application provides its own definition of the
   semantics of a session.  Multiple sessions may be open
   simultaneously.

1.4.2.  Comparison of Diameter With MIDCOM Architectural Requirements

   The MIDCOM Agent does not perform the functions of a Diameter client,
   nor does the Middlebox support the functions of a Diameter server.
   Thus the MIDCOM application would introduce two new types of
   endpoints into the Diameter architecture.  Moreover, the MIDCOM
   requirements do not at this time imply any type of intermediate node.

   A general assessment might be that Diameter meets and exceeds MIDCOM
   architectural requirements, however the connection orientation may be
   too heavy for the number of relationships the Middlebox must support.
   Certainly the focus on extensibility, request-response messaging
   orientation, and treatment of the session, are all well-matched to
   what MIDCOM needs.  At this point, MIDCOM is focused on simple
   point-to-point relationships, so the proxying and forwarding
   capabilities provided by Diameter are not needed.  Most of the
   commands and AVPs defined in the base protocol are also surplus to
   MIDCOM requirements.







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1.5.  COPS

   Overall, COPS, defined in RFC 2748 [25], and COPS-PR, defined in RFC
   3084 [26], have similar compliancy with regards to the MIDCOM
   protocol requirements.  In this document, references to COPS are
   generally applicable to both COPS and COPS-PR.  However, COPS-PR is
   explicitly identified to meet two of the requirements.  The only
   other major difference between COPS-PR and COPS, as applied to the
   MIDCOM protocol, would be the description of the MIDCOM policy rule
   attributes with COPS-PR MIDCOM PIB attributes rather than COPS MIDCOM
   client specific objects.

1.5.1.  COPS Protocol Architecture

   COPS is a simple query and response protocol that can be used to
   exchange policy information between a policy server (Policy Decision
   Point or PDP) and its clients (Policy Enforcement Points or PEPs).
   COPS was defined to be a simple and extensible protocol.  The main
   characteristics of COPS include the following:

   1. The protocol employs a client/server model.  The PEP sends
      requests, updates, and deletions to the remote PDP and the PDP
      returns decisions back to the PEP.

   2. The protocol uses TCP as its transport protocol for reliable
      exchange of messages between policy clients and a server.

   3. The protocol is extensible in that it is designed to leverage
      self-identifying objects and can support diverse client specific
      information without requiring modification of the COPS protocol.

   4. The protocol was created for the general administration,
      configuration, and enforcement of policies.

   5. COPS provides message level security for authentication, replay
      protection, and message integrity.  COPS can make use of existing
      protocols for security such as IPSEC [22] or TLS [21] to
      authenticate and secure the channel between the PEP and the PDP.

   6. The protocol is stateful in two main aspects:

     (1) Request/Decision state is shared and kept synchronized in a
         transactional manner between client and server.  Requests from
         the client PEP are installed or remembered by the remote PDP
         until they are explicitly deleted by the PEP.  At the same
         time, Decisions from the remote PDP can be generated
         asynchronously at any time for a currently installed request
         state.



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     (2) State from various events (Request/Decision pairs) may be
         inter-associated.  The server may respond to new queries
         differently because of previously installed, related
         Request/Decision state(s).

   7. The protocol is also stateful in that it allows the server to push
      configuration information to the client, and then allows the
      server to remove such state from the client when it is no longer
      applicable.

1.5.2.  Comparison of COPS and the MIDCOM Framework

   In the MIDCOM framework, the Middlebox enforces the policy controlled
   by an application-aware Agent.  Thus, when compared to the COPS
   architecture, the Middlebox serves as the PEP (COPS Client) and the
   MIDCOM Agent serves as the PDP (COPS Policy Server).  One major
   difference between the COPS protocol model and the MIDCOM protocol
   requirements is that MIDCOM requires that the MIDCOM Agent establish
   the session.  Whereas, the COPS definition is that a PEP (Middlebox)
   establishes communication with a PDP (MIDCOM Agent).

2.  Item Level Compliance Evaluation

   This section contains a review of the protocol's level of compliance
   to each of the MIDCOM Requirements [1].  The following key will be
   used to identify the level of compliancy of each of the individual
   protocols:

   T =  Total Compliance.  Meets the requirement fully.

   P+ = Partial Compliance+.  Fundamentally meets the requirement
        through the use of extensions (e.g., packages, additional
        parameters, etc).

   P =  Partial Compliance.  Meets some aspect of the requirement,
        however, the necessary changes require more than an extension
        and/or are inconsistent with the design intent of the
        protocol.

   F =  Failed Compliance.  Does not meet the requirement.

2.1.  Protocol Machinery

   This section describes the compliancy of the proposed protocols
   against the protocol machinery requirements from section 2.1 of the
   requirements document [1].  A short description of each of the
   protocols is provided to substantiate the evaluation.




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2.1.1.  Ability to Establish Association Between Agent and Middlebox.

   SNMP: T, RSIP: P+, Megaco: P, Diameter: T, COPS: P

   SNMP:  SNMPv3 provides mutual authentication at the user level
      (where the user can be an application or a host if desired) via
      shared secrets.  Each authenticated principal is associated with a
      group that has access rights that control the principals ability
      to perform operations on specific subsets of data.  Failure to
      authenticate can generate a SNMP notification (administrator
      configurable choice).

   RSIP: RSIP allows sessions to be established between middleboxes
      and applications and MIDCOM agents.  Authorization credentials
      would have to be added to the session establishment request to
      allow the middlebox to authorize the session requestor.

   Megaco: There is a directionality component implicit in this
      requirement in that the MA initiates the establishment of the
      authorized session.  Megaco defines this association to be
      established in the opposite direction, i.e., the Middlebox(MG)
      initiates the establishment.  If this restriction is not
      considered, then Megaco makes the syntax and semantics available
      for the endpoint to initiate the connection.

   Diameter: Although this is out of scope, the Diameter specification
      describes several ways to discover a peer.  Having done so, a
      Diameter node establishes a transport connection (TCP, TLS, or
      SCTP) to the peer.  The two peers then exchange Capability
      Exchange Request/Answer messages to identify each other and
      determine the Diameter applications each supports.

      If the connection between two peers is lost, Diameter prescribes
      procedures whereby it may be re-established.  To ensure that loss
      of connectivity is detected quickly, Diameter provides the
      Device-Watchdog Request/Answer messages, to be used when traffic
      between the two peers is low.

      Diameter provides an extensive state machine to govern the
      relationship between two peers.

   COPS: COPS does not meet the directionality part of the
      requirement.  The definition of COPS allows a PEP (Middlebox) to
      establish communication with a PDP (MIDCOM Agent).  However,
      nothing explicitly prohibits a PDP from establishing communication






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      with a PEP.  The PEP could have local policies dictating what
      action to take when it is contacted by an unknown PDP.  These
      actions, defined in the local policies, would ensure the proper
      establishment of an authorized association.

2.1.2.  Agent Can Relate to Multiple Middleboxes

   SNMP: T, RSIP: P, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP:  An SNMP manager can communicate simultaneously with several
      Middleboxes.

   RSIP: RSIP sessions are identified by their IP source and
      destination addresses and their TCP / UDP port numbers.  Thus each
      RSIP client can communicate with multiple servers, and each server
      can communicate with multiple clients.  However, RSIP did not
      explicitly include agents in its design.  The architecture and
      semantics of RSIP messages do not preclude agents, thus the RSIP
      architecture could certainly be extended to explicitly include
      agents; therefore RSIP is deemed partially compliant to this
      requirement.

   Megaco: Megaco allows an MA to control several Middleboxes.  Each
      message carries an identifier of the endpoint that transmitted the
      message allowing the recipient to determine the source.

   Diameter: Diameter allows connection to more than one peer (and
      encourages this for improved reliability).  Whether the Diameter
      connection state machine is too heavy to support the number of
      connections needed is a matter for discussion.

   COPS: COPS PDPs are designed to communicate with several PEPs.

2.1.3.  Middlebox Can Relate to Multiple Agents

   SNMP: T, RSIP: P, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP:  An SNMP agent can communicate with several SNMP managers
      Simultaneously.

   RSIP: Refer to 2.1.2.

   Megaco: Megaco has the concept of Virtual Media Gateways (VMG),
      allowing multiple MGCs to communicate simultaneously with the same
      MG.  Applying this model to MIDCOM would allow the same middlebox
      (MG) to have associations with multiple MIDCOM Agents (MGCs).





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   Diameter: Diameter allows connection to more than one peer and
      encourages this for improved reliability.  Whether the Diameter
      connection state machine is too heavy to support the number of
      connections needed is a matter for discussion.  The Middlebox and
      Agent play symmetric roles as far as Diameter peering is
      concerned.

   COPS: The COPS-PR framework specifies that a PEP should have a
      unique PDP in order to achieve effective policy control.  The
      COPS-PR protocol would allow the scenario whereby a PEP
      establishes communication with multiple PDPs by creating a COPS
      client instance per PDP.

2.1.4.  Deterministic Outcome When Multiple Requests are Presented to
        the Middlebox Simultaneously

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP:  While the architectural design of SNMP can permit race
      conditions to occur, there are mechanisms defined as part of the
      SNMPv3 standard, such as view-based access control and advisory
      locking that can be used to prevent the conditions, and MIB
      modules may also contain special functionality, such as RMONs
      OwnerString, to prevent conflicts.  Deterministic behavior of SNMP
      agents when being accessed by multiple managers is important for
      several management applications and supported by SNMP.

   RSIP: All RSIP requests are defined to be atomic.  Near simultaneous
      requests are executed as is they were sequential.

   Megaco: Megaco supports the concept of VMGs to make these
      interactions deterministic and to avoid resource access conflicts.
      Each VMG has a single owner, in a MGC, and there can be no overlap
      between the sets of Terminations belonging to multiple VMGs.  The
      Megaco protocol messages also include the identifier of the
      sending entity, so that the MG can easily determine to whom to
      send the response or asynchronously report certain events.

   Diameter: Diameter depends partly upon the transport protocol to
      provide flow control when the server becomes heavily loaded.  It
      also has application-layer messaging to indicate that it is too
      busy or out of space (Diameter_TOO_BUSY and Diameter_OUT_OF_SPACE
      result codes).

   COPS: COPS has built-in support for clear state and policy
      instances.  This would allow the creation of well-behaved MIDCOM
      state machines.




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2.1.5.  Known and Stable State

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: P, COPS: T

   SNMP:  Requests are atomic in SNMP.  MIB modules can define which
      data is persistent across reboots, so a known startup state can be
      established.  The manager can poll the agent to determine the
      current state.

   RSIP: RSIP assumes that on middlebox start-up no sessions are
      defined, and thus no allocations have been made.  In effect, all
      resources are released upon restart after failure.

   Megaco: Megaco has extensive audit capabilities to synchronize
      states between the MG and the MGC.  Megaco also provides the MGC
      with the ability to do mass resets, as well as individual resets.
      The MGC can always release resources in the MG.  The MG can also
      initiate the release of resources by the MGC.

   Diameter: Diameter documentation does not discuss the degree of
      atomicity of message processing, so this would have to be
      specified in the MIDCOM extension.

   COPS: The COPS protocol maintains synchronized states between
      Middleboxes and MA hence all the states are known on both sides.

2.1.6.  Middlebox Status Report

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP:  The status of a middlebox can be reported using asynchronous
      communications, or via polling.

   RSIP: All RSIP client requests have explicit server responses.
      Additionally, a client may explicitly request server status using
      a QUERY request.

   Megaco: Megaco has extensive audit capabilities for the MG to
      report status information to the MGC.  It can also report some
      status updates using the ServiceChange command.

   Diameter: Diameter provides a number of response codes by means of
      which a server can indicate error conditions reflecting status of
      the server as a whole.  The Disconnect-Peer-Request provides a
      means in the extreme case to terminate a connection with a peer
      gracefully, informing the other end about the reason for the
      disconnection.




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   COPS: The COPS Report message is designed to indicate any
      asynchronous conditions/events.

2.1.7.  Middlebox Can Generate Unsolicited Messages

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP:  SNMPv3 supports both confirmed and unconfirmed asynchronous
      notifications.

   RSIP: An RSIP server will send an unsolicited DE_REGISTER_RESPONSE
      to force an RSIP host to relinquish all of its bindings and
      terminate its relationship with the RSIP gateway.  An RSIP server
      can send an asynchronous ERROR_RESPONSE to indicate less severe
      conditions.

   Megaco: Megaco supports the asynchronous notification of events
      using the Notify command.

   Diameter: The Diameter protocol permits either peer in a connection
      to originate transactions.  Thus the protocol supports Middlebox-
      originated messages.

   COPS: The COPS Report message is designed to indicate any
      asynchronous conditions/events.

2.1.8.  Mutual Authentication

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP: SNMPv3 meets this requirement.  SNMPv3 supports user
      authentication and explicitly supports symmetric secret key
      encryption between MIDCOM agent (SNMP manager) and Middlebox (SNMP
      agent), thus supporting mutual authentication.  The default
      authentication and encryption methods are specified in RFC 3414
      [11] (MD5, SHA-1, and DES).  Different users at the same
      management application (MIDCOM agent) can authenticate themselves
      with different authentication and encryption methods, and
      additional methods can be added to SNMPv3 entities as needed.

   RSIP: This requirement can be met by operating RSIP over IPSec as
      described in RFC 3104 [19].  The RSIP framework recommends all
      communication between an RSIP host and gateway be authenticated.
      Authentication, in the form of a message hash appended to the end
      of each RSIP protocol packet, can serve to authenticate the RSIP
      host and gateway to one another, provide message integrity, and





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      avoid replay attacks with an anti-replay counter.  However, the
      message hash and replay counter parameters would need to be
      defined for the RSIP protocol.

   Megaco: Megaco provides for the use of IPSec [22] for all security
      mechanisms including mutual authentication, integrity check and
      encryption.  Use of IKE is recommended with support of RSA
      signatures and public key encryption.

   Diameter: The Diameter base protocol assumes that messages are
      secured by using either IPSec or TLS [21].  Diameter requires that
      when using the latter, peers must mutually authenticate
      themselves.

   COPS: COPS has built-in message level security for authentication,
      replay protection, and message integrity.  COPS can also use TLS
      or IPSec.

2.1.9.  Termination of session by either party

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP: Each SNMPv3 message is authenticated and authorized, so each
      message could be considered to have its own session, which
      automatically terminates after processing.  Processing may be
      stopped for a number of reasons, such as security, and a response
      is sent.

      Either peer may stop operating, and be unavailable for further
      operations.  The authentication and/or authorization parameters of
      a principal may be changed between operations if desired, to
      prevent further authentication or authorization for security
      reasons.

      Additionally, managed objects can be defined for realizing
      sessions that persist beyond processing of a single message.  The
      MIB module would need to specify the responsibility for cleanup of
      the objects following normal/abnormal termination.

   RSIP: An RSIP client may terminate a session with a
      DE_REGISTER_REQUEST.  An RSIP server may terminate a session with
      an unsolicited DE_REGISTER_RESPONSE, and then respond to
      subsequent requests on the session with a REGISTER_FIRST error.

   Megaco: The Megaco protocol allows both peers to terminate the
      association with proper reason code.





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   Diameter: Either peer in a connection may issue a Disconnect-Peer-
      Request to end the connection gracefully.

   COPS: COPS allows both the PEP and PDP to terminate a session.

2.1.10.  Indication of Success or Failure

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP: Each operation request has a corresponding response message
      that contains an error status to indicate success or failure.  For
      complex requests that the middlebox cannot complete immediately,
      the corresponding MIB module may be designed to also provide
      asynchronous notifications of the success or failure of the
      complete transaction, and/or may provide pollable objects that
      indicate the success or failure of the complete transaction.  For
      example, see ifAdminStatus and ifOperStatus in RFC 2863 [28].

   RSIP: All RSIP requests result in a paired RSIP response if the
      request was successful or an ERROR_RESPONSE if the request was not
      successful.

   Megaco: Megaco defines a special descriptor called an Error
      descriptor that contains the error code and an optional
      explanatory string.

   Diameter: Every Diameter request is matched by a response, and this
      response contains a result code as well as other information.

   COPS: The COPS Report message directly fulfills this requirement.

2.1.11.  Version Interworking

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP: SNMP has a separation of the protocol to carry data, and the
      data that defines additional management functionality.  Additional
      functionality can be added easily through MIBs.  Capability
      exchange in SNMP is usually uni-directional.  Managers can query
      the middlebox (SNMP agent) to determine which MIBs are supported.
      In addition, multiple message versions can be supported
      simultaneously, and are identified by a version number in the
      message header.

   RSIP: Each RSIP message contains a version parameter.

   Megaco: Version interworking and negotiation are supported both for
      the protocol and any extension Packages.



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   Diameter: The Capabilities Exchange Request/Answer allows two peers
      to determine information about what each supports, including
      protocol version and specific applications.

   COPS: The COPS protocol can carry a MIDCOM version number and
      capability negotiation between the COPS client and the COPS
      server.  This capability negotiation mechanism allows the COPS
      client and server to communicate the supported
      features/capabilities.  This would allow seamless version
      interworking.

2.1.12.  Deterministic Behaviour in the Presence of Overlapping
         Rules

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: P, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP: Rulesets would be defined in MIBs.  The priority of rulesets,
      and the resolution of conflict, can be defined in the MIB module
      definition.  The SNMPConf policy MIB defines mechanisms to achieve
      deterministic behavior in the presence of overlapping rule sets.

   RSIP: All requests for allocation of IP addresses, or ports or both
      resulting in rule overlap are rejected by an RSIP server with a
      LOCAL_ADDR_INUSE error.

   Megaco: This is met with the help of a model that separates Megaco
      protocol elements from the overlapping Policy rules (see Appendix
      C).  However, new behavior for the Megaco protocol elements needs
      to be specified as part of a new MIDCOM specific Package.

   Diameter: The IPFilterRule type specification, which would probably
      be used as the type of a Policy Rule AVP, comes with an extensive
      semantic description providing a deterministic outcome, which the
      individual Agent cannot know unless it knows all of the Policy
      Rules installed on the Middlebox.  Rules for the appropriate
      direction are evaluated in order, with the first matched rule
      terminating the evaluation.  Each packet is evaluated once.  If no
      rule matches, the packet is dropped if the last rule evaluated was
      a permit, and passed if the last rule was a deny.  The
      IPFilterRule format and further details on its applicability to
      this requirement are provided in Appendix D.

   COPS: The COPS protocol provides transactional-based communication
      between the PEP and PDP, hence the behavior is totally
      deterministic provided the middlebox state machine is designed
      correctly.  The COPS protocol features encourage and support good
      state machine design.




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2.2.  Protocol Semantics

   This section contains the individual protocols as evaluated against
   the protocol semantic requirements from section 2.2 of the
   requirements document [1].  A short description of each of the
   protocols is provided to substantiate the evaluation.

2.2.1.  Extensibility

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP: Extensibility is a basic feature of the SNMP management
      Framework.

   RSIP: All RSIP messages consist of three mandatory fields (protocol
      version, message type, and message length) and a sequence of
      parameterType / length / value 3-tuples.  New messages may be
      defined by defining new values for the message type field.  New
      parameter types may be defined, and existing messages may be
      extended, by defining new parameterType values.  If new messages,
      parameters, or both are added in a non-backward compatible way, a
      new value of the protocol version field may be defined.  This may
      be desirable even of the additions are backward compatible.

   Megaco: Megaco is easily extensible through new Packages, which
      allow definition of new attributes and behavior of a Termination.

   Diameter: Diameter provides a great deal of flexibility for
      extensions, including allowance for vendor-defined commands and
      AVPs and the ability to flag each AVP as must-understand or
      ignorable if not understood.

   COPS: The COPS protocol is extensible, since it was designed to
      separate the Protocol from the Policy Control Information.

2.2.2.  Support of Multiple Middlebox Types

   SNMP: T, RSIP: P+, Megaco: T, Diameter: P+, COPS: T

   SNMP: SNMP explicitly supports managing different device types with
      different capabilities.  First the managed object called
      sysObjectID from basic MIB-II [3] identifies the type of box.  For
      boxes with variable capabilities, SNMP can check the availability
      of corresponding MIBs.







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   RSIP: All types of middleboxes are supported so long as the ruleset
      action is permit.  Other actions would require the definition of a
      new RSIP message parameter with values for permit and the other
      desired actions.

   Megaco: Megaco can support multiple Middlebox types on the same
      interface either by designing the properties representing the
      Policy Rules to provide this support, or by using multiple
      terminations in the same session, each representing one type of
      action.  In the latter case, the Megaco Context can be used as a
      convenient means of managing the related terminations as a group.
      However, the inherent idea of flow between terminations of a
      context is irrelevant and would have to be discarded.

   Diameter: Any necessary additional AVPs or values must be specified
      as part of the MIDCOM application extension (see <2.2.8> below).

   COPS: COPS allows a PDP to provide filters and actions to multiple
      PEP functions through a single COPS session.

2.2.3.  Ruleset Groups

   SNMP: T, RSIP: P+, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP: This requirement can be realized via the SNMP management
      framework by an appropriate definition of a MIB module.  The
      SNMPConf WG has already defined an SNMP Policy MIB that permits
      the definitions of policy rulesets and grouping of rulesets.

   RSIP: RSIP currently only allows one IP address, or address and
      port range, to be assigned to a bind-ID.  RSIP could implement
      rulesets as required by adding an optional bind-ID parameter to
      the ASSIGN_REQUESTs to extend an existing ruleset rather than
      creating a new one.  Similarly, the FREE_REQUESTs would have to be
      extended by adding optional, local and remote, address and port
      parameters.

   Megaco: The Megaco context can be used to group terminations to be
      managed together.  For example, all of the terminations, each
      representing an instantiation of a Policy Rule, can be deleted in
      one command by doing a wildcarded Subtract from the context.
      However, the inherent idea of media flows between terminations of
      a context would be irrelevant in this application of the protocol.

   Diameter: Diameter allows message syntax definitions where multiple
      instances of the same AVP (for example, a Policy Rule AVP whose
      syntax and low-level semantics are defined by the IPFilterRule
      type definition) may be present.  If a tighter grouping is



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      required, the set of Diameter base types includes the Grouped
      type.  MIDCOM can choose how to make use of these capabilities to
      meet the ruleset group requirement when defining its application
      extension to the Diameter protocol.

   COPS: The COPS-PR Handle State may be used to associate the set of
      closely related policy objects.  As the Middlebox learns
      additional requirements, the Middlebox adds these resource
      requirements under the same handle ID, which constitutes the
      required aggregation.

2.2.4.  Lifetime Extension

   SNMP: P+, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: P+

   SNMP: This requirement can be realized via the SNMP management
      framework by an appropriate definition of a MIB module.  The
      SNMPConf WG has developed a Policy MIB module that includes a
      pmPolicySchedule object with a modifiable lifetime.

   RSIP: A client may request an explicit lease time when a request is
      made to assign one or more IP addresses, ports or both.  The
      server may grant the requested lease time, or assign one if none
      was requested.  Subsequently, the lease time may be extended if a
      client's EXTEND_REQUEST is granted by the server.

   Megaco: The MG can report the imminent expiry of a policy rule to
      the MGC, which can then extend or delete the corresponding
      Termination.

   Diameter: The Diameter concept of a session includes the session
      lifetime, grace period, and lifetime extension.  It may make sense
      to associate the Diameter session with the lifetime of a MIDCOM
      Policy Rule, in which case support for lifetime extension comes
      ready-made.

   COPS: COPS allows a PDP to send unsolicited decisions to the PEP.
      However, the unsolicited events will be relevant to the COPS
      MIDCOM specific client or the MIDCOM specific PIB which needs to
      be defined.  This would allow the PDP to extend the lifetime of an
      existing ruleset.










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2.2.5.  Handling of Mandatory/Optional Nature of Unknown Attributes

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: P+, Diameter: P+, COPS: T

   SNMP: Unknown attributes in a read operation are flagged as
      exceptions in the Response message, but the rest of the read
      succeeds.  In a write operation (a SET request), all attributes
      are validated before the write is performed.  If there are unknown
      attributes, the request fails and no writes are done.  Unknown
      attributes are flagged as exceptions in the Response message, and
      the error status is reported.

   RSIP: All options of all requests are fully specified.  Not
      understood parameters must be reported by an ERROR_RESPONSE with
      an EXTRA_PARM error value, with the entire request otherwise
      ignored.

   Megaco: Megaco entities provide Error codes in response messages.
      If a command marked "Optional" in a transaction fails, the
      remaining commands will continue.  However, the specified
      requirement deals with rules of processing properties that need
      definition in new Package.

   Diameter: Indication of the mandatory or optional status of AVPs is
      fully supported, provided it is enabled in the AVP definition.  No
      guidance is imposed regarding the return of diagnostic information
      for optional AVPs.

   COPS: COPS provides for the exchange of capabilities and
      limitations between the PEP and PDP to ensure well-known outcomes
      are understood for scenarios with unknown attributes.  There is
      also clear error handling for situations when the request is
      rejected.

2.2.6.  Actionable Failure Reasons

   SNMP: T, RSIP: P+, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP: The SNMPv3 protocol returns error codes and exception codes
      in Response messages, to permit the requestor to modify their
      request.  Errors and exceptions indicate the attribute that caused
      the error, and an error code identifies the nature of the error
      encountered.

      If desired, a MIB can be designed to provide additional data about
      error conditions either via asynchronous notifications or polled
      objects.




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   RSIP: RSIP defines a fairly large number of very specific error
      values.  It is anticipated that additional error values will also
      have to be defined along with the new messages and parameters
      required for MIDCOM.

   Megaco: The MG can provide Error codes in response messages
      allowing the MGC to modify its behavior.  Megaco uses transaction
      identifiers for correlation between a response and a command.  If
      the same transaction id is received more than once, the receiving
      entity silently discards the message, thus providing some
      protection against replay attacks.

   Diameter: Diameter provides an extensive set of failure reasons in
      the base protocol.

   COPS: COPS uses an error object to identify a particular COPS
      protocol error.  The error sub-code field may contain additional
      detailed COPS client (MIDCOM Middlebox) specific error codes.

2.2.7.  Multiple Agents Operating on the Same Ruleset.

   SNMP: T, RSIP: P, Megaco: P, Diameter: T, COPS: P

   SNMP: The SNMP framework supports multiple managers working on the
      same managed objects.  The View-based Access Control Model (VACM,
      RFC 3415 [14]) even offers means to customize the access rights of
      different managers in a fine-grained way.

   RSIP: RSIP neither explicitly permits nor precludes an operation on
      a binding by a host that had not originally create the binding.
      However, to support this requirement, the RSIP semantics must be
      extended to explicitly permit any authorized host to request
      operations on a binding; this does not require a change to the
      protocol.

   Megaco: If the Megaco state machine on the Middle Box is decoupled
      from the Middle Box policy rule management, this requirement can
      be met with local policies on the Middle Box.  However, this
      violates the spirit of the Megaco protocol, thus Megaco is
      considered partially compliant to this requirement.

   Diameter: The Diameter protocol, as currently defined, would allow
      multiple agents to operate on the same ruleset.

   COPS: It is possible to use COPS to operate the same resource with
      multiple agents.  An underlying resource management function,
      separate from the COPS state machine, on the Middlebox will handle
      the arbitration when resource conflicts happen.



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2.2.8.  Transport of Filtering Rules

   SNMP: P+, RSIP: P+, Megaco: P+, Diameter: P+, COPS: P+

   SNMP: This requirement can be met by an appropriate definition of a
      MIDCOM MIB module.  SMI, the language used for defining MIB
      modules, is flexible enough to allow the implementation of a MIB
      module to meet the semantics of this requirement.

   RSIP: To support this requirement, a new optional enumeration
      parameter, transportProtocol, can be added to the RSIP
      ASSIGN_REQUESTs.  When the parameter is included, the binding
      created applies only to the use of the bound addresses and ports,
      by the specific transportProtocol.  When the parameter is not
      included, the binding applies to the use of all the bound
      addresses and ports, by any transport protocol, thus maintaining
      backward compatibility with the current definition of RSIP.

   Megaco: Megaco protocol can meet this requirement by defining a new
      property for the transport of filtering rules.

   Diameter: While Diameter defines the promising IPFilterRule data
      type (see 2.1.12 above), there is no existing message, which would
      convey this to a Middlebox along with other required MIDCOM
      attributes.  A new MIDCOM application extension of Diameter would
      have to be defined.

   COPS: The COPS protocol can meet this requirement by using a COPS
      MIDCOM specific client or a MIDCOM specific PIB.

2.2.9.  Mapped Port Parity

   SNMP: P+, RSIP: P+, Megaco: P+, Diameter: P+, COPS: P+

   SNMP: This requirement can be met by an appropriate definition of a
      MIDCOM MIB module.

   RSIP: To support this requirement, a new optional boolean
      parameter, portOddity, can be added to the RSIP ASSIGN_REQUESTs.
      If the parameter is TRUE, the remote port number of the binding
      created would have the same oddity as the local port.  If the
      parameter is not specified, or is FALSE, the remote port's oddity
      is independent of the local port's oddity, thus maintaining
      backward compatibility with the current definition of RSIP.

   Megaco: Megaco can be easily extended using a MIDCOM specific
      Package to support this feature.




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   Diameter: This capability is not part of the current IPFilterRule
      type definition.  Rather than modify the IPFilterRule type, MIDCOM
      could group it with other AVPs which add the missing information.

   COPS: The COPS protocol has all the flexibility to meet this
      requirement by using a COPS MIDCOM specific client or a MIDCOM
      specific PIB.

2.2.10.  Consecutive Range of Port Numbers

   SNMP: P+, RSIP: T, Megaco: P+, Diameter: P+, COPS: P+

   SNMP: This requirement can be met by an appropriate definition of a
      MIDCOM MIB module.  SMI, the language used for defining MIB
      modules, is flexible enough to allow the implementation of a MIB
      module to meet the semantics of this requirement.

   RSIP: The ports parameter of the RSIP ASSIGN_REQUESTs specifically
      allows multiple, consecutive port numbers to be specified.

   Megaco: Megaco can be easily extended using a MIDCOM specific
      Package to support this feature.

   Diameter: This capability is not part of the current IPFilterRule
      type definition.  Rather than modify the IPFilterRule type, MIDCOM
      could group it with other AVPs which add the missing information.

   COPS: The COPS protocol has all the flexibility to meet this
      requirement by using a COPS MIDCOM specific client or a MIDCOM
      specific PIB.

2.2.11.  More Precise Rulesets Contradicting Overlapping Rulesets

   SNMP: P+, RSIP: P+, Megaco: P+, Diameter: T, COPS: P+

   SNMP: This requirement can be met by an appropriate definition of a
      MIDCOM MIB module.

   RSIP: To support this requirement, a new optional boolean
      parameter, overlapOK, can be added to the RSIP ASSIGN_REQUESTs.
      If the parameter is TRUE, the binding may overlap with an existing
      binding.  If the parameter is unspecified, or is FALSE, the
      binding will not overlap with an existing binding, thus
      maintaining backward compatibility with the current definition of
      RSIP.






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   Megaco: This requirement would be met if the policy in the
      Middlebox allows contradictory, overlapping policy rules to be
      installed.

   Diameter: Allowed by the IPFilterRule semantics described in
      Appendix D.

   COPS: The COPS protocol has all the flexibility to meet this
      requirement by using a COPS MIDCOM specific client or a MIDCOM
      specific PIB.

2.3.  General Security Requirements

   This section contains the individual protocols as evaluated against
   the General Security requirements from section 2.3 of the
   requirements document [1].  A short description of each of the
   protocols is provided to substantiate the evaluation.

2.3.1.  Message Authentication, Confidentiality and Integrity

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP:  SNMPv3 includes the User-based Security Model (USM,
      RFC 3414 [11]), which defines three standardized methods for
      providing authentication, confidentiality, and integrity.
      Additionally, USM has specific built-in mechanisms for preventing
      replay attacks including unique protocol engine IDs, timers and
      counters per engine and time windows for the validity of messages.

   RSIP: This requirement can be met by operating RSIP over IPSec.  The
      RSIP framework recommends all communication between an RSIP host
      and gateway be authenticated.  Authentication, in the form of a
      message hash appended to the end of each RSIP protocol packet, can
      serve to authenticate the RSIP host and gateway to one another,
      provide message integrity, and avoid replay attacks with an anti-
      replay counter.  However, the message hash and replay counter
      parameters would need to be defined for the RSIP protocol.

   Megaco: Megaco provides for these functions with the combined usage
      of IPSEC [22] or TLS [21].

   Diameter: Diameter relies on either IPSEC or TLS for these
      functions.

   COPS: COPS has built-in message level security for authentication,
      replay protection, and message integrity.  COPS can also use TLS
      or IPSec, thus reusing existing security mechanisms that have
      interoperated in the markets.



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2.3.2.  Optional Confidentiality Protection

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP:  SNMPv3 includes the User-based Security Model, which defines
      three standardized methods for providing authentication,
      confidentiality, and integrity, and is open to add further
      methods.  The method to use can be optionally chosen.

   RSIP: Refer to 2.3.1.

   Megaco: Refer to 2.3.1

   Diameter: Implementation support of IPSEC ESP (RFC 2406 [23]) in
      Diameter applications is not optional.  Deployment of either IPSEC
      or TLS is optional.

   COPS: Refer to 2.3.1.

2.3.3.  Operate Across Untrusted Domains

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP:  The User-based Security Model of SNMPv3 defines three
      standardized methods for providing authentication,
      confidentiality, and integrity, and it is open to add further
      methods.  These methods operate securely across untrusted domains.

   RSIP: Refer to 2.3.1.

   Megaco: Refer to 2.3.1.

   Diameter: The Diameter specification [24] recommends the use of
      TLS [21] across untrusted domains.

   COPS: Refer to 2.3.1

2.3.4.  Mitigates Replay Attacks on Control Messages

   SNMP: T, RSIP: T, Megaco: T, Diameter: T, COPS: T

   SNMP:  The User-based Security Model for SNMPv3 has specific built-
      in mechanisms for preventing replay attacks including unique
      protocol engine IDs, timers and counters per engine and time
      windows for the validity of messages.

   RSIP: Refer to 2.3.1




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   Megaco: Megaco commands and responses include matching transaction
      identifiers.  The recipient receiving the same transaction id
      multiple times would discard the message, thus providing some
      protection against replay attacks.  If even stronger protection
      against replay attack is needed, Megaco provides for the use of
      IPSec or TLS.

   Diameter: Diameter requires that implementations support the replay
      protection mechanisms of IPSEC.

   COPS: Refer to 2.3.1

3.  Conclusions

   The overall statistics with regards to the number of Fully Compliant,
   Partially Compliant (P+ and P) and Failing Compliancy requirements
   for each of the protocols is summarized in table 1.

                 T            P+           P            F
   -----------------------------------------------------------------
   SNMP          22           5            0            0
   RSIP          17           7            3            0
   Megaco        19           5            3            0
   Diameter      21           5            1            0
   COPS          20           5            2            0

                 Table 1: Totals across all Requirements

   In considering the P+ category of compliancy, an important aspect is
   the mechanism for support of extensibility.  The extension mechanism
   provided by SNMP and COPS-PR using MIBs and PIBs respectively,
   provides extensions with no impact to the protocol.  Diameter
   extensions require protocol changes, thus has a higher impact,
   although the extensions can be handled by other Diameter entities
   without being understood.  Megaco's extension mechanisms of packages
   also requires protocol changes that must be understand by both
   sending and receiving entities, also being considered higher impact.
   The RSIP extension mechanism has the largest impact on the existing
   protocol and is based upon defining the necessary new parameters.

   The SNMP management framework meets all the specified MIDCOM protocol
   requirements with the appropriate design of a MIDCOM MIB module.
   SNMP is a proven technology with stable and proven development tools,
   already has extensions defined to support NAT configuration and
   policy-based management.  SNMPv3 is a full standard, is more mature
   and has undergone more validation than the other protocols in





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   the evaluation, and has been deployed to manage large-scale real-
   world networks (e.g., DOCSIS cable modem networks).  The
   applicability of SNMP to the MIDCOM framework has a restriction in
   that it assumes the MIDCOM PDP is part of the Middlebox.

   RSIP fully meets many of the MIDCOM requirements.  However, it does
   require additions and extensions to meet several of the requirements.
   RSIP would also require several framework elements to be added to the
   MIDCOM framework as identified in section 1.2.3.  In addition, the
   tunneling required for RSIP as described in section 1.2.4, results in
   RSIP not being acceptable by the WG as the MIDCOM protocol.

   Megaco fully meets most of the key requirements for the MIDCOM
   Protocol.  Additional extensions in the form of a new Termination /
   Package definition would be required for MIDCOM to meet several of
   the requirements.  In order to meet the remaining requirements,
   modeling the underlying Middlebox resources (e.g., filters, policy
   rules) as separate elements from the Megaco entities might allow the
   usage of the protocol as-is, satisfying some of the resource access
   control requirements.

   The Diameter evaluation indicated a good overall fit.  Some partially
   met requirements were identified that could be addressed by a new
   application extension.  However, the Diameter architecture may be too
   heavy for the MIDCOM application and clearly much of the Diameter
   base is not needed.  In addition, Diameter is the only protocol, at
   the time of this evaluation, for which the RFCs had not yet been
   published.  Other than these reservations, the protocol is a good fit
   to MIDCOM requirements.

   The COPS evaluation indicates that the protocol meets the majority of
   the MIDCOM protocol requirements by using the protocol's native
   extension techniques, with COPS-PR being explicitly required to meet
   requirements 2.1.3 and 2.2.3.  In order to fully satisfy one
   partially met requirement, 2.1.1, the COPS model would need to allow
   a PDP to establish communication with a PEP.  While not explicitly
   prohibited by the COPS model, this would require additions, in the
   form of local policy, to ensure the proper establishment of an
   authorized association.

4.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations for the MIDCOM protocol are covered by the
   comparison against the specific Security requirements in the MIDCOM
   requirements document [1] and are specifically addressed by section
   2.1.8 and section 2.3.





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5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [1]  Swale, R., Mart, P., Sijben, P., Brim, S., and  M. Shore,
        "Middlebox Communications (MIDCOM) Protocol Requirements", RFC
        3304, August 2002.

   [2]  Srisuresh, P., Kuthan, J., Rosenberg, J., Molitor, A., and A.
        Rayhan, "Middlebox Communications Architecture and Framework",
        RFC 3303, August 2002.

   [3]  Rose, M. and K. McCloghrie, "Management Information Base for
        Network Management of TCP/IP-based internets: MIB-II", STD 17,
        RFC 1213, March 1991.

   [4]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [5]  Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An Architecture for
        Describing SNMP Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411,
        December 2002.

   [6]  McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., and J. Schoenwaelder, "Structure of
        Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578,
        April 1999.

   [7]  McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., and J. Schoenwaelder, "Textual
        Conventions for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999.

   [8]  McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., and J. Schoenwaelder, "Conformance
        Statements for SMIv2", STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999.

   [9]  Presuhn, R. (Ed.), "Transport Mappings for the Simple Network
        Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3417, December 2002.

   [10] Case, J., Harrington D., Presuhn R., and B. Wijnen, "Message
        Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management
        Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3412, December 2002.

   [11] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model(USM)
        for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol
        (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, December 2002.

   [12] Presuhn, R. (Ed.), "Version 2 of the Protocol Operations for the
        Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3416,
        December 2002.




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   [13] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "SNMPv3 Applications", STD
        62, RFC 3413, December 2002.

   [14] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based Access
        Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol
        (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3415, December 2002.

   [15] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart, "Introduction
        to Version 3 of the Internet-Standard Network Management
        Framework", RFC 3410, December 2002.

   [16] Rohit, R., Srisuresh, P., Raghunarayan, R., Pai, N., and C.
        Wang, "Definitions of Managed Objects for Network Address
        Translators (NAT)", RFC 4008, March 2005.

   [17] Borella, M., Lo, J., Grabelsky, D., and G. Montenegro, "Realm
        Specific IP: Framework", RFC 3102, October 2001.

   [18] Borella, M., Grabelsky, D., Lo, J., and  K. Taniguchi, "Realm
        Specific IP: Protocol Specification", RFC 3103, October 2001.

   [19] Montenegro, G. and M. Borella, "RSIP Support for End-to-end
        Ipsec", RFC 3104, October 2001.

   [20] Cuervo, F., Greene, N., Rayhan, A., Huitema, C., Rosen, B., and
        J. Segers, "Megaco Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 3015, October
        2001.

   [21] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
        2246, January 1999.

   [22] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
        Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.

   [23] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload",
        RFC 2406, November 1998.

   [24] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko,
        "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.

   [25] Durham, D. (Ed.), Boyle, J., Cohen, R., Herzog, S., Rajan, R.,
        and A. Sastry, "The COPS (Common Open Policy Service) Protocol",
        RFC 2748, January 2000.

   [26] Chan, K., Seligson, J., Durham, D., Gai, S., McCloghrie, K.,
        Herzog, S., Reichmeyer, F., Yavatkar, R., and A. Smith, "COPS
        Usage for Policy Provisioning", RFC 3084, March 2001.




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5.2.  Informative References

   [27] Raz, D., Schoenwalder, J., and B. Sugla, "An SNMP Application
        Level Gateway for Payload Address Translation", RFC 2962,
        October 2000.

   [28] McCloghrie, K. and F. Kastenholz, "The Interfaces Group MIB",
        RFC 2863, June 2000.

6.  Acknowledgements

   The editor would like to acknowledge the constructive feedback
   provided by Joel M. Halpern on the individual protocol evaluation
   contributions.  In addition, a thanks to Elwyn Davies, Christopher
   Martin, Bob Penfield, Scott Brim and Martin Stiemerling for
   contributing to the mailing list discussion on the document content.



































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Appendix A - SNMP Overview

   The SNMP Management Framework presently consists of five major
   components:

   o  An overall architecture, described in RFC 3411 [5].  A more
      detailed introduction and applicability statements for the SNMP
      Management Framework can be found in RFC 3410 [15].

   o  Mechanisms for describing and naming objects and events for the
      purpose of management.  The current version of this Structure of
      Management Information (SMI) is called SMIv2 and described in RFC
      2578 [6], RFC 2579 [7] and RFC 2580 [8].

   o  Message protocols for transferring management information.  The
      current version of the message protocol is called SNMPv3 and
      described in RFC 3412 [10], RFC 3414 [11] and RFC 3417 [9].

   o  Protocol operations for accessing management information.  The
      current version of the protocol operations and associated PDU
      formats is described in RFC 3416 [12].

   o  A set of fundamental applications described in RFC 3413 [13] and
      the view-based access control mechanism described in RFC 3415
      [14].

   Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
   the Management Information Base or MIB.  Objects in the MIB are
   defined using the mechanisms defined in the SMI.

A.1 SNMPv3 Proxy Forwarding

   SNMPv3 proxy forwarding (RFC 3413 [13]) provides a standardized
   mechanism to configure an intermediate node to forward SNMP messages.
   A command generating entity sends requests to a proxy forwarding
   entity that forwards the request to a third entity.

   One SNMP entity may serve both functions as the SNMP agent to monitor
   and configure the node on which it is resident, and as an
   intermediate node in a proxy relationship to permit monitoring and
   configuration of additional entities.

   Each entity is identified by a unique engineID value, specifically to
   support proxy between addressing domains and/or trust domains.  An
   SNMPv3 message contains two engineIDs- one to identify the database
   to be used for message security, and one to identify the source (or
   target) of the contained data.  Message security is applied between
   the originator and the proxy, and then between the proxy and the



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   end-target.  The PDU contains the engineID of the node whose data is
   contained in the message, which passes end-to-end, unchanged by the
   proxy.

   SNMPv3 proxy was designed to provide a standard SNMP approach to
   inserting an intermediate node in the middle of communications for a
   variety of scenarios.  SNMPv3 proxy can support crossing addressing
   domains, such as IPv4 and IPv6, crossing SNMP version domains, such
   as SNMPv3 and SNMPv1, crossing security mechanism domains, such as
   DES and AES, and for providing a single point of management contact
   for a subset of the network, such as managing a private network
   through a NAT device or a VPN endpoint.

A.2 Proxies Versus Application Level Gateways

   Proxies are generally preferred to Application Level Gateways for
   SNMP.  ALGs typically modify the headers and content of messages.
   SNMP is a protocol designed for troubleshooting network (mis-)
   configurations.  Because an operator needs to understand the actual
   configuration, the translation of addresses within SNMP data causes
   confusion, hiding the actual configuration of a managed device from
   the operator.  ALGs also introduce security vulnerabilities, and
   other complexities related to modifying SNMP data.

   SNMP Proxies can modify message headers without modifying the
   contained data.  This avoids the issues associated with translating
   the payload data, while permitting application level translation of
   addresses.

   The issues of ALGs versus proxies for SNMP Payload Address
   Translation are discussed at length in RFC 2962 [27].

Appendix B - RSIP with Tunneling

   NAT requires ALGs (Application Layer Gateways) in middleboxes without
   MIDCOM, and application modifications or agents for middleboxes with
   MIDCOM.

   Support for NAT without tunneling could easily be added to the RSIP
   control protocol.  NAT would be defined as a new, null tunnel type.
   Support for the NAT null tunnels could be implemented in hosts, or in
   applications or application agents.

   If support for NAT null tunnels were implemented in hosts, no
   modifications to applications would be required, and no application
   agents or ALGs would be required.  This has obvious advantages.  In
   addition to the NAT null tunnel, the host would have to implement an
   RSIP / MIDCOM client (or a STUN client) and the middlebox would have



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   to implement an RSIP / MIDCOM server, or a STUN server would have to
   be available _beyond_ the middlebox.  Note that the STUN client /
   server approach may not work with all types of middleboxes.

   If support for NAT null tunnels were NOT implemented in hosts, then
   applications would have to be modified, or application agents or ALGs
   would have to be implemented.  This has the advantage over tunnels
   (whether null or not) of not requiring modification to hosts, but
   would require the modification of host applications or the
   implementation of application agents, both of which would include an
   RSIP / MIDCOM client, and the implementation of an RSIP/MIDCOM server
   in the middlebox.  Again, in some situations, STUN could be used
   instead of RSIP / MIDCOM.

   Tunneled or not, an RSIP / MIDCOM server is needed in the middlebox.
   Tunneled, the host needs to be modified, but not the application.
   Untunneled, an agent must be added or the application must be
   modified, but there would be no host modifications.  The
   advantages/disadvantages of tunneling would need to be evaluated in
   considering RSIP.































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Appendix C - Megaco Modeling Approach

   To model the Middlebox functions such as firewall, NAT etc., a new
   Middlebox Termination type needs to be defined within Megaco.  If
   policy-rule overlap or modification by multiple Agents is NOT
   required, then a policy rule is equivalent to a Termination (see
   Figure 1).  The various components of a Policy rule such as filter,
   action, life-time, creator etc. are described as various properties
   of a Termination.  Use of the Virtual Media Gateway (VMG) concept
   allows for conflict-free interaction of multiple MA's with the same
   MB.

                 +-------+             +-------+
                 |  MA-1 |             |  MA-2 |
                 |       |             |       |
                 +-------+     |IF2    +-------+
                     |         |          |
       +-------------|---------|----------|-----------+
       |     +---------+       | +-------------+      |
   IF1 |VMG1 | +--+    |       | | +--+  +--+  |VMG2  |IF3
   ----------| |Tx|-------+    +---|Ty|--|Tz|----------------
       |     | +--+    |  |      | +--+  +--+  |      |
       | ....|         |  |      +-------------+      |
       |     +---------+  |                           |
       |                  +---------------------------------
       | Middlebox                                    | IF4
       +----------------------------------------------+

                              Tx: Termination x = Policy rule x
                              Ty: Termination y = Policy rule y
                              Tz: Termination z = Policy rule z
                              MA: MIDCOM Agent
                              IF: Interface

                          Figure 1.
















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   If it is required to allow multiple agents manipulate the same
   Middlebox resource (e.g., a Policy rule or a filter), the latter
   needs to be kept separate from the Termination (the Policy rule is
   manipulated by the MA by manipulating the properties of the
   associated Termination).  For example, if overlapping policy rule
   manipulation is required, then a Termination shall be associated with
   a single policy rule, but a policy rule may be associated with more
   than one Termination.  Thus, a Termination can share a policy rule
   with another Termination, or have a policy rule partially overlapping
   with that of another Termination.  This model allows two MAs,
   controlling two distinct Terminations (see Figure 2), manipulate the
   same or overlapping policy rules.  In Figure 2, policy rules 1 and 2
   are overlapping and they are shared by MA-1 and MA-2.

                 +-------+             +-------+
                 |  MA-1 |             |  MA-2 |
                 |       |             |       |
                 +-------+     |IF2    +-------+
                     |         |          |          MB
       +-------------|---------|----------|-----------+
       |       +-----------+   | +-------------+      |
   IF1 |VMG1   |     +--+  |   | | +--+  +--+  |VMG2  |IF3
   ------------------|Ty|----+ +---|Tx|--|Tz|----------------
       |       |     +--+  | |   | +--+  +--+  |      |
       | ....  |       |   | |   +--/------\---+      |
       |       +-------|---+ |     /        \         |
       |               |     +----/----------\------------------
       |            +------+----+------+   +------+   |IF4
       |            |Policy1 Policy2   |   |Policy|   |
       |            |    |      |      |   |  3   |   |
       |            +----+------+------+   +------+   |
       +----------------------------------------------+

                        Tx: Termination x
                        Ty: Termination y
                        Tz: Termination z
                        MA: MIDCOM Agent
                        IF: Interface
                        MB: Middlebox

                           Figure 2.

   This requires that the Agent and the Middlebox adhere to the
   following principles:

   (1) Only one Termination has read/write access to a filter at any
       time.




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   (2) When the policy rule is being modified by a new agent (i.e., not
       the one that created the policy) the Middlebox makes a policy
       decision and decides whether to accept the requested modification
       or not.  In the case the modification is accepted the initial
       MIDCOM agent may be notified.

Appendix D - Diameter IPFilter Rule

   The IPFilterRule format is derived from the OctetString AVP Base
   Format.  It uses the UTF-8 encoding and has the same requirements as
   the UTF8String.  Packets may be filtered based on the following
   information that is associated with it:

      Direction                          (in or out)
      Source and destination IP address  (possibly masked)
      Protocol
      Source and destination port        (lists or ranges)
      TCP flags
      IP fragment flag
      IP options
      ICMP types

   Rules for the appropriate direction are evaluated in order, with the
   first matched rule terminating the evaluation.  Each packet is
   evaluated once.  If no rule matches, the packet is dropped if the
   last rule evaluated was a permit, and passed if the last rule was a
   deny.

   IPFilterRule filters MUST follow the format:

   action dir proto from src to dst [options]

   action       permit - Allow packets that match the rule.
                deny   - Drop packets that match the rule.

   dir          "in" is from the terminal, "out" is to the
                terminal.

   proto        An IP protocol specified by number.  The "ip"
                keyword means any protocol will match.

   src and dst  <address/mask> [ports]









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                The <address/mask> may be specified as:

                ipno       An IPv4 or IPv6 number in dotted-
                           quad or canonical IPv6 form.  Only
                           this exact IP number will match the
                           rule.

                ipno/bits  An IP number as above with a mask
                           width of the form 1.2.3.4/24.  In
                           this case, all IP numbers from
                           1.2.3.0 to 1.2.3.255 will match.
                           The bit width MUST be valid for the
                           IP version and the IP number MUST
                           NOT have bits set beyond the mask.

                           For a match to occur, the same IP
                           version must be present in the
                           packet that was used in describing
                           the IP address.  To test for a
                           particular IP version, the bits part
                           can be set to zero.  The keyword
                           "any" is 0.0.0.0/0 or the IPv6
                           equivalent.  The keyword "assigned"
                           is the address or set of addresses
                           assigned to the terminal.  For IPv4,
                           a typical first rule is often
                           "deny in ip! assigned"

                The sense of the match can be inverted by
                preceding an address with the not modifier (!),
                causing all other addresses to be matched
                instead.  This does not affect the selection of
                port numbers.

                With the TCP, UDP and SCTP protocols, optional
                ports may be specified as:

                        {port|port-port}[,ports[,...]]

                The '-' notation specifies a range of ports
                (including boundaries).

                Fragmented packets that have a non-zero offset
                (i.e., not the first fragment) will never match
                a rule that has one or more port
                specifications.  See the frag option for
                details on matching fragmented packets.




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   options:

      frag    Match if the packet is a fragment and this is not
              the first fragment of the datagram.  frag may not
              be used in conjunction with either tcpflags or
              TCP/UDP port specifications.

      ipoptions spec
              Match if the IP header contains the comma
              separated list of options specified in spec.  The
              supported IP options are:

              ssrr (strict source route), lsrr (loose source
              route), rr (record packet route) and ts
              (timestamp).  The absence of a particular option
              may be denoted with a '!'.

      tcpoptions spec
              Match if the TCP header contains the comma
              separated list of options specified in spec.  The
              supported TCP options are:

              mss (maximum segment size), window (tcp window
              advertisement), sack (selective ack), ts (rfc1323
              timestamp) and cc (rfc1644 t/tcp connection
              count).  The absence of a particular option may
              be denoted with a '!'.

      established
              TCP packets only.  Match packets that have the RST
              or ACK bits set.

      setup   TCP packets only.  Match packets that have the SYN
              bit set but no ACK bit.

      tcpflags spec
              TCP packets only.  Match if the TCP header
              contains the comma separated list of flags
              specified in spec.  The supported TCP flags are:

              fin, syn, rst, psh, ack and urg.  The absence of a
              particular flag may be denoted with a '!'.  A rule
              that contains a tcpflags specification can never
              match a fragmented packet that has a non-zero
              offset.  See the frag option for details on
              matching fragmented packets.





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      icmptypes types
              ICMP packets only.  Match if the ICMP type is in
              the list types.  The list may be specified as any
              combination of ranges or individual types
              separated by commas.  Both the numeric values and
              the symbolic values listed below can be used.  The
              supported ICMP types are:

              echo reply (0), destination unreachable (3),
              source quench (4), redirect (5), echo request
              (8), router advertisement (9), router
              solicitation (10), time-to-live exceeded (11), IP
              header bad (12), timestamp request (13),
              timestamp reply (14), information request (15),
              information reply (16), address mask request (17)
              and address mask reply (18).

   There is one kind of packet that the access device MUST always
   discard, that is an IP fragment with a fragment offset of one.  This
   is a valid packet, but it only has one use, to try to circumvent
   firewalls.

   An access device that is unable to interpret or apply a deny rule
   MUST terminate the session.  An access device that is unable to
   interpret or apply a permit rule MAY apply a more restrictive rule.
   An access device MAY apply deny rules of its own before the supplied
   rules, for example to protect the access device owner's
   infrastructure.

   The rule syntax is a modified subset of ipfw(8) from FreeBSD, and the
   ipfw.c code may provide a useful base for implementations.

Contributors

   The following identifies the key contributors who provided the
   primary content for this document in the form of individual documents
   for each protocol:

   RSIP:

      Jim Renkel

   SNMP:

      Juergen Quittek
      NEC Europe Ltd.
      EMail: quittek@ccrle.nec.de




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      David Harrington
      Co-chair SNMPv3 WG
      EMail: dbh@enterasys.com

   Megaco:

      Sanjoy Sen

      Cedric Aoun
      Nortel
      EMail: cedric.aoun@nortel.com

      Tom Taylor
      Nortel
      EMail: taylor@nortel.com

   Diameter:

      Tom Taylor
      Nortel
      EMail:  taylor@nortel.com

   COPS:

      Cedric Aoun
      Nortel
      EMail: cedric.aoun@nortel.com

      Kwok-Ho Chan
      Nortel
      EMail: khchan@nortel.com

      Louis-Nicolas Hamer

      Reinaldo Penno
      EMail: rpenno@juniper.net

      Sanjoy Sen

Author's Address

   Mary Barnes
   Nortel
   2201 Lakeside Blvd.
   Richardson, TX USA

   Phone:  1-972-684-5432
   EMail:  mary.barnes@nortel.com



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Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

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   gement






Barnes                       Informational                     [Page 44]


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