[Docs] [txt|pdf] [draft-ietf-sippin...] [Diff1] [Diff2]

INFORMATIONAL

Network Working Group                                     R. Sparks, Ed.
Request for Comments: 4475                              Estacado Systems
Category: Informational                                   A. Hawrylyshen
                                                         Ditech Networks
                                                             A. Johnston
                                                                   Avaya
                                                            J. Rosenberg
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                          H. Schulzrinne
                                                     Columbia University
                                                                May 2006


        Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Torture Test Messages

Status of This Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

Abstract

   This informational document gives examples of Session Initiation
   Protocol (SIP) test messages designed to exercise and "torture" a SIP
   implementation.

Table of Contents

   1. Overview ........................................................3
   2. Document Conventions ............................................3
      2.1. Representing Long Lines ....................................4
      2.2. Representing Non-printable Characters ......................4
      2.3. Representing Long Repeating Strings ........................5
   3. SIP Test Messages ...............................................5
      3.1. Parser Tests (syntax) ......................................5
           3.1.1. Valid Messages ......................................5
                  3.1.1.1. A Short Tortuous INVITE ....................5
                  3.1.1.2. Wide Range of Valid Characters .............8
                  3.1.1.3. Valid Use of the % Escaping Mechanism ......9
                  3.1.1.4. Escaped Nulls in URIs .....................11
                  3.1.1.5. Use of % When It Is Not an Escape .........11
                  3.1.1.6. Message with No LWS between
                           Display Name and < ........................12



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                  3.1.1.7. Long Values in Header Fields ..............12
                  3.1.1.8. Extra Trailing Octets in a UDP Datagram ...14
                  3.1.1.9. Semicolon-Separated Parameters in
                           URI User Part .............................16
                  3.1.1.10. Varied and Unknown Transport Types .......16
                  3.1.1.11. Multipart MIME Message ...................17
                  3.1.1.12. Unusual Reason Phrase ....................18
                  3.1.1.13. Empty Reason Phrase ......................19
           3.1.2. Invalid Messages ...................................20
                  3.1.2.1. Extraneous Header Field Separators ........20
                  3.1.2.2. Content Length Larger Than Message ........20
                  3.1.2.3. Negative Content-Length ...................21
                  3.1.2.4. Request Scalar Fields with
                           Overlarge Values ..........................22
                  3.1.2.5. Response Scalar Fields with
                           Overlarge Values ..........................23
                  3.1.2.6. Unterminated Quoted String in
                           Display Name ..............................24
                  3.1.2.7. <> Enclosing Request-URI ..................25
                  3.1.2.8. Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS) ..26
                  3.1.2.9. Multiple SP Separating
                           Request-Line Elements .....................27
                  3.1.2.10. SP Characters at End of Request-Line .....28
                  3.1.2.11. Escaped Headers in SIP Request-URI .......29
                  3.1.2.12. Invalid Timezone in Date Header Field ....30
                  3.1.2.13. Failure to Enclose name-addr URI in <> ...31
                  3.1.2.14. Spaces within addr-spec ..................31
                  3.1.2.15. Non-token Characters in Display Name .....32
                  3.1.2.16. Unknown Protocol Version .................32
                  3.1.2.17. Start Line and CSeq Method Mismatch ......33
                  3.1.2.18. Unknown Method with CSeq Method Mismatch .33
                  3.1.2.19. Overlarge Response Code ..................34
      3.2. Transaction Layer Semantics ...............................34
           3.2.1. Missing Transaction Identifier .....................34
      3.3. Application-Layer Semantics ...............................35
           3.3.1. Missing Required Header Fields .....................35
           3.3.2. Request-URI with Unknown Scheme ....................36
           3.3.3. Request-URI with Known but Atypical Scheme .........36
           3.3.4. Unknown URI Schemes in Header Fields ...............37
           3.3.5. Proxy-Require and Require ..........................37
           3.3.6. Unknown Content-Type ...............................38
           3.3.7. Unknown Authorization Scheme .......................38
           3.3.8. Multiple Values in Single Value Required Fields ....39
           3.3.9. Multiple Content-Length Values .....................40
           3.3.10. 200 OK Response with Broadcast Via Header
                   Field Value .......................................40
           3.3.11. Max-Forwards of Zero ..............................41
           3.3.12. REGISTER with a Contact Header Parameter ..........42



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           3.3.13. REGISTER with a url-parameter .....................42
           3.3.14. REGISTER with a URL Escaped Header ................43
           3.3.15. Unacceptable Accept Offering ......................44
      3.4. Backward Compatibility ....................................44
           3.4.1. INVITE with RFC 2543 Syntax ........................44
   4. Security Considerations ........................................45
   5. Acknowledgements ...............................................46
   6. Informative References .........................................46
   Appendix A. Bit-Exact Archive of Each Test Message ................47
      A.1. Encoded Reference Messages ................................48

1.  Overview

   This document is informational and is NOT NORMATIVE on any aspect of
   SIP.

   This document contains test messages based on the current version
   (2.0) of the Session Initiation Protocol as, defined in [RFC3261].
   Some messages exercise SIP's use of the Session Description Protocol
   (SDP), as described in [RFC3264].

   These messages were developed and refined at the SIPIt
   interoperability test events.

   The test messages are organized into several sections.  Some stress
   only a SIP parser, and others stress both the parser and the
   application above it.  Some messages are valid, and some are not.
   Each example clearly calls out what makes any invalid messages
   incorrect.

   This document does not attempt to catalog every way to make an
   invalid message, nor does it attempt to be comprehensive in exploring
   unusual, but valid, messages.  Instead, it tries to focus on areas
   that have caused interoperability problems or that have particularly
   unfavorable characteristics if they are handled improperly.  This
   document is a seed for a test plan, not a test plan in itself.

   The messages are presented in the text using a set of markup
   conventions to avoid ambiguity and meet Internet-Draft layout
   requirements.  To resolve any remaining ambiguity, a bit-accurate
   version of each message is encapsulated in an appendix.

2.  Document Conventions

   This document contains many example SIP messages.  Although SIP is a
   text-based protocol, many of these examples cannot be unambiguously
   rendered without additional markup due to the constraints placed on
   the formatting of RFCs.  This document defines and uses the markup



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   defined in this section to remove that ambiguity.  This markup uses
   the start and end tag conventions of XML but does not define any XML
   document type.

   The appendix contains an encoded binary form of all the messages and
   the algorithm needed to decode them into files.

2.1.  Representing Long Lines

   Several of these examples contain unfolded lines longer than 72
   characters.  These are captured between <allOneLine/> tags.  The
   single unfolded line is reconstructed by directly concatenating all
   lines appearing between the tags (discarding any line feeds or
   carriage returns).  There will be no whitespace at the end of lines.
   Any whitespace appearing at a fold-point will appear at the beginning
   of a line.

   The following represent the same string of bits:

      Header-name: first value, reallylongsecondvalue, third value

      <allOneLine>
      Header-name: first value,
       reallylongsecondvalue
      , third value
      </allOneLine>

      <allOneLine>
      Header-name: first value,
       reallylong
      second
      value,
       third value
      </allOneLine>

   Note that this is NOT SIP header-line folding, where different
   strings of bits have equivalent meaning.

2.2.  Representing Non-printable Characters

   Several examples contain binary message bodies or header field values
   containing non-ascii range UTF-8 encoded characters.  These are
   rendered here as a pair of hexadecimal digits per octet between
   <hex/> tags.  This rendering applies even inside quoted-strings.







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   The following represent the same string of bits:

      Header-name: value one
      Header-name: value<hex>206F6E</hex>e

   The following is a Subject header field containing the euro symbol:

      Subject: <hex>E282AC</hex>

2.3.  Representing Long Repeating Strings

   Several examples contain very large data values created with
   repeating bit strings.  Those will be rendered here using <repeat
   count=some_integer>value</repeat>.  As with <hex>, this rendering
   applies even inside quoted strings.

   For example, the value "abcabcabc" can be rendered as <repeat
   count=3>abc</repeat>.  A display name of "1000000 bottles of beer"
   could be rendered as

      To: "1<repeat count=6><hex>30</hex></repeat> bottles of beer"
          <sip:beer.example.com>

   A Max-Forwards header field with a value of one google will be
   rendered here as

      Max-Forwards: 1<repeat count=100>0</repeat>

3.  SIP Test Messages

3.1.  Parser Tests (syntax)

3.1.1.  Valid Messages

3.1.1.1.  A Short Tortuous INVITE

   This short, relatively human-readable message contains:

   o  line folding all over.

   o  escaped characters within quotes.

   o  an empty subject.

   o  LWS between colons, semicolons, header field values, and other
      fields.

   o  both comma separated and separately listed header field values.



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   o  a mix of short and long form for the same header field name.

   o  unknown Request-URI parameter.

   o  unknown header fields.

   o  an unknown header field with a value that would be syntactically
      invalid if it were defined in terms of generic-param.

   o  unusual header field ordering.

   o  unusual header field name character case.

   o  unknown parameters of a known header field.

   o  a uri parameter with no value.

   o  a header parameter with no value.

   o  integer fields (Max-Forwards and CSeq) with leading zeros.

   All elements should treat this as a well-formed request.

   The UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue header field deserves special
   attention.  If this header field were defined in terms of comma-
   separated values with semicolon-separated parameters (as would many
   of the existing defined header fields), this would be invalid.
   However, since the receiving element does not know the definition of
   the syntax for this field, it must parse it as a header value.
   Proxies would forward this header field unchanged.  Endpoints would
   ignore the header field.




















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      Message Details : wsinv

      INVITE sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com;unknownparam SIP/2.0
      TO :
       sip:vivekg@chair-dnrc.example.com ;   tag    = 1918181833n
      from   : "J Rosenberg \\\""       <sip:jdrosen@example.com>
        ;
        tag = 98asjd8
      MaX-fOrWaRdS: 0068
      Call-ID: wsinv.ndaksdj@192.0.2.1
      Content-Length   : 150
      cseq: 0009
        INVITE
      Via  : SIP  /   2.0
       /UDP
          192.0.2.2;branch=390skdjuw
      s :
      NewFangledHeader:   newfangled value
       continued newfangled value
      UnknownHeaderWithUnusualValue: ;;,,;;,;
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Route:
       <sip:services.example.com;lr;unknownwith=value;unknown-no-value>
      v:  SIP  / 2.0  / TCP     spindle.example.com   ;
        branch  =   z9hG4bK9ikj8  ,
       SIP  /    2.0   / UDP  192.168.255.111   ; branch=
       z9hG4bK30239
      m:"Quoted string \"\"" <sip:jdrosen@example.com> ; newparam =
            newvalue ;
        secondparam ; q = 0.33

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.3
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.4
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC












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3.1.1.2.  Wide Range of Valid Characters

   This message exercises a wider range of characters in several key
   syntactic elements than implementations usually see.  In particular,
   note the following:

   o  The Method contains non-alpha characters from token.  Note that %
      is not an escape character for this field.  A method of IN%56ITE
      is an unknown method.  It is not the same as a method of INVITE.

   o  The Request-URI contains unusual, but legal, characters.

   o  A branch parameter contains all non-alphanum characters from
      token.

   o  The To header field value's quoted string contains quoted-pair
      expansions, including a quoted NULL character.

   o  The name part of name-addr in the From header field value contains
      multiple tokens (instead of a quoted string) with all non-alphanum
      characters from the token production rule.  That value also has an
      unknown header parameter whose name contains the non-alphanum
      token characters and whose value is a non-ascii range UTF-8
      encoded string.  The tag parameter on this value contains the
      non-alphanum token characters.

   o  The Call-ID header field value contains the non-alphanum
      characters from word.  Notice that in this production:

      *  % is not an escape character.  It is only an escape character
         in productions matching the rule "escaped".

      *  " does not start a quoted string.  None of ',` or " imply that
         there will be a matching symbol later in the string.

      *  The characters []{}()<> do not have any grouping semantics.
         They are not required to appear in balanced pairs.

   o  There is an unknown header field (matching extension-header) with
      non-alphanum token characters in its name and a UTF8-NONASCII
      value.

   If this unusual URI has been defined at a proxy, the proxy will
   forward this request normally.  Otherwise, a proxy will generate a
   404.  Endpoints will generate a 501 listing the methods they
   understand in an Allow header field.





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      Message Details : intmeth

      <allOneLine>
      !interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~
       sip:1_unusual.URI~(to-be!sure)&isn't+it$/crazy?,/;;*
      :&it+has=1,weird!*pas$wo~d_too.(doesn't-it)
      @example.com SIP/2.0
      </allOneLine>
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-.!%66*_+`'~
      <allOneLine>
      To: "BEL:\<hex>07</hex> NUL:\<hex>00</hex> DEL:\<hex>7F</hex>"
       <sip:1_unusual.URI~(to-be!sure)&isn't+it$/crazy?,/;;*
      @example.com>
      </allOneLine>
      <allOneLine>
      From: token1~` token2'+_ token3*%!.- <sip:mundane@example.com>
      ;fromParam''~+*_!.-%=
      "<hex>D180D0B0D0B1D0BED182D0B0D18ED189D0B8D0B9</hex>"
      ;tag=_token~1'+`*%!-.
      </allOneLine>
      Call-ID: intmeth.word%ZK-!.*_+'@word`~)(><:\/"][?}{
      CSeq: 139122385 !interesting-Method0123456789_*+`.%indeed'~
      Max-Forwards: 255
      <allOneLine>
      extensionHeader-!.%*+_`'~:
      <hex>EFBBBFE5A4A7E5819CE99BBB</hex>
      </allOneLine>
      Content-Length: 0

3.1.1.3.  Valid Use of the % Escaping Mechanism

   This INVITE exercises the % HEX HEX escaping mechanism in several
   places.  The request is syntactically valid.  Interesting features
   include the following:

   o  The request-URI has sips:user@example.com embedded in its
      userpart.  What that might mean to example.net is beyond the scope
      of this document.

   o  The From and To URIs have escaped characters in their userparts.

   o  The Contact URI has escaped characters in the URI parameters.
      Note that the "name" uri-parameter has a value of "value%41",
      which is NOT equivalent to "valueA".  Per [RFC3986], unescaping
      URI components is never performed recursively.






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   A parser must accept this as a well-formed message.  The application
   using the message must treat the % HEX HEX expansions as equivalent
   to the character being encoded.  The application must not try to
   interpret % as an escape character in those places where % HEX HEX
   ("escaped" in the grammar) is not a valid part of the construction.
   In [RFC3261], "escaped" only occurs in the expansions of SIP-URI,
   SIPS-URI, and Reason-Phrase.

      Message Details : esc01

      INVITE sip:sips%3Auser%40example.com@example.net SIP/2.0
      To: sip:%75se%72@example.com
      From: <sip:I%20have%20spaces@example.net>;tag=938
      Max-Forwards: 87
      i: esc01.239409asdfakjkn23onasd0-3234
      CSeq: 234234 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      C: application/sdp
      Contact:
        <sip:cal%6Cer@host5.example.net;%6C%72;n%61me=v%61lue%25%34%31>
      Content-Length: 150

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC





















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3.1.1.4.  Escaped Nulls in URIs

   This register request contains several URIs with nulls in the
   userpart.  The message is well formed - parsers must accept this
   message.  Implementations must take special care when unescaping the
   Address-of-Record (AOR) in this request so as to not prematurely
   shorten the username.  This request registers two distinct contact
   URIs.

      Message Details : escnull

      REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:null-%00-null@example.com
      From: sip:null-%00-null@example.com;tag=839923423
      Max-Forwards: 70
      Call-ID: escnull.39203ndfvkjdasfkq3w4otrq0adsfdfnavd
      CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Contact: <sip:%00@host5.example.com>
      Contact: <sip:%00%00@host5.example.com>
      L:0

3.1.1.5.  Use of % When It Is Not an Escape

   In most of the places % can appear in a SIP message, it is not an
   escape character.  This can surprise the unwary implementor.  The
   following well-formed request has these properties:

   o  The request method is unknown.  It is NOT equivalent to REGISTER.

   o  The display name portion of the To and From header fields is
      "%Z%45".  Note that this is not the same as %ZE.

   o  This message has two Contact header field values, not three.
      <sip:alias2@host2.example.com> is a C%6Fntact header field value.

   A parser should accept this message as well formed.  A proxy would
   forward or reject the message depending on what the Request-URI meant
   to it.  An endpoint would reject this message with a 501.












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      Message Details : esc02

      RE%47IST%45R sip:registrar.example.com SIP/2.0
      To: "%Z%45" <sip:resource@example.com>
      From: "%Z%45" <sip:resource@example.com>;tag=f232jadfj23
      Call-ID: esc02.asdfnqwo34rq23i34jrjasdcnl23nrlknsdf
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK209%fzsnel234
      CSeq: 29344 RE%47IST%45R
      Max-Forwards: 70
      Contact: <sip:alias1@host1.example.com>
      C%6Fntact: <sip:alias2@host2.example.com>
      Contact: <sip:alias3@host3.example.com>
      l: 0

3.1.1.6.  Message with No LWS between Display Name and <

   This OPTIONS request is not valid per the grammar in RFC 3261 since
   there is no LWS between the token in the display name and < in the
   From header field value.  This has been identified as a specification
   bug that will be removed when RFC 3261 is revised.  Elements should
   accept this request as well formed.

      Message Details : lwsdisp

      OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: caller<sip:caller@example.com>;tag=323
      Max-Forwards: 70
      Call-ID: lwsdisp.1234abcd@funky.example.com
      CSeq: 60 OPTIONS
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP funky.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      l: 0

3.1.1.7.  Long Values in Header Fields

   This well-formed request contains header fields with many values and
   values that are very long.  Features include the following:

   o  The To header field has a long display name, and long uri
      parameter names and values.

   o  The From header field has long header parameter names and values,
      in particular, a very long tag.

   o  The Call-ID is one long token.






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      Message Details : longreq

      INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      <allOneLine>
      To: "I have a user name of
       <repeat count=10>extreme</repeat> proportion"
      <sip:user@example.com:6000;
      unknownparam1=very<repeat count=20>long</repeat>value;
      longparam<repeat count=25>name</repeat>=shortvalue;
      very<repeat count=25>long</repeat>ParameterNameWithNoValue>
      </allOneLine>
      <allOneLine>
      F: sip:
      <repeat count=5>amazinglylongcallername</repeat>@example.net
      ;tag=12<repeat count=50>982</repeat>424
      ;unknownheaderparam<repeat count=20>name</repeat>=
      unknowheaderparam<repeat count=15>value</repeat>
      ;unknownValueless<repeat count=10>paramname</repeat>
      </allOneLine>
      Call-ID: longreq.one<repeat count=20>really</repeat>longcallid
      CSeq: 3882340 INVITE
      <allOneLine>
      Unknown-<repeat count=20>Long</repeat>-Name:
       unknown-<repeat count=20>long</repeat>-value;
       unknown-<repeat count=20>long</repeat>-parameter-name =
       unknown-<repeat count=20>long</repeat>-parameter-value
      </allOneLine>
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip33.example.com
      v: SIP/2.0/TCP sip32.example.com
      V: SIP/2.0/TCP sip31.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip30.example.com
      ViA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip29.example.com
      VIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip28.example.com
      VIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip27.example.com
      via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip26.example.com
      viA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip25.example.com
      vIa: SIP/2.0/TCP sip24.example.com
      vIA: SIP/2.0/TCP sip23.example.com
      V :  SIP/2.0/TCP sip22.example.com
      v :  SIP/2.0/TCP sip21.example.com
      V  : SIP/2.0/TCP sip20.example.com
      v  : SIP/2.0/TCP sip19.example.com
      Via : SIP/2.0/TCP sip18.example.com
      Via  : SIP/2.0/TCP sip17.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip16.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip15.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip14.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip13.example.com



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      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip12.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip11.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip10.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip9.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip8.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip7.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip6.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip5.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip4.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip3.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip2.example.com
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip1.example.com
      <allOneLine>
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP
       host.example.com;received=192.0.2.5;
      branch=very<repeat count=50>long</repeat>branchvalue
      </allOneLine>
      Max-Forwards: 70
      <allOneLine>
      Contact: <sip:
      <repeat count=5>amazinglylongcallername</repeat>
      @host5.example.net>
      </allOneLine>
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      l: 150

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC

3.1.1.8.  Extra Trailing Octets in a UDP Datagram

   This message contains a single SIP REGISTER request, which ostensibly
   arrived over UDP in a single datagram.  The packet contains extra
   octets after the body (which in this case has zero length).  The
   extra octets happen to look like a SIP INVITE request, but (per
   section 18.3 of [RFC3261]) they are just spurious noise that must be
   ignored.

   A SIP element receiving this datagram would handle the REGISTER
   request normally and ignore the extra bits that look like an INVITE
   request.  If the element is a proxy choosing to forward the REGISTER,
   the INVITE octets would not appear in the forwarded request.



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      Message Details : dblreq

      REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:j.user@example.com
      From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=43251j3j324
      Max-Forwards: 8
      I: dblreq.0ha0isndaksdj99sdfafnl3lk233412
      Contact: sip:j.user@host.example.com
      CSeq: 8 REGISTER
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.125;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw23492
      Content-Length: 0

      INVITE sip:joe@example.com SIP/2.0
      t: sip:joe@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=141334
      Max-Forwards: 8
      Call-ID: dblreq.0ha0isnda977644900765@192.0.2.15
      CSeq: 8 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw380234
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Content-Length: 150

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m =video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC





















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3.1.1.9.  Semicolon-Separated Parameters in URI User Part

   This request has a semicolon-separated parameter contained in the
   "user" part of the Request-URI (whose value contains an escaped @
   symbol).  Receiving elements will accept this as a well-formed
   message.  The Request-URI will parse so that the user part is
   "user;par=u@example.net".

      Message Details : semiuri

      OPTIONS sip:user;par=u%40example.net@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:j_user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242
      Max-Forwards: 3
      Call-ID: semiuri.0ha0isndaksdj
      CSeq: 8 OPTIONS
      Accept: application/sdp, application/pkcs7-mime,
              multipart/mixed, multipart/signed,
              message/sip, message/sipfrag
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      l: 0

3.1.1.10.  Varied and Unknown Transport Types

   This request contains Via header field values with all known
   transport types and exercises the transport extension mechanism.
   Parsers must accept this message as well formed.  Elements receiving
   this message would process it exactly as if the 2nd and subsequent
   header field values specified UDP (or other transport).

      Message Details : transports

      OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: <sip:caller@example.com>;tag=323
      Max-Forwards: 70
      Call-ID:  transports.kijh4akdnaqjkwendsasfdj
      Accept: application/sdp
      CSeq: 60 OPTIONS
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP t1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Via: SIP/2.0/SCTP t2.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKklasjdhf
      Via: SIP/2.0/TLS t3.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK2980unddj
      Via: SIP/2.0/UNKNOWN t4.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKasd0f3en
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP t5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK0a9idfnee
      l: 0






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3.1.1.11.  Multipart MIME Message

   This MESSAGE request contains two body parts.  The second part is
   binary encoded and contains null (0x00) characters.  Receivers must
   take care to frame the received message properly.

   Parsers must accept this message as well formed, even if the
   application above the parser does not support multipart/signed.

   Additional examples of multipart/mime messages, in particular S/MIME
   messages, are available in the security call flow examples document
   [SIP-SEC].

      Message Details : mpart01

      MESSAGE sip:kumiko@example.org SIP/2.0
      <allOneLine>
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 127.0.0.1:5070
      ;branch=z9hG4bK-d87543-4dade06d0bdb11ee-1--d87543-;rport
      </allOneLine>
      Max-Forwards: 70
      Route: <sip:127.0.0.1:5080>
      <allOneLine>
      Identity: r5mwreLuyDRYBi/0TiPwEsY3rEVsk/G2WxhgTV1PF7hHuL
      IK0YWVKZhKv9Mj8UeXqkMVbnVq37CD+813gvYjcBUaZngQmXc9WNZSDN
      GCzA+fWl9MEUHWIZo1CeJebdY/XlgKeTa0Olvq0rt70Q5jiSfbqMJmQF
      teeivUhkMWYUA=
      </allOneLine>
      Contact: <sip:fluffy@127.0.0.1:5070>
      To: <sip:kumiko@example.org>
      From: <sip:fluffy@example.com>;tag=2fb0dcc9
      Call-ID: 3d9485ad0c49859b@Zmx1ZmZ5LW1hYy0xNi5sb2NhbA..
      CSeq: 1 MESSAGE
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
      Content-Type: multipart/mixed;boundary=7a9cbec02ceef655
      Date: Sat, 15 Oct 2005 04:44:56 GMT
      User-Agent: SIPimp.org/0.2.5 (curses)
      Content-Length: 553

      --7a9cbec02ceef655
      Content-Type: text/plain
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary

      Hello
      --7a9cbec02ceef655
      Content-Type: application/octet-stream
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary




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      <hex>
      3082015206092A86
      4886F70D010702A08201433082013F02
      01013109300706052B0E03021A300B06
      092A864886F70D010701318201203082
      011C020101307C3070310B3009060355
      04061302555331133011060355040813
      0A43616C69666F726E69613111300F06
      03550407130853616E204A6F7365310E
      300C060355040A130573697069743129
      3027060355040B132053697069742054
      65737420436572746966696361746520
      417574686F7269747902080195007102
      330113300706052B0E03021A300D0609
      2A864886F70D01010105000481808EF4
      66F948F0522DD2E5978E9D95AAE9F2FE
      15A06659716292E8DA2AA8D8350A68CE
      FFAE3CBD2BFF1675DDD5648E593DD647
      28F26220F7E941749E330D9A15EDABDB
      93D10C42102E7B7289D29CC0C9AE2EFB
      C7C0CFF9172F3B027E4FC027E1546DE4
      B6AA3ABB3E66CCCB5DD6C64B8383149C
      B8E6FF182D944FE57B65BC99D005
      </hex>
      --7a9cbec02ceef655--

3.1.1.12.  Unusual Reason Phrase

   This 200 response contains a reason phrase other than "OK".  The
   reason phrase is intended for human consumption and may contain any
   string produced by

       Reason-Phrase   =  *(reserved / unreserved / escaped
                          / UTF8-NONASCII / UTF8-CONT / SP / HTAB)

   This particular response contains unreserved and non-ascii UTF-8
   characters.  This response is well formed.  A parser must accept this
   message.













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      Message Details : unreason

      <allOneLine>
      SIP/2.0 200 = 2**3 * 5**2 <hex>D0BDD0BE20D181D182
      D0BE20D0B4D0B5D0B2D18FD0BDD0BED181D182D0BE20D0B4
      D0B5D0B2D18FD182D18C202D20D0BFD180D0BED181D182D0
      BED0B5</hex>
      </allOneLine>
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923
      Call-ID: unreason.1234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf
      CSeq: 35 INVITE
      From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343
      To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229
      Content-Length: 154
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Contact: <sip:user@host198.example.com>

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC

3.1.1.13.  Empty Reason Phrase

   This well-formed response contains no reason phrase.  A parser must
   accept this message.  The space character after the reason code is
   required.  If it were not present, this message could be rejected as
   invalid (a liberal receiver would accept it anyway).

      Message Details : noreason

      SIP/2.0 100<hex>20</hex>
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe
      Call-ID: noreason.asndj203insdf99223ndf
      CSeq: 35 INVITE
      From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=39ansfi3
      To: <sip:user@example.edu>;tag=902jndnke3
      Content-Length: 0
      Contact: <sip:user@host105.example.com>








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3.1.2.  Invalid Messages

   This section contains several invalid messages reflecting errors seen
   at interoperability events and exploring important edge conditions
   that can be induced through malformed messages.  This section does
   not attempt to be a comprehensive list of all types of invalid
   messages.

3.1.2.1.  Extraneous Header Field Separators

   The Via header field of this request contains additional semicolons
   and commas without parameters or values.  The Contact header field
   contains additional semicolons without parameters.  This message is
   syntactically invalid.

   An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad
   Request error.

      Message Details : badinv01

      INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:j.user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=134161461246
      Max-Forwards: 7
      Call-ID: badinv01.0ha0isndaksdjasdf3234nas
      CSeq: 8 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;;,;,,
      Contact: "Joe" <sip:joe@example.org>;;;;
      Content-Length: 152
      Content-Type: application/sdp

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC

3.1.2.2.  Content Length Larger Than Message

   This is a request message with a Content Length that is larger than
   the actual length of the body.

   When sent over UDP (as this message ostensibly was), the receiving
   element should respond with a 400 Bad Request error.  If this message
   arrived over a stream-based transport, such as TCP, there's not much



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   the receiving party could do but wait for more data on the stream and
   close the connection if none is forthcoming within a reasonable
   period of time.

      Message Details : clerr

      INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      Max-Forwards: 80
      To: sip:j.user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93942939o2
      Contact: <sip:caller@hungry.example.net>
      Call-ID: clerr.0ha0isndaksdjweiafasdk3
      CSeq: 8 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK-39234-23523
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Content-Length: 9999

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.155
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.155
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC

3.1.2.3.  Negative Content-Length

   This request has a negative value for Content-Length.

   An element receiving this message should respond with an error.  This
   request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can
   simply be discarded.  If a request like this arrives over TCP, the
   framing error is not recoverable, and the connection should be
   closed.  The same behavior is appropriate for messages that arrive
   without a numeric value in the Content-Length header field, such as
   the following:

      Content-Length: five

   Implementors should take extra precautions if the technique they
   choose for converting this ascii field into an integral form can
   return a negative value.  In particular, the result must not be used
   as a counter or array index.







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      Message Details : ncl

      INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      Max-Forwards: 254
      To: sip:j.user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=32394234
      Call-ID: ncl.0ha0isndaksdj2193423r542w35
      CSeq: 0 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.53;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Contact: <sip:caller@example53.example.net>
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Content-Length: -999

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.53
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.53
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC

3.1.2.4.  Request Scalar Fields with Overlarge Values

   This request contains several scalar header field values outside
   their legal range.

      o  The CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1.

      o  The Max-Forwards value is >255.

      o  The Expires value is >2**32-1.

      o  The Contact expires parameter value is >2**32-1.

   An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad
   Request due to the CSeq error.  If only the Max-Forwards field were
   in error, the element could choose to process the request as if the
   field were absent.  If only the expiry values were in error, the
   element could treat them as if they contained the default values for
   expiration (3600 in this case).

   Other scalar request fields that may contain aberrant values include,
   but are not limited to, the Contact q value, the Timestamp value, and
   the Via ttl parameter.






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      Message Details : scalar02

      REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK342sdfoi3
      To: <sip:user@example.com>
      From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=239232jh3
      CSeq: 36893488147419103232 REGISTER
      Call-ID: scalar02.23o0pd9vanlq3wnrlnewofjas9ui32
      Max-Forwards: 300
      Expires: 1<repeat count=100>0</repeat>
      Contact: <sip:user@host129.example.com>
        ;expires=280297596632815
      Content-Length: 0

3.1.2.5.  Response Scalar Fields with Overlarge Values

   This response contains several scalar header field values outside
   their legal range.

   o  The CSeq sequence number is >2**32-1.

   o  The Retry-After field is unreasonably large (note that RFC 3261
      does not define a legal range for this field).

   o  The Warning field has a warning-value with more than 3 digits.

   An element receiving this response will simply discard it.

      Message Details : scalarlg

      SIP/2.0 503 Service Unavailable
      <allOneLine>
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host129.example.com
      ;branch=z9hG4bKzzxdiwo34sw
      ;received=192.0.2.129
      </allOneLine>
      To: <sip:user@example.com>
      From: <sip:other@example.net>;tag=2easdjfejw
      CSeq: 9292394834772304023312 OPTIONS
      Call-ID: scalarlg.noase0of0234hn2qofoaf0232aewf2394r
      Retry-After: 949302838503028349304023988
      Warning: 1812 overture "In Progress"
      Content-Length: 0








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3.1.2.6.  Unterminated Quoted String in Display Name

   This is a request with an unterminated quote in the display name of
   the To field.  An element receiving this request should return a 400
   Bad Request error.

   An element could attempt to infer a terminating quote and accept the
   message.  Such an element needs to take care that it makes a
   reasonable inference when it encounters

      To: "Mr J. User <sip:j.user@example.com> <sip:realj@example.net>

      Message Details : quotbal

      INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: "Mr. J. User <sip:j.user@example.com>
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=93334
      Max-Forwards: 10
      Call-ID: quotbal.aksdj
      Contact: <sip:caller@host59.example.net>
      CSeq: 8 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.59:5050;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Content-Length: 152

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.15
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.15
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC


















Sparks, et al.               Informational                     [Page 24]

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3.1.2.7.  <> Enclosing Request-URI

   This INVITE request is invalid because the Request-URI has been
   enclosed within in "<>".

   It is reasonable always to reject a request with this error with a
   400 Bad Request.  Elements attempting to be liberal with what they
   accept may choose to ignore the brackets.  If the element forwards
   the request, it must not include the brackets in the messages it
   sends.

      Message Details : ltgtruri

      INVITE <sip:user@example.com> SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=39291
      Max-Forwards: 23
      Call-ID: ltgtruri.1@192.0.2.5
      CSeq: 1 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.5
      Contact: <sip:caller@host5.example.net>
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Content-Length: 159

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5
      t=3149328700 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC



















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3.1.2.8.  Malformed SIP Request-URI (embedded LWS)

   This INVITE has illegal LWS within the Request-URI.

   An element receiving this request should respond with a 400 Bad
   Request.

   An element could attempt to ignore the embedded LWS for those schemes
   (like SIP) where doing so would not introduce ambiguity.

      Message Details : lwsruri

      INVITE sip:user@example.com; lr SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com;tag=3xfe-9921883-z9f
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=231413434
      Max-Forwards: 5
      Call-ID: lwsruri.asdfasdoeoi2323-asdfwrn23-asd834rk423
      CSeq: 2130706432 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2395
      Contact: <sip:caller@host1.example.net>
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Content-Length: 159

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      t=3149328700 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC




















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3.1.2.9.  Multiple SP Separating Request-Line Elements

   This INVITE has illegal multiple SP characters between elements of
   the start line.

   It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed.  An element
   that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP
   characters when processing the request.  If the element forwards the
   request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the
   messages it sends.

      Message Details : lwsstart

      INVITE  sip:user@example.com  SIP/2.0
      Max-Forwards: 8
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8814
      Call-ID: lwsstart.dfknq234oi243099adsdfnawe3@example.com
      CSeq: 1893884 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw3923
      Contact: <sip:caller@host1.example.net>
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Content-Length: 150

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC



















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3.1.2.10.  SP Characters at End of Request-Line

   This OPTIONS request contains SP characters between the SIP-Version
   field and the CRLF terminating the Request-Line.

   It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed.  An element
   that is liberal in what it accepts may ignore these extra SP
   characters when processing the request.  If the element forwards the
   request, it must not include these extra SP characters in the
   messages it sends.

      Message Details : trws

      OPTIONS sip:remote-target@example.com SIP/2.0<hex>2020</hex>
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK299342093
      To: <sip:remote-target@example.com>
      From: <sip:local-resource@example.com>;tag=329429089
      Call-ID: trws.oicu34958239neffasdhr2345r
      Accept: application/sdp
      CSeq: 238923 OPTIONS
      Max-Forwards: 70
      Content-Length: 0





























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3.1.2.11.  Escaped Headers in SIP Request-URI

   This INVITE is malformed, as the SIP Request-URI contains escaped
   headers.

   It is acceptable for an element to reject this request with a 400 Bad
   Request.  An element could choose to be liberal in what it accepts
   and ignore the escaped headers.  If the element is a proxy, the
   escaped headers must not appear in the Request-URI of the forwarded
   request (and most certainly must not be translated into the actual
   header of the forwarded request).

      Message Details : escruri

      INVITE sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:example.com%3E SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=341518
      Max-Forwards: 7
      Contact: <sip:caller@host39923.example.net>
      Call-ID: escruri.23940-asdfhj-aje3br-234q098w-fawerh2q-h4n5
      CSeq: 149209342 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host-of-the-hour.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Content-Length: 150

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC


















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3.1.2.12.  Invalid Time Zone in Date Header Field

   This INVITE is invalid, as it contains a non-GMT time zone in the SIP
   Date header field.

   It is acceptable to reject this request as malformed (though an
   element shouldn't do that unless the contents of the Date header
   field were actually important to its processing).  An element wishing
   to be liberal in what it accepts could ignore this value altogether
   if it wasn't going to use the Date header field anyway.  Otherwise,
   it could attempt to interpret this date and adjust it to GMT.

   RFC 3261 explicitly defines the only acceptable time zone designation
   as "GMT".  "UT", while synonymous with GMT per [RFC2822], is not
   valid.  "UTC" and "UCT" are also invalid.

      Message Details : baddate

      INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2234923
      Max-Forwards: 70
      Call-ID: baddate.239423mnsadf3j23lj42--sedfnm234
      CSeq: 1392934 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Date: Fri, 01 Jan 2010 16:00:00 EST
      Contact: <sip:caller@host5.example.net>
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Content-Length: 150

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC













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3.1.2.13.  Failure to Enclose name-addr URI in <>

   This REGISTER request is malformed.  The SIP URI contained in the
   Contact Header field has an escaped header, so the field must be in
   name-addr form (which implies that the URI must be enclosed in <>).

   It is reasonable for an element receiving this request to respond
   with a 400 Bad Request.  An element choosing to be liberal in what it
   accepts could infer the angle brackets since there is no ambiguity in
   this example.  In general, that won't be possible.

      Message Details : regbadct

      REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: sip:user@example.com;tag=998332
      Max-Forwards: 70
      Call-ID: regbadct.k345asrl3fdbv@10.0.0.1
      CSeq: 1 REGISTER
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 135.180.130.133:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Contact: sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:sip.example.com%3E
      l: 0

3.1.2.14.  Spaces within addr-spec

   This request is malformed, since the addr-spec in the To header field
   contains spaces.  Parsers receiving this request must not break.  It
   is reasonable to reject this request with a 400 Bad Request response.
   Elements attempting to be liberal may ignore the spaces.

      Message Details : badaspec

      OPTIONS sip:user@example.org SIP/2.0
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host4.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdju43234
      Max-Forwards: 70
      From: "Bell, Alexander" <sip:a.g.bell@example.com>;tag=433423
      To: "Watson, Thomas" < sip:t.watson@example.org >
      Call-ID: badaspec.sdf0234n2nds0a099u23h3hnnw009cdkne3
      Accept: application/sdp
      CSeq: 3923239 OPTIONS
      l: 0










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3.1.2.15.  Non-token Characters in Display Name

   This OPTIONS request is malformed, since the display names in the To
   and From header fields contain non-token characters but are unquoted.

   It is reasonable always to reject this kind of error with a 400 Bad
   Request response.

   An element may attempt to be liberal in what it receives and infer
   the missing quotes.  If this element were a proxy, it must not
   propagate the error into the request it forwards.  As a consequence,
   if the fields are covered by a signature, there's not much point in
   trying to be liberal - the message should simply be rejected.

      Message Details : baddn

      OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/2.0
      Via:     SIP/2.0/UDP c.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Max-Forwards:      70
      From:    Bell, Alexander <sip:a.g.bell@example.com>;tag=43
      To:      Watson, Thomas <sip:t.watson@example.org>
      Call-ID: baddn.31415@c.example.com
      Accept: application/sdp
      CSeq:    3923239 OPTIONS
      l: 0

3.1.2.16.  Unknown Protocol Version

   To an element implementing [RFC3261], this request is malformed due
   to its high version number.

   The element should respond to the request with a 505 Version Not
   Supported error.

      Message Details : badvers

      OPTIONS sip:t.watson@example.org SIP/7.0
      Via:     SIP/7.0/UDP c.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Max-Forwards:     70
      From:    A. Bell <sip:a.g.bell@example.com>;tag=qweoiqpe
      To:      T. Watson <sip:t.watson@example.org>
      Call-ID: badvers.31417@c.example.com
      CSeq:    1 OPTIONS
      l: 0







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3.1.2.17.  Start Line and CSeq Method Mismatch

   This request has mismatching values for the method in the start line
   and the CSeq header field.  Any element receiving this request will
   respond with a 400 Bad Request.

      Message Details : mismatch01

      OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:j.user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525
      Max-Forwards: 6
      Call-ID: mismatch01.dj0234sxdfl3
      CSeq: 8 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      l: 0

3.1.2.18.  Unknown Method with CSeq Method Mismatch

   This message has an unknown method in the start line, and a CSeq
   method tag that does not match.

   Any element receiving this response should respond with a 501 Not
   Implemented.  A 400 Bad Request is also acceptable, but choosing a
   501 (particularly at proxies) has better future-proof
   characteristics.

      Message Details : mismatch02

      NEWMETHOD sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:j.user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=34525
      Max-Forwards: 6
      Call-ID: mismatch02.dj0234sxdfl3
      CSeq: 8 INVITE
      Contact: <sip:caller@host.example.net>
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host.example.net;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      l: 138

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.1
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC





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3.1.2.19.  Overlarge Response Code

   This response has a response code larger than 699.  An element
   receiving this response should simply drop it.

      Message Details : bigcode

      SIP/2.0 4294967301 better not break the receiver
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.105;branch=z9hG4bK2398ndaoe
      Call-ID: bigcode.asdof3uj203asdnf3429uasdhfas3ehjasdfas9i
      CSeq: 353494 INVITE
      From: <sip:user@example.com>;tag=39ansfi3
      To: <sip:user@example.edu>;tag=902jndnke3
      Content-Length: 0
      Contact: <sip:user@host105.example.com>

3.2.  Transaction Layer Semantics

   This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser
   and transaction-layer logic.

3.2.1.  Missing Transaction Identifier

   This request indicates support for RFC 3261-style transaction
   identifiers by providing the z9hG4bK prefix to the branch parameter,
   but it provides no identifier.  A parser must not break when
   receiving this message.  An element receiving this request could
   reject the request with a 400 Response (preferably statelessly, as
   other requests from the source are likely also to have a malformed
   branch parameter), or it could fall back to the RFC 2543-style
   transaction identifier.

      Message Details : badbranch

      OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.org;tag=33242
      Max-Forwards: 3
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.1;branch=z9hG4bK
      Accept: application/sdp
      Call-ID: badbranch.sadonfo23i420jv0as0derf3j3n
      CSeq: 8 OPTIONS
      l: 0








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3.3.  Application-Layer Semantics

   This section contains tests that exercise an implementation's parser
   and application-layer logic.

3.3.1.  Missing Required Header Fields

   This request contains no Call-ID, From, or To header fields.

   An element receiving this message must not break because of the
   missing information.  Ideally, it will respond with a 400 Bad Request
   error.

      Message Details : insuf

      INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      CSeq: 193942 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.95;branch=z9hG4bKkdj.insuf
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      l: 152

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.95
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.95
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC






















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3.3.2.  Request-URI with Unknown Scheme

   This OPTIONS contains an unknown URI scheme in the Request-URI.  A
   parser must accept this as a well-formed SIP request.

   An element receiving this request will reject it with a 416
   Unsupported URI Scheme response.

   Some early implementations attempt to look at the contents of the To
   header field to determine how to route this kind of request.  That is
   an error.  Despite the fact that the To header field and the Request
   URI frequently look alike in simplistic first-hop messages, the To
   header field contains no routing information.

      Message Details : unkscm

      OPTIONS nobodyKnowsThisScheme:totallyopaquecontent SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384
      Max-Forwards: 3
      Call-ID: unkscm.nasdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34
      CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234
      Content-Length: 0

3.3.3.  Request-URI with Known but Atypical Scheme

   This OPTIONS contains an Request-URI with an IANA-registered scheme
   that does not commonly appear in Request-URIs of SIP requests.  A
   parser must accept this as a well-formed SIP request.

   If an element will never accept this scheme as meaningful in a
   Request-URI, it is appropriate to treat it as unknown and return a
   416 Unsupported URI Scheme response.  If the element might accept
   some URIs with this scheme, then a 404 Not Found is appropriate for
   those URIs it doesn't accept.

      Message Details : novelsc

      OPTIONS soap.beep://192.0.2.103:3002 SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=384
      Max-Forwards: 3
      Call-ID: novelsc.asdfasser0q239nwsdfasdkl34
      CSeq: 3923423 OPTIONS
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP host9.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw39234
      Content-Length: 0




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3.3.4.  Unknown URI Schemes in Header Fields

   This message contains registered schemes in the To, From, and Contact
   header fields of a request.  The message is syntactically valid.
   Parsers must not fail when receiving this message.

   Proxies should treat this message as they would any other request for
   this URI.  A registrar would reject this request with a 400 Bad
   Request response, since the To: header field is required to contain a
   SIP or SIPS URI as an AOR.

      Message Details : unksm2

      REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
      To: isbn:2983792873
      From: <http://www.example.com>;tag=3234233
      Call-ID: unksm2.daksdj@hyphenated-host.example.com
      CSeq: 234902 REGISTER
      Max-Forwards: 70
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.21:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Contact: <name:John_Smith>
      l: 0

3.3.5.  Proxy-Require and Require

   This request tests proper implementation of SIP's Proxy-Require and
   Require extension mechanisms.

   Any element receiving this request will respond with a 420 Bad
   Extension response, containing an Unsupported header field listing
   these features from either the Require or Proxy-Require header field,
   depending on the role in which the element is responding.

      Message Details : bext01

      OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:j_user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=242etr
      Max-Forwards: 6
      Call-ID: bext01.0ha0isndaksdj
      Require: nothingSupportsThis, nothingSupportsThisEither
      Proxy-Require: noProxiesSupportThis, norDoAnyProxiesSupportThis
      CSeq: 8 OPTIONS
      Via: SIP/2.0/TLS fold-and-staple.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Content-Length: 0






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3.3.6.  Unknown Content-Type

   This INVITE request contains a body of unknown type.  It is
   syntactically valid.  A parser must not fail when receiving it.

   A proxy receiving this request would process it just as it would any
   other INVITE.  An endpoint receiving this request would reject it
   with a 415 Unsupported Media Type error.

      Message Details : invut

      INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      Contact: <sip:caller@host5.example.net>
      To: sip:j.user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=8392034
      Max-Forwards: 70
      Call-ID: invut.0ha0isndaksdjadsfij34n23d
      CSeq: 235448 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP somehost.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Content-Type: application/unknownformat
      Content-Length: 40

      <audio>
       <pcmu port="443"/>
      </audio>

3.3.7.  Unknown Authorization Scheme

   This REGISTER request contains an Authorization header field with an
   unknown scheme.  The request is well formed.  A parser must not fail
   when receiving it.

   A proxy will treat this request as it would any other REGISTER.  If
   it forwards the request, it will include this Authorization header
   field unmodified in the forwarded messages.

   A registrar that does not care about challenge-response
   authentication will simply ignore the Authorization header field,
   processing this registration as if the field were not present.  A
   registrar that does care about challenge-response authentication will
   reject this request with a 401, issuing a new challenge with a scheme
   it understands.

   Endpoints choosing not to act as registrars will simply reject the
   request.  A 405 Method Not Allowed is appropriate.






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      Message Details : regaut01

      REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:j.user@example.com
      From: sip:j.user@example.com;tag=87321hj23128
      Max-Forwards: 8
      Call-ID: regaut01.0ha0isndaksdj
      CSeq: 9338 REGISTER
      Via: SIP/2.0/TCP 192.0.2.253;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Authorization: NoOneKnowsThisScheme opaque-data=here
      Content-Length:0

3.3.8.  Multiple Values in Single Value Required Fields

   The message contains a request with multiple Call-ID, To, From, Max-
   Forwards, and CSeq values.  An element receiving this request must
   not break.

   An element receiving this request would respond with a 400 Bad
   Request error.

      Message Details : multi01

      INVITE sip:user@company.com SIP/2.0
      Contact: <sip:caller@host25.example.net>
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.25;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Max-Forwards: 70
      CSeq: 5 INVITE
      Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.1
      CSeq: 59 INVITE
      Call-ID: multi01.98asdh@192.0.2.2
      From: sip:caller@example.com;tag=3413415
      To: sip:user@example.com
      To: sip:other@example.net
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=2923420123
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      l: 154
      Contact: <sip:caller@host36.example.net>
      Max-Forwards: 5

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.25
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.25
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC



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3.3.9.  Multiple Content-Length Values

   Multiple conflicting Content-Length header field values appear in
   this request.

   From a framing perspective, this situation is equivalent to an
   invalid Content-Length value (or no value at all).

   An element receiving this message should respond with an error.  This
   request appeared over UDP, so the remainder of the datagram can
   simply be discarded.  If a request like this arrives over TCP, the
   framing error is not recoverable, and the connection should be
   closed.

      Message Details : mcl01

      OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.net;branch=z9hG4bK293423
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: sip:other@example.net;tag=3923942
      Call-ID: mcl01.fhn2323orihawfdoa3o4r52o3irsdf
      CSeq: 15932 OPTIONS
      Content-Length: 13
      Max-Forwards: 60
      Content-Length: 5
      Content-Type: text/plain

      There's no way to know how many octets are supposed to be here.

3.3.10.  200 OK Response with Broadcast Via Header Field Value

   This message is a response with a 2nd Via header field value's sent-
   by containing 255.255.255.255.  The message is well formed; parsers
   must not fail when receiving it.

   Per [RFC3261], an endpoint receiving this message should simply
   discard it.

   If a proxy followed normal response processing rules blindly, it
   would forward this response to the broadcast address.  To protect
   against this as an avenue of attack, proxies should drop such
   responses.









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      Message Details : bcast

      SIP/2.0 200 OK
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.198;branch=z9hG4bK1324923
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 255.255.255.255;branch=z9hG4bK1saber23
      Call-ID: bcast.0384840201234ksdfak3j2erwedfsASdf
      CSeq: 35 INVITE
      From: sip:user@example.com;tag=11141343
      To: sip:user@example.edu;tag=2229
      Content-Length: 154
      Content-Type: application/sdp
      Contact: <sip:user@host28.example.com>

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.198
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.198
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC

3.3.11.  Max-Forwards of Zero

   This is a legal SIP request with the Max-Forwards header field value
   set to zero.

   A proxy should not forward the request and should respond 483 (Too
   Many Hops).  An endpoint should process the request as if the Max-
   Forwards field value were still positive.

      Message Details : zeromf

      OPTIONS sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=3ghsd41
      Call-ID: zeromf.jfasdlfnm2o2l43r5u0asdfas
      CSeq: 39234321 OPTIONS
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw2349i
      Max-Forwards: 0
      Content-Length: 0










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3.3.12.  REGISTER with a Contact Header Parameter

   This register request contains a contact where the 'unknownparam'
   parameter must be interpreted as a contact-param and not a url-param.

   This REGISTER should succeed.  The response must not include
   "unknownparam" as a url-parameter for this binding.  Likewise,
   "unknownparam" must not appear as a url-parameter in any binding
   during subsequent fetches.

   Behavior is the same, of course, for any known contact-param
   parameter names.

      Message Details : cparam01

      REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Max-Forwards: 70
      From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=DkfVgjkrtMwaerKKpe
      To: sip:watson@example.com
      Call-ID: cparam01.70710@saturn.example.com
      CSeq: 2 REGISTER
      Contact: sip:+19725552222@gw1.example.net;unknownparam
      l: 0

3.3.13.  REGISTER with a url-parameter

   This register request contains a contact where the URI has an unknown
   parameter.

   The register should succeed, and a subsequent retrieval of the
   registration must include "unknownparam" as a url-parameter.

   Behavior is the same, of course, for any known url-parameter names.

      Message Details : cparam02

      REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP saturn.example.com:5060;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Max-Forwards: 70
      From: sip:watson@example.com;tag=838293
      To: sip:watson@example.com
      Call-ID: cparam02.70710@saturn.example.com
      CSeq: 3 REGISTER
      Contact: <sip:+19725552222@gw1.example.net;unknownparam>
      l: 0





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3.3.14.  REGISTER with a URL Escaped Header

   This register request contains a contact where the URI has an escaped
   header.

   The register should succeed, and a subsequent retrieval of the
   registration must include the escaped Route header in the contact URI
   for this binding.

      Message Details : regescrt

      REGISTER sip:example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:user@example.com
      From: sip:user@example.com;tag=8
      Max-Forwards: 70
      Call-ID: regescrt.k345asrl3fdbv@192.0.2.1
      CSeq: 14398234 REGISTER
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP host5.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      M: <sip:user@example.com?Route=%3Csip:sip.example.com%3E>
      L:0































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3.3.15.  Unacceptable Accept Offering

   This request indicates that the response must contain a body in an
   unknown type.  In particular, since the Accept header field does not
   contain application/sdp, the response may not contain an SDP body.
   The recipient of this request could respond with a 406 Not
   Acceptable, with a Warning/399 indicating that a response cannot be
   formulated in the formats offered in the Accept header field.  It is
   also appropriate to respond with a 400 Bad Request, since all SIP
   User-Agents (UAs) supporting INVITE are required to support
   application/sdp.

      Message Details : sdp01

      INVITE sip:user@example.com SIP/2.0
      To: sip:j_user@example.com
      Contact: <sip:caller@host15.example.net>
      From: sip:caller@example.net;tag=234
      Max-Forwards: 5
      Call-ID: sdp01.ndaksdj9342dasdd
      Accept: text/nobodyKnowsThis
      CSeq: 8 INVITE
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.0.2.15;branch=z9hG4bKkdjuw
      Content-Length: 150
      Content-Type: application/sdp

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0 12
      m=video 3227 RTP/AVP 31
      a=rtpmap:31 LPC

3.4.  Backward Compatibility

3.4.1.  INVITE with RFC 2543 Syntax

   This is a legal message per RFC 2543 (and several bis versions) that
   should be accepted by RFC 3261 elements that want to maintain
   backwards compatibility.

   o  There is no branch parameter at all on the Via header field value.

   o  There is no From tag.





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RFC 4475               SIP Torture Test Messages                May 2006


   o  There is no explicit Content-Length.  (The body is assumed to be
      all octets in the datagram after the null-line.)

   o  There is no Max-Forwards header field.

      Message Details : inv2543

      INVITE sip:UserB@example.com SIP/2.0
      Via: SIP/2.0/UDP iftgw.example.com
      From: <sip:+13035551111@ift.client.example.net;user=phone>
      Record-Route: <sip:UserB@example.com;maddr=ss1.example.com>
      To: sip:+16505552222@ss1.example.net;user=phone
      Call-ID: inv2543.1717@ift.client.example.com
      CSeq: 56 INVITE
      Content-Type: application/sdp

      v=0
      o=mhandley 29739 7272939 IN IP4 192.0.2.5
      s=-
      c=IN IP4 192.0.2.5
      t=0 0
      m=audio 49217 RTP/AVP 0

4.  Security Considerations

   This document presents NON-NORMATIVE examples of SIP session
   establishment.  The security considerations in [RFC3261] apply.

   Parsers must carefully consider edge conditions and malicious input
   as part of their design.  Attacks on many Internet systems use
   crafted input to cause implementations to behave in undesirable ways.
   Many of the messages in this document are designed to stress a parser
   implementation at points traditionally used for such attacks.
   However, this document does not attempt to be comprehensive.  It
   should be considered a seed to stimulate thinking and planning, not
   simply a set of tests to be passed.















Sparks, et al.               Informational                     [Page 45]

RFC 4475               SIP Torture Test Messages                May 2006


5.  Acknowledgements

   The final detailed review of this document was performed by Diego
   Besprosvan, Vijay Gurbani, Shashi Kumar, Derek MacDonald, Gautham
   Narasimhan, Nils Ohlmeier, Bob Penfield, Reinaldo Penno, Marc
   Petit-Huguenin, Richard Sugarman, and Venkatesh Venkataramanan.

   Earlier versions of this document were reviewed by Aseem Agarwal,
   Rafi Assadi, Gonzalo Camarillo, Ben Campbell, Cullen Jennings, Vijay
   Gurbani, Sunitha Kumar, Rohan Mahy, Jon Peterson, Marc
   Petit-Huguenin, Vidhi Rastogi, Adam Roach, Bodgey Yin Shaohua, and
   Tom Taylor.

   Thanks to Cullen Jennings and Eric Rescorla for their contribution to
   the multipart/mime sections of this document and their work
   constructing S/MIME examples in [SIP-SEC].  Thanks to Neil Deason for
   contributing several messages and to Kundan Singh for performing
   parser validation of messages in earlier versions.

   The following individuals provided significant comments during the
   early phases of the development of this document: Jean-Francois Mule,
   Hemant Agrawal, Henry Sinnreich, David Devanatham, Joe Pizzimenti,
   Matt Cannon, John Hearty, the whole MCI IPOP Design team, Scott
   Orton, Greg Osterhout, Pat Sollee, Doug Weisenberg, Danny Mistry,
   Steve McKinnon, and Denise Ingram, Denise Caballero, Tom Redman, Ilya
   Slain, Pat Sollee, John Truetken, and others from MCI, 3Com, Cisco,
   Lucent, and Nortel.

6.  Informative References

   [RFC2822]  Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April
              2001.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP:  Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [RFC3264]  Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
              with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264, June
              2002.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC
              3986, January 2005.

   [SIP-SEC]  Jennings, C. and K. Ono, "Example call flows using SIP
              security mechanisms", Work in Progress, July 2005.



Sparks, et al.               Informational                     [Page 46]

RFC 4475               SIP Torture Test Messages                May 2006


Appendix A.  Bit-Exact Archive of Each Test Message

   The following text block is an encoded, gzip-compressed TAR archive
   of files that represent each of the example messages discussed in
   Section 3.

   To recover the compressed archive file intact, the text of this
   document may be passed as input to the following Perl script (the
   output should be redirected to a file or piped to "tar -xzvf -").

   #!/usr/bin/perl
   use strict;
   my $bdata = "";
   use MIME::Base64;
   while(<>) {
    if (/-- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/ .. /-- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE --/) {
        if ( m/^\s*[^\s]+\s*$/) {
            $bdata = $bdata . $_;
        }
     }
   }
   print decode_base64($bdata);


   Figure 58

   Alternatively, the base-64 encoded block can be edited by hand to
   remove document structure lines and fed as input to any base-64
   decoding utility.






















Sparks, et al.               Informational                     [Page 47]

RFC 4475               SIP Torture Test Messages                May 2006


A.1.  Encoded Reference Messages

   -- BEGIN MESSAGE ARCHIVE --
   H4sIAEDwcEMCA+xdW2zc2Hm2nexNG6UN3LRF0QfaiKJdyxwdnkMOhyOPVrIt
   27It22tdvHYTeM8MDzWc4ZAjkqORvK2bbIAAedmHtEHRdlvkoUCLFAjSlyLF
   9rJPLYoWrTdAg6JFHwp0i+5D0SIoEAQFuj2HnAuH5GgoW3PxmgcazYU/b4f/
   //3Xc04Rq9ipk1JGxe6xITVAW1YUvXc5K/W8syYheEygP0lIECWJ0gkSkMAx
   DhwbQWs4LrY57phdcerYrjr96AZtb91L5/0paTdvbazevLHOOXo933CIvUT2
   cK1ukIxlb3Prq7fmYQZMT23pON/+Nr958RZXthxXzLRpS1YtL4EsWCja2CyV
   Cw+U8mWxeK2qVhoigkicnlrDe/wly25iW3XynEwPecmmO3GnzxPDOMstG/RQ
   pkrs09w5diU4s50p0i1LgTMsLrh4uyAiJEI0PbVh0Z3vYNexzLPcRtmqYYfu
   692Gm2l6v/fcyuL01AVsGPzqxTxXbPO8o2qAXp4JTdUBGChKA6IyKptmEwCl
   pFZNQs+0XCqRupvncL1u6CXs6pY576h1erx1spPnkALpLSpcqyOnp4w8R29v
   eurpeP60L/yHNkQAGCT/IsiG5R8KMJX/sco/lbiu/DNpi6NoizHbVqLi1Ysf
   nsAiBEUYBgAUAymCQj9lYEYIochBEhiQ6BYXO1i1TM2CSBchqOwC7AAKKxqq
   ILMtsbmnVVaHJP9U8Mkw1f8g+RcAFI+xf6IIBJRFVP7FbDbV/yNpqze2VjdW
   jl78TeJ64g+pflWYwo5aAEHp9XiQqlGq22smlWEqsBAZFRHyvENUzax5VoQv
   vwJVuQoSOf/S+xgnQdskxixpTk9dpKfMc5ds/SwHBO4qNjlIWZETsnkA6B+3
   sr5Bz2iZLi5R7DkXuEd2fCkTuNNFn5CYLr+xXydxSNXafJ2Y226Z3oPk4c5u
   gb5ZhVqZGj8G2eegIlNTQoYyvUGF3iC3ekvsAKM0PeUU+OmpUiG6wS0AhmS1
   Am6ousXRLhdk7vbGrfnlrVscvSnItu3qKrE4BGF3ExKmp3DBdus1XM8jgbt+
   68KzjIbPJv6bQ0X/BP6fgEL2n4gkKcX/Udt/sY5Trw/IWhBqS0l8wGYY/b3W
   dQJpC7mBg71AXyl5rdcL9HeNu5WQC0jZnvKbIC313MNAf4+2Pi7f0yr/urkL
   hHHGf2QEwvafDFAq/xNn/1Uyj2EBCkgUstSiF6CYjZiBvSLpcyIoY6A7poqr
   jlrBDrUFWYwGO13/ra/l1/EhpYWFswtnzwYMuNNXLdKKLlUs0oMLC7TFmWhw
   oFl3SAtO6GvCCeOy4Wiv7xLbGaf/B0QxqP8lT/5RNpX/idH/ckT/y3H6P6nq
   79H8yxlP+Q/S+DtNYuk7dRLQ+xuZlupPrPI9TmdKXw4r/Y5uF56x4FCxhKmz
   PFb7n4p+JP6Dsqn8j6S1tCcHAeBuXjtIpSq5kHwLCPqhncg+UJIygVd4PwcX
   ic127Mqmx4UA5cScCCAQqMKnyl/DVVSBxG4SVXOW11Wtk3OROiZA1/wImya+
   8SFQaUdtdyFCRtRGK0oFlTgLQEwU2OkGiLyDs/AQzAXxZfHwloKS62sqsE1p
   vCdtR4P/ZM8drveXIP4jS2H7T4RCiv+Tl/+r3H+cFIAIiWuHDcFsEP59Juxx
   /KanbpOdhm5T0DUtt6yb2+uNet2yXWejrDtn435c0d0yoSe6ZVt7+3xgd/aD
   TpwWbXt/+6K1bO5Ht8XkCXs03Mb1dU6zDJWnQM5T7vEUySArOKxbJsWyLOrb
   JUsda/4PSIIY8f/S+M9o7T8RKqKSlREQqDS6LrGZgHFFm+AqR6WKs0mJ6LtM
   uvpbiCBs6UGk5Kg4WyQo6y2Gw45qaahRgQDRj6aG6BU06Keyhh1Eyl7gBzuK
   3rX5kKiIIbvvXBxs+Q4jUrDpaHrL8jsXZ/r5hAqAFVM1q6zWJ0ZK+xh49GYj
   Ft7TqP9LFLHtMed/5CwM+3/UaE/lf2Liv72aO/ekEWGF5fnpPwv2S7A3zG17
   P5xhbyOIz7I9xkKT6JiihVpFCYLEven7qMbmWX5H5CGSIDp0Yl+h7THiwgcE
   hocbGS5Rpsa18eZ/JCBE9b+cyv8o2u2Vy6vrGyu3PXmNFf6I/DjYbdjmYyV+
   u5FfdrpQvLYds7lY1ba2K1XbXWtiYl+71g76xu8SBIY2L1PuEcBS9Drb4AC5
   9m0HAIgdfk5QZEhZENK2tN0UghC00DCrptU0vZN8YqLDrT6D45R/MStH5B+m
   +v9Zlf8cylEleTiZhwNlHsXJ/LlDCf3iJzAnpBYNm+yMNf4nICkbtv+ltP5r
   UuQ/makf3doq1IKSUEEVBCODgHLTU6t5rsV/Pda8ojDfXzMNZFQhQqIAQ2q6
   dbJwnW/X9u+Kev9oBZTiEMsrV+4TrqMX3PWWgkUkPf3Vvsbe7UkKZajTi+K6
   qQN24c5SZJnKleJJ01KwlOQwhTIxnYBywK+3Hn5R85OXxHCJPZ800xVtxCkN
   O/0zOP+P5DD+wzT+M/L4D305M2iZQeuMCALYFUSqqF6YkSWHzMgwDu08+2p1
   BlLE2iX0jXZhiTjB47VisCgXwT15ekrPcz5/spEhQPFCwtVK1YTIMukXwKPA
   sBDIBoaKScM+DHTjEzUHJPmnp7hOnGomeyFuKMgC/Z12xoI5kxVqpLBL34wG



Sparks, et al.               Informational                     [Page 48]

RFC 4475               SIP Torture Test Messages                May 2006


   vXVpBokzSFg8ItTsC5ppaUDaDov/cMzx/2zU/6eSnOL/aOz/GVGmtvKMKPk+
   gE22dce1sZ3p6w2cnrlHyVvF1DZxrIZd6jF2FzvD+wdSevCvQQQrWNUqPUVh
   Pmsy0Dd3mhYS7R2IdCRWbJYbLJkGRKZtVE2H1YX1JugvDBwDCIEyoz1wTGIE
   NYiCRJEL9kjssMWe4AE2dOwIfkowlBC8MJO9FCGFfnlYmDR6TOQRohDhkccf
   aCebDcMYb/5fjMb/sun4/wnz/xmb8DMA8OxDP9e2L1Ersqco0J+/44DhwG2W
   RAoEyFS13WpFxY5W3UFN0XLtHYBVR6OggHfVzpBgESk5Zv0d4PgPSvsFCnW6
   okhvZSmy42IMVT/C6/nJjhfSzrYbtj7e8f9iJP4nS6n+H7X/Fw7gvXbbarik
   MIMuhLBhBq0cydwASBQkIRc3JqzfqHsPP/rVBbRZ2XMWeWY3lCs8rhBUtHmK
   DTtAyTV5DTeJXYY7fFk0pS58UKihyh8e7D3ylsa7ZcKXqRmTvOJvmMGz1A1M
   25M13XQa2pj9PzEbGf8rpvnfseN/F+NbKOnVbQ3OKSgxOYWMx2cDQdFoDbs9
   JA4qfZMISjo3yiD5d2vELY/V/oM99V9Z3/5L/b+RtFOUAYhNHFc3t/k1ygmW
   6g2/k7JyTrl/Zu7NzIxuqoSosw89kBDuN8yG08BGZvP26sNXXIsvklNOwyav
   flF3zFl3Tne/MF+y8YP9187OLyycyX9Rd+fK2CkIZ5tEt9VTZ+rY+ULTeqje
   dy0r84pqEbYbr7uvLg0uP2lHdoSDyjczp2ay2TP3596cfdiKV51fuZ7/0gvc
   jU36doy7yL79aisoddj7iQ1zuVaVmMLDN/0PcHbuvv8JnZk5leH9E9UaporN
   UPBLo7vfYqUls7MP587cp8QzhdMffOXR9x790aM//+DtR9/74J0PvvHo+4/+
   5LRnMN/3jvpQmJ17kx6ZzwSM37YcNy1bnbl3jT+VoT0wu8S+vvnw1VcWz+W/
   NH/6y7/02q+8FZhGS4AQ5STuEDwQNtYhK08lexTTHQriVwhWiU3PPXNm7j7t
   /vx/vfcXH/7e73/41Xc/+u33JncMzLNt/+1CSURjjf9lvfF/IfsvHf83avtv
   k9p/55eS1QDqmrvdzPTL+M4JCCBJkgTalihppmToVPB7C+vo2Qr1smWSRTbU
   r0SBivcCDq1jRK5moYZV1S44TjjO3o5AzAlZCbTr+IJkvafrAU2f+QVZkOOu
   M1BTJGU7hu/Rzgnz+LP6HQl20i5ouOPO/wE5bP+J6fyfk+T/JZ0F84mGBeW8
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   K6NI/D/N/02Q/HtO1CrHirg4zDE6zsQ1wlkaR21/m9TIE75xddtiokHl6nTs
   mN58lvZpTzG+UNgl9j5j36N87WKjQRbYJ+8k7C6H/So4ZXrn/omHcUtxL8/n
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   2yynd2wFlGOVA6BjLGz6PcNfp5RH+eKZrOW5VsfzRy3SvP9ch3f8ehszeA/7
   C6M4k3dPMTFAilAI9bppu1EK2EuxFaUQQhRx5wFhmuUIDVRCNKvR4/TOCMZo
   Yo4jh+4p5npgNkwTcxwpRBN3PWKYJuY4oT7e4vJchCbUy7txNOF+5rjouUD4
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   dHKCPk7QxQl6OEEHJ+nfASQRr7I1cY5a6MR12o7mqIy9Ubz8W2rB9cCa2THY
   lo+xZofxLBTlGO62O+wCwIHz/0Tmf5WEtP5vpP5//ERaR1Plp0BFiOQNg4X+
   HR4UlgLB71aWcnC9iTTMZXqUIw7oI0FUEMzJYEKAwGg6qu7Ux5r/QzKL/7OB
   3jKbDNqP/6X1XyNpR7P+ny9x52JQoDsf34Cq/zYjssIDXCypSxr1L/fjUnFZ
   0GdiTgYKkb3iw/rpwn9d+R9//T8K5/8lANL5P8Yd/1/gDHswBPjCvacRXqFK
   LJdD/ANFSzIrMPJnZo/k+6ReUPC4058MVLWIpbOll7zi/qZt+p9ySLSr3qCi
   VvJPQNSkzIooQa2q0HfqIoiUgwwLYfSGxcGOxaQZFml7WvCfAaA7Vv9PhhH/
   T07rP0aJ//H2X98ZYJ/IIczlBLEX41scqFXNHWr9UYwXEVAUrLKh37hJ0FKM
   FSjkFJTLDZjvQxhkCSKlPcfrcFB+4sNHtZIx7vl/gCRnw/Vf6fwPE+X/HXoy
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   adc0uRo29zmr5BLX4bBNOIetLuEQlREVCcd2zEyG+1nTnRp2S+VhgsDA+I8k
   huRfgmn95yTGfx6rrhOJEpQOWv4lyIMVNvOgs6dqRtKp3NNgz5HIPxyf/Mve
   +L8e+59+SeV/FO3Gyp21lY0rNy9OBgLAAQjQ11IPGeoHI0X/yf8GZ4TZTIWH
   N+njrPmJiNHUKFMPewG4AfIPRYH5/wjK9Mkj4M3/JKX6fzRtbWV9ffmyHwCu
   Nmp61Yqs/hvvAQhQpowMvAiqHI6g8mpOlkTEiypWCciqoKgWBYEQXuDbmxZs



Sparks, et al.               Informational                     [Page 49]

RFC 4475               SIP Torture Test Messages                May 2006


   VvAdlxIKjgILniUHqGCvqlQ+dXc/z9lSrWmT6439i7fvntfnwYZ+q7ni3EX2
   ypZTnb8M7+yVtze2hFuX5PKVxvXVa+Duna1r98rXdpW1Sm6TvLFTXdsqmls7
   SL5wcS4noO3du5XS+U18z9x+vfZGSblz4976xRuXLzxYntPuGMrayuaVO6v3
   LOECuUqK6t35N4zta2QDg5vG7g6wXRm8LlX0da24s3a19vollxB9d7NcXbtz
   d3O5EAYuzWho2v5Sbx8uBpaqij6KxZ4Rdq0DRLJsUCsCtVRSAtiKVEXMSVgF
   JVHJSUpx6V5tT7hXuyddvyOU7+6DvRu65BThjXJxOZPppt1bjBHARJstqEVs
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   2cjhi5g96XXsnqUeG3ez5LJ1aCUOiHlRzEtZ7vLaxvQUGwnIL2/TE3gcqNfq
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   m7DVQxKdB7x9/PbzL535+pWv/3j6+Asnvv328Qv0p9dOHD8uvAReeP65uc9+
   6sQvgJe7JMeFt49zlOQXKQn4ZVAXXgYvPf+pzU8/f/LE5rpwEnyOfXnxJOMN
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   ndsgjstdILara+zmCLfccMvUH3f3T7x4/FvHdk6g4ye7lzfdubzjx5879umv
   fuWd/9F+cuW/b/M/+PA33vmdb33nox/93+e/rd3dKX7zP/7pzB/8ozRV/ruP
   v3vuz+Y+/tnGv/yD+s7dwg8vv/KjIvfjj5bd30XTv/X5//zDf/61Dz5z/qcz
   b9nf+MG77//1dzP/+1fv//1Pfm5+4cTDm+/P/utG7d/++Dv59xa1v/2bL//w
   L6997Ws/8+73//3jn+d//eaHb5E//c1Hz8U9OJ5/Vr0DT1jHq/8FCILjv0Rf
   /6frP40l/0s1SR2b+wnHf0JpkN3dtnfjV1uIrQjxx1t3Tf6Ok9BiVSXHlolc
   CljSrV2UxPvAA5yWTk6bpafZIgT9Y5jtLZEIZpL8tzcTJptnI1khqnjQtHjZ
   0GOIZNQP6bHAvkVs8KgnVErDMmNtZskYcvYnQfynZ/5PD/9BWv83HvxPsP4n
   ZFj0ZPEgL7WDgllgxoc9w/qh4KWQbEmETdQpBwYJyoFRkol9e69MQk+W6OUf
   Z9VP5p/0qRRGIxsqYFrUIXEsc6zr/0EYyP/IXv0HSuV/JK29/jftf+6J1/bu
   MBOmUsxW9tbZ7PyKAiGbx7u7kne6ivfk6H9rlxhOaaz1/yKUQvKf1v+PPP9r
   4XqmSEg9Pz/fFXqURwDAoxkGlItU+qIe6PD50K/0pYcHOxRhzKZf+Fs1uqt0
   IH8JgT5jANpjMJUklV9iOifhTsNyi3i863/IohS2/+V0/c8Jsv+9+X/W7Ax3
   NcOxaLyvRaOm/2ICHFBQzCKXQnAkUJslPTfgoLF9SthoT7rqpaTkJSCBBLCQ
   uNATjmHly6PIEdtkGzeGnABONv97r/4X0/k/R9KGvP5vTkZQKFcgEmDuoJVt
   O2zYEwNoizTFjL5r+jKF3w1O9vH9WxmqB54I57kb1k2TXDOtprNR1p31UplN
   QWbV8U6D8FQOcIEVaEak/BNpGtCOL2K15I5X/lHY/wdp/mfS5P8g6Y+VfUXJ
   IQQPHPTb4b4qEiXs2AbS1OLukgD8sohuNcJBC3ojKSPkKDViL9R3QF9oDfGD
   Vzuir0zvikef0DJS+gTYuknjlX8pG43/pfWfT7v85waJvs94IdEPZ3X/v72j
   2W3bBt8L9B2IALsEcUqRki05c9Fi2LB2a7I169JDgUKxKFv+oRxSspqctp4H
   7F2G9bjtFZI3Gj9RdiXZlpN2tZNVbFLHlCjJ9Pf/+x+29nu2wtS4DvXvQBu/
   Dx5SKVSu+LQtgNfq/9RckP9Jjf+3BP+XN2AhVQY2ahLp+eFqs33eVlBh/Seg
   jZNBfx4ITpu2Q01IIFUKogMxw5TkCMOcuMyhmtAQTzxn6vLRGU24GHGWhP7A
   lU4cLMomFKvP+/WbSSBYapTYwFjtmijuMJQQRwdMP1uH2Jg4LctpNimxDesj
   zJh6p0a9beJ/U+d/ENLEoCim8n9t/9us/8/CFB0zMQ26DL3g7tQNRu7piH0Q
   +l9cvPEC6Ngtk8Xyh2rptanCQlxVRhaYK72BzwbJ3EBA0mxRm5qtFqHYhEQC
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RFC 4475               SIP Torture Test Messages                May 2006


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   -- END MESSAGE ARCHIVE --




























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RFC 4475               SIP Torture Test Messages                May 2006


Authors' Addresses

   Robert J. Sparks (editor)
   Estacado Systems

   EMail: RjS@estacado.net


   Alan Hawrylyshen
   Ditech Networks
   200 - 1167 Kensington Cr. NW
   Calgary, Alberta  T2N 1X7
   Canada

   Phone : +1.403.806.3366
   EMail : ahawrylyshen@ditechcom.com


   Alan Johnston
   Avaya
   St. Louis, MO 63124

   EMail: alan@sipstation.com


   Jonathan Rosenberg
   Cisco Systems
   600 Lanidex Plaza
   Parsippany, NJ  07052

   Phone: +1 973 952 5000
   EMail: jdrosen@cisco.com
   URI:   http://www.jdrosen.net


   Henning Schulzrinne
   Columbia University
   Department of Computer Science
   450 Computer Science Building
   New York, NY  10027
   US

   Phone: +1 212 939 7042
   EMail: hgs@cs.columbia.edu
   URI:   http://www.cs.columbia.edu






Sparks, et al.               Informational                     [Page 52]

RFC 4475               SIP Torture Test Messages                May 2006


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
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Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).







Sparks, et al.               Informational                     [Page 53]


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