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PROPOSED STANDARD
Errata Exist
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       K. Moriarty
Request for Comments: 6545                                           EMC
Obsoletes: 6045                                               April 2012
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721


                 Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)

Abstract

   Security incidents, such as system compromises, worms, viruses,
   phishing incidents, and denial of service, typically result in the
   loss of service, data, and resources both human and system.  Service
   providers and Computer Security Incident Response Teams need to be
   equipped and ready to assist in communicating and tracing security
   incidents with tools and procedures in place before the occurrence of
   an attack.  Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) outlines a
   proactive inter-network communication method to facilitate sharing
   incident-handling data while integrating existing detection, tracing,
   source identification, and mitigation mechanisms for a complete
   incident-handling solution.  Combining these capabilities in a
   communication system provides a way to achieve higher security levels
   on networks.  Policy guidelines for handling incidents are
   recommended and can be agreed upon by a consortium using the security
   recommendations and considerations.  This document obsoletes RFC
   6045.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6545.










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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction ....................................................3
      1.1. Changes from RFC 6045 ......................................5
      1.2. Normative and Informative ..................................6
      1.3. Terminology ................................................7
   2. Characteristics of Incidents ....................................7
   3. Communication between CSIRTs and Service Providers ..............8
      3.1. Inter-Service-Provider RID Messaging ......................10
      3.2. RID Communication Topology ................................12
   4. Message Formats ................................................13
      4.1. RID Data Types ............................................13
           4.1.1. Boolean ............................................13
      4.2. RID Message Types .........................................14
   5. IODEF-RID Schema ...............................................15
      5.1. RIDPolicy Class ...........................................17
           5.1.1. ReportSchema .......................................23
      5.2. RequestStatus .............................................26
      5.3. IncidentSource ............................................28
      5.4. RID Name Spaces ...........................................29
      5.5. Encoding ..................................................29
      5.6. Including IODEF or Other XML Documents ....................29
           5.6.1. Including XML Documents in RID .....................30
   6. RID Messages ...................................................31
      6.1. Request ...................................................31
      6.2. Acknowledgement ...........................................33
      6.3. Result ....................................................34
      6.4. Report ....................................................36
      6.5. Query .....................................................38
   7. RID Communication Exchanges ....................................39
      7.1. Upstream Trace Communication Flow .........................40
           7.1.1. RID TraceRequest Example ...........................43
           7.1.2. Acknowledgement Message Example ....................47



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           7.1.3. Result Message Example .............................47
      7.2. Investigation Request Communication Flow ..................50
           7.2.1. Investigation Request Example ......................51
           7.2.2. Acknowledgement Message Example ....................53
      7.3. Report Communication Flow .................................54
           7.3.1. Report Example .....................................54
      7.4. Query Communication Flow ..................................56
           7.4.1. Query Example ......................................57
   8. RID Schema Definition ..........................................58
   9. Security Requirements ..........................................62
      9.1. XML Digital Signatures and Encryption .....................62
      9.2. Message Transport .........................................66
      9.3. Public Key Infrastructure .................................67
           9.3.1. Authentication .....................................68
           9.3.2. Multi-Hop Request Authentication ...................69
      9.4. Consortiums and Public Key Infrastructures ................70
      9.5. Privacy Concerns and System Use Guidelines ................71
      9.6. Sharing Profiles and Policies .............................76
   10. Security Considerations .......................................77
   11. Internationalization Issues ...................................77
   12. IANA Considerations ...........................................78
   13. Summary .......................................................80
   14. References ....................................................80
      14.1. Normative References .....................................80
      14.2. Informative References ...................................82
   Appendix A. Acknowledgements ......................................84

1.  Introduction

   Organizations require help from other parties to identify incidents,
   mitigate malicious activity targeting their computing resources, and
   to gain insight into potential threats through the sharing of
   information.  This coordination might entail working with a service
   provider (SP) to filter attack traffic, working with an SP to resolve
   a configuration issue that is unintentionally causing problems,
   contacting a remote site to take down a bot network, or sharing
   watch-lists of known malicious IP addresses in a consortium.  The
   term "SP" is to be interpreted as any type of service provider or
   Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) that may be involved
   in RID communications.

   Incident handling involves the detection, reporting, identification,
   and mitigation of an incident, whether it be a benign configuration
   issue, IT incident, an infraction to a service level agreement (SLA),
   system compromise, socially engineered phishing attack, or a denial-
   of-service (DoS) attack, etc.  When an incident is detected, the
   response may include simply filing a report, notification to the
   source of the incident, a request to an SP for resolution/mitigation,



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   or a request to locate the source.  One of the more difficult cases
   is that in which the source of an attack is unknown, requiring the
   ability to trace the attack traffic iteratively upstream through the
   network for the possibility of any further actions to take place.  In
   cases when accurate records of an active session between the target
   or victim system and the source or attacking system are available,
   the source is easy to identify.

   Real-time inter-network defense (RID) outlines a proactive inter-
   network communication method to facilitate sharing incident-handling
   data while integrating existing detection, tracing, source
   identification, and mitigation mechanisms for a complete incident
   handling solution.  RID provides a secure method to communicate
   incident information, enabling the exchange of Incident Object
   Description and Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFC5070] Extensible Markup
   Language (XML) documents.  RID considers security, policy, and
   privacy issues related to the exchange of potentially sensitive
   information, enabling SPs or organizations the options to make
   appropriate decisions according to their policies.  RID includes
   provisions for confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.

   The data in RID messages is represented in an XML [XML1.0] document
   using the IODEF and RID.  By following this model, integration with
   other aspects for incident handling is simplified.  Methods are
   incorporated into the communication system to indicate what actions
   need to be taken closest to the source in order to halt or mitigate
   the effects of the incident or attack at hand.  RID is intended to
   provide a method to communicate the relevant information between
   CSIRTs while being compatible with a variety of existing and possible
   future detection-tracing and response approaches.  Incidents may be
   extended to include Information Technology (IT) incidents, where RID
   enables the communication between or within providers for non-
   security IT incidents.

   Security and privacy considerations are of high concern since
   potentially sensitive information may be passed through RID messages.
   RID messaging takes advantage of XML security, privacy, and policy
   information set in the RID schema.  The RID schema defines
   communication-specific metadata to support the communication of IODEF
   documents for exchanging or tracing information regarding incidents.
   RID messages are encapsulated for transport, which is defined in a
   separate document [RFC6546].  The authentication, integrity, and
   authorization features that RID and RID transport offer are used to
   achieve a necessary level of security.

   Coordinating with other CSIRTs is not strictly a technical problem.
   There are numerous procedural, trust, and legal considerations that
   might prevent an organization from sharing information.  RID provides



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   information and options that can be used by organizations who must
   then apply their own policies for sharing information.  Organizations
   must develop policies and procedures for the use of the RID protocol
   and IODEF.

1.1.  Changes from RFC 6045

   This document contains the following changes with respect to its
   predecessor [RFC6045]:

   o  This document is Standards Track, while [RFC6045] was published as
      Informational.

   o  This document obsoletes [RFC6045] and moves it to Historic status.

   o  This document refers to the updated RID transport specification
      [RFC6546], where appropriate.

   o  Edits reflected in this updated version of RID are primarily
      improvements to the informational descriptions.  The descriptions
      have been updated to clarify that IODEF and RID can be used for
      all types of incidents and are not limited to network security
      incidents.  The language has been updated to change the focus from
      attacks to incidents, where appropriate.  The term "network
      provider" has been replaced with the more generic term of "service
      provider".  Several introductory informational sections have been
      removed as they are not necessary for the implementation of the
      protocol.  The sections include:

      *  1.3.  Attack Types and RID Messaging,

      *  2.  RID Integration with Network Provider Technologies,

      *  3.1.  Integrating Trace Approaches, and

      *  3.2.  Superset of Packet Information for Traces.

   o  An option for a star topology has been included in an
      informational section to meet current use-case requirements of
      those who provide reports on incident information.

   o  The schema version was incremented.  The schema has changed to
      include IODEF [RFC5070] enveloped in RID in the RIDPolicy class
      using the new ReportSchema class, to include one verified erratum,
      to include additional enumerations in the Justification attribute,
      to remove the AcrossNationalBoundaries region enumeration, to add
      the DataWithHandlingRequirements enumeration in TrafficTypes, and
      to change the name of the RequestAuthorization MsgType to



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      Acknowledgement.  Additional text has been provided to clarify
      definitions of enumerated values for some attributes.  The
      RequestAuthorization name was replaced with Acknowledgement to
      more accurately represent the function of that message type.  Text
      was clarified to note the possible use of this message in response
      to Query and Report messages.  The attributes were fixed in the
      schema to add 'lang' at the RID class level for language support.

   o  The TraceRequest and Investigation messages have been collapsed
      into a single message with the requirement to set the MsgType
      according to the functionality required for automation.  The
      message descriptions were identical with the exception of the
      MsgType, which remains an exception depending on the desired
      function.  Since both of the enumerations for MsgType are each a
      Request, 'Investigation' is now 'InvestigationRequest'.  Content
      may vary within the IODEF document for the type of Request
      specified.

   o  The IncidentQuery message description name and MsgType enumeration
      value in the schema have been changed to the more generic name of
      'Query'.

   o  Guidance has been improved to ensure consistent implementations
      and use of XML encryption to provide confidentiality based on data
      markers, specifically the iodef:restriction attribute in the IODEF
      and IODEF-RID schemas.  The attribute may also be present in IODEF
      extension schemas, where the guidance also applies.  Additional
      guidance and restrictions have been added for XML requirements.

   o  All of the normative text from the Security Considerations section
      has been moved to a new section, Security Requirements.

   o  The order in which the RID schema is presented in Section 5 has
      been changed to match the order in the IODEF-RID schema.

   o  Additional text has been provided to explain the content and
      interactions between entities in the examples.

   o  Additional references have been provided to improve
      interoperability with stricter guidance on the use of XML digital
      signatures and encryption.

1.2.  Normative and Informative

   Sections 1, 2, 3, and 12 provide helpful background information and
   considerations.  RID systems participating in a consortium are
   REQUIRED to fully implement Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 to
   prevent interoperability concerns.



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1.3.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Characteristics of Incidents

   An incident may be defined as a benign configuration issue, IT
   incident, an infraction to a service level agreement (SLA), system
   compromise, a worm or Trojan infection, or a single- or multiple-
   source denial-of-service attack.  The goal of tracing a security
   incident may be to identify the source or to find a point on the
   network as close to the origin of the incident as possible.  Incident
   tracing can be used to identify the source(s) of an attack in order
   to halt or mitigate the undesired behavior or to correct an
   identified issue.  RID messages can be communicated between entities
   to report or investigate any type of incident and allow for actions
   to be taken when the source of the incident or a point closer to the
   source is known or has been identified.  Methods to accomplish
   mitigation may include remediation of a configuration issue,
   filtering or rate-limiting the traffic close to the source, or taking
   the host or network offline.  Care must also be taken to ensure that
   the systems involved in the RID communications are not abused and to
   use proper analysis in determining if attack traffic is, in fact,
   attack traffic at each SP involved in the investigation.

   Investigating security incidents can be a difficult task since
   attackers go to great lengths to obscure their identity.  In the case
   of a security incident, the true source might be identified through
   an existing established connection to the attacker's point of origin.
   However, the attacker may not connect to the compromised system for a
   long period of time after the initial compromise or may access the
   system through a series of compromised hosts spread across the
   network.  Other methods of obscuring the source may include targeting
   the host with the same attack from multiple sources using both valid
   and spoofed source addresses.  This tactic can be used to compromise
   a machine and leave the difficult task of locating the true origin
   for the administrators.  Attackers use many techniques, which can
   vary between individuals or even organized groups of attackers.
   Through analysis, the techniques may be grouped into indicators of
   compromise to be shared via IODEF and RID, further assisting with the
   improvement of detection capabilities.  Security incidents, including
   distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, can be difficult or
   nearly impossible to trace because of the nature of the attack.  Some
   of the difficulties in investigating attacks include the following:

   o  the incident or attack originates from multiple sources;



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   o  the incident may leverage social-engineering techniques or other
      methods to gain access to resources and intellectual property
      using what appears to be legitimate access methods such as
      outbound web sessions from user systems;

   o  the attack may include various types of traffic meant to consume
      server resources, such as a SYN flood attack without a significant
      increase in bandwidth utilization;

   o  the type of traffic could include valid destination services,
      which cannot be blocked since they are essential services to
      business, such as DNS servers at an SP or HTTP requests sent to an
      organization connected to the Internet;

   o  the attack may utilize varying types of packets including TCP,
      UDP, ICMP, or other IP protocols;

   o  the attack may be from "zombies" or large botnets, which then
      require additional searches to locate a controlling server as the
      true origin of the attack;

   o  the attack may use a very small number of packets from any
      particular source, thus making a trace after the fact nearly
      impossible;

   o  the indicators of a compromise may be difficult to detect.

   If the source(s) of an incident cannot be determined from IP address
   information, it may be possible to trace the traffic based on
   characteristics of the incident such as tracing the increased
   bandwidth utilization or the type of packets seen by the client.  In
   the case of packets with spoofed source addresses, it is not a
   trivial task to identify the source of an attack.

   IODEF, any extensions to IODEF, and RID can be used to detail an
   incident, characteristics of the incident (as it evolves), the
   incident history, and communications of the incident to facilitate
   the resolution and reporting of the incident.

3.  Communication between CSIRTs and Service Providers

   Expediting the communication between CSIRTs and SPs is essential when
   responding to a security-related incident, which may cross network
   access points between service providers.  As a result of the urgency
   involved in this inter-service-provider security incident
   communication, there must be an effective system in place to
   facilitate the interaction.  This communication policy or method
   should involve multiple means of communication to avoid a single



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   point of failure.  Email is one way to transfer information about the
   incident, packet traces, etc.  However, email may not be received in
   a timely fashion or be acted upon with the same urgency as a phone
   call or other communication mechanism like RID.

   A technical solution to trace traffic across a single SP may include
   homegrown or commercial systems for which RID messaging must
   accommodate the input requirements.  The incident-handling system
   used on the SP's backbone by the CSIRT to coordinate the trace across
   the single network requires a method to accept, process, and relay
   RID messages to the system, as well as to wait for responses from the
   system to continue the RID request process as appropriate.  In this
   scenario, each service provider maintains its own system capable of
   communicating via RID and integrates with a management station used
   for monitoring and analysis.  An alternative for providers lacking
   sufficient resources may be to have a neutral third party with access
   to the provider's network resources who could be used to perform the
   incident-handling functions.  This could be a function of a central
   organization operating as a CSIRT for countries as a whole or within
   a consortium that may be able to provide centralized resources.

   Consortiums could consist of a federation or a group of service
   providers or CSIRTs that agrees to participate in the RID
   communication protocol with an agreed-upon policy and communication
   protocol facilitating the secure transport of IODEF-RID XML
   documents.  Transport for RID messages is specified in [RFC6546].

   One goal of RID is to prevent the need to permit access to other
   networks' equipment.  RID provides a standard messaging mechanism to
   enable the communication of incident-handling information to other
   providers in a consortium or in neighboring networks.  The third
   party mentioned above may be used in this technical solution to
   assist in facilitating incident handling and possibly traceback
   through smaller providers.  The RID messaging mechanism may be a
   logical or physical out-of-band network to ensure that the
   communication is secure and unaffected by the state of the network
   under attack.  The two management methods would accommodate the needs
   of larger providers to maintain full management of their network, and
   the third-party option could be available to smaller providers who
   lack the necessary human resources to perform incident-handling
   operations.  The first method enables the individual providers to
   involve (via a notification and alerting system) their network
   operations staff to authorize the continuance of a trace or other
   necessary response to a RID communication request through their
   network.






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   The network used for the communication should consist of out-of-band
   or protected channels (direct communication links) or encrypted
   channels dedicated to the transport of RID messages.  The
   communication links would be direct connections (virtual or physical)
   between peers who have agreed-upon use and abuse policies through a
   consortium.  Consortiums might be linked through policy comparisons
   and additional agreements to form a larger web or iterative network
   of peers that correlates to the traffic paths available over the
   larger web of networks or is based on regions and logical groups.
   Contact information, IP addresses of RID systems, and other
   information must be coordinated between bilateral peers by a
   consortium and may use existing databases, such as the routing
   arbiter.  The security, configuration, and Confidence rating schemes
   of the RID messaging peers must be negotiated by peers and must meet
   certain overall requirements of the fully connected network
   (Internet, government, education, etc.) through the peering and/or a
   consortium-based agreement.

   RID messaging established with clients of an provider may be
   negotiated in a contract as part of a value-added service or through
   a service level agreement (SLA).  Further discussion is beyond the
   scope of this document and may be more appropriately handled in
   peering or service level agreements.

   Procedures for incident handling need to be established and well
   known by anyone that may be involved in incident response.  The
   procedures should also contain contact information for internal
   escalation procedures, as well as for external assistance groups such
   as a CSIRT, CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC), Global Information
   Assurance Certification (GIAC), and the U.S. Federal Bureau of
   Investigations (FBI) or other assisting government organization in
   the country of the investigation.

3.1.  Inter-Service-Provider RID Messaging

   RID provides a protocol and format that ensures interoperability
   between vendors for the implementation of an incident messaging
   mechanism.  The messages should meet several requirements in order to
   be meaningful as they traverse multiple networks.  RID provides the
   framework necessary for communication between networks involved in
   the incident handling, possible traceback, and mitigation of a
   security incident.  Several message types described in Section 4.2
   are necessary to facilitate the handling of a security incident.  The
   message types include the Report, Query, Request, Acknowledgement,
   and Result message.

   The Report message is used when an incident is to be filed on a RID
   system or associated database, where no further action is required.



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   A Query message is used to request information on a particular
   incident.  A Request message with options set to 'TraceRequest' is
   used when the source of the traffic may have been spoofed.  In that
   case, each SP in the upstream path who receives this Request will
   issue a trace across the network to determine the upstream source of
   the traffic.  The Acknowledgement and Result messages are used to
   communicate the status and result of a Request.  The Request message
   with options set to 'InvestigationRequest' may be sent to any party
   assisting in an incident investigation.  The InvestigationRequest
   leverages the bilateral relationships or a consortium's
   interconnections to mitigate or stop problematic traffic close to the
   source.  Routes could determine the fastest path to a known source IP
   address in the case of an InvestigationRequest.  A Request message
   (set to 'TraceRequest' or 'InvestigationRequest') sent between RID
   systems to stop traffic at the source through a bordering network
   requires the information enumerated below:

   1.  Enough information to enable the network administrators to make a
       decision about the importance of continuing the trace.

   2.  The incident or IP packet information needed to carry out the
       trace or investigation.

   3.  Contact information of the origin of the RID communication.  The
       contact information could be provided through the Autonomous
       System Number (ASN) [RFC1930] or Network Information Center (NIC)
       handle information listed in the Registry for Internet Numbers or
       other Internet databases.

   4.  Network path information to help prevent any routing loops
       through the network from perpetuating a trace.  If a RID system
       receives a Request with MsgType set to 'TraceRequest' that
       contains its own information in the path, the trace must cease
       and the RID system should generate an alert to inform the network
       operations staff that a tracing loop exists.

   5.  A unique identifier for a single attack.  This identifier should
       be used to correlate traces to multiple sources in a DDoS attack.

   Use of the communication network and the RID protocol must be for
   pre-approved, authorized purposes only.  It is the responsibility of
   each participating party to adhere to guidelines set forth in both a
   global use policy established through the peering agreements for each
   bilateral peer or agreed-upon consortium guidelines.  The purpose of
   such policies is to avoid abuse of the system; the policies shall be
   developed by a consortium or participating entities.  The global
   policy may be dependent on the domain it operates under; for example,
   a government network or a commercial network such as the Internet



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   would adhere to different guidelines to address the individual
   concerns.  Privacy issues must be considered in public networks such
   as the Internet.  Privacy issues are discussed in the Security
   Requirements section, along with other requirements that must be
   agreed upon by participating entities.

   RID requests must be legitimate incidents and not used for purposes
   such as sabotage or censorship.  An example of such abuse of the
   system includes a request to rate-limit legitimate traffic to prevent
   information from being shared between users on the Internet
   (restricting access to online versions of papers) or restricting
   access from a competitor's product in order to sabotage a business.

   The RID system should be configurable to either require user input or
   automatically continue traces.  This feature enables a network
   manager to assess the available resources before continuing a Request
   message set to 'InvestigationRequest' or 'TraceRequest'.  If the
   Confidence rating (provided in IODEF) is low, it may not be in the
   provider's best interest to continue the Request with options set to
   'InvestigationRequest' or 'TraceRequest'.  The Confidence ratings
   must adhere to the specifications for selecting the percentage used
   to avoid abuse of the system.  Requests must be issued by authorized
   individuals from the initiating CSIRT, set forth in policy guidelines
   established through peering or a SLA.

3.2.  RID Communication Topology

   The most basic topology for communicating RID systems is a direct
   connection or a bilateral relationship as illustrated below.

            ___________                                  __________
            |         |                                  |        |
            |  RID    |__________-------------___________|  RID   |
            |_________|          | SP Border |           |________|
                                 -------------

                      Figure 1: Direct Peer Topology

   Within the consortium model, several topologies might be agreed upon
   and used.  One would leverage bilateral network peering relationships
   of the members of the consortium.  The peers for RID would match that
   of routing peers, and the logical network borders would be used.
   This approach may be necessary for an iterative trace where the
   source is unknown.  The model looks like the above diagram; however,
   there may be an extensive number of interconnections of bilateral
   relationships formed.  Also within a consortium model, it may be
   useful to establish an integrated mesh of networks to pass RID
   messages.  This may be beneficial when the source address is known,



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   and an interconnection may provide a faster route to reach the
   closest upstream peer to the source of the attack traffic if direct
   communication between SPs is not possible.  An example is illustrated
   below.

       _______                     _______                     _______
       |     |                     |     |                     |     |
     __| RID |____-------------____| RID |____-------------____| RID |__
       |_____|    | SP Border |    |_____|    | SP Border |    |_____|
          |       -------------               -------------       |
          |_______________________________________________________|

      Direct connection to network that is not an immediate network peer

                       Figure 2: Mesh Peer Topology

   By using a fully meshed model in a consortium, broadcasting RID
   requests would be possible, but not advisable.  By broadcasting a
   request, RID peers that may not have carried the attack traffic on
   their network would be asked to perform a trace for the potential of
   decreasing the time in which the true source was identified.  As a
   result, many networks would have utilized unnecessary resources for a
   Request that may have also been unnecessary.

   A star topology may be desirable in instances where a peer may be a
   provider of incident information.  This requires trust relationships
   to be established between the provider of information and each of the
   consumers of that information.  Examples may include country-level
   CSIRTs or service providers distributing incident information to
   organizations.

4.  Message Formats

4.1.  RID Data Types

   RID is derived from the IODEF data model and inherits all of the data
   types defined in the IODEF model.  One data type is added by RID:
   BOOLEAN.

4.1.1.  Boolean

   A boolean value is represented by the BOOLEAN data type.

   The BOOLEAN data type is implemented as "xs:boolean" [XMLschema] in
   the schema.  Note that there are two lexical representations for
   boolean in [XMLschema]: '1' or 'true' for TRUE and '0' or 'false' or
   FALSE.




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4.2.  RID Message Types

   The five RID message types described below MUST be implemented.  RID
   messages uses both the IODEF [RFC5070] and RID document, which MUST
   be encapsulated for transport as specified in [RFC6546].  The
   messages are generated and received on designated systems for RID
   communications.  Each RID message type, along with an example, is
   described in the following sections.  The IODEF-RID schema is
   introduced in Section 5 to support the described RID message types.

   1.  Request.  This message type is used when a request
       ('InvestigationRequest' or 'TraceRequest') is needed.  The
       purpose of the Request message (set to 'InvestigationRequest') is
       to leverage the existing peer relationships in order to notify
       the SP closest to the source of the valid traffic of a security-
       related incident for any necessary actions to be taken.  The
       Request (set to 'TraceRequest') is used when the traffic has to
       be traced iteratively through networks to find the source by
       setting the MsgType to 'TraceRequest'.  The
       'InvestigationRequest' MsgType is used for all other Request
       messages.

   2.  Acknowledgement.  This message is sent to the initiating RID
       system from each of the upstream provider's RID systems to
       provide information on the status of a Request.  The
       Acknowledgement is also used to provide a reason why a Request,
       Report, or Query was not accepted.

   3.  Result.  The Result message is used to provide a final report and
       the notification of actions taken for a Request.  This message is
       sent to the initiating CSIRT through the network of RID systems
       in the path of the trace as notification that the source of the
       attack was located.

   4.  Report.  This message is used to report a security incident, for
       which no action is requested.  This may be used for the purpose
       of correlating attack information by CSIRTs, sharing incident
       information, statistics and trending information, etc.

   5.  Query.  This message is used to request information about an
       incident or incident type from a trusted system communicating via
       RID.  The response is provided through the Report message.

   When an application receives a RID message, it must be able to
   determine the type of message and parse it accordingly.  The message
   type is specified in the RIDPolicy class.  The RIDPolicy class may





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   also be used by the transport protocol to facilitate the
   communication of security incident data to trace, investigate, query,
   or report information regarding security incidents.

5.  IODEF-RID Schema

   There are three classes included in the RID extension required to
   facilitate RID communications.  The RequestStatus class is used to
   indicate the approval status of a Request message; the IncidentSource
   class is used to report whether or not a source was found and to
   identify the source host(s) or network(s); and the RIDPolicy class
   provides information on the agreed-upon policies and specifies the
   type of communication message being used.

   The RID schema defines communication-specific metadata to support the
   exchange of incident information in an IODEF document.  The intent in
   maintaining a separate schema and not using the AdditionalData
   extension of IODEF is the flexibility of sending messages between RID
   hosts.  Since RID is a separate schema and RID messages include both
   the RID and IODEF documents, the RID message acts as an envelope in
   that policy and security defined at the RID message layer are applied
   to both documents.  One reason for maintaining separate schemas is
   for flexibility, where the RIDPolicy class can be easily extracted
   for use in the RID message and by the transport protocol.

   The security requirements of sending incident information between
   entities include the use of encryption.  The RIDPolicy information is
   not required to be encrypted, so separating out this data from the
   IODEF XML document removes the need for decrypting and parsing the
   IODEF document to determine how it should be handled at each RID
   host.

   The purpose of the RIDPolicy class is to specify the message type for
   the receiving host, facilitate the policy needs of RID, and provide
   routing information in the form of an IP address of the destination
   RID system.

   The security requirements and policy guidelines are discussed in
   Section 9.  The policy is defined between RID peers and within or
   between consortiums.  RIDPolicy is meant to be a tool to facilitate
   the defined policies.  This MUST be used in accordance with policy
   set between clients, peers, consortiums, and/or regions.  Security,
   privacy, and confidentiality MUST be considered as specified in this
   document.







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   The RID schema is defined as follows:

           +------------------+
           |        RID       |
           +------------------+
           |                  |
           | ENUM lang        |<>---{0..1}----[ RIDPolicy      ]
           |                  |
           |                  |<>---{0..1}----[ RequestStatus  ]
           |                  |
           |                  |<>---{0..1}----[ IncidentSource ]
           +------------------+

                         Figure 3: The RID Schema

   The aggregate classes that constitute the RID schema in the iodef-rid
   namespace are as follows:

   RIDPolicy

      Zero or One.  The RIDPolicy class is used by all message types to
      facilitate policy agreements between peers, consortiums, or
      federations, as well as to properly route messages.

   RequestStatus

      Zero or One.  The RequestStatus class is used only in
      Acknowledgement messages.  The message reports back to the CSIRT
      or SP in the Acknowledgement message to provide status on a
      Request or if an error or problem occurs with the receipt or
      processing of a Report, Query, or Result message.

   IncidentSource

      Zero or One.  The IncidentSource class is used in the Result
      message only.  The IncidentSource provides the information on the
      identified source host or network of an attack trace or
      investigation.

   Each of the three listed classes may be the only class included in
   the RID class, hence the option for zero or one.  In some cases,
   RIDPolicy MAY be the only class in the RID definition when used by
   the transport protocol [RFC6546], as that information should be as
   small as possible and may not be encrypted.  The RequestStatus
   message MUST be able to stand alone without the need for an IODEF
   document to facilitate the communication, limiting the data
   transported to the required elements per [RFC6546].




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   The RID class has one attribute:

      lang

         One.  REQUIRED.  ENUM.  A valid language code per [RFC5646]
         constrained by the definition of "xs:language" inherited from
         [XML1.0].

5.1.  RIDPolicy Class

   The RIDPolicy class facilitates the delivery of RID messages and is
   also referenced for transport in the transport document [RFC6546].
   The RIDPolicy Class includes the ability to embed an IODEF document
   or XML documents that conform to schemas other than IODEF in the
   ReportSchema element.

          +------------------------+
          | RIDPolicy              |
          +------------------------+
          |                        |
          | ENUM restriction       |<>-------------[ Node         ]
          | ENUM MsgType           |
          | ENUM MsgDestination    |<>---{0..1}----[ IncidentID   ]
          | ENUM ext-MsgType       |
          | ENUM ext-MsgDestination|<>---{1..*}----[ PolicyRegion ]
          |                        |
          |                        |<>---{1..*}----[ TrafficType  ]
          |                        |
          |                        |<>---{0..1}----[ ReportSchema ]
          +------------------------+

                       Figure 4: The RIDPolicy Class

   The aggregate elements that constitute the RIDPolicy class are as
   follows:

   Node

      One.  The Node class is used to identify a host or network device,
      in this case to identify the system communicating RID messages,
      and the usage is determined by the MsgDestination attribute.  The
      base definition of this class is reused from the IODEF
      specification [RFC5070], Section 3.16.  See Section 11 of this
      document for Internationalization considerations.







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   IncidentID

      Zero or one.  Global reference pointing back to the IncidentID
      defined in the IODEF data model.  The IncidentID includes the name
      of the CSIRT, an incident number, and an instance of that
      incident.  The instance number is appended with a dash separating
      the values and is used in cases for which it may be desirable to
      group incidents.  Examples of incidents that may be grouped
      include botnets, polymorphic attacks, DDoS attacks, multiple hops
      of compromised systems found during an investigation, etc.

   PolicyRegion

      One or many.  REQUIRED.  The values for the attribute "region" are
      used to determine what policy area may require consideration
      before a trace can be approved.  The PolicyRegion may include
      multiple selections from the attribute list in order to fit all
      possible policy considerations when crossing regions, consortiums,
      or networks.

   region

      One or many.  REQUIRED.  ENUM.  The attribute region is used to
      identify the expected sharing range of the incident information.
      The region may be within a region or defined by existing
      relationships such as those of a consortium or a client to a
      service provider.

      1.  ClientToSP.  A client initiated the request to their service
          provider (SP).  A client may be an individual, enterprise, or
          other type of entity (government, commercial, education,
          etc.).  An SP may be a network, telecommunications,
          infrastructure, or other type of SP where a client-to-vendor
          relationship has been established.  The client-to-vendor
          relationship will typically have established contracts or
          agreements to define expectations and trust relationships.

      2.  SPToClient.  An SP initiated a RID request or report to a
          client.  A client may be an individual, enterprise, or other
          type of entity (government, commercial, education, etc.).  An
          SP may be a network, telecommunications, infrastructure, or
          other type of SP where a client-to-vendor relationship has
          been established.  The client-to-vendor relationship will
          typically have established contracts or agreements to define
          expectations and trust relationships.






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      3.  IntraConsortium.  Incident information that should have no
          restrictions within the boundaries of a consortium with the
          agreed-upon use and abuse guidelines.  A consortium is a well-
          defined group with established members and trust relationships
          specific to sharing within that group.  A consortium would
          typically define the types of data that can be shared in
          advance, define the expectations on protecting that data, as
          well as have established contractual agreements.  Examples of
          consortiums may include industry-focused sharing communities
          (financial, government, research and education, etc.) or cross
          industry sharing communities (for instance, organizations
          within local proximity that form a sharing group).

      4.  PeerToPeer.  Incident information that should have no
          restrictions between two peers but may require further
          evaluation before continuance beyond that point with the
          agreed-upon use and abuse guidelines.  PeerToPeer
          communications may involve any two individuals or entities
          that decide to share information directly with each other.

      5.  BetweenConsortiums.  Incident information that should have no
          restrictions between consortiums that have established agreed-
          upon use and abuse guidelines.  BetweenConsortiums is used
          when two consortiums (as defined in IntraConsortium above)
          share data.  The types of data that can be shared
          BetweenConsortiums should be identified in their agreements
          and contracts along with expectations on how that data should
          be handled and protected.

      6.  ext-value.  An escape value used to extend this attribute.
          See IODEF [RFC5070], Section 5.1.

   TrafficType

      One or many.  REQUIRED.  The values for the attribute "type" are
      meant to assist in determining if a trace is appropriate for the
      SP receiving the request to continue the trace.  Multiple values
      may be selected for this element; however, where possible, it
      should be restricted to one value that most accurately describes
      the traffic type.

   type

      One or many.  REQUIRED.  ENUM.  The attribute type is used to
      identify the type of information included in the RID message or
      the type of incident.





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      1.  Attack.  This option SHOULD only be selected if the traffic is
          related to an information security incident or attack.  The
          type of attack MUST also be listed in more detail in the IODEF
          Method and Impact classes for further clarification to assist
          in determining if the trace can be continued ([RFC5070],
          Sections 3.9 and 3.10.1).

      2.  Network.  This option MUST only be selected when the trace is
          related to network traffic or routing issues.

      3.  Content.  This category MUST be used only in the case in which
          the request is related to the content and regional
          restrictions on accessing that type of content exist.  This is
          not malicious traffic but may be used for determining what
          sources or destinations accessed certain materials available
          on the Internet, including, but not limited to, news,
          technology, or inappropriate content.

      4.  DataWithHandlingRequirements.  This option is used when data
          shared may have additional restrictions for handling,
          protection, and processing based on the type of data and where
          it resides.  Regulatory or legal restrictions may be imposed
          on specific types of data that could vary based on the
          location, region or nation, of the data or where it
          originated.  The IODEF document, as well as any extensions,
          included with the RID message should indicate the specific
          restrictions to be considered.  The use of this enumeration
          flag is not legally binding.

      5.  AudienceRestriction.  This option is used to indicate that the
          message contains data that should be viewed by a restricted
          audience.  This setting should not be used for normal
          incidents or reporting as it could slow response times.  The
          content may be a business-relevant notification or request.
          This option MAY be used by a business partner to report or
          request assistance if an incident has affected a supply chain.
          This option may also be used if the content is relevant to
          regulatory obligations, legal (eDiscovery), or other use cases
          that require management attention.

      6.  Other.  If this option is selected, a description of the
          traffic type MUST be provided so that policy decisions can be
          made to continue or stop the investigation.  The information
          should be provided in the IODEF message in the Expectation
          class or in the History class using a HistoryItem log.  This
          may also be used for incident types other than information-
          security-related incidents.




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      7.  ext-value.  An escape value used to extend this attribute.
          See IODEF [RFC5070], Section 5.1.

      ReportSchema

         Zero or One.  The ReportSchema class is used by the message
         types that require the full IODEF schema to be included in the
         RID envelope.  Alternate schemas may be included if approved by
         the Designated Reviewer and registered by IANA for use with
         RID.

   The RIDPolicy class has five attributes:

      restriction

         OPTIONAL.  ENUM.  This attribute indicates the disclosure
         guidelines to which the sender expects the recipient to adhere.
         This guideline provides no real security since it is the choice
         of the recipient of the document to honor it.  This attribute
         follows the same guidelines as "restriction" used in IODEF.

      MsgType

         One.  REQUIRED.  ENUM.  The type of RID message sent.  The five
         types of messages are described in Section 4.2 and can be noted
         as one of the six selections below, where a Request is set to
         either 'InvestigationRequest' or 'TraceRequest'.

         1.  TraceRequest.  This Request message may be used to initiate
             a TraceRequest or to continue a TraceRequest to an upstream
             network closer to the source address of the origin of the
             security incident.

         2.  Acknowledgement.  This message is sent to the initiating
             RID system from each of the upstream RID systems to provide
             information on the request status in the current network.

         3.  Result.  This message indicates that the source of the
             attack was located, and the message is sent to the
             initiating RID system through the RID systems in the path
             of the trace.










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         4.  InvestigationRequest.  This Request message type is used
             when the source of the traffic is believed to be valid.
             The purpose of the InvestigationRequest is to leverage the
             existing peer or consortium relationships in order to
             notify the SP closest to the source of the valid traffic
             that some event occurred, which may be a security-related
             incident.

         5.  Report.  This message is used to report a security incident
             for which no action is requested in the IODEF Expectation
             class.  This may be used for the purpose of correlating
             attack information by CSIRTs, gathering statistics and
             trending information, etc.

         6.  Query.  This message is used to request information from a
             trusted RID system about an incident or incident type.

      Additionally, there is an extension attribute to add new
      enumerated values:

         ext-value.  An escape value used to extend this attribute.  See
         IODEF [RFC5070], Section 5.1.

      MsgDestination

         One.  REQUIRED.  ENUM.  The destination required at this level
         may either be the RID messaging system intended to receive the
         request, or, in the case of a Request with MsgType set to
         'InvestigationRequest', the source of the incident.  In the
         case of an InvestigationRequest, the RID system that can help
         stop or mitigate the traffic may not be known, and the message
         may have to traverse RID messaging systems by following the
         routing path to the RID system closest to the source of the
         attack traffic.  The Node element lists either the RID system
         or the IP address of the source, and the meaning of the value
         in the Node element is determined by the MsgDestination
         element.

         1.  RIDSystem.  The IP address of the next upstream system
             accepting RID communications is REQUIRED and is listed in
             the Node element of the RIDPolicy class.  If NodeName
             element of the Node class is used, it contains a DNS domain
             name.  The originating RID system is required to check that
             this domain name resolves to the IP address to which the
             RID message is sent.  This check may be performed in
             advance of sending the message and the result saved for
             future use with additional RID messages.




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         2.  SourceOfIncident.  The Address element of the Node element
             contains the IP address of the incident source, and the
             NodeName element of the Node class is not used.  The IP
             address is REQUIRED when this option is selected.  The IP
             address is used to determine the path of systems accepting
             RID communications that will be used to find the closest
             RID system to the source of an attack in which the IP
             address used by the source is believed to be valid and a
             Request message with MsgDestination set to
             'InvestigationRequest' is used.  This is not to be confused
             with the IncidentSource class, as the defined value here is
             from an initial Request ('InvestigationRequest' or
             'TraceRequest'), not the source used in a Result message.

         3.  ext-value.  An escape value used to extend this attribute.
             All extensions shall specify the contents and meaning of
             the Node element of RIDPolicy.  See IODEF [RFC5070],
             Section 5.1, on extensibility.  If the NodeName element of
             the Node class is used by an extension, NodeName may
             contain an Internationalized Domain Name (IDN); see
             Section 11 for applicable requirements.  All extensions
             SHOULD use an IP address in the Address element of the Node
             class as the primary means of Node identification.

      MsgType-ext

         OPTIONAL.  STRING.  A means by which to extend the MsgType
         attribute.  See IODEF [RFC5070], Section 5.1.

      MsgDestination-ext

         OPTIONAL.  STRING.  A means by which to extend the
         MsgDestination attribute.  See IODEF [RFC5070], Section 5.1

5.1.1.  ReportSchema

   The ReportSchema class is an aggregate class in the RIDPolicy class.
   The IODEF schema is the approved schema for inclusion in RID messages
   via the ReportSchema class.












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          +-------------------------+
          |      ReportSchema       |
          +-------------------------+
          |                         |
          |  ENUM Version           |
          |  STRING ext-Version     |<>---{1}-------[ XMLDocument   ]
          |  ENUM XMLSchemaID       |
          |  STRING ext-XMLSchemaID |<>---{0..1}----[ URL           ]
          |                         |
          |                         |<>---{0..*}----[ Signature     ]
          |                         |
          +-------------------------+

                     Figure 5: The ReportSchema Class

   The elements that constitute the ReportSchema class are as follows:

      XMLDocument

         One.  The XMLDocument is a complete XML document defined by the
         iodef:ExtensionType class.  This class follows the guidelines
         in [RFC5070], Section 5, where the data type is set to 'xml'
         and meaning is set to 'xml' to include an XML document.

      URL

         Zero or One.  URL.  A reference to the XML schema of the XML
         document included.  The URL data type is defined in [RFC5070],
         Section 2.15, as "xs:anyURI" in the schema.  The schemaLocation
         for IODEF is already included in the RID schema, so this is not
         necessary to include a URL for IODEF documents.  The list of
         registered schemas for inclusion will be maintained by IANA.

      Signature

         Zero to many.  The Signature uses the iodef:ExtensionType class
         to enable this element to contain a detached or enveloped
         signature.  This class follows the guidelines in [RFC5070]
         Section 5 where the data type is set to 'xml' and meaning is
         set to 'xml' to include an XML document.  This element is used
         to encapsulate the detached signature based on the iodef:
         RecordItem class within the IODEF document to verify the
         originator of the message or to include the enveloped
         signature.  If other schemas are used instead of IODEF, they
         MUST provide guidance on what class to use if a detached
         signature is provided for this purpose.





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      The ReportSchema class has four attributes:

      Version

         OPTIONAL.  One.  The Version attribute is the version number of
         the specified XML schema.  That schema must be an approved
         version of IODEF or a schema registered with IANA for use with
         RID.  The IANA registry for managing schemas other than IODEF
         is specified in Section 12.

            ext-value.  An escape value used to extend this attribute.
            See IODEF [RFC5070], Section 5.1.

      ext-Version

         OPTIONAL.  One.  The ext-Version attribute is the version
         number of the included XML schema.  This attribute is used if a
         schema other than IODEF or an IANA-registered schema that has
         been added to the enumerated list for Version is included.

      XMLSchemaID

         OPTIONAL.  One.  The XMLSchemaID attribute is the identifier,
         the defined namespace [XMLNames], of the XML schema of the XML
         document included.  The XMLSchemaID and Version specify the
         format of the XMLDocument element.  The only permitted values,
         include the namespace for IODEF [RFC5070],
         "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0", any future IETF-approved
         versions of IODEF, and any namespace included in the IANA-
         managed list of registered schemas for use with RID.  The IANA
         registry for managing schemas other than IODEF is specified in
         Section 12.

            ext-value.  An escape value used to extend this attribute.
            See IODEF [RFC5070], Section 5.1.

      ext-XMLSchemaID

         OPTIONAL.  One.  The ext-XMLSchemaID attribute is the
         identifier (defined namespace) of the XML schema of the XML
         document included.  The ext-XMLSchemaID and ext-Version specify
         the format of the XMLDocument element and are used if the
         included schema is not IODEF version 1.0 or an IANA-registered
         schema that has been added to the enumerated list for
         XMLSchemaID.






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5.2.  RequestStatus

   The RequestStatus class is an aggregate class in the RID class.

                       +--------------------------------+
                       | RequestStatus                  |
                       +--------------------------------+
                       |                                |
                       | ENUM restriction               |
                       | ENUM AuthorizationStatus       |
                       | ENUM Justification             |
                       | STRING ext-AuthorizationStatus |
                       | STRING ext-Justification       |
                       |                                |
                       +--------------------------------+

                     Figure 6: The RequestStatus Class

   The RequestStatus class has five attributes:

      restriction

         OPTIONAL.  ENUM.  This attribute indicates the disclosure
         guidelines to which the sender expects the recipient to adhere.
         This guideline provides no real security since it is the choice
         of the recipient of the document to honor it.  This attribute
         follows the same guidelines as "restriction" used in IODEF.

      AuthorizationStatus

         One.  REQUIRED.  ENUM.  The listed values are used to provide a
         response to the requesting CSIRT of the status of a Request,
         Report, or Query.

         1.  Approved.  The trace was approved and will begin in the
             current SP.

         2.  Denied.  The trace was denied in the current SP.  The next
             closest SP can use this message to filter traffic from the
             upstream SP using the example packet to help mitigate the
             effects of the attack as close to the source as possible.
             The Acknowledgement message must be passed back to the
             originator and a Result message must be used from the
             closest SP to the source in order to indicate actions taken
             in the IODEF History class.






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         3.  Pending.  Awaiting approval; a timeout period has been
             reached, which resulted in this Pending status and
             Acknowledgement message being generated.

         4.  ext-value.  An escape value used to extend this attribute.
             See IODEF [RFC5070], Section 5.1.

         Justification

            OPTIONAL.  ENUM.  Provides a reason for a Denied or Pending
            message.

            1.  SystemResource.  A resource issue exists on the systems
                that would be involved in the request.

            2.  Authentication.  The enveloped digital signature
                [RFC3275] failed to validate.

            3.  AuthenticationOrigin.  The detached digital signature
                for the original requestor on the RecordItem entry
                failed to validate.

            4.  Encryption.  The recipient was unable to decrypt the
                request, report, or query.

            5.  UnrecognizedFormat.  The format of the provided document
                was unrecognized.

            6.  CannotProcess.  The document could not be processed.
                Reasons may include legal or policy decisions.
                Resolution may require communication outside of this
                protocol to resolve legal or policy issues.  No further
                messages SHOULD be sent until resolved.

            7.  Other.  There were other reasons this request could not
                be processed.

            8.  ext-value.  An escape value used to extend this
                attribute.  See IODEF [RFC5070], Section 5.1.

         AuthorizationStatus-ext

            OPTIONAL.  STRING.  A means by which to extend the
            AuthorizationStatus attribute.  See IODEF [RFC5070], Section
            5.1.






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         Justification-ext

            OPTIONAL.  STRING.  A means by which to extend the
            Justification attribute.  See IODEF [RFC5070], Section 5.1.

5.3.  IncidentSource

   The IncidentSource class is an aggregate class in the RID class.

          +-------------------+
          | IncidentSource    |
          +-------------------+
          |                   |
          | ENUM restriction  |
          |                   |<>-------------[ SourceFound    ]
          |                   |
          |                   |<>---{0..*}----[ Node           ]
          |                   |
          +-------------------+

                    Figure 7: The IncidentSource Class

   The elements that constitute the IncidentSource class follow:

      SourceFound

         One.  BOOLEAN.  The Source class indicates if a source was
         identified.  If the source was identified, it is listed in the
         Node element of this class.

         True.  Source of incident was identified.

         False.  Source of incident was not identified.

      Node

         Zero or many.  The Node class is used to identify a system
         identified as part of an incident.  If this element is used,
         the Address element of the Node element MUST contain the IP
         address of the system.  If the NodeName element of the Node
         class is used, it contains a DNS domain name that has been
         checked to ensure that it resolved to that IP address when the
         check was performed.  See Section 11 of this document for
         internationalization considerations for NodeName.  The base
         definition of this class from the IODEF ([RFC5070], Section
         3.16) can be expanded to include other identifiers.





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      The IncidentSource class has one attribute:

      restriction

         OPTIONAL.  ENUM.  This attribute indicates the disclosure
         guidelines to which the sender expects the recipient to
         adhere.This guideline provides no real security since it is the
         choice of the recipient of the document to honor it.  This
         attribute follows the same guidelines as "restriction" used in
         IODEF.

5.4.  RID Name Spaces

   The RID schema declares a namespace of
   "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0" and registers it per
   [RFC3688].  Each IODEF-RID document MUST use the "iodef-rid-2.0"
   namespace in the top-level element RID-Document.  It can be
   referenced as follows:

   <RID-Document version="2.0" lang="en-US"
      xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0"
      xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3c.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
      xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0.xsd">

5.5.  Encoding

   RID documents MUST begin with an XML declaration and MUST specify the
   XML version used; also, the use of UTF-8 encoding is REQUIRED
   ([RFC3470], Section 4.4).  RID conforms to all XML data encoding
   conventions and constraints.

   The XML declaration with no character encoding will read as follows:

      <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

   The following characters have special meaning in XML and MUST be
   escaped with their entity reference equivalent: "&", "<", ">", "\""
   (double quotation mark), and "'" (apostrophe).  These entity
   references are "&amp;", "&lt;", "&gt;", "&quot;", and "&apos;",
   respectively.

5.6.  Including IODEF or Other XML Documents

   In order to support the changing activity of CSIRTS, the RID schema
   can include an IODEF or other data model.  The IODEF is also
   extensible, enabling the schemas to evolve along with the needs of
   CSIRTs.  This section discusses how to include the IODEF XML document
   or other XML documents to leverage the security and trust



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   relationships established through the use of RID.  These techniques
   are designed so that adding new data will not require a change to the
   RID schema.  This approach also supports the exchange of private XML
   documents relevant only to a closed consortium.  XML documents can be
   included through the ReportSchema class in the RIDPolicy class.  The
   XMLDocument attribute is set to 'xml' to allow for the inclusion of
   full IODEF or other XML documents.  The following guidelines MUST be
   followed:

   1.  The included schema MUST define a separate namespace, such as the
       declared namespace for IODEF of
       "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0".

   2.  When a parser encounters an included XML document it does not
       understand, the included document MUST be ignored (and not
       processed), but the remainder of the document MUST be processed.
       Parsers will be able to identify the XML documents for which they
       have no processing logic through the namespace declaration.
       Parsers that encounter an unrecognized element in a namespace
       that they do support SHOULD reject the document as a syntax
       error.

   3.  Implementations SHOULD NOT download schemas at runtime due to the
       security implications, and included documents MUST NOT be
       required to provide a resolvable location of their schema.

   The examples included in Section 7 demonstrate how an IODEF document
   is included.  The included schema of IODEF is represented in
   ReportSchema as follows:

      Version: "1.0"

      XMLSchemaID: "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"

      URL: "http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/schema/
      iodef-1.0.xsd"

   The URL is optionally included for IODEF since it is already in the
   RID schema, and the schemaLocation is defined.

5.6.1.  Including XML Documents in RID

   XML schemas may be registered for inclusion in a RID message.  This
   may include schemas other than IODEF or updated versions of IODEF.
   The registered IANA information for additional schemas MUST include
   the specification name, version, specification Uniform Resource
   Identifier (URI), and namespace.  The following provides an example
   of the necessary information for additional schemas beyond IODEF.



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   Example Name (XXXX)

      Schema Name:   XXXX_1.1
      Version:       1.1
      Namespace:     <registered namespace>
      Specification URI:  http://www.example.com/XXXX

   The version attribute of the ReportSchema class is populated with the
   approved versions of IODEF or any additional schemas registered by
   IANA; see Section 12.

   The XMLSchemaID of the ReportSchema class is populated with the
   namespace of the included schema.  The attribute enumeration values
   include the namespace for IODEF and any schema registered by IANA;
   see Section 12.

   The URL element of the ReportSchema class is populated with the
   Specification URI value of the included schema.

6.  RID Messages

   The IODEF model is followed as specified in [RFC5070] for each of the
   RID message types.  The RID schema is used in combination with IODEF
   documents to facilitate RID communications.  Each message type varies
   slightly in format and purpose; hence, the requirements vary and are
   specified for each.  All classes, elements, attributes, etc., that
   are defined in the IODEF-Document are valid in the context of a RID
   message; however, some listed as optional in IODEF are mandatory for
   RID as listed for each message type.  The IODEF model MUST be fully
   implemented for RID messages that include IODEF payloads to ensure
   proper parsing of those messages.

   Note: The implementation of RID may automate the ability to fill in
   the content required for each message type from packet input,
   incident data, situational awareness information, or default values
   such as those used in the EventData class.

6.1.  Request

   Description: This message type is used to request assistance in a
   computer security investigation.  The investigation request may be
   directed to another party that can assist with forensics and continue
   the investigation (the incident may have originated on the SP network
   to which the Request was sent), or it may be directed to an SP to
   trace the traffic from an unknown source.  The Request message with
   MsgType set to 'InvestigationRequest' may leverage the existing
   bilateral peer relationships in order to notify the SP closest to the
   source of the valid traffic that some event occurred, which may be a



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   security-related incident.  A Request message with the MsgType set to
   'TraceRequest' may be sent to an upstream peer to trace back through
   the network to locate the source of malicious traffic.  The following
   information is REQUIRED for Request messages and is provided through
   the following data structures:

   RID Information:

      RIDPolicy

         RID message type, IncidentID, and destination policy
         information

   IODEF Information:

      Timestamps (DetectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime).

      Incident Identifier (Incident class, IncidentID).

      Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
      class).

      System class is used to list both the Source and Destination.

      Expectation class should be used to request any specific actions
      to be taken close to the source.

      Path information of nested RID systems, beginning with the request
      originator used in the trace using IODEF EventData with category
      set to 'infrastructure'.

      Event, Record, and RecordItem classes to include example packets
      and other information related to the incident.  Note: Event
      information included here requires a second instance of EventData
      in addition to that used to convey SP path contact information.

   Standards for encryption and digital signatures [RFC3275] [XMLsig]
   [XMLencrypt]:

      Digital signature from initiating CSIRT or provider system sending
      the RID message, passed to all systems receiving the Request using
      a detached XML digital signature on a RecordItem entry, placed in
      an instance of the Signature element.

      Digital signature of sending CSIRT or SP for authenticity of the
      RID message, from the CSIRT or provider creating this message
      using an enveloped XML digital signature on the IODEF document,
      placed in an instance of the Signature element.



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      XML encryption as required by policy, agreements, and data
      markers.

   Security requirements include the ability to encrypt [XMLencrypt] the
   contents of the Request message using the public key of the
   destination RID system.  The incident number increases whether the
   Request message has the MsgDestination set to 'InvestigationRequest'
   or 'TraceRequest' in order to ensure uniqueness within the system.
   The relaying peers also append their Autonomous System (AS) or RID
   system information using the path information as the Request message
   was relayed through SPs.  This enables the response (Result message)
   to utilize the same path and trust relationships for the return
   message, indicating any actions taken.  The request is recorded in
   the state tables of both the initiating and destination SP RID
   systems.  The destination SP is responsible for any actions taken as
   a result of the request in adherence to any service level agreements
   or policies.  The SP MUST confirm that the traffic actually
   originated from the suspected system before taking any action and
   confirm the reason for the request.  The request may be sent directly
   to a known RID system or routed by the source address of the attack
   using the MsgDestination of RIDPolicy set to 'SourceOfIncident'.
   Note: Any intermediate parties in a TraceRequest MUST be able to view
   RIDPolicy information of responding message types in order to
   properly direct RID messages.

   A DDoS attack can have many sources, resulting in multiple traces to
   locate the sources of the attack.  It may be valid to continue
   multiple traces for a single attack.  The path information enables
   the administrators to determine if the exact trace already passed
   through a single network.  The Incident Identifier must also be used
   to identify multiple Requests from a single incident.  If a single
   Request results in divergent paths of Requests, a separate instance
   number MUST be used under the same IncidentID.  The IncidentID
   instance number of IODEF can be used to correlate related incident
   data that is part of a larger incident.

6.2.  Acknowledgement

   Description: The Acknowledgement is also used to provide a status to
   any message type and to provide a Justification if the message could
   not be processed for any reason.  This message is sent to the
   initiating RID system from the next upstream provider's application
   or system designated for accepting RID communications to provide
   information on the request status in the current SP.

   The following information is REQUIRED for Acknowledgement messages
   and is provided through the following data structures:




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   RID Information:

      RIDPolicy

         RID message type, IncidentID, and destination policy
         information

      RequestStatus class:

         Status of Request

   Standards for encryption and digital signatures [RFC3275], [XMLsig],
   [XMLencrypt]:

      Digital signature of responding CSIRT or provider for authenticity
      of Trace Status Message, from the CSIRT or provider creating this
      message using an enveloped XML digital signature.

      XML encryption as required by policy, agreements, and data
      markers.

   A message is sent back to the initiating CSIRT or provider's system;
   it accepts RID communications of the trace as status notification.
   This message verifies that the next RID system in the path has
   received the message from the previous system in the path.  This
   message also verifies that the trace is now continuing, has stopped,
   or is pending in the next upstream CSIRT or provider's RID system.
   The Pending status is automatically generated after a 2-minute
   timeout without system-predefined or administrator action to approve
   or disapprove the trace continuance.  If a Request is denied, the
   originator and sending peer (if they are not the same) MUST both
   receive the message.  This provides the sending peer with the option
   to take action to stop or mitigate the traffic as close to the source
   as possible.

6.3.  Result

   Description: This message indicates that the trace or investigation
   has been completed and provides the result.  The Result message
   includes information on whether or not a source was found, and the
   source information is provided through the IncidentSource class.  The
   Result information MUST go back to the originating RID system that
   began the investigation or trace.  A provider may use any number of
   incident-handling data sources to ascertain the true source of an
   attack.  All of the possible information sources may or may not be
   readily tied into the RID communications system.





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   The following information is REQUIRED for Result messages and will be
   provided through the following data structures:

      RID Information:

         RIDPolicy

            RID message type, IncidentID, and destination policy
            information

         Incident Source

            The IncidentSource class of the RID schema is used to note
            if a source was identified and provide the source
            address(es) or other Node information.

      IODEF Information:

         Timestamps (DetectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime).

         Incident Identifier (Incident class, IncidentID).

            Trace number is used for multiple traces of a single
            incident; it MUST be included if the response is specific to
            an instance of an incident.

         Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
         class).

         System class is used to list both the Source and Destination
         Information used in the attack and must note if the traffic is
         spoofed, thus requiring in RID an upstream Request set to
         'TraceRequest'.

         History class "atype" attribute is used to note any actions
         taken.

         History class also notes any other background information
         including notes about the Confidence level or rating of the
         result information.

         Path information of nested RID systems, beginning with the
         request originator used in the trace using IODEF EventData with
         category set to 'infrastructure'.  The last SP listed is the SP
         that located the source of the traffic (the provider sending
         the Result message).





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         Event, Record, and RecordItem classes to include example
         packets and other information related to the incident
         (optional).  Note: Event information included here requires a
         second instance of EventData in addition to that used to convey
         SP path contact information.

      Standards for encryption and digital signatures [RFC3275],
      [XMLsig], [XMLencrypt]:

         Digital signature of source CSIRT or provider for authenticity
         of Result message, from the CSIRT or provider creating this
         message using an enveloped XML digital signature.

         XML encryption as required by policy, agreements, and data
         markers.

   A message is sent back to the initiating CSIRT or provider's RID
   system to notify the CSIRT that the source has been located.  The
   actual source information may or may not be included, depending on
   the policy of the network in which the client or host is attached.
   Any action taken by the SP to act upon the discovery of the source of
   a trace should be included.  The SP may be able to automate the
   adjustment of filters at their border router to block outbound access
   for the machine(s) discovered as a part of the attack.  The filters
   may be comprehensive and block all Internet access until the host has
   taken the appropriate action to resolve any security issues.  The SP
   may be limited in their options for filtering due to agreements or
   other restrictions resulting in less comprehensive filters, such as
   rate-limiting the ingress traffic as close to the source as possible.

   Security and privacy requirements discussed in Section 9 MUST be
   taken into account.

   Note: The History class has been expanded in IODEF to accommodate all
   of the possible actions taken as a result of a RID Request using the
   "iodef:atype", or action type, attribute.  The History class should
   be used to note all actions taken close to the source of a trace or
   incident using the most appropriate option for the type of action
   along with a description.  The "atype" attribute in the Expectation
   class can also be used to request an appropriate action when a
   Request is made.

6.4.  Report

   Description: This message or document is sent to a RID system to
   provide a report of a security incident.  This message does not
   require any actions to be taken, except to file the report on the
   receiving RID system or associated database.



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   The following information is REQUIRED for Report messages and will be
   provided through the following data structures:

      RID Information:

         RIDPolicy RID message type, IncidentID, and destination policy
         information

      The following data is RECOMMENDED if available and can be provided
      through the following data structures:

      IODEF Information:

         Timestamps (DetectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime).

         Incident Identifier (Incident class, IncidentID).

            Trace number is used for multiple traces of a single
            incident; it MUST be included if the Report is specific to
            an instance of an incident.

         Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
         class).

         System class is used to list both the Source and Destination
         Information used in the attack.

         Event, Record, and RecordItem classes are used to include
         example packets and other information related to the incident
         (optional).

      Standards for encryption and digital signatures [RFC3275],
      [XMLsig], [XMLencrypt]:

         Digital signature from initiating RID system, passed to all
         systems receiving the report using an enveloped XML digital
         signature, placed in an instance of the Signature element.

         XML encryption as required by policy, agreements, and data
         markers.

   Security requirements include the ability to encrypt [XMLencrypt] the
   contents of the Report message using the public key of the
   destination RID system.  Senders of a Report message should note that
   the information may be used to correlate security incident
   information for the purpose of trending, pattern detection, etc., and
   may be shared with other parties unless otherwise agreed upon with
   the receiving RID system.  Therefore, sending parties of a Report



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   message may obfuscate or remove destination addresses or other
   sensitive information before sending a Report message.  A Report
   message may be sent either to file an incident report or to respond
   to a Query, and data sensitivity must be considered in both cases.
   The SP path information is not necessary for this message, as it will
   be communicated directly between two trusted RID systems.

6.5.  Query

   Description: The Query message is used to request incident
   information from a trusted RID system.  The request can include the
   incident number, if known, or detailed information about the
   incident.  If the incident number is known, the Report message
   containing the incident information can easily be returned to the
   trusted requestor using automated methods.  If an example packet or
   other unique information is included in the Query, the return report
   may be automated; otherwise, analyst intervention may be required.

   The following information is REQUIRED for a Query message and is
   provided through the following data structures:

      RID Information:

         RIDPolicy

            RID message type, IncidentID, and destination policy
            information

      IODEF Information (optional):

         Timestamps (DetectTime, StartTime, EndTime, ReportTime).

         Incident Identifier (Incident class, IncidentID).

            Trace number is used for multiple traces of a single
            incident; it MUST be included if the Query is an instance of
            an incident.

         Confidence rating of security incident (Impact and Confidence
         class).

         System class is used to list both the Source and Destination
         Information used in the attack.

         Event, Record, and RecordItem classes are used to include
         example packets and other information related to the incident
         (optional).




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      Standards for encryption and digital signatures [RFC3275],
      [XMLsig], [XMLencrypt]:

         Digital signature from the CSIRT or SP initiating the RID
         message, passed to all systems receiving the Query using an
         enveloped XML digital signature, placed in an instance of the
         Signature element.

         XML encryption as required by policy, agreements, and data
         markers.

   The proper response to the Query message is a Report message.
   Multiple incidents may be returned for a single query if an incident
   type is requested.  In this case, the receiving system sends an IODEF
   document containing multiple incidents or all instances of an
   incident.  The system sending the reply may preset a limit to the
   number of documents returned in one report.  The recommended limit is
   5, to prevent the documents from becoming too large.  Other transfer
   methods may be better suited than RID for large transfers of data.
   The Confidence rating may be used in the Query message to select only
   incidents with an equal or higher Confidence rating than what is
   specified.  This may be used for cases when information is gathered
   on a type of incident but not on specifics about a single incident.
   Source and Destination Information may not be needed if the Query is
   intended to gather data about a specific type of incident.

7.  RID Communication Exchanges

   The following section outlines the communication flows for RID and
   also provides examples of messages.

   The possible set of message exchanges include:

   o  Request: Asynchronous Request for assistance and/or action to be
      taken, MAY involve multiple systems and iterative Requests

         MsgType set to 'InvestigationRequest' or 'TraceRequest'

         Possible responses:

         +  Acknowledgement (OPTIONAL for InvestigationRequest)

         +  Result (REQUIRED unless Acknowledgement was set to 'no')

         +  Report (OPTIONAL; zero or more; Report can be sent
            unsolicited)





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   o  Query: Synchronous request for information

         MsgType set to 'Query'

         Possible responses:

         +  Acknowledgement (OPTIONAL if yes; REQUIRED if no Report will
            be sent)

         +  Report (REQUIRED unless Acknowledgement was set to 'no')

   o  Report: Asynchronous information report; may be pushed to systems
      or may be a response to a Query

         MsgType set to 'Report'

         Possible responses:

         +  Acknowledgement (OPTIONAL)

   Processing considerations for the IODEF document and any IODEF
   included elements or attributes MUST follow the guidelines specified
   in [RFC5070], Section 4.  [RFC3023] and [RFC3470] specify
   requirements and best practices for the use of XML in IETF
   application protocols.  RID and IODEF documents MUST be well-formed
   (see [RFC3470], Section 4.1) and MUST be validated against the
   appropriate schema.  Internal or external DTD subsets are prohibited
   in RID; see [RFC3023], Section 3.

   Comments can be ignored by conform ant processors for RID or IODEF
   documents (see [RFC3470], Section 4.6) and are included below for
   informational purposes only.  The first example demonstrates the use
   of a detached digital signature.  Subsequent examples do not include
   the detached signature required for some message types.  The
   signature is applied after the message is created as demonstrated in
   the first example.

   Note: For each example listed below, [RFC5735] addresses were used.
   Assume that each IP address listed is actually a separate network
   range held by different SPs.  Addresses were used from /27 network
   ranges.

7.1.  Upstream Trace Communication Flow

   The diagram below outlines the RID Request communication flow for a
   TraceRequest between RID systems on different networks tracing an
   attack.  The Request message with MsgDestination set to




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   'TraceRequest' is represented in the diagram by "TraceRequest".
   SP-1, SP-2, and SP-3 represent service providers that are involved in
   the example trace communication flow.

    Attack Dest      SP-1            SP-2        SP-3        Attack Src

    1. Attack    |  Attack
       reported  |  detected

    2.              Initiate trace

    3.              Locate origin
                    through
                    upstream SP

    4.              o---TraceRequest----->

    5.                              Trace
                                    Initiated

    6.              <---Acknowledgement--o

    7.                              Locate origin
                                    through
                                    upstream SP

    8.                              o---TraceRequest--->

    9.                                             Trace Initiated

    10.             <----------Acknowledgement----o
                                     <-Acknowledgement-o

    11.                                            Locate attack
                                                   source on network   X

    12.             <------------Result----------------o

    13.             o- - - - -Acknowledgement- - - - - >


                 Figure 8: TraceRequest Communication Flow

   Before a trace is initiated, the RID system should verify that an
   instance of the trace or a similar request is not active.  The traces
   may be resource intensive; therefore, providers need to be able to
   detect potential abuse of the system or unintentional resource




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   drains.  Information such as the Source and Destination Information,
   associated packets, and the incident may be desirable to maintain for
   a period of time determined by administrators.

   The communication flow demonstrates that an Acknowledgement message
   is sent to both the downstream peer and the original requestor.  If a
   Request in a traceback is denied, the downstream peer has the option
   to take an action and respond with a Result message.  The originator
   of the request may follow up with the downstream peer of the SP
   involved using a Request with the MsgType set to
   'InvestigationRequest' to ensure that an action is taken if no
   response is received.  Nothing precludes the originator of the
   request from initiating a new Request with the MsgType set to
   'TraceRequest' thereby bypassing the SP that denied the request, if a
   trace is needed beyond that point.  Another option may be for the
   initiator to send an 'InvestigationRequest' to an SP upstream of the
   SP that denied the request.  This action assumes enough information
   was gathered to discern the true source of the attack traffic from
   the incident-handling information.

   The proper response to a TraceRequest is an Acknowledgement message.
   The Acknowledgement message lets the requestor know if the trace will
   continue through the next upstream network.  If there is a problem
   with the request, such as a failure to validate the digital signature
   or decrypt the request, an Acknowledgement message MUST be sent to
   the requestor and the downstream peer (if they are not one and the
   same) providing the reason why the message could not be processed.
   Assuming that the trace continued, additional TraceRequests with the
   response of an Acknowledgement message would occur, thereby passing
   the request upstream in the path to the source of the traffic related
   to the incident.  Once a source is found, a Result message is sent to
   the originator of the trace, as determined by the SP path information
   provided through the document instance of EventData, where contact is
   set to 'infrastructure'.  The SP path information is also used when
   sending the Acknowledgement messages to the first entry (the trace
   originator) and the last nested entry (the downstream peer).  The
   Result message is encrypted [XMLencrypt] for the originator providing
   information about the incident source and any actions taken.  If the
   originator fails to decrypt or authenticate the Result message, an
   Acknowledgement message is sent in response; otherwise, no return
   message is sent.  The final Acknowledgement to the Result message is
   depicted as optional in the diagram above.  If an Acknowledgement
   message is sent with the RequestStatus set to Denied, a downstream
   peer receiving this message may choose to take action to stop or
   mitigate the traffic at that point in the network, as close to the
   source as possible.  If the downstream peer chooses this option, it
   would send a Result message to the trace originator.




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7.1.1.  RID TraceRequest Example

   The example listed is of a Request message with MsgDestination set to
   'TraceRequest' based on the incident report example from the IODEF
   document.  The RID classes were included as appropriate for a Request
   message of this type using the RIDPolicy class.  The example given is
   that of a CSIRT reporting a DoS attack in progress to the upstream
   SP.  The request asks the next SP to continue the trace and have the
   traffic mitigated closer to the source of the traffic.  The example
   Request message is the first step of a TraceRequest as depicted in
   the previous diagram, where 'Attack Dest' is represented by
   192.0.2.67 (and SP-1).  The 'Attack Src' is later identified in the
   Result message example as 192.0.2.37 and initially as tracing closer
   to 192.0.2.35.  SP-1 is identified in the Request as CSIRT-FOR-OUR-
   DOMAIN, and SP-2 is identified in the RID document for the Request as
   the 'RIDSystem' in 'MsgDestination' as 192.0.2.3 using the Node
   class.  SP-3 is later used in the Result message and the
   administrator is identified as 'Admin-contact@10.1.1.2' as they
   searched for 192.0.2.35; the administrator may be different than the
   constituency contact (an additional Request with MsgDestination set
   to 'TraceRequest' occurred between SP-2 to SP-3 that is not
   included).  SP-3 is the service provider for 192.0.2.32/27 and was
   able to take the action to rate-limit their traffic.  The SP-1, SP-2,
   and SP-3 information would be replaced with the appropriate (and
   valid) email and other contact information in real usages.  The Node
   class enables multiple methods to identify a system, such as a fully
   qualified domain name or the IP address to be provided for the SP.
   Any mapping of existing relationships from the SP Node information to
   the name, contact, digital signature verification information and
   other identifying or trust information is provided at the application
   layer to support end users of the incident management system.  A
   packet is provided in this example to enable any traces to be
   performed by SP-2 and SP-3 to perform traces to the attack source
   before taking the requested action to 'rate-limit' the traffic.  The
   subnet of 192.0.2.0 uses a 27-bit mask in the examples below.

   In the following example, use of [XMLsig] to generate digital
   signatures follows the guidance of [XMLsig] 1.0.  Version 1.1 of
   [XMLsig] supports additional digest algorithms.  Reference [RFC4051]
   for URIs intended for use with XML digital signatures, encryption,
   and canonicalization.  SHA-1 SHOULD NOT be used; see [RFC6194] for
   further details.

   Note: Due to the limit of 72 characters per line, some line breaks
   were added in the examples and schemas in this document.






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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
<iodef-rid:RID lang="en-US"
 xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0"
 xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
 xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
 xsi:schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0">
 <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgDestination="RIDSystem" MsgType="TraceRequest">
   <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
     <iodef:Node>
      <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.3</iodef:Address>
     </iodef:Node>
     <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
     <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
            CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
     </iodef:IncidentID>
     <!-- IODEF-Document included in RID -->
     <iodef-rid:ReportSchema Version="1.0">
      <iodef-rid:XMLDocument dtype="xml" meaning="xml">
       <IODEF-Document lang="en">
        <iodef:Incident purpose="traceback" restriction="need-to-know">
          <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
                           CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
          </iodef:IncidentID>
          <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-02T22:49:24+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
          <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-02T22:19:24+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
          <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-02T23:20:24+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
          <iodef:Description>
                           Host involved in DoS attack
          </iodef:Description>
          <iodef:Assessment>
            <iodef:Impact completion="failed" severity="low"
                          type="dos"/>
          </iodef:Assessment>
          <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
            <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
            </iodef:ContactName>
            <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@192.0.2.35</iodef:Email>
          </iodef:Contact>
          <iodef:EventData>
            <iodef:Flow>
              <iodef:System category="source">
                <iodef:Node>
                  <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
                  </iodef:Address>
                </iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
                  <iodef:Port>38765</iodef:Port>
                </iodef:Service>



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              </iodef:System>
              <iodef:System category="target">
                <iodef:Node>
                  <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
                  </iodef:Address>
                </iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
                  <iodef:Port>80</iodef:Port>
                </iodef:Service>
              </iodef:System>
            </iodef:Flow>
            <iodef:Expectation action="rate-limit-host" severity="high">
              <iodef:Description>
                     Rate-limit traffic close to source
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:Expectation>
          <iodef:Record>
            <iodef:RecordData>
              <iodef:Description>
               The IPv4 packet included was used in the described attack
              </iodef:Description>
              <iodef:RecordItem dtype="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
                0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
                4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
                6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
                46432e0a
              </iodef:RecordItem>
             </iodef:RecordData>
            </iodef:Record>
           </iodef:EventData>
           <iodef:History>
             <iodef:HistoryItem action="rate-limit-host">
               <iodef:DateTime>
                      2001-09-14T08:19:01+00:00
               </iodef:DateTime>
               <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
                      CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
               </iodef:IncidentID>
               <iodef:Description>
              Notification sent to next upstream SP closer to 192.0.2.35
               </iodef:Description>
              </iodef:HistoryItem>
             </iodef:History>
            </iodef:Incident>
           </IODEF-Document>
         </iodef-rid:XMLDocument>
       <!-- End of IODEF-Document included in RID -->
       <!-- Start of detached XML signature included in RID -->



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       <iodef-rid:Signature dtype="xml" meaning="xml">
        <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
                   Id="dsig-123456">
        <SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod
  Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
<SignatureMethod
  Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
    <Reference URI="">
    <Transforms>
     <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
     <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2002/06/xmldsig-filter2">
     <XPath xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2002/06/xmldsig-filter2"
       xmlns:dsig="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
       xmlns:dsig-trans="http://www.w3.org/2002/06/xmldsig-filter2"
       Filter="intersect">
       //dsig:Signature[@Id = 'dsig-123456']/
       ancestor::iodef-rid:ReportSchema/
       iodef-rid:XMLDocument/IODEF-Document[1]/iodef:Incident[1]/
       iodef:EventData[1]/iodef:Record[1]/iodef:RecordData[1]/
       iodef:RecordItem[1]</XPath></Transform></Transforms>
    <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
    <DigestValue>
       NQuIhPjdZuZJnPi/hW62dwJT1dR+vqcZV8mpemCVN5g=
    </DigestValue>
   </Reference></SignedInfo>
   <SignatureValue>
lnq/ePQ4AVpxCR0ifCp9sMsW0r/AdT3C2GR/zaN1V+hZ/NApOygUjMzTCQnx+RvGPNkO/RVq
BEIDgZQUEnQZn/uSbmr0tQ6xpBfaxF1DCosLgiZy+2jFzpXrwoN/jHNgtxR/9QLW9mZ+I7V6
LEEJ73Kut+d0naTGHlyi64ab2PqsVuRXQ4pXUKbhMkhzeTIqvFLK93KGfsIMd6Cb+n2u/ABy
Lkc+gflJYUWVP4DxkQ4cyex6hM6RYTRUSr7jVD9K4d8KFP2g85i69YLtSu01W1Np0afpJ4a9
MK0E7ISMNRmC8wIklCAsSXiBRqyaEwaSy/clybI0vCTPqGOYh3/SZg==
   </SignatureValue>
   <KeyInfo>
    <KeyValue>
      <RSAKeyValue>
       <Modulus>
z8adrX9m0S8OxIxN+fui33wiz4ZYgb4xPbR9MS5pOp1A8kVpH5Ew3N6O3/dMs2a4diIxyGLV
h0r86QXWH/W6T2IC2ny+hi+jWRwXrvgTY3ZAFgePvz2OdRhVN/cUbOto4Pa4I2mVZWW+/Q0F
n7YpqPBDDxlGq/xyFPuYq/4y7Y+Ah+vHO2ZSaiQjbj8F38XrGhwlcbFVyK8AmxK3z0zWwX86
uMEqVCjW6s6j2KAWdbAjEpgZHlJY87i/DqnFgxfmdg3oru+YeiEPVRY8hyQpYbtgryveZOHT
gnCHmS/53U9jSS0cyb/ADuj1upfyNoOiMMgQr7Olhc5pTvuWAl4Fnw==</Modulus>
       <Exponent>AQAB</Exponent>
      </RSAKeyValue>
      </KeyValue>
    </KeyInfo>
   </Signature>
  </iodef-rid:Signature>



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  <!-- End of detached XML signature included in RID -->
      </iodef-rid:ReportSchema>
   </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
</iodef-rid:RID>

7.1.2.  Acknowledgement Message Example

   The example Acknowledgement message is in response to the Request
   message listed above.  The SP that received the request is responding
   to approve the trace continuance in their network.

   <iodef-rid:RID lang="en"
                  xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0"
                  xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
     <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Acknowledgement"
                          MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
       <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
       <iodef:Node>
         <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67</iodef:Address>
       </iodef:Node>
       <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
       <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
         CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
       </iodef:IncidentID>
     </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
     <iodef-rid:RequestStatus AuthorizationStatus="Approved"/>
   </iodef-rid:RID>

7.1.3.  Result Message Example

   The example Result message is in response to the Request listed
   above.  This message type only comes after an Acknowledgement within
   the Request flow of messages where a TraceRequest is in progress.  It
   may be a direct response to a Request with the MsgType set to
   'InvestigationRequest'.  This message provides information about the
   source of the attack and the actions taken to mitigate the traffic.
   The Result message is typically the last message in a Request flow;
   however, an Acknowledgement MAY follow if there are any issues
   receiving or processing the Result.

<iodef-rid:RID lang="en"
               xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0"
               xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
  <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Result"
                       MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
    <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
    <iodef:Node>
      <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67</iodef:Address>



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    </iodef:Node>
    <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
    <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
      CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
    </iodef:IncidentID>
<!-- IODEF-Document included in RID -->
    <iodef-rid:ReportSchema Version="1.0">
     <iodef-rid:XMLDocument dtype="xml" meaning="xml">
      <iodef:IODEF-Document lang="en">
      <iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="traceback">
        <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
          CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
        </iodef:IncidentID>
      <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-02T22:49:24+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
      <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-02T22:19:24+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
      <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-02T23:20:24+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
      <iodef:Description>Host involved in DoS attack</iodef:Description>
      <iodef:Assessment>
        <iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed"
                      type="dos"/>
      </iodef:Assessment>
      <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
        <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
        </iodef:ContactName>
        <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@192.0.2.35</iodef:Email>
      </iodef:Contact>
      <iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:Contact role="admin" type="organization">
          <iodef:ContactName>Admin-contact for 192.0.2.35
          </iodef:ContactName>
          <iodef:Email>Admin-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>
        </iodef:Contact>
        <iodef:Flow>
          <iodef:System category="intermediate">
            <iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
              </iodef:Address>
            </iodef:Node>
          </iodef:System>
        </iodef:Flow>
        <iodef:EventData>
          <iodef:Contact role="admin" type="organization">
            <iodef:ContactName>Admin-contact for 192.0.2.3
            </iodef:ContactName>
            <iodef:Email>Admin-contact@192.0.2.3</iodef:Email>
          </iodef:Contact>
          <iodef:Flow>
            <iodef:System category="intermediate">



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              <iodef:Node>
                <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.3
                </iodef:Address>
              </iodef:Node>
            </iodef:System>
          </iodef:Flow>
        </iodef:EventData>
      </iodef:EventData>
      <iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:Flow>
          <iodef:System category="source">
            <iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
              </iodef:Address>
            </iodef:Node>
            <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
              <iodef:Port>38765</iodef:Port>
            </iodef:Service>
          </iodef:System>
          <iodef:System category="target">
            <iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
              </iodef:Address>
            </iodef:Node>
            <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
              <iodef:Port>80</iodef:Port>
            </iodef:Service>
          </iodef:System>
        </iodef:Flow>
        <iodef:Expectation severity="high" action="rate-limit-host">
          <iodef:Description>
            Rate-limit traffic close to source
          </iodef:Description>
        </iodef:Expectation>
        <iodef:Record>
          <iodef:RecordData>
            <iodef:Description>
              The IPv4 packet included was used in the described attack
            </iodef:Description>
            <iodef:RecordItem dtype="ipv4-packet">450000522ad9
            0000ff06c41fc0a801020a010102976d0050103e020810d9
            4a1350021000ad6700005468616e6b20796f7520666f7220
            6361726566756c6c792072656164696e6720746869732052
            46432e0a
            </iodef:RecordItem>
          </iodef:RecordData>
        </iodef:Record>
      </iodef:EventData>



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      <iodef:History>
        <iodef:HistoryItem action="rate-limit-host">
          <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-02T22:53:01+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
          <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
            CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#207-1
          </iodef:IncidentID>
          <iodef:Description>
            Notification sent to next upstream SP closer to 192.0.2.35
          </iodef:Description>
        </iodef:HistoryItem>
        <iodef:HistoryItem action="rate-limit-host">
          <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-02T23:07:21+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
          <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-SP3">
            CSIRT-FOR-SP3#3291-1
          </iodef:IncidentID>
          <iodef:Description>
            Host rate-limited for 24 hours
            </iodef:Description>
          </iodef:HistoryItem>
        </iodef:History>
      </iodef:Incident>
      </iodef:IODEF-Document>
     </iodef-rid:XMLDocument>
<!-- End of IODEF-Document included in RID -->
   </iodef-rid:ReportSchema>
  </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
  <iodef-rid:IncidentSource>
    <iodef-rid:SourceFound>true</iodef-rid:SourceFound>
    <iodef:Node>
      <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.37</iodef:Address>
    </iodef:Node>
  </iodef-rid:IncidentSource>
</iodef-rid:RID>

7.2.  Investigation Request Communication Flow

   The diagram below outlines a RID Request communication flow between
   RID systems on different networks for a security incident with a
   known source address.  Therefore, MsgDestination is set to
   'InvestigationRequest' for the Request message and is included in the
   diagram below as "Investigation".  The proper response to a Request
   with the MsgDestination set to 'InvestigationRequest' is a Result
   message.  If there is a problem with the Request, such as a failure
   to validate the digital signature or decrypt the Request, an
   Acknowledgement message is sent to the requestor.  The
   Acknowledgement message should provide the reason why the message
   could not be processed.




Moriarty                     Standards Track                   [Page 50]

RFC 6545                           RID                        April 2012


       Attack Dest      SP-1              SP-2        Attack Src

       1. Attack    |  Attack
          reported  |  detected

       2.              Determine source
                       of security incident

       3.              o---Investigation---->

       4.                              Research
                                       incident and
                                       determine appropriate
                                       actions to take

       5.              <-------Result-------o

            Figure 9: Investigation Request Communication Flow

7.2.1.  Investigation Request Example

   The following example only includes the RID-specific details.  The
   IODEF and security measures are similar to the TraceRequest, with the
   exception that the source is known, the receiving RID system is known
   to be close to the source, and the MsgDestination is set to
   'InvestigationRequest'.  The source known is indicated in the IODEF
   document, which allows for incident sources to be listed as spoofed,
   if appropriate.

   This flow does not include a Result message because the request is
   denied as shown in the Acknowledgement response.

   SP-1 is represented by CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN and 192.0.2.67.  SP-2 is
   identified by 192,0.2.98.  In this example, SP-2 is the service
   provider for systems on the 192.0.2.32/27 subnet.  The contact for
   the host 192.0.2.35 is known at the start of the request as
   'Constituency-contact@10.1.1.2'.

  <iodef-rid:RID lang="en"
                 xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0"
                 xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
    <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="InvestigationRequest"
                         MsgDestination="SourceOfIncident">
      <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
      <iodef:Node>
        <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.98</iodef:Address>
      </iodef:Node>
      <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>



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      <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
        CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
      </iodef:IncidentID>
  <!-- IODEF-Document included in RID -->
      <iodef-rid:ReportSchema Version="1.0">
       <iodef-rid:XMLDocument dtype="xml" meaning="xml">
    <iodef:IODEF-Document lang="en">
    <iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="other">
      <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
        CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
      </iodef:IncidentID>
      <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-05T08:13:33+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
      <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-05T08:13:31+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
      <iodef:EndTime>2004-02-05T08:13:33+00:00</iodef:EndTime>
      <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-05T08:13:35+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
      <iodef:Description>Host involved in DoS attack</iodef:Description>
      <iodef:Assessment>
        <iodef:Impact severity="low" completion="failed" type="recon"/>
      </iodef:Assessment>
      <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
        <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
        </iodef:ContactName>
        <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>
      </iodef:Contact>
      <iodef:EventData>
        <iodef:Flow>
          <iodef:System category="source">
            <iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
              </iodef:Address>
            </iodef:Node>
            <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
              <iodef:Port>41421</iodef:Port>
            </iodef:Service>
          </iodef:System>
          <iodef:System category="target">
            <iodef:Node>
              <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
              </iodef:Address>
            </iodef:Node>
            <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
              <iodef:Port>80</iodef:Port>
            </iodef:Service>
          </iodef:System>
        </iodef:Flow>
        <iodef:Expectation severity="high" action="investigate">
          <iodef:Description>
            Investigate whether source has been compromised



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          </iodef:Description>
        </iodef:Expectation>
      </iodef:EventData>
      <iodef:History>
        <iodef:HistoryItem action="block-host">
          <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-05T08:19:01+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
          <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
            CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
          </iodef:IncidentID>
          <iodef:Description>
            Investigation request sent to SP for 192.0.2.35
          </iodef:Description>
        </iodef:HistoryItem>
      </iodef:History>
    </iodef:Incident>
    </iodef:IODEF-Document>
       </iodef-rid:XMLDocument>
  <!-- End of IODEF-Document included in RID -->
      </iodef-rid:ReportSchema>
    </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
  </iodef-rid:RID>

7.2.2.  Acknowledgement Message Example

   The example Acknowledgement message is in response to the Request
   listed above.  The SP that received the request was unable to
   validate the digital signature used to authenticate the sending RID
   system.

   <iodef-rid:RID lang="en"
                  xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0"
                  xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
     <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Acknowledgement"
                          MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
       <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="IntraConsortium"/>
       <iodef:Node>
         <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67</iodef:Address>
       </iodef:Node>
       <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
       <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
         CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#208-1
       </iodef:IncidentID>
     </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
     <iodef-rid:RequestStatus AuthorizationStatus="Denied"
                              Justification="Authentication"/>
   </iodef-rid:RID>





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RFC 6545                           RID                        April 2012


7.3.  Report Communication Flow

   The diagram below outlines the RID Report communication flow between
   RID systems on different SPs.

           SP-1                           SP-2

        1. Generate incident information
           and prepare Report message

        2.              o-------Report------->

        3.                          File report in database

                   Figure 10: Report Communication Flow

   The Report communication flow is used to provide information on
   incidents.  Incident information may be shared between CSIRTs or
   other entities using this format.  When a report is received, the RID
   system must verify that the report has not already been filed.  The
   incident number and incident data, such as the hexadecimal packet and
   incident class information, can be used to compare with existing
   database entries.  The Report message typically does not have a
   response.  If there is a problem with the Report message, such as a
   failure to validate the digital signature [RFC3275] or decrypt the
   request, an Acknowledgement message is sent to the requestor.  The
   Acknowledgement message should provide the reason why the message
   could not be processed.

7.3.1.  Report Example

   The following example only includes the RID-specific details.  This
   report is an unsolicited Report message that includes an IPv4 packet.
   The IODEF document and digital signature is similar to the Request
   example with MsgDestination set to 'TraceRequest'.

   This example is a message sent from SP-1, CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN at
   192.0.2.67, to SP-2 at 192.0.2.130 for informational purposes on an
   attack that took place.

   <iodef-rid:RID lang="en"
                  xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0"
                  xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
     <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Report" MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
       <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
       <iodef:Node>
         <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.130</iodef:Address>
       </iodef:Node>



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       <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
       <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
         CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
       </iodef:IncidentID>
   <!-- IODEF-Document included in RID -->
       <iodef-rid:ReportSchema>
        <iodef-rid:XMLDocument dtype="xml" meaning="xml">
     <iodef:IODEF-Document lang="en">
     <iodef:Incident restriction="need-to-know" purpose="reporting">
       <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
         CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
       </iodef:IncidentID>
       <iodef:DetectTime>2004-02-05T10:21:08+00:00</iodef:DetectTime>
       <iodef:StartTime>2004-02-05T10:21:05+00:00</iodef:StartTime>
       <iodef:EndTime>2004-02-05T10:35:00+00:00</iodef:EndTime>
       <iodef:ReportTime>2004-02-05T10:27:38+00:00</iodef:ReportTime>
       <iodef:Description>Host illicitly accessed admin account
       </iodef:Description>
       <iodef:Assessment>
         <iodef:Impact severity="high" completion="succeeded"
                       type="admin"/>
         <iodef:Confidence rating="high"/>
       </iodef:Assessment>
       <iodef:Contact role="creator" type="organization">
         <iodef:ContactName>Constituency-contact for 192.0.2.35
         </iodef:ContactName>
         <iodef:Email>Constituency-contact@10.1.1.2</iodef:Email>
       </iodef:Contact>
       <iodef:EventData>
         <iodef:Flow>
           <iodef:System category="source">
             <iodef:Node>
               <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.35
               </iodef:Address>
             </iodef:Node>
             <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
               <iodef:Port>32821</iodef:Port>
             </iodef:Service>
           </iodef:System>
           <iodef:System category="target">
             <iodef:Node>
               <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.67
               </iodef:Address>
             </iodef:Node>
             <iodef:Service ip_protocol="6">
               <iodef:Port>22</iodef:Port>
             </iodef:Service>
           </iodef:System>



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         </iodef:Flow>
       </iodef:EventData>
       <iodef:History>
         <iodef:HistoryItem action="rate-limit-host">
           <iodef:DateTime>2004-02-05T10:28:00+00:00</iodef:DateTime>
           <iodef:IncidentID name="CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
             CSIRT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#209-1
           </iodef:IncidentID>
           <iodef:Description>
             Incident report sent to SP for 192.0.2.35
           </iodef:Description>
         </iodef:HistoryItem>
       </iodef:History>
     </iodef:Incident>
     </iodef:IODEF-Document>
        </iodef-rid:XMLDocument>
   <!-- End of IODEF-Document included in RID -->
     </iodef-rid:ReportSchema>
     </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
   </iodef-rid:RID>

7.4.  Query Communication Flow

   The diagram below outlines the RID Query communication flow between
   RID systems on different networks.

           SP-1                           SP-2

        1. Generate a request for
           information on a specific
           incident number or incident type

        2.              o-------Query------->

        3.                              Verify policy information
                                        and determine if matches exist
                                        for requested information

        4.              <-------Report------o

        5.  Associate report to request
            by incident number or type
            and file report(s).

                    Figure 11: Query Communication Flow

   The Query message communication receives a response of a Report
   message.  If the Report message is empty, the responding host did not



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   have information available to share with the requestor.  The incident
   number and responding RID system, as well as the transport, assist in
   the association of the request and response since a report can be
   filed and is not always solicited.  If there is a problem with the
   Query message, such as a failure to validate the digital signature or
   decrypt the request, an Acknowledgement message is sent to the
   requestor.  The Acknowledgement message should provide the reason why
   the message could not be processed.

7.4.1.  Query Example

   The Query request may be received in several formats as a result of
   the type of query being performed.  If the incident number is the
   only information provided, the IODEF document and IP packet data may
   not be needed to complete the request.  However, if a type of
   incident is requested, the incident number remains NULL, and the IP
   packet data will not be included in the IODEF RecordItem class; the
   other incident information is the main source for comparison.  In the
   case in which an incident number may not be the same between CSIRTs,
   the incident number and/or IP packet information can be provided and
   used for comparison on the receiving RID system to generate (a)
   Report message(s).

   This query is sent to 192.0.2.3, inquiring about the incident with
   the identifier CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#210-1.  The Report will be
   provided to the requestor identified and verified through the
   authentication and digital signature information provided in the RID
   message.  An example Report is provided above.

   <iodef-rid:RID lang="en"
                  xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0"
                  xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0">
     <iodef-rid:RIDPolicy MsgType="Query"
                          MsgDestination="RIDSystem">
       <iodef-rid:PolicyRegion region="PeerToPeer"/>
       <iodef:Node>
         <iodef:Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.3</iodef:Address>
       </iodef:Node>
       <iodef-rid:TrafficType type="Attack"/>
       <iodef:IncidentID name="CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN">
         CERT-FOR-OUR-DOMAIN#210-1
       </iodef:IncidentID>
     </iodef-rid:RIDPolicy>
   </iodef-rid:RID>







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8.  RID Schema Definition

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <xs:schema xmlns:iodef-rid="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0"
  xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
  xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
  targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0"
  elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
 <xs:import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
 schemaLocation="http://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/schema/
 iodef-1.0.xsd"/>
 <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
 schemaLocation="http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/
 xmldsig-core-schema.xsd"/>

 <!-- ****************************************************************
 *********************************************************************
 ***  Real-time Inter-network Defense - RID XML Schema             ***
 ***    Namespace - iodef-rid, April 2012                        ***
 ***    The namespace is defined to support transport of IODEF     ***
 ***     documents for exchanging incident information.            ***
 *********************************************************************
 -->
 <!--RID messages act as an envelope for IODEF and RID documents
     to support the exchange of incident information-->
 <!--
 ====== Real-Time Inter-network Defense - RID ======
 ====  Suggested definition for RID messaging ======

  -->

 <xs:annotation>
   <xs:documentation>XML Schema wrapper for IODEF</xs:documentation>
 </xs:annotation>
 <xs:element name="RID" type="iodef-rid:RIDType"/>
   <xs:complexType name="RIDType">
     <xs:sequence>
       <xs:element ref="iodef-rid:RIDPolicy" minOccurs="0"/>
       <xs:element ref="iodef-rid:RequestStatus" minOccurs="0"/>
       <xs:element ref="iodef-rid:IncidentSource" minOccurs="0"/>
     </xs:sequence>
     <xs:attribute name="lang"
                    type="xs:language" use="required"/>
   </xs:complexType>

 <!--Used in Acknowledgement Message for RID-->




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 <xs:element name="RequestStatus" type="iodef-rid:RequestStatusType"/>
   <xs:complexType name="RequestStatusType">
      <xs:attribute name="AuthorizationStatus" use="required">
         <xs:simpleType>
           <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
           <xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="Approved"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="Denied"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="Pending"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
           </xs:restriction>
         </xs:simpleType>
      </xs:attribute>
      <xs:attribute name="ext-AuthorizationStatus"
                    type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
      <xs:attribute name="Justification">
         <xs:simpleType>
           <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
           <xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="SystemResource"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="Authentication"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AuthenticationOrigin"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="Encryption"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="UnrecognizedFormat"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="CannotProcess"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="Other"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
           </xs:restriction>
         </xs:simpleType>
      </xs:attribute>
      <xs:attribute name="ext-Justification"
                    type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
     <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type"/>
   </xs:complexType>

 <!--Incident Source Information for Result Message-->

 <xs:element name="IncidentSource" type="iodef-rid:IncidentSourceType"/>
   <xs:complexType name="IncidentSourceType">
     <xs:sequence>
       <xs:element ref="iodef-rid:SourceFound"/>
       <xs:element ref="iodef:Node" minOccurs="0"
           maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
     </xs:sequence>
     <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type"/>
   </xs:complexType>
   <xs:element name="SourceFound" type="xs:boolean"/>




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 <!--
 ====== Real-Time Inter-network Defense Policy - RIDPolicy ======
 ======  Definition for RIDPolicy for messaging
  -->

 <xs:annotation>
  <xs:documentation>RID Policy used for transport of
      messages</xs:documentation>
 </xs:annotation>

 <!-- RIDPolicy information with setting information listed in RID
      documentation -->

 <xs:element name="RIDPolicy" type="iodef-rid:RIDPolicyType"/>
   <xs:complexType name="RIDPolicyType">
     <xs:sequence>
       <xs:element ref="iodef-rid:PolicyRegion" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
       <xs:element ref="iodef:Node"/>
       <xs:element ref="iodef-rid:TrafficType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
       <xs:element ref="iodef:IncidentID" minOccurs="0"/>
       <xs:element ref="iodef-rid:ReportSchema" minOccurs="0"/>
     </xs:sequence>
    <xs:attribute name="MsgType" use="required">
     <xs:simpleType>
       <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
       <xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
         <xs:enumeration value="TraceRequest"/>
         <xs:enumeration value="Acknowledgement"/>
         <xs:enumeration value="Result"/>
         <xs:enumeration value="InvestigationRequest"/>
         <xs:enumeration value="Report"/>
         <xs:enumeration value="Query"/>
         <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
       </xs:restriction>
     </xs:simpleType>
    </xs:attribute>
   <xs:attribute name="ext-MsgType" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
   <xs:attribute name="MsgDestination" use="required">
     <xs:simpleType>
       <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
       <xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
         <xs:enumeration value="RIDSystem"/>
         <xs:enumeration value="SourceOfIncident"/>
         <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
       </xs:restriction>
     </xs:simpleType>
    </xs:attribute>
   <xs:attribute name="ext-MsgDestination" type="xs:string"



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                 use="optional"/>
   <xs:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type"/>
    </xs:complexType>
   <xs:element name="PolicyRegion">
     <xs:complexType>
      <xs:attribute name="region" use="required">
       <xs:simpleType>
        <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
        <xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="ClientToSP"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="SPToClient"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="IntraConsortium"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="PeerToPeer"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="BetweenConsortiums"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
        </xs:restriction>
       </xs:simpleType>
      </xs:attribute>
      <xs:attribute name="ext-region"
                    type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
     </xs:complexType>
   </xs:element>
   <xs:element name="TrafficType">
     <xs:complexType>
      <xs:attribute name="type" use="required">
       <xs:simpleType>
        <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
        <xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="Attack"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="Network"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="Content"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="DataWithHandlingRequirements"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="AudienceRestriction"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="Other"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
        </xs:restriction>
       </xs:simpleType>
      </xs:attribute>
      <xs:attribute name="ext-type"
                    type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
     </xs:complexType>
   </xs:element>
 <!--Used to include an enveloped XML document in RID-->
 <xs:element name="ReportSchema" type="iodef-rid:ReportSchemaType"/>
   <xs:complexType name="ReportSchemaType">
     <xs:sequence>
       <xs:element ref="iodef-rid:XMLDocument" minOccurs="1"
                   maxOccurs="1"/>



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       <xs:element ref="iodef-rid:URL" minOccurs="0"
                   maxOccurs="1"/>
       <xs:element ref="iodef-rid:Signature" minOccurs="0"
                   maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
     </xs:sequence>
      <xs:attribute name="Version" use="optional">
       <xs:simpleType>
        <xs:restriction base="xs:NMTOKEN">
        <xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="1.0"/>
               <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
        </xs:restriction>
       </xs:simpleType>
      </xs:attribute>
      <xs:attribute name="ext-Version"
                    type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
      <xs:attribute name="XMLSchemaID" use="optional">
       <xs:simpleType>
        <xs:restriction base="xs:anyURI">
        <xs:whiteSpace value="collapse"/>
          <xs:enumeration value="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"/>
               <xs:enumeration value="ext-value"/>
        </xs:restriction>
       </xs:simpleType>
      </xs:attribute>
      <xs:attribute name="ext-XMLSchemaID"
                    type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
     </xs:complexType>
   <xs:element name="XMLDocument"
               type="iodef:ExtensionType"/>
   <xs:element name="URL"
               type="xs:anyURI"/>
   <xs:element name="Signature"
               type="iodef:ExtensionType"/>
 </xs:schema>

9.  Security Requirements

9.1.  XML Digital Signatures and Encryption

   RID leverages existing security standards and data markings in
   RIDPolicy to achieve the required levels of security for the exchange
   of incident information.  The use of standards includes TLS and the
   XML security features of encryption [XMLencrypt] and digital
   signatures [RFC3275] [XMLsig].  The standards provide clear methods
   to ensure that messages are secure, authenticated, and authorized;
   meet policy and privacy guidelines; and maintain integrity.  XML




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   Signature Best Practices [XMLSigBP] should be referenced by
   implementers for information on improving security to mitigate
   attacks.

   As specified in the relevant sections of this document, the XML
   digital signature [RFC3275] and XML encryption [XMLencrypt] are used
   in the following cases:

   XML Digital Signature

   o  The originator of a Request MUST use a detached signature to sign
      at least one of the original elements contained in the RecordItem
      class to provide authentication to all upstream participants in
      the trace or those involved in the investigation.  All instances
      of RecordItem provided by the originator may be individually
      signed, and additional RecordItem entries by upstream peers in the
      trace or investigation may be signed by the peer adding the data,
      while maintaining the original RecordItem entry(s) and detached
      signature(s) from the original requestor.  It is important to note
      that the data is signed at the RecordItem level.  Since multiple
      RecordItems may exist within an IODEF document and may originate
      from different sources, the signature is applied at the RecordItem
      level to enable the use of an XML detached signature.  Exclusive
      canonicalization [XMLCanon] is REQUIRED for the detached signature
      and not the references, as the XML document generated is then
      included in the RID message within the Signature element of the
      ReportSchema class.  This signature MUST be passed to all
      recipients of the Request message.

   o  If a Request does not include a RecordItem entry, a timestamp MUST
      be used to ensure there is data to be signed for the multi-hop
      authentication use case.  The DateTime element of the iodef:
      RecordData class ([RFC5070], Section 3.19.1) is used for this
      purpose.

   o  For all message types, the full IODEF-RID document MUST be signed
      using an enveloped signature by the sending peer to provide
      authentication and integrity to the receiving RID system.  The
      signature is placed in an instance of the Signature element.

   o  XML Signature Best Practices [XMLSigBP] guidance SHOULD be
      followed to prevent or mitigate security risks.  Examples include
      the recommendation to authenticate a signature prior to processing
      (executing potentially dangerous operations) and the
      recommendation to limit the use of URIs since they may enable
      cross-site scripting attacks or access to local information.





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   o  XML Path Language (XPath) 2.0 [XMLPath] MUST be followed to
      specify the portion of the XML document to be signed.  XPath is
      used to specify a location within an XML document.  Best practice
      recommendations for using XPath [XMLSigBP] SHOULD be referenced to
      reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks.  The use of XSLT
      transforms MUST be restricted according to security guidance in
      [XMLSigBP].

   XML Encryption

   o  The IODEF-RID document MAY be encrypted to provide an extra layer
      of security between peers so that not only the message is
      encrypted for transport.  This behavior would be agreed upon
      between peers or a consortium, or determined on a per-message
      basis, depending on security requirements.  It should be noted
      that there are cases for transport where the RIDPolicy class needs
      to be presented in clear text, as detailed in the transport
      document [RFC6546].

   o  A Request, or any other message type that may be relayed through
      RID systems before reaching the intended destination as a result
      of trust relationships, MAY be encrypted specifically for the
      intended recipient.  This may be necessary if the RID network is
      being used for message transfer, the intermediate parties do not
      need to have knowledge of the request contents, and a direct
      communication path does not exist.  In that case, the RIDPolicy
      class is used by intermediate parties and as such, RIDPolicy is
      maintained in clear text.

   o  The action taken in the Result message may be encrypted using the
      key of the request originator.  In that case, the intermediate
      parties can view the RIDPolicy information and know the trace has
      been completed and do not need to see the action.  If the use of
      encryption were limited to sections of the message, the History
      class information would be encrypted.  Otherwise, it is
      RECOMMENDED to encrypt the entire IODEF-RID document and use an
      enveloped signature for the originator of the request.  The
      existence of the Result message for an incident would tell any
      intermediate parties used in the path of the incident
      investigation that the incident handling has been completed.

   o  The iodef:restriction attribute sets expectations for the privacy
      of an incident and is defined in Section 3.2 of RFC 5070.
      Following the guidance for XML encryption in the Security
      Requirements section, the iodef:restriction attribute can be set
      in any of the RID classes to define restrictions and encryption
      requirements for the exchange of incident information.  The
      restriction options enable encryption capabilities for the



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      complete exchange of an IODEF document (including any extensions),
      within specific classes of IODEF, or IODEF extensions, where more
      limited restrictions are desired.  The restriction attribute is
      contained in each of the RID classes and MUST be used in
      accordance with confidentiality expectations for either sections
      of the IODEF document or the complete IODEF document.  Consortiums
      and organizations should consider this guidance when creating
      exchange policies.

   o  Expectations based on how restriction is set:

      *  If restriction is set to 'private', the class or document MUST
         be encrypted for the recipient using XML encryption and the
         public key of the recipient.  See Section 9.3 for a discussion
         on public key infrastructure (PKI) and other security
         requirements.

      *  If restriction is set to 'need-to-know', the class or document
         MUST be encrypted to ensure only those with need-to-know access
         can decrypt the data.  The document can either be encrypted for
         each individual for which access is intended or be encrypted
         with a single group key.  The method used SHOULD adhere to any
         certificate policy and practices agreements between entities
         for the use of RID.  A group key in this instance refers to a
         single key (symmetric) that is used to encrypt the block of
         data.  The users with need-to-know access privileges may be
         given access to the shared key via a secure distribution
         method, for example, providing access to the symmetric key
         encrypted with each of the user's public keys.

      *  If restriction is set to 'public', the class or document MUST
         be sent in clear text.  This setting can be critical if certain
         sections of a document or an entire document are to be shared
         without restrictions.  This provides flexibility within an
         incident to share certain information freely where appropriate.

      *  If restriction is set to 'default', the information can be
         shared according to an information disclosure policy pre-
         arranged by the communicating parties.

   o  Expectations based on placement of the restriction setting:

      *  If restriction is set within one of the RID classes, the
         restriction applies to the entire IODEF document.

      *  If restriction is set within individual IODEF classes, the
         restriction applies to the specific IODEF class and the
         children of that class.



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   The formation of policies is a very important aspect of using a
   messaging system like RID to exchange potentially sensitive
   information.  Many considerations should be involved for peering
   parties, and some guidelines to protect the data, systems, and
   transport are covered in this section.  Policies established should
   provide guidelines for communication methods, security, and fall-back
   procedures.  See Sections 9.4 and 9.5 for additional information on
   consortiums and PKI considerations.

   The security considerations for the storage and exchange of
   information in RID messaging may include adherence to local,
   regional, or national regulations in addition to the obligations to
   protect client information during an investigation.  RIDPolicy is a
   necessary tool for listing the requirements of messages to provide a
   method to categorize data elements for proper handling.  Controls are
   also provided for the sending entity to protect messages from third
   parties through XML encryption.

   RID provides a method to exchange incident-handling requests and
   Report messages between entities.  Administrators have the ability to
   base decisions on the available resources and other factors of their
   network and maintain control of incident investigations within their
   own network.  Thus, RID provides the ability for participating
   networks to manage their own security controls, leveraging the
   information listed in RIDPolicy.

   RID is used to transfer or exchange XML documents in an IODEF format
   or using another IANA-registered format.  Implementations SHOULD NOT
   download schemas at runtime due to the security implications, and
   included documents MUST NOT be required to provide a resolvable
   location of their schema.

9.2.  Message Transport

   A transport specification is defined in a separate document
   [RFC6546].  The specified transport protocols MUST use encryption to
   provide an additional level of security and integrity, while
   supporting mutual authentication through bidirectional certificate
   usage.  Any subsequent transport method defined should take advantage
   of existing standards for ease of implementation and integration of
   RID systems.  Session encryption for the transport of RID messages is
   enforced in the transport specification.  The privacy and security
   considerations are addressed fully in RID to protect sensitive
   portions of documents and to provide a method to authenticate the
   messages.  Therefore, RID messages do not rely on the security
   provided by the transport layer alone.  The encryption requirements
   and considerations for RID messages are discussed in Section 9.1 of
   this document.



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   Consortiums may vary their selected transport mechanisms and thus
   decide upon a mutual protocol to use for transport when communicating
   with peers in a neighboring consortium using RID.  RID systems MUST
   implement and deploy HTTPS as defined in the transport document
   [RFC6546] and optionally MAY support other protocols such as the
   Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP) [RFC3080].  Bindings would
   need to be defined to enable support for other transport protocols.

   Systems used to send authenticated RID messages between networks MUST
   use a secured system and interface to connect to a border network's
   RID systems.  Each connection to a RID system MUST meet the security
   requirements agreed upon through the consortium regulations, peering,
   or SLAs.  The RID system MUST listen for and send RID messages on
   only the designated port, which also MUST be over an encrypted tunnel
   meeting the minimum requirement of algorithms and key lengths
   established by the consortium, peering, or SLA.  The selected
   cryptographic algorithms for symmetric encryption, digital
   signatures, and hash functions MUST meet minimum security levels of
   the times.  The encryption strength MUST adhere to import and export
   regulations of the involved countries for data exchange.

   Out-of-band communications dedicated to SP interaction for RID
   messaging would provide additional security as well as guaranteed
   bandwidth during a denial-of-service attack.  For example, an out-of-
   band channel may consist of logical paths defined over the existing
   network.  Out-of-band communications may not be practical or possible
   between service providers, but provisions should be considered to
   protect the incident management systems used for RID messaging.
   Methods to protect the data transport may also be provided through
   session encryption.

9.3.  Public Key Infrastructure

   It is RECOMMENDED that RID, the XML security functions, and transport
   protocols properly integrate with a PKI managed by the consortium,
   federate PKIs within a consortium, or use a PKI managed by a trusted
   third party.  Entities MAY use shared keys as an alternate solution,
   although this may limit the ability to validate certificates and
   could introduce risk.  For the Internet, a few examples of existing
   efforts that could be leveraged to provide the supporting PKI include
   the Regional Internet Registry's (RIR's) PKI hierarchy, vendor issued
   certificates, or approved issuers of Extended Validation (EV)
   Certificates.  Security and privacy considerations related to
   consortiums are discussed in Sections 9.4 and 9.5.

   The use of PKI between entities or by a consortium SHOULD adhere to
   any applicable certificate policy and practices agreements for the
   use of RID.  [RFC3647] specifies a commonly used format for



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   certificate policy (CP) and certification practices statements (CPS).
   Systems with predefined relationships for RID include those who peer
   directly or through a consortium with agreed-upon appropriate use
   agreements.  The agreements to trust other entities may be based on
   assurance levels that could be determined by a comparison of the CP,
   CPS, and/or RID operating procedures.  The initial comparison of
   policies and the ability to audit controls provide a baseline
   assurance level for entities to form and maintain trust
   relationships.  Trust relationships may also be defined through a
   bridged or hierarchical PKI in which both peers belong.  If shared
   keys or keys issued from a common CA are used, the verification of
   controls to determine the assurance level to trust other entities may
   be limited to the RID policies and operating procedures.

   XML security functions utilized in RID require a trust center such as
   a PKI for the distribution of credentials to provide the necessary
   level of security for this protocol.  Layered transport protocols
   also utilize encryption and rely on a trust center.  Public key
   certificate pairs issued by a trusted Certification Authority (CA)
   MAY be used to provide the necessary level of authentication and
   encryption for the RID protocol.  The CA used for RID messaging must
   be trusted by all involved parties and may take advantage of similar
   efforts, such as the Internet2 federated PKI or the ARIN/RIR effort
   to provide a PKI to service providers.  The PKI used for
   authentication also provides the necessary certificates needed for
   encryption used for the RID transport protocol [RFC6546].

9.3.1.  Authentication

   Hosts receiving a RID message MUST be able to verify that the sender
   of the request is valid and trusted.  Using digital signatures on a
   hash of the RID message with an X.509 version 3 certificate issued by
   a trusted party MUST be used to authenticate the request.  The X.509
   version 3 specifications as well as the digital signature
   specifications and path validation standards set forth in [RFC5280]
   MUST be followed in order to interoperate with a PKI designed for
   similar purposes.  Full path validation verifies the chaining
   relationship to a trusted root and also performs a certificate
   revocation check.  The use of digital signatures in RID XML messages
   MUST follow the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) recommendations for
   signature syntax and processing when either the XML encryption
   [XMLencrypt] or digital signature [XMLsig] [RFC3275] is used within a
   document.








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   It might be helpful to define an extension to the authentication
   scheme that uses attribute certificates [RFC5755] in such a way that
   an application could automatically determine whether human
   intervention is needed to authorize a request; however, the
   specification of such an extension is out of scope for this document.

   The use of pre-shared keys may be considered for authentication at
   the transport layer.  If this option is selected, the specifications
   set forth in "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer
   Security (TLS)" [RFC4279] MUST be followed.  Transport specifications
   are detailed in a separate document [RFC6546].

9.3.2.  Multi-Hop Request Authentication

   The use of multi-hop authentication in a Request is used when a
   Request is sent to multiple entities or SPs in an iterative manner.
   Multi-hop authentication is REQUIRED in Requests that involve
   multiple SPs where Requests are forwarded iteratively through peers.
   Bilateral trust relationships MAY be used between peers; multi-hop
   authentication MUST be used for cases where the originator of a
   message is authenticated several hops into the message flow.

   For practical reasons, SPs may want to prioritize incident-handling
   events based upon the immediate peer for a Request, the originator of
   a request, and the listed Confidence rating for the incident.  In
   order to provide a higher assurance level of the authenticity of a
   Request, the originating RID system is included in the Request along
   with contact information and the information of all RID systems in
   the path the trace has taken.  This information is provided through
   the IODEF EventData class, which nests the list of systems and
   contacts involved in a trace, while setting the category attribute to
   "infrastructure".

   To provide multi-hop authentication, the originating RID system MUST
   include a digital signature in the Request sent to all systems in the
   upstream path.  The digital signature from the RID system is
   performed on the RecordItem class of the IODEF following the XML
   digital signature specifications from W3C [XMLsig] using a detached
   signature.  The signature MUST be passed to all parties that receive
   a Request, and each party MUST be able to perform full path
   validation on the digital signature [RFC5280].  In order to
   accommodate that requirement, the RecordItem data MUST remain
   unchanged as a request is passed along between providers and is the
   only element for which the signature is applied.  If additional
   RecordItems are included in the document at upstream peers, the
   initial RecordItem entry MUST still remain with the detached
   signature.  The subsequent RecordItem elements may be signed by the
   peer adding the incident information for the investigation.  A second



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   benefit to this requirement is that the integrity of the filter used
   is ensured as it is passed to subsequent SPs in the upstream trace of
   the incident.  The trusted PKI also provides the keys used to
   digitally sign the RecordItem class for a Request to meet the
   requirement of authenticating the original request.  Any host in the
   path of the trace should be able to verify the digital signature
   using the trusted PKI.

   In the case in which an enterprise using RID sends a Request to its
   provider, the signature from the enterprise MUST be included in the
   initial request.  The SP may generate a new request to send upstream
   to members of the SP consortium to continue the investigation.  If
   the original request is sent, the originating SP, acting on behalf of
   the enterprise network under attack, MUST also digitally sign, with
   an enveloped signature, the full IODEF document to assure the
   authenticity of the Request.  An SP that offers RID as a service may
   be using its own PKI to secure RID communications between its RID
   system and the attached enterprise networks.  SPs participating in
   the trace MUST be able to determine the authenticity of RID requests.

9.4.  Consortiums and Public Key Infrastructures

   Consortiums are an ideal way to establish a communication web of
   trust for RID messaging.  It should be noted that direct
   relationships may be ideal for some communications, such as those
   between a provider of incident information and a subscriber of the
   incident reports.  The consortium could provide centralized
   resources, such as a PKI, and established guidelines and control
   requirements for use of RID.  The consortium may assist in
   establishing trust relationships between the participating SPs to
   achieve the necessary level of cooperation and experience-sharing
   among the consortium entities.  This may be established through PKI
   certificate policy [RFC3647] reviews to determine the appropriate
   trust levels between organizations or entities.  The consortium may
   also be used for other purposes to better facilitate communication
   among SPs in a common area (Internet, region, government, education,
   private networks, etc.).

   Using a PKI to distribute certificates used by RID systems provides
   an already established method to link trust relationships between
   consortiums that peer with SPs belonging to a separate consortium.
   In other words, consortiums could peer with other consortiums to
   enable communication of RID messages between the participating SPs.
   The PKI along with Memorandums of Agreement could be used to link
   border directories to share public key information in a bridge, a
   hierarchy, or a single cross-certification relationship.





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   Consortiums also need to establish guidelines for each participating
   SP to adhere to.  The RECOMMENDED guidelines include:

   o  Physical and logical practices to protect RID systems;

   o  Network- and application-layer protection for RID systems and
      communications;

   o  Proper use guidelines for RID systems, messages, and requests; and

   o  A PKI, certificate policy, and certification practices statement
      to provide authentication, integrity, and privacy.

   The functions described for a consortium's role parallel those of a
   PKI federation.  The PKI federations that currently exist are
   responsible for establishing security guidelines and PKI trust
   models.  The trust models are used to support applications to share
   information using trusted methods and protocols.

   A PKI can also provide the same level of security for communication
   between an end entity (enterprise, educational, or government
   customer network) and the SP.

9.5.  Privacy Concerns and System Use Guidelines

   Privacy issues raise many concerns when information-sharing is
   required to achieve the goal of stopping or mitigating the effects of
   a security incident.  The RIDPolicy class is used to automate the
   enforcement of the privacy concerns listed within this document.  The
   privacy and system use concerns for the system communicating RID
   messages and other integrated components include the following:

   Service Provider Concerns:

   o  Privacy of data monitored and/or stored on Intrusion Detection
      Systems (IDSs) for attack detection.

   o  Privacy of data monitored and stored on systems used to trace
      traffic across a single network.

   o  Privacy of incident information stored on incident management
      systems participating in RID communications.

   Customer Attached Networks Participating in RID with SP:

   o  Customer networks may include enterprise, educational, government,
      or other networks attached to an SP participating in RID.
      Customers should review data handling policies to understand how



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      data will be protected by a service provider.  This information
      will enable customers to decide what types of data at what
      sensitivity level can be shared with service providers.  This
      information could be used at the application layer to establish
      sharing profiles for entities and groups; see Section 9.6.

   o  Customers should request information on the security and privacy
      considerations in place by their SP and the consortium of which
      the SP is a member.  Customers should understand if their data
      were to be forwarded, how it might be sanitized and how it will be
      protected.  In advance of sharing data with their SP, customers
      should also understand if limitations can be placed on how it will
      be used.

   o  Customers should be aware that their data can and will be sent to
      other SPs in order to complete a trace unless an agreement stating
      otherwise is made in the service level agreements between the
      customer and SP.  Customers considering privacy options may limit
      the use of this feature if they do not want the data forwarded.

   Parties Involved in the Attack:

   o  Privacy of the identity of a host involved in an attack or any
      indicators of compromise.

   o  Privacy of information such as the source and destination used for
      communication purposes over the monitored or RID-connected
      network(s).

   o  Protection of data from being viewed by intermediate parties in
      the path of an Request request should be considered.

   Consortium Considerations:

   o  System use restrictions for security incident handling within the
      local region's definitions of appropriate traffic.  When
      participating in a consortium, appropriate use guidelines should
      be agreed upon and entered into contracts.

   o  System use prohibiting the consortium's participating SPs from
      inappropriately tracing traffic to locate sources or mitigate
      traffic unlawfully within the jurisdiction or region.

   Inter-Consortium Considerations:

   o  System use between peering consortiums should consider any
      government communication regulations that apply between those two
      regions, such as encryption export and import restrictions.



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   o  System use between consortiums SHOULD NOT request traffic traces
      and actions beyond the scope intended and permitted by law or
      inter-consortium agreements.

   o  System use between consortiums should consider national boundary
      issues and request limits in their appropriate system use
      agreements.  Appropriate use should include restrictions to
      prevent the use of the protocol for limiting or restricting
      traffic that is otherwise permitted within the country in which
      the peering consortium resides.

   The security and privacy considerations listed above are for the
   consortiums, SPs, and enterprises to agree upon.  The agreed-upon
   policies may be facilitated through use of the RIDPolicy class and
   application-layer options.  Some privacy considerations are addressed
   through the RID guidelines for encryption and digital signatures as
   described in Section 9.1.

   RID is useful in determining the true source of an incident that
   traverses multiple networks or to communicate security incidents and
   automate the response.  The information obtained from the
   investigation may determine the identity of the source host or the SP
   used by the source of the traffic.  It should be noted that the trace
   mechanism used across a single SP may also raise privacy concerns for
   the clients of the network.  Methods that may raise concern include
   those that involve storing packets for some length of time in order
   to trace packets after the fact.  Monitoring networks for intrusions
   and for tracing capabilities also raises concerns for potentially
   sensitive valid traffic that may be traversing the monitored network.
   IDSs and single-network tracing are outside of the scope of this
   document, but the concern should be noted and addressed within the
   use guidelines of the network.  Some IDSs and single-network trace
   mechanisms attempt to properly address these issues.  RID is designed
   to provide the information needed by any single-network trace
   mechanism.  The provider's choice of a single trace mechanism depends
   on resources, existing solutions, and local legislation.  Privacy
   concerns in regard to the single-network trace must be dealt with at
   the client-to-SP level and are out of scope for RID messaging.

   The identity of the true source of an attack being traced through RID
   could be sensitive.  The true identity listed in a Result message can
   be protected through the use of encryption [XMLencrypt] enveloping
   the IODEF document and RID Result information, using the public
   encryption key of the originating SP.  Alternatively, the action
   taken may be listed without the identity being revealed to the
   originating SP.  The ultimate goal of the RID communication system is
   to stop or mitigate attack traffic, not to ensure that the identity
   of the attack traffic is known to involved parties.  The SP that



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   identifies the source should deal directly with the involved parties
   and proper authorities in order to determine the guidelines for the
   release of such information, if it is regarded as sensitive.  In some
   situations, systems used in attacks are compromised by an unknown
   source and, in turn, are used to attack other systems.  In that
   situation, the reputation of a business or organization may be at
   stake, and the action taken may be the only additional information
   reported in the Result message to the originating system.  If the
   security incident is a minor incident, such as a zombie system used
   in part of a large-scale DDoS attack, ensuring the system is taken
   off the network until it has been fixed may be sufficient.  The
   decision is left to the system users and consortiums to determine
   appropriate data to be shared given that the goal of the
   specification is to provide the appropriate technical options to
   remain compliant.  The textual descriptions should include details of
   the incident in order to protect the reputation of the unknowing
   attacker and prevent the need for additional investigation.  Local,
   state, or national laws may dictate the appropriate reporting action
   for specific security incidents.

   Privacy becomes an issue whenever sensitive data traverses a network.
   For example, if an attack occurred between a specific source and
   destination, then every SP in the path of the trace becomes aware
   that the cyber attack occurred.  In a targeted attack, it may not be
   desirable that information about two nation states that are battling
   a cyber war would become general knowledge to all intermediate
   parties.  However, it is important to allow the traces to take place
   in order to halt the activity since the health of the networks in the
   path could also be at stake during the attack.  This provides a
   second argument for allowing the Result message to only include an
   action taken and not the identity of the offending host.  In the case
   of a Request or Report, where the originating SP is aware of the SP
   that will receive the request for processing, the free-form text
   areas of the document could be encrypted [XMLencrypt] using the
   public key of the destination SP to ensure that no other SP in the
   path can read the contents.  The encryption is accomplished through
   the W3C [XMLencrypt] specification for encrypting an element.

   In some situations, all network traffic of a nation may be granted
   through a single SP.  In that situation, options must support sending
   Result messages from a downstream peer of that SP.  That option
   provides an additional level of abstraction to hide the identity and
   the SP of the identified source of the traffic.  Legal action may
   override this technical decision after the trace has taken place, but
   that is out of the technical scope of this document.






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   Privacy concerns when using an Request message to request action
   close to the source of valid attack traffic need to be considered.
   Although the intermediate SPs may relay the request if there is no
   direct trust relationship to the closest SP to the source, the
   intermediate SPs do not require the ability to see the contents of
   the packet or the text description field(s) in the request.  This
   message type does not require any action by the intermediate RID
   systems, except to relay the packet to the next SP in the path.
   Therefore, the contents of the request may be encrypted for the
   destination system.  The intermediate SPs only need to know how to
   direct the request to the manager of the ASN in which the source IP
   address belongs.

   Traces must be legitimate security-related incidents and not used for
   purposes such as sabotage or censorship.  An example of such abuse of
   the system includes a request to block or rate-limit legitimate
   traffic to prevent information from being shared between users on the
   Internet (restricting access to online versions of papers) or
   restricting access from a competitor's product in order to sabotage a
   business.

   Intra-consortium RID communications raise additional issues,
   especially when the peering consortiums reside in different regions
   or nations.  Request messages and requested actions to mitigate or
   stop traffic must adhere to the appropriate use guidelines and yet
   prevent abuse of the system.  First, the peering consortiums must
   identify the types of traffic that can be traced between the borders
   of the participating SPs of each consortium.  The traffic traced
   should be limited to security-incident-related traffic.  Second, the
   traces permitted within one consortium, if passed to a peering
   consortium, may infringe upon the peering consortium's freedom-of-
   information laws.  An example would be a consortium in one country
   permitting a trace of traffic containing objectionable material,
   outlawed within that country.  The RID trace may be a valid use of
   the system within the confines of that country's network border;
   however, it may not be permitted to continue across network
   boundaries where such content is permitted under law.  By continuing
   the trace in another country's network, the trace and response could
   have the effect of improperly restricting access to data.  A
   continued trace into a second country may break the laws and
   regulations of that nation.  Any such traces MUST cease at the
   country's border.

   The privacy concerns listed in this section address issues among the
   trusted parties involved in a trace within an SP, a RID consortium,
   and peering RID consortiums.  Data used for RID communications must
   also be protected from parties that are not trusted.  This protection
   is provided through the authentication and encryption of documents as



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   they traverse the path of trusted servers and through the local
   security controls in place for the incident management systems.  Each
   RID system MUST perform a bidirectional authentication when sending a
   RID message and use the public encryption key of the upstream or
   downstream peer to send a message or document over the network.  This
   means that the document is decrypted and re-encrypted at each RID
   system via TLS over a transport protocol such as [RFC6546].  The RID
   messages may be decrypted at each RID system in order to properly
   process the request or relay the information.  Today's processing
   power is more than sufficient to handle the minimal burden of
   encrypting and decrypting relatively small typical RID messages.

9.6.  Sharing Profiles and Policies

   The application layer can be used to establish workflows and rulesets
   specific to sharing profiles for entities or consortiums.  The
   profiles can leverage sharing agreements to restrict data types or
   classifications of data that are shared.  The level of information or
   classification of data shared with any entity may be based on
   protection levels offered by the receiving entity and periodic
   validation of those controls.  The profile may also indicate how far
   information can be shared according to the entity and data type.  The
   profile may also indicate whether requests to share data from an
   entity must go directly to that entity.

   In some cases, pre-defined sharing profiles will be possible.  These
   include any use case where an agreement is in place in advance of
   sharing.  Examples may be between clients and SPs, entities such as
   partners, or consortiums.  There may be other cases when sharing
   profiles may not be established in advance, such as an organization
   dealing with an incident who requires assistance from an entity that
   it has not worked with before.  An organization may want to establish
   sharing profiles specific to possible user groups to prepare for
   possible incident scenarios.  The user groups could include business
   partners, industry peers, service providers, experts not part of a
   service provider, law enforcement, or regulatory reporting bodies.

   Workflows to approve transactions may be specific to sharing profiles
   and data types.  Application developers should include capabilities
   to enable these decision points for users of the system.

   Any expectations between entities to preserve the weight and
   admissibility of evidence should be handled at the policy and
   agreement level.  A sharing profile may include notes or an indicator
   for approvers in workflows to reflect if such agreements exist.






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10.  Security Considerations

   RID has many security requirements and considerations built into the
   design of the protocol, several of which are described in the
   Security Requirements section.  For a complete view of security,
   considerations include the availability, confidentiality, and
   integrity concerns for the transport, storage, and exchange of
   information.

   Protected tunnels between systems accepting RID communications are
   used to provide confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and privacy
   for the data at the transport layer.  Encryption and digital
   signatures are also used at the IODEF document level through RID
   options to provide confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, privacy
   and traceability of the document contents at the application layer.
   Trust relationships are based on PKI and the comparison/validation of
   security controls for the incident management systems communicating
   via RID.  Trust levels can be established in cross-certification
   processes where entities compare PKI policies that include the
   specific management and handling of an entity's PKI and certificates
   issued under that policy.  [RFC3647] defines an Internet X.509 Public
   Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices
   Framework that may be used in the comparison of policies to establish
   trust levels and agreements between entities, an entity and a
   consortium, and consortiums.  The agreements SHOULD consider key
   management practices including the ability to perform path validation
   on certificates [RFC5280], key distribution techniques [RFC2585], and
   Certificate Authority and Registration Authority management
   practices.

   The agreements between entities SHOULD also include a common
   understanding of the usage of RID security, policy, and privacy
   options discussed in both the Security Requirements and Security
   Considerations sections.  The formality, requirements, and complexity
   of the agreements for the certificate policy, practices, supporting
   infrastructure, and the use of RID options SHOULD be decided by the
   entities or consortiums creating those agreements.

11.  Internationalization Issues

   The Node class identifies a host or network device.  This document
   reuses the definition of Node from the IODEF specification [RFC5070],
   Section 3.16.  However, that document did not clearly specify whether
   a NodeName could be an Internationalized Domain Name (IDN).  RID
   systems MUST treat the NodeName class as a domain name slot
   [RFC5890].  RID systems SHOULD support IDNs in the NodeName class.
   If they do so, the UTF-8 representation of the domain name MUST be
   used, i.e., all of the domain name's labels MUST be U-labels



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   expressed in UTF-8 or NR-LDH labels [RFC5890]; A-labels MUST NOT be
   used.  An application communicating via RID can convert between
   A-labels and U-labels by using the Punycode encoding [RFC3492] for
   A-labels as described in the protocol specification for
   Internationalized Domain Names in Applications [RFC5891].

12.  IANA Considerations

   This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
   [XMLschema] conforming to a registry mechanism described in
   [RFC3688].

   Registration request for the iodef-rid namespace:

      URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-rid-2.0

      Registrant Contact: IESG.

      XML: None.  Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.

   Registration request for the iodef-rid XML schema:

      URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:iodef-rid-2.0

      Registrant Contact: IESG.

      XML: See Section 8, "RID Schema Definition", of this document.

   The following registry has been created and is now managed by IANA:

      Name of the registry: "XML Schemas Exchanged via RID"

      Namespace details: A registry entry for an XML Schema Transferred
      via RID consists of:

         Schema Name: A short string that represents the schema
         referenced.  This value is for reference only in the table.
         The version of the schema MUST be included in this string to
         allow for multiple versions of the same specification to be in
         the registry.

         Version: The version of the registered XML schema.  The version
         is a string that SHOULD be formatted as numbers separated by a
         '.' (period) character.







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         Namespace: The namespace of the referenced XML schema.  This is
         represented in the RID ReportSchema class in the XMLSchemaID
         attribute as an enumerated value is represented by a URN or
         URI.

         Specification URI: A URI [RFC3986] from which the registered
         specification can be obtained.  The specification MUST be
         publicly available from this URI.

         Reference: The reference to the document that describes the
         schema.

      Information that must be provided to assign a new value: The above
      list of information.

      Fields to record in the registry: Schema Name, Version, Namespace,
      Specification URI, Reference

      Initial registry contents: See Section 5.6.1.

      Allocation Policy: Expert Review [RFC5226] and Specification
      Required [RFC5226].

   The Designated Expert is expected to consult with the MILE (Managed
   Incident Lightweight Exchange) working group or its successor if any
   such WG exists (e.g., via email to the working group's mailing list).
   The Designated Expert is expected to retrieve the XML schema
   specification from the provided URI in order to check the public
   availability of the specification and verify the correctness of the
   URI.  An important responsibility of the Designated Expert is to
   ensure that the XML schema is appropriate for use in RID.

   The following registry has been created and is now managed by IANA:

      Name of the registry: "RID Enumeration List"

      The registry is intended to enable enumeration value additions to
      attributes in the iodef-rid XML schema.

      Fields to record in the registry: Attribute Name, Attribute Value,
      Description, Reference

      Initial registry content: none.

      Allocation Policy: Expert Review [RFC5226]






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   The Designated Expert is expected to consult with the MILE (Managed
   Incident Lightweight Exchange) working group or its successor if any
   such WG exists (e.g., via email to the working group's mailing list).
   The Designated Expert is expected to review the request and validate
   the appropriateness of the enumeration for the attribute.  If a
   specification is associated with the request, it MUST be reviewed by
   the Designated Expert.

13.  Summary

   Security incidents have always been difficult to trace as a result of
   spoofed sources, resource limitations, and bandwidth utilization
   problems.  Incident response is often slow even when the IP address
   is known to be valid because of the resources required to notify the
   responsible party of the attack and then to stop or mitigate the
   attack traffic.  Methods to identify and trace attacks near real time
   are essential to thwarting attack attempts.  SPs need policies and
   automated methods to combat the hacker's efforts.  SPs need automated
   monitoring and response capabilities to identify and trace attacks
   quickly without resource-intensive side effects.  Integration with a
   centralized communication system to coordinate the detection,
   tracing, and identification of attack sources on a single network is
   essential.  RID provides a way to integrate SP resources for each
   aspect of attack detection, tracing, and source identification and
   extends the communication capabilities among SPs.  The communication
   is accomplished through the use of flexible IODEF XML-based documents
   passed between incident-handling systems or RID systems.  A Request
   is communicated to an upstream SP and may result in an upstream trace
   or in an action to stop or mitigate the attack traffic.  The messages
   are communicated among peers with security inherent to the RID
   messaging scheme provided through existing standards such as XML
   encryption and digital signatures.  Policy information is carried in
   the RID message itself through the use of the RIDPolicy.  RID
   provides the timely communication among SPs, which is essential for
   incident handling.

14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
                 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2585]     Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key
                 Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP",
                 RFC 2585, May 1999.





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RFC 6545                           RID                        April 2012


   [RFC3023]     Murata, M., St. Laurent, S., and D. Kohn, "XML Media
                 Types", RFC 3023, January 2001.

   [RFC3275]     Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible
                 Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing",
                 RFC 3275, March 2002.

   [RFC3470]     Hollenbeck, S., Rose, M., and L. Masinter, "Guidelines
                 for the Use of Extensible Markup Language (XML)
                 within IETF Protocols", BCP 70, RFC 3470, January 2003.

   [RFC3492]     Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of
                 Unicode for Internationalized Domain Names in
                 Applications (IDNA)", RFC 3492, March 2003.

   [RFC3688]     Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81,
                 RFC 3688, January 2004.

   [RFC4051]     Eastlake, D., "Additional XML Security Uniform Resource
                 Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 4051, April 2005.

   [RFC4279]     Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key
                 Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
                 RFC 4279, December 2005.

   [RFC5070]     Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The
                 Incident Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 5070,
                 December 2007.

   [RFC5226]     Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing
                 an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
                 RFC 5226, May 2008.

   [RFC5280]     Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
                 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
                 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
                 List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

   [RFC5646]     Phillips, A. and M. Davis, "Tags for Identifying
                 Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, September 2009.

   [RFC5755]     Farrell, S., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "An Internet
                 Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization",
                 RFC 5755, January 2010.

   [RFC5890]     Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
                 Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document
                 Framework", RFC 5890, August 2010.



Moriarty                     Standards Track                   [Page 81]

RFC 6545                           RID                        April 2012


   [RFC5891]     Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names in
                 Applications (IDNA): Protocol", RFC 5891, August 2010.

   [RFC6546]     Trammell, B., "Transport of Real-time Inter-network
                 Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS", RFC 6546,
                 April 2012.

   [XML1.0]      Bray, T., Maler, E., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C.,
                 and F. Yergeau, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0",
                 W3C Recommendation XML 1.0, November 2008,
                 <http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/>.

   [XMLCanon]    Boyer, J., "Canonical XML 1.0", W3C Recommendation 1.0,
                 December 2001, <http://www.w3.org/TR/xml-c14n>.

   [XMLPath]     Berglund, A., Boag, S., Chamberlin, D., Fernandez, M.,
                 Kay, M., Robie, J., and J. Simeon, "XML Schema Part 1:
                 Structures", W3C Recommendation Second Edition,
                 December 2010, <http://www.w3.org/TR/xpath20/>.

   [XMLSigBP]    Hirsch, F. and P. Datta, "XML-Signature Best
                 Practices", W3C Recommendation, August 2011,
                 <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-bestpractices/>.

   [XMLencrypt]  Imaura, T., Dillaway, B., and E. Simon, "XML Encryption
                 Syntax and Processing", W3C Recommendation,
                 December 2002, <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/>.

   [XMLschema]   Thompson, H., Beech, D., Maloney, M., and N.
                 Mendelsohn, "XML Schema Part 1: Structures", W3C
                 Recommendation Second Edition, October 2004,
                 <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema-1/>.

   [XMLsig]      Bartel, M., Boyer, J., Fox, B., LaMaccia, B., and E.
                 Simon, "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", W3C
                 Recommendation Second Edition, June 2008,
                 <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/>.

14.2.  Informative References

   [RFC1930]     Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
                 selection, and registration of an Autonomous System
                 (AS)", BCP 6, RFC 1930, March 1996.

   [RFC3080]     Rose, M., "The Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol
                 Core", RFC 3080, March 2001.





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RFC 6545                           RID                        April 2012


   [RFC3647]     Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
                 Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
                 Certificate Policy and Certification Practices
                 Framework", RFC 3647, November 2003.

   [RFC3986]     Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter,
                 "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax",
                 STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005.

   [RFC5735]     Cotton, M. and L. Vegoda, "Special Use IPv4 Addresses",
                 BCP 153, RFC 5735, January 2010.

   [RFC6045]     Moriarty, K., "Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)",
                 RFC 6045, November 2010.

   [RFC6194]     Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman,
                 "Security Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1
                 Message-Digest Algorithms", RFC 6194, March 2011.

   [XMLNames]    Bray, T., Hollander, D., Layman, A., Tobin, R., and H.
                 Thomson, "Namespaces in XML 1.0 (Third Edition)", W3C
                 Recommendation , December 2009,
                 <http://www.w3.org/TR/xml-names/>.




























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Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to colleagues and the Internet community for reviewing
   and commenting on the document as well as providing recommendations
   to improve, simplify, and secure the protocol: Steve Bellovin, David
   Black, Harold Booth, Paul Cichonski, Robert K. Cunningham, Roman
   Danyliw, Yuri Demchenko, Sandra G. Dykes, Stephen Farrell, Katherine
   Goodier, Cynthia D. McLain, Thomas Millar, Jean-Francois Morfin,
   Stephen Northcutt, Damir Rajnovic, Tony Rutkowski, Peter Saint-Andre,
   Jeffrey Schiller, Robert Sparks, William Streilein, Richard Struse,
   Tony Tauber, Brian Trammell, Sean Turner, Iljitsch van Beijnum, and
   David Waltermire.

Author's Address

   Kathleen M. Moriarty
   EMC Corporation
   176 South Street
   Hopkinton, MA
   United States

   EMail: Kathleen.Moriarty@emc.com





























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