Charter and Goals of the SAVI Working Group

Christian Vogt, Bill Fenner

SAVI working group meeting @ IETF 72, Dublin

July 28, 2008

Source Address Validation – Why Do We Need It?

- Internet fails to prevent IP source address spoofing
  - packet delivery based on IP destination address only
  - IP source address used by receiver, network entities
    - sender identification
    - destination for return traffic

- resulting threats
  - illegitimate authorization to service
  - circumvent accounting
  - identity/location spoofing
  - redirect unwanted traffic to 3rd party

Existing Solutions

- ingress filtering
- Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding + variants
- Cisco IPv4 Source Guard

- not sufficient
  - too coarse (IP address prefix validation at aggregated level)
  - not standardized (as oftentimes demanded for procurement)
- M.I.T. Spoofer project provides evidence
  - spoofing possible in ¼ of observed IP address space

- need additional protection – standardized

Possible Solution Scopes

- on local link — scope of SAVI
- within administrative domain
- across administrative domains

envisioned benefits in focus area

- detect misconfigurations locally
- trace IP spoofing attacks
- IP-address-based authorization/accounting
- location identification

SAVI Goals and Requirements

ensure that hosts attached to the same IP link cannot spoof each other's IP addresses without disrupting legitimate traffic

- for Ethernet or Ethernet-based broadband
- observe/use existing protocols
- no host changes
- for IPv4 and IPv6
- for all address configuration methods
- preferably auto-configuring

Framework for SAVI Solutions



1. derive legitimate IP address from on-link traffic
2. bind legitimate IP address to lower-layer entity
3. enforce binding

Challenges

- multiple IP addresses per interface
- multiple link layer addresses per interface
- host mobility at link layer
- hosts with multiple interfaces on same link
- routers
- address translators
- anycast addressing

SAVI solution can be "default-on" only if it never disrupts legitimate traffic despite these challenges

Deliverables

Aug 08	first working group draft on threats document
Oct 08	first working group draft on IPv4 solution
Oct 08	first working group draft on IPv6 solution
Oct 08	**submit document on threats to IESG for Informational RFC**
Feb 09	first working group draft on solution for Ethernet-based broadband access network
Mar 09	**submit IPv4 solution to IESG for Proposed Standard**
May 09	**submit IPv6 solution to IESG for Proposed Standard**
Oct 09	**submit Ethernet-based broadband access network solution to IESG for Proposed Standard**