

# **IETF BMWG**

## **Security Effectiveness Benchmarking**

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# Critical Functions of Content Aware Devices

Content-aware security devices perform the following key functions:

1. Categorise traffic as either legal or illegal
2. Log/notify about illegal traffic (in-band/out-of-band)
3. Block illegal traffic (in-band)
4. Forward legal traffic (in-band)

All devices must implement categorisation as it is fundamental to the other functions.

# Distinguishing Performance and Effectiveness

- **Security Performance** = how well a content-aware device forwards good traffic with security features enabled and in the presence of illegal traffic.

This has begun to be addressed by:  
`draft-hamilton-bmwg-ca-bench_xxx`

- **Security Effectiveness** = how well the device categorises traffic.
  - No false negatives = accurately identifies all evil traffic
  - No false positives = never flags good traffic as evil

**This is not currently addressed.**

# The Proposed Drafts

**Two drafts:** Terminology and methodology for Security Effectiveness benchmarking

- **Terminology** draft will cover items specific to Security Effectiveness testing
  - Legal traffic, Illegal traffic (taking RFC2647 as a starting point)
  - Vulnerability, Malware, Virus, Trojan, Rootkit ...
  - False positive, false negative ...
  - Wildlist
  - Others TBD (as required by the Methodology draft)

# The Proposed Drafts (cont.)

**Methodology** draft will provide general information on test setups and test results, then describe the specific benchmark metrics and tests

- Maximum Attack Blocking Rate
  - Useful Attack Blocking Rate
  - Attack Blocking Effectiveness
  - Others TBD
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- Results to include details of all attacks and identify those blocked and those not blocked.

# Why Do We Need To Do This?

- The nature of this testing is orthogonal to that of performance testing and is not covered by existing RFCs or IDs.
  - A security device with high forwarding performance is of little use if it misses malicious traffic.
  - Currently there is no standard way to validate effectiveness of security solutions and hence no mechanism exists for realistic apples-to-apples comparisons of the breadth and currency of competing solutions.
- The range of security challenges grows exponentially
  - Existing exploits and malware remain a risk and effectiveness against them must be validated for both new and updated products.
  - New exploits and malware appear all the time requiring re-validation of the effectiveness of existing devices and solution updates.

## Next steps

- Continue to solicit comments, feedback, and support
- Submit initial drafts based on comments and input received

Initial methodology draft: `draft-green-bmwg-seceff-bench-meth-00.txt`

Comments?