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Versions: 00 01 02 draft-ietf-dprive-eval

Network Working Group                                        A. Mohaisen
Internet-Draft                                              SUNY Buffalo
Intended status: Informational                                 A. Mankin
Expires: April 20, 2016                                    Verisign Labs
                                                        October 18, 2015

             Evaluation of Privacy for DNS Private Exchange


   The set of DNS requests that an individual makes can provide a
   monitor with a large amount of information about that individual.
   DNS Private Exchange (DPRIVE) aims to deprive this actor of this
   information.  This document describes methods for measuring the
   performance of DNS privacy mechanisms, particularly it provides
   methods for measuring effectiveness in the face of pervasive
   monitoring as defined in RFC7258.  The document includes example
   evaluations for common use cases.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2016.

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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
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Table of Contents

   1.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Privacy Evaluation Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Entities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Data and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Identifiability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Other Central Definitions and Formalizations  . . . . . .   6
   3.  Assumptions about Quantification of Privacy . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  System Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  DNS Resolvers (System Model)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  System Setup - Putting It Together  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Risk Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Risk Type-1 - Passive Pervasive Monitor . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  Risk Type-2 - Active Monitor  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.3.  Risks in the System Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Privacy Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Privacy Evaluation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Other evaluation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   11. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   12. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22

1.  Motivation

   One of the IETF's core views is that protocols should be designed to
   enable security and privacy while online [RFC3552].  In light of the
   recent reported pervasive monitoring efforts, another goal is to
   design protocols and mechanisms to make such monitoring expensive or
   infeasible to conduct.  As detailed in the DPRIVE problem statement
   [RFC7626], DNS resolution is an important arena for pervasive
   monitoring, and in some cases may be used for breaching the privacy
   of individuals.  The set of DNS requests that an individual makes can
   provide a large amount of information about that individual.  In some
   specific use cases, the sets of DNS requests from a DNS recursive
   resolver or other entity may also provide revealing information.
   This document describes methods for measuring the performance of DNS
   privacy mechanisms; in particular, it provides methods for measuring
   effectiveness in the face of pervasive monitoring as defined in
   [RFC7258].  The document includes example evaluations for common use

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   The privacy threats associated with DNS monitoring are not new,
   however they were made more obvious by the issue described in
   [RFC7258].  The DPRIVE working group was formed to respond and at
   this time has several DNS private exchange mechanisms in
   consideration, including [dns-over-tls], [confidential-dns],
   [phb-dnse], and [privatedns].  There is also related work in other
   working groups, including DNSOP: [qname-minimisation] and
   (potentially) DANE [ipseca].  The recently published RFC on
   opportunistic security [RFC7435] also has relevance to DNS private

   Each effort related to DNS privacy mechanisms asserts some privacy
   assurances and operational relevance.  Metrics for these privacy
   assurances are needed and are in reach based on existing techniques
   from the general field of privacy engineering.  Systematic evaluation
   of DNS privacy mechanisms will enhance the likely operational
   effectiveness of DNS private exchange.

   Evaluating an individual mechanism for DNS privacy could be
   accomplished on a one-off basis, presumably as Privacy Considerations
   within each specification, but this will not address as much
   variation of operational contexts nor will it cover using multiple
   mechanisms together (in composition).  Section 2 of [RFC6973]
   discussed both benefits and risks of using multiple mechanisms.

   Definitions required for evaluating the privacy of stand-alone and
   composed design are not limited to privacy notions, but also need to
   include the risk model and some information about relationships among
   the entities in a given system.  A mechanism for providing privacy to
   withstand the power and capabilities of a passive pervasive monitor
   may not withstand a more powerful actor using active monitoring by
   plugging itself into the path of individuals' DNS requests as a
   forwarder .  Having some standard models, and understanding how
   applicable they are to various designs is a part of evaluating the

   Sections 2 and 3 present privacy terminology and some assumptions.
   Sections 4 and 5 cover the system model or setup and the risk models
   of interest.  In Section 6, we review a list of DNS privacy
   mechanisms, including some which are not in scope of the DPRIVE
   working group.  Section 7 tackles how to evaluate privacy mechanisms,
   in the form of templates and outcomes.  Given a specific risk model,
   the guarantees with respect to privacy of an individual or an item of
   interest are quantified.

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2.  Privacy Evaluation Definitions

   This section provides definitions to be used for privacy evaluation
   of DNS.  The verbatim source of most of those definitions is from
   [RFC6973], which are included as an aid in reasability.  In some
   definitions, text is added to apply them to the DNS case.  Also, a
   new section of terms has been added to include several important
   practical or conventional terms that were not included in [RFC6973]
   such as PII.  For the terms from [RFC6973], we include their
   definitions rather than simply referencing them as an aid to

2.1.  Entities

   o  Attacker: An entity that works against one or more privacy
      protection goals.  Unlike observers, attackers' behavior is
      unauthorized, in a way similar to that of an eavesdropper.

   o  Eavesdropper: A type of attacker that passively observes an
      initiator's communications without the initiator's knowledge or
      authorization.  DNS example may include a passive pervasive
      monitor, defined below.

   o  Enabler: A protocol entity that facilitates communication between
      an initiator and a recipient without being directly in the
      communications path.  DNS examples of an enabler in this sense
      include a recursive resolver, a proxy, or a forwarder.

   o  Individual: A human being (or a group of them)

   o  Initiator: A protocol entity that initiates communications with a

   o  Intermediary: A protocol entity that sits between the initiator
      (DNS example of stub resolver) and the recipient (DNS example of
      recursive resolver or authority resolver) and is necessary for the
      initiator and recipient to communicate.  Unlike an eavesdropper,
      an intermediary is an entity that is part of the communication
      architecture and therefore at least tacitly authorized.

   o  Observer: An entity that is able to observe and collect
      information from communications, potentially posing privacy risks,
      depending on the context.  As defined in this document,
      initiators, recipients, intermediaries, and enablers can all be
      observers.  Observers are distinguished from eavesdroppers by
      being at least tacitly authorized.

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   o  We note that while the definition of an observer may include an
      initiator in the risk model, an initiator of a request is excluded
      in the context of this document, because it corresponds to the
      subject of interest being studied.  Similar to the definition in
      [RFC7258], we note that an attacker is broader than an observer.
      While [RFC7258] claim that an attack does not consider the motive
      of the actor, the given context of DNS implies a motive if the
      term attacker is used to characterize the risk.

2.2.  Data and Analysis

   We assume the following definitions related to data and analysis from
   [RFC4949]: attacker, correlation, fingerprint, fingerprinting, item
   of interest (IOI), personal data, interaction, traffic analysis,
   undetectability, and unlinkability.  We augment some of those
   definitions later in this document.

   from [RFC4949], we relax the definition of IOI to exclude "the fact
   that a communication interaction has taken place" as this does not
   suite the evaluated context of DNS.

2.3.  Identifiability

   We assume the following definitions related to identifiability from
   [RFC4949]: anonymity, anonymity set, anonymous, attribute, identity
   provider, personal name, and relying party.

   The following definitions are modified for the context of this
   document from those defined in [RFC4949]

   o  Identifiability: The extent to which an individual is
      identifiable.  [RFC6973] includes the rest of the variations on
      this (Identifiable, Identification, Identified, Identifier,
      Identity, Identity Confidentiality)

   o  Personal Name: A natural name for an individual.  Personal names
      are often not unique and often comprise given names in combination
      with a family name.  An individual may have multiple personal
      names at any time and over a lifetime, including official names.
      From a technological perspective, it cannot always be determined
      whether a given reference to an individual is, or is based upon,
      the individual's personal name(s) (see Pseudonym).  NOTE: The
      reason to import this definition is that some query names that
      cause privacy leakage do so by embedding personal names as
      identifiers of host or other equipment, e.g.

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   o  Pseudonymity: See the formal definition in section 2.4 in lieu of

   NOTE: Identifiability Definitions in [RFC6973] also include some
   material not included here because the distinctions are not major for
   DNS Private Exchange, such as real and official names, and variant
   forms of Pseudonymity in its informal definition.

2.4.  Other Central Definitions and Formalizations

   Central to the presentation of this document is the definition of
   personally identifiable information (PII), as well as other
   definitions that supplement the definitions listed earlier or modify
   them for the context of this document.  In this section, we outline
   such definitions we further notes on their indications.

   o  Personally Identifiable Information (PII): Information
      (attributes) that can be used as is, or along with other side
      information, to identify, locate, and/or contact a single
      individual or subject (c.f. item of interest).

   NOTE: the definition above indicates that PII can be used on its own
   or in context.  In DNS privacy, the items without additional context
   include IP(v4 or v6) addresses, qname, qtype, timings of queries,
   etc.  The additional context includes organization-level attributes,
   such as a network prefix that can be associated with an organization.
   The definition of PII is complementary to the definition of items of

   o  Subject: This term is useful as a parallel term to Individual.
      When the privacy of a group or an organization is of interest, we
      can reference the group or organization as Subject rather than

   Often it is desirable to reference alternative identifiers known as
   pseudonyms.  A pseudonym is a name assumed by an individual in some
   context, unrelated to the names or identifiers known by others in
   that context.

   o  Pseudonymity/Pseudonym: a relaxation of the definition of
      anonymity for usability.  In particular, pseudonymity is an
      anonymity feature obtained by using a pseudonym, an identifier
      that is used for establishing a long relationship between two

   As an example, in the DNS context, a randomly generated pseudonym
   might identify a set of query data with a shared context, such as
   geographic origin.  Such pseudonymity enables another entity

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   interested in breaching the privacy to link multiple queries on a
   long-term basis.  Pseudonyms are assumed long-lived and their
   uniqueness may be a goal.  There are many findings that indicate that
   pseudonymity is weaker than anonymity.

   o  Unlinkability: Formally, two items of interest are said to be
      unlinkable if the certainty of an actor concerning those items of
      interest is not affected by observing the system.  This is,
      unlinkability implies that the a-posteriori probability computed a
      monitor that two items of interest are related is close enough to
      the a-priori probability computed by a monitor based on their

   Two items of interest are said to be unlinkable if there is a small
   chance (beta, close to 0 probability) that the monitor identifies
   them as associated, and they are linkable if there is a sufficiently
   large probability (referred to as alpha).

   Informally, given two items of interest (user attributes, DNS
   queries, users, etc.), unlinkability is defined as the inability of
   the monitor to sufficiently determine whether those items are related
   to one another.  In the context of DNS, this refers typically but not
   only to a monitor relating queries to the same individual.

   o  Undetectability: a stronger definition of privacy, where an item
      of interest is said to be undetectable if the monitor is not
      sufficiently able to know or tell whether the item exists or not.

   Note that undetectability implies unlinkability.  As explained below,
   a way of ensuring undetectability is to use encryption that is secure
   under known ciphertext attacks, or randomized encryption.

   o  Unobservability: a stronger definition of privacy that requires
      satisfying both undetectability and anonymity.  Unobservability
      means that an item of interest is undetectable by any not involved
      individual, monitor or not.

   In theory, there are many ways of ensuring unobservability by
   fulfilling both requirements.  For example, undetectability requires
   that no party that is not invovled in the resolution of a DNS query
   shall know that query has existed or not.  A mechanism to ensure this
   function is encryption secure under known ciphertext attacks, or
   randomized encryption for all other than stub resolvers, and
   pseudonyms for the stub resolver.  An alternative mechanism to
   provide the anonymity property would be the use of mix networks for
   routing DNS queries.

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3.  Assumptions about Quantification of Privacy

   The quantification of privacy is connected with the privacy goals.
   Is the desired privacy property unlinkability only, or is it
   undetectability?  Is pseudonymity a sufficient property?  Parameters
   and entire privacy mechanism choices are affected by the choice of
   privacy goals.

   While a binary measure of privacy is sometimes possible, that is,
   being able to say that the transaction is anonymous, in this
   document, we assume that the binary is not frequently obtainable, and
   therefore we focus on methods for continuous quantification.  Both
   are relevant to DNS Private Exchange.  Another way to state this is
   that the quantification could be exactly the probabilities 1 and 0,
   corresponding to the binary, but the methods prefer to provide
   continuous values instead.

   Here is an example of continuous quantification, related to
   identifiability of an individual or item of interest based on
   observing queries.

   o  For an individual A, and a set of observations by a monitor Y,
      where Y = [y1, y2, ... yn], we define the privacy of A as the
      uncertainty of the monitor knowing that A is itself among many
      others under the observations Y; that is, we define Privacy = 1 -
      P[A | Y]

   o  For an item of interest r associated with a user A, we similarly
      define the privacy of r as Privacy = 1 - P[r | Y].

4.  System Model

   A DNS client (a DNS stub resolver) may resolve a domain name or
   address into the corresponding DNS record by contacting the
   authoritative name server responsible for that domain name (or
   address) directly.  However, to improve the operation of DNS
   resolution, and reduce the round trip time required for resolving an
   address, both caching and recursive resolution are implemented.
   Caching is implemented at an intermediary between the stub and the
   authoritative name server.  In practice, many caching servers also
   implement the recursive logic of DNS resolution for finding the name
   server authoritative for a domain, and are thus called DNS recursive
   resolvers.  Another type of entity, DNS forwarders (or proxies), acts
   as intermediaries between stub resolvers and recursive resolvers, and
   recursive resolvers and authoritative resolvers.  The system model
   for DNS privacy evaluation includes the four entities quickly
   sketched here: stub resolvers, recursive resolvers, authoritative
   name servers, and forwarders.

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4.1.  DNS Resolvers (System Model)

   o  Stub resolver (S): a minimal resolver that does not support
      referral, and delegates recursive resolution to a recursive
      resolver.  A stub resolver is a consumer of recursive resolutions.
      Per the terminology of [RFC6973], a stub resolver is an Initiator.

   o  Recursive resolver (R): a resolver that implements the recursive
      function of DNS resolution on behalf of a stub resolver.  Per the
      terminology of [RFC6973], a recursive resolver is an Enabler.

   o  Authoritative resolver (A): is a server that is the origin of a
      DNS record.  A recursive resolver queries the authoritative
      resolver to resolve a domain name or address.  Per the terminology
      of [RFC6973], the authoritative name server is also an Enabler.

   o  Forwarder/proxy (P): between the stub resolver and the
      authoritative resolver there may be one or more DNS-involved
      entity.  These are systems located between S and R (stub resolver
      and recursive), or between R and A (recursive and authoritative),
      which do not play a primary role in the DNS protocol.  Per the
      terminology of [RFC6973], forwarders are Intermediaries.

4.2.  System Setup - Putting It Together

   Evaluating various privacy protection mechanisms in relation to
   monitors such as the pervasive monitors defined next requires
   understanding links in the system setup.  We define the following
   links.  In relation to [RFC7258] these are the attack surface where a
   monitor (eavesdropper) can collect sets of query information.

   o  Stub -> Recursive (S-R): a link between the stub resolver and a
      recursive resolver.  At the time of writing, the scope of DPRIVE
      Working Group privacy mechanisms is supposed to be limited to S-R.

   o  Stub -> Proxy (S-P): a link between the stub resolver and a
      forwarder/ proxy.  The intended function of this link may be
      difficult to analyze.

   o  Proxy -> Recursive (P-R): a link between a proxy and a recursive

   o  Recursive -> Authoritative (R-A): a link between a recursive and
      an authoritative name server.  Although at the time of writing,
      R-A is not in the DPRIVE scope, we discuss it in the evaluation.

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   Rather than notating in system setup that an entity is compromised,
   this is covered in the monitor model in Section 6, which has system
   elements as parameters.

   In the system setup, there is a possibility that S and R exist on a
   single machine.  The concept of the Unlucky Few relates S and R in
   this case.  A monitor can monitor R-A and find the query traffic of
   the initiator individual.  The same concept applies in the case where
   a recursive is serving a relatively small number of individuals.  The
   query traffic of a subject group or organization (c.f.  Subject in
   the definitions) is obtained by the monitor who monitors this
   system's R-A.

   Because R-A is not in the DPRIVE scope, it is for future work to
   examine the Unlucky Few circumstance fully.  The general system setup
   is that PII, the individual's private identifying information, is not
   sent on R-A and is not seen by authoritative name server.

   There could be one or more proxies between the stub resolver and a
   recursive.  From a functionality point of view they can all be
   consolidated into a single proxy without affecting the system view.
   However, the behavior of such proxies may affect the size and shape
   of the attack surface.  However, we believe that an additional
   treatment is needed for this case and it is not included in the

   We also do not include in discussion proxies that exist along R-A,
   between a recursive and an authoritative name server.  We do so in
   respect for the DPRIVE charter's scope at this time.  According to
   recent work at [openresolverproject.org], there may be multiple
   intermediaries with poorly defined behavior.

   The system setup here leaves out other realistic considerations for
   simplicity, such as the impact of shared caches in DNS entities.

5.  Risk Model

   The Definitions section defines observer, attack and monitor, but not
   a Risk Model, which is needed to actually evaluate privacy.

   For consistency, we note that the only difference between an attacker
   and an obeserver is that an attacker is an unauthorized observer with
   all the capabilities it may have.  We also stress that for the
   context of DNS privacy, the term attacker may implicitly assume an
   intent.  To that end, active and passive observers are collectively
   referred to as actors.

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   o  Risk Model: a well-defined set of capabilities indicating how much
      information an observer (or eavesdropper) has, and in what
      context, in order to reach a goal of breaching the privacy of an
      individual or subject with respect to a given privacy metric.

   In this document we focus on two risk models, namely a pervasive
   monitor and a malicious monitor.

5.1.  Risk Type-1 - Passive Pervasive Monitor

   This risk corresponds to the passive pervasive monitoring model
   described in [RFC7258].  This model relies on monitoring capabilities
   to breach the privacy of individuals from the DNS traffic at scale
   without decimation.  An actor causing this risk is capable of
   eavesdropping or observing traffic between two end points, including
   traffic between any of the pairs of entities described in section
   2.1.  Per [RFC7258], this type of actor has the ability to eavesdrop
   pervasively on many links at once, which is a powerful form of
   attack.  Type-1 monitors are passive.  They do not modify traffic or
   insert traffic.

5.2.  Risk Type-2 - Active Monitor

   This risk corresponds to an actor with the same types of capabilities
   of monitoring links.  Additionally, this model can select links in
   order to target specific individuals.  A Type-2 monitor for instance
   might put into place intermediaries in order to obtain traffic on
   specific links.

   Note that we exclude malicious monitoring from this document since,
   by definition, a malicious actor has an intent associated with his

5.3.  Risks in the System Setup

   To evaluate the privacy provided by a given mechanism or mechanisms
   in a particular system model, we characterize the risk using a
   template where parameters from the system model in which the risk
   actor (eavesdropper or observer as monitors) is located are used.
   The general template is: Risk(Type, [Entities], [Links]).  For
   example, the template Risk(Type-2, R, S-R) passed as a parameter in
   the evaluation of a privacy mechanism indicates a Type-2 monitor that
   controls a recursive resolver and has the capability of eavesdropping
   on the link between the stub and recursive resolvers (S-R).  Other
   risk templates include the appropriate parameterizations based on the
   above description of those monitors, including monitors that have the
   capabilities of monitoring multiple links and controlling multiple
   pieces of infrastructure.

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6.  Privacy Mechanisms

   Various mechanisms for enhancing privacy in networks are applicable
   to DNS private exchange.  Some mechanisms common to privacy research
   include mix networks, dummy traffic, and private information
   retrieval techniques.  Applicable protocol mechanisms include
   encryption-based techniques - encrypting the channel carrying the
   queries using IPSEC [ipseca], TLS [dns-over-tls] or special-purpose
   encryption [confidential-dns].  [privatedns] includes special-purpose
   encryption but also depends on a trusted service broker.

   o  Mix Networks: in this type of mechanism, the initiator uses a mix
      network such as Tor to route the DNS queries to the intended DNS
      server entity.  A monitor observing part of the system finds it
      difficult to determine which individual sends which queries, and
      will not be able to tell which individual has sent them (ideally,
      though it is known that attacks exist that allow correlation and
      privacy breaches against mix networks).  The privacy property is
      unlinkability of the queries; the probability that two queries
      coming from one exit node in the mix network belong to the same
      individual is uniform among all the individuals using the network.

   o  Dummy Traffic: a simple mechanism in which the initiator of a DNS
      request will also generate k dummy queries and send the intended
      query along with those queries.  As such, the adversary will not
      be able to tell which query is of interest to the initiator.  For
      a given k, the probability that the adversary will be able to
      detect which query is of interest to the initiator is equal to
      1-1/(k+1).  In that sense, and for the proper parameterization of
      the protocol, the monitor is bounded to the undetectability of the

   o  Private Information Retrieval: a mechanism that allows a user s to
      retrieve a record r from a database DB on a server without
      allowing the server to learn the recordr.  A trivial solution to
      the problem requires that s downloads the entire database DB and
      then perform the queries locally.  While this provides privacy to
      the queries of the user, the solution is communication inefficient
      at the scale of the DNS.  More sophisticated cryptographic
      solutions are multi-round, and thus reduce the communication
      overhead, but are still inefficient for the DNS.

   o  Query Minimization: a mechanism that allows the resolver to
      minimize the amount of information it sends on behalf of a stub
      resolver.  A method of query minimization is specified in
      [qname-minimisation].  Qname minimization deprives a Type-1 risk
      on R-A of information from correlating queries, unless the
      individuals have an Unfortunate Few problem.

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   o  NOTE: queries on R-A generally do not include an identifier of the
      individual making the query, because the source address is that of
      R.  With respect R or A themselves, they may have well established
      policies for respecting the sensitivity of queries they process,
      while still using summary analysis of those queries to improve
      security, stability of their business operation.

   o  Encrypted Channel Mechanisms: Using these mechanisms, an initiator
      has an encrypted channel with a corresponding enabler, so that the
      queries are not available to eavesdropping Pervasive Monitor risk.
      Examples include [dns-over-tls], [ipseca], and [confidential-dns].
      Depending on the characteristics of the channel, various privacy
      properties are ensured.  For instance, undetectability of queries
      is ensured for encryption-based mechanisms once the encrypted
      channel is established.  Unlinkability of the queries may depend
      on the type of crypto-suite; it is provided as long as randomized
      encryption is used.

   o  Composed (Multiple) Mechanisms: the use of multiple mechanisms is
      a likely scenario and results in varied privacy guarantees.
      Consider a hypothetical system in which mix networks (for
      unlinkability) and randomized encryption (for undetectability) can
      both be applied, thus providing for unobservability, a stronger
      property than either of the two along.  On the other hand,
      consider another hypothetical system in which mix networks are
      used to reach a third party broker requiring sign-in and
      authorization.  Depending on the risk type, this could mean that
      the mix network unlinkability was cancelled out by the linkability
      due to entrusting the third party with identifying information in
      order to be authorized.

7.  Privacy Evaluation

   Now we turn our attention to the evaluation of privacy mechanisms in
   a standard form, given the risk models and system definitions, for
   some of the example mechanisms.

   An evaluation takes multiple parameters as input.  The output of the
   evaluation template is based on the analysis of the individual
   algorithms, settings, and parameters passed to this evaluation

   Here is the top level interface of the evaluation template:


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   The output of the function is a privacy guarantee for the given
   settings, expressed through defined properties such as unlinkability
   and unobservability, for the specified system and risk model.

   7.1 Dummy Traffic Example

   Eval(Dummy_Traffic (k=10, distribution=uniform),
       System_Setting([S, P, R, A], [S-P, P-R, R-A]),
       Risk_Model(Type-1A, S-R))

   The dummy traffic mechanism is not presented as a practical
   mechanism, though there's no way to know if there are deployments of
   this type of mechanism.  This example evaluation uses k=10 to
   indicate that for every one query initiated by an individual, ten
   queries that disguise the query of interest are selected randomly
   from a pool of queries.  In the parameters passed in the evaluation
   function, we indicate that the privacy assurances of interest concern
   the S-R link, with a Passive Pervasive Monitor (Type-1A) risk.

   Here is a template format for the example:

   Eval(Dummy_Traffic (k=10, distribution=uniform),
       System_Setting([S, P, R, A], [S-P, P-R, R-A]),
         Risk_Model(Type-1A, S-R)) {
               Mechanism_name = Dummy_Traffic
                   Queries = 10
                   Query_distribution = uniform
               Entities = S, P, R and A;
               Links = S-P, P-R, R-A
               Type = Type-1A
               Links = S-R
           Privacy_guarantee = undetectability
           Privacy_measure = 1-(1/(queries+1)).

           Return Privacy_guarantee, Privacy_measure


   Undetectability is provided with 0.91 probability (though we know
   there are other weaknesses for dummy traffic) If the threat model is

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   replaced with Type-2, so that responses to arbitrary requests can be
   injected, and tracked, the undetectability probability is decreased.

   7.2 Mix Network Example

   Here is an input for a mix network privacy mechanism:

   Eval(Mix (u=10, distribution=uniform), System_Setting(link=S-R),

   This indicates that the monitor resides between the stub and
   resolver.  While queries are not undetectable, two queries are not
   linkable to the same individual; the provided guarantee is
   unlinkability.  For a given number of individuals in the mix network,
   indicated by the parameter u, assuming that at any time, traffic from
   these individuals is uniformly random, the probability that one query
   is comes from a given individual is (1/10 = 0.1).  The probability
   that two queries are issued by the same initiator is 0.1^2 = 0.01,
   which represents the linkability probability.  The unlinkability
   probability is given as 1-0.01 = 0.99.  Thus,

   (unlinkability, 0.99) < Eval(Mix (u=10, distribution=uniform),
   System_Setting(link=S-R), Risk_Model(type-1)).

   We note that even if there is a Type-2 Risk in recursive resolver R,
   the same results hold.

   To sum up, the above example is represented in the following

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   Eval(Mix (u=10, distribution=uniform),
       System_Setting([S, P, R, A], [S-P, P-R, R-A]),
         Risk_Model(Type-1A, S-R)) {
               Mechanism_name = mix    //mix network
                   Users = 10
                   Query_distribution = uniform
               Entities = S, P, R and A;
               Links = S-P, P-R, R-A
               Type = Type-1A
               Links = P-R

           Privacy_guarantee = unlinkability
           Privacy_measure = 1-(1/users)^2.

           Return privacy_guarantee, privacy_measure

   7.3 Encrypted Channel (DNS-over-TLS) Example

   For one of the encryption-based mechanisms, DNS-over-TLS
   [dns-over-tls], we have the following template (TLS parameters are
   from [RFC5246]):

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Eval(TLS_enc (SHA256, ECDSA, port 53, uniform),
    System_Setting([S, P, R, A], [S-P, P-R, RA]),
        Risk_Model(Type-1B, S-R)) {
            Mechanism_name = TLS-upgrade-based
                Query_distribution = uniform
                Hash_algorithm = SHA256
                Sig_Algorithm = ECDSA
                Port 53
                Entities = S, P, R and A;
                Links = S-P, P-R, R-A
                Type = Type-1B
                Links = S-R
              Privacy_guarantee = unlinkability, undetectability
              Privacy_measure (unlinkability) = 1
              Privacy_measure (undetectability) = 0 // port 53 indicates DNS used

              Return privacy_guarantee, privacy_measure

   This template features an Active Monitor risk model (Type-2) in order
   to show how that the monitor might apply extra resources to an
   encrypted channel.  Undetectability is an issue whether using
   upgrade-based TLS on port 53, or a port-based TLS on a dedicated port
   - both ports indicate the use of DNS.  The source address of the
   individual is exposed in all cases.  If this were a suitably
   parameterized use of [ipseca], the monitor would not be certain that
   all the traffic from S-R was DNS, and undetectability would be

   7.4 Encrypted Channel (IPSec) Example

   In the following, we use the same template above to characterize the
   encryption capabilities provided by IPSec, as a potential mechanisms
   for enabling privacy in DNS exchanges.

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       System_Setting([S, P, R, A], [S-P, P-R, RA]),
         Risk_Model(Type-1B, S-R)) {
             Mechanism_name = IPSec
               Query_distribution = uniform
               Entities = S, P, R and A;
               Links = S-P, P-R, R-A
               Type = 2
               Links = S-R
             Privacy_guarantee = unlinkability, undetectability
             Privacy_measure (unlinkability) = 1
             Privacy_measure (undetectability) = 1

             Return privacy_guarantee, privacy_measure

   We note that IPSec can provide better guarantees with respect to
   studied privacy notions.  However, whether the technique itself is
   widely deployable or not is worth further investigation.

   7.5 QName Minimization Example (R-A) Example

   Analyzing the privacy assurances of QName minimization is a non-
   trivial problem, given that the notions introduced in this document
   are techniques that do not alter items of interest.  This is, the
   notions of privacy as outlined above are concerned with a certain IOI
   that is modified by this technique.  To this end, we modify the
   aforementioned notions in ordered to be able to analyze the
   technique.  For example, we define linkability as the ability of an
   adversary to link two labels of (minimized) queries to each other,
   and relate them to original source of query.  Assuming a reasonable
   use of a recursive resolver that minimizes queries on behalf of
   users, this task is non-trivial, although quantifying the probability
   would depend on the number of labels in queries, the number of
   queries issued, and the number of users using the studied recursive
   resolvers.  The following template captures QName minimization as a

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   Eval(Qname_minimisation ([...],
       System_Settings([S, P, R, A], [R-A]),
             Mechanism_name = Qname_minimisation
               Qtype_used = NS
             Entities = S, P, R and A;
             Links = R-A
             Type = 2
             Links = R-A
           Privacy_guarantee =  unlinkability
           Privacy_measure = analytical

           Return privacy_guarantee, privacy_measure

   Note that QName minimization does not solve the problem of the
   privacy for a monitoring risk between the stub and recursive.
   Encrypting the channel between the recursive and the stub, utilizing
   other techniques such as TDNS or IPSec, can marginalize such risk.
   Furthermore, note that the risk on the link between the recursive and
   authority name servers is always mitigated by the fact that recursive
   name servers act as a mixer of queries, even when they are sent in
   full to the authority name servers.

   7.7 Private-DNS (S-R) Example

   The template for [privatedns] takes note of deployments in which in
   addition to S, R and A, there is another entity in the system, the
   function that authenticates the individual using S prior to
   permitting an encrypted channel to be formed to R or A.  If the
   Private-DNS connection is with R, then identifiability of S as an
   individual may be similar to the identifiability of S from source
   address, or it may be stronger, depending on the nature of the
   account information required.  If the Private-DNS connection is with
   A, source address PII is provided to A, and linkability of the
   queries from S has probability 1.

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8.  Other evaluation

   This document does not address a lot of the evaluation aspects not
   associated with privacy.  For example, some of the mechanisms
   discussed in the working group are built of well-understood and
   standardized technologies, whereas others use other non-standard and
   less widely deployed techniques.  A comprehensive evaluation of such
   mechanisms should take into account such facts.

9.  Security Considerations

   The purpose of this document is to provide methods for those
   deploying or using DNS private exchange to assess the effectiveness
   of privacy mechanisms in depriving monitors of access to private
   information.  Protecting privacy is one of the dimensions of an
   overall security strategy.

   It is possible for privacy-enhancing mechanisms to be deployed in
   ways that are vulnerable to security risks, with the result of not
   achieving security gains.  For the purposes of privacy evaluation, it
   is important for the person making an evaluation to also ensure close
   attention to the content of the Security Considerations section of
   each mechanism being evaluated, for instance, to ensure if TLS is
   used for encryption of a link against surveillance, that TLS best
   security practices [RFC7525] are in use.

10.  IANA Considerations

   No requests are made to IANA.

11.  Acknowledgements

   We wish to thank Scott Hollenbeck, Burt Kaliski, Minsuk Kang, Paul
   Livesay and Eric Osterweil for reviewing early versions.  We wish to
   thank Stephane Bortzmeyer and Tim Wicinski for their detailed review
   and feedback on the previous versions of this document.  We also wish
   to thank those who commented on presentations of this work ahead of
   publication, including Simson Garfinkel, Cathy Meadows, Paul
   Syverson, and Christine Task.

12.  Informative References

              Wijngaards, W. and G. Wiley, "Confidential DNS", draft-
              wijngaards-dnsop-confidentialdns-03 (work in progress),
              March 2015.

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              Zhu, L., Hu, Z., Heidemann, J., Wessels, D., Mankin, A.,
              and P. Hoffman, "TLS for DNS: Initiation and Performance
              Considerations", draft-ietf-dprive-dns-over-tls-01.txt
              (work in progress), February 2015.

   [ipseca]   Osterweil, E., Wiley, G., Okubo, T., Lavu, R., and A.
              Mohaisen, "Opportunistic Encryption with DANE Semantics
              and IPsec: IPSECA", draft-osterweil-dane-ipsec-03 (work in
              progress), March 2015.

              Mauch, J., "The Open Resolver Project", April 2015.

              Hallam-Baker, P., "DNS Privacy and Censorship: Use Cases
              and Requirements", draft-hallambaker-dnse-02 (work in
              progress), November 2014.

              Hallam-Baker, P., "Private-DNS", draft-hallambaker-
              privatedns-01 (work in progress), November 2014.

              Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS query name minimisation to improve
              privacy", draft-ietf-dnsop-qname-minimisation-07 (work in
              progress), March 2015.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, DOI
              10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI
              36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC5246, August 2008,

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI
              10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,

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   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7435]  Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
              Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
              December 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.

   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
              (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
              2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.

   [RFC7626]  Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS Privacy Considerations", RFC 7626,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7626, August 2015,

Authors' Addresses

   Aziz Mohaisen
   SUNY Buffalo
   323 Davis Hall
   Buffalo, NY  14260

   Phone: +1 716 645-1592
   Email: mohaisen@buffalo.edu

   Allison Mankin
   Verisign Labs
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston, VA  20190

   Phone: +1 703 948-3200
   Email: amankin@verisign.com

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