[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker] [Email] [Nits]

Versions: 00

Network Working Group                                           J. Arkko
Internet-Draft                                                  Ericsson
Intended status: Informational                                S. Farrell
Expires: May 7, 2020                              Trinity College Dublin
                                                       November 04, 2019


          Challenges and Changes in the Internet Threat Model
                  draft-arkko-farrell-arch-model-t-00

Abstract

   Communications security has been at the center of many security
   improvements in the Internet.  The goal has been to ensure that
   communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.

   This memo suggests that the existing threat model, while important
   and still valid, is no longer alone sufficient to cater for the
   pressing security issues in the Internet.  For instance, it is also
   necessary to protect systems against endpoints that are compromised,
   malicious, or whose interests simply do not align with the interests
   of the users.  While such protection is difficult, there are some
   measures that can be taken.

   It is particularly important to ensure that as we continue to develop
   Internet technology, non-communications security related threats are
   properly understood.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.







Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 1]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Observations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Communications Security Improvements  . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Beyond Communications Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.3.1.  Deliberate adversarial behaviour in applications  . .   8
       2.3.2.  Inadvertent adversarial behaviours  . . . . . . . . .  13
   3.  Analysis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.1.  The Role of End-to-end  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.2.  Trusted networks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       3.2.1.  Even closed networks can have compromised nodes . . .  17
     3.3.  Balancing Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   4.  Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.1.  Basic Guidelines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.2.  Potential Further Guidelines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       4.2.1.  Consider ABuse-cases as well as use-cases . . . . . .  20
       4.2.2.  Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       4.2.3.  Transparency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       4.2.4.  Minimise  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       4.2.5.  Same-Origin Policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       4.2.6.  Greasing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       4.2.7.  Generalise OAuth Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       4.2.8.  Look again at how well we're securing infrastructure   22
       4.2.9.  Consider recovery from attack as part of protocol
               design  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       4.2.10. Don't think in terms of hosts . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     4.3.  Does IETF Analysis of Protocols Need to Change? . . . . .  23
       4.3.1.  Develop a BCP for privacy considerations  . . . . . .  23
       4.3.2.  Re-consider protocol design "lore"  . . . . . . . . .  23
       4.3.3.  Consider the user perspective . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       4.3.4.  Potential changes in RFC 3552 . . . . . . . . . . . .  24



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 2]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


       4.3.5.  Potential Changes in RFC 7258 . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   5.  Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   6.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32

1.  Introduction

   Communications security has been at the center of many security
   improvements in the Internet.  The goal has been to ensure that
   communications are protected against outside observers and attackers.
   At the IETF, this approach has been formalized in BCP 72 [RFC3552],
   which defined the Internet threat model in 2003.

   The purpose of a threat model is to outline what threats exist in
   order to assist the protocol designer.  But RFC 3552 also ruled some
   threats to be in scope and of primary interest, and some threats out
   of scope [RFC3552]:

      The Internet environment has a fairly well understood threat
      model.  In general, we assume that the end-systems engaging in a
      protocol exchange have not themselves been compromised.
      Protecting against an attack when one of the end-systems has been
      compromised is extraordinarily difficult.  It is, however,
      possible to design protocols which minimize the extent of the
      damage done under these circumstances.

      By contrast, we assume that the attacker has nearly complete
      control of the communications channel over which the end-systems
      communicate.  This means that the attacker can read any PDU
      (Protocol Data Unit) on the network and undetectably remove,
      change, or inject forged packets onto the wire.

   However, the communications-security -only threat model is becoming
   outdated.  This is due to three factors:

   o  Advances in protecting most of our communications with strong
      cryptographic means.  This has resulted in much improved
      communications security, but also highlights the need for
      addressing other, remaining issues.  This is not to say that
      communications security is not important, it still is:
      improvements are still needed.  Not all communications have been
      protected, and even out of the already protected communications,
      not all of their aspects have been fully protected.  Fortunately,
      there are ongoing projects working on improvements.






Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 3]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   o  Adversaries have increased their pressure against other avenues of
      attack, from compromising devices to legal coercion of centralized
      endpoints in conversations.

   o  New adversaries and risks have arisen, e.g., due to creation of
      large centralized information sources.

   In short, attacks are migrating towards the currently easier targets,
   which no longer necessarily include direct attacks on traffic flows.
   In addition, trading information about users and ability to influence
   them has become a common practice for many Internet services, often
   without consent of the users.

   This memo suggests that the existing threat model, while important
   and still valid, is no longer alone sufficient to cater for the
   pressing security issues in the Internet.  For instance, while it
   continues to be very important to protect Internet communications
   against outsiders, it is also necessary to protect systems against
   endpoints that are compromised, malicious, or whose interests simply
   do not align with the interests of the users.

   Of course, there are many trade-offs in the Internet on who one
   chooses to interact with and why or how.  It is not the role of this
   memo to dictate those choices.  But it is important that we
   understand the implications of different practices.  It is also
   important that when it comes to basic Internet infrastructure, our
   chosen technologies lead to minimal exposure with respect to the non-
   communications threats.

   It is particularly important to ensure that non-communications
   security related threats are properly understood for any new Internet
   technology.  While the consideration of these issues is relatively
   new in the IETF, this memo provides some initial ideas about
   potential broader threat models to consider when designing protocols
   for the Internet or when trying to defend against pervasive
   monitoring.  Further down the road, updated threat models could
   result in changes in BCP 72 [RFC3552] (guidelines for writing
   security considerations) and BCP 188 [RFC7258] (pervasive
   monitoring), to include proper consideration of non-communications
   security threats.

   It may also be necessary to have dedicated guidance on how systems
   design and architecture affect security.  The sole consideration of
   communications security aspects in designing Internet protocols may
   lead to accidental or increased impact of security issues elsewhere.
   For instance, allowing a participant to unnecessarily collect or
   receive information may lead to a similar effect as described in
   [RFC8546] for protocols: over time, unnecessary information will get



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 4]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   used with all the associated downsides, regardless of what deployment
   expectations there were during protocol design.

   The rest of this memo is organized as follows.  Section 2 makes some
   observations about the situation, with respect to communications
   security and beyond.  The section also provides a number of real-
   world examples.

   Section 3 discusses some high-level implications that can be drawn,
   such as the need to consider what the "ends" really are in an "end-
   to-end" communication.

   Section 4 discusses the potential remedies, both from the point of
   view of a system design, as well as from the point of IETF procedures
   and recommended analysis procedures when designing new protocols.
   For instance, Section 4.1 will also discuss high-level guidance to
   addressing these threats, and Section 4.3.4 suggests some potential
   changes to the definition of the IETF's "Internet Threat Model".  It
   is also apparent that the dangers posed by pervasive monitoring need
   to be taken in a broader light, given the evolution of the threats
   beyond communications security.

   Comments are solicited on these and other aspects of this document.
   The best place for discussion is on the arch-discuss list
   (https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/Architecture-discuss).

   Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions for next steps.

2.  Observations

2.1.  Communications Security Improvements

   The fraction of Internet traffic that is cryptographically protected
   has grown tremendously in the last few years.  Several factors have
   contributed to this change, from Snowden revelations to business
   reasons and to better available technology such as HTTP/2 [RFC7540],
   TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], QUIC [I-D.ietf-quic-transport].

   In many networks, the majority of traffic has flipped from being
   cleartext to being encrypted.  Reaching the level of (almost) all
   traffic being encrypted is no longer something unthinkable but rather
   a likely outcome in a few years.

   At the same time, technology developments and policy choices have
   driven the scope of cryptographic protection from protecting only the
   pure payload to protecting much of the rest as well, including far
   more header and meta-data information than was protected before.  For
   instance, efforts are ongoing in the IETF to assist encrypting



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 5]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   transport headers [I-D.ietf-quic-transport], server domain name
   information in TLS [I-D.ietf-tls-esni], and domain name queries
   [RFC8484].

   There have also been improvements to ensure that the security
   protocols that are in use actually have suitable credentials and that
   those credentials have not been compromised, see, for instance, Let's
   Encrypt [RFC8555], HSTS [RFC6797], HPKP [RFC7469], and Expect-CT
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-expect-ct].

   This is not to say that all problems in communications security have
   been resolved - far from it.  But the situation is definitely
   different from what it was a few years ago.  Remaining issues will be
   and are worked on; the fight between defense and attack will also
   continue.  Communications security will stay at the top of the agenda
   in any Internet technology development.

2.2.  Beyond Communications Security

   There are, however, significant issues beyond communications security
   in the Internet.  To begin with, it is not necessarily clear that one
   can trust all the endpoints.

   Of course, the endpoints were never trusted, but the pressures
   against endpoints issues seem to be mounting.  For instance, the
   users may not be in as much control over their own devices as they
   used to be due to manufacturer-controlled operating system
   installations and locked device ecosystems.  And within those
   ecosystems, even the applications that are available tend to have
   features that users by themselves would most likely not desire to
   have, such as excessive rights to media, location, and peripherals.
   There are also designated efforts by various authorities to hack end-
   user devices as a means of intercepting data about the user.

   The situation is different, but not necessarily better on the side of
   servers.  The pattern of communications in today's Internet is almost
   always via a third party that has at least as much information than
   the other parties have.  For instance, these third parties are
   typically endpoints for any transport layer security connections, and
   able to see any communications or other messaging in cleartextx.
   There are some exceptions, of course, e.g., messaging applications
   with end-to-end protection.

   With the growth of trading users' information by many of these third
   parties, it becomes necessary to take precautions against endpoints
   that are compromised, malicious, or whose interests simply do not
   align with the interests of the users.




Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 6]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   Specifically, the following issues need attention:

   o  Security of users' devices and the ability of the user to control
      their own equipment.

   o  Leaks and attacks related to data at rest.

   o  Coercion of some endpoints to reveal information to authorities or
      surveillance organizations, sometimes even in an extra-territorial
      fashion.

   o  Application design patterns that result in cleartext information
      passing through a third party or the application owner.

   o  Involvement of entities that have no direct need for involvement
      for the sake of providing the service that the user is after.

   o  Network and application architectures that result in a lot of
      information collected in a (logically) central location.

   o  Leverage and control points outside the hands of the users or end-
      user device owners.

   For instance, while e-mail transport security [RFC7817] has become
   much more widely distributed in recent years, progress in securing
   e-mail messages between users has been much slower.  This has lead to
   a situation where e-mail content is considered a critical resource by
   mail providers who use it for machine learning, advertisement
   targeting, and other purposes.

   The Domain Name System (DNS) shows signs of ageing but due to the
   legacy of deployed systems has changed very slowly.  Newer technology
   [RFC8484] developed at the IETF enables DNS queries to be performed
   confidentially, but its deployment is happening mostly in browsers
   that use global DNS resolver services, such as Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1
   or Google's 8.8.8.8.  This results in faster evolution and better
   security for end users.

   However, if one steps back and considers the overall security effects
   of these developments, the resulting effects can be different.  While
   the security of the actual protocol exchanges improves with the
   introduction of this new technology, at the same time this implies a
   move from using a worldwide distributed set of DNS resolvers into
   more centralised global resolvers.  While these resolvers are very
   well maintained (and a great service), they are potential high-value
   targets for pervasive monitoring and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.
   In 2016, for example, DoS attacks were launched against Dyn, one of
   the largest DNS providers, leading to some outages.  It is difficult



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 7]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   to imagine that DNS resolvers wouldn't be a target in many future
   attacks or pervasive monitoring projects.

   Unfortunately, there is little that even large service providers can
   do to refuse authority-sanctioned pervasive monitoring.  As a result
   it seems that the only reasonable course of defense is to ensure that
   no such information or control point exists.

   There are other examples about the perils of centralised solutions in
   Internet infrastructure.  The DNS example involved an interesting
   combination of information flows (who is asking for what domain
   names) as well as a potential ability to exert control (what domains
   will actually resolve to an address).  Routing systems are primarily
   about control.  While there are intra-domain centralized routing
   solutions (such as PCE [RFC4655]), a control within a single
   administrative domain is usually not the kind of centralization that
   we would be worried about.  Global centralization would be much more
   concerning.  Fortunately, global Internet routing is performed a
   among peers.  However, controls could be introduced even in this
   global, distributed system.  To secure some of the control exchanges,
   the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) system ([RFC6480])
   allows selected Certification Authorities (CAs) to help drive
   decisions about which participants in the routing infrastructure can
   make what claims.  If this system were globally centralized, it would
   be a concern, but again, fortunately, current designs involve at
   least regional distribution.

   In general, many recent attacks relate more to information than
   communications.  For instance, personal information leaks typically
   happen via information stored on a compromised server rather than
   capturing communications.  There is little hope that such attacks can
   be prevented entirely.  Again, the best course of action seems to be
   avoid the disclosure of information in the first place, or at least
   to not perform that in a manner that makes it possible that others
   can readily use the information.

2.3.  Examples

2.3.1.  Deliberate adversarial behaviour in applications

   In this section we describe a few documented examples of deliberate
   adversarial behaviour by applications that could affect Internet
   protocol development.  The adversarial behaviours described below
   involve various kinds of attack, varying from simple fraud, to
   credential theft, surveillance and contributing to DDoS attacks.
   This is not intended to be a comprehensive nor complete survey, but
   to motivate us to consider deliberate adversarial behaviour by
   applications.



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 8]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   While we have these examples of deliberate adversarial behaviour,
   there are also many examples of application developers doing their
   best to protect the security and privacy of their users or customers.
   That's just the same as the case today where we need to consider in-
   network actors as potential adversaries despite the many examples of
   network operators who do act primarily in the best interests of their
   users.

2.3.1.1.  Malware in curated application stores

   Despite the best efforts of curators, so-called App-Stores frequently
   distribute malware of many kinds and one recent study [Curated]
   claims that simple obfuscation enables malware to avoid detection by
   even sophisticated operators.  Given the scale of these deployments,
   ditribution of even a small percentage of malware-infected
   applictions can affect a huge number of people.

2.3.1.2.  Virtual private networks (VPNs)

   Virtual private networks (VPNs) are supposed to hide user traffic to
   various degrees depending on the particular technology chosen by the
   VPN provider.  However, not all VPNs do what they say, some for
   example misrepresenting the countries in which they provide vantage
   points [Vpns].

2.3.1.3.  Compromised (home) networks

   What we normally might consider network devices such as home routers
   do also run applications that can end up being adversarial, for
   example running DNS and DHCP attacks from home routers targeting
   other devices in the home.  One study [Home] reports on a 2011 attack
   that affected 4.5 million DSL modems in Brazil.  The absence of
   software update [RFC8240] has been a major cause of these issues and
   rises to the level that considering this as intentional behaviour by
   device vendors who have chosen this path is warranted.

2.3.1.4.  Web browsers

   Tracking of users in order to support advertising based business
   models is ubiquitous on the Internet today.  HTTP header fields (such
   as cookies) are commonly used for such tracking, as are structures
   within the content of HTTP responses such as links to 1x1 pixel
   images and (ab)use of Javascript APIs offered by browsers [Tracking].

   While some people may be sanguine about this kind of tracking, others
   consider this behaviour unwelcome, when or if they are informed that
   it happens, [Attitude] though the evidence here seems somewhat harder
   to interpret and many studies (that we have found to date) involve



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                  [Page 9]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   small numbers of users.  Historically, browsers have not made this
   kind of tracking visible and have enabled it by default, though some
   recent browser versions are starting to enable visibility and
   blocking of some kinds of tracking.  Browsers are also increasingly
   imposing more stringent requirements on plug-ins for varied security
   reasons.

2.3.1.5.  Web site policy deception

   Many web sites today provide some form of privacy policy and terms of
   service, that are known to be mostly unread [Unread].  This implies
   that, legal fiction aside, users of those sites have not in reality
   agreed to the specific terms published and so users are therefore
   highly exposed to being exploited by web sites, for example
   [Cambridge] is a recent well-publicised case where a service provider
   abused the data of 87 million users via a partnership.  While many
   web site operators claim that they care deeply about privacy, it
   seems prudent to assume that some (or most?) do not in fact care
   about user privacy, or at least not in ways with which many of their
   users would agree.  And of course, today's web sites are actually
   mostly fairly complex web applications and are no longer static sets
   of HTML files, so calling these "web sites" is perhaps a misnomer,
   but considered as web applications, that may for example link in
   advertising networks, it seems clear that many exist that are
   adversarial.

2.3.1.6.  Tracking bugs in mail

   Some mail user agents (MUAs) render HTML content by default (with a
   subset not allowing that to be turned off, perhaps particularly on
   mobile devices) and thus enable the same kind of adversarial tracking
   seen on the web.  Attempts at such intentional tracking are also seen
   many times per day by email users - in one study [Mailbug] the
   authors estimated that 62% of leakage to third parties was
   intentional, for example if leaked data included a hash of the
   recipient email address.

2.3.1.7.  Troll farms in online social networks

   Online social network applications/platforms are well-known to be
   vulnerable to troll farms, sometimes with tragic consequences where
   organised/paid sets of users deliberately abuse the application
   platform for reasons invisible to a normal user.  For-profit
   companies building online social networks are well aware that subsets
   of their "normal" users are anything but.  In one US study, [Troll]
   sets of troll accounts were roughly equally distributed on both sides
   of a controversial discussion.  While Internet protocol designers do
   sometimes consider sybil attacks [Sybil], arguably we have not



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 10]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   provided mechanisms to handle such attacks sufficiently well,
   especially when they occur within walled-gardens.  Equally, one can
   make the case that some online social networks, at some points in
   their evolution, appear to have prioritised counts of active users so
   highly that they have failed to invest sufficient effort for
   detection of such troll farms.

2.3.1.8.  Smart televisions

   There have been examples of so-called "smart" televisions spying on
   their owners and one survey of user attitudes [SmartTV] found "broad
   agreement was that it is unacceptable for the data to be repurposed
   or shared" although the level of user understanding may be
   questionable.  What is clear though is that such devices generally
   have not provided controls for their owners that would allow them to
   meaningfully make a decision as to whether or not they want to share
   such data.

2.3.1.9.  Internet of things

   Internet of Things (IoT) devices (which might be "so-called Internet
   of Things" as all devices were already things:-) have been found
   deficient when their security and privacy aspects were analysed, for
   example children's toys [Toys].  While in some cases this may be due
   to incompetence rather than being deliberately adversarial behaviour,
   the levels of incompetence frequently seen imply these aspects have
   simply not been considered a priority.

2.3.1.10.  Attacks leveraging compromised high-level DNS infrastructure

   Recent attacks [DeepDive] against DNS infrastructure enable
   subsequent targetted attacks on specific application layer sources or
   destinations.  The general method appears to be to attack DNS
   infrastructure, in these cases infrastructure that is towards the top
   of the DNS naming hierarchy and "far" from the presumed targets, in
   order to be able to fake DNS responses to a PKI, thereby acquiring
   TLS server certificates so as to subsequently attack TLS connections
   from clients to services (with clients directed to an attacker-owned
   server via additional fake DNS responses).

   Attackers in these cases seem well resourced and patient - with
   "practice" runs over months and with attack durations being
   infrequent and short (e.g. 1 hour) before the attacker withdraws.

   These are sophisticated multi-protocol attacks, where weaknesses
   related to deployment of one protocol (DNS) bootstrap attacks on
   another protocol (e.g.  IMAP/TLS), via abuse of a 3rd protocol
   (ACME), partly in order to capture user IMAP login credentials, so as



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 11]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   to be able to harvest message store content from a real message
   store.

   The fact that many mail clients regularly poll their message store
   means that a 1-hour attack is quite likely to harvest many cleartext
   passwords or crackable password hashes.  The real IMAP server in such
   a case just sees fewer connections during the "live" attack, and some
   additional connections later.  Even heavy email users in such cases
   that might notice a slight gap in email arrivals, would likely
   attribute that to some network or service outage.

   In many of these cases the paucity of DNSSEC-signed zones (about 1%
   of existing zones) and the fact that many resolvers do not enforce
   DNSSEC validation (e.g., in some mobile operating systems) assisted
   the attackers.

   It is also notable that some of the personnel dealing with these
   attacks against infrastructure entites are authors of RFCs and
   Internet-drafts.  That we haven't provided protocol tools that better
   protect against these kinds of attack ought hit "close to home" for
   the IETF.

   In terms of the overall argument being made here, the PKI and DNS
   interactions, and the last step in the "live" attack all involve
   interaction with a deliberately adversarial application.  Later, use
   of acquired login credentials to harvest message store content
   involves an adversarial client application.  It all cases, a TLS
   implementation's PKI and TLS protocol code will see the fake
   endpoints as protocol-valid, even if, in the real world, they are
   clearly fake.  This appears to be a good argument that our current
   threat model is lacking in some respect(s), even as applied to our
   currently most important security protocol (TLS).

2.3.1.11.  BGP hijacking

   There is a clear history of BGP hijacking [BgpHijack] being used to
   ensure endpoints connect to adversarial applications.  As in the
   previous example, such hijacks can be used to trick a PKI into
   issuing a certificate for a fake entity.  Indeed one study
   [HijackDet] used the emergence of new web server TLS key pairs during
   the event, (detected via Internet-wide scans), as a distinguisher
   between one form of deliberate BGP hijacking and indadvertent route
   leaks.








Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 12]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


2.3.2.  Inadvertent adversarial behaviours

   Not all adversarial behaviour by applications is deliberate, some is
   likely due to various levels of carelessness (some quite
   understandable, others not) and/or due to erroneous assumptions about
   the environments in which those applications (now) run.

   We very briefly list some such cases:

   o  Application abuse for command and control, for example, use of IRC
      or apache logs for [CommandAndControl]

   o  Carelessly [LeakyBuckets], for example, lots of Amazon S3 leaks
      showing that careless admins can too easily cause application
      server data to become available to adversaries

   o  Virtualisation exposing secrets, for example, [MeltdownAndSpectre]
      and similar side-channels

   o  Compromised badly-maintained web sites, that for example, have led
      to massive online [Passwords].

   o  Supply-chain attacks, for example, the [TargetAttack] or malware
      within pre-installed applications on Android phones [Bloatware].

   o  Breaches of major service providers, that many of us might have
      assumed would be sufficiently capable to be the best large-scale
      "Identity providers", for example:

      *  3 billion accounts: https://www.wired.com/story/yahoo-breach-
         three-billion-accounts/

      *  "up to 600M" account passwords stored in clear:
         https://www.pcmag.com/news/367319/facebook-stored-up-to-600m-
         user-passwords-in-plain-text

      *  many millions at risk: https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-telcos-
         caught-selling-your-location-data-again-senator-demands-new-
         laws/

      *  50 million accounts: https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-breach-
         affected-50-million-people/

      *  14 million accounts: https://www.zdnet.com/article/millions-
         verizon-customer-records-israeli-data/






Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 13]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


      *  "hundreds of thousands" of accounts:
         https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-exposed-user-data-feared-
         repercussions-of-disclosing-to-public-1539017194

      *  unknown numbers, some email content exposed:
         https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ywyz3x/hackers-
         could-read-your-hotmail-msn-outlook-microsoft-customer-support

   o  Breaches of smaller service providers: Too many to enumerate,
      sadly

3.  Analysis

3.1.  The Role of End-to-end

   [RFC1958] notes that "end-to-end functions can best be realised by
   end-to-end protocols":

      The basic argument is that, as a first principle, certain required
      end-to-end functions can only be performed correctly by the end-
      systems themselves.  A specific case is that any network, however
      carefully designed, will be subject to failures of transmission at
      some statistically determined rate.  The best way to cope with
      this is to accept it, and give responsibility for the integrity of
      communication to the end systems.  Another specific case is end-
      to-end security.

   The "end-to-end argument" was originally described by Saltzer et al
   [Saltzer].  They said:

      The function in question can completely and correctly be
      implemented only with the knowledge and help of the application
      standing at the endpoints of the communication system.  Therefore,
      providing that questioned function as a feature of the
      communication system itself is not possible.

   These functional arguments align with other, practical arguments
   about the evolution of the Internet under the end-to-end model.  The
   endpoints evolve quickly, often with simply having one party change
   the necessary software on both ends.  Whereas waiting for network
   upgrades would involve potentially a large number of parties from
   application owners to multiple network operators.

   The end-to-end model supports permissionless innovation where new
   innovation can flourish in the Internet without excessive wait for
   other parties to act.





Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 14]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   But the details matter.  What is considered an endpoint?  What
   characteristics of Internet are we trying to optimize?  This memo
   makes the argument that, for security purposes, there is a
   significant distinction between actual endpoints from a user's
   interaction perspective (e.g., another user) and from a system
   perspective (e.g., a third party relaying a message).

   This memo proposes to focus on the distinction between "real ends"
   and other endpoints to guide the development of protocols.  A
   conversation between one "real end" to another "real end" has
   necessarily different security needs than a conversation between,
   say, one of the "real ends" and a component in a larger system.  The
   end-to-end argument is used primarily for the design of one protocol.
   The security of the system, however, depends on the entire system and
   potentially multiple storage, compute, and communication protocol
   aspects.  All have to work properly together to obtain security.

   For instance, a transport connection between two components of a
   system is not an end-to-end connection even if it encompasses all the
   protocol layers up to the application layer.  It is not end-to-end,
   if the information or control function it carries actually extends
   beyond those components.  For instance, just because an e-mail server
   can read the contents of an e-mail message does not make it a
   legitimate recipient of the e-mail.

   This memo also proposes to focus on the "need to know" aspect in
   systems.  Information should not be disclosed, stored, or routed in
   cleartext through parties that do not absolutely need to have that
   information.

   The proposed argument about real ends is as follows:

      Application functions are best realised by the entities directly
      serving the users, and when more than one entity is involved, by
      end-to-end protocols.  The role and authority of any additional
      entities necessary to carry out a function should match their part
      of the function.  No information or control roles should be
      provided to these additional entities unless it is required by the
      function they provide.

   For instance, a particular piece of information may be necessary for
   the other real endpoint, such as message contents for another user.
   The same piece of information may not be necessary for any additional
   parties, unless the information had to do with, say, routing
   information for the message to reach the other user.  When
   information is only needed by the actual other endpoint, it should be
   protected and be only relayed to the actual other endpoint.  Protocol




Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 15]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   design should ensure that the additional parties do not have access
   to the information.

   Note that it may well be that the easiest design approach is to send
   all information to a third party and have majority of actual
   functionality reside in that third party.  But this is a case of a
   clear tradeoff between ease of change by evolving that third party
   vs. providing reasonable security against misuse of information.

   Note that the above "real ends" argument is not limited to
   communication systems.  Even an application that does not communicate
   with anyone else than its user may be implemented on top of a
   distributed system where some information about the user is exposed
   to untrusted parties.

   The implications of the system security also extend beyond
   information and control aspects.  For instance, poorly design
   component protocols can become DoS vectors which are then used to
   attack other parts of the system.  Availability is an important
   aspect to consider in the analysis along other aspects.

3.2.  Trusted networks

   Some systems are thought of as being deployed only in a closed
   setting, where all the relevant nodes are under direct control of the
   network administrators.  Technologies developed for such networks
   tend to be optimized, at least initially, for these environments, and
   may lack security features necessary for different types of
   deployments.

   It is well known that many such systems evolve over time, grow, and
   get used and connected in new ways.  For instance, the collaboration
   and mergers between organizations, and new services for customers may
   change the system or its environment.  A system that used to be truly
   within an administrative domain may suddenly need to cross network
   boundaries or even run over the Internet.  As a result, it is also
   well known that it is good to ensure that underlying technologies
   used in such systems can cope with that evolution, for instance, by
   having the necessary security capabilities to operate in different
   environments.

   In general, the outside vs. inside security model is outdated for
   most situations, due to the complex and evolving networks and the
   need to support mixture of devices from different sources (e.g., BYOD
   networks).  Network virtualization also implies that previously clear
   notions of local area networks and physical proximity may create an
   entirely different reality from what appears from a simple notion of
   a local network.



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 16]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


3.2.1.  Even closed networks can have compromised nodes

   This memo argues that the situation is even more dire than what was
   explained above.  It is impossible to ensure that all components in a
   network are actually trusted.  Even in a closed network with
   carefully managed components there may be compromised components, and
   this should be factored into the design of the system and protocols
   used in the system.

   For instance, during the Snowden revelations it was reported that
   internal communication flows of large content providers were
   compromised in an effort to acquire information from large number of
   end users.  This shows the need to protect not just communications
   targeted to go over the Internet, but in many cases also internal and
   control communications.

   Furthermore, there is a danger of compromised nodes, so
   communications security alone will be insufficient to protect against
   this.  The defences against this include limiting information within
   networks to the parties that have a need to know, as well as limiting
   control capabilities.  This is necessary even when all the nodes are
   under the control of the same network manager; the network manager
   needs to assume that some nodes and communications will be
   compromised, and build a system to mitigate or minimise attacks even
   under that assumption.

   Even airgapped networks can have these issues, as evidenced, for
   instance, by the Stuxnet worm.  The Internet is not the only form of
   connectivity, as most systems include, for instance, USB ports that
   proved to be the achilles heel of the targets in the Stuxnet case.
   More commonly, every system runs large amount of software, and it is
   often not practical or even possible to black the software to prevent
   compromised code even in a high-security setting, let alone in
   commercial or private networks.  Installation media, physical ports,
   both open source and proprietary programs, firmware, or even
   innocent-looking components on a circuit board can be suspect.  In
   addition, complex underlying computing platforms, such as modern CPUs
   with underlying security and management tools are prone for problems.

   In general, this means that one cannot entirely trust even a closed
   system where you picked all the components yourself.  Analysis for
   the security of many interesting real-world systems now commonly
   needs to include cross-component attacks, e.g., the use of car radios
   and other externally communicating devices as part of attacks
   launched against the control components such as breaks in a car
   [Savage].





Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 17]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


3.3.  Balancing Threats

   Note that not all information needs to be protected, and not all
   threats can be protected against.  But it is important that the main
   threats are understood and protected against.

   Sometimes there are higher-level mechanisms that provide safeguards
   for failures.  For instance, it is very difficult in general to
   protect against denial-of-service against compromised nodes on a
   communications path.  However, it may be possible to detect that a
   service has failed.

   Another example is from packet-carrying networks.  Payload traffic
   that has been properly protected with encryption does not provide
   much value to an attacker.  For instance, it does not always make
   sense to encrypt every packet transmission in a packet-carrying
   system where the traffic is already encrypted at other layers.  But
   it almost always makes sense to protect control communications and to
   understand the impacts of compromised nodes, particularly control
   nodes.

4.  Actions

   This section discusses potential actions to be taken by the Internet
   community:

4.1.  Basic Guidelines

   As [RFC3935] says:

      We embrace technical concepts such as decentralized control, edge-
      user empowerment and sharing of resources, because those concepts
      resonate with the core values of the IETF community.

   To be more specific, this memo suggests the following guidelines for
   protocol designers:

   1.  Consider first principles in protecting information and systems,
       rather than following a specific pattern such as protecting
       information in a particular way or at a particular protocol
       layer.  It is necessary to understand what components can be
       compromised, where interests may or may not be aligned, and what
       parties have a legitimate role in being a party to a specific
       information or a control task.

   2.  Minimize information passed to others: Information passed to
       another party in a protocol exchange should be minimized to guard
       against the potential compromise of that party.



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 18]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   3.  Perform end-to-end protection via other parties: Information
       passed via another party who does not intrinsically need the
       information to perform its function should be protected end-to-
       end to its intended recipient.  This guideline is general, and
       holds equally for sending TCP/IP packets, TLS connections, or
       application-layer interactions.  As [RFC8546] notes, it is a
       useful design rule to avoid "accidental invariance" (the
       deployment of on-path devices that over-time start to make
       assumptions about protocols).  However, it is also a necessary
       security design rule to avoid "accidental disclosure" where
       information originally thought to be benign and untapped over-
       time becomes a significant information leak.  This guideline can
       also be applied for different aspects of security, e.g.,
       confidentiality and integrity protection, depending on what the
       specific need for information is in the other parties.

   4.  Minimize passing of control functions to others: Any passing of
       control functions to other parties should be minimized to guard
       against the potential misuse of those control functions.  This
       applies to both technical (e.g., nodes that assign resources) and
       process control functions (e.g., the ability to allocate number
       or develop extensions).  Control functions can also become a
       matter of contest and power struggle, even in cases where their
       function as such is minimal, as we saw with the IANA transition
       debates.

   5.  Avoid centralized resources: While centralized components,
       resources, and function provide usually a useful function, there
       are grave issues associated with them.  Protocol and network
       design should balance the benefits of centralized resources or
       control points against the threats arising from them.  The
       general guideline is to avoid such centralized resources when
       possible.  And if it is not possible, find a way to allow the
       centralized resources to be selectable, depending on context and
       user settings.

   6.  Have explicit agreements: When users and their devices provide
       information to network entities, it would be beneficial to have
       an opportunity for the users to state their requirements
       regarding the use of the information provided in this way.  While
       the actual use of such requirements and the willingness of
       network entities to agree to them remains to be seen, at the
       moment even the technical means of doing this are limited.  For
       instance, it would be beneficial to be able to embed usage
       requirements within popular data formats.

   7.  Treat parties that your equipment connects to with suspicion,
       even if the communications are encrypted.  The other endpoint may



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 19]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


       misuse any information or control opportunity in the
       communication.  Similarly, even parties within your own system
       need to be treated with suspicision, as some nodes may become
       compromised.

   8.  Do not take any of this as blanket reason to provide no
       information to anyone, encrypt everything to everyone, or other
       extreme measures.  However, the designers of a system need to be
       aware of the different threats facing their system, and deal with
       the most serious ones (of which there are typically many).
       Similarly, users should be aware of the choices made in a
       particular design, and avoid designs or products that protect
       against some threats but are wide open to other serious issues.

4.2.  Potential Further Guidelines

4.2.1.  Consider ABuse-cases as well as use-cases

   Protocol developers and those implementing and deploying Internet
   technologies are typically most interested in a few specific use-
   cases for which they need solutions.  Expanding our threat model to
   include adversarial application behaviours [AbuseCases] seems likely
   to call for significant attention to be paid to potential abuses of
   whatever new or re-purposed technology is being considered.

4.2.2.  Isolation

   Sophisticated users can sometimes deal with adversarial behaviours in
   applications by using different instances of those applications, for
   example, differently configured web browsers for use in different
   contexts.  Applications (including web browsers) and operating
   systems are also building in isolation via use of different processes
   or sandboxing.  Protocol artefacts that relate to uses of such
   isolation mechanisms might be worth considering.  To an extent, the
   IETF has in practice already recognised some of these issues as being
   in-scope, e.g.  when considering the linkability issues with
   mechanisms such as TLS session tickets, or QUIC connection
   identifiers.

4.2.3.  Transparency

   Certificate transparency (CT) [RFC6962] has been an effective
   countermeasure for X.509 certificate mis-issuance, which used be a
   known application layer misbehaviour in the public web PKI.  CT can
   also help with post-facto detection of some infrastructure attacks
   where BGP or DNS weakenesses have been leveraged so that some
   certification authority is tricked into issuing a certificate for the
   wrong entity.



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 20]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   While the context in which CT operates is very constrained
   (essentially to the public CAs trusted by web browsers), similar
   approaches could perhaps be useful for other protocols or
   technologies.

   In addition, legislative requirements such as those imposed by the
   GDPR [GDPRAccess] could lead to a desire to handle internal data
   structures and databases in ways that are reminiscent of CT, though
   clearly with significant authorisation being required and without the
   append-only nature of a CT log.

4.2.4.  Minimise

   As recommended in [RFC6973] data minimisation and additional
   encryption are likely to be helpful - if applications don't ever see
   data, or a cleartext form of data, then they should have a harder
   time misbehaving.  Similarly, not adding new long-term identifiers,
   and not exposing existing ones, would seem helpful.

4.2.5.  Same-Origin Policy

   The Same-Origin Policy (SOP) [RFC6454] perhaps already provides an
   example of how going beyond the RFC 3552 threat model can be useful.
   Arguably, the existence of the SOP demonstrates that at least web
   browsers already consider the 3552 model as being too limited.
   (Clearly, differentiating between same and not-same origins
   implicitly assumes that some origins are not as trustworthy as
   others.)

4.2.6.  Greasing

   The TLS protocol [RFC8446] now supports the use of GREASE
   [I-D.ietf-tls-grease] as a way to mitigate on-path ossification.
   While this technique is not likely to prevent any deliberate
   misbehaviours, it may provide a proof-of-concept that network
   protocol mechanisms can have impact in this space, if we spend the
   time to try analyse the incentives of the various parties.

4.2.7.  Generalise OAuth Threat Model

   The OAuth threat model [RFC6819] provides an extensive list of
   threats and security considerations for those implementing and
   deploying OAuth version 2.0 [RFC6749].  That document is perhaps too
   detailed to serve as useful generic guidance but does go beyond the
   Internet threat model from RFC3552, for example it says:






Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 21]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   two of the three parties involved in the OAuth protocol may
   collude to mount an attack against the 3rd party.  For example,
   the client and authorization server may be under control of an
   attacker and collude to trick a user to gain access to resources.

   It could be useful to attempt to derive a more abstract threat model
   from that RFC that considers threats in more generic multi-party
   contexts.

4.2.8.  Look again at how well we're securing infrastructure

   Some attacks (e.g. against DNS or routing infrastructure) appear to
   benefit from current infrastructure mechanisms not being deployed,
   e.g.  DNSSEC, RPKI.  In the case of DNSSEC, deployment is still
   minimal despite much time having elapsed.  This suggests a number of
   different possible avenues for investigation:

   o  For any protocol dependent on infrastructure like DNS or BGP, we
      ought analysse potential outcomes in the event the relevant
      infrastructure has been compromised

   o  Protocol designers perhaps ought consider post-facto detection
      compromise mechanisms in the event that it is infeasible to
      mitigate attacks on infrastructure that is not under local control

   o  Despite the sunk costs, it may be worth re-considering
      infrastructure security mechanisms that have not been deployed,
      and hence are ineffective.

4.2.9.  Consider recovery from attack as part of protocol design

   Recent work on multiparty messaging security primitives
   [I-D.ietf-mls-architecture] considers "post-compromise security" as
   an inherent part of the design of that protocol.  Perhaps protocol
   designers ought generally consider recovery from attack during
   protocol design - we do know that all widely used protocols will at
   sometime be subject to successful attack, whether that is due to
   deployment or implementation error, or, as is less common, due to
   protocol design flaws.

4.2.10.  Don't think in terms of hosts

   More and more, protocol endpoints are not being executed on what used
   be understood as a host system.  The web and Javascript model clearly
   differs from traditional host models, but so do most server-side
   deployments these days, thanks to virtualisation.





Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 22]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   As yes unpublished work on this topic within the IAB [StackEvo]
   programme, appears to posit the same kind of thesis.  In the stackevo
   case, that work would presumably lead to some new definition of
   protocol endpoint, but (consensus on) such a definition may not be
   needed for an expanded threat model.  For this work, it may be
   sufficient to note that protocol endpoints can no longer be
   considered to be executing on a traditional host, to assume (at
   protocol design time) that all endpoints will be run in a virtualised
   environment where co-tenants and (sometimes) hypervisors are
   adversaries, and to then call for analysis of such scenarios.

4.3.  Does IETF Analysis of Protocols Need to Change?

   It may also be necessary to make procedural changes in how new
   protocols are defined at the IETF.  For instance, our existing
   documentation of threat models and requirements for security
   considerations sections may not be adequate in today's world.

   These suggested changes are entirely tentative.

4.3.1.  Develop a BCP for privacy considerations

   It may be time for the IETF to develop a BCP for privacy
   considerations, possibly starting from [RFC6973].

4.3.2.  Re-consider protocol design "lore"

   It could be that this discussion demonstrates that it is timely to
   reconsider some protocol design "lore" as for example is done in
   [I-D.iab-protocol-maintenance].  More specifically, protocol
   extensibility mechanisms may inadvertently create vectors for abuse-
   cases, given that designers cannot fully analyse their impact at the
   time a new protocol is defined or standardised.  One might conclude
   that a lack of extensibility could be a virtue for some new
   protocols, in contrast to earlier assumptions.  As pointed out by one
   commenter though, people can find ways to extend things regardless,
   if they feel the need.

4.3.3.  Consider the user perspective

   [I-D.nottingham-for-the-users] argues that, in relevant cases where
   there are conflicting requirements, the "IETF considers end users as
   its highest priority concern."  Doing so seems consistent with the
   expanded threat model being argued for here, so may indicate that a
   BCP in that space could also be useful.






Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 23]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


4.3.4.  Potential changes in RFC 3552

   The earlier quote from OAuth (Section 4.2.7) also has another aspect
   - it considers the effect of compromised endpoints on those that are
   not compromised.  It may therefore be interesting to consider the
   consequeneces that would follow from a change to [RFC3552].  RFC 3552
   is the RFC that defines "An Internet Threat Model".  It also provides
   guidance to writing Security Considerations sections in other RFCs.
   One initial, draft proposal for such changes would be this:

   OLD:

      In general, we assume that the end-systems engaging in a protocol
      exchange have not themselves been compromised.  Protecting against
      an attack when one of the end-systems has been compromised is
      extraordinarily difficult.  It is, however, possible to design
      protocols which minimize the extent of the damage done under these
      circumstances.

   NEW:

      In general, we assume that the end-system engaging in a protocol
      exchange has not itself been compromised.  Protecting against an
      attack of a protocol implementation itself is extraordinarily
      difficult.  It is, however, possible to design protocols which
      minimize the extent of the damage done when the other parties in a
      protocol become compromised or do not act in the best interests
      the end-system implementing a protocol.

   In addition, the following new section could be added to discuss the
   capabilities required to mount an attack:

   NEW:

   3.x.  Other endpoint compromise

      In this attack, the other endpoints in the protocol become
      compromised.  As a result, they can, for instance, misuse any
      information that the end-system implementing a protocol has sent
      to the compromised endpoint.

   System and architecture aspects definitely also need more attention
   from Internet technology developers and standards organizations.
   Here is one possible addition:

   NEW:





Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 24]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


      The design of any Internet technology should start from an
      understanding of the participants in a system, their roles, and
      the extent to which they should have access to information and
      ability to control other participants.

4.3.5.  Potential Changes in RFC 7258

   Other additional guidelines may be necessary also in [RFC7258], the
   RFC that specifies how IETF work should take into account pervasive
   monitoring, such as the one performed as a part of broad,
   indiscriminate surveillance activity.

   An initial, draft suggestion for starting point of those changes
   could be adding the following paragraph after the 2nd paragraph in
   Section 2:

   NEW:

      PM attacks include those cases where information collected by a
      legitimate protocol participant is misused for PM purposes.  The
      attacks also include those cases where a protocol or network
      architecture results in centralized data storage or control
      functions relating to many users, raising the risk of said misuse.

5.  Conclusions

   At this stage we don't think it approriate to claim that any strong
   conclusion can be reached based on the above.  We do however, claim
   that the is a topic that could be worth discussion and more work.

   To start with, Internet technology developers need to be better aware
   of the issues beyond communications security, and consider them in
   design.  At the IETF it would be beneficial to include some of these
   considerations in the usual systematic security analysis of
   technologies under development.

   In particular, when the IETF develops infrastructure technology for
   the Internet (such as routing or naming systems), considering the
   impacts of data generated by those technologies is important.
   Minimising data collection from users, minimising the parties who get
   exposed to user data, and protecting data that is relayed or stored
   in systems should be a priority.

   A key focus area at the IETF has been the security of transport
   protocols, and how transport layer security can be best used to
   provide the right security for various applications.  However, more
   work is needed in equivalently broadly deployed tools for minimising
   or obfuscating information provided by users to other entities, and



Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 25]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   the use of end-to-end security through entities that are involved in
   the protocol exchange but who do not need to know everything that is
   being passed through them.

   Comments on the issues discussed in this memo are gladly taken either
   privately or on the architecture-discuss mailing list.

6.  Informative References

   [AbuseCases]
              McDermott, J. and C. Fox, "Using abuse case models for
              security requirements analysis", IEEE Annual Computer
              Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'99),
              https://www.acsac.org/1999/papers/wed-b-1030-john.pdf ,
              1999.

   [Attitude]
              "User Perceptions of Sharing, Advertising, and Tracking",
              Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS),
              https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2015/proceedings/
              presentation/chanchary , 2015.

   [BgpHijack]
              Sermpezis, P., Kotronis, V., Dainotti, A., and X.
              Dimitropoulos, "A survey among network operators on BGP
              prefix hijacking", ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication
              Review 48, no. 1 (2018): 64-69,
              https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.02918.pdf , 2018.

   [Bloatware]
              Gamba, G., Rashed, M., Razaghpanah, A., Tapiado, J., and
              N. Vallina, "An Analysis of Pre-installed Android
              Software", arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.02713 (2019) , 2019.

   [Cambridge]
              Isaak, J. and M. Hanna, "User Data Privacy: Facebook,
              Cambridge Analytica, and Privacy Protection", Computer
              51.8 (2018): 56-59, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/
              stamp.jsp?arnumber=8436400 , 2018.

   [CommandAndControl]
              Botnet, ., "Creating botnet C&C server. What architecture
              should I use? IRC? HTTP?", Stackexchange.com question,
              https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/100577/
              creating-botnet-cc-server-what-architecture-should-i-use-
              irc-http , 2014.





Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 26]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   [Curated]  Hammad, M., Garcia, J., and S. MaleK, "A large-scale
              empirical study on the effects of code obfuscations on
              Android apps and anti-malware products", ACM International
              Conference on Software Engineering 2018,
              https://www.ics.uci.edu/~seal/
              publications/2018ICSE_Hammad.pdf , 2018.

   [DeepDive]
              Krebs on Security, ., "A Deep Dive on the Recent
              Widespread DNS Hijacking Attacks", krebsonsecurity.com
              blog, https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-
              the-recent-widespread-dns-hijacking-attacks/ , 2019.

   [GDPRAccess]
              EU, ., "Right of access by the data subject", Article 15,
              GDPR, https://gdpr-info.eu/art-15-gdpr/ , n.d..

   [HijackDet]
              Schlamp, J., Holz, R., Gasser, O., Korste, A., Jacquemart,
              Q., Carle, G., and E. Biersack, "Investigating the nature
              of routing anomalies: Closing in on subprefix hijacking
              attacks", International Workshop on Traffic Monitoring and
              Analysis, pp. 173-187. Springer, Cham,
              https://www.net.in.tum.de/fileadmin/bibtex/publications/
              papers/schlamp_TMA_1_2015.pdf , 2015.

   [Home]     Nthala, N. and I. Flechais, "Rethinking home network
              security", European Workshop on Usable Security
              (EuroUSEC), https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/
              uuid:e2460f50-579b-451b-b14e-b7be2decc3e1/download_file?sa
              fe_filename=bare_conf_EuroUSEC2018.pdf&file_format=applica
              tion%2Fpdf&type_of_work=Conference+item , 2018.

   [I-D.farrell-etm]
              Farrell, S., "We're gonna need a bigger threat model",
              draft-farrell-etm-03 (work in progress), July 2019.

   [I-D.iab-protocol-maintenance]
              Thomson, M., "The Harmful Consequences of the Robustness
              Principle", draft-iab-protocol-maintenance-03 (work in
              progress), May 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-expect-ct]
              estark@google.com, e., "Expect-CT Extension for HTTP",
              draft-ietf-httpbis-expect-ct-08 (work in progress),
              December 2018.





Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 27]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   [I-D.ietf-mls-architecture]
              Omara, E., Beurdouche, B., Rescorla, E., Inguva, S., Kwon,
              A., and A. Duric, "The Messaging Layer Security (MLS)
              Architecture", draft-ietf-mls-architecture-03 (work in
              progress), September 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-quic-transport]
              Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
              and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-transport-23 (work
              in progress), September 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-esni]
              Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. Wood,
              "Encrypted Server Name Indication for TLS 1.3", draft-
              ietf-tls-esni-04 (work in progress), July 2019.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-grease]
              Benjamin, D., "Applying GREASE to TLS Extensibility",
              draft-ietf-tls-grease-04 (work in progress), August 2019.

   [I-D.nottingham-for-the-users]
              Nottingham, M., "The Internet is for End Users", draft-
              nottingham-for-the-users-09 (work in progress), July 2019.

   [LeakyBuckets]
              Chickowski, E., "Leaky Buckets: 10 Worst Amazon S3
              Breaches", Bitdefender blog,
              https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/
              worst-amazon-breaches , 2018.

   [Mailbug]  Englehardt, S., Han, J., and A. Narayanan, "I never signed
              up for this! Privacy implications of email tracking",
              Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2018.1
              (2018): 109-126, https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/
              popets.2018.2018.issue-1/popets-2018-0006/
              popets-2018-0006.pdf , 2018.

   [MeltdownAndSpectre]
              CISA, ., "Meltdown and Spectre Side-Channel Vulnerability
              Guidance", Alert (TA18-004A),
              https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-004A , 2018.

   [Passwords]
              com, haveibeenpwned., "Pwned Passwords", Website
              https://haveibeenpwned.com/Passwords , 2019.






Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 28]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   [RFC1958]  Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
              Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1958>.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.

   [RFC3935]  Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF",
              BCP 95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3935>.

   [RFC4655]  Farrel, A., Vasseur, J., and J. Ash, "A Path Computation
              Element (PCE)-Based Architecture", RFC 4655,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4655, August 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4655>.

   [RFC6454]  Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>.

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC6797]  Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict
              Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6797, November 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6797>.

   [RFC6819]  Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
              Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.

   [RFC6962]  Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
              Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>.








Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 29]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7469]  Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
              Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469, April
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7469>.

   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

   [RFC7817]  Melnikov, A., "Updated Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Server Identity Check Procedure for Email-Related
              Protocols", RFC 7817, DOI 10.17487/RFC7817, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7817>.

   [RFC8240]  Tschofenig, H. and S. Farrell, "Report from the Internet
              of Things Software Update (IoTSU) Workshop 2016",
              RFC 8240, DOI 10.17487/RFC8240, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8240>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

   [RFC8546]  Trammell, B. and M. Kuehlewind, "The Wire Image of a
              Network Protocol", RFC 8546, DOI 10.17487/RFC8546, April
              2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8546>.

   [RFC8555]  Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
              Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
              (ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.






Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 30]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   [Saltzer]  Saltzer, J., Reed, D., and D. Clark, "End-To-End Arguments
              in System Design", ACM TOCS, Vol 2, Number 4, pp 277-288 ,
              November 1984.

   [Savage]   Savage, S., "Modern Automotive Vulnerabilities: Causes,
              Disclosures, and Outcomes", USENIX , 2016.

   [SmartTV]  Malkin, N., Bernd, J., Johnson, M., and S. Egelman, "What
              Can't Data Be Used For? Privacy Expectations about Smart
              TVs in the U.S.", European Workshop on Usable Security
              (Euro USEC), https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-
              content/uploads/2018/06/
              eurousec2018_16_Malkin_paper.pdf" , 2018.

   [StackEvo]
              Trammell, B., Thomson, M., Howard, L., and T. Hardie,
              "What Is an Endpoint?", Unpublished work,
              https://github.com/stackevo/endpoint-draft/blob/master/
              draft-trammell-whats-an-endpoint.md , 2017.

   [Sybil]    Viswanath, B., Post, A., Gummadi, K., and A. Mislove, "An
              analysis of social network-based sybil defenses", ACM
              SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 41(4), 363-374,
              https://conferences.sigcomm.org/sigcomm/2010/papers/
              sigcomm/p363.pdf , 2011.

   [TargetAttack]
              Osborne, C., "How hackers stole millions of credit card
              records from Target", ZDNET,
              https://www.zdnet.com/article/how-hackers-stole-millions-
              of-credit-card-records-from-target/ , 2014.

   [Toys]     Chu, G., Apthorpe, N., and N. Feamster, "Security and
              Privacy Analyses of Internet of Things Childrens' Toys",
              IEEE Internet of Things Journal 6.1 (2019): 978-985,
              https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.02751.pdf , 2019.

   [Tracking]
              Ermakova, T., Fabian, B., Bender, B., and K. Klimek, "Web
              Tracking-A Literature Review on the State of Research",
              Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International Conference on
              System Sciences, https://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/
              bitstream/10125/50485/paper0598.pdf , 2018.








Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 31]


Internet-Draft       Internet Threat Model Evolution       November 2019


   [Troll]    Stewart, L., Arif, A., and K. Starbird, "Examining trolls
              and polarization with a retweet network", ACM Workshop on
              Misinformation and Misbehavior Mining on the Web,
              https://faculty.washington.edu/kstarbi/
              examining-trolls-polarization.pdf , 2018.

   [Unread]   Obar, J. and A. Oeldorf, "The biggest lie on the
              internet{:} Ignoring the privacy policies and terms of
              service policies of social networking services",
              Information, Communication and Society (2018): 1-20 ,
              2018.

   [Vpns]     Khan, M., DeBlasio, J., Voelker, G., Snoeren, A., Kanich,
              C., and N. Vallina, "An empirical analysis of the
              commercial VPN ecosystem", ACM Internet Measurement
              Conference 2018 (pp. 443-456),
              https://eprints.networks.imdea.org/1886/1/
              imc18-final198.pdf , 2018.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the members of the IAB, participants
   of the IETF SAAG meeting, participants of the IAB 2019 DEDR workshop,
   and numerous other people for insightful comments and discussions in
   this space.

Authors' Addresses

   Jari Arkko
   Ericsson

   Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net


   Stephen Farrell
   Trinity College Dublin

   Email: stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie













Arkko & Farrell            Expires May 7, 2020                 [Page 32]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129d, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/