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Versions: 00 01 draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile

Network Working Group                                          A. Azimov
Internet-Draft                                                  E. Uskov
Intended status: Standards Track                             Qrator Labs
Expires: December 30, 2018                                       R. Bush
                                               Internet Initiative Japan
                                                                K. Patel
                                                                  Arrcus
                                                             J. Snijders
                                                                     NTT
                                                              R. Housley
                                                          Vigil Security
                                                           June 28, 2018


         A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
                  draft-azimov-sidrops-aspa-profile-00

Abstract

   This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System
   Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure.  An
   Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object
   that provides a means of verifying that a Customer Autonomous System
   holder has authorized a Provider Autonomous System to be its upstream
   provider and for the Provider to send prefixes received from the
   Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and
   peers.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any



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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  customerASID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  providerASID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type  . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
   is to improve routing security.  (See [RFC6480] for more
   information.)  As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed
   to verify that a Provider AS (PAS) has permission from a Customer AS
   (CAS) holder to send routes in all directions.  The digitally signed
   Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this
   verification mechanism.



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   The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
   [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
   [RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic
   validation procedure for RPKI signed objects.  As ASPAs need to be
   validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current
   infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in
   [RFC6485], or its successor.

   To complete the specification of the ASPA (see Section 4 of
   [RFC6488]), this document defines:

   1.  The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed
       object.  This OID appears in the eContentType field of the
       encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed
       attribute within the signerInfo structure).

   2.  The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload
       signed by the CAS.  The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1
       [X680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X690].

   3.  The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation
       steps specified in [RFC6488]).

2.  The ASPA Content Type

   The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-cct-ASPA, which has the
   numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD.  This OID MUST appear
   both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as
   well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo
   structure (see [RFC6488]).

3.  The ASPA eContent

   The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as
   the Provider AS (PAS) that is authorized to further propagate
   announcements received from the customer.  If customer has multiple
   providers, it issues multiple ASPAs, one for each provider AS.  An
   ASPA is formally defined as:













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       ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
           { ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }

       id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD }

       ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
           version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0,
           AFI  AddressFamilyIdentifier,
           customerASID  ASID,
           providerASID  ASID }

       ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER  { v0(0) }

       AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER

       ASID ::= INTEGER

   Note that this content appears as the eContent within the
   encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488].

3.1.  version

   The version number of the ASProviderAttestation MUST be v0.

3.2.  AFI

   The AFI field contains Address Family Identifier for which the
   relation between customer and provider ASes is authorized.  Presently
   defined values for the Address Family Identifier field are specified
   in the IANA's Address Family Numbers registry [IANA-AF].

3.3.  customerASID

   The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous
   System that authorizes an upstream provider (listed in the
   providerASId) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family
   other ASes.

3.4.  providerASID

   The providerASID contains the AS number that is authorized to further
   propagate announcements in the specified address family received from
   the customer.








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4.  ASPA Validation

   Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing
   announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object
   itself.  To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the
   validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following
   additional ASPA-specific validation step.

   o  The autonomous system identifier delegation extension [RFC3779] is
      present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the
      ASPA), and the customer AS number in the ASPA is contained within
      the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's autonomous
      system identifier delegation extension.

5.  ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type




































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     RPKI-ASPA-2018
         { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
            pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018(TBD2) }
     DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
     BEGIN
     IMPORTS

     CONTENT-TYPE
     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010  -- RFC 6268
         { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
            pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

     ContentSet CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-ASPA, ... }

     --
     -- ASPA Content Type
     --

     id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
          us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 16 }

     id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }

     id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD }

     ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
         { TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }

     ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
         version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0,
         AFI  AddressFamilyIdentifier,
         customerASID  ASID,
         providerASID  ASID }

     ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER  { v0(0) }

     AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER

     ASID ::= INTEGER

     END

6.  IANA Considerations

   Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018 to the SMI Security for S/MIME
   Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry
   (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
   numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows:



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       Decimal   | Description                   | Specification
       -----------------------------------------------------------
       TBD2      | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018         | [ThisRFC]

   Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
   (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/
   smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows:

       Decimal   | Description                   | Specification
       -----------------------------------------------------------
       TBD       | id-ct-ASPA                    | [ThisRFC]

   Please add the ASPA to the RPKI Signed Object registry
   (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as
   follows:

       Name      | OID                           | Specification
       -----------------------------------------------------------
       ASPA      | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD   | [ThisRFC]

7.  Security Considerations

8.  Acknowledgments

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [IANA-AF]  IANA, "Address Family Numbers",
              <http://www.iana.org/numbers.html>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc3779>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.







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   [RFC6485]  Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
              Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
              RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6485>.

   [RFC6488]  Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
              Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [X680]     ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
              One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation",
              ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2015.

   [X690]     ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
              Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.

Authors' Addresses

   Alexander Azimov
   Qrator Labs

   Email: aa@qrator.net


   Eugene Uskov
   Qrator Labs

   Email: eu@qrator.net


   Randy Bush
   Internet Initiative Japan

   Email: randy@psg.com




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   Keyur Patel
   Arrcus, Inc.

   Email: keyur@arrcus.com


   Job Snijders
   NTT Communications
   Theodorus Majofskistraat 100
   Amsterdam  1065 SZ
   The Netherlands

   Email: job@ntt.net


   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   918 Spring Knoll Drive
   Herndon, VA  20170
   USA

   Email: housley@vigilsec.com





























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