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Internet Engineering Task Force                                M. Badra
INTERNET DRAFT                                             O. Cherkaoui
                                                        UQAM University
                                                              I. Hajjeh
Expires: 8, February 2004                                A. Serhrouchni
                                                            ENST, Paris
                                                        August, 10 2004


            Pre-Shared-Key key Exchange methods for TLS
               <draft-badra-tls-key-exchange-00.txt>


Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, I certify that any applicable
   patent or other IPR claims of which I am aware have been disclosed,
   or will be disclosed, and any of which I become aware will be
   disclosed, in accordance with RFC 3668.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on February 8, 2005.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document specifies new key exchange methods for Transport Layer
   Security protocol to support authentication based on pre installed
   key and to allow anonymous exchanges, identity protection And
   Perfect Forward Secrecy.






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1. Introduction

   Transport Layer Security (TLS) [TLS] is an authentication protocol
   that establishes a secure channel, as well as mutual authentication,
   protected cipher suite negotiation and key exchange between two
   entities. TLS handshake uses certificates and PKI for mutual
   authentication and key exchange. In many cases, a TLS public-key-
   based handshake is unnecessary; especially for closed environments
   or for clients pre-configured. This document specifies how to
   establish a TLS session using symmetric keys.

   Although several Internet Draft authors ([TLSPSK], [TLSSK],
   [TSLEXP], etc) propose the pre shared key mechanism, none of them
   provides neither anonymous exchanges and identity protection against
   eavesdropping nor Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). On the other hand,
   some approaches like [ISATLS], propose a radical change to the TLS
   protocol. Other like [SPTLS], propose Password-based cipher suite
   for TLS Handshake scheme.

   This document specifies new key exchange methods for TLS for pre
   shared key. The advantageous use of the pre shared key regarding the
   Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based certificates is that the pre
   shared key reduces the cryptographic operations, the messages load
   and the number of round trips.

1.1. Requirements language

   The key words "MUST", "SHALL", "SHOULD", and "MAY", in this document
   are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119.

2. Changes to the TLS Handshake protocol

   TLS [TLS] defines the client key exchange message that is always
   sent by the client. With this message [TLS], the premaster secret is
   set, either though direct transmission of the RSA-encrypted secret,
   or by the transmission of Diffie-Hellman parameters which will allow
   each side to agree upon the same premaster secret. The structure of
   this message depends on which key exchange method has been selected.
   The actual TLS standard defines two methods using RSA or
   Diffie_Hellman algorithms.

   The rest of this document describes the changes to the handshake
   messages contents when the pre shared key is being used.

2.1. Client Hello

   In order to negotiate and to signal to the server that the client
   wishes to use a pre_shared_key key exchange method, the client MAY
   include an extension of type "psk_key_exchange (9)" in the extended
   client hello, such is defined in [TLSEXT]. The "extension_data"


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   field of the psk key exchange extension SHALL contain
   "PSKKeyExchangeMethod" where:

        struct {
          PSKMethod psk_methods_list<0..2^16-1>;
        } PSKKeyExchangeMethod;

        struct {
          MethodType method_type;
            Select (method_type) {
             case rsa_psk : RSAPSK
             case diffie_hellman_psk : DHPSK
            } method;
        } PSKMethod;

        enum { rsa_psk(0), diffie_hellmen_psk(1), (255) } MethodType;

   Here, "PSKKeyExchangeMethod" provides a list of PSK key exchange
   methods that the client supports.

2.3. Server Key Exchange

   The format of ServerKeyExchange is as follow:

        struct {
            select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
             case diffie_hellman:
                ServerDHParams params;
                Signature signed_params;
             case rsa:
                ServerRSAParams params;
                Signature signed_params;
             case rsa_psk: /*NEW/
                ServerRSAParamsPSK params;
                Signature signed_params; /*optional/
             case diffie_hellman_psk: /*NEW/
                ServerDHParamsPSK params;
                Signature signed_params;/*optional/
            };
        } ServerKeyExchange;

   rsa_psk and diffie_hellman_psk cases are respectively identical to
   rsa and diffie_hellman cases that are definied in [TLS].

   Note that because the pre_shared_key SHOULD protect entities against
   man-in-the-middle attack (see section 2.4), the server MAY not sign
   its Diffie_Hellman parameters and thus the signed_params field MAY
   be omitted. For more information, see security considerations
   section.



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2.2. Client Key Exchange

   This document adds two new key exchange methods to the enumerated
   KeyExchangeAlgorithm originally defined in [TLS].

        enum {
          rsa, diffie_hellman, rsa_psk, diffie_hellman_psk
        } KeyExchangeAlgorithm;

   Thus, the structure of the client key exchange becomes as follow:

        struct {
         select (KeyEchangeAlgorithm){
          case rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret;
          case diffie_hellman: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic;
          case rsa_psk: EncryptPreMasterSecretPSK; /*NEW/
          case diffie_hellman_psk: ClientDiffieHellmanPublicPSK; /*NEW/
          } exchange_key;
        } ClientKeyExchange;

  2.2.1. rsa_psk encrypted premaster secret message

   If rsa_psk is being used for key agreement, the client generates a
   30-byte random value, concatenates it with the pre shared key
   identity, encrypts the result (premaster secret) using the server
   public key and sends it in an encrypted premaster secret message.

   Structure of the premaster secret:

       struct {
         ProtocolVersion client_version;
         opaque random[30];
         opaque psk_identity<1..2^16-1>;
         opaque pad[16-psk_identity.length];
       } PreMasterSecret;

       struct { public-key-encrypted PreMasterSecret pre_master_secret;
       } EncryptedPreMasterSecretPSK;

   For interoperation issues, this document uses the same definition
   used in [TLSSRP]. Thus, the psk_identity SHALL be UTF-8 encoded
   Unicode, where the psk_identity is the pre shared key identifier.

   If the psk_identity is less than 16 bytes in length, the premaster
   secret will be padded to obtain 46 bytes. For example, if the
   psk_identity length is 13 bytes, then the last three bytes of the
   premaster secret will be 0x03 0x03 0x03. This mechanism will allow
   the server to extract the psk_identity from the premaster secret.




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  2.2.2. diffie_hellman_psk encrypted premaster secret message

   Because the client does not use any certificate, its value Yc needs
   to be sent. As a result, the case implicit MAY be omitted.

        struct {
            select (PublicValueEncoding) {
             case implicit: struct { };
             case explicit: opaque dh_Yc<1..2^16-1>;
            } dh_public;
            opaque psk_identity<1..2^16-1>;
        } ClientDiffieHellmanPublicPSK;

             dh_Yc
                 The client's Diffie-Hellman public value (Yc).

             psk_identity
                 The pre shared key identifier.

   The psk_identity helps the client to indicate which key it wants to
   use and the server to retrieve the corresponding pre shared key
   value, if exists. When using a Diffie-Hellman based key exchange
   method, the psk_identity is sent in the clear.

2.4. Computing the master secret

   This document uses the same mechanism defined in [TLS] for keys
   computation and calculation, except the master secret key. It
   generates the master secret by applying the PRF on the premaster
   secret XOR pre_shared_key value instead of the premaster secret:

   master_secret = PRF(pre_master_secret XOR pre_shared_key,
                       "master_secret",
                       ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random)[0..47];

   As a result, if the server uses a static private key and if this key
   is compromised, the intruder must have the pre_shared_key to decrypt
   old sessions.

   On the other hand, if either the client or the server calculates an
   incorrect premaster_secret XOR pre_shared_key value, the finished
   messages will fail to decrypt properly and the other party will
   return a bad_record_mac alert. This MAY happen when the server does
   not send its certificate and that a man-in-the-middle intercepts the
   session exchanges and sends its public key instead of the server
   public key.






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2.5. Error Alerts

   Three new TLS error alerts are defined by this document (This
   section is inspired by [TLSSRP]):

   a) "unknown_psk_key_exchange" (integer) - this alert MAY be sent by
      a server that does not support any PSK key exchange methods sent
      by the client.  This alert is always a warning. Upon receiving
      this alert, the client MAY send a new hello message on the same
      connection using another TLS authentication methods.

   b) "unknown_psk_identity" (integer) - this alert MAY be sent by a
      server that receives an unknown ticket identity.  This alert is
      always fatal.

   c) "missing_psk_identity" (integer) - this alert MAY be sent by a
      server that would like to select an offered PSK key exchange
      method, if the MethodType extension is absent from the client's
      hello message.  This alert is always a warning. Upon receiving
      this alert, the client MAY send a new hello message on the same
      connection, this time including the MethodType extension.

2.6. Handshake

   In order to indicate the support of the shared key type, the client
   adds the extension "psk_key_exchange (9)" to its extended hello
   message.

   When the server receives an extended client hello message, it
   replies by its hello that contains the following attributes:
   Protocol Version, Random, Session ID, Cipher Suite, and Compression
   Method.

   If the server is able to agree on a key exchange method using the
   pre shared key, it will send its server key exchange message that
   contains the selected method. In this case, the Certificate message
   MAY be omitted from the response.

   If the server does not support any PSK key exchange methods sent by
   the client, the server MAY abort the handshake with a
   unknown_key_exchange alert.

   Now the server will send the server hello done message, indicating
   that the hello-message phase of the handshake is completed.

   The client send its client key exchange message. The content of this
   message depends on the method selected between the client hello and
   the server key exchange messages.



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   The handshake exchange is given in the following diagram:

            ClientHello         -------->
            (MethodType)                     ServerHello
                                             Certificate*
                                             ServerKeyExchange
                                <--------    ServerHelloDone
            ClientKeyExchange
            ChangeCipherSpec
            Finished            -------->
                                             ChangeCipherSpec
                                <--------    Finished

      * Indicates an optional message which is not always sent.

3. Security considerations

   The server MUST stock the shared key in a secure and protected
   manner in order to prevent attackers from retrieving its value.

   During the handshake phase, the server MAY send its certificate. The
   certificate's use protects entities against man-in-the-middle
   attack.

   If the server certificate is omitted, the client and the server
   authenticate each other via the finished messages. In fact, the
   finished value is computed using the master_secret calculated during
   the establishment session and the pre shared key. Thus, if the
   client is intercepted by a bogus server, this later will be
   detectable by the client during the finished phase. As a result, no
   third party can calculate the same finished value without having the
   correct pre_shared_key. Instead, the third party MAY discover the
   pre shared key identity sent in the client key exchange message.

   When using a Diffie-Hellman based PSK key exchange method, the
   client sends its psk_identity in the clear. In order to avoid this
   issue, the client could first open a conventional anonymous and then
   renegotiate a PSK key exchange method with the handshake protected
   by the first connection. Another solution MAY be done using the
   pseudonym management.

3.1. Key management with non-human support

   In the case where the client does not enter his credentials manually
   during the session establishment and that he does not need to
   remember them, then he can stock them on a secure token (e.g.
   smartcard) or in a local file. In this case, the server and the
   client MAY update the pre shared key value after each session has
   been formed. In this case, the both MAY add a seed to their
   credentials entries. By this method, the client's support and the


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   server calculate the seed and update the pre shared key as following
   (in the session i):

       seed(0) is a random on 16 bytes.

       seed(i) = P_MD5(seed(i-1) XOR psk_identity,
                       "seed" +
                       ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random)[0..16];

       psk(i) = PRF(psk(i-1) XOR premaster secret(i), "pre shared key",
                    ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)[0..48];

   With this mechanism, the psk_identity remains unchanged. However,
   when the client connect to the server, it sends the seed (seed(i-1)
   for session i) instead of the psk_identity. The rest of the protocol
   is unchangeable. This SHALL ensure, among other, PFS and anonymity.

4. IANA Considerations

   To be specified.

5. Acknowledgment

   This document has been inspired by [TLS], [TLSSRP] and [TLSPSK].
   Thus, it reused extracts of these documents.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

   [TLSEXT]  Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwwod, D., Mikkelsen, J.
             and Wright, T., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
             Extensions", RFC 3546, June 2003.

   [TLS]     Dierks, T., and Allen, C., "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
             RFC 2246, November 1998.

   [ISATLS]  Hajjeh, I., and Serhrouchni, A., "ISAKMP Handshake for
             SSL/TLS", IEEE GLOBECOM'03, Vol. 3, San Francisco, USA,
             1-5 December 2003, Pages: 1481-1485.

   [SPTLS]   Steiner, Michael, et. al., "Secure Password-Based Cipher
             Suite for TLS", ACM Transaction on Information and System
             Security, Vol. 4, No. 2, May 2001, Pages 134-157.

6.2.  Informative References

   [TLSSRP]  Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavroyanopoulos, N., and Perrin,
             T., "Using SRP for TLS Authentication",
             draft-ietf-tls-srp-07.txt, Internet Draft (work in
             progress), June 2004.
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   [TLSPSK]  Eronen, P., and Tschofenig, H., "Pre-Shared Key
             Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
             draft-eronen-tls-psk-00.txt, Internet Draft (work in
             progress), August 2004.

   [TLSSK]   Gutmann, P.,"Use of Shared Keys in the TLS Protocol",
             draft-ietf-tls-sharedkeys-02.txt, Internet Draft
             (expired), October 2003.

   [TSLEXP]  Badra, M., Serhrouchni, A., and Urien, P., "TLS Express",
             draft-badra-tls-express-00.txt, Internet Draft (work in
             progress), June 2004.

6. Author's Addresses

   Mohamad Badra
   ENST Telecom
   46 rue Barrault
   75634 Paris               Phone: NA
   France                    Email: Mohamad.Badra@enst.fr

   Omar Cherkaoui
   UQAM University
   Montreal (Quebec)         Phone: NA
   Canada                    Email: cherkaoui.omar@uqam.ca

   Ibrahim Hajjeh
   ENST Telecom
   46 rue Barrault
   75634 Paris               Phone: NA
   France                    Email: Ibrahim.Hajjeh@enst.fr

   Ahmed Serhrouchni
   ENST Telecom
   46 rue Barrault
   75634 Paris               Phone: NA
   France                    Email: Ahmed.Serhrouchni@enst.fr

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