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Network Working Group                                          R. Barnes
Internet-Draft                                                  O. Friel
Intended status: Informational                                     Cisco
Expires: October 13, 2018                                 April 11, 2018


                      Usage of SPAKE with TLS 1.3
                        draft-barnes-tls-pake-00

Abstract

   The pre-shared key mechanism available in TLS 1.3 is not suitable for
   usage with low-entropy keys, such as passwords entered by users.
   This document describes how the SPAKE password-authenticated key
   exchange can be used with TLS 1.3.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 13, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.




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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  TLS Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   DISCLAIMER: This is a work-in-progress draft of MLS and has not yet
   seen significant security analysis.  It should not be used as a basis
   for building production systems.

   In some applications, it is desireable to enable a client and server
   to authenticate to one another using a low-entropy pre-shared value,
   such as a user-entered password.

   In prior versions of TLS, this functionality has been provided by the
   integration of the Secure Remote Password PAKE protocol (SRP)
   [RFC5054].  The specific SRP integration described in RFC 5054 does
   not immediately extend to TLS 1.3 becauseit relies on the Client Key
   Exchange and Server Key Exchange messages, which no longer exist in
   1.3.  At a more fundamental level, the messaging patterns required by
   SRP do not map cleanly to the standard TLS 1.3 handshake, which has
   fewer round-trips than prior versions.

   TLS 1.3 itself provides a mechanism for authentication with pre-
   shared keys (PSKs).  However, PSKs used with this protocol need to be
   "full-entropy", because the binder values used for authentication can
   be used to mount a dictionary attack on the PSK.  So while the TLS
   1.3 PSK mechanism is suitable for the session resumption cases for
   which it is specified, it cannot be used when the client and server
   share only a low-entropy secret.

   Enabling TLS to address this use case effectively requires the TLS
   handshake to perform a password-authenticated key establishment
   (PAKE) protocol.  This document describes an embedding of the SPAKE2
   PAKE protocol in TLS 1.3 [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2] [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].
   This mechanism also applies to DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13], but
   for brevity, we will refer only to TLS throughout.





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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Setup

   In order to use this protocol, a TLS client and server need to have
   pre-provisioned the values required to execute the SPAKE2 protocol
   (see Section 3.1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2]):

   o  A DH group "G" of order "p*h", with "p" a large prime

   o  Fixed elements M and N for the group

   o  A hash function "H"

   o  A password "p"

   Note that the hash function "H" might be different from the hash
   function associated with the ciphersuite negotiated by the two
   parties.  Clients offering SPAKE2 authentication SHOULD NOT offer
   ciphersuites with hashes that provide different security properties
   than the SPAKE hash.

   The TLS client and server roles map to the "A" and "B" roles in the
   SPAKE specification, respectively.  The identity of the server is the
   domain name sent in the "server_name" extension of the ClientHello
   message.  The identity of the client is an opaque octet string,
   specified in the "spake2" ClientHello extension, defined below.

   From the shared password, each party computes a shared integer "w" in
   the following way:

   ``` struct { opaque client_identity<0..255>; opaque password<0..255>;
   } IdentifierAndPassword;

   struct { opaque salt<0..255>; opaque idpass[H.length]; }
   PasswordWithContext; ```

   o  Encode the client's identity and the shared password into an
      "IdentifierAndPassword" struct and compute its hash value "x"
      under "H".

   o  Encode the salt and the value "x" into a PasswordWithContext
      struct and compute its hash value "y" under "H".




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   o  Set "w = y % p", interpreting "y" as an integer in network byte
      order.

   Note servers only need to store the integers "w", which are
   effectively salted password hashes.  Clients that take passwords as
   input from users rather than storing them will need to know the
   appropriate salt value for use with a given server.

4.  TLS Extensions

   A client offers to authenticate with SPAKE2 by including an "spake2"
   extension in its ClientHello.  The content of this exension is an
   "SPAKE2ClientHello" value, specifying the client's identity, where
   the identity matches that used in 'IdentifierAndPassword', and a key
   share "T".  The value "T" is computed as specified in
   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2], as "T = w*M + X", where "M" is a fixed value
   for the DH group and "X" is the public key of a fresh DH key pair.
   The format of the key share "T" is the same as for a "KeyShareEntry"
   value from the same group.

   If a client sends the "spake2" extension, then it MAY also send the
   "key_share" and "pre_shared_key" extensions, to allow the server to
   choose an authentication mode.  Unlike PSK-based authentication,
   however, authentication with SPAKE2 cannot be combined with the
   normal TLS ECDH mechanism.

   ``` struct { opaque identity<0..2^16-1>; opaque
   key_exchange<1..2^16-1>; } SPAKE2Share;

   struct { SPAKE2Share client_shares<0..2^16-1>; } SPAKE2ClientHello;
   ```

   A server that receives an "spake2" extension examines the list of
   client shares to see if there is one with an identity the server
   recognizes.  If so, the server may indicate its use of SPAKE2
   authentication by including an "spake2" extension in its ServerHello.
   The content of this exension is an "SPAKE2ServerHello" value,
   specifying the client's identity and a key share "S".  The value "S"
   is computed as specified in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2], as "S = w*N + Y",
   where "N" is a fixed value for the DH group and "Y" is the public key
   of a fresh DH key pair.  The format of the key share "S" is the same
   as for a "KeyShareEntry" value from the same group.

   Use of SPAKE2 authenication is not inconsistent with standard
   certificate-based authentication of both clients and servers.
   authentication are not mutually exclusive.  If a server includes an
   "spake2" extension in its ServerHello, it may still send the




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   Certificate and CertificateVerify messages, and/or send a
   CertificateRequest message to the client.

   If a server uses SPAKE2 authentication, then it MUST NOT send an
   extension of type "key_share", "pre_shared_key", or "early_data".

   "struct { SPAKE2Share server_share; } SPAKE2ServerHello; "

   Based on these messages, both the client and server can compute the
   shared key "K = x*(S-w*N) = y*(T-w*M)", as specified in
   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2].  The value "K" is then used as the "(EC)DHE"
   input to the TLS key schedule.  The integer "w" is used as the PSK
   input, encoded as an integer in network byte order, using the
   smallest number of octets possible.

   As with client authentication via certificates, the server has not
   authenticated the client until after it has received the client's
   Finished message.  When a server negotiates the use of this mechanism
   for authentication, it MUST NOT send application data before it has
   received the client's Finished message.

5.  Security Considerations

   For the most part, the security properties of the password-based
   authentication described in this document are the same as those
   described in the Security Considerations of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2].
   The TLS Finished MAC provides the key confirmation required for the
   security of the protocol.  Note that all of the elements covered by
   the example confirmation hash listed in that document are also
   covered by the Finished MAC:

   o  "A", "B", and "T" are included via the ClientHello

   o  "S" via the ServerHello

   o  "K", and "w" via the TLS key schedule

   The mechanism described above does not provide protection for the
   client's identity, in contrast to TLS client authentication with
   certificates.  If client identities are considered sensitive

   [[ XXX(rlb@ipv.sx): Or maybe there's some HRR dance we could do.  For
   example: Server provides a key share in HRR, client does ECIES on
   identity. ]]







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6.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests that IANA add a value to the TLS ExtensionType
   Registry with the following contents:

             +-------+----------------+---------+-----------+
             | Value | Extension Name | TLS 1.3 | Reference |
             +-------+----------------+---------+-----------+
             | TBD   | spake2         |  CH, SH |  RFC XXXX |
             +-------+----------------+---------+-----------+

   [[ RFC EDITOR: Please replace "TBD" in the above table with the value
   assigned by IANA, and replace "XXXX" with the RFC number assigned to
   this document. ]]

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]
              Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-26 (work in progress), March
              2018.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
              Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28 (work in progress),
              March 2018.

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-spake2]
              Ladd, W. and B. Kaduk, "SPAKE2, a PAKE", draft-irtf-cfrg-
              spake2-05 (work in progress), February 2018.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5054]  Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavrogiannopoulos, N., and T. Perrin,
              "Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS
              Authentication", RFC 5054, DOI 10.17487/RFC5054, November
              2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5054>.






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Authors' Addresses

   Richard Barnes
   Cisco

   Email: rlb@ipv.sx


   Owen Friel
   Cisco

   Email: ofriel@cisco.com







































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