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ANIMA                                                  M. Behringer, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Informational                              B. Carpenter
Expires: April 20, 2015                                Univ. of Auckland
                                                               T. Eckert
                                                                   Cisco
                                                        October 17, 2014


               A Reference Model for Autonomic Networking
                draft-behringer-anima-reference-model-00

Abstract

   This document describes a reference model for Autonomic Networking.
   The goal is to define how the various elements in an autonomic
   context work together, to describe their interfaces and relations.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 20, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of




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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  The Network View  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Entities in an Autonomic Network  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  The Network Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  The Registrar Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  The MASA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Naming  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Addressing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Trust Infrastructure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Autonomic Control Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.1.  Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     7.2.  Negotiation and Synchronisation . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.3.  Intent Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.4.  Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.5.  Feedback Loops  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.6.  Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   8.  Hybrid Approach with Non-Autonomic Functions  . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.1.  Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   11. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   12. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]  . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   The document "Autonomic Networking - Definitions and Design Goals"
   [I-D.irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions] explains the
   fundamental concepts behind Autonomic Networking, and defines the
   relevant terms in this space.  In section 5 it describes a high level
   reference model.  This document defines this reference model with
   more detail, to allow for functional and protocol specifications to
   be developed in an architecturally consistent, non-overlapping
   manner.

   As discussed in [I-D.irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions], the
   goal of this work is not to focus exclusively on fully autonomic
   nodes or networks.  In reality, most networks will run with some
   autonomic functions, while the rest of the network is traditionally
   managed.  This reference model allows for this hybrid approach.





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2.  The Network View

   This section describes the various elements in a network with
   autonomic functions, and how these entities work together, on a high
   level.  Subsequent sections explain the detailed inside view for each
   of the autonomic network elements, as well as the network functions
   (or interfaces) between those elements.

   Autonomic entities include:

   o  Network elements: A network element can be a fully or partially
      autonomic node.  It runs autonomic functions, and interacts with
      other autonomic nodes.

   o  Registrar: Security is a fundamental requirement in an autonomic
      network.  For nodes and services to securely interact without the
      need to provision shared secrets, a trust infrastructure must be
      in place.  The registrar is the trust anchor in an autonomic
      domain.

   o  MASA: The MASA is service for devices of a particular vendor.  It
      can validate the identity of devices that are to be used in an
      autonomic domain, assert which device is owned by which domain,
      etc.

3.  Entities in an Autonomic Network

   This section describes all the elements in an autonomic network,
   their function, internal organisation and architecture.  In the
   network view in Section 2, this section describes the "boxes".  The
   following sections describes how those boxes interact, and the
   necessary means to do so (addressing, routing, etc).

3.1.  The Network Element

   This section describes an autonomic network element and its internal
   architecture.  The reference model explained in
   [I-D.irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions] shows the sources of
   information that an autonomic service agent can leverage: Self-
   knowledge, network knowledge (through discovery), Intent, and
   feedback loops.  Fundamentally, there are two levels inside an
   autonomic node: the level of autonomic service agents, which uses the
   functions of the autonomic networking infrastructure.  Figure 1
   illustrates this concept.







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   +------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                                                            |
   | +-----------+        +------------+        +------------+  |
   | | Autonomic |        | Autonomic  |        | Autonomic  |  |
   | | Service   |        | Service    |        | Service    |  |
   | | Agent 1   |        | Agent 2    |        | Agent 3    |  |
   | +-----------+        +------------+        +------------+  |
   |       ^                    ^                     ^         |
   |       |                    |                     |         |
   |       V                    V                     V         |
   |------------------------------------------------------------|
   | Autonomic Networking Infrastructure                        |
   |    - Data structures (ex: certificates, peer information)  |
   |    - discovery, negotiation and synchronisation functions  |
   |    - intent distribution                                   |
   |    - aggregated reporting and feedback loops               |
   |    - routing                                               |
   |------------------------------------------------------------|
   |           Standard Operating System Functions              |
   +------------------------------------------------------------+

                                 Figure 1

   The Autonomic Networking Infrastructure (lower part of Figure 1)
   contains node specific data structures, for example trust information
   about itself and its peers, as well as a generic set of functions,
   independent of a particular usage.  This infrastructure should be
   generic, and support a variety of Autonomic Service Agents (upper
   part of Figure 1).  The Autonomic Control Plane is the summary of all
   interactions of the Autonomic Networking Infrastructure with other
   nodes and services.

   The use cases of "Autonomics" such as self-management, self-
   optimisation, etc, are implemented as Autonomic Service Agents.  They
   use the services and data structures of the underlying autonomic
   networking infrastructure.  The underlying Autonomic Networking
   Infrastructure should itself be self-managing.

3.2.  The Registrar Element

   This section describes the registrar function in an autonomic
   network.  It explains the tasks of a registrar element, and how
   registrars are placed in a network, redundancy between several, etc.
   [tbc]







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3.3.  The MASA

   tbc

4.  Naming

   Inside a domain, each autonomic device needs a domain specific
   identifier. [tbc]

5.  Addressing

   tbc

6.  Trust Infrastructure

   Autonomic nodes have direct interactions between themselves, which
   must be secured.  Since an autonomic network does not rely on
   configuration, it is not an option to configure for example pre-
   shared keys.  A trust infrastructure such as a PKI infrastructure
   must be in place.  This section describes the principles of this
   trust infrastructure.

   A completely autonomic way to automatically and securely deploy such
   a trust infrastructure is to set up a trust anchor for the domain,
   and then use an approach as in the document "Bootstrapping Key
   Infrastructures" [I-D.pritikin-bootstrapping-keyinfrastructures].

7.  Autonomic Control Plane

   This section describes how autonomic nodes interact.  In the network
   view in Section 2 this section describes the "lines" and "arrows"
   between nodes.  The summary of autonomic interactions forms the
   "Autonomic Control Plane".  This control plane can be either
   implemented in the global routing table of a node, such as IGPs in
   today's networks; or it can be provided as an overlay network, as
   described in [I-D.behringer-autonomic-control-plane].  This section
   describes the function of the autonomic control plane, independent of
   its implementation.

7.1.  Discovery

   Traditionally, most of the information a node requires is provided
   through configuration or northbound interfaces.  An autonomic
   function should only minimally rely on such northbound interfaces,
   therefore it needs to discover resources in the network.  This
   section describes various discovery functions in an autonomic
   network.




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   Discovering nodes and their properties: A core function to establish
   an autonomic domain is the discovery of autonomic nodes, primarily
   adjacent nodes.  This may either leverage existing neigbhour
   discovery mechanisms, or new mechanisms.

   Discovering services: Network services such as AAA should also be
   discovered and not configured.  Service discovery is required for
   such tasks.  An autonomic network can either leverage existing
   service discovery functions, or build a new approach.

7.2.  Negotiation and Synchronisation

   Autonomic nodes must negotiate and/or synchronise parameters, etc.
   The document "A Generic Discovery and Negotiation Protocol for
   Autonomic Networking" [I-D.carpenter-anima-gdn-protocol] explains
   requirements for negotiation and synchronisation in an autonomic
   network, and a protocol for this purpose.

7.3.  Intent Distribution

   The distribution of intent is also a function of the Autonomic
   Control Plane.  Various methods can be used to distribute intent
   across an autonomic domain.

7.4.  Reporting

   An autonomic network offers through the autonomic control plane the
   possibility to aggregate information inside the network, before
   sending it to the admin of the network.  While this can be seen or
   implemented as a specific form of negotiation, the use case is
   different and therefore mentioned here explicitly.

7.5.  Feedback Loops

   Feedback loops are required in an autonomic network to allow
   administrator intervention, while maintaining a default behaviour.
   Through a feedback loop an administrator can be prompted with a
   default action, and has the possibility to acknowledge or override
   the proposed default action.

7.6.  Routing

   All autonomic nodes in a domain must be able to communicate with each
   other, and with autonomic nodes outside their own domain.  Therefore,
   an Autonomic Control Plane relies on a routing function.






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8.  Hybrid Approach with Non-Autonomic Functions

   This section explains how autonomic functions can co-exist with non-
   autonomic functions, and how a potential overlap is managed. (tbc)

9.  Security Considerations

9.1.  Threat Analysis

   This is a preliminary outline of a threat analysis, to be expanded
   and made more specific as the various Autonomic Networking
   specifications evolve.

   Since AN will hand over responsibility for network configuration from
   humans or centrally established management systems to fully
   distributed devices, the threat environment is also fully
   distributed.  On the one hand, that means there is no single point of
   failure to act as an attractive target for bad actors.  On the other
   hand, it means that potentially a single misbehaving autonomic device
   could launch a widespread attack, by misusing the distributed AN
   mechanisms.  For example, a resource exhaustion attack could be
   launched by a single device requesting large amounts of that resource
   from all its peers, on behalf of a non-existent traffic load.
   Alternatively it could simply send false information to its peers,
   for example by announcing resource exhaustion when this was not the
   case.  If security properties are managed autonomically, a
   misbehaving device could attempt a distributed attack by requesting
   all its peers to reduce security protections in some way.  In
   general, since autonomic devices run without supervision, almost any
   kind of undesirable management action could in theory by attempted by
   a misbehaving device.

   If it is possible for an unauthorised device to act as an autonomic
   device, or for a malicious third party to inject messages appearing
   to come from an autonomic device, all these same risks would apply.

   If AN messages can be observed by a third party, they might reveal
   valuable information about network configuration, security
   precautions in use, individual users, and their traffic patterns.  If
   encrypted, AN messages might still reveal some information via
   traffic analysis, but this would be quite limited (for example, this
   would be highly unlikely to reveal any specific information about
   user traffic).  AN messages are liable to be exposed to third parties
   on any unprotected Layer 2 link, and to insider attacks even on
   protected Layer 2 links.






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10.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests no action by IANA.

11.  Acknowledgements

   tbc

12.  Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]

      00: Initial version.

13.  References

   [I-D.behringer-autonomic-control-plane]
              Behringer, M., Bjarnason, S., BL, B., and T. Eckert, "An
              Autonomic Control Plane", draft-behringer-autonomic-
              control-plane-00 (work in progress), June 2014.

   [I-D.carpenter-anima-gdn-protocol]
              Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and B. Liu, "A Generic Discovery
              and Negotiation Protocol for Autonomic Networking", draft-
              carpenter-anima-gdn-protocol-00 (work in progress),
              October 2014.

   [I-D.irtf-nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions]
              Behringer, M., Pritikin, M., Bjarnason, S., Clemm, A.,
              Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and L. Ciavaglia, "Autonomic
              Networking - Definitions and Design Goals", draft-irtf-
              nmrg-autonomic-network-definitions-04 (work in progress),
              October 2014.

   [I-D.pritikin-bootstrapping-keyinfrastructures]
              Pritikin, M., Behringer, M., and S. Bjarnason,
              "Bootstrapping Key Infrastructures", draft-pritikin-
              bootstrapping-keyinfrastructures-01 (work in progress),
              September 2014.

Authors' Addresses

   Michael H. Behringer (editor)
   Cisco

   Email: mbehring@cisco.com







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   Brian Carpenter
   Department of Computer Science
   University of Auckland
   PB 92019
   Auckland  1142
   New Zealand

   Email: brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com


   Toerless Eckert
   Cisco

   Email: eckert@cisco.com





































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