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DNSOP Working Group                                            R. Bellis
Internet-Draft                                                       ISC
Intended status: Standards Track                        January 06, 2017
Expires: July 10, 2017


                           EDNS X-Proxied-For
                       draft-bellis-dnsop-xpf-00

Abstract

   It is becoming more commonplace to install front end proxy devices in
   front of DNS servers to provide (for example) load balancing or to
   perform transport layer conversions.

   This document defines an option within the EDNS(0) Extension
   Mechanism for DNS that allows a DNS server to receive the original
   client source IP address when supplied by trusted proxies.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 10, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  EDNS Option Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Proxy Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.3.  Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)  . .   4
     3.5.  Multi-tier Proxies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   It is becoming more commonplace to install front end proxy devices in
   front of DNS servers [RFC1035] to provide (for example) load
   balancing or to perform transport layer conversions.

   This has the unfortunate side effect of hiding the clients' source IP
   addresses from the server, making it harder to employ server-side
   technologies that rely on knowing those address (e.g.  ACLs, DNS
   Response Rate Limiting, etc).

   This document defines an option within the EDNS(0) Extension
   Mechanism for DNS [RFC6891] that allows a DNS server to receive the
   original client source IP address when supplied by trusted proxies.

   This specification is only intended for use on server-side proxy
   devices that are under the same administrative control as the DNS
   servers themselves.  As such there is no change in the scope within
   which any private information might be shared.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].





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3.  Description

3.1.  EDNS Option Format

   The overall format of an EDNS option is shown for reference below,
   per [RFC6891], followed by the option specific data:

      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   0: |                          OPTION-CODE                          |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   2: |                         OPTION-LENGTH                         |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   4: |                                                               |
      /                          OPTION-DATA                          /
      /                                                               /
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

   OPTION-CODE: TBD, with mnemonic "XPF".

   OPTION-LENGTH: Size (in octets) of OPTION-DATA.

   OPTION-DATA: Option specific, as below:

                   +0 (MSB)                            +1 (LSB)
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   0: |     Unused    |   IP Version  |        Address Octet 0        |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   2: |        Address Octet 1        |              ...              |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
      |              ...             ///                              |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

   Unused: Currently reserved.  These MUST be zero unless redefined in a
   subsequent specification.

   IP Version: The IP protocol version number used by the client.

   Address: The source IP address of the client.

3.2.  Proxy Processing

   Proxies implementing this specification must append this option to
   each request packet received before forwarding it to the intended DNS
   server.

   If the proxy has to create a new OPT RR (because none was present in
   the original request) it MUST strip any OPT RR subsequently seen in
   the response for conformance with Section 7 of [RFC6891].



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   Author's note: what are the implications of that for TSIG
   Section 3.4?

3.3.  Server Processing

   This option MUST be ignored by servers when received from a client
   that is not white-listed by the server.

   When this option is received from a white-listed proxy, the DNS
   server MUST (SHOULD?) use the address contained therein in preference
   to the client's source IP address for any data processing logic that
   would otherwise depend on the latter.

   If the length of the client IP address contained in the OPTION-DATA
   is not consistent with that expected for the given IP version then
   the server MUST return a FORMERR response.

   Author's note: What response for unknown IP version numbers?

   Servers MUST NOT send this option in DNS responses.

3.4.  Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)

   The considerations for TSIG [RFC2845] from Section 4.5 of "DNS Proxy
   Implementation Guidelines" [RFC5625] apply here.

   A TSIG-signed request MUST either:

   1.  be forwarded according to RFC 5625 without addition of this
       option, or

   2.  be verified using a secret shared between client and proxy,
       updated with this option, and then re-signed with a (potentially
       different) shared secret before sending to the server.

   In the case of option 1, the server might still be able to uniquely
   identify and authenticate the client through its shared key, but not
   by its IP address.

   If option 2 is used, there is an operational trade-off to be
   considered as to whether the two secrets (between client and proxy,
   and between proxy and server) are actually the same secret.  A
   potential advantage of three-way sharing of the secret is that the
   server response (which per above MUST NOT be modified by adding this
   option) may be returned directly to the client without any further
   TSIG operations.





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   Author's note: A third alternative exists, which is to append an
   additional TSIG signature to the packet based on a secret shared only
   between the proxy and server.  If end-to-end TSIG validation is
   required alongside TSIG validation between proxy and server, the
   server would have to 1) validate that second signature, 2) strip it,
   and then 3) perform further validation on the original signature.
   Feedback is sought on whether this is worth pursuing.

3.5.  Multi-tier Proxies

   TBD

4.  Security Considerations

   If the white-list of trusted proxies is implemented as a list of IP
   addresses, the server administrator MUST have the ability to
   selectively disable this feature for any transport where there is a
   possibility of the proxy's source address being spoofed.

   This does not mean to imply that use over UDP is impossible - if for
   example the network architecture keeps all proxy-to-server traffic on
   a dedicated network and clients have no direct access to the servers
   then the proxies' source addresses can be considered unspoofable.

5.  Privacy Considerations

   Used incorrectly, this option could expose internal network
   information, however it is not intended for use on proxy / forwarder
   devices that sit on the client-side of a DNS request.

6.  IANA Considerations

   IANA are directed to assign the value TBD for the XPF option in the
   DNS EDNS0 Option Codes Registry.

7.  Acknowledgements

8.  Normative References

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC2119, March 1997,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.




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   [RFC2845]  Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
              Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
              (TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.

   [RFC5625]  Bellis, R., "DNS Proxy Implementation Guidelines", BCP
              152, RFC 5625, DOI 10.17487/RFC5625, August 2009,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5625>.

   [RFC6891]  Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
              for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891, DOI 10.17487/
              RFC6891, April 2013,
              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.

Author's Address

   Ray Bellis
   Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
   950 Charter Street
   Redwood City  CA 94063
   USA

   Phone: +1 650 423 1200
   Email: ray@isc.org



























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