[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 04

DNSOP Working Group                                            R. Bellis
Internet-Draft                                                       ISC
Updates: RFC 2845, RFC 2931 (if                              P. van Dijk
         approved) (if approved)                              R. Gacogne
Intended status: Standards Track                                PowerDNS
Expires: September 6, 2018                                March 05, 2018


                           DNS X-Proxied-For
                       draft-bellis-dnsop-xpf-04

Abstract

   It is becoming more commonplace to install front end proxy devices in
   front of DNS servers to provide (for example) load balancing or to
   perform transport layer conversions.

   This document defines a meta resource record that allows a DNS server
   to receive information about the client's original transport protocol
   parameters when supplied by trusted proxies.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



Bellis, et al.          Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 1]


Internet-Draft              DNS X-Proxied-For                 March 2018


   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Client Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  Request Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Proxy Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  Server Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.5.  Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.6.  Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.7.  Signed DNS Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Implementation status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  dnsdist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  PowerDNS Recursor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.3.  Wireshark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   It is becoming more commonplace to install front end proxy devices in
   front of DNS servers [RFC1035] to provide load balancing or to
   perform transport layer conversions (e.g. to add DNS over TLS
   [RFC7858] to a DNS server that lacks native support).

   This has the unfortunate side effect of hiding the clients' source IP
   addresses from the server, making it harder to employ server-side
   technologies that rely on knowing those addresses (e.g.  ACLs, DNS
   Response Rate Limiting, etc).

   This document defines the XPF meta resource record (RR) that allows a
   DNS server to receive information about the client's original
   transport protocol parameters when supplied by trusted proxies.

   Whilst in some circumstances it would be possible to re-use the
   Client Subnet EDNS Option [RFC7871] to carry a subset of this



Bellis, et al.          Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 2]


Internet-Draft              DNS X-Proxied-For                 March 2018


   information, a new RR is defined to allow both this feature and the
   Client Subnet Option to co-exist in the same packet.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   The XPF RR is analogous to the HTTP "X-Forwarded-For" header, but in
   DNS the term "forwarder" is usually understood to describe a network
   component that sits on the outbound query path of a resolver.

   Instead we use the term "proxy", which in this document means a
   network component that sits on the inbound query path in front of a
   recursive or authoritative DNS server, receiving DNS queries from
   clients and dispatching them to local servers.

3.  Description

   The XPF RR contains the entire 6-tuple (IP version, Layer 4 protocol,
   source address, destination address, source port and destination
   port) of the packet received from the client by the proxy.

   The presence of the source address supports use of ACLs based on the
   client's IP address.

   The source port allows for ACLs to support Carrier Grade NAT whereby
   different end-users might share a single IP address.

   The destination address supports scenarios where the server behaviour
   depends upon the packet destination (e.g.  BIND view's "match-
   destinations" option)

   The protocol and destination port fields allow server behaviour to
   vary depending on whether DNS over TLS [RFC7858] or DNS over DTLS
   [RFC8094] are in use.

3.1.  Client Handling

   Stub resolvers, client-side proxy devices, and recursive resolvers
   MUST NOT add the XPF RR to DNS requests.







Bellis, et al.          Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 3]


Internet-Draft              DNS X-Proxied-For                 March 2018


3.2.  Request Handling

   The rules in this section apply to processing of the XPF RR whether
   by a proxy device or a DNS server.

   If this RR is received from a non-white-listed client the server MUST
   return a REFUSED response.

   If a server finds this RR anywhere other than in the Additional
   Section of a request it MUST return a REFUSED response.

   If the value of the RR's IP version field is not understood by the
   server it MUST return a REFUSED response.

   If the length of the IP addresses contained in the RR are not
   consistent with that expected for the given IP version then the
   server MUST return a FORMERR response.

   Servers MUST NOT send this RR in DNS responses.

3.3.  Proxy Handling

   For each request received, proxies MUST generate an XPF RR containing
   the 6-tuple representing the client's Layer 3 and Layer 4 headers and
   append it to the Additional Section of the request (updating the
   ARCOUNT field accordingly) before sending it to the intended DNS
   server.

   If a valid XPF RR is received from a white-listed client the original
   XPF RR MUST be preserved instead.

3.4.  Server Handling

   When this RR is received from a white-listed client the DNS server
   SHOULD use the transport information contained therein in preference
   to the packet's own transport information for any data processing
   logic (e.g.  ACLs) that would otherwise depend on the latter.

3.5.  Wire Format

   The XPF RR is formatted like any standard RR, but none of the fields
   except RDLENGTH and RDATA have any meaning in this specification.
   All multi-octet fields are transmitted in network order (i.e. big-
   endian).

   The required values of the RR header fields are as follows:

   NAME: MUST contain a single 0 octet (i.e. the root domain).



Bellis, et al.          Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 4]


Internet-Draft              DNS X-Proxied-For                 March 2018


   TYPE: MUST contain TBD1 (XPF).

   CLASS: MUST contain 1 (IN).

   TTL: MUST contain 0 (zero).

   RDLENGTH: specifies the length in octets of the RDATA field.

   The RDATA of the XPF RR is as follows:

                   +0 (MSB)                            +1 (LSB)
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   0: |     Unused    |   IP Version  |           Protocol            |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
   2: |     Source Address Octet 0    |              ...              |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
      |              ...             ///                              |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
      |  Destination Address Octet 0  |              ...              |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
      |              ...             ///                              |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
      |                          Source Port                          |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
      |                        Destination Port                       |
      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

   Unused: Currently reserved.  These bits MUST be zero unless redefined
   in a subsequent specification.

   IP Version: The IP protocol version number used by the client, as
   defined in the IANA IP Version Number Registry [IANA-IP].
   Implementations MUST support IPv4 (4) and IPv6 (6).

   Protocol: The Layer 4 protocol number (e.g.  UDP or TCP) as defined
   in the IANA Protocol Number Registry [IANA-PROTO].

   Source Address: The source IP address of the client.

   Destination Address: The destination IP address of the request, i.e.
   the IP address of the proxy on which the request was received.

   Source Port: The source port used by the client.

   Destination Port: The destination port of the request.

   The length of the Source Address and Destination Address fields will
   be variable depending on the IP Version used by the client.



Bellis, et al.          Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 5]


Internet-Draft              DNS X-Proxied-For                 March 2018


3.6.  Presentation Format

   XPF is a meta RR that cannot appear in master format zone files, but
   a standardised presentation format is defined here for use by
   debugging utilities that might need to display the contents of an XPF
   RR.

   The Unused bits and the IP Version field are treated as a single
   octet and presented as an unsigned decimal integer with range 0 ..
   255.

   The Protocol field is presented as an unsigned decimal integer with
   range 0 .. 255.

   The Source and Destination Address fields are presented either as
   IPv4 or IPv6 addresses according to the IP Version field.  In the
   case of IPv6 the recommendations from [RFC5952] SHOULD be followed.

   The Source and Destination Port fields are presented as unsigned
   decimal integers with range 0 .. 65535.

3.7.  Signed DNS Requests

   Any XPF RRs found in a packet MUST be ignored for the purposes of
   calculating or verifying any signatures used for Secret Key
   Transaction Authentication for DNS [RFC2845] or DNS Request and
   Transaction Signatures (SIG(0)) [RFC2931].

   Typically it is expected that proxies will append the XPF RR to the
   packet after any existing TSIG or SIG(0) RRs, and that servers will
   remove the XPF RR from the packet prior to verification of the
   original signature, with the ARCOUNT field updated as appropriate.

   If either TSIG or SIG(0) are configured between the proxy and server
   then any XPF RRs MUST be ignored when the proxy calculates the packet
   signature.

4.  Security Considerations

   If the white-list of trusted proxies is implemented as a list of IP
   addresses, the server administrator MUST have the ability to
   selectively disable this feature for any transport where there is a
   possibility of the proxy's source address being spoofed.

   This does not mean to imply that use over UDP is impossible - if for
   example the network architecture keeps all proxy-to-server traffic on
   a dedicated network and clients have no direct access to the servers
   then the proxies' source addresses can be considered unspoofable.



Bellis, et al.          Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 6]


Internet-Draft              DNS X-Proxied-For                 March 2018


5.  Implementation status

   [RFC Editor Note: Please remove this entire section prior to
   publication as an RFC.]

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups
   to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
   running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
   and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
   It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
   they see fit".

5.1.  dnsdist

   Support for adding an XPF RR to proxied packets is provided in the
   git version of dnsdist.  The code point is configurable.

5.2.  PowerDNS Recursor

   Support for extracting the XPF RR from received packets (when coming
   from a trusted source) is available in the git version of the
   PowerDNS Recursor.  The code point is configurable.

5.3.  Wireshark

   Support for dissecting XPF RRs is present in Wireshark 2.5.0, using a
   temporary code point of 65422.

6.  Privacy Considerations

   Used incorrectly, this RR could expose internal network information,
   however it is not intended for use on proxy / forwarder devices that
   sit on the client-side of a DNS request.





Bellis, et al.          Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 7]


Internet-Draft              DNS X-Proxied-For                 March 2018


   This specification is only intended for use on server-side proxy
   devices that are under the same administrative control as the DNS
   servers themselves.  As such there is no change in the scope within
   which any private information might be shared.

   Use other than as described above would be contrary to the principles
   of [RFC6973].

7.  IANA Considerations

   << a copy of the RFC 6895 IANA RR TYPE application template will
   appear here >>

8.  Acknowledgements

   Mark Andrews, Robert Edmonds, Duane Wessels

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [IANA-IP]  IANA, "IANA IP Version Registry", n.d.,
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/version-numbers/>.

   [IANA-PROTO]
              IANA, "IANA Protocol Number Registry", n.d.,
              <http://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2845]  Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake 3rd, D., and B.
              Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS
              (TSIG)", RFC 2845, DOI 10.17487/RFC2845, May 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2845>.

   [RFC2931]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures
              ( SIG(0)s )", RFC 2931, DOI 10.17487/RFC2931, September
              2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2931>.






Bellis, et al.          Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 8]


Internet-Draft              DNS X-Proxied-For                 March 2018


   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5952]  Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
              Address Text Representation", RFC 5952,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC7871]  Contavalli, C., van der Gaast, W., Lawrence, D., and W.
              Kumari, "Client Subnet in DNS Queries", RFC 7871,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7871, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7871>.

   [RFC8094]  Reddy, T., Wing, D., and P. Patil, "DNS over Datagram
              Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 8094,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8094, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8094>.

Authors' Addresses

   Ray Bellis
   Internet Systems Consortium, Inc.
   950 Charter Street
   Redwood City  CA 94063
   USA

   Phone: +1 650 423 1200
   Email: ray@isc.org




Bellis, et al.          Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 9]


Internet-Draft              DNS X-Proxied-For                 March 2018


   Peter van Dijk
   PowerDNS.COM B.V.
   Den Haag
   The Netherlands

   Email: peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com


   Remi Gacogne
   PowerDNS.COM B.V.
   Den Haag
   The Netherlands

   Email: remi.gacogne@powerdns.com





































Bellis, et al.          Expires September 6, 2018              [Page 10]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129b, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/