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HTTPbis                                                        M. Bishop
Internet-Draft                                                    Akamai
Intended status: Standards Track                         January 9, 2018
Expires: July 13, 2018

                      The "SNI" Alt-Svc Parameter


   HTTP Alternative Services provides a mechanism for an origin to
   declare that its content is accessible via some other combination of
   host, port, and protocol.  In the process of using such an
   alternative, an observer can identify that the client is requesting
   resources from a particular hostname.

   This document extends HTTP Alternative Services, in combination with
   Secondary Certificate Authentication, to enable clients not to
   disclose the origin to which they intend to connect.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 13, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect

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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  The "sni" Alt-Svc Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.3.  URIs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   Confidentiality and authentication during communication are primary
   goals of using TLS to secure traffic on the Internet.  However, due
   to the nature of TLS, certain information is inherently not
   confidential - notably, the hostname and the corresponding
   certificate of the origin to which the client is connecting are
   transferred unencrypted in the Server Name Indication extension [SNI]
   and the server's Certificate message [TLS12].

   While the client identity can be obscured by using TLS renegotiation
   immediately after the handshake (in TLS 1.2) or by using TLS 1.3
   [TLS13], the server is not afforded such privacy considerations.

   Servers may also have wildcard certificates which do not enumerate
   specific subdomains, but clients will disclose the first subdomain
   used on a connection via the SNI extension when establishing the

   [SNIEncryption] discusses a potential solution to these issues in
   Section 3, HTTP Co-Tenancy Fronting, but notes both discoverability
   and server authentication issues with that approach.  This document
   provides a mechanism to address both limitations.

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1.1.  Usage

   In [AltSvc], once a client has received a validated Alternative
   Service record for an origin, it "SHOULD use that alternative service
   for all requests to the associated origin as soon as it is available,
   provided the alternative service information is fresh (Section 2.2)
   and the security properties of the alternative service protocol are
   desirable, as compared to the existing connection."  However, the
   client "MUST have reasonable assurances that the alternative service
   is under control of and valid for the whole origin ... established
   through use of a TLS-based protocol with the certificate checks
   defined in [RFC2818]."  This causes the origin to be disclosed in the
   SNI extension while connecting to the alternative, and the origin's
   certificate to be returned by the alternative, creating the same
   privacy issues as connecting directly to the origin.

   The extension described in Section 2 enables an origin to declare
   that reasonable assurances should be obtained, not by requesting the
   desired hostname in the TLS handshake, but by requesting it via
   [SecondaryCerts].  The validation checks from [RFC2818] are applied
   to this certificate.

   Because the entire exchange happens inside TLS, a passive observer
   cannot identify the hostname(s) the client might be requesting.

1.2.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   "COULD", "POSSIBLE", and "MIGHT" in this document are to be
   interpreted as described in [RFC6919].

   Field definitions are given in Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF), as
   defined in [RFC5234].

2.  The "sni" Alt-Svc Extension

   When an origin wishes to nominate a "fronting server", it includes
   the "sni" parameter in its alternative service entry.


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   sni = host

   "host" is defined in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC3986].

   When processing such an alternative, clients SHOULD present the
   hostname given in the "sni" parameter in the SNI extension during the
   TLS handshake.  If the resulting certificate is also for the origin
   which published the alternative service, the client MUST validate the
   certificate in the handshake for authenticity according to [RFC2818].

   Otherwise, the client MAY choose not to validate the certificate, but
   MUST NOT make requests to any origin corresponding to this
   certificate unless the certificate has been successfully validated.
   In this case, the client SHOULD send a "CERTIFICATE_REQUEST" frame
   including an SNI extension indicating the origin which published the
   alternative service immediately upon connecting.  If no corresponding
   "CERTIFICATE" frame is presented by the server after a reasonable
   timeout, or if the server's SETTINGS frame does not include the
   "SETTINGS_HTTP_CERT_AUTH" setting, the client MUST consider the
   alternative connection to have failed.

3.  Security Considerations

   [AltSvc] permits clients to ignore unrecognized parameters.  As a
   result, servers publishing records with the "sni" parameter cannot be
   assured that clients will not include their origin in the SNI header
   when connecting to the nominated alternative.  If, for security
   reasons, an origin wishes its identity never to be disclosed when the
   alternative is being used, an alternative mechanism would be required
   to ascertain client support before generating the Alt-Svc record.

   Clients will need to connect directly to the origin at least once in
   order to receive the Alt-Svc entry via an HTTP header or "ALTSVC"
   frame, thus disclosing their use of the origin to the network on the
   first connection.  This could be mitigated by future work defining a
   way to publish alternative services in a mechanism which can be
   retrieved confidentially, such as via DNS in combination with
   [RFC7858] or [DoH].

   However, servers which publish Alt-Svc records over unencrypted
   channels (HTTP connections without TLS) or channels without client
   authorization (DNS, or publicly accessible HTTP resources) enable
   active observers to build a map of fronting servers by collecting
   Alt-Svc advertisements.  Servers SHOULD CONSIDER this trade-off in
   deciding when and how to make Alt-Svc records available to
   unauthenticated parties.

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4.  IANA Considerations

   The "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Alt-Svc Parameter Registry"
   defines the name space for parameters, as described in [AltSvc].  It
   is maintained at http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-alt-svc-
   parameters [1].

   This document registers the following parameter:

   Name:  "sni"

   Specification:  This document

5.  References

5.1.  Normative References

   [AltSvc]   Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
              Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838,
              April 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7838>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,

   [RFC6919]  Barnes, R., Kent, S., and E. Rescorla, "Further Key Words
              for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 6919,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6919, April 2013,

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

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              Bishop, M., Sullivan, N., and M. Thomson, "Secondary
              Certificate Authentication in HTTP/2", draft-bishop-
              httpbis-http2-additional-certs-05 (work in progress),
              October 2017.

   [SNI]      Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,

   [TLS12]    Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,

   [TLS13]    Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23 (work in progress),
              January 2018.

5.2.  Informative References

   [DoH]      Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS",
              draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-02 (work in progress),
              November 2017.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

              Huitema, C. and E. Rescorla, "SNI Encryption in TLS
              Through Tunneling", draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption-00 (work
              in progress), August 2017.

5.3.  URIs

   [1] http://www.iana.org/assignments/http-alt-svc-parameters

Appendix A.  Acknowledgements

   Conversations with Benjamin Schwartz helped to flesh out this idea.

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Author's Address

   Mike Bishop

   Email: mbishop@evequefou.be

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