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Versions: 00 01 02

ConEx                                                         B. Briscoe
Internet-Draft                                                        BT
Intended status: Informational                              M. Sridharan
Expires: August 18, 2014                                       Microsoft
                                                       February 14, 2014


Network Performance Isolation in Data Centres using Congestion Policing
                   draft-briscoe-conex-data-centre-02

Abstract

   This document describes how a multi-tenant (or multi-department) data
   centre operator can isolate tenants from network performance
   degradation due to each other's usage, but without losing the
   multiplexing benefits of a LAN-style network where anyone can use any
   amount of any resource.  Zero per-tenant configuration and no
   implementation change is required on network equipment.  Instead the
   solution is implemented with a simple change to the hypervisor (or
   container) beneath the tenant's virtual machines on every physical
   server connected to the network.  These collectively enforce a very
   simple distributed contract - a single network allowance that each
   tenant can allocate among their virtual machines, even if distributed
   around the network.  The solution uses layer-3 switches that support
   explicit congestion notification (ECN).  It is best if the sending
   operating system supports congestion exposure (ConEx).  Nonetheless,
   the operator can unilaterally deploy a complete solution while
   operating systems are being incrementally upgraded to support ConEx
   and ECN.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 18, 2014.

Copyright Notice



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   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Features of the Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Outline Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Performance Isolation: Intuition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.1.  Performance Isolation: The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     4.2.  Why Congestion Policing Works  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   5.  Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     5.1.  Trustworthy Congestion Signals at Ingress  . . . . . . . . 13
       5.1.1.  Tunnel Feedback vs. ConEx  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       5.1.2.  ECN Recommended  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       5.1.3.  Summary: Trustworthy Congestion Signals at Ingress . . 15
     5.2.  Switch/Router Support  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     5.3.  Congestion Policing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     5.4.  Distributed Token Buckets  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   6.  Incremental Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     6.1.  Migration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
     6.2.  Evolution  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   7.  Related Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   9.  IANA Considerations (to be removed by RFC Editor)  . . . . . . 21
   10. Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   11. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   12. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
   Appendix A.  Summary of Changes between Drafts (to be removed
                by RFC Editor)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23











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1.  Introduction

   A number of companies offer hosting of virtual machines on their data
   centre infrastructure--so-called infrastructure as a service (IaaS)
   or 'cloud computing'.  A set amount of processing power, memory,
   storage and network are offered.  Although processing power, memory
   and storage are relatively simple to allocate on the 'pay as you go'
   basis that has become common, the network is less easy to allocate,
   given it is a naturally distributed system.

   This document describes how a data centre infrastructure provider can
   offer isolated network performance to each tenant by deploying
   congestion policing at every ingress to the data centre network, e.g.
   in all the hypervisors (or containers).  The data packets pick up
   congestion information as they traverse the network, which is brought
   to the ingress using one of two approaches: feedback tunnels or ConEx
   (or a mix of the two).  Then, these ingress congestion policers have
   sufficient information to limit the amount of congestion any tenant
   can cause anywhere in the whole meshed pool of data centre network
   resources.  This isolates the network performance experienced by each
   tenant from the behaviour of all the others, without any tenant-
   related configuration on any of the switches.

   _How _it works is very simple and quick to describe. _Why_ this
   approach provides performance isolation may be more difficult to
   grasp.  In particular, why it provides performance isolation across a
   network of links, even though there is no isolation mechanism in each
   link.  Essentially, rather than limiting how much traffic can go
   where, traffic is allowed anywhere and the policer finds out whenever
   and wherever any traffic causes a small amount of congestion so that
   it can prevent heavier congestion.

   This document explains how it works, while a companion document
   [conex-policing] builds up an intuition for why it works.
   Nonetheless to make this document self-contained, brief summaries of
   both the 'how' and the 'why' are given in sections 3 & 4.  Then
   Section 5 gives details of the design and Section 6 explains the
   aspects of the design that enable incremental deployment.  Finally
   Section 7 introduces other attempts to solve the network performance
   isolation problem and why they fall down in various ways.

   The solution would also be just as applicable to isolate the network
   performance of different departments within the private data centre
   of an enterprise, which could be implemented without virtualisation.
   However, it will be described as a multi-tenant scenario, which is
   the more difficult case from a security point of view.





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2.  Features of the Solution

   The following goals are met by the design, each of which is explained
   subsequently:

   o  Performance isolation

   o  No loss of LAN-like openness and multiplexing benefits

   o  Zero tenant-related switch configuration

   o  No change to existing switch implementations

   o  Weighted performance differentiation

   o  Ultra-Simple contract--per-tenant network-wide allowance

   o  Sender constraint, but with transferrable allowance

   o  Transport-agnostic

   o  Extensible to wide-area and inter-data-centre interconnection

   o  Doesn't require traffic classes, or manages traffic within each
      class

   Performance Isolation with Openness of a LAN:  The primary goal is to
      ensure that each tenant of a data centre receives a minimum
      assured performance from the whole network resource pool, but
      without losing the efficiency savings from multiplexed use of
      shared infrastructure (work-conserving).  There is no need for
      partitioning or reservation of network resources.

   Zero Tenant-Related Switch Configuration:  Performance isolation is
      achieved with no per-tenant configuration of switches.  All switch
      resources are potentially available to all tenants.

      Separately, _forwarding_ isolation may (or may not) be configured
      to ensure one tenant cannot receive traffic from another's virtual
      network.  However, _performance_ isolation is kept completely
      orthogonal, and adds nothing to the configuration complexity of
      the network.

   No New Switch Implementation:  Straightforward commodity switches (or
      routers) are sufficient.  Bulk explicit congestion notification
      (ECN) is recommended, which is available in a growing range of
      layer-3 switches (a layer-3 switch does switching at layer-2, but
      it can use the Diffserv and ECN fields for traffic control if it



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      can find an IP header).

   Weighted Performance Differentiation:  A tenant gets network
      performance in proportion to their allowance when constrained by
      others, with no constraint otherwise.  Importantly, this assurance
      is not just instantaneous, but over time.  And the assurance is
      not just localised to each link but network-wide.  This will be
      explained later with reference to the numerical examples in
      [conex-policing].

   Ultra-Simple Contract:  The tenant needs to decide only two things:
      The peak bit-rate connecting each virtual machine to the network
      (as today) and an overall 'usage' allowance.  This document
      focuses on the latter.  A tenant just decides one number for this
      contracted allowance that can be shared between all the tenant's
      virtual machines (VMs).  The 'usage' allowance is a measure of
      congestion-bit-rate, which will be explained later, but most
      tenants will just think of it as a number, where more is better.

   Multi-machine:  A tenant operating multiple VMs has no need to decide
      in advance which VMs will need more allowance and which less--an
      automated process can allocate the allowance across the VMs,
      shifting more to those that need it most, as they use it.
      Therefore, performance cannot be constrained by poor choice of
      allocations between VMs, removing a whole dimension from the
      problem that tenants face when choosing their traffic contract.
      The allocation process can be operated by the tenant, or provided
      by the data centre operator as part of an enhanced platform to
      complement the basic infrastructure (platform as a service or
      PaaS).

   Sender Constraint with transferrable allowance:  By default,
      constraints are always placed on data senders, determined by the
      sending party's traffic contract.  Nonetheless, if the receiving
      party (or any other party) wishes to enhance performance it can
      arrange this with the sender at the expense of its own sending
      allowance.

      For instance, when a VM sends data to a storage facility the
      tenant that owns the VM consumes as much of their allowance as
      necessary to achieve the desired sending performance.  But by
      default when that tenant later retrieves data from storage, the
      storage facility is the sender, so the storage facility consumes
      its allowance to determine performance in the reverse direction.
      Nonetheless, during the retrieval request, the storage facility
      can require that its sending 'costs' are covered by the receiving
      VM's allowance.  The design of this feature is beyond the scope of
      this document, but the system provides all the hooks to build it



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      at the application (or transport) layer.

   Transport-Agnostic:  In a well-provisioned network, enforcement of
      performance isolation rarely introduces constraints on network
      behaviour.  However, it continually counts how much each tenant is
      limiting the performance of others, and it will intervene to
      enforce performance isolation against only those tenants who most
      persistently constrain others.  By default, this intervention is
      oblivious to flows and to the protocols and algorithms being used
      above the IP layer.  However, flow-aware or application-aware
      prioritisation can be built on top, either by the tenant or by the
      data centre operator as a complementary PaaS facility.

   Interconnection:  The solution is designed so that interconnected
      networks can ensure each is accountable for the performance
      degradation it contributes to in other networks.  If necessary,
      one network has the information to intervene at its ingress to
      limit traffic from another network that is degrading performance.
      Alternatively, with the proposed protocols, networks can see
      sufficient information in traffic arriving at their borders to
      give their neighbours financial incentives to limit the traffic
      themselves.

      The present document focuses on a single provider-scenario, but
      evolution to interconnection with other data centres over wide-
      area networks, and interconnection with access networks is briefly
      discussed in Section 6.2.

   Intra-class:  The solution does not need traffic to have been
      classified into classes.  Or if traffic is divided into classes,
      it manages contention for the resources of each class,
      independently of any scheduling between classes.



















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3.  Outline Design

              virtual     hypervisors   hosts        switches
              machines

          V11 V12     V1m +--------+                         __/
          *   * ...   *   |  ____  |  H1 ,-.__________+--+__/
           \___\__   __\__|__\T1/__|____/`-'       __-|S1|____,--
                          |  /__\  |        `. _ ,' ,'|  |_______
                  .       +--------|  H2 ,-._,`.  ,'  +--+
                  .                    . `-'._  `.
                  .       +--------+   .      `,' `.
                          |  ____  |   .     ,' `-. `.+--+_______
          Vn1 Vn2     Vnm | _\T1/_ |        /      `-_|S2|____
          *   * ...   *   |/ /__\ \|  Hn ,-.__________|  |__  `--
           \___\__   __\__/policers\____/`-'          +--+  \__
                          \  ____  /                           \
                          |\_\T2/_/|
                          |  /__\  |
                          +--------+

      The two (or more) policers associated with tenant T1 act as one
                             logical policer.

            Figure 1: Edge Policing and the Hose Traffic Model

   Edge policing:  Traffic policing is located at the policy enforcement
      point where each sending host connects to the network, typically
      beneath the tenant's operating system in the hypervisor controlled
      by the infrastructure operator (Figure 1).  In this respect, the
      approach has a similar arrangement to the Diffserv architecture
      with traffic policers forming a ring around the network [RFC2475].

   (Multi-)Hose model:  Each policer controls all traffic from the set
      of VMs associated with each tenant without regard to destination,
      similar to the Diffserv 'hose' model.  If the tenant has VMs
      spread across multiple physical hosts, they are all constrained by
      one logical policer that feeds tokens to individual sub-policers
      within each hypervisor on each physical host (e.g. the two
      policers associated with tenant T1 in Figure 1).  In other words,
      the network is treated as one resource pool.

   Congestion policing:  A congestion policer is very similar to a
      traditional bit-rate policer.  A classifier associates each packet
      with the relevant tenant's meter to drain tokens from the
      associated token bucket, while at the same time the bucket fills
      with tokens at the tenant's contracted rate (Figure 2).




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      However, unlike a traditional policer, the tokens in a congestion
      policer represent congested bits (i.e. discarded or ECN-marked
      bits), not just any bits.  So, the bits in ECN-marked packets in
      Figure 2 count as congested bits, while all other bits don't drain
      anything from the token bucket--unmarked packets are invisible to
      the meter.  And a tenant's contracted fill rate (wi for tenant Ti
      in Figure 2) is only the rate of congested bits, not all bits.
      Then if, on average, any tenant tries to cause more congestion
      than their allowance, the policer will focus discards on that
      tenant's traffic to prevent any further increase in congestion for
      everyone else.

      The detail design section describes how congestion policers at the
      network ingress know the congestion that each packet will
      encounter in the network, as well as how the congestion policer
      limits both peak and average rates of congestion.

                                                 ______________________
                     |          |          |    | Legend               |
                     |w1        |w2        |wi  |                      |
                     |          |          |    | [_] [_]packet stream |
                     V          V          V    |                      |
       congestion    .          .          .    | [*]    marked packet |
       token bucket| . |      | . |    __|___|  | ___                  |
                 __|___|      | . |   |  |:::|  | \ /    policer       |
                |  |:::|    __|___|   |  |:::|  | /_\                  |
                |  +---+   |  +---+   |  +---+  |                      |
   bucket depth |    :     |    :     |    :    | /\     marking meter |
   controls the |    .     |    :     |    .    | \/                   |
      policer  _V_   .     |    :     |    .    |______________________|
           ____\ /__/\___________________________             downstream
          /[*] /_\  \/ [_] |    : [_] |    : [_] \            /->network
   class-/                 |    .     |    .      \          /    /--->
   ifier/T1               _V_   .     |    .       \        /    /
  __,--.__________________\ /__/\___________________\______/____/ loss
    `--' T2   [*]  [_] [_]/_\  \/ [_] |    .  [*]   /      \    \-X--->
        \                             |    .       /        \-->
         \Ti                         _V_   :      /          \  loss
          \__________________________\ /__/\_____/            \-X--->
           [_]   [*]  [_] [*] [_]    /_\  \/ [_]

                Figure 2: Bulk Congestion Policer Schematic

   Optional Per-Flow policing:  A congestion policer could be designed
      to focus policing on the particular data flow(s) contributing most
      to the excess congestion-bit-rate.  However bulk per-tenant
      congestion policing is sufficient to protect other tenants, then
      each tenant can choose per-flow policing if it wants.



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   FIFO forwarding:  If scheduling by traffic class is used in network
      buffers (for whatever reason), congestion policing can be used to
      isolate tenants from each other within each class.  However,
      congestion policing will tend to keep queues short, therefore it
      is more likely that simple first-in first-out (FIFO) will be
      sufficient, with no need for any priority scheduling.

   ECN marking recommended:  All queues that might become congested
      should support bulk ECN marking.  For any non-ECN-capable flows or
      packets, the solution enables ECN universally in the outer IP
      header of an edge-to-edge tunnel.  It can use the edge-to-edge
      tunnel created by one of the network virtualisation overlay
      approaches, e.g. [nvgre, vxlan].

   In the proposed approach, the network operator deploys capacity as
   usual--using previous experience to determine a reasonable contention
   ratio at every tier of the network.  Then, the tenant contracts with
   the operator for the rate at which their congestion policer will
   allow them to contribute to congestion. [conex-policing] explains how
   the operator or tenant would determine an appropriate allowance.

4.  Performance Isolation: Intuition

4.1.  Performance Isolation: The Problem

   Network performance isolation traditionally meant that each user
   could be sure of a minimum guaranteed bit-rate.  Such assurances are
   useful if traffic from each tenant follows relatively predictable
   paths and is fairly constant.  If traffic demand is more dynamic and
   unpredictable (both over time and across paths), minimum bit-rate
   assurances can still be given, but they have to be very small
   relative to the available capacity, because a large number of users
   might all want to simulataneously share any one link, even though
   they rarely all use it at the same time.

   This either means the shared capacity has to be greatly overprovided
   so that the assured level is large enough, or the assured level has
   to be small.  The former is unnecessarily expensive; the latter
   doesn't really give a sufficiently useful assurance.

   Round robin or fair queuing are other forms of isolation that
   guarantee that each user will get 1/N of the capacity of each link,
   where N is the number of active users at each link.  This is fine if
   the number of active users (N) sharing a link is fairly predictable.
   However, if large numbers of tenants do not typically share any one
   link but at any time they all could (as in a data centre), a 1/N
   assurance is fairly worthless.  Again, given N is typically small but
   could be very large, either the shared capacity has to be expensively



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   overprovided, or the assured bit-rate has to be worthlessly small.
   The argument is no different for the weighted forms of these
   algorithms: WRR & WFQ).

   Both these traditional forms of isolation try to give one tenant
   assured instantaneous bit-rate by constraining the instantaneous bit-
   rate of everyone else.  This approach is flawed except in the special
   case when the load from every tenant on every link is continuous and
   fairly constant.  The reality is usually very different: sources are
   on-off and the route taken varies, so that on any one link a source
   is more often off than on.

      In these more realistic (non-constant) scenarios, the capacity
      available for any one tenant depends much more on _how often_
      everyone else uses a link, not just _how much_ bit-rate everyone
      else would be entitled to if they did use it.

   For instance, if 100 tenants are using a 1Gb/s link for 1% of the
   time, there is a good chance each will get the full 1Gb/s link
   capacity.  But if just six of those tenants suddenly start using the
   link 50% of the time, whenever the other 94 tenants need the link,
   they will typically find 3 of these heavier tenants using it already.
   If a 1/N approach like round-robin were used, then the light tenants
   would suddently get 1/4 * 1Gb/s = 250Mb/s on average.  Round-robin
   cannot claim to isolate tenants from each other if they usually get
   1Gb/s but sometimes they get 250Mb/s (and only 10Mb/s guaranteed in
   the worst case when all 100 tenants are active).

   In contrast, congestion policing is the key to network performance
   isolation because it focuses policing only on those tenants that go
   fast over congested path(s) excessively and persistently over time.
   This keeps congestion below a design threshold everywhere so that
   everyone else can go fast.  In this way, congestion policing takes
   account of highly variable loads (varying in time and varying across
   routes).  And, if everyone's load happens to be constant, congestion
   policing converges on the same outcome as the traditional forms of
   isolation.

   The other flaw in the traditional approaches to isolation, like WRR &
   WFQ, is that they actually prevent long-running flows from yielding
   to brief bursts from lighter tenants.  A long-running flow can yield
   to brief flows and still complete nearly as soon as it would have
   otherwise (the brief flows complete sooner, freeing up the capacity
   for the longer flow sooner).  However, WRR & WFQ prevent flows from
   even seeing the congestion signals that would allow them to co-
   ordinate between themselves, because they isolate each tenant
   completely into separate queues.




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   In summary, superficially, traditional approaches with separate
   queues sound good for isolation, but:

   1.  not when everyone's load is variable, so each tenant has no
       assurance about how many other queues there will be;

   2.  and not when each tenant can no longer even see the congestion
       signals from other tenants, so no-one's control algorithms can
       determine whether they would benefit most by pushing harder or
       yielding.

4.2.  Why Congestion Policing Works

   [conex-policing] explains why congestion policing works using
   numerical examples from a data centre and schematic traffic plots (in
   ASCII art).  The bullets below provide a summary of that explanation,
   which builds from the simple case of long-running flows through a
   single link up to a full meshed network with on-off flows of
   different sizes and different behaviours:

   o  Starting with the simple case of long-running flows focused on a
      single bottleneck link, tenants get weighted shares of the link,
      much like weighted round robin, but with no mechanism in any of
      the links.  This is because losses (or ECN marks) are random, so
      if one tenant sends twice as much bit-rate it will suffer twice as
      many lost bits (or ECN-marked bits).  So, at least for constant
      long-running flows, regulating congestion-bits gives the same
      outcome as regulating bits;

   o  In the more realistic case where flows are not all long-running
      but a mix of short to very long, it is explained that bit-rate is
      not a sufficient metric for isolating performance; how _often_ a
      tenant is sending (or not sending) is the significant factor for
      performance isolation, not whether bit-rate is shared equally
      whenever a source happens to be sending;

   o  Although it might seem that data volume would be a good measure of
      how often a tenant is sending, we then show why it is not.  For
      instance, a tenant can send a large volume of data but hardly
      affect the performance of others -- by being more responsive to
      congestion.  Using congestion-volume (congestion-bit-rate over
      time) in a policer encourages large data senders to be more
      responsive (to yield), giving other tenants much higher
      performance while hardly affecting their own performance.
      Whereas, using straight volume as an allocation metric provides no
      distinction between high volume sources that yield and high volume
      sources that do not yield (the widespread behaviour today);




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   o  We then show that a policer based on the congestion-bit-rate
      metric works across a network of links treating it as a pool of
      capacity, whereas other approaches treat each link independently,
      which is why the proposed approach requires none of the
      configuration complexity on switches that is involved in other
      approaches.

   o  We also show that a congestion policer can be arranged to limit
      bursts of congestion from sources that focus traffic onto a single
      link, even where one source may consist of a large aggregate of
      sources.

   o  We show that a congestion policer rewards traffic that shifts to
      less congested paths (e.g. multipath TCP or virtual machine
      motion).  This means congestion policing encourages and ultimately
      forces end-systems to balance their load over the whole pool of
      bandwidth.  The network can attempt to balance the load, but bulk
      congestion policing is particularly designed to encourage end-
      systems to do the job, either at the transport layer with
      multipath TCP [RFC6356] or at the application layer by moving
      virtual machines or choosing peer virtual machines in a similar
      way to BitTorrent.

   o  We show that congestion policing works on the pool of links,
      irrespective of whether individual links have significantly
      different capacities.

   o  We show that a congestion policer allows a wide variety of
      responses to congestion (e.g.  New Reno TCP, Cubic TCP, Compound
      TCP, Data Centre TCP and even unresponsive UDP traffic), while
      still encouraging and enforcing a sufficient response to
      congestion from all sources taken together.

   o  Congestion policing can and will enforce a congestion response if
      a tenant persistently causes excessive congestion.  This ensures
      that each tenant's minimum performance is isolated from the
      combined effects of everyone else.  However, the purpose of
      congestion policing is not to intervene in everyone's rate control
      all the time.  Rather it is encourage each tenant to avoid being
      policed -- to keep the aggregate of all their flows' responses to
      congestion within an overall envelope and balanced across the
      network.

   [conex-policing] also includes a section that gives guidance on how
   to estimate appropriate fill rates and sizes for congestion token
   buckets.





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5.  Design

   The design involves the following elements, each detailed in the
   following subsections:

   1.  Trustworthy Congestion Signals at Ingress

   2.  Switch/Router Support

   3.  Congestion Policing

   4.  Distributed Token Buckets

5.1.  Trustworthy Congestion Signals at Ingress
   ,---------.                                               ,---------.
   |Transport|                                               |Transport|
   | Sender  |   .                                           |Receiver |
   |         |  /|___________________________________________|         |
   |     ,-<---------------Congestion-Feedback-Signals--<--------.     |
   |     |   |/                                              |   |     |
   |     |   |\           Transport Layer Feedback Flow      |   |     |
   |     |   | \  ___________________________________________|   |     |
   |     |   |  \|                                           |   |     |
   |     |   |   '         ,-----------.               .     |   |     |
   |     |   |_____________|           |_______________|\    |   |     |
   |     |   |    IP Layer |           |  Data Flow      \   |   |     |
   |     |   |             |(Congested)|           ,-----.\  |   |     |
   |     |   |             |  Network  |--Congestion-Signals--->-'     |
   |     |   |             |  Device   |           |     |  \|         |
   |     |   |             |           |           |Audit|  /|         |
   |     `----------->--(new)-IP-Layer-ConEx-Signals-------->|         |
   |         |             |           |           `-----'/  |         |
   |         |_____________|           |_______________  /   |         |
   |         |             |           |               |/    |         |
   `---------'             `-----------'               '     `---------'

         Figure 3: The ConEx Protocol in the Internet Architecture

   The operator of the data centre infrastructure needs to trust this
   information, therefore it cannot just use the feedback in the end-to-
   end transport (e.g.  TCP SACK or ECN echo congestion experienced
   flags) that might anyway be encrypted.  Trusted congestion feedback
   may be implemented in either of the following two ways:

   a.  Either as a shim in both sending and receiving hypervisors using
       an edge-to-edge (host-host) tunnel controlled by the
       infrastructure operator, with feedback messages reporting
       congestion back to the sending host's hypervisor (in addition to



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       the e2e feedback at the transport layer).

   b.  Or in the sending operating system using the congestion exposure
       protocol (ConEx [ConEx-Abstract-Mech]) with a ConEx audit
       function at the egress edge to check ConEx signals against actual
       congestion signals (Figure 3);

5.1.1.  Tunnel Feedback vs. ConEx

   The feedback tunnel approach (a) is inefficient because it duplicates
   end-to-end feedback and it introduces at least a round trip's delay,
   whereas the ConEx approach (b) is more efficient and not delayed,
   because ConEx packets signal a conservative estimate of congestion in
   the upcoming round trip.  Avoiding feedback delay is important for
   controlling congestion from aggregated short flows.  However, ConEx
   signals will not necessarily be supported by the sending operating
   system.

   Therefore, given ConEx IP packets are self-identifying, the best
   approach is to rely on ConEx signals when present and fill in with
   tunnelled feedback when not, on a packet-by-packet basis.

5.1.2.  ECN Recommended

   Both approaches are much easier if explicit congestion notification
   (ECN [RFC3168]) is enabled on network switches and if all packets are
   ECN-capable.  For non-ECN-capable packets, ECN support can be turned
   on in the outer of an edge-to-edge tunnel.  The reasons that ECN
   helps in each case are:

   a.  Tunnel Feeback: To feed back congestion signals, the tunnel
       egress needs to be able to detect forward congestion signals in
       the first place.  If the only symptom of congestion is dropped
       packets, the egress has to watch for gaps in the sequence space
       of the transport protocol, which cannot be guaranteed to be
       possible--the IP payload may be encrypted, or an unknown
       protocol, or parts of the flow may be sent over diverse paths.
       The tunnel ingress could add its own sequence numbers (as done by
       some pseudowire protocols), but it is easier to simply turn on
       ECN at the ingress so that the egress can detect ECN markings.

   b.  ConEx: The audit function needs to be able to compare ConEx
       signals with actual congestion.  So, as before, it needs to be
       able to detect congestion at the egress.  Therefore the same
       arguments for ECN apply.






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5.1.3.  Summary: Trustworthy Congestion Signals at Ingress

   The above cases can be arranged in a 2x2 matrix, to show when edge-
   to-edge tunnelling is needed and what function the tunnel would need
   to serve:

   +----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+
   | ConEx-capable? | ECN-capable: Y | ECN-capable: N                  |
   +----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+
   | Y              | No tunnel      | ECN-enabled tunnel              |
   |                | needed         |                                 |
   | N              | Tunnel         | ECN-enabled tunnel + Tunnel     |
   |                | Feedback       | feedback                        |
   +----------------+----------------+---------------------------------+

   We can now summarise the steps necessary to ensure an ingress
   congestion policer obtains trustworthy congestion signals:

   1.  Sending operating system:

       1.  The sender SHOULD send ConEx-enabled and ECN-enabled packets
           whenever possible.

       2.  If the sender uses IPv6 it can signal ConEx in a destination
           option header [conex-destopt].

       3.  If the sender uses IPv4, it can signal ConEx markings by
           encoding them within the packet ID field as proposed in
           [ipv4-id-reuse].

   2.  Ingress edge:

       1.  If an arriving packet is either not ConEx-capable or not ECN-
           capable it SHOULD be tunnelled to the appropriate egress edge
           in an outer IP header.

       2.  A pre-existing edge-to-edge tunnel (e.g. [nvgre, vxlan]) can
           be used, irrespective of whether the packet is not ConEx-
           capable or not ECN-capable.

       3.  Incoming ConEx signals MUST be copied to the outer.  For an
           incoming IPv4 packet, this implies copying the ID field.  For
           an incoming IPv6 packet, this implies copying the Destination
           Option header.

       4.  In all cases, the tunnel ingress MUST use the normal mode of
           ECN tunnelling [RFC6040].




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   3.  Directly after encapsulation (but not if the packet was not
       encapsulated):

       1.  If and only if the ECN field of the outer header is not ECN-
           capable (Not-ECT i.e. 00) it MUST be made ECN-capable by
           remarking it to ECT(0), i.e. 01.

       2.  If the outer ECN field carries any other value than 00, it
           should be left unchanged.

   4.  Directly before the edge egress (irrespective of whether the
       packet is encapsulated):

       1.  If the outer IP header is ConEx-capable, it MUST be passed
           through a ConEx audit function

       2.  If the packet is not ConEx-capable, it MUST be passed to a
           function that feeds back ECN marking statistics to the tunnel
           ingress.  Such a function is also a requirement of
           [tunnel-cong-exp], which may be re-usable for this purpose
           {ToDo: to be confirmed}.

   5.  Egress Edge Decapsulator:

       1.  Decapsulation must comply with [RFC6040].  This ensures that,
           a congestion experienced marking (CE or 11) on the outer will
           lead to the packet being dropped if the inner indicates that
           the endpoints will not understand ECN (i.e. the inner ECN
           field is Not-ECT or 00).  Effectively the egress edge drops
           such packets on behalf of the congested upstream buffer that
           marked it because the packet appeared to be ECN-capable on
           the outside, but it is not ECN-capable on this inside.
           [RFC6040] was deliberately arranged like this so that it
           would drop such packets to give an equivalent congestion
           signal to the end-to-end transport.

5.2.  Switch/Router Support

   Network switches/routers do not need any modification.  However, both
   congestion detection by the tunnel (approach a) and ConEx audit
   (approach b) are significantly easier if switches support ECN.

   Once switches support ECN, Data centre TCP [DCTCP] could optionally
   be used (DCTCP requires ECN).  It also requires modified sender and
   receiver TCP algorithms as well as a more aggressive configuration of
   the active queue management (AQM) in the L3 switches or routers.





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5.3.  Congestion Policing

   Innovation in the design of congestion policers is expected and
   encouraged, but here we wlil describe one specific design to be
   concrete.

   A bulk congestion policing function would most likely be implemented
   as a shim in the hypervisor.  The hypervisor would create one
   instance of a bulk congestion policer per tenant on the physical
   machine, and it would ensure that all traffic sent by that tenant's
   VMs into the network would pass through the relevant congestion
   policer by associating every new virtual machine with the relevant
   policer.

   A bulk congestion policing function has already been outlined in
   Section 3.  To recap, it consists of a token bucket that is filled
   with congestion tokens at a constant rate.  The bucket is drained by
   the size of every packet that carries a congestion marking.  If the
   tunnel-feedback approach (a) were used, the bucket would be drained
   by congestion feedback from the tunnel egress, rather than markings
   on packets.  If the ConEx approach (b) were used, the bucket would be
   drained by ConEx markings on the actual data packets being forwarded.
   A congestion policer will need to drain in response to either form of
   signal, because it is recommended that both approaches are used in
   combination.

   Various more sophisticated congestion policer designs have been
   evaluated [CPolTrilogyExp].  In these experiments, it was found that
   it is better if the policer gradually increases discards as the
   bucket becomes empty.  Also isolation between tenants is better if
   each tenant is policed based on the combination of two buckets, not
   one (Figure 4):

   1.  A deep bucket (that would take minutes or even hours to fill at
       the contracted fill-rate) that constrains the tenant's long-term
       average rate of congestion (wi)

   2.  a very shallow bucket (e.g. only two or three MTU) that is filled
       considerably faster than the deep bucket (c * wi), where c = ~10,
       which prevents a tenant storing up a large backlog of tokens then
       causing congestion in one large burst.

   In this arrangement each marked packet drains tokens from both
   buckets, and the probability of policer discard is taken as the worse
   of the two buckets.






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                                |         |
     Legend:                    |c*wi     |wi
     See previous figure        V         V
                                .         .
                                .       | . | deep bucket
                _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ |___|
               |                .       |:::|
               |_ _ _ _ _ _ _ |___|     |:::|
               |      shallow +---+     +---+
   worse of the|       bucket
    two buckets|               \____   ____/
       triggers|                    \ / both buckets
      policing V                     :  drained by
              ___                    .  marked packets
   ___________\ /___________________/ \__________________
      [_] [_] /_\   [_]  [*]   [_]  \ /  [_]  [_]   [_]


      Figure 4: Dual Congestion Token Bucket (in place of each single
                      bucket in the previous figure)

   While the data centre network operator only needs to police
   congestion in bulk, tenants may wish to enforce their own limits on
   individual users or applications, as sub-limits of their overall
   allowance.  Given all the information used for policing is readily
   available within the transport layer of their own operating system.
   Tenants can readily apply any such per-flow, per-user or per-
   application limitations.  The tenant may operate their own fine-
   grained policing software, or such detailed control capabilities may
   be offered as part of the platform (platform as a service or PaaS).

5.4.  Distributed Token Buckets

   A customer may run virtual machines on multiple physical nodes, in
   which case at the time each VM is instantiated the data centre
   operator will deploy a congestion policer in the hypervisor on each
   node where the customer is running a VM.The DC operator can arrange
   for these congestion policers to collectively enforce the per-
   customer congestion allowance, as a distributed policer.

   A function to distribute a customer's tokens to the policer
   associated with each of the customer's VMs would be needed.  This
   could be similar to the distributed rate limiting of [DRL], which
   uses a gossip-like protocol to fill the sub-buckets.  Alternatively,
   a logically centralised bucket of congestion tokens could be used. it
   could be replicated for reliability then there could be simple 1-1
   communication between the central bucket and each local token bucket.




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   Importantly, congestion tokens can be freely reassigned between
   different VMs, because a congestion token is equivalent at any place
   or time in a network.  In contrast, traditional bit-rate tokens
   cannot simply be reassigned from one VM to another without
   implications on the balance of network loading.  This is because the
   parameters used for bit-rate policing depend on the topology and its
   capacity planning (open loop), whereas congestion policing
   complements the closed loop congestion avoidance system that adapts
   to the prevailing traffic and topology.

   As well as distribution of tokens between the VMs of a tenant, it
   would similarly be feasible to allow transfer of tokens between
   tenants, also without breaking the performance isolation properties
   of the system.  Secure token transfer mechanisms could be built above
   the underlying policing design described here, but that is beyond the
   current scope and therefore deferred to future work.

6.  Incremental Deployment

6.1.  Migration

   A mechanism to bring trustworthy congestion signals to the ingress
   (Section 5.1) is critical to this performance isolation solution.
   Section 5.1.1 compares the two solutions: b) ConEx, which is
   efficient and it's timely enough to police short flows; and a)
   tunnel-feedback, which is neither.  However, ConEx requires
   deployment in host operating systems first, while tunnel feedback can
   be deployed unilaterally by the data centre operator in all
   hypervisors (or containers), without requiring support in guest
   operating systems.

   The section describes the steps necessary to support both approaches.
   This would provide an incremental deployment route with the best of
   both worlds: tunnel feedback could be deployed initially for
   unmodified guest OSs despite its weaknesses, and ConEx could
   gradually take over as it was deployed more widely in guest OSs.  It
   is important not to deploy the tunnel feedback approach without
   checking for ConEx-capable packets, otherwise it will never be
   possible to migrate to ConEx.  The advantages of being able to
   migrate to ConEx are:

   o  no duplicate feedback channel between hypervisors (sending and
      forwarding a large proportion of tiny packets), which would cause
      considerable packet processing overhead

   o  performance isolation includes the contribution to congestion from
      short (sub-round-trip-time) flows




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6.2.  Evolution

   Initially, the approach would be confined to intra-data centre
   traffic.  With the addition of ECN support on network equipment (at
   least bottleneck access routers) in the WAN between data centres, it
   could straightforwardly be extended to inter-data centre scenarios,
   including across interconnected backbone networks.

   Once this approach becomes deployed within data centres and possibly
   across interconnects between data centres and enterprise LANs, the
   necessary support will be implemented in a wide range of equipment
   used in these scenarios.  Similar equipment is also used in other
   networks (e.g. broadband access and backhaul), so that it would start
   to be possible for these other networks to deploy a similar approach.

7.  Related Approaches

   The Related Work section of [CongPol] provides a useful comparison of
   the approach proposed here against other attempts to solve similar
   problems.

   When the hose model is used with Diffserv, capacity has to be
   considerably over-provisioned for all the unfortunate cases when
   multiple sources of traffic happen to coincide even though they are
   all in-contract at their respective ingress policers.  Even so, every
   node within a Diffserv network also has to be configured to limit
   higher traffic classes to a maximum rate in case of really unusual
   traffic distributions that would starve lower priority classes.
   Therefore, for really important performance assurances, Diffserv is
   used in the 'pipe' model where the policer constrains traffic
   separately for each destination, and sufficient capacity is provided
   at each network node for the sum of all the peak contracted rates for
   paths crossing that node.

   In contrast, the congestion policing approach is designed to give
   full performance assurances across a meshed network (the hose model),
   without having to divide a network up into pipes.  If an unexpected
   distribution of traffic from all sources focuses on a congestion
   hotspot, it will increase the congestion-bit-rate seen by the
   policers of all sources contributing to the hot-spot.  The congestion
   policers then focus on these sources, which in turn limits the
   severity of the hot-spot.

   The critical improvement over Diffserv is that the ingress edges
   receive information about any congestion occuring in the middle, so
   they can limit how much congestion occurs, wherever it happens to
   occur.  Previously Diffserv edge policers had to limit traffic
   generally in case it caused congestion, because they never knew



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   whether it would (open loop control).

   Congestion policing mechanisms could be used to assure the
   performance of one data flow (the 'pipe' model), but this would
   involve unnecessary complexity, given the approach works well for the
   'hose' model.

   Therefore, congestion policing allows capacity to be provisioned for
   the average case, not for the near-worst case when many unlikely
   cases coincide.  It assures performance for all traffic using just
   one traffic class, whereas Diffserv only assures performance for a
   small proportion of traffic by partitioning it off into higher
   priority classes and over-provisioning relative to the traffic
   contracts sold for for this class.

   {ToDo: Refer to [conex-policing] for comparison with WRR & WFQ}

   Seawall {ToDo} [Seawall]

8.  Security Considerations

   {ToDo}

9.  IANA Considerations (to be removed by RFC Editor)

   This document does not require actions by IANA.

10.  Conclusions

   {ToDo}

11.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Yu-Shun Wang for comments on some of the practicalities.

   Bob Briscoe is part-funded by the European Community under its
   Seventh Framework Programme through the Trilogy 2 project (ICT-
   317756).  The views expressed here are solely those of the author.

12.  Informative References

   [CPolTrilogyExp]       Raiciu, C., Ed., "Progress on resource
                          control", Trilogy EU 7th Framework Project
                          ICT-216372 Deliverable 9, December 2009, <http
                          ://trilogy-project.org/publications/
                          deliverables.html>.

   [ConEx-Abstract-Mech]  Mathis, M. and B. Briscoe, "Congestion



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                          Exposure (ConEx) Concepts and Abstract
                          Mechanism", draft-ietf-conex-abstract-mech-08
                          (work in progress), October 2013.

   [CongPol]              Jacquet, A., Briscoe, B., and T. Moncaster,
                          "Policing Freedom to Use the Internet Resource
                          Pool", Proc ACM Workshop on Re-Architecting
                          the Internet (ReArch'08) , December 2008,
                          <http://bobbriscoe.net/projects/
                          refb/#polfree>.

   [DCTCP]                Alizadeh, M., Greenberg, A., Maltz, D.,
                          Padhye, J., Patel, P., Prabhakar, B.,
                          Sengupta, S., and M. Sridharan, "Data Center
                          TCP (DCTCP)", ACM SIGCOMM CCR 40(4)63--74,
                          October 2010, <http://portal.acm.org/
                          citation.cfm?id=1851192>.

   [DRL]                  Raghavan, B., Vishwanath, K., Ramabhadran, S.,
                          Yocum, K., and A. Snoeren, "Cloud control with
                          distributed rate limiting", ACM SIGCOMM
                          CCR 37(4)337--348, 2007,
                          <http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1282427.1282419>.

   [RFC2475]              Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E.,
                          Wang, Z., and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for
                          Differentiated Services", RFC 2475,
                          December 1998.

   [RFC3168]              Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black,
                          "The Addition of Explicit Congestion
                          Notification (ECN) to IP", RFC 3168,
                          September 2001.

   [RFC6040]              Briscoe, B., "Tunnelling of Explicit
                          Congestion Notification", RFC 6040,
                          November 2010.

   [RFC6356]              Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and D. Wischik,
                          "Coupled Congestion Control for Multipath
                          Transport Protocols", RFC 6356, October 2011.

   [Seawall]              Shieh, A., Kandula, S., Greenberg, A., and C.
                          Kim, "Seawall: Performance Isolation in Cloud
                          Datacenter Networks", Proc 2nd USENIX Workshop
                          on Hot Topics in Cloud Computing , June 2010,
                          <http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/
                          seawall/>.



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   [conex-destopt]        Krishnan, S., Kuehlewind, M., and C. Ucendo,
                          "IPv6 Destination Option for ConEx",
                          draft-ietf-conex-destopt-05 (work in
                          progress), October 2013.

   [conex-policing]       Briscoe, B., "Network Performance Isolation
                          using Congestion Policing",
                          draft-briscoe-conex-policing-01 (work in
                          progress), February 2014.

   [ipv4-id-reuse]        Briscoe, B., "Reusing the IPv4 Identification
                          Field in Atomic Packets",
                          draft-briscoe-intarea-ipv4-id-reuse-04 (work
                          in progress), February 2014.

   [nvgre]                Sridhavan, M., Greenberg, A., Wang, Y., Garg,
                          P., Duda, K., Venkataramaiah, N., Ganga, I.,
                          Lin, G., Pearson, M., Thaler, P., and C.
                          Tumuluri, "NVGRE: Network Virtualization using
                          Generic Routing Encapsulation",
                          draft-sridharan-virtualization-nvgre-04 (work
                          in progress), February 2014.

   [tunnel-cong-exp]      Zhu, L., Zhang, H., and X. Gong, "Tunnel
                          Congestion Exposure", draft-zhang-tsvwg-
                          tunnel-congestion-exposure-00 (work in
                          progress), October 2012.

   [vxlan]                Mahalingam, M., Dutt, D., Duda, K., Agarwal,
                          P., Kreeger, L., Sridhar, T., Bursell, M., and
                          C. Wright, "VXLAN: A Framework for Overlaying
                          Virtualized Layer 2 Networks over Layer 3
                          Networks",
                          draft-mahalingam-dutt-dcops-vxlan-08 (work in
                          progress), February 2014.

Appendix A.  Summary of Changes between Drafts (to be removed by RFC
             Editor)

   Detailed changes are available from
   http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-briscoe-conex-data-centre

   From briscoe-01 to briscoe-02:  Added clarification about intra-class
      applicability.  Updated references.







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   From briscoe-conex-data-centre-00 to briscoe-conex-data-centre-01:

      *  Took out text Section 4 "Performance Isolation Intuition" and
         Section 6.  "Parameter Setting" into a separate draft
         [conex-policing] and instead included only a summary in these
         sections, referring out for details.

      *  Considerably updated Section 5 "Design"

      *  Clarifications and updates throughout, including addition of
         diagrams

   From briscoe-conex-initial-deploy-02 to
   briscoe-conex-data-centre-00:

      *  Split off data-centre scenario as a separate document, by
         popular request.

Authors' Addresses

   Bob Briscoe
   BT
   B54/77, Adastral Park
   Martlesham Heath
   Ipswich  IP5 3RE
   UK

   Phone: +44 1473 645196
   EMail: bob.briscoe@bt.com
   URI:   http://bobbriscoe.net/


   Murari Sridharan
   Microsoft
   1 Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA  98052


   Phone:
   Fax:
   EMail: muraris@microsoft.com
   URI:









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