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PCN Working Group                                             B. Briscoe
Internet-Draft                                                        BT
Intended status: Standards Track                        October 26, 2009
Expires: April 29, 2010


        Emulating Border Flow Policing using Re-PCN on Bulk Data
                  draft-briscoe-re-pcn-border-cheat-03

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 29, 2010.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Abstract

   Scaling per flow admission control to the Internet is a hard problem.
   The approach of combining Diffserv and pre-congestion notification
   (PCN) provides a service slightly better than Intserv controlled load



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   that scales to networks of any size without needing Diffserv's usual
   overprovisioning, but only if domains trust each other to comply with
   admission control and rate policing.  This memo claims to solve this
   trust problem without losing scalability.  It provides a sufficient
   emulation of per-flow policing at borders but with only passive bulk
   metering rather than per-flow processing.  Measurements are
   sufficient to apply penalties against cheating neighbour networks.












































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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   2.  Requirements Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   3.  The Problem  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     3.1.  The Traditional Per-flow Policing Problem  . . . . . . . . 11
     3.2.  Generic Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   4.  Re-ECN Protocol in IP with Two Congestion Marking Levels . . . 16
     4.1.  Protocol Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     4.2.  Re-PCN Abstracted Network Layer Wire Protocol (IPv4 or
           v6)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       4.2.1.  Re-ECN Recap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
       4.2.2.  Re-ECN Combined with Pre-Congestion Notification
               (re-PCN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
     4.3.  Protocol Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
       4.3.1.  Protocol Operation for an Established Flow . . . . . . 22
       4.3.2.  Aggregate Bootstrap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
       4.3.3.  Flow Bootstrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
       4.3.4.  Router Forwarding Behaviour  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
       4.3.5.  Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   5.  Emulating Border Policing with Re-ECN  . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     5.1.  Informal Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     5.2.  Policing Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     5.3.  Pre-requisite Contractual Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . 31
     5.4.  Emulation of Per-Flow Rate Policing: Rationale and
           Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
     5.5.  Sanctioning Dishonest Marking  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
     5.6.  Border Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
       5.6.1.  Border Accounting Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
       5.6.2.  Competitive Routing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
       5.6.3.  Fail-safes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
   6.  Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
   7.  Incremental Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
   8.  Design Choices and Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
   9.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
   10. IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
   11. Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
   12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
   13. Comments Solicited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
   14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
     14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
     14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
   Appendix A.  Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
     A.1.  Ingress Gateway Algorithm for Blanking the RE flag . . . . 56
     A.2.  Downstream Congestion Metering Algorithms  . . . . . . . . 57
       A.2.1.  Bulk Downstream Congestion Metering Algorithm  . . . . 57
       A.2.2.  Inflation Factor for Persistently Negative Flows . . . 58
     A.3.  Algorithm for Sanctioning Negative Traffic . . . . . . . . 58



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Status (to be removed by the RFC Editor)

   The IETF PCN working group is initially chartered to consider PCN
   domains only under a single trust authority.  However, after its
   initial work is complete the charter says the working group may re-
   charter to consider concatenated Diffserv domains, amongst other new
   work items.  The charter ends by stating "The details of these work
   items are outside the scope of the initial phase; but the WG may
   consider their requirements to design components that are
   sufficiently general to support such extensions in the future."

   This memo is therefore contributed to describe how PCN could be
   extended to inter-domain.  We wanted to document the solution to
   reduce the chances that something else eats up the codepoint space
   needed before PCN re-charters to consider inter-domain.  Losing the
   chance to standardise this simple, scalable solution to the problem
   of inter-domain flow admission control would be unfortunate
   (understatement), given it took years to find, and even then it was
   very difficult to find codepoint space for it.

   The scheme described here (Section 4) requires the PCN ingress
   gateway to re-echo any PCN feedback it receives back into the forward
   stream of IP packets (hence we call this scheme re-PCN).  Re-PCN
   works in a very similar way to the re-ECN proposal on which it is
   based [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp], the only difference being that
   PCN might encode three states of congestion, whereas ECN encodes two.
   This document is written to stand alone from re-ECN, so that readers
   do not have to read [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp].

   The authors seek comments from the Internet community on whether
   combining PCN and re-ECN to create re-PCN in this way is a sufficient
   solution to the problem of scaling microflow admission control to the
   Internet as a whole.  Here we emphasise that scaling is not just an
   issue of numbers of flows, but also the number of security entities--
   networks and users--who may all have conflicting interests.

   This memo is posted as an Internet-Draft with the intent to
   eventually be broken down in two documents; one for the standards
   track and one for informational status.  But until it becomes an item
   of IETF working group business the whole proposal has been kept
   together to aid understanding.  Only the text of Section 4 of this
   document is intended to be normative (requiring standardisation).
   The rest of the sections are merely informative, describing how a
   system might be built from these protocols by the operators of an
   internetwork.  Note in particular that the policing and monitoring
   functions proposed for the trust boundaries between operators would
   not need standardisation by the IETF.  They simply represent one
   possible way that the proposed protocols could be used to extend the



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   PCN architecture [RFC5559] to span multiple domains without mutual
   trust between the operators.

Dependencies (to be removed by the RFC Editor)

   To realise the system described, this document also depends on other
   documents chartered in the IETF Transport Area progressing along the
   standards track:

   o  Pre-congestion notification (PCN) marking on interior nodes
      [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour], chartered for standardisation in
      the PCN w-g;

   o  The baseline encoding of pre-congestion notification in the IP
      header [I-D.ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding], also chartered for
      standardisation in the PCN w-g;

   o  Feedback of aggregate PCN measurements by suitably extending the
      admission control signalling protocol (e.g.  RSVP extension
      [RSVP-ECN] or NSIS extension [I-D.arumaithurai-nsis-pcn]).

   The baseline encoding makes no new demands on codepoint space in the
   IP header but provides just two PCN encoding states (not marked and
   marked).  The PCN architecture recognises that operators might want
   PCN marking to trigger two functions (admission control and flow
   termination) at different levels of pre-congestion, which seems to
   require three encoding states.  A scheme has been proposed
   [I-D.charny-pcn-single-marking] that can do both functions with just
   two encoding states, but simulations have shown it performs poorly
   under certain conditions that might be typical.  As it seems likely
   that PCN might need three encoding states to be fully operational, we
   want to be sure that three encoding states can be extended to work
   inter-domain.  Therefore, we have defined a three-state extension
   encoding scheme in this document, then we have added the re-PCN
   scheme to it.  The three-state encoding we have chosen depends on
   standardisation of yet another document in the IETF Transport Area:

   o  Propagation beyond the tunnel decapsulator of any changes in the
      ECN field to ECT(0) or ECT(1) made within a tunnel (the ideal
      decapsulation rules of [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel]);

Changes from previous drafts (to be removed by the RFC Editor)

   Full diffs of incremental changes between drafts are available at
   URL: <http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/B.Briscoe/pubs.html#repcn>






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   Changes from <draft-briscoe-re-pcn-border-cheat-02> to
   <draft-briscoe-re-pcn-border-cheat-03> (current version):  Updated
      references and other minor changes.

   Changes from <draft-briscoe-re-pcn-border-cheat-01>            to
   <draft-briscoe-re-pcn-border-cheat-02>:

         Considerably updated the 'Status' note to explain the
         relationship of this draft to other documents in the IETF
         process (or not) and to chartered PCN w-g activity.

         Split out the dependencies into a separate note and added
         dependencies on new PCN documents in progress.

         Made scalability motivation in the introduction clearer,
         explaining why Diffserv over-provisioning doesn't scale unless
         PCN is used.

         Clarified that the standards action in Section 4 is to define
         the meanings of the combination of fields in the IP header: the
         RE flag and 2-level congestion marking in the ECN field.  And
         that it is not characterised by a particular feedback style in
         the transport.

         Switched round the two ECT codepoints to be compatible with the
         new PCN baseline encoding and used less confusing naming for
         re-PCN codepoints (Section 4).

         Generalised rules for encoding probes when bootstrapping or re-
         starting aggregates & flows (Section 4.3.2).

         Downgraded drop sanction behaviour from MUST to conditional
         SHOULD (Section 5.5).

         Added incremental deployment safety justification for choice of
         which way round the RE flag works (Section 7).

         Added possible vulnerability to brief attacks and possible
         solution to security considerations (Section 9).

         Updated references and terminology, particularly taking account
         of recent new PCN w-g documents;

         Replaced suggested Ingress Gateway Algorithm for Blanking the
         RE flag (Appendix A.1)

         Clarifications throughout;




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   Changes from <draft-briscoe-re-pcn-border-cheat-00>            to
   <draft-briscoe-re-pcn-border-cheat-01>:

         Updated references.

   Changes from <draft-briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-border-cheat-01>
   to <draft-briscoe-re-pcn-border-cheat-00>:

         Changed filename to associate it with the new IETF PCN w-g,
         rather than the TSVWG w-g.

         Introduction: Clarified that bulk policing only replaces per-
         flow policing at interior inter-domain borders, while per-flow
         policing is still needed at the access interface to the
         internetwork.  Also clarified that the aim is to neutralise any
         gains from cheating using local bilateral contracts between
         neighbouring networks, rather than merely identifying remote
         cheaters.

         Section 3.1: Described the traditional per-flow policing
         problem with inter-domain reservations more precisely,
         particularly with respect to direction of reservations and of
         traffic flows.

         Clarified status of Section 5 onwards, in particular that
         policers and monitors would not need standardisation, but that
         the protocol in Section 4 would require standardisation.

         Section 5.6.2 on competitive routing: Added discussion of
         direct incentives for a receiver to switch to a different
         provider even if the provider has a termination monopoly.

         Clarified that "Designing in security from the start" merely
         means allowing codepoint space in the PCN protocol encoding.
         There is no need to actually implement inter-domain security
         mechanisms for solutions confined to a single domain.

         Updated some references and added a ref to the Security
         Considerations, as well as other minor corrections and
         improvements.

   Changes from <draft-briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-border-cheat-00> to
   <draft-briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-border-cheat-01>:

         Added subsection on Border Accounting Mechanisms
         (Section 5.6.1)





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         Section 4.2 on the re-ECN wire protocol clarified and re-
         organised to separately discuss re-ECN for default ECN marking
         and for pre-congestion marking (PCN).

         Router Forwarding Behaviour subsection added to re-organised
         section on Protocol Operation (Section 4.3).  Extensions
         section moved within Protocol Operations.

         Emulating Border Policing (Section 5) reorganised, starting
         with a new Terminology subsection heading, and a simplified
         overview section.  Added a large new subsection on Border
         Accounting Mechanisms within a new section bringing together
         other subsections on Border Mechanisms generally (Section 5.6).
         Some text moved from old subsections into these new ones.

         Added section on Incremental Deployment (Section 7), drawing
         together relevant points about deployment made throughout.

         Sections on Design Rationale (Section 8) and Security
         Considerations (Section 9) expanded with some new material,
         including new attacks and their defences.

         Suggested Border Metering Algorithms improved (Appendix A.2)
         for resilience to newly identified attacks.

1.  Introduction

   The Internet community largely lost interest in the Intserv
   architecture after it was clarified that it would be unlikely to
   scale to the whole Internet [RFC2208].  Although Intserv mechanisms
   proved impractical, the bandwidth reservation service it aimed to
   offer is still very much required.

   A recently proposed approach [RFC5559] combines Diffserv and pre-
   congestion notification (PCN) to provide a service slightly better
   than Intserv controlled load [RFC2211].  PCN does not require the
   considerable over-provisioning that is normally required for
   admission control over Diffserv [RFC2998] to be robust against re-
   routes or variation in the traffic matrix.  It has been proved that
   Diffserv's over-provisioning requirement grows linearly with the
   network diameter in hops [QoS_scale].

   A number of PCN domains can be concatenated into a larger PCN region
   without any per-flow processing between them, but only if each domain
   trusts the ingress network to have checked that upstream customers
   aren't taking more bandwidth than they reserved, either accidentally
   or deliberately.  Unfortunately, networks can gain considerably by
   breaking this trust.  One way for a network to protect itself against



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   others is to handle flow signalling at its own border and police
   traffic against reservations itself.  However, this reintroduces the
   per-flow unscalability at borders that Intserv over Diffserv suffers
   from.

   This memo describes a protocol called re-PCN that enables bulk border
   measurements so that one network can protect its interests, even if
   networks around it are deliberately trying to cheat.  The approach
   provides a sufficient emulation of flow rate policing at trust
   boundaries but without per-flow processing.  Per-flow rate policing
   for each reservation is still expected to be used at the access edge
   of the internetwork, but at the borders between networks bulk
   policing can be used to emulate per-flow policing.  The emulation is
   not perfect, but it is sufficient to ensure that the punishment is at
   least proportionate to the severity of the cheat.  Re-PCN neither
   requires the unscalable over-provisioning of Diffserv nor the per-
   flow processing at borders of Intserv over Diffserv.

   It should therefore scale controlled load service to the whole
   internetwork without the cost of Diffserv's linearly increasing over-
   provisioning, or the cost of per-flow policing at each border.  To
   achieve such scaling, this memo combines two recent proposals, both
   of which it briefly recaps:

   o  The pre-congestion notification (PCN) architecture[RFC5559]
      describes how bulk pre-congestion notification on routers within
      an edge-to-edge Diffserv region can emulate the precision of per-
      flow admission control to provide controlled load service without
      unscalable per-flow processing;

   o  Re-ECN: Adding Accountability to TCP/
      IP [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp].

   We coin the term re-PCN for the combination of PCN and re-ECN.

   The trick that addresses cheating at borders is to recognise that
   border policing is mainly necessary because cheating upstream
   networks will admit traffic when they shouldn't only as long as they
   don't directly experience the downstream congestion their
   misbehaviour can cause.  The re-ECN protocol ensures a network can be
   made to experience the congestion it causes in other networks.  Re-
   ECN requires the sending node to declare expected downstream
   congestion in all packets and it makes it in its interest to declare
   this honestly.  At the border between upstream network 'A' and
   downstream network 'B' (say), both networks can monitor packets
   crossing the border to measure how much congestion 'A' is causing in
   'B' and beyond.  'B' can then include a limit or penalty based on
   this metric in its contract with 'A'.  This is how 'A' experiences



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   the effect of congestion it causes in other networks.  'A' no longer
   gains by admitting traffic when it shouldn't, which is why we can say
   re-PCN emulates flow policing, even though it doesn't measure flows.

   The aim is not to enable a network to _identify_ some remote cheating
   party, which would rarely be useful given the victim network would be
   unlikely to be able to seek redress from a cheater in some remote
   part of the world with whom no direct contractual relationship
   exists.  Rather the aim is to ensure that any gain from cheating will
   be cancelled out by penalties applied to the cheating party by its
   local network.  Further, the solution ensures each of the chain of
   networks between the cheater and the victim will lose out if it
   doesn't apply penalties to its neighbour.  Thus the solution builds
   on the local bilateral contractual relationships that already exist
   between neighbouring networks.

   Rather than the end-to-end arrangement used when re-ECN was specified
   for the TCP transport [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp], this memo
   specifies re-ECN in an edge-to-edge arrangement, making it applicable
   to deployment models where admission control over Diffserv is based
   on pre-congestion notification.  Also, rather than using a TCP
   transport for regular congestion feedback, this memo specifies re-ECN
   using RSVP as the transport for feedback [RSVP-ECN].  RSVP is used to
   be concrete, but a similar deployment model, but with a different
   transport for signalling congestion feedback could be used (e.g.
   Arumaithurai [I-D.arumaithurai-nsis-pcn] and RMD [I-D.ietf-nsis-rmd]
   both use NSIS).

   This memo aims to do two things: i) define how to apply the re-PCN
   protocol to the admission control over Diffserv scenario; and ii)
   explain why re-PCN sufficiently emulates border policing in that
   scenario.  Most of the memo is taken up with the second aim;
   explaining why it works.  Applying re-PCN to the scenario actually
   involves quite a trivial modification to the ingress gateway.  That
   modification can be added to gateways later, so our immediate goal is
   to convince everyone to have the foresight to define the PCN wire
   protocol encoding to accommodate the extended codepoints defined in
   this document, whether first deployments require border policing or
   not.  Otherwise, when we want to add policing, we will have built
   ourselves a legacy problem.  In other words, we aim to convince
   people to "Design in security from the start."

   The body of this memo is structured as follows:

      Section 3 describes the border policing problem.  We recap the
      traditional, unscalable view of how to solve the problem, and we
      recap the admission control solution which has the scalability we
      do not want to lose when we add border policing;



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      Section 4 specifies the re-PCN protocol solution in detail;

      Section 5 explains how to use the protocol to emulate border
      policing, and why it works;

      Section 6 analyses the security of the proposed solution;

      Section 8 explains the sometimes subtle rationale behind our
      design decisions;

      Section 9 comments on the overall robustness of the security
      assumptions and lists specific security issues.

   It must be emphasised that we are not evangelical about removing per-
   flow processing from borders.  Network operators may choose to do
   per-flow processing at their borders for their own reasons, such as
   to support business models that require per-flow accounting.  Our aim
   is to show that per-flow processing at borders is no longer
   _necessary_ in order to provide end-to-end QoS using flow admission
   control.  Indeed, we are absolutely opposed to standardisation of
   technology that embeds particular business models into the Internet.
   Our aim is merely to provide a new useful metric (downstream
   congestion) at trust boundaries.  Given the well-known significance
   of congestion in economics, operators can then use this new metric in
   their interconnection contracts if they choose.  This will enable
   competitive evolution of new business models (for examples
   see [IXQoS]), even for sets of flows running alongside another set
   across the same border but using the more traditional model that
   depends on more costly per-flow processing at each border.

2.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  The Problem

3.1.  The Traditional Per-flow Policing Problem

   If we claim to be able to emulate per-flow policing with bulk
   policing at trust boundaries, we need to know exactly what we are
   emulating.  So, we will start from the traditional scenario with per-
   flow policing at trust boundaries to explain why it has always been
   considered necessary.

   To be able to take advantage of a reservation-based service such as
   controlled load, a source-destination pair must reserve resources



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   using a signalling protocol such as RSVP [RFC2205].  An RSVP
   signalling request refers to a flow of packets by its flow ID tuple
   (filter spec [RFC2205]) (or its security parameter index
   (SPI) [RFC2207] if port numbers are hidden by IPSec encryption).
   Other signalling protocols use similar flow identifiers.  But, it is
   insufficient to merely authorise and admit a flow based on its
   identifiers, for instance merely opening a pin-hole for packets with
   identifiers that match an admitted flow ID.  Because, once a flow is
   admitted, it cannot necessarily be trusted to send packets within the
   rate profile it requested.

   The packet rate must also be policed to keep the flow within the
   requested flow spec [RFC2205].  For instance, without data rate
   policing, a source-destination pair could reserve resources for an
   8kbps audio flow but the source could transmit a 6Mbps video (theft
   of service).  More subtly, the sender could generate bursts that were
   outside the profile requested.

   In traditional architectures, per-flow packet rate-policing is
   expensive and unscalable but, without it, a network is vulnerable to
   such theft of service (whether malicious or accidental).  Perhaps
   more importantly, if flows are allowed to send more data than they
   were permitted, the ability of admission control to give assurances
   to other flows will break.

   Just as sources need not be trusted to keep within the requested flow
   spec, whole networks might also try to cheat.  We will now set up a
   concrete scenario to illustrate such cheats.  Imagine reservations
   for unidirectional flows, through at least two networks, an edge
   network and its downstream transit provider.  Imagine the edge
   network charges its retail customers per reservation but also has to
   pay its transit provider a charge per reservation.  Typically, both
   the charges for buying from the transit and selling to the retail
   customer might depend on the duration and rate of each reservation.
   The level of the actual selling and buying prices are irrelevant to
   our discussion (most likely the network will sell at a higher price
   than it buys, of course).

   A cheating ingress network could systematically reduce the size of
   its retail customers' reservation signalling requests (e.g. the
   SENDER_TSPEC object in RSVP's PATH message) before forwarding them to
   its transit provider and systematically reinstate the responses on
   the way back (e.g. the FLOWSPEC object in RSVP's RESV message).  It
   would then receive an honest income from its upstream retail customer
   but only pay for fraudulently smaller reservations downstream.  A
   similar but opposite trick (increasing the TSPEC and decreasing the
   FLOWSPEC) could be perpetrated by the receiver's access network if
   the reservation was paid for by the receiver.



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   Equivalently, a cheating ingress network may feed the traffic from a
   number of flows into an aggregate reservation over the transit that
   is smaller than the total of all the flows.  Because of these fraud
   possibilities, in traditional QoS reservation architectures the
   downstream network polices traffic at each border.  The policer
   checks that the actual sent data rate of each flow is within the
   signalled reservation.

   Reservation signalling could be authenticated end to end, but this
   wouldn't prevent the aggregation cheat just described.  For this
   reason, and to avoid the need for a global PKI, signalling integrity
   is typically only protected on a hop-by-hop basis [RFC2747].

   A variant of the above cheat is where a router in an honest
   downstream network denies admission to a new reservation, but a
   cheating upstream network still admits the flow.  For instance, the
   networks may be using Diffserv internally, but Intserv admission
   control at their borders [RFC2998].  The cheat would only work if
   they were using bulk Diffserv traffic policing at their borders,
   perhaps to avoid the cost/complexity of Intserv border policing.  As
   far as the cheating upstream network is concerned, it gets the
   revenue from the reservation, but it doesn't have to pay any
   downstream wholesale charges and the congestion is in someone else's
   network.  The cheating network may calculate that most of the flows
   affected by congestion in the downstream network aren't likely to be
   its own.  It may also calculate that the downstream router has been
   configured to deny admission to new flows in order to protect
   bandwidth assigned to other network services (e.g. enterprise VPNs).
   So the cheating network can steal capacity from the downstream
   operator's VPNs that are probably not actually congested.

   All the above cheats are framed in the context of RSVP's receiver
   confirmed reservation model, but similar cheats are possible with
   sender-initiated and other models.

   To summarise, in traditional reservation signalling architectures, if
   a network cannot trust a neighbouring upstream network to rate-police
   each reservation, it has to check for itself that the data rate fits
   within each of the reservations it has admitted.

3.2.  Generic Scenario

   We will now describe a generic internetworking scenario that we will
   use to describe and to test our bulk policing proposal.  It consists
   of a number of networks and endpoints that do not fully trust each
   other to behave.  In Section 6 we will tie down exactly what we mean
   by partial trust, and we will consider the various combinations where
   some networks do not trust each other and others are colluding



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   together.

    _    ___      _____________________________________       ___    _
   | |  |   |   _|__    ______    ______    ______    _|__   |   |  | |
   | |  |   |  |    |  |      |  |      |  |      |  |    |  |   |  | |
   | |  |   |  |    |  |Inter-|  |Inter-|  |Inter-|  |    |  |   |  | |
   | |  |   |  |    |  | ior  |  | ior  |  | ior  |  |    |  |   |  | |
   | |  |   |  |    |  |Domain|  |Domain|  |Domain|  |    |  |   |  | |
   | |  |   |  |    |  |  A   |  |  B   |  |  C   |  |    |  |   |  | |
   | |  |   |  |    |  |      |  |      |  |      |  |    |  |   |  | |
   | |  |   |  +----+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +----+  |   |  | |
   | |  |   |  |    |  |B|  |B|  |B|  |B|  |B|  |B|  |    |  |   |\ | |
   | |==|   |==|Ingr|==|R|  |R|==|R|  |R|==|R|  |R|==|Egr |==|   |=>| |
   | |  |   |  |G/W |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  | |  |G/W |  |   |/ | |
   | |  |   |  +----+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +----+  |   |  | |
   | |  |   |  |    |  |      |  |      |  |      |  |    |  |   |  | |
   | |  |   |  |____|  |______|  |______|  |______|  |____|  |   |  | |
   |_|  |___|    |_____________________________________|     |___|  |_|

   Sx   Ingress               Diffserv region               Egress   Rx
   End  Access                                              Access  End
   Host Network                                            Network Host
                <-------- edge-to-edge signalling ------->
                          (for admission control)

   <-------------------end-to-end QoS signalling protocol------------->

      Figure 1: Generic Scenario (see text for explanation of terms)

   An ingress and egress gateway (Ingr G/W and Egr G/W in Figure 1)
   connect the interior Diffserv region to the edge access networks
   where routers (not shown) use per-flow reservation processing.
   Within the Diffserv region are three interior domains, 'A', 'B' and
   'C', as well as the inward facing interfaces of the ingress and
   egress gateways.  An ingress and egress border router (BR) is shown
   interconnecting each interior domain with the next.  There will
   typically be other interior routers (not shown) within each interior
   domain.

   In two paragraphs we now briefly recap how pre-congestion
   notification is intended to be used to control flow admission to a
   large Diffserv region.  The first paragraph describes data plane
   functions and the second describes signalling in the control plane.
   We omit many details from [RFC5559] including behaviour during
   routing changes.  For brevity here we assume other flows are already
   in progress across a path through the Diffserv region before a new
   one arrives, but how bootstrap works is described in Section 4.3.2.




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   Figure 1 shows a single simplex reserved flow from the sending (Sx)
   end host to the receiving (Rx) end host.  The ingress gateway polices
   incoming traffic and colours conforming traffic within an admitted
   reservation to a combination of Diffserv codepoint and ECN field that
   defines the traffic as 'PCN-enabled'.  This redefines the meaning of
   the ECN field as a PCN field, which is largely the same as ECN
   [RFC3168], but with slightly different semantics defined in
   [I-D.ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding] (or various extensions that are
   currently experimental).  The Diffserv region is called a PCN-region
   because all the queues within it are PCN-enabled.  This means the
   per-hop behaviour they apply to PCN-enabled traffic consists of both
   a scheduling behaviour and a new ECN marking behaviour that we call
   `pre-congestion notification' [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour].  A
   PCN-enabled queue typically re-uses the definition of expedited
   forwarding (EF) [RFC3246] for its scheduling behaviour.  The new
   congestion marking behaviour sets the PCN field of an increasing
   proportion of PCN packets to the PCN-marked (PM) codepoint
   [I-D.ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding] as their load approaches a threshold
   rate that is lower than the line rate
   [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour].  This can be achieved with an
   algorithm similar to a token-bucket called a virtual queue.  The aim
   is for a queue to start marking PCN traffic to trigger admission
   control before the real queue builds up any congestion delay.  The
   level of a queue's pre-congestion marking is detected at the egress
   of the Diffserv region and used by the signalling system to control
   admission of further traffic that would otherwise overload that
   queue, as follows.

   The end-to-end QoS signalling for a new reservation (to be concrete
   we will use RSVP) takes one giant hop from ingress to egress gateway,
   because interior routers within the Diffserv region are configured to
   ignore RSVP.  The egress gateway holds flow state because it takes
   part in the end-to-end reservation.  So it can classify all packets
   by flow and it can identify all flows that have the same previous
   RSVP hop (an ingress-egress-aggregate).  For each ingress-egress-
   aggregate of flows in progress, the egress gateway maintains a per-
   packet moving average of the fraction of pre-congestion-marked
   traffic.  Once an RSVP PATH message for a new reservation has hopped
   across the Diffserv region and reached the destination, an RSVP RESV
   message is returned.  As the RESV message passes, the egress gateway
   piggy-backs the relevant pre-congestion level onto it [RSVP-ECN].
   Again, interior routers ignore the RSVP message, but the ingress
   gateway strips off the pre-congestion level.  If the pre-congestion
   level is above a threshold, the ingress gateway denies admission to
   the new reservation, otherwise it returns the original RESV signal
   back towards the data sender.

   Once a reservation is admitted, its traffic will always receive low



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   delay service for the duration of the reservation.  This is because
   ingress gateways ensure that traffic not under a reservation cannot
   pass into the PCN-region with a Diffserv codepoint that gives it
   priority over the capacity used for PCN traffic.

   Even if some disaster re-routes traffic after it has been admitted,
   if the PCN traffic through any PCN resource tips over a higher, fail-
   safe threshold, pre-congestion notification can trigger flow
   termination to very quickly bring every router within the whole PCN-
   region back below its operating point.  The same marking process and
   ECN codepoint can be used for both admission control and flow
   termination, by simply triggering them at different fractions of
   marking [I-D.charny-pcn-single-marking].  However simulations have
   confirmed that this approach is not robust in all circumstances that
   might typically be encountered, so approaches with two thresholds and
   two congestion encodings are expected to be required in production
   networks.

   The whole admission control system just described deliberately
   confines per-flow processing to the access edges of the network,
   where it will not limit the system's scalability.  But ideally we
   want to extend this approach to multiple networks, to take even more
   advantage of its scaling potential.  We would still need per-flow
   processing at the access edges of each network, but not at the high
   speed interfaces where they interconnect.  Even though such an
   admission control system would work technically, it would gain us no
   scaling advantage if each network also wanted to police the rate of
   each admitted flow for itself--border routers would still have to do
   complex packet operations per-flow anyway, given they don't trust
   upstream networks to do their policing for them.

   This memo describes how to emulate per-flow rate policing using bulk
   mechanisms at border routers.  Otherwise the full scalability
   potential of pre-congestion notification would be limited by the need
   for per-flow policing mechanisms at borders, which would make borders
   the most cost-critical pinch-points.  Instead we can achieve the long
   sought-for vision of secure Internet-wide bandwidth reservations
   without over-generous provisioning or per-flow processing.  We still
   use per-flow processing at the edge routers closest to the end-user,
   but we need no per-flow processing at all in core _or border
   routers_--where scalability is most critical.

4.  Re-ECN Protocol in IP with Two Congestion Marking Levels

4.1.  Protocol Overview

   First we need to recap the way routers accumulate PCN congestion
   marking along a path (it accumulates the same way as ECN).  Each PCN-



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   capable queue into a link might mark some packets with a PCN-marked
   (PM) codepoint, the marking probability increasing with the length of
   the queue [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour].  With a series of PCN-
   capable routers on a path, a stream of packets accumulates the
   fraction of PCN markings that each queue adds.  The combined effect
   of the packet marking of all the queues along the path signals
   congestion of the whole path to the receiver.  So, for example, if
   one queue early in a path is marking 1% of packets and another later
   in a path is marking 2%, flows that pass through both queues will
   experience approximately 3% marking over a sequence of packets.

   (Note: Whenever the word 'congestion' is used in this document it
   should be taken to mean congestion of the virtual resource assigned
   for use by PCN-traffic.  This avoids cumbersome repetition of the
   strictly correct term 'pre-congestion'.)

   The packets crossing an inter-domain trust boundary within the PCN-
   region will all have come from different ingress gateways and will
   all be destined for different egress gateways.  We will show that the
   key to policing against theft of service is for a border router to be
   able to directly measure the congestion that is about to be caused by
   the packets it forwards into any of the downstream paths between
   itself and the egress gateways that each packet is destined for.  The
   purpose of the re-PCN protocol is to make packets automatically carry
   this information, which then merely needs to be counted locally at
   the border.

   With the original PCN protocol, if a border router, e.g. that between
   domains 'A' & 'B' Figure 2), counts PCN markings crossing the border
   over a period, they represent the accumulated congestion that has
   already been experienced by those packets (congestion upstream of the
   border, u).  The idea of re-PCN is to make the ingress gateway
   continuously encode the path congestion it knows into a new field in
   the IP header (in this case, `path' means the path from the ingress
   to the egress gateway).  This new field is _not_ altered by queues
   along the path.  Then at any point on that path (e.g. between domains
   'A' & 'B'), IP headers can be monitored to measure both expected path
   congestion, p and upstream congestion, u.  Then congestion expected
   downstream of the border, v, can be derived simply by subtracting
   upstream congestion from expected path congestion.  That is v ~= p -
   u.

   Importantly, it turns out that there is no need to monitor downstream
   congestion on a per-flow, per-path or per-aggregate basis.  We will
   show that accounting for it in bulk by counting the volume of all
   marked packet will be sufficient.





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                  _____________________________________
                _|__    ______    ______    ______    _|__
               |    |  |  A   |  |  B   |  |  C   |  |    |
               +----+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +----+
               |    |  |B|  |B|  |B|  |B|  |B|  |B|  |    |
               |Ingr|==|R|  |R|==|R|  |R|==|R|  |R|==|Egr |
               |G/W |  | |  | |: | |  | |  | |  | |  |G/W |
               +----+  +-+  +-+: +-+  +-+  +-+  +-+  +----+
               |    |  |      |: |      |  |      |  |    |
               |____|  |______|: |______|  |______|  |____|
                 |_____________:_______________________|
                               :
                 |             :                       |
                 |<-upstream-->:<-expected downstream->|
                 | congestion  :      congestion       |
                 |     u               v ~= p - u      |
                 |                                     |
                 |<--- expected path congestion, p --->|

                         Figure 2: Re-ECN concept

4.2.  Re-PCN Abstracted Network Layer Wire Protocol (IPv4 or v6)

   In this section we define the names of the various codepoints of the
   extended ECN field when used with pre-congestion notification,
   deferring description of their semantics to the following sections.
   But first we recap the re-ECN wire protocol proposed in
   [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp].

4.2.1.  Re-ECN Recap

   Re-ECN uses the two bit ECN field broadly as in RFC3168 [RFC3168].
   It also uses a new re-ECN extension (RE) flag.  The actual position
   of the RE flag is different between IPv4 & v6 headers so we will use
   an abstraction of the IPv4 and v6 wire protocols by just calling it
   the RE flag.  [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp] proposes using bit 48
   (currently unused) in the IPv4 header for the RE flag, while for IPv6
   it proposes an congestion extension header.

   Unlike the ECN field, the RE flag is intended to be set by the sender
   and remain unchanged along the path, although it can be read by
   network elements that understand the re-ECN protocol.  In the
   scenario used in this memo, the ingress gateway is the 'sender' as
   far as the scope of the PCN region is concerned, so it sets the RE
   flag (as permitted for sender proxies in the specification of re-
   ECN).

   Note that general-purpose routers do not have to read the RE flag,



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   only special policing elements at borders do.  And no general-purpose
   routers have to change the RE flag, although the ingress and egress
   gateways do because in the edge-to-edge deployment model we are
   using, they act as the endpoints of the PCN region.  Therefore the RE
   flag does not even have to be visible to interior routers.  So the RE
   flag has no implications on protocols like MPLS.  Congested label
   switching routers (LSRs) would have to be able to notify their
   congestion with an ECN/PCN codepoint in the MPLS shim [RFC5129], but
   like any interior IP router, they can be oblivious to the RE flag,
   which need only be read by border policing functions.

   Although the RE flag is a separate single bit field, it can be read
   as an extension to the two-bit ECN field; the three concatenated bits
   in what we will call the extended ECN field (EECN) make eight
   codepoints available.  When the RE flag setting is "don't care", we
   use the RFC3168 names of the ECN codepoints, but
   [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp] proposes the following six codepoint
   names for when there is a need to be more specific.

   +--------+-------------+-------+-------------+----------------------+
   |   ECN  | RFC3168     |   RE  | Extended    |    Re-ECN meaning    |
   |  field | codepoint   |  flag | ECN         |                      |
   |        |             |       | codepoint   |                      |
   +--------+-------------+-------+-------------+----------------------+
   |   00   | Not-ECT     |   0   | Not-RECT    |  Not re-ECN-capable  |
   |        |             |       |             |       transport      |
   |   00   | Not-ECT     |   1   | FNE         |     Feedback not     |
   |        |             |       |             |      established     |
   |   10   | ECT(0)      |   0   | ---         |    Legacy ECN use    |
   |        |             |       |             |        only          |
   |   10   | ECT(0)      |   1   | --CU--      |   Currently unused   |
   |        |             |       |             |                      |
   |   01   | ECT(1)      |   0   | Re-Echo     | Re-echoed congestion |
   |        |             |       |             |       and RECT       |
   |   01   | ECT(1)      |   1   | RECT        |    Re-ECN capable    |
   |        |             |       |             |       transport      |
   |   11   | CE          |   0   | CE(0)       |      Congestion      |
   |        |             |       |             |   experienced with   |
   |        |             |       |             |        Re-Echo       |
   |   11   | CE          |   1   | CE(-1)      |      Congestion      |
   |        |             |       |             |      experienced     |
   +--------+-------------+-------+-------------+----------------------+

    Table 1: Re-cap of Default Extended ECN Codepoints Proposed for Re-
                                    ECN






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4.2.2.  Re-ECN Combined with Pre-Congestion Notification (re-PCN)

   As permitted by the ECN specification [RFC3168] and by the guidelines
   for specifying alternative semantics for the ECN field [RFC4774], a
   proposal is currently being advanced in the IETF to define different
   semantics for how queues might mark the ECN field of certain packets.
   The idea is to be able to notify congestion when the queue's load
   approaches a logical limit, rather than the physical limit of the
   line.  This new marking is called pre-congestion
   notification [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour] and we will use the
   term PCN-enabled queue for a queue that can apply pre-congestion
   notification marking to the ECN fields of packets.

   [RFC3168] recommends that a packet's Diffserv codepoint should
   determine which type of ECN marking it receives.  A PCN-capable
   packet must meet two conditions; it must carry a DSCP that has been
   associated with PCN marking and it must carry an ECN field that turns
   on PCN marking.

   As an example, a packet carrying the VOICE-ADMIT
   [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-admitted-realtime-dscp] DSCP would be associated with
   expedited forwarding [RFC3246] as its scheduling behaviour and pre-
   congestion notification as its congestion marking behaviour.  PCN
   would only be turned on within a PCN-region by an ECN codepoint other
   than Not-ECT (00).  Then we would describe packets with the VOICE-
   ADMIT DSCP and with ECN turned on as PCN-capable packets.

   [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour] actually proposes that two logical
   limits can be used for pre-congestion notification, with the higher
   limit as a back-stop for dealing with anomalous events.  It envisages
   PCN will be used to admission control inelastic real-time traffic, so
   marking at the lower limit will trigger admission control, while at
   the higher limit it will trigger flow termination.

   Because it needs two types of congestion marking, PCN needs four
   states: Not PCN-capable (Not-PCN), PCN-capable but not PCN-marked
   (NM), Admission Marked (AM) and Flow Termination Marked (TM).  A
   proposed encoding of the four required PCN states is shown on the
   left of Table 2.  Note that these codepoints of the ECN field only
   take on the semantics of pre-congestion notification if they are
   combined with a Diffserv codepoint that the operator has configured
   to be associated with PCN marking.

   This encoding only correctly traverses an IP in IP tunnel if the
   ideal decapsulation rules in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel] are followed
   when combining the ECN fields of the outer and inner headers.  If
   instead the decapsulation rules in [RFC3168] or [RFC4301] are
   followed, any admission marking applied to an outer header will be



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   incorrectly removed on decapsulation at the tunnel egress.

   The RFC3168 ECN field includes space for the experimental ECN
   Nonce [RFC3540], which seems to require a fifth state if it is also
   needed with re-PCN.  But re-PCN supersedes any need for the Nonce
   within the PCN-region.  The ECN Nonce is an elegant scheme, but it
   only allows a sending node (or its proxy) to detect suppression of
   congestion marking in the feedback loop.  Thus the Nonce requires the
   sender (or in our case the PCN ingress) to be trusted to respond
   correctly to congestion.  But this is precisely the main cheat we
   want to protect against (as well as many others).  Also, the ECN
   nonce only works once the receiver has placed packets in the same
   order as they left the ingress, which cannot be done by an edge node
   without adding unnecessary edge-edge packet ordering.  Nonetheless,
   if the ECN nonce were in use outside the PCN region (end-to-end), the
   ingress would have to tunnel the arriving IP header across the PCN
   region ([RFC5559]).

   For the rest of this memo, to mean either Admission Marking or
   Termination Marking we will call both "congestion marking" or "PCN
   marking" unless we need to be specific.  With the above encoding,
   congestion marking can be read to mean any packet with the right-most
   bit of the ECN field set.

   The re-ECN protocol can be used to control misbehaving sources
   whether congestion is with respect to a logical threshold (PCN) or
   the physical line rate (ECN).  In either case the RE flag can be used
   to create an extended ECN field.  For PCN-capable packets, the 8
   possible encodings of this 3-bit extended PCN (EPCN) field are
   defined on the right of Table 2 below.  The purposes of these
   different codepoints will be introduced in subsequent sections.




















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   +--------+-----------+-------+-----------------+--------------------+
   |   ECN  | PCN       |   RE  | Extended PCN    |   Re-PCN meaning   |
   |  field | codepoint |  flag | codepoint       |                    |
   +--------+-----------+-------+-----------------+--------------------+
   |   00   | Not-PCN   |   0   | Not-PCN         |   Not PCN-capable  |
   |        |           |       |                 |      transport     |
   |   00   | Not-PCN   |   1   | FNE             |    Feedback not    |
   |        |           |       |                 |     established    |
   |   10   | NM        |   0   | Re-PCT-Echo     |      Re-echoed     |
   |        |           |       |                 |   congestion and   |
   |        |           |       |                 |       Re-PCT       |
   |   10   | NM        |   1   | Re-PCT          |   Re-PCN capable   |
   |        |           |       |                 |      transport     |
   |   01   | AM        |   0   | AM(0)           |  Admission Marking |
   |        |           |       |                 |    with Re-Echo    |
   |   01   | AM        |   1   | AM(-1)          |  Admission Marking |
   |        |           |       |                 |                    |
   |   11   | TM        |   0   | TM(0)           |     Termination    |
   |        |           |       |                 |    Marking with    |
   |        |           |       |                 |       Re-Echo      |
   |   11   | TM        |   1   | TM(-1)          |     Termination    |
   |        |           |       |                 |       Marking      |
   +--------+-----------+-------+-----------------+--------------------+

   Table 2: Extended ECN Codepoints if the Diffserv codepoint uses Pre-
                       congestion Notification (PCN)

   Note that Table 2 shows re-PCN uses ECT(0) but Table 1 shows re-ECN
   uses ECT(1) for the unmarked state.  The difference is intended--
   although it makes it harder to remember the two schemes, it makes
   them both safer during incremental deployment.

4.3.  Protocol Operation

4.3.1.  Protocol Operation for an Established Flow

   The re-PCN protocol involves a simple addition to the action of the
   gateway at the ingress edge of the PCN region (the PCN-ingress-node).
   But first we will recap how PCN works without the addition.  For each
   active traffic aggregate across a PCN region (ingress-egress-
   aggregate) the egress gateway measures the level of PCN marking and
   feeds it back to the ingress piggy-backed as 'PCN-feedback-
   information' on any control signal passing between the nodes (e.g.
   every flow set-up, refresh or tear-down).  Therefore the ingress
   gateway will always hold a fairly recent (typically at most 30sec)
   estimate of the ingress-egress-aggregate congestion level.  For
   instance, one aggregate might have been experiencing 3% pre-
   congestion (that is, congestion marked octets whether Admission



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   Marked or Termination Marked).

   To comply with the re-PCN protocol, for all PCN packets in each
   ingress-egress-aggregate the ingress gateway MUST clear the RE flag
   to "0" for the same percentage of octets as its current estimate of
   congestion on the aggregate (e.g. 3%) and set it to "1" in the rest
   (97%).  Appendix A.1 gives a simple pseudo-code algorithm that the
   ingress gateway may use to do this.

   The RE flag is set and cleared this way round for incremental
   deployment reasons (see Section 7).  To avoid confusion we will use
   the term `blanking' (rather than marking) when the RE flag is cleared
   to "0", so we will talk of the `RE blanking fraction' as the fraction
   of octets with the RE flag cleared to "0".

       ^
       |
       |         RE blanking fraction
    3% |    +----------------------------+====+
       |    |                            |    |
    2% |    |                            |    |
       |    | congestion marking fraction|    |
    1% |    |     +----------------------+    |
       |    |     |                           |
    0% +----+=====+---------------------------+------>
            ^   <--A---> <---B---> <---C--->  ^        domain
            |     ^                      ^    |
        ingress   |                      |    egress
                1.00%                 2.00%          marking fraction

        Figure 3: Example Extended ECN codepoint Marking fractions
                                (Imprecise)

   Figure 3 illustrates our example.  The horizontal axis represents the
   index of each congestible resource (typically queues) along a path
   through the Internet.  The two superimposed plots show the fraction
   of each extended PCN codepoint observed along this path, assuming
   there are two congested routers somewhere within domains A and C. And
   Table 3 below shows the downstream pre-congestion measured at various
   border observation points along the path.  Figure 4 (later) shows the
   same results of these subtractions, but in graphical form like the
   above figure.  The tabulated figures are actually reasonable
   approximations derived from more precise formulae given in Appendix A
   of [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp].  The RE flag is not changed by
   interior routers, so it can be seen that it acts as a reference
   against which the congestion marking fraction can be compared along
   the path.




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   +--------------------------+---------------------------------------+
   | Border observation point | Approximate Downstream pre-congestion |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------------+
   |       ingress -- A       |              3% - 0% = 3%             |
   |          A -- B          |              3% - 1% = 2%             |
   |          B -- C          |              3% - 1% = 2%             |
   |        C -- egress       |              3% - 3% = 0%             |
   +--------------------------+---------------------------------------+

   Table 3: Downstream Congestion Measured at Example Observation Points

   Note that the ingress determines the RE blanking fraction for each
   aggregate using the most recent feedback from the relevant egress,
   arriving with each new reservation, or each refresh.  These updates
   arrive relatively infrequently compared to the speed with which
   congestion changes.  Although this feedback will always be out of
   date, on average positive errors should cancel out negative over a
   sufficiently long duration.

   In summary, the network adds pre-congestion marking in the forward
   data path, the egress feeds its level back to the ingress in RSVP (or
   similar signalling), then the ingress gateway re-echoes it into the
   forward data path by blanking the RE flag.  Then at any border within
   the PCN-region, the pre-congestion marking that every passing packet
   will be expected to experience downstream can be measured to be the
   RE blanking fraction minus the congestion marking fraction.

4.3.2.  Aggregate Bootstrap

   When a new reservation PATH message arrives at the egress, if there
   are currently no flows in progress from the same ingress, there will
   be no state maintaining the current level of pre-congestion marking
   for the aggregate.  In the case of RSVP reservation signalling, while
   the signal continues onward towards the receiving host, the egress
   gateway can return an RSVP message to the ingress with a
   flag [RSVP-ECN] asking the ingress to send a specified number of data
   probes between them.  The more general possibilities for bootstrap
   behaviour are described in the PCN architecture [RFC5559], including
   using the reservation signal itself as a probe.

   However, with our new re-PCN scheme, the ingress does not know what
   proportion of the data probes should have the RE flag blanked,
   because it has no estimate yet of pre-congestion for the path across
   the PCN-region.

   To be conservative, following the guidance for specifying other re-
   ECN transports in [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp], the ingress SHOULD
   set the FNE codepoint of the extended PCN header in all probe packets



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   (Table 2).  As per the PCN deployment model, the egress gateway
   measures the fraction of congestion-marked probe octets and feeds
   back the resulting pre-congestion level to the ingress, piggy-backed
   on the returning reservation response (RESV) for the new flow.  Probe
   packets are identifiable by the egress because they carry the FNE
   codepoint.

   It may seem inadvisable to expect the FNE codepoint to be set on
   probes, given legacy firewalls etc. might discard such packets
   (because this flag had no previous legitimate use).  However, in the
   deployment scenarios envisaged, each domain in the PCN-region has to
   be explicitly configured to support the admission controlled service.
   So, before deploying the service, the operator MUST reconfigure such
   a badly implemented middlebox to allow through packets with the RE
   flag set.

   Note that we have said SHOULD rather than MUST for the FNE setting
   behaviour of the ingress for probe packets.  This entertains the
   possibility of an ingress implementation having the benefit of other
   knowledge of the path, which it re-uses for a newly starting
   aggregate.  For instance, it may hold cached information from a
   recent use of the aggregate that is still sufficiently current to be
   useful.  If not all probe packets are set to FNE, the ingress will
   have to ensure probe packets are identifiable by some other means,
   perhaps by using the egress as the destination address.

   It might seem pedantic worrying about these few probe packets, but
   this behaviour ensures the system is safe, even if the proportion of
   probe packets becomes large.

4.3.3.  Flow Bootstrap

   It might be expected that a new flow within an active aggregate would
   need no special bootstrap behaviour.  If there was an aggregate
   already in progress between the gateways the new flow was about to
   use, it would inherit the prevailing RE blanking fraction.  And if
   there were no active aggregate, the bootstrap behaviour for an
   aggregate would be appropriate and sufficient for the new flow.

   However, for a number of reasons, at least the first packet of each
   new flow SHOULD be set to the FNE codepoint, irrespective of whether
   it is joining an active aggregate or not.  If the first packet is
   unlikely to be reliably delivered, a number of FNE packets MAY be
   sent to increase the probability that at least one is delivered to
   the egress gateway.

   If each flow does not start with an FNE packet, it will be seen later
   that sanctions may be too strict at the interface before the egress



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   gateway.  It will often be possible to apply sanctions at the
   granularity of aggregates rather than flows, but in an internetworked
   environment it cannot be guaranteed that aggregates will be
   identifiable in remote networks.  So setting FNE at the start of each
   flow is a safe strategy.  For instance, a remote network may have
   equal cost multi-path (ECMP) routing enabled, causing different flows
   between the same gateways to traverse different paths.

   After an idle period of more than 1 second, the ingress gateway
   SHOULD set the EPCN field of the next packet it sends to FNE.  This
   allows the design of network policers to be deterministic (see
   [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp]).

   However, if the ingress gateway can guarantee that the network(s)
   that will carry the flow to its egress gateway all use a common
   identifier for the aggregate (e.g. a single MPLS network without ECMP
   routing), it MAY NOT set FNE when it adds a new flow to an active
   aggregate.  And an FNE packet need only be sent if a whole aggregate
   has been idle for more than 1 second.

4.3.4.  Router Forwarding Behaviour

   Adding re-PCN works well with the regular PCN forwarding behaviour of
   interior queues.  However, below, two optional changes are proposed
   when forwarding packets with a per-hop-behaviour that requires pre-
   congestion notification:

   Preferential drop:  When a router cannot avoid dropping PCN-capable
      packets, preferential dropping of packets with different extended
      PCN codepoints SHOULD be implemented between packets within a PHB
      that uses PCN marking.  The drop preference order to use is
      defined in Table 4.  Note that to reduce configuration complexity,
      Re-PCT-Echo and FNE MAY be given the same drop preference, but if
      feasible, FNE SHOULD be dropped in preference to Re-PCT-Echo.

      If this proposal were advanced at the same time as PCN itself, we
      would recommend that preferential drop based on extended PCN
      codepoint SHOULD be added to router forwarding at the same time as
      PCN marking.  Preferential dropping can be difficult to implement,
      but we RECOMMEND this security-related re-PCN improvement where
      feasible as it is an effective defence against flooding attacks.

   Marking vs. Drop:  We propose that PCN-routers SHOULD inspect the RE
      flag as well as the ECN field to decide whether to drop or mark
      PCN DSCPs.  They MUST choose drop if the codepoint of this
      extended ECN field is Not-PCN.  Otherwise they SHOULD mark
      (unless, of course, buffer space is exhausted).




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      A PCN-capable router MUST NOT ever congestion mark a packet
      carrying the Not-PCN codepoint because the transport will only
      understand drop, not congestion marking.  But a PCN-capable router
      can mark rather than drop an FNE packet, even though its ECN field
      when looked at in isolation is '00' which appears to be a legacy
      Not-ECT packet.  Therefore, if a packet's RE flag is '1', even if
      its ECN field is '00', a PCN-enabled router SHOULD use congestion
      marking.  This allows the `feedback not established' (FNE)
      codepoint to be used for probe packets, in order to pick up PCN
      marking when bootstrapping an aggregate.

      PCN marking rather than dropping of FNE packets MUST only be
      deployed in controlled environments, such as that in [RFC5559],
      where the presence of an egress node that understands PCN marking
      is assured.  Congestion events might otherwise be ignored if the
      receiver only understands drop, rather than PCN marking.  This is
      because there is no guarantee that PCN capability has been
      negotiated if feedback is not established (FNE).  Also,
      [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp] places the strong condition that a
      router MUST apply drop rather than marking to FNE packets unless
      it can guarantee that FNE packets are rate limited either locally
      or upstream.

   +---------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------------+
   |   PCN   |   RE  | Extended PCN    | Drop    |    Re-PCN meaning   |
   |  field  |  flag | codepoint       | Pref    |                     |
   +---------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------------+
   |    10   |   0   | Re-PCT-Echo     | 5/4     |      Re-echoed      |
   |         |       |                 |         |    congestion and   |
   |         |       |                 |         |        Re-PCT       |
   |    00   |   1   | FNE             | 4       |     Feedback not    |
   |         |       |                 |         |     established     |
   |    10   |   1   | Re-PCT          | 3       |    Re-PCN capable   |
   |         |       |                 |         |      transport      |
   |    01   |   0   | AM(0)           | 3       |  Admission Marking  |
   |         |       |                 |         |     with Re-Echo    |
   |    01   |   1   | AM(-1)          | 3       |  Admission Marking  |
   |         |       |                 |         |                     |
   |    11   |   0   | TM(0)           | 2       | Termination Marking |
   |         |       |                 |         |     with Re-Echo    |
   |    11   |   1   | TM(-1)          | 2       | Termination Marking |
   |         |       |                 |         |                     |
   |    00   |   0   | Not-PCN         | 1       |   Not PCN-capable   |
   |         |       |                 |         |      transport      |
   +---------+-------+-----------------+---------+---------------------+

    Table 4: Drop Preference of Extended ECN Codepoints (1 = drop 1st)




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4.3.5.  Extensions

   If a different signalling system, such as NSIS, were used but it
   provided admission control in a similar way using pre-congestion
   notification (e.g.  Arumaithurai [I-D.arumaithurai-nsis-pcn] or
   RMD [I-D.ietf-nsis-rmd]), we believe re-PCN could be used to protect
   against misbehaving networks in the same way as proposed above.

5.  Emulating Border Policing with Re-ECN

   The following sections are informative, not normative.  The re-PCN
   protocol described in Section 4 above would require standardisation,
   whereas operators acting in their own interests would be expected to
   deploy policing and monitoring functions similar to those proposed in
   the sections below without any further need for standardisation by
   the IETF.  Flexibility is expected in exactly how policing and
   monitoring is done.

5.1.  Informal Terminology

   In the rest of this memo, where the context makes it clear, we will
   sometimes loosely use the term `congestion' rather than using the
   stricter `downstream pre-congestion'.  Also we will loosely talk of
   positive or negative flows, meaning flows where the moving average of
   the downstream pre-congestion metric is persistently positive or
   negative.  The notion of a negative metric arises because it is
   derived by subtracting one metric from another.  Of course actual
   downstream congestion cannot be negative, only the metric can
   (whether due to time lags or deliberate malice).

   Just as we will loosely talk of positive and negative flows, we will
   also talk of positive or negative packets, meaning packets that
   contribute positively or negatively to downstream pre-congestion.

   Therefore packets can be considered to have a `worth' of +1, 0 or -1,
   which, when multiplied by their size, indicates their contribution to
   downstream congestion.  Packets will usually be initialised by the
   PCN ingress with a worth of 0.  Blanking the RE flag increments the
   worth of a packet to +1.  Congestion marking a packet decrements its
   worth (whether admission marking or termination marking).  Congestion
   marking a previously blanked packet cancels out the positive worth
   with the negative worth of the congestion marking (resulting in a
   packet worth 0).  The FNE codepoint is an exception.  It has the same
   positive worth as a packet with the Re-PCT-Echo codepoint.  The table
   below specifies unambiguously the worth of each extended PCN
   codepoint.  Note the order is different from the previous table to
   emphasise how congestion marking processes decrement the worth (with
   the exception of FNE).



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   +---------+-------+------------------+-------+----------------------+
   |   ECN   |   RE  | Extended PCN     | Worth |    Re-PCN meaning    |
   |  field  |  flag | codepoint        |       |                      |
   +---------+-------+------------------+-------+----------------------+
   |    00   |   0   | Not-PCN          | n/a   |    Not PCN-capable   |
   |         |       |                  |       |       transport      |
   |    10   |   0   | Re-PCT-Echo      | +1    | Re-echoed congestion |
   |         |       |                  |       |      and Re-PCT      |
   |    01   |   0   | AM(0)            | 0     |   Admission Marking  |
   |         |       |                  |       |     with Re-Echo     |
   |    11   |   0   | TM(0)            | 0     |  Termination Marking |
   |         |       |                  |       |     with Re-Echo     |
   |    00   |   1   | FNE              | +1    |     Feedback not     |
   |         |       |                  |       |      established     |
   |    10   |   1   | Re-PCT           | 0     |    Re-PCN capable    |
   |         |       |                  |       |       transport      |
   |    01   |   1   | AM(-1)           | -1    |   Admission Marking  |
   |         |       |                  |       |                      |
   |    11   |   1   | TM(-1)           | -1    |  Termination Marking |
   +---------+-------+------------------+-------+----------------------+

                Table 5: 'Worth' of Extended ECN Codepoints

5.2.  Policing Overview

   It will be recalled that downstream congestion can be found by
   subtracting upstream congestion from path congestion.  Figure 4
   displays the difference between the two plots in Figure 3 to show
   downstream pre-congestion across the same path through the Internet.

   To emulate border policing, the general idea is for each domain to
   apply penalties to its upstream neighbour in proportion to the amount
   of downstream pre-congestion that the upstream network sends across
   the border.  That is, the penalties should be in proportion to the
   height of the plot.  Downward arrows in the figure show the resulting
   pressure for each domain to under-declare downstream pre-congestion
   in traffic they pass to the next domain, because of the penalties.














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               p e n a l t i e s
              /        |        \
       A     :         :         :
       |     |  <--A---> <---B---> <---C--->           domain
       |     V         :         :         :
    3% |    +-----+    |         |         :
       |    |     |    V         V         :
    2% |    |     +----------------------+ :
       |    |  downstream pre-congestion | :
    1% |    |     :                      | :
       |    |     :                      | :
    0% +----+----------------------------+====+------>
            :     :                      : A  :
            :     :                      : |  :
        ingress   :                      : :  egress
                1.00%                 2.00%:         pre-congestion
                                           |
                                       sanctions

   Figure 4: Policing Framework, showing creation of opposing pressures
    to under-declare and over-declare downstream pre-congestion, using
                          penalties and sanctions

   These penalties seem to encourage everyone to understate downstream
   congestion in order to reduce the penalties they incur.  But a
   balancing pressure is introduced by the last domain (strictly by any
   domain), which applies sanctions to flows if downstream congestion
   goes negative before the egress gateway.  The upward arrow at Domain
   C's border with the egress gateway represents the incentive the
   sanctions would create to prevent negative traffic.  The same upward
   pressure can be applied at any domain border (arrows not shown).

   Any flow that persistently goes negative by the time it leaves a
   domain must not have been marked correctly in the first place.  A
   domain that discovers such a flow can adopt a range of strategies to
   protect itself.  Which strategy it uses will depend on policy,
   because it cannot immediately assume malice--there may be an innocent
   configuration error somewhere in the system.

   This memo does not propose to standardise any particular mechanism to
   detect persistently negative flows, but Section 5.5 does give
   examples.  Note that we have used the term flow, but there will be no
   need to bury into the transport layer for port numbers; identifiers
   visible in the network layer will be sufficient (IP address pair,
   DSCP, protocol ID).  The appendix also gives a mechanism to limit the
   required flow state, preventing state exhaustion attacks.

   Of course, some domains may trust other domains to comply with



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   admission control without applying sanctions or penalties.  In these
   cases, the protocol should still be used but no penalties need be
   applied.  The re-PCN protocol ensures downstream pre-congestion
   marking is passed on correctly whether or not penalties are applied
   to it, so the system works just as well with a mixture of some
   domains trusting each other and others not.

   Providers should be free to agree the contractual terms they wish
   between themselves, so this memo does not propose to standardise how
   these penalties would be applied.  It is sufficient to standardise
   the re-PCN protocol so the downstream pre-congestion metric is
   available if providers choose to use it.  However, the next section
   (Section 5.3) gives some examples of how these penalties might be
   implemented.

5.3.  Pre-requisite Contractual Arrangements

   The re-PCN protocol has been chosen to solve the policing problem
   because it embeds a downstream pre-congestion metric in passing PCN
   traffic that is difficult to lie about and can be measured in bulk.
   The ability to emulate border policing depends on network operators
   choosing to use this metric as one of the elements in their contracts
   with each other.

   Already many inter-domain agreements involve a capacity and a usage
   element.  The usage element may be based on volume or various
   measures of peak demand.  We expect that those network operators who
   choose to use pre-congestion notification for admission control would
   also be willing to consider using this downstream pre-congestion
   metric as a usage element in their interconnection contracts for
   admission controlled (PCN) traffic.

   Congestion (or pre-congestion) has the dimension of [octet], being
   the product of volume transferred [octet] and the congestion fraction
   [dimensionless], which is the fraction of the offered load that the
   network isn't able to serve (or would rather not serve in the case of
   pre-congestion).  Measuring downstream congestion gives a measure of
   the volume transferred but modulated by congestion expected
   downstream.  So volume transferred during off-peak periods counts as
   nearly nothing, while volume transferred at peak times or over
   temporarily congested links counts very highly.  The re-PCN protocol
   allows one network to measure how much pre-congestion has been
   `dumped' into it by another network.  And then in turn how much of
   that pre-congestion it dumped into the next downstream network.

   Section 5.6 describes mechanisms for calculating border penalties
   referring to Appendix A.2 for suggested metering algorithms for
   downstream congestion at a border router.  Conceptually, it could



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   hardly be simpler.  It broadly involves accumulating the volume of
   packets with the RE flag blanked and the volume of those with
   congestion marking then subtracting the two.

   Once this downstream pre-congestion metric is available, operators
   are free to choose how they incorporate it into their interconnection
   contracts [IXQoS].  Some may include a threshold volume of pre-
   congestion as a quality measure in their service level agreement,
   perhaps with a penalty clause if the upstream network exceeds this
   threshold over, say, a month.  Others may agree a set of tiered
   monthly thresholds, with increasing penalties as each threshold is
   exceeded.  But, it would be just as easy, and more resistant to
   gaming, to do away with discrete thresholds, and instead make the
   penalty rise smoothly with the volume of pre-congestion by applying a
   price to pre-congestion itself.  Then the usage element of the
   interconnection contract would directly relate to the volume of pre-
   congestion caused by the upstream network.

   The direction of penalties and charges relative to the direction of
   traffic flow is a constant source of confusion.  Typically, where
   capacity charges are concerned, lower tier customer networks pay
   higher tier provider networks.  So money flows from the edges to the
   middle of the internetwork, towards greater connectivity,
   irrespective of the flow of data.  But we advise that penalties or
   charges for usage should follow the same direction as the data flow--
   the direction of control at the network layer.  Otherwise a network
   lays itself open to `denial of funds' attacks.  So, where a tier 2
   provider sends data into a tier 3 customer network, we would expect
   the penalty clauses for sending too much pre-congestion to be against
   the tier 2 network, even though it is the provider.

   It may help to remember that data will be flowing in the other
   direction too.  So the provider network has as much opportunity to
   levy usage penalties as its customer, and it can set the price or
   strength of its own penalties higher if it chooses.  Usage charges in
   both directions tend to cancel each other out, which confirms that
   usage-charging is less to do with revenue raising and more to do with
   encouraging load control discipline in order to smooth peaks and
   troughs, improving utilisation and quality.

   Further, when operators agree penalties in their interconnection
   contracts for sending downstream congestion, they should make sure
   that any level of negative marking only equates to zero penalty.  In
   other words, penalties are always paid in the same direction as the
   data, and never against the data flow, even if downstream congestion
   seems to be negative.  This is consistent with the definition of
   physical congestion; when a resource is underutilised, it is not
   negatively congested.  Its congestion is just zero.  So, although



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   short periods of negative marking can be tolerated to correct
   temporary over-declarations due to lags in the feedback system,
   persistent downstream negative congestion can have no physical
   meaning and therefore must signify a problem.  The incentive for
   domains not to tolerate persistently negative traffic depends on this
   principle that negative penalties must never be paid for negative
   congestion.

   Also note that at the last egress of the PCN-region, domain C should
   not agree to pay any penalties to the egress gateway for pre-
   congestion passed to the egress gateway.  Downstream pre-congestion
   to the egress gateway should have reached zero here.  If domain C
   were to agree to pay for any remaining downstream pre-congestion, it
   would give the egress gateway an incentive to over-declare pre-
   congestion feedback and take the resulting profit from domain C.

   To focus the discussion, from now on, unless otherwise stated, we
   will assume a downstream network charges its upstream neighbour in
   proportion to the pre-congestion it sends (V_b in the notation of
   Appendix A.2).  Effectively tiered thresholds would be just more
   coarse-grained approximations of the fine-grained case we choose to
   examine.  If these neighbours had previously agreed that the (fixed)
   price per octet of pre-congestion would be L, then the bill at the
   end of the month would simply be the product L*V_b, plus any fixed
   charges they may also have agreed.

   We are well aware that the IETF tries to avoid standardising
   technology that depends on a particular business model.  Indeed, this
   principle is at the heart of all our own work.  Our aim here is to
   make a new metric available that we believe is superior to all
   existing metrics.  Then, our aim is to show that bulk border policing
   can at least work with the one model we have just outlined.  Of
   course, operators are free to complement this pre-congestion-based
   usage element of their charges with traditional capacity charging,
   and we expect they will.  But if operators don't want to use this
   business model at all, they don't have to do bulk border policing.
   We also assume that operators might experiment with the metric in
   other models.

   Also note well that everything we discuss in this memo only concerns
   interconnection within the PCN-region.  ISPs are free to sell or give
   away reservations however they want on the retail market.  But of
   course, interconnection charges will have a bearing on that.  Indeed,
   in the present scenario, the ingress gateway effectively sells
   reservations on one side and buys congestion penalties on the other.
   As congestion rises, one can imagine the gateway discovering that
   congestion penalties have risen higher than the (probably fixed)
   revenue it will earn from selling the next flow reservation.  This



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   encourages the gateway to cut its losses by blocking new calls, which
   is why we believe downstream congestion penalties can emulate per-
   flow rate policing at borders, as the next section explains.

5.4.  Emulation of Per-Flow Rate Policing: Rationale and Limits

   The important feature of charging in proportion to congestion volume
   is that the penalty aggregates and disaggregates correctly along with
   packet flows.  This is because the penalty rises linearly with bit
   rate (unless congestion is absolutely zero) and linearly with
   congestion, because it is the product of them both.  So if the
   packets crossing a border belong to a thousand flows, and one of
   those flows doubles its rate, the ingress gateway forwarding that
   flow will have to put twice as much congestion marking into the
   packets of that flow.  And this extra congestion marking will add
   proportionately to the penalties levied at every border the flow
   crosses in proportion to the amount of pre-congestion remaining on
   the path.

   Effectively, usage charges will continuously flow from ingress
   gateways to the places generating pre-congestion marking, in
   proportion to the pre-congestion marking introduced and to the data
   rates from those gateways.

   As importantly, pre-congestion itself rises super-linearly with
   utilisation of a particular resource.  So if someone tries to push
   another flow into a path that is already signalling enough pre-
   congestion to warrant admission control, the penalty will be a lot
   greater than it would have been to add the same flow to a less
   congested path.  This makes the incentive system fairly insensitive
   to the actual level of pre-congestion for triggering admission
   control that each ingress chooses.  The deterrent against exceeding
   whatever threshold is chosen rises very quickly with a small amount
   of cheating.

   These are the properties that allow re-PCN to emulate per-flow border
   policing of both rate and admission control.  It is not a perfect
   emulation of per-flow border policing, but we claim it is sufficient
   to at least ensure the cost to others of a cheat is borne by the
   cheater, because the penalties are at least proportionate to the
   level of the cheat.  If an edge network operator is selling
   reservations at a large profit over the congestion cost, these pre-
   congestion penalties will not be sufficient to ensure networks in the
   middle get a share of those profits, but at least they can cover
   their costs.

   We will now explain with an example.  When a whole inter-network is
   operating at normal (typically very low) congestion, the pre-



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   congestion marking from virtual queues will be a little higher than
   if the real queues had been used--still low, but more noticeable.
   But low congestion levels do not imply that usage _charges_ must also
   be low.  Usage charges will depend on the _price_ L as well.

   If the metric of the usage element of an interconnection agreement
   was changed from pure volume to pre-congested volume, one would
   expect the price of pre-congestion to be arranged so that the total
   usage charge remained about the same.  So, if an average pre-
   congestion fraction turned out to be 1/1000, one would expect that
   the price L (per octet) of pre-congestion would be about 1000 times
   the previously used (per octet) price for volume.  We should add that
   a switch to pre-congestion is unlikely to exactly maintain the same
   overall level of usage charges, but this argument will be
   approximately true, because usage charge will rise to at least the
   level the market finds necessary to push back against usage.

   From the above example it can be seen why a 1000x higher price will
   make operators become acutely sensitive to the congestion they cause
   in other networks, which is of course the desired effect; to
   encourage networks to _avoid_ the congestion they allow their users
   to cause to others.

   If any network sends even one flow at higher rate, they will
   immediately have to pay proportionately more usage charges.  Because
   there is no knowledge of reservations within the PCN-region, no
   interior router can police whether the rate of each flow is greater
   than each reservation.  So the system doesn't truly emulate rate-
   policing of each flow.  But there is no incentive to pack a higher
   rate into a reservation, because the charges are directly
   proportional to rate, irrespective of the reservations.

   However, if virtual queues start to fill on any path, even though
   real queues will still be able to provide low latency service, pre-
   congestion marking will rise fairly quickly.  It may eventually reach
   the threshold where the ingress gateway would deny admission to new
   flows.  If the ingress gateway cheats and continues to admit new
   flows, the affected virtual queues will rapidly fill, even though the
   real queues will still be little worse than they were when admission
   control should have been invoked.  The ingress gateway will have to
   pay the penalty for such an extremely high pre-congestion level, so
   the pressure to invoke admission control should become unbearable.

   The above mechanisms protect against rational operators.  In
   Section 5.6.3 we discuss how networks can protect themselves from
   accidental or deliberate misconfiguration in neighbouring networks.





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5.5.  Sanctioning Dishonest Marking

   As PCN traffic leaves the last network before the egress gateway
   (domain 'C' in Figure 4) the RE blanking fraction should match the
   congestion marking fraction, when averaged over a sufficiently long
   duration (perhaps ~10s to allow a few rounds of feedback through
   regular signalling of new and refreshed reservations).

   To protect itself, domain 'C' should install a monitor at its egress.
   It aims to detect flows of PCN packets that are persistently
   negative.  If flows are positive, domain 'C' need take no action--
   this simply means an upstream network must be paying more penalties
   than it needs to.  Appendix A.3 gives a suggested algorithm for the
   monitor, meeting the criteria below.

   o  It SHOULD introduce minimal false positives for honest flows;

   o  It SHOULD quickly detect and sanction dishonest flows (minimal
      false negatives);

   o  It MUST be invulnerable to state exhaustion attacks from malicious
      sources.  For instance, if the dropper uses flow-state, it should
      not be possible for a source to send numerous packets, each with a
      different flow ID, to force the dropper to exhaust its memory
      capacity;

   o  If drop is used as a sanction, it SHOULD introduce sufficient loss
      in goodput so that malicious sources cannot play off losses in the
      egress dropper against higher allowed throughput.
      Salvatori [CLoop_pol] describes this attack, which involves the
      source understating path congestion then inserting forward error
      correction (FEC) packets to compensate expected losses.

   Note that the monitor operates on flows but with careful design we
   can avoid per-flow state.  This is why we have been careful to ensure
   that all flows MUST start with a packet marked with the FNE
   codepoint.  If a flow does not start with the FNE codepoint, a
   monitor is likely to treat it unfavourably.  This risk makes it worth
   setting the FNE codepoint at the start of a flow, even though there
   is a cost to setting FNE (positive `worth').

   Starting flows with an FNE packet also means that a monitor will be
   resistant to state exhaustion attacks from other networks, as the
   monitor can then be designed to never create state unless an FNE
   packet arrives.  And an FNE packet counts positive, so it will cost a
   lot for a network to send many of them.

   Monitor algorithms will often maintain a moving average across flows



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   of the fraction of RE blanked packets.  When maintaining an average
   across flows, a monitor MUST ignore packets with the FNE codepoint
   set.  An ingress gateway sets the FNE codepoint when it does not have
   the benefit of feedback from the egress.  So counting packets with
   FNE cleared would be likely to make the average unnecessarily
   positive, providing headroom (or should we say footroom?) for
   dishonest (negative) traffic.

   If the monitor detects a persistently negative flow, it could drop
   sufficient negative and neutral packets to force the flow to not be
   negative.  This is the approach taken for the `egress dropper' in
   [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp], but for the scenario in this memo,
   where everyone would expect everyone else to keep to the protocol, a
   management alarm SHOULD be raised on detecting persistently negative
   traffic and any automatic sanctions taken SHOULD be logged.  Even if
   the chosen policy is to take no automatic action, the cause can then
   be investigated manually.

   Then all ingresses cannot understate downstream pre-congestion
   without their action being logged.  So network operators can deal
   with offending networks at the human level, out of band.  As a last
   resort, perhaps where the ingress gateway address seems to have been
   spoofed in the signalling, packets can be dropped.  Drops could be
   focused on just sufficient packets in misbehaving flows to remove the
   negative bias while doing minimal harm.

   A future version of this memo may define a control message that could
   be used to notify an offending ingress gateway (possibly via the
   egress gateway) that it is sending persistently negative flows.
   However, we are aware that such messages could be used to test the
   sensitivity of the detection system, so currently we prefer silent
   sanctions.

   An extreme scenario would be where an ingress gateway (or set of
   gateways) mounted a DoS attack against another network.  If their
   traffic caused sufficient congestion to lead to drop but they
   understated path congestion to avoid penalties for causing high
   congestion, the preferential drop recommendations in Section 4.3.4
   would at least ensure that these flows would always be dropped before
   honest flows..

5.6.  Border Mechanisms

5.6.1.  Border Accounting Mechanisms

   One of the main design goals of re-PCN was for border security
   mechanisms to be as simple as possible, otherwise they would become
   the pinch-points that limit scalability of the whole internetwork.



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   As the title of this memo suggests, we want to avoid per-flow
   processing at borders.  We also want to keep to passive mechanisms
   that can monitor traffic in parallel to forwarding, rather than
   having to filter traffic inline--in series with forwarding.  As data
   rates continue to rise, we suspect that all-optical interconnection
   between networks will soon be a requirement.  So we want to avoid any
   new need for buffering (even though border filtering is current
   practice for other reasons, we don't want to make it even less likely
   that we will ever get rid of it).

   So far, we have been able to keep the border mechanisms simple,
   despite having had to harden them against some subtle attacks on the
   re-PCN design.  The mechanisms are still passive and avoid per-flow
   processing, although we do use filtering as a fail-safe to
   temporarily shield against extreme events in other networks, such as
   accidental misconfigurations (Section 5.6.3).

   The basic accounting mechanism at each border interface simply
   involves accumulating the volume of packets with positive worth (Re-
   PCT-Echo and FNE), and subtracting the volume of those with negative
   worth: AM(-1) and TM(-1).  Even though this mechanism takes no regard
   of flows, over an accounting period (say a month) this subtraction
   will account for the downstream congestion caused by all the flows
   traversing the interface, wherever they come from, and wherever they
   go to.  The two networks can agree to use this metric however they
   wish to determine some congestion-related penalty against the
   upstream network (see Section 5.3 for examples).  Although the
   algorithm could hardly be simpler, it is spelled out using pseudo-
   code in Appendix A.2.1.

   Various attempts to subvert the re-ECN design have been made.  In all
   cases their root cause is persistently negative flows.  But, after
   describing these attacks we will show that we don't actually have to
   get rid of all persistently negative flows in order to thwart the
   attacks.

   In honest flows, downstream congestion is measured as positive minus
   negative volume.  So if all flows are honest (i.e. not persistently
   negative), adding all positive volume and all negative volume without
   regard to flows will give an aggregate measure of downstream
   congestion.  But such simple aggregation is only possible if no flows
   are persistently negative.  Unless persistently negative flows are
   completely removed, they will reduce the aggregate measure of
   congestion.  The aggregate may still be positive overall, but not as
   positive as it would have been had the negative flows been removed.

   In Section 5.5 we discussed how to sanction traffic to remove, or at
   least to identify, persistently negative flows.  But, even if the



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   sanction for negative traffic is to discard it, unless it is
   discarded at the exact point it goes negative, it will wrongly
   subtract from aggregate downstream congestion, at least at any
   borders it crosses after it has gone negative but before it is
   discarded.

   We rely on sanctions to deter dishonest understatement of congestion.
   But even the ultimate sanction of discard can only be effective if
   the sender is bothered about the data getting through to its
   destination.  A number of attacks have been identified where a sender
   gains from sending dummy traffic or it can attack someone or
   something using dummy traffic even though it isn't communicating any
   information to anyone:

   o  A network can simply create its own dummy traffic to congest
      another network, perhaps causing it to lose business at no cost to
      the attacking network.  This is a form of denial of service
      perpetrated by one network on another.  The preferential drop
      measures in Section 4.3.4 provide crude protection against such
      attacks, but we are not overly worried about more accurate
      prevention measures, because it is already possible for networks
      to DoS other networks on the general Internet, but they generally
      don't because of the grave consequences of being found out.  We
      are only concerned if re-PCN increases the motivation for such an
      attack, as in the next example.

   o  A network can just generate negative traffic and send it over its
      border with a neighbour to reduce the overall penalties that it
      should pay to that neighbour.  It could even initialise the TTL so
      it expired shortly after entering the neighbouring network,
      reducing the chance of detection further downstream.  This attack
      need not be motivated by a desire to deny service and indeed need
      not cause denial of service.  A network's main motivator would
      most likely be to reduce the penalties it pays to a neighbour.
      But, the prospect of financial gain might tempt the network into
      mounting a DoS attack on the other network as well, given the gain
      would offset some of the risk of being detected.

   Note that we have not included DoS by Internet hosts in the above
   list of attacks, because we have restricted ourselves to a scenario
   with edge-to-edge admission control across a PCN-region.  In this
   case, the edge ingress gateways insulate the PCN-region from DoS by
   Internet hosts.  Re-ECN resists more general DoS attacks, but this is
   discussed in [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp].

   The first step towards a solution to all these problems with negative
   flows is to be able to estimate the contribution they make to
   downstream congestion at a border and to correct the measure



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   accordingly.  Although ideally we want to remove negative flows
   themselves, perhaps surprisingly, the most effective first step is to
   cancel out the polluting effect negative flows have on the measure of
   downstream congestion at a border.  It is more important to get an
   unbiased estimate of their effect, than to try to remove them all.  A
   suggested algorithm to give an unbiased estimate of the contribution
   from negative flows to the downstream congestion measure is given in
   Appendix A.2.2.

   Although making an accurate assessment of the contribution from
   negative flows may not be easy, just the single step of neutralising
   their polluting effect on congestion metrics removes all the gains
   networks could otherwise make from mounting dummy traffic attacks on
   each other.  This puts all networks on the same side (only with
   respect to negative flows of course), rather than being pitched
   against each other.  The network where a flow goes negative as well
   as all the networks downstream lose out from not being reimbursed for
   any congestion this flow causes.  So they all have an interest in
   getting rid of these negative flows.  Networks forwarding a flow
   before it goes negative aren't strictly on the same side, but they
   are disinterested bystanders--they don't care that the flow goes
   negative downstream, but at least they can't actively gain from
   making it go negative.  The problem becomes localised so that once a
   flow goes negative, all the networks from where it happens and beyond
   downstream each have a small problem, each can detect it has a
   problem and each can get rid of the problem if it chooses to.  But
   negative flows can no longer be used for any new attacks.

   Once an unbiased estimate of the effect of negative flows can be
   made, the problem reduces to detecting and preferably removing flows
   that have gone negative as soon as possible.  But importantly,
   complete eradication of negative flows is no longer critical--best
   endeavours will be sufficient.

   Note that the guiding principle behind all the above discussion is
   that any gain from subverting the protocol should be precisely
   neutralised, rather than punished.  If a gain is punished to a
   greater extent than is sufficient to neutralise it, it will most
   likely open up a new vulnerability, where the amplifying effect of
   the punishment mechanism can be turned on others.

   For instance, if possible, flows should be removed as soon as they go
   negative, but we do NOT RECOMMEND any attempts to discard such flows
   further upstream while they are still positive.  Such over-zealous
   push-back is unnecessary and potentially dangerous.  These flows have
   paid their `fare' up to the point they go negative, so there is no
   harm in delivering them that far.  If someone downstream asks for a
   flow to be dropped as near to the source as possible, because they



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   say it is going to become negative later, an upstream node cannot
   test the truth of this assertion.  Rather than have to authenticate
   such messages, re-PCN has been designed so that flows can be dropped
   solely based on locally measurable evidence.  A message hinting that
   a flow should be watched closely to test for negativity is fine.  But
   not a message that claims that a positive flow will go negative
   later, so it should be dropped.

5.6.2.  Competitive Routing

   With the above penalty system, each domain seems to have a perverse
   incentive to fake pre-congestion.  For instance domain 'B' profits
   from the difference between penalties it receives at its ingress (its
   revenue) and those it pays at its egress (its cost).  So if 'B'
   overstates internal pre-congestion it seems to increase its profit.
   However, we can assume that domain 'A' could bypass 'B', routing
   through other domains to reach the egress.  So the competitive
   discipline of least-cost routing can ensure that any domain tempted
   to fake pre-congestion for profit risks losing _all_ its incoming
   traffic.  The least congested route would eventually be able to win
   this competitive game, only as long as it didn't declare more fake
   pre-congestion than the next most competitive route.

   The competitive effect of interdomain routing might be weaker nearer
   to the egress.  For instance, 'C' may be the only route 'B' can take
   to reach the ultimate receiver.  And if 'C' over-penalises 'B', the
   egress gateway and the ultimate receiver seem to have no incentive to
   move their terminating attachment to another network, because only
   'B' and those upstream of 'B' suffer the higher penalties.  However,
   we must remember that we are only looking at the money flows at the
   unidirectional network layer.  There are likely to be all sorts of
   higher level business models constructed over the top of these low
   level 'sender-pays' penalties.  For instance, we might expect a
   session layer charging model where the session originator pays for a
   pair of duplex flows, one as receiver and one as sender.
   Traditionally this has been a common model for telephony and we might
   expect it to be used, at least sometimes, for other media such as
   video.  Wherever such a model is used, the data receiver will be
   directly affected if its sessions terminate through a network like
   'C' that fakes congestion to over-penalise 'B'.  So end-customers
   will experience a direct competitive pressure to switch to cheaper
   networks, away from networks like 'C' that try to over-penalise 'B'.

   This memo does not need to standardise any particular mechanism for
   routing based on re-PCN.  Goldenberg et al [Smart_rtg] refers to
   various commercial products and presents its own algorithms for
   moving traffic between multi-homed routes based on usage charges.
   None of these systems require any changes to standards protocols



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   because the choice between the available border gateway protocol
   (BGP) routes is based on a combination of local knowledge of the
   charging regime and local measurement of traffic levels.  If, as we
   propose, charges or penalties were based on the level of re-PCN
   measured locally in passing traffic, a similar optimisation could be
   achieved without requiring any changes to standard routing protocols.

   We must be clear that applying pre-congestion-based routing to this
   admission control system remains an open research issue.  Traffic
   engineering based on congestion requires careful damping to avoid
   oscillations, and should not be attempted without adult supervision
   :) Mortier & Pratt [ECN-BGP] have analysed traffic engineering based
   on congestion.  But without the benefit of re-ECN or re-PCN, they had
   to add a path attribute to BGP to advertise a route's downstream
   congestion (actually they proposed that BGP should advertise the
   charge for congestion, which we believe wrongly embeds an assumption
   into BGP that the only thing to do with congestion is charge for it).

5.6.3.  Fail-safes

   The mechanisms described so far create incentives for rational
   operators to behave.  That is, one operator aims to make another
   behave responsibly by applying penalties and expects a rational
   response (i.e. one that trades off costs against benefits).  It is
   usually reasonable to assume that other network operators will behave
   rationally (policy routing can avoid those that might not).  But this
   approach does not protect against the misconfigurations and accidents
   of other operators.

   Therefore, we propose the following two mechanisms at a network's
   borders to provide "defence in depth".  Both are similar:

   Highly positive flows:  A small sample of positive packets should be
      picked randomly as they cross a border interface.  Then subsequent
      packets matching the same source and destination address and DSCP
      should be monitored.  If the fraction of positive marking is well
      above a threshold (to be determined by operational practice), a
      management alarm SHOULD be raised, and the flow MAY be
      automatically subject to focused drop.

   Persistently negative flows:  A small sample of congestion marked
      packets should be picked randomly as they cross a border
      interface.  Then subsequent packets matching the same source and
      destination address and DSCP should be monitored.  If the RE
      blanking fraction minus the congestion marking fraction is
      persistently negative, a management alarm SHOULD be raised, and
      the flow MAY be automatically subject to focused drop.




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   Both these mechanisms rely on the fact that highly positive (or
   negative) flows will appear more quickly in the sample by selecting
   randomly solely from positive (or negative) packets.

   Note that there is no assumption that _users_ behave rationally.  The
   system is protected from the vagaries of irrational user behaviour by
   the ingress gateways, which transform internal penalties into a
   deterministic, admission control mechanism that prevents users from
   misbehaving, by directly engineered means.

6.  Analysis

   The domains in Figure 1 are not expected to be completely malicious
   towards each other.  After all, we can assume that they are all co-
   operating to provide an internetworking service to the benefit of
   each of them and their customers.  Otherwise their routing polices
   would not interconnect them in the first place.  However, we assume
   that they are also competitors of each other.  So a network may try
   to contravene our proposed protocol if it would gain or make a
   competitor lose, or both.  But only if it can do so without being
   caught.  Therefore we do not have to consider every possible random
   attack one network could launch on the traffic of another, given
   anyway one network can always drop or corrupt packets that it
   forwards on behalf of another.

   Therefore, we only consider new opportunities for _gainful_ attack
   that our proposal introduces.  But to a certain extent we can also
   rely on the in depth defences we have described (Section 5.6.3 )
   intended to mitigate the potential impact if one network accidentally
   misconfiguring the workings of this protocol.

   The ingress and egress gateways are shown in the most generic
   arrangement possible in Figure 1, without any surrounding network.
   This allows us to consider more specific cases where these gateways
   and a neighbouring network are operated by the same player.  As well
   as cases where the same player operates neighbouring networks, we
   will also consider cases where the two gateways collude as one player
   and where the sender and receiver collude as one.  Collusion of other
   sets of domains is less likely, but we will consider such cases.  In
   the general case, we will assume none of the nine trust domains
   across the figure fully trust any of the others.

   As we only propose to change routers within the PCN-region, we assume
   the operators of networks outside the region will be doing per-flow
   policing.  That is, we assume the networks outside the PCN-region and
   the gateways around its edges can protect themselves.  So given we
   are proposing to remove flow policing from some networks, our primary
   concern must be to protect networks that don't do per-flow policing



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   (the potential `victims') from those that do (the `enemy').  The
   ingress and egress gateways are the only way the outer enemy can get
   at the middle victim, so we can consider the gateways as the
   representatives of the enemy as far as domains 'A', 'B' and 'C' are
   concerned.  We will call this trust scenario `edges against middles'.

   Earlier in this memo, we outlined the classic border rate policing
   problem (Section 3).  It will now be useful to reiterate the
   motivations that are the root cause of the problem.  The more
   reservations a gateway can allow, the more revenue it receives.  The
   middle networks want the edges to comply with the admission control
   protocol when they become so congested that their service to others
   might suffer.  The middle networks also want to ensure the edges
   cannot steal more service from them than they are entitled to.

   In the context of this `edges against middles' scenario, the re-PCN
   protocol has two main effects:

   o  The more pre-congestion there is on a path across the PCN-region,
      the higher the ingress gateway must declare downstream pre-
      congestion.

   o  If the ingress gateway does not declare downstream pre-congestion
      high enough on average, it will `hit the ground before the
      runway', going negative and triggering sanctions, either directly
      against the traffic or against the ingress gateway at a management
      level

   An executive summary of our security analysis can be stated in three
   parts, distinguished by the type of collusion considered.

   Neighbour-only Middle-Middle Collusion:  Here there is no collusion
      or collusion is limited to neighbours in the feedback loop.  In
      other words, two neighbouring networks can be assumed to act as
      one.  Or the egress gateway might collude with domain 'C'.  Or the
      ingress gateway might collude with domain 'A'.  Or ingress and
      egress gateways might collude with each other.

      In these cases where only neighbours in the feedback loop collude,
      we concludes that all parties have a positive incentive to declare
      downstream pre-congestion truthfully, and the ingress gateway has
      a positive incentive to invoke admission control when congestion
      rises above the admission threshold in any network in the region
      (including its own).  No party has an incentive to send more
      traffic than declared in reservation signalling (even though only
      the gateways read this signalling).  In short, no party can gain
      at the expense of another.




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   Non-neighbour Middle-Middle Collusion:  In the case of other forms of
      collusion between middle networks (e.g. between domain 'A' and
      'C') it would be possible for say 'A' & 'C' to create a tunnel
      between themselves so that 'A' would gain at the expense of 'B'.
      But 'C' would then lose the gain that 'A' had made.  Therefore the
      value to 'A' & 'C' of colluding to mount this attack seems
      questionable.  It is made more questionable, because the attack
      can be statistically detected by 'B' using the second `defence in
      depth' mechanism mentioned already.  Note that 'C' can defend
      itself from being attacked through a tunnel by treating the tunnel
      end point as a direct link to a neighbouring network (e.g. as if
      'A' were a neighbour of 'C', via the tunnel), which falls back to
      the safety of the neighbour-only scenario.

   Middle-Edge Collusion:  Collusion between networks or gateways within
      the PCN-region and networks or users outside the region has not
      yet been fully analysed.  The presence of full per-flow policing
      at the ingress gateway seems to make this a less likely source of
      a successful attack.

   {ToDo: Due to lack of time, the full write up of the security
   analysis is deferred to the next version of this memo.}

   Finally, it is well known that the best person to analyse the
   security of a system is not the designer.  Therefore, our confident
   claims must be hedged with doubt until others with perhaps a greater
   incentive to break it have mounted a full analysis.

7.  Incremental Deployment

   We believe ECN has so far not been widely deployed because it
   requires end system and widespread network deployment just to achieve
   a marginal improvement in performance.  The ability to offer a new
   service (admission control) would be a much stronger driver for ECN
   deployment.

   As stated in the introduction, the aim of this memo is to "Design in
   security from the start" when admission control is based on pre-
   congestion notification.  The proposal has been designed so that
   security can be added some time after first deployment, but only if
   the PCN wire protocol encoding is defined with the foresight to
   accommodate the extended set of codepoints defined in this document.
   Given admission control based on pre-congestion notification requires
   few changes to standards, it should be deployable fairly soon.
   However, re-PCN requires a change to IP, which may take a little
   longer :)

   We expect that initial deployments of PCN-based admission control



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   will be confined to single networks, or to clubs of networks that
   trust each other.  The proposal in this memo will only become
   relevant once networks with conflicting interests wish to
   interconnect their admission controlled services, but without the
   scalability constraints of per-flow border policing.  It will not be
   possible to use re-PCN, even in a controlled environment between
   consenting operators, unless it is standardised into IP.  Given the
   IPv4 header has limited space for further changes, current IESG
   policy [RFC4727] is not to allow experimental use of codepoints in
   the IPv4 header, as whenever an experiment isn't taken up, the space
   it used tends to be impossible to reclaim.  Therefore, for IPv4 at
   least, we will need to find a way to run an experiment so that the
   header fields it uses can be reclaimed if the experiment is not a
   success.

   If PCN-based admission control is deployed before re-PCN is
   standardised into IP, wherever a network (or club of networks)
   connects to another network (or club of networks) with conflicting
   interests, they will place a gateway between the two regions that
   does per-flow rate policing and admission control.  If re-PCN is
   eventually standardised into IP, it will be possible for these
   separate regions to upgrade all their ingress gateways to support re-
   PCN before removing the per-flow policing gateways between them.
   Given the edge-to-edge deployment model of PCN-based admission
   control, it is reasonable to expect incremental deployment of re-PCN
   will be feasible on a domain-by domain basis, without needing to
   cater for partial deployment of re-PCN in just some of the gateways
   around one PCN-domain.

   Nonetheless, if the upgrade of one ingress gateway is accidentally
   overlooked, the RE flag has been defined the safe way round for the
   default legacy behaviour (leaving RE cleared as "0").  A legacy
   ingress will appear to be declaring a high level of pre-congestion
   into the aggregate.  The fail-safe border mechanism in Section 5.6.3
   might trigger management alarms (which would help in tracking down
   the need to upgrade the ingress), but all packets would continue to
   be delivered safely, as overstatement of downstream congestion
   requires no sanction.

   Only the ingress edge gateways around a PCN-region have to be
   upgraded to add re-PCN support, not interior routers.  It is also
   necessary to add the mechanisms that monitor re-PCN to secure a
   network against misbehaving gateways and networks.  Specifically,
   these are the border mechanisms (Section 5.6) and the mechanisms to
   sanction dishonest marking (Section 5.5).

   We also RECOMMEND adding improvements to forwarding on interior
   routers (Section 4.3.4).  But the system works whether all, some or



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   none are upgraded, so interior routers may be upgraded in a piecemeal
   fashion at any time.

8.  Design Choices and Rationale

   The primary insight of this work is that downstream congestion is the
   metric that would be most useful to control an internetwork, and
   particularly to police how one network responds to the congestion it
   causes in a remote network.  This is the problem that has previously
   made it so hard to provide scalable admission control.

   The case for using re-feedback (a generalisation of re-ECN) to police
   congestion response and provide QoS is made in [Re-fb].  Essentially,
   the insight is that congestion is a factor that crosses layers from
   the physical upwards.  Therefore re-feedback polices congestion as it
   crosses the physical interface between networks.  This is achieved by
   bringing information about congestion of resources later on the path
   to the interface, rather than trying to deal with congestion where it
   happens by examining the notoriously unreliable source address in
   packets.  Then congestion crossing the physical interface at a border
   can be policed at the interface, rather than policing the congestion
   on packets that claim to come from an address (which may be spoofed).
   Also, re-feedback works in the network layer independently of other
   layers--despite its name re-feedback does not actually require
   feedback.  It makes a source to act conservatively before it gets
   feedback.

   On the subject of lack of feedback, the feedback not established
   (FNE) codepoint is motivated by arguments for a state set-up bit in
   IP to prevent state exhaustion attacks.  This idea was first put
   forward informally by David Clark and developed by Handley and
   Greenhalgh in [Steps_DoS].  The idea is that network layer datagrams
   should signal explicitly when they require state to be created in the
   network layer or the layer above (e.g. at flow start).  Then a node
   can refuse to create any state unless a datagram declares this
   intent.  We believe the proposed FNE codepoint serves the same
   purpose as the proposed state set-up bit, but it has been overloaded
   with a more specific purpose, using it on more packets than just the
   first in a flow, but never less (i.e. it is idempotent).  In effect
   the FNE codepoint serves the purpose of a `soft-state set-up
   codepoint'.

   The re-feedback paper [Re-fb] also makes the case for converting the
   economic interpretation of congestion into hard engineering
   mechanism, which is the basis of the approach used in this memo.  The
   admission control gateways around the PCN-region use hard
   engineering, not incentives, to prevent end users from sending more
   traffic than they have reserved.  Incentive-based mechanisms are only



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   used between networks, because they are expected to respond to
   incentives more rationally than end-users can be expected to.
   However, even then, a network can use fail-safes to protect itself
   from excessively unusual behaviour by neighbouring networks, whether
   due to an accidental misconfiguration or malicious intent.

   The guiding principle behind the incentive-based approach used
   between networks is that any gain from subverting the protocol should
   be precisely neutralised, rather than punished.  If a gain is
   punished to a greater extent than is sufficient to neutralise it, it
   will most likely open up a new vulnerability, where the amplifying
   effect of the punishment mechanism can be turned on others.

   The re-feedback paper also makes the case against the use of
   congestion charging to police congestion if it is based on classic
   feedback (where only upstream congestion is visible to network
   elements).  It argues this would open up receiving networks to
   `denial of funds' attacks and would require end users to accept
   dynamic pricing (which few would).

   Re-PCN has been deliberately designed to simplify policing at the
   borders between networks.  These trust boundaries are the critical
   pinch-points that will limit the scalability of the whole
   internetwork unless the overall design minimises the complexity of
   security functions at these borders.  The border mechanisms described
   in this memo run passively in parallel to data forwarding and they do
   not require per-flow processing.

9.  Security Considerations

   This whole memo concerns the security of a scalable admission control
   system.  In particular the analysis section.  Below some specific
   security issues are mentioned that did not belong elsewhere or which
   comment on the overall robustness of the security provided by the
   design.

   Firstly, we must repeat the statement of applicability in the
   analysis: that we only consider new opportunities for _gainful_
   attack that our proposal introduces, particularly if the attacker can
   avoid being identified.  Despite only involving a few bits, there is
   sufficient complexity in the whole system that there are probably
   numerous possibilities for other attacks.  However, as far as we are
   aware, none reap any benefit to the attacker.  For instance, it would
   be possible for a downstream network to remove the congestion
   markings introduced by an upstream network, but it would only lose
   out on the penalties it could apply to a downstream network.

   When one network forwards a neighbouring network's traffic it will



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   always be possible to cause damage by dropping or corrupting it.
   Therefore we do not believe networks would set their routing policies
   to interconnect in the first place if they didn't trust the other
   networks not to arbitrarily damage their traffic.

   Having said this, we do want to highlight some of the weaker parts of
   our argument.

   o  We have argued that networks will be dissuaded from faking
      congestion marking by the possibility that upstream networks will
      route round them.  As we have said, these arguments are based on
      fairly delicate assumptions and will remain fairly tenuous until
      proved in practice, particularly close to the egress where less
      competitive routing is likely.

   o  Given the congestion feedback system is piggy-backed on flow
      signalling, which can be fairly infrequent, sanctions may not be
      appropriate until a flow has been persistently negative for
      perhaps 20s.  This may allow brief attacks to go unpunished.
      However, vulnerability to brief attacks may be reduced if the
      egress triggers asynchronous feedback when the congestion level on
      an aggregate has risen sufficiently since the last feedback,
      rather than waiting for the next opportunity to piggy-back on a
      signal.

   o  We should also point out that the approach in this memo was only
      designed to be robust for admission control.  We do not claim the
      incentives will always be strong enough to force correct flow
      termination behaviour.  This is because a user will tend to
      perceive much greater loss in value if a flow is terminated than
      if admission is denied at the start.  However, in general the
      incentives for correct flow termination are similar to those for
      admission control.

   Finally, it may seem that the 8 codepoints that have been made
   available by extending the ECN field with the RE flag have been used
   rather wastefully.  In effect the RE flag has been used as an
   orthogonal single bit in nearly all cases.  The only exception being
   when the ECN field is cleared to "00".  The mapping of the codepoints
   in an earlier version of this proposal used the codepoint space more
   efficiently, but the scheme became vulnerable to a network operator
   focusing its congestion marking to mark more positive than neutral
   packets in order to reduce its penalties (see Appendix B of
   [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp]).

   With the scheme as now proposed, once the RE flag is set or cleared
   by the sender or its proxy, it should not be written by the network,
   only read.  So the gateways can detect if any network maliciously



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   alters the RE flag.  IPSec AH integrity checking does not cover the
   IPv4 option flags (they were considered mutable--even the one we
   propose using for the RE flag that was `currently unused' when IPSec
   was defined).  But it would be sufficient for a pair of gateways to
   make random checks on whether the RE flag was the same when it
   reached the egress gateway as when it left the ingress.  Indeed, if
   IPSec AH had covered the RE flag, any network intending to alter
   sufficient RE flags to make a gain would have focused its alterations
   on packets without authenticating headers (AHs).

   Therefore, no cryptographic algorithms have been exploited in the
   making of this proposal.

10.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

11.  Conclusions

   This memo solves the classic problem of making flow admission control
   scale to any size network.  It builds on a technique, called PCN,
   which involves the use of Diffserv in a domain and uses pre-
   congestion notification feedback to control admission into each
   network path across the domain [RFC5559].

   Without PCN, Diffserv requires over-provisioning that must grow
   linearly with network diameter to cater for variation in the traffic
   matrix.  However, even with PCN, multiple network domains can only
   join together into one larger PCN region if all domains trust each
   other to comply with the protocols, invoking admission control and
   flow termination when requested.  Domains could join together and
   still police flows at their borders by requiring reservation
   signalling to touch each border and only use PCN internally to each
   domain.  But the per-flow processing at borders would still limit
   scalability.

   Instead, this memo proposes a technique called re-PCN which enables a
   PCN region to extend across multiple domains, without unscalable per-
   flow processing at borders, and still without the need for linear
   growth in capacity over-provisioning as the hop-diameter of the
   Diffserv region grows.

   We propose that the congestion feedback used for PCN-based admission
   control should be re-echoed into the forward data path, by making a
   trivial modification to the ingress gateway.  We then explain how the
   resulting downstream pre-congestion metric in packets can be
   monitored in bulk at borders to sufficiently emulate flow rate
   policing.



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   We claim the result of combining these two approaches is an admission
   control system that scales to any size network _and_ any number of
   interconnected networks, even if they all act in their own interests.

   This proposal aims to convince its readers to "Design in Security
   from the start," by ensuring the PCN wire protocol encoding can
   accommodate the extended set of codepoints defined in this document,
   even if per-flow policing is used at first rather than the bulk
   border policing described here.  This way, we will not build
   ourselves tomorrow's legacy problem.

   Re-echoing congestion feedback is based on a principled technique
   called Re-ECN [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp], designed to add
   accountability for causing congestion to the general-purpose IP
   datagram service.  Re-ECN proposes to consume the last completely
   unused bit in the basic IPv4 header or it uses extension header in
   IPv6.

12.  Acknowledgements

   All the following have given helpful comments either on re-PCN or on
   relevant parts of re-ECN that re-PCN uses: Arnaud Jacquet, Alessandro
   Salvatori, Steve Rudkin, David Songhurst, John Davey, Ian Self,
   Anthony Sheppard, Carla Di Cairano-Gilfedder (BT), Mark Handley (who
   identified the excess canceled packets attack), Stephen Hailes, Adam
   Greenhalgh (UCL), Francois Le Faucheur, Anna Charny (Cisco), Jozef
   Babiarz, Kwok-Ho Chan, Corey Alexander (Nortel), David Clark, Bill
   Lehr, Sharon Gillett, Steve Bauer (MIT) (who publicised various dummy
   traffic attacks), Sally Floyd (ICIR) and comments from participants
   in the CFP/CRN Inter-Provider QoS, Broadband and DoS-Resistant
   Internet working groups.

13.  Comments Solicited

   Comments and questions are encouraged and very welcome.  They can be
   addressed to the IETF Congestion and Pre-Congestion Notification
   working group's mailing list <pcn@ietf.org>, and/or to the author(s).

14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp]           Briscoe, B., Jacquet, A.,
                                            Moncaster, T., and A. Smith,
                                            "Re-ECN: Adding
                                            Accountability for Causing
                                            Congestion to TCP/IP", draft
                                            -briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp-08



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                                            (work in progress),
                                            September 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-pcn-baseline-encoding]         Moncaster, T., Briscoe, B.,
                                            and M. Menth, "Baseline
                                            Encoding and Transport of
                                            Pre-Congestion Information",
                                            draft-ietf-pcn-baseline-
                                            encoding-07 (work in
                                            progress), September 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-pcn-marking-behaviour]         Eardley, P., "Metering and
                                            marking behaviour of PCN-
                                            nodes", draft-ietf-pcn-
                                            marking-behaviour-05 (work
                                            in progress), August 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-ecn-tunnel]              Briscoe, B., "Tunnelling of
                                            Explicit Congestion
                                            Notification", draft-ietf-
                                            tsvwg-ecn-tunnel-03 (work in
                                            progress), July 2009.

   [RFC2119]                                Bradner, S., "Key words for
                                            use in RFCs to Indicate
                                            Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
                                            RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2211]                                Wroclawski, J.,
                                            "Specification of the
                                            Controlled-Load Network
                                            Element Service", RFC 2211,
                                            September 1997.

   [RFC3168]                                Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S.,
                                            and D. Black, "The Addition
                                            of Explicit Congestion
                                            Notification (ECN) to IP",
                                            RFC 3168, September 2001.

   [RFC3246]                                Davie, B., Charny, A.,
                                            Bennet, J., Benson, K., Le
                                            Boudec, J., Courtney, W.,
                                            Davari, S., Firoiu, V., and
                                            D. Stiliadis, "An Expedited
                                            Forwarding PHB (Per-Hop
                                            Behavior)", RFC 3246,
                                            March 2002.



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   [RFC4774]                                Floyd, S., "Specifying
                                            Alternate Semantics for the
                                            Explicit Congestion
                                            Notification (ECN) Field",
                                            BCP 124, RFC 4774,
                                            November 2006.

14.2.  Informative References

   [CLoop_pol]                              Salvatori, A., "Closed Loop
                                            Traffic Policing",
                                            Politecnico Torino and
                                            Institut Eurecom Masters
                                            Thesis , September 2005.

   [ECN-BGP]                                Mortier, R. and I. Pratt,
                                            "Incentive Based Inter-
                                            Domain Routeing", Proc
                                            Internet Charging and QoS
                                            Technology Workshop
                                            (ICQT'03) pp308--317,
                                            September 2003, <http://
                                            research.microsoft.com/
                                            users/mort/
                                            publications.aspx>.

   [I-D.arumaithurai-nsis-pcn]              Arumaithurai, M., "NSIS PCN-
                                            QoSM: A Quality of Service
                                            Model for Pre-Congestion
                                            Notification  (PCN)", draft-
                                            arumaithurai-nsis-pcn-00
                                            (work in progress),
                                            September 2007.

   [I-D.charny-pcn-single-marking]          Charny, A., Zhang, X.,
                                            Faucheur, F., and V.
                                            Liatsos, "Pre-Congestion
                                            Notification Using Single
                                            Marking for Admission and
                                            Termination", draft-charny-
                                            pcn-single-marking-03 (work
                                            in progress), November 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-nsis-rmd]                      Bader, A., Westberg, L.,
                                            Karagiannis, G., Kappler,
                                            C., Tschofenig, H., Phelan,
                                            T., Takacs, A., and A.
                                            Csaszar, "RMD-QOSM - The



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                                            Resource Management in
                                            Diffserv QOS Model",
                                            draft-ietf-nsis-rmd-15 (work
                                            in progress), July 2009.

   [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-admitted-realtime-dscp]  Baker, F., Polk, J., and M.
                                            Dolly, "DSCP for Capacity-
                                            Admitted Traffic", draft-
                                            ietf-tsvwg-admitted-
                                            realtime-dscp-05 (work in
                                            progress), November 2008.

   [IXQoS]                                  Briscoe, B. and S. Rudkin,
                                            "Commercial Models for IP
                                            Quality of Service
                                            Interconnect", BT Technology
                                            Journal (BTTJ) 23(2)171--
                                            195, April 2005, <http://
                                            www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/
                                            B.Briscoe/pubs.html#ixqos>.

   [QoS_scale]                              Reid, A., "Economics and
                                            Scalability of QoS
                                            Solutions", BT Technology
                                            Journal (BTTJ) 23(2)97--117,
                                            April 2005.

   [RFC2205]                                Braden, B., Zhang, L.,
                                            Berson, S., Herzog, S., and
                                            S. Jamin, "Resource
                                            ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP)
                                            -- Version 1 Functional
                                            Specification", RFC 2205,
                                            September 1997.

   [RFC2207]                                Berger, L. and T. O'Malley,
                                            "RSVP Extensions for IPSEC
                                            Data Flows", RFC 2207,
                                            September 1997.

   [RFC2208]                                Mankin, A., Baker, F.,
                                            Braden, B., Bradner, S.,
                                            O'Dell, M., Romanow, A.,
                                            Weinrib, A., and L. Zhang,
                                            "Resource ReSerVation
                                            Protocol (RSVP) Version 1
                                            Applicability Statement Some
                                            Guidelines on Deployment",



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                                            RFC 2208, September 1997.

   [RFC2747]                                Baker, F., Lindell, B., and
                                            M. Talwar, "RSVP
                                            Cryptographic
                                            Authentication", RFC 2747,
                                            January 2000.

   [RFC2998]                                Bernet, Y., Ford, P.,
                                            Yavatkar, R., Baker, F.,
                                            Zhang, L., Speer, M.,
                                            Braden, R., Davie, B.,
                                            Wroclawski, J., and E.
                                            Felstaine, "A Framework for
                                            Integrated Services
                                            Operation over Diffserv
                                            Networks", RFC 2998,
                                            November 2000.

   [RFC3540]                                Spring, N., Wetherall, D.,
                                            and D. Ely, "Robust Explicit
                                            Congestion Notification
                                            (ECN) Signaling with
                                            Nonces", RFC 3540,
                                            June 2003.

   [RFC4301]                                Kent, S. and K. Seo,
                                            "Security Architecture for
                                            the Internet Protocol",
                                            RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4727]                                Fenner, B., "Experimental
                                            Values In IPv4, IPv6,
                                            ICMPv4, ICMPv6, UDP, and TCP
                                            Headers", RFC 4727,
                                            November 2006.

   [RFC5129]                                Davie, B., Briscoe, B., and
                                            J. Tay, "Explicit Congestion
                                            Marking in MPLS", RFC 5129,
                                            January 2008.

   [RFC5559]                                Eardley, P., "Pre-Congestion
                                            Notification (PCN)
                                            Architecture", RFC 5559,
                                            June 2009.

   [RSVP-ECN]                               Le Faucheur, F., Charny, A.,



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                                            Briscoe, B., Eardley, P.,
                                            Babiarz, J., and K. Chan,
                                            "RSVP Extensions for
                                            Admission Control over
                                            Diffserv using Pre-
                                            congestion Notification",
                                            draft-lefaucheur-rsvp-ecn-01
                                            (work in progress),
                                            June 2006.

   [Re-fb]                                  Briscoe, B., Jacquet, A., Di
                                            Cairano-Gilfedder, C.,
                                            Salvatori, A., Soppera, A.,
                                            and M. Koyabe, "Policing
                                            Congestion Response in an
                                            Internetwork Using Re-
                                            Feedback", ACM SIGCOMM
                                            CCR 35(4)277--288,
                                            August 2005, <http://
                                            www.acm.org/sigs/sigcomm/
                                            sigcomm2005/
                                            techprog.html#session8>.

   [Smart_rtg]                              Goldenberg, D., Qiu, L.,
                                            Xie, H., Yang, Y., and Y.
                                            Zhang, "Optimizing Cost and
                                            Performance for
                                            Multihoming", ACM SIGCOMM
                                            CCR 34(4)79--92,
                                            October 2004, <http://
                                            citeseer.ist.psu.edu/
                                            698472.html>.

   [Steps_DoS]                              Handley, M. and A.
                                            Greenhalgh, "Steps towards a
                                            DoS-resistant Internet
                                            Architecture", Proc. ACM
                                            SIGCOMM workshop on Future
                                            directions in network
                                            architecture (FDNA'04) pp
                                            49--56, August 2004.

Appendix A.  Implementation

A.1.  Ingress Gateway Algorithm for Blanking the RE flag

   The ingress gateway receives regular feedback 'PCN-feedback-
   information' reporting the fraction of congestion marked octets for



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   each aggregate arriving at the egress.  So for each aggregate it
   should blank the RE flag on this fraction of octets.  A suitable
   pseudo-code algorithm for the ingress gateway is as follows:
   ====================================================================
   for each PCN-capable-packet {
       if RAND(0,1) <= PCN-feedback-information
           writeRE(0);
       else
           writeRE(1);
   }
   ====================================================================

A.2.  Downstream Congestion Metering Algorithms

A.2.1.  Bulk Downstream Congestion Metering Algorithm

   To meter the bulk amount of downstream pre-congestion in traffic
   crossing an inter-domain border, an algorithm is needed that
   accumulates the size of positive packets and subtracts the size of
   negative packets.  We maintain two counters:

      V_b: accumulated pre-congestion volume

      B: total data volume (in case it is needed)

   A suitable pseudo-code algorithm for a border router is as follows:

   ====================================================================
   V_b = 0
   B   = 0
   for each PCN-capable packet {
       b = readLength(packet)      /* set b to packet size          */
       B += b                      /* accumulate total volume       */
       if readEPCN(packet) == (Re-PCT-Echo || FNE) {
           V_b += b                /* increment...                  */
       } elseif readEPCN(packet) == ( AM(-1) || TM(-1) ) {
           V_b -= b                /* ...or decrement V_b...        */
       }                           /*...depending on EPCN field     */
   }
   ====================================================================

   At the end of an accounting period this counter V_b represents the
   pre-congestion volume that penalties could be applied to, as
   described in Section 5.3.

   For instance, accumulated volume of pre-congestion through a border
   interface over a month might be V_b = 5TB (terabyte = 10^12 byte).
   This might have resulted from an average downstream pre-congestion



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   level of 0.001% on an accumulated total data volume of B = 500PB
   (petabyte = 10^15 byte).

A.2.2.  Inflation Factor for Persistently Negative Flows

   The following process is suggested to complement the simple algorithm
   above in order to protect against the various attacks from
   persistently negative flows described in Section 5.6.1.  As explained
   in that section, the most important and first step is to estimate the
   contribution of persistently negative flows to the bulk volume of
   downstream pre-congestion and to inflate this bulk volume as if these
   flows weren't there.  The process below has been designed to give an
   unbiased estimate, but it may be possible to define other processes
   that achieve similar ends.

   While the above simple metering algorithm (Appendix A.2) is counting
   the bulk of traffic over an accounting period, the meter should also
   select a subset of the whole flow ID space that is small enough to be
   able to realistically measure but large enough to give a realistic
   sample.  Many different samples of different subsets of the ID space
   should be taken at different times during the accounting period,
   preferably covering the whole ID space.  During each sample, the
   meter should count the volume of positive packets and subtract the
   volume of negative, maintaining a separate account for each flow in
   the sample.  It should run a lot longer than the large majority of
   flows, to avoid a bias from missing the starts and ends of flows,
   which tend to be positive and negative respectively.

   Once the accounting period finishes, the meter should calculate the
   total of the accounts V_{bI} for the subset of flows I in the sample,
   and the total of the accounts V_{fI} excluding flows with a negative
   account from the subset I. Then the weighted mean of all these
   samples should be taken a_S = sum_{forall I} V_{fI} / sum_{forall I}
   V_{bI}.

   If V_b is the result of the bulk accounting algorithm over the
   accounting period (Appendix A.2.1) it can be inflated by this factor
   a_S to get a good unbiased estimate of the volume of downstream
   congestion over the accounting period a_S.V_b, without being polluted
   by the effect of persistently negative flows.

A.3.  Algorithm for Sanctioning Negative Traffic

   {ToDo: Write up algorithms similar to Appendix E of
   [I-D.briscoe-tsvwg-re-ecn-tcp] for the negative flow monitor with
   flow management algorithm and the variant with bounded flow state.}





Briscoe                  Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 58]


Internet-Draft      Bulk Border Policing using Re-ECN       October 2009


Author's Address

   Bob Briscoe
   BT
   B54/77, Adastral Park
   Martlesham Heath
   Ipswich  IP5 3RE
   UK

   Phone: +44 1473 645196
   EMail: bob.briscoe@bt.com
   URI:   http://bobbriscoe.net/







































Briscoe                  Expires April 29, 2010                [Page 59]


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