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Versions: 00 01 02 03

Internet Engineering Task Force                             H. Brockhaus
Internet-Draft                                                   Siemens
Updates: 4210 (if approved)                             November 3, 2019
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: May 6, 2020


                              CMP Updates
                  draft-brockhaus-lamps-cmp-updates-01

Abstract

   This document contains a set of updates to the base syntax of
   Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) version 2.  This document
   updates RFC 4210.

   Specifically, the CMP services updated in this document comprise the
   enabling of using EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue and the
   definition of extended key usages to identify certificates of CMP
   endpoints on certification and registration authorities.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  History of changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Convention and Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) .   3
     3.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210 . . . . . . . .   3
     3.2.  New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage  . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values . . . . . . . .   5
     3.5.  Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response  . . . . .   7
     3.6.  Update Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase  . . . .   8
     3.7.  New Section  - Polling Request and Response . . . . . . .   8
     3.8.  Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase  . .   9
     3.9.  Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral
           Clarifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.10. Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification
           (Basic Authenticated Scheme)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  History of changes

   From version 00 -> 01:

   o  Add a section describing the new extended key usages

   o  Complete the section on changes to the specification of encrypted
      values

   o  Add a section on a clarification to Appendix D.4

   o  Add a section describing the new extended key usages

   o  Minor generalization in sections 5.1.3.4 and 5.3.22

   o  Minor changes in wording



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2.  Introduction

   While using CMP [RFC4210] in industrial and IoT environments and
   developing the Lightweight CMP Profile
   [I-D.brockhaus-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile] some limitations were
   identified in the original CMP specification.  This document updates
   RFC 4210 [RFC4210] to overcome these limitations.

   In general this document aims to improve the crypto agility of CMP to
   be flexible to react on future advances in cryptography.

   This document also introduces new extended key usages to identify CMP
   services on registration and certification authorities.

2.1.  Convention and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

   In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
   only when in ALL CAPS.  Lower case uses of these words are not to be
   interpreted as carrying significance described in RFC 2119.

   Technical terminology is used in conformance with RFC 4210 [RFC4210],
   RFC 4211 [RFC4211], and RFC 5280 [RFC5280].  The following key words
   are used:

   CA:     Certification authority, which issues certificates.

   RA:     Registration authority, an optional system component to which
           a CA delegates certificate management functions such as
           authorization checks.

   KGA:    Key generation authority, which generates key pairs on behalf
           of an EE.  The KGA could be co-located with a RA or a CA.

   EE:     End entity, a user, device, or service that holds a PKI
           certificate.  An identifier for the EE is given as its
           subject of the certificate.

3.  Updates to RFC 4210 - Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)

3.1.  New Section 1.1. - Changes since RFC 4210

   The following subsections describe feature updates to RFC 4210
   [RFC4210].  They are always related to the base specification.  Hence




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   references to the original sections in RFC 4210 [RFC4210] are used
   whenever possible.

   Insert this section at the end of the current Section 1.

   The following updates were made since RFC 4210:

   o  Offering envelopedData as another choice next to EncryptedValue to
      extend crypto agility in CMP.  Note that according to RFC 4211
      [RFC4211] section 2.1.9 the use of the EncryptedValue structure
      has been deprecated in favor of the EnvelopedData structure.  For
      reasons of completeness and consistency the exchange of
      EncryptedValue with EncryptedKey is performed not only where
      required for the needed crypto agility for protection of centrally
      generated private key, but also for other purposes like encryption
      of certificates and revocation passphrases.

   o  Add new extended key usages for different CMP server types, e.g.
      Registration authority and certification authority.

3.2.  New Section 4.5 - Extended Key Usage

   Insert this section.

   The Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension indicates the purposes for
   which the certified public key may be used.  It therefore restricts
   the use of a certificate to specific applications.  Certificates used
   for CMP message protection or signed data for central key generation
   SHOULD use one of the following EKUs to express its authorization for
   acting as the PKI management entities described below.  The ASN.1 to
   define these EKUs is:

   id-kp-cmpCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp ... }
   id-kp-cmpRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp ... }
   id-kp-cmpKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp ... }

   < TBD: IDs to be defined. >

   The description of the PKI entity for each of the EKUs is as follows:

   CMP Certification Authorities as described in section 3.1.1.2 are
   identified by the id-kp-cmpCA extended key usage in the context of
   CMP management operations, especially CMP message protection.  The
   certificate may be the same as or different than the CA uses to sign
   a certificate.  If a different certificate is used for CMP management
   operations, the certificates containing the id-kp-cmpCA extended key
   usage SHOULD have the same name as the certificate used for issuing
   certificates.



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   Note: Using a separate key pair for protecting CMP management
   operations at the CA decreases the number of operations of the
   private key used to sign certificates.

   CMP Registration Authorities as described in section 3.1.1.3 are
   identified by the id-kp-cmpRA extended key usage.  This usage is
   placed into RA certificates.

   CMP Key Generation Authorities are identified by the id-kp-cmPKGA
   extended key usage.  Though the KGA knows the private key it
   generated on behalf of the end entity, this is a very sensible
   service and needs specific authorization.  This authorization is
   indicated by placing the id-kp-cmpKGA extended key usage into the RA
   or CA certificate used to protect the origin of the private key to
   express the aithorization to offer this service.

3.3.  Replace Section 5.1.3.4 - Multiple Protection

   Section 5.1.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the nested Message.
   This document deletes the stipulation that all PKI messages contained
   in a nested message must be of the same type.

   Replace the last paragraph in Section 5.1.3.4 with the following
   text.

   (The use of PKIMessages, a SEQUENCE OF PKIMessage, lets the RA batch
   the requests of several EEs in a single new message.)  If the RA
   wishes to modify the message(s) in some way (e.g., add particular
   field values or new extensions), then it MAY create its own desired
   PKIBody.  The original PKIMessage from the EE MAY be included in the
   generalInfo field of PKIHeader (to accommodate, for example, cases in
   which the CA wishes to check POP or other information on the original
   EE message).  The infoType to be used in this situation is {id-it 15}
   (see Section 5.3.19 for the value of id-it) and the infoValue is
   PKIMessages (contents MUST be in the same order as the requests in
   PKIBody).

3.4.  Replace Section 5.2.2. - Encrypted Values

   Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of
   EncryptedValue to transport encrypted data.  This document extends
   the encryption of data to also use EnvelopedData.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text.

   Where encrypted data (restricted, in this specification, to be either
   private keys, certificates or passwords) are sent in PKI messages,
   the EncryptedKey data structure is used.



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   EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
      encryptedValue        EncryptedValue, -- deprecated
      envelopedData     [0] EnvelopedData }

   See CRMF [RFC4211] for EncryptedKey and EncryptedValue syntax and for
   EnvelopedData syntax see CMS [RFC5652].  Using the EncryptedKey data
   structure, the choice to either use EncryptedValue (for backward
   compatibility only) or EnvelopedData is offered.  The use of the
   EncryptedValue structure has been deprecated in favor of the
   EnvelopedData structure.  Therefore, it is recommended to use
   EnvelopedData.

   The EncryptedKey data structure is used in CMP to either transport a
   private key, certificate or revocation passphrase in encrypted form.

   EnvelopedData is used as follows:

   o  Contains only one recepientInfo structure because the content is
      encrypted only for one recipient.

   o  Contains the private key in a SignedData structure as specified in
      CMS section 5 [RFC5652] signed by the Key Generation Authority.

   o  Contains the certificate or revocation passphrase directly in the
      encryptedContent field.

   Note: When transferring a centrally generated private key in a
   certificate response message to the EE, the algorithm identifier and
   the associated public key will anyhow be transported in this response
   message.  Therefore, the private key will not be delivered in a key
   package structure as specified in [RFC5958] and [RFC6032].  But the
   wrapping of the private key in a SignedData structure that is wrapped
   in an this EnvelopedData structure as specified in [RFC6032] is
   applied here.

   The content of the EnvelopedData structure, as specified in CMS
   section 3 [RFC5652], MUST be encrypted using a newly generated
   symmetric content-encryption key.  This content-encryption key MUST
   be securely provided to the recipient using one of three key
   management techniques.

   The choice of the key management technique to be used by the sender
   depends on the ceredential available for the recitpient:

   o  Jointly shared secret: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the symmetric key-encryption key management
      technique, as specified in CMS section 5.2.3 [RFC5652].




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   o  Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
      asserting keyAgreement: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the key agreement key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 5.2.2 [RFC5652].

   o  Recipient's certificate that contains a key usage extension
      asserting keyEncipherment: The content-encryption key will be
      protected using the key transport key management technique, as
      specified in CMS section 5.2.1 [RFC5652].

   The EncryptedValue data structure MAY be used for backward
   compatibility reasons.  Use of this data structure requires that the
   creator and intended recipient be able to encrypt and decrypt,
   respectively.  Typically, this will mean that the sender and
   recipient have, or are able to generate, a shared secret key.  If the
   recipient of the PKIMessage already possesses a private key usable
   for decryption, then the encSymmKey field MAY contain a session key
   encrypted using the corresponding recipient's public key.

3.5.  Update Section 5.3.4. - Certification Response

   Section 5.3.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the Certification
   Response.  This document updates the syntax by using EncryptedKey
   instead of EncryptedValue as described in Section 3.1 above.

   Replace the ASN.1 syntax of CertifiedKeyPair and CertOrEncCert with
   the following text.

   CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
       certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
       privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey        OPTIONAL,
       -- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
       publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL
   }

   CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
       certificate     [0] Certificate,
       encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
   }

   Add the following paragraphs to the end of the section.

   The use of EncryptedKey is described in section 5.2.2.








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3.6.  Update Section 5.3.19.9. - Revocation Passphrase

   Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the provisioning of
   a revocation passphrase for authenticating a later revocation
   request.  This document updates the handling by using EncryptedKey
   instead of EncryptedValue to transport this information as described
   in Section 3.1 above.

   Replace the text of the section with the following text.

   The revocation passphrase MAY be used by the EE to send a passphrase
   to a CA/RA for the purpose of authenticating a later revocation
   request (in the case that the appropriate signing private key is no
   longer available to authenticate the request).  See Appendix B for
   further details on the use of this mechanism.

   GenMsg:    {id-it 12}, EncryptedKey
   GenRep:    {id-it 12}, < absent >

   The use of EncryptedKey is described in section 5.2.2.

3.7.  New Section - Polling Request and Response

   Section 5.3.22 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes when and how polling
   messages are used.  This document adds the polling mechanism also to
   outstanding p10cr transactions.

   Replace the all paragraphs in front of the state machine diagram in
   Section 5.3.22 with the following text.

   This pair of messages is intended to handle scenarios in which the
   client needs to poll the server in order to determine the status of
   an outstanding ir, cr, p10cr, or kur transaction (i.e., when the
   "waiting" PKIStatus has been received).

   PollReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId    INTEGER }

   PollRepContent ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
       certReqId    INTEGER,
       checkAfter   INTEGER,  -- time in seconds
       reason       PKIFreeText OPTIONAL }

   The following clauses describe when polling messages are used, and
   how they are used.  It is assumed that multiple certConf messages can
   be sent during transactions.  There will be one sent in response to
   each ip, cp, or kup that contains a CertStatus for an issued
   certificate.



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   1  In response to an ip, cp, or kup message, an EE will send a
       certConf for all issued certificates and, following the ack, a
       pollReq for all pending certificates.

   2  In response to a pollReq, a CA/RA will return an ip, cp, or kup if
       one or more of the pending certificates is ready; otherwise, it
       will return a pollRep.

   3  If the EE receives a pollRep, it will wait for at least as long as
       the checkAfter value before sending another pollReq.

   4  If an ip, cp, or kup is received in response to a pollReq, then it
       will be treated in the same way as the initial response.

   Note: As the PKCS#10 [RFC2986] does not contain a certificate request
   number, it is assumed that there is only one CertificationRequestInfo
   data structure in a p10cr message and the certReqId is to be det to 0
   in all following messages of this transaction.

3.8.  Update Appendix B - The Use of Revocation Passphrase

   Appendix B of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] describes the usage of the
   revocation passphrases.  As this document updates RFC 4210 [RFC4210]
   to utilize EncryptedKey in favor of EncryptedValue as described in
   Section 3.1 above, the description is updated accordingly.

   Replace the first bullet point of this section with the following
   text.

   o  The OID and value specified in Section 5.3.19.9 of RFC 4210
      [RFC4210] MAY be sent in a GenMsg message at any time, or MAY be
      sent in the generalInfo field of the PKIHeader of any PKIMessage
      at any time.  (In particular, the EncryptedKey as described in
      section 5.2.2 may be sent in the header of the certConf message
      that confirms acceptance of certificates requested in an
      initialization request or certificate request message.)  This
      conveys a revocation passphrase chosen by the entity (i.e., for
      use of EnvelopedData this is in the decrypted bytes of
      encryptedContent of the EnvelopedData structure and for use of
      EncryptedValue this is in the decrypted bytes of the encValue
      field) to the relevant CA/RA; furthermore, the transfer is
      accomplished with appropriate confidentiality characteristics.

   Replace the third bullet point of this section with the following
   text.

   o  When using EnvelopedData the contentType of EncryptedContentInfo
      and when using EncryptedValue the valueHint field MAY contain a



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      key identifier (chosen by the entity, along with the passphrase
      itself) to assist in later retrieval of the correct passphrase
      (e.g., when the revocation request is constructed by the entity
      and received by the CA/RA).

3.9.  Update Appendix C - Request Message Behavioral Clarifications

   Appendix C of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides clarifications to the
   request message behavior.  As this document updates RFC 4210
   [RFC4210] to utilize EncryptedKey in favor of EncryptedValue as
   described in Section 3.1 above, the description is updated
   accordingly.

   Replace the note coming after the ASN.1 syntax of POPOPrivKey of this
   section with the following text.

   -- **********
   -- *  the type of "thisMessage" is given as BIT STRING in RFC 4211
   -- *  [RFC4211]; it should be "EncryptedKey" (in accordance with
   -- *  Section 5.2.2, "Encrypted Values", of this specification).
   -- *  Therefore, this document makes the behavioral clarification of
   -- *  specifying that the contents of "thisMessage" MUST be encoded
   -- *  either as EnvelopedData or EncryptedValue (only for backward
   -- *  compatibility) and then wrapped in a BIT STRING.  This allows
   -- *  the necessary conveyance and protection of the private key
   -- *  while maintaining bits-on-the-wire compatibility with RFC 4211
   -- *  [RFC4211].
   -- **********

3.10.  Update Appendix D.4. - Initial Registration/Certification (Basic
       Authenticated Scheme)

   Appendix D.4 of RFC 4210 [RFC4210] provides the initial registration/
   certification scheme.  This scheme shall continue to use
   EncryptedValue for backward compatibility reasons.

   Replace the comment after the privateKey field of
   crc[1].certifiedKeyPair in the syntax of the Initialization Response
   message with the following text.

   -- see Appendix C, Request Message Behavioral Clarifications
   -- for backward compatibility reasons, use EncryptedValue

4.  IANA Considerations

   <Add any IANA considerations>





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5.  Security Considerations

   No changes are made to the existing security considerations of
   RFC 4210 [RFC4210].

6.  Acknowledgements

   Special thank goes to Jim Schaad his guidance and for the inspiration
   I got from [RFC6402] that updates CMC in a similar manner.

   I also like to thank all reviewers of this document for their
   valuable feedback.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC4210]  Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
              "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
              Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4211>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.




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7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.brockhaus-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile]
              Brockhaus, H., Fries, S., and D. Oheimb, "Lightweight CMP
              Profile", draft-brockhaus-lamps-lightweight-cmp-profile-00
              (work in progress), July 2019.

   [RFC5958]  Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958>.

   [RFC6032]  Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax
              (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6032,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6032, December 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6032>.

   [RFC6402]  Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
              Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6402>.

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Modules

   Changes to the following parts are needed

   o  Import from PKIKXCRMF-2005

   CertTemplate, PKIPublicationInfo, EncryptedKey, CertId,
   CertReqMessages
       FROM PKIXCRMF-2005 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
       dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
       id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf2005(36)}

   o  In CertifiedKeyPair, CertOrEncCert and id-it-revPassphrase


















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   CertifiedKeyPair ::= SEQUENCE {
       certOrEncCert       CertOrEncCert,
       privateKey      [0] EncryptedKey        OPTIONAL,
       -- see [CRMF] for comment on encoding
       publicationInfo [1] PKIPublicationInfo  OPTIONAL
   }

   CertOrEncCert ::= CHOICE {
       certificate     [0] CMPCertificate,
       encryptedCert   [1] EncryptedKey
   }

   --   id-it-revPassphrase    OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-it 12}
   --      RevPassphraseValue      ::= EncryptedKey

   --
   -- Extended Key Usage extension for PKI entities used in
   -- CMP operations
   --

   id-kp-cmpCA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp ... }
   id-kp-cmpRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp ... }
   id-kp-cmpKGA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp ... }
   < TBD: IDs to be defined. >

   < TBD: If needed the complete ASN.1 Module from RFC 4210 section
   needs to be copied here. >

Author's Address

   Hendrik Brockhaus
   Siemens AG
   Otto-Hahn-Rin 6
   Munich  81739
   Germany

   Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
   URI:   http://www.siemens.com/













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