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ADD                                                         M. Boucadair
Internet-Draft                                                    Orange
Updates: 8484 (if approved)                                      N. Cook
Intended status: Standards Track                            Open-Xchange
Expires: October 12, 2020                                       T. Reddy
                                                                  McAfee
                                                                 D. Wing
                                                                  Citrix
                                                          April 10, 2020


     Supporting Redirect Responses in DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)
                 draft-btw-add-rfc8484-clarification-00

Abstract

   This document clarifies whether DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) redirection is
   allowed and specifies how redirection is thus performed.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Discussion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   4.  RFC8484 Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Resolving the Redirect Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.1.  Response Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Server Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Applicability to DoH Server Redirect  . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   This document clarifies the intent of DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484]
   whether redirection is allowed (Section 4), and subsequently
   specifies how redirection is performed (Sections 5 and 6).

   This document adheres to Section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-httpbis-bcp56bis]
   which discusses the need for protocols using HTTP to specify redirect
   handling to avoid interoperability problems.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   "A/AAAA" is used to refer to "A and/or AAAA records".

3.  Discussion

   [RFC8484] indicates that the support of HTTP redirection is one of
   DoH design goals (Section 1):

      "The described approach is more than a tunnel over HTTP.  It
      establishes default media formatting types for requests and



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      responses but uses normal HTTP content negotiation mechanisms for
      selecting alternatives that endpoints may prefer in anticipation
      of serving new use cases.  In addition to this media type
      negotiation, it aligns itself with HTTP features such as caching,
      redirection, proxying, authentication, and compression.

      The integration with HTTP provides a transport suitable for both
      existing DNS clients and native web applications seeking access to
      the DNS."

   Nevertheless, Section 3 of [RFC8484] indicates the following:

      "This specification does not extend DNS resolution privileges to
      URIs that are not recognized by the DoH client as configured
      URIs."

   This looks like an internal inconsistency of [RFC8484] that is worth
   the clarification: is redirection allowed or not?

   Also, Section 3 of [RFC8484] indicates that:

      "A DoH client MUST NOT use a different URI simply because it was
      discovered outside of the client's configuration (such as through
      HTTP/2 server push) or because a server offers an unsolicited
      response that appears to be a valid answer to a DNS query."

   Nevertheless, [RFC8484] does not:

   o  specify under which conditions a discovered different URI can be
      used.

   o  describe how a different URI can be discovered using HTTP/2 server
      push.  The only available example in the mailing list archives
      clarifies that server push is an example of unsolicited responses.

      The text was updated late in the publication process to address
      this comment: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/doh/f_V-tBgB-
      KRsLZhttx9tGt75cps/.  The example provided in the thread (server
      push) is related to the second part of the above excerpt.

   o  clarify that unsolicited messages from a trusted DoH server should
      be excluded.

   A clarification is proposed in Section 4.  This clarification focuses
   on a "different URI" that might be discovered while communicating
   with an HTTP server.





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   Additionally, assuming that redirection is allowed, this
   specification recommends how it is achieved, specifically regarding
   inline resolution of any domain name in the redirect URI.  This is
   required because redirection to a domain-based URI requires DNS
   resolution of that domain name, which creates a potential
   bootstrapping problem (e.g., If DoH server is the only configured DNS
   server, redirecting the client to a new server by presenting a name
   will fail).

4.  RFC8484 Update

   OLD:

      A DoH client MUST NOT use a different URI simply because it was
      discovered outside of the client's configuration (such as through
      HTTP/2 server push) or because a server offers an unsolicited
      response that appears to be a valid answer to a DNS query.

   NEW

      A DoH client MUST NOT use a different URI that was discovered
      outside of the client's configuration when communicating with HTTP
      servers except via HTTP redirection from a configured URI
      (Section 6.4 of [RFC7231]).

      Also, a DoH client MUST ignore an unsolicited response (such as
      through HTTP/2 server push) that appears to be a valid answer to a
      DNS query unless that response comes from a configured URI (as
      described in Section 5.3).

5.  Resolving the Redirect Domain

   Redirection in DoH is slightly different from "regular" HTTP
   redirection, in that the DoH server may be the only configured DNS
   resolver for the client (e.g., as per Section 7.1 of [RFC8310]).  In
   that case, and assuming the redirect URI uses a domain name, the
   client will be unable to contact the URI returned in the redirect
   response unless the DoH server provides the resolution information
   for that domain as part of the response.  Even if a DoH client has a
   plaintext DNS resolver configured, using that resolver is considered
   as a minimal privacy leakage [RFC8310].

   There are two possible approaches to resolving the redirect domain,
   which are not mutually exclusive, but may have different implications
   for clients:

   o  Returning the required A/AAAA information directly in the body of
      the redirect response (Section 5.1).



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   o  Using server push to provide the client with the required A/AAAA
      information (Section 5.2).

   Servers supporting DoH redirect MUST support returning the redirect
   response body mechanism and MAY support the server push mechanism.
   Server push has some issues as discussed in Section 4.14 of
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-bcp56bis].

5.1.  Response Body

   Returning the required DNS response information in the body of the
   redirect request is another approach to achieve the same goal.

   The approach is straightforward; the DoH server returns in the
   response body a DNS response with an application/dns-message media
   type as specified in Section 6 of [RFC8484], containing any A and
   AAAA records for the domain name in the redirect URI, including any
   CNAMEs.  For example if the redirect URI contains the domain name
   "redirect.example.com", and "redirect.example.com" is a CNAME
   pointing to "real.example.com", then an example response body would
   contain:

   o  A CNAME record for redirect.example.com

   o  Any A records for real.example.com

   o  Any AAAA records for real.example.com

   Advantages of this approach are simplicity; no client or server
   support of server push is required, and it is also more efficient in
   terms of the amount of data transmitted.

   The main disadvantage is that this approach requires new code to be
   developed in DoH clients to handle the new condition that a redirect
   response will contain a "application/dns-message" media type in the
   response body.  DoH clients using HTTP stacks to perform redirection
   transparently may run into problems, as this approach is specific to
   DoH.

5.2.  Server Push

   The DoH specification allows the use of server push to send DNS
   responses (Section 5.3 of [RFC8484]).  The typical use case for
   server push is when the server knows that the client will need to
   make a request for a resource, and so provides the answer to that
   request via the server push mechanism.  Sending answers to queries
   implies that the DoH server performs those queries itself, or
   retrieves them from its cache.



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   In this case, the DoH server knows that the DoH client will need to
   resolve the domain returned in the redirect URI.  Therefore, after
   receiving the initial request which would lead to a redirect
   response, but before returning the response, the server MUST send a
   push promise frame (Section 8.2.1 of [RFC7540]) request URL to
   retrieve the A/AAAA resource records for the domain in the redirect
   response (for example, if the domain has both A and AAAA records, two
   push promise frames would be sent).  Any intermediate CNAME records
   would result in additional push promise frames.  Promise requests
   cannot contain a request body as specified in Section 8.2.1 of
   [RFC7540], thus they MUST use the GET method specified in Sections
   4.1 and 6 of [RFC8484].  The A/AAAA responses are then sent in
   separate streams as specified in Section 8.2.2 of [RFC7540].
   Finally, the redirect response itself is sent.

   An example of the use of server push for redirection is shown in
   Figure 1.

     DoH client                                             DoH server
         |                                                        |
         |<===== Connect & TLS Negotiation ======================>|
         |====== DNS Request for example.com/A ==================>|
         |<===== Push Promise: GET redirect.example.com/A ========|
         |<===== Push Promise: GET redirect.example.com/AAAA =====|
         |<===== Redirect Response: https://redirect.example.com =|
         |<===== Push Response for redirect.example.com/A ========|
         |<===== Push Response for redirect.example.com/AAAA======|
         |                             ...                        |

                   Figure 1: Redirect using Server Push

   The advantage of using server push to provide the DNS resolution
   information of the redirect domain is that, assuming that the DoH
   client already supports unsolicited server push messages, then this
   approach should work without any changes.

   Disadvantages include the possibility that DoH clients do not support
   server push.

6.  Applicability to DoH Server Redirect

   This section specifies how DoH server redirection can be safely used
   to present a different URI to a requesting DoH client (Section 4).
   To that aim, the DoH server uses HTTP redirection (Section 6.4 in
   [RFC7231]) and one of the mechanisms discussed in Section 5 to inform
   the client about the new URI and location of the DoH server.





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   The mechanism discussed in [RFC7838] MAY be implemented by a DoH
   server if the DoH service is authoritatively available at a separate
   network location.  This mechanism requires the alternative service to
   present a certificate for the origin's host name.

   If the client does not support both server push (or disables server
   push) and the response body with A/AAAA information (Section 5.1), it
   will have to resolve the domain name in the redirected URI using
   Do53.

7.  Security Considerations

   DoH-related security considerations are discussed in Section 9 of
   [RFC8484].

   Section 9 of [RFC7838] describes security considerations related to
   the use of alternate services.

   DNS clients that ignore authentication failures and accept spoofed
   certificates will be subject to attacks (e.g., redirect to malicious
   servers, intercept sensitive data).

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not request any action from IANA.

9.  Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Christian Jacquenet and Philippe Fouquart for the
   review.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.







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   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

   [RFC7838]  Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
              Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838,
              April 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7838>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8310]  Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
              for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8310>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-bcp56bis]
              Nottingham, M., "Building Protocols with HTTP", draft-
              ietf-httpbis-bcp56bis-09 (work in progress), November
              2019.

Authors' Addresses

   Mohamed Boucadair
   Orange
   Rennes  35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com


   Neil Cook
   Open-Xchange
   UK

   Email: neil.cook@noware.co.uk







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   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   McAfee, Inc.
   Embassy Golf Link Business Park
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560071
   India

   Email: TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com


   Dan Wing
   Citrix Systems, Inc.
   USA

   Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com





































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