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ADD                                                         M. Boucadair
Internet-Draft                                                    Orange
Updates: 8484 (if approved)                                      N. Cook
Intended status: Standards Track                            Open-Xchange
Expires: January 7, 2021                                        T. Reddy
                                                                  McAfee
                                                                 D. Wing
                                                                  Citrix
                                                            July 6, 2020


        Supporting Redirection for DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)
                 draft-btw-add-rfc8484-clarification-02

Abstract

   This document clarifies whether DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) redirection is
   allowed, describes potential issues with redirection in DoH, and
   proposes how DoH redirection might be performed.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Discussion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  RFC8484 Update  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Issues with Redirection in DoH  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Service-Level Redirect  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  Well-Known URI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Resource-Level Redirect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.1.  resinfo Well-Known URI Suffix . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Extending Alternative Services . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   This document clarifies the intent of DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484]
   whether redirection is allowed (Section 4), potential issues with
   redirection in DoH (Section 5) and subsequently makes some proposals
   for how service-level (Section 6) and resource-level (Section 7)
   redirection might be performed.

   This document adheres to Section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-httpbis-bcp56bis]
   which discusses the need for protocols using HTTP to specify redirect
   handling to avoid interoperability problems.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   "A/AAAA" is used to refer to "A and/or AAAA records".






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3.  Discussion

   [RFC8484] indicates that the support of HTTP [RFC7540] redirection is
   one of DoH design goals (Section 1):

      "The described approach is more than a tunnel over HTTP.  It
      establishes default media formatting types for requests and
      responses but uses normal HTTP content negotiation mechanisms for
      selecting alternatives that endpoints may prefer in anticipation
      of serving new use cases.  In addition to this media type
      negotiation, it aligns itself with HTTP features such as caching,
      redirection, proxying, authentication, and compression.

      The integration with HTTP provides a transport suitable for both
      existing DNS clients and native web applications seeking access to
      the DNS."

   Nevertheless, Section 3 of [RFC8484] indicates the following:

      "This specification does not extend DNS resolution privileges to
      URIs that are not recognized by the DoH client as configured
      URIs."

   This looks like an internal inconsistency of [RFC8484] that is worth
   the clarification: is redirection allowed or not?

   Also, Section 3 of [RFC8484] indicates that:

      "A DoH client MUST NOT use a different URI simply because it was
      discovered outside of the client's configuration (such as through
      HTTP/2 server push) or because a server offers an unsolicited
      response that appears to be a valid answer to a DNS query."

   Nevertheless, [RFC8484] does not:

   o  specify under which conditions a discovered different URI can be
      used.

   o  describe how a different URI can be discovered using HTTP/2 server
      push.  The only available example in the mailing list archives
      clarifies that server push is an example of unsolicited responses.

      The text was updated late in the publication process to address
      this comment: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/doh/f_V-tBgB-
      KRsLZhttx9tGt75cps/.  The example provided in the thread (server
      push) is related to the second part of the above excerpt.





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   o  clarify that unsolicited messages from a configured DoH server
      should be excluded.

   A clarification is proposed in Section 4.  This clarification focuses
   on a "different URI" that might be discovered while communicating
   with an HTTP server.

   Additionally, assuming that redirection is allowed, this
   specification recommends how it is achieved.  This is required
   because redirection to a domain-based URI requires DNS resolution of
   that domain name, which creates a potential bootstrapping problem
   (e.g., If DoH server is the only configured DNS server, redirecting
   the client to a new server by presenting a name will fail).

4.  RFC8484 Update

   OLD:

      A DoH client MUST NOT use a different URI simply because it was
      discovered outside of the client's configuration (such as through
      HTTP/2 server push) or because a server offers an unsolicited
      response that appears to be a valid answer to a DNS query.

   NEW

      A DoH client MUST NOT use a different URI that was discovered
      outside of the client's configuration when communicating with HTTP
      servers except via HTTP redirection from a configured URI
      (Section 6.4 of [RFC7231]).

      Also, a DoH client MUST ignore an unsolicited response (such as
      through HTTP/2 server push) that appears to be a valid answer to a
      DNS query unless that response comes from a configured URI (as
      described in Section 5.3 of [RFC8484]).

5.  Issues with Redirection in DoH

   There are several potential issues with redirection in DoH, which are
   summarized below.

   The first issue to be considered is whether a new document
   considering redirection is needed at all.  Redirection in HTTP is
   done on a per-resource basis; if the only functionality required is
   to redirect all requests to an entirely different server under the
   same administrative control, then the alternative service mechanism
   described in [RFC7838] might be sufficient.  However, there are
   restrictions on the use of alternative services; specifically the
   certificate presented by the alternative service must be valid for



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   the origin.  This restriction means that alternative services cannot
   be used for use-cases such as redirecting the client to a locally
   administered DoH server (e.g., resolver or forwarder) which does not
   have a certificate valid for the origin.  Additionally, alternative
   services suffer from the bootstrapping issue described below.

   The second issue with using HTTP redirection is bootstrapping; any
   client that is relying solely upon a DoH server for resolution must
   be able to resolve the domain in the redirect response.  Even if a
   DoH client has a plaintext DNS resolver configured, using that
   resolver is considered as a minimal privacy leakage [RFC8310].  One
   possible solution is for the DoH client to use the same server that
   returned the redirect response to perform the resolution, however
   that may then lead to a further redirect response.  Another solution
   is for the DoH server to include additional information in the
   response, similar to the "glue" records as defined in [RFC7719].

   The final issue is that HTTP redirection is done on a per-resource
   basis; this presents several problems for DoH:

   1.  Every GET request with a new query name will require redirection,
       which is suboptimal.  Indeed, a redirect will only affect a
       unique request, and the DoH client will thus need to contact the
       origin server for every new request and get redirected, requiring
       two roundtrips.  Also, permanent redirects [RFC7538] for all
       these queries would bloat the client's HTTP cache.

   2.  Using POST requests would solve the issue.  Nevertheless POST
       responses are not widely cached as per Section 4.2.3 of
       [RFC7231], and mandating the use of POST requests for DoH in
       order to enable redirection hardly seems reasonable.

   The above issues would seem to indicate that despite the intention of
   [RFC8484] to align itself with HTTP redirection, some additional work
   is required in order for any other mechanism than alternative
   services (e.g., [RFC7838]) to be deployed with confidence.

   The rest of this document considers the issue of redirection at two
   levels:

   1.  Service-level Redirect: Similar to alternative services, this
       would allow a DoH server to redirect a DoH client to an
       alternative service for all future queries, rather than on a per-
       resource basis.

   2.  Resource-Level Redirect: Solving the bootstrapping problem for
       regular HTTP redirects.  Note that this doesn't solve the caching
       issues described above, and does raise the question of whether



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       regular HTTP redirection is desirable or worthwhile (i.e., are
       there any valid use-cases for resource-level redirection in
       DoH?).

6.  Service-Level Redirect

   We considered two possibilities for service-level redirect:

   1.  Extending [RFC7838] by relaxing the host authentication checks.

   2.  Using a well-known URI to return information about alternative
       services.

   Extending alternative services was considered, but rejected (see
   Appendix A for the reasons) in favour of the well-known URI approach.

6.1.  Well-Known URI

   We propose the use of the well-known URI mechanism [RFC8615], with
   the name "resinfo" to retrieve resolver information, which could
   include specifying alternative services, through the use of a JSON
   object in the response payload.  A well-known URI would thus look
   like "https://doh.example.com/.well-known/resinfo".

   The example in Figure 1 shows what a JSON object might look like that
   specified one or more alternative services.  The structure of the
   response is inspired by Section 4.4.2 of [RFC7975].

   Note that the response includes "glue" RR information to allow the
   alternative service to be accessed without further DNS queries, and
   includes an authenticated domain name to be used for authenticating
   the alternative service.



















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          {
            "associated-resolvers": {
              "adn": [
                {
                  "name": "cpe123.example.net",
                  "uri-template": [
                    "https://cpe123.example.net/dns-query{?dns}"
                  ],
                  "a": [
                    "192.0.2.1",
                    "192.0.2.2"
                  ],
                  "aaaa": [
                    "2001:db8::1",
                    "2001:db8::2"
                  ],
                  "ttl": 3600
                }
              ]
            }
          }


            Figure 1: Response Example with Glue RR Information


7.  Resource-Level Redirect

   Notwithstanding the issues with resource-level redirects described in
   Section 5, this section describes a proposal for returning the "glue"
   RRs required to avoid the bootstrapping issue described in that
   section (but not the roundtrip or caching issues).

   Servers supporting DoH redirect MUST support returning the redirect
   response body mechanism described hereafter.

      Note: "MUST" is used here because resolving the redirect name
      using Do53 will fail in some configurations, e.g.,
      https://wiki.mozilla.org/Trusted_Recursive_Resolver
      (network.trr.mode=3).

   Concretely, the DoH server returns in the response body a DNS
   response with an 'application/dns-message' media type as specified in
   Section 6 of [RFC8484], containing any A and AAAA records for the
   domain name in the redirect URI, including any CNAMEs.

   For example, if the redirect URI contains the domain name
   "redirect.example.com", and "redirect.example.com" is a CNAME



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   pointing to "real.example.com", then an example response body would
   contain:

   o  A CNAME record for "redirect.example.com"

   o  Any A records for "real.example.com"

   o  Any AAAA records for "real.example.com"

   This approach is simple; no client or server support of server push
   is required, and it is also more efficient in terms of the amount of
   data transmitted.

8.  Security Considerations

   DoH-related security considerations are discussed in Section 9 of
   [RFC8484].

   Section 9 of [RFC7838] describes security considerations related to
   the use of alternate services.  Relaxing the host authentication
   requirements would certainly warrant additional security
   considerations.

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  resinfo Well-Known URI Suffix

   This document requests IANA to assign the following well-known URI
   from the registry available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-
   known-uris/well-known-uris.xhtml.

      URI suffix: resinfo

      Change controller: IETF

      Specification document(s): This document

      Status: permanent

10.  Acknowledgements

   Many thanks to Christian Jacquenet, Philippe Fouquart, and Ben
   Schwartz for the comments.








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11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.

   [RFC7538]  Reschke, J., "The Hypertext Transfer Protocol Status Code
              308 (Permanent Redirect)", RFC 7538, DOI 10.17487/RFC7538,
              April 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7538>.

   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

   [RFC7838]  Nottingham, M., McManus, P., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
              Alternative Services", RFC 7838, DOI 10.17487/RFC7838,
              April 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7838>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8310]  Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
              for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8310>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

   [RFC8615]  Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
              (URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.








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11.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-bcp56bis]
              Nottingham, M., "Building Protocols with HTTP", draft-
              ietf-httpbis-bcp56bis-09 (work in progress), November
              2019.

   [RFC7719]  Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
              Terminology", RFC 7719, DOI 10.17487/RFC7719, December
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7719>.

   [RFC7975]  Niven-Jenkins, B., Ed. and R. van Brandenburg, Ed.,
              "Request Routing Redirection Interface for Content
              Delivery Network (CDN) Interconnection", RFC 7975,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7975, October 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7975>.

Appendix A.  Extending Alternative Services

   Section 9.2 of [RFC7838] discusses the possibilities for attackers to
   hijack the communication to an origin.  This is the justification for
   the requirement in Section 2.1 of [RFC7838] that "Clients MUST have
   reasonable assurances that the alternative service is under control
   of and valid for the whole origin.".

   However, when a DoH server presents an alternative DoH service to a
   DoH client, both the origin and alternative service, as well as the
   DNS queries and responses, must be, by definition, resistant to MITM
   attacks.  Thus it could be argued that in these circumstances,
   relaxing the host authentication requirements is justified.  The
   relaxation could be limited, e.g., still requiring some relationship
   between the origin and the alternative, or unlimited, allowing no
   such relationship to exist.

   However the bootstrapping issues described in Section 5 still apply,
   and there is no mechanism for the DoH server to specify an
   authenticated domain name to use to authenticate the alternative
   service, making this proposal unsuitable for deployment.

Authors' Addresses

   Mohamed Boucadair
   Orange
   Rennes  35000
   France

   Email: mohamed.boucadair@orange.com




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   Neil Cook
   Open-Xchange
   UK

   Email: neil.cook@noware.co.uk


   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   McAfee, Inc.
   Embassy Golf Link Business Park
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560071
   India

   Email: TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com


   Dan Wing
   Citrix Systems, Inc.
   USA

   Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com






























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