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Versions: 00 01 draft-ietf-hip-bone

HIP Working Group                                           G. Camarillo
Internet-Draft                                               P. Nikander
Expires: June 23, 2008                                     J. Hautakorpi
                                                                Ericsson
                                                       December 21, 2007


    HIP BONE: Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Based Overlay Networking
                              Environment
                    draft-camarillo-hip-bone-00.txt

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

Abstract

   This document specifies a framework to build HIP (Host Identity
   Protocol)-based overlay networks.  This framework uses HIP to perform
   connection management.  Other functions, such as data storage and
   retrieval or overlay maintenance, are implemented using protocols
   other than HIP.  These protocols are loosely referred to as peer
   protocols.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Background on HIP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  ID/locator Split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
       2.1.1.  Identifier Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.2.  HIP Base Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
       2.1.3.  Locator Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.2.  NAT Traversal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.3.  Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.1.  DoS Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.2.  Identifier Assignment and Authentication . . . . . . .  6
       2.3.3.  Connection Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     2.4.  HIP Deployability and Legacy Applications  . . . . . . . .  7
   3.  The HIP BONE Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.1.  Peer ID Assignment and Bootstrap . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     3.2.  Connection Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     3.3.  Lightweight Message Exchanges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.  Advantages of Using HIP BONE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   5.  Relation of HIP BONE with P2PSIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   6.  Architectural Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   8.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15
























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1.  Introduction

   The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [I-D.ietf-hip-base] defines a new
   name space between the network and transport layers.  HIP provides
   upper layers with mobility, multihoming, NAT (Network Address
   Translation) traversal, and security functionality.  HIP implements
   the so called identifier/location split, which implies that IP
   addresses are only used as locators, not as host identifiers.  This
   split makes HIP a suitable protocol to build overlay networks that
   implement identifier-based overlay routing over IP networks, which in
   turn implement locator-based routing.

   The remainder of this document is organized as follows.  Section 2
   provides background information on HIP.  Section 3 described the HIP
   BONE (HIP-Based Overlay Networking Environment) framework.  Section 4
   discusses some of the advantages derived from using the HIP BONE
   framework.  Section 5 briefly explores the relationship of this
   document to the efforts in the IETF P2PSIP Working Group.  Finally,
   before the customary sections, Section 6 attempts to put the
   presented proposal into a larger architectural context.


2.  Background on HIP

   This section provides background on HIP.  Given the tutorial nature
   of this section, readers that are familiar with what HIP provides and
   how HIP works may want to skip it.  All descriptions contain
   references to the relevant HIP specifications where readers can find
   detailed explanations on the different topics discussed in this
   section.

2.1.  ID/locator Split

   In an IP network, IP addresses typically serve two roles: they are
   used as host identifiers and locators.  IP addresses are locators
   because a given host's IP address indicates where in the network that
   host is.  IP networks route based on these locators.  Additionally,
   IP addresses are used to identify remote hosts.  The simultaneous use
   of IP addresses as host identifiers and locators makes mobility and
   multihoming complicated.  For example, when a host opens a TCP
   connection, the host identifies the remote end of the connection by
   the remote IP address (plus port).  If the remote host changes its IP
   address, the TCP connection will not survive, since the transport
   layer identifier of the remote end of the connection is gone.

   Mobility solutions such as Mobile IP keep the remote IP address from
   changing so that it can still be used as an identifier.  HIP, on the
   other hand, uses IP addresses as only locators and defines a new



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   identifier space.  This approach is referred to as the ID/locator
   split and makes the implementation of mobility and multihoming more
   natural.  In the previous example, the TCP connection would be bound
   to the remote host's identifier, which would not change when the
   remote hosts moves to a new IP address (i.e., to a new locator).  The
   TCP connection is able to survive locator changes because the remote
   host's identifier does not change.

2.1.1.  Identifier Format

   HIP uses 128-bit ORCHIDs (Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash
   Identifiers) [RFC4843] as identifiers.  ORCHIDs look like IPv6
   addresses but cannot collide with regular IPv6 addresses because
   ORCHID spaces are registered with the IANA.  That is, a portion of
   the IPv6 address space is reserved for ORCHIDs.  The ORCHID
   specification allows the creation of multiple disjoint identifier
   spaces.  Each such space is identified by a separate Context
   Identifier.  The Context Identifier can be either drawn implicitly
   from the context of ORCHID use or carried explicitly in a protocol.

   HIP defines a native socket API [I-D.ietf-hip-native-api] that
   applications can use to establish and manage connections.
   Additionally, HIP can also be used through the traditional IPv4 and
   IPv6 TCP/IP socket APIs.  Section 2.4 describes how an application
   using these traditional APIs can make use of HIP.  Figure 1 shows all
   these APIs between the application and the transport layers.



                     +-----------------------------------------+
                     |               Application               |
                     +----------------+------------------------+
                     | HIP Native API | Traditional Socket API |
                     +----------------+------------------------+
                     |             Transport Layer             |
                     +-----------------------------------------+

                             Figure 1: HIP API

2.1.2.  HIP Base Exchange

   Before two HIP hosts exchange upper-layer traffic, they to perform a
   four-way handshake that is referred to as the HIP base exchange.
   Figure 2 illustrates the HIP base exchange.  The initiator sends an
   I1 packet and receives an R1 packet from the responder.  After that,
   the initiator sends an I2 packet and receives an R2 packet from the
   responder.




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          Initiator                              Responder
                                 I1
                     -------------------------->
                                 R1
                     <--------------------------
                                 I2
                     -------------------------->
                                 R2
                     <--------------------------

                        Figure 2: HIP base exchange

   Of course, the initiator needs the responder's locator (or locators)
   in order to send its I1 packet.  The initiator can obtain locators
   for the responder in multiple ways.  For example, according to the
   current HIP specifications the initiator can get the locactors
   directly from the DNS [I-D.ietf-hip-dns] or indirectly by sending
   packets through a HIP rendezvous server [I-D.ietf-hip-rvs].  However,
   as an architecture HIP is open ended, and allows the locators to be
   obtained by any means (e.g., from packets traversing an overlay
   network or as part of candidate address collection in a NAT traversal
   scenario).

2.1.3.  Locator Management

   Once a HIP connection between two hosts has been established with a
   HIP base exchange, the hosts can start exchanging higher-layer
   traffic.  If any of the hosts changes its set of locators, it runs an
   update exchange [I-D.ietf-hip-mm], which consists of three messages.
   If a host is multihomed, it simply provides more than one locator in
   its exchanges.  However, if both of the end points move at the same
   time, or through some other reason both lose track of the peers'
   currently active locators, they need to resort to using a rendezvous
   server or getting new peer locators by some other means.

2.2.  NAT Traversal

   HIP's NAT traversal mechanism is based on ICE (Interactive
   Connectivity Establishment) [I-D.ietf-mmusic-ice].  Hosts gather
   address candidates and, as part of the HIP base exchange, hosts
   perform an ICE offer/answer exchange where they exchange their
   respective address candidates.  Hosts perform end-to-end STUN
   [I-D.ietf-behave-rfc3489bis] based connectivity checks in order to
   discover which address candidate pairs yield connectivity.

   Even though, architecturally, HIP lies below the transport layer
   (i.e., HIP packets are carried directly in IP packets), in presence
   of NATs, HIP sometimes needs to be tunneled in a transport protocol



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   (i.e., HIP packets are carried by a transport protocol such as UDP).

2.3.  Security

   Security is an essential part of HIP.  The following sections
   describe the security-related functionality provided by HIP.

2.3.1.  DoS Protection

   HIP provides protection against DoS (Denial of Service) attacks by
   having initiators resolve a cryptographic puzzle before the responder
   stores any state.  On receiving an I1 packet, a responder sends a
   pre-generated R1 packet that contains a cryptographic puzzle and
   deletes all the state associated with the processing of this I1
   packet.  The initiator needs to resolve the puzzle in the R1 packet
   in order to generate an I2 packet.  The difficulty of the puzzle can
   be adjusted so that, if a receiver is under a DoS attack, it can
   increase the difficulty of its puzzles.

   On receiving an I2 packet, a receiver checks that the solution in the
   packet corresponds to a puzzle generated by the receiver and that the
   solution is correct.  If it is, the receiver processes the I2 packet.
   Otherwise, it silently discards it.

2.3.2.  Identifier Assignment and Authentication

   As discussed earlier, HIP uses ORCHIDs [RFC4843] as the main
   representation identifiers.  Potentially, HIP can use different types
   of ORCHIDs as long as the probability of finding collisions (i.e.,
   two nodes with the same ORCHID) is low enough.  One way to completely
   avoid this type of collision is to have a central authority generate
   and assign ORCHIDs to nodes.  To secure the binding between ORCHIDs
   and any higher-layer identifiers, every time the central authority
   assigns an ORCHID to a node, it also generates and signs a
   certificate stating who is the owner of the ORCHID.  The owner of the
   ORCHID then includes the corresponding certificate in its R1 (when
   acting as responder) and I2 packets (when acting initiator) to prove
   that it is actually allowed to use the ORCHID and, implicitly, the
   associated public key.

   Having a central authority works well to completely avoid collisions.
   However, having a central authority is impractical in some scenarios.
   As defined today, HIP systems generally use a self-certifying ORCHID
   type called HIT (Host Identity Tag) that does not require a central
   authority (but still allows one to be used).

   A HIT is the hash of a node's public key.  A node proves that it has
   the right to use a HIT by showing its ability to sign data with its



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   associated private key.  This scheme is secure due to the so called
   second-preimage resistance property of hash functions.  That is,
   given a fixed public key K1, finding a different public key K2 such
   that hash(K1) = hash(K2) is computationally very hard.  Optimally, a
   preimage attack on the 100-bit hash function used in ORCHIDs will
   take an order of 2^100 operations to be successful, and can be
   expected to take in the average 2^99 operations.  Given that each
   operation requires the attacker to generate a new key pair, the
   attack is completely impractical (see [RFC4843]).

   HIP nodes using HITs as ORCHIDs do not typically use certificates
   during their base exchanges.  Instead, the use a leap-of-faith
   mechanism, similar to SSH, whereby a node authenticates somehow
   remote nodes the first time they connect it and, then, remembers
   their public keys.  While user-assisted leap-of-faith (such as in
   SSH) can be used to facilitate a human-operated offline path (such as
   a telephone call), automated leap-of-faith could be combined with a
   reputation management system to create an incentive to behave.
   However, such considerations go well beyond the current HIP
   architecture and even beyond this proposal.  For the purposes of the
   present document, we merely want to point out that architecturally
   HIP supports both self-generated opportunistic identifiers and
   administratively assigned ones.

2.3.3.  Connection Security

   Once two nodes complete a base exchange between them, the traffic
   they exchange is encrypted and integrity protected.  The security
   mechanism used to protect the traffic is IPsec ESP
   [I-D.ietf-hip-esp].  However, there is ongoing work to specify how to
   use different protection mechanisms.

2.4.  HIP Deployability and Legacy Applications

   As discussed earlier, HIP defines a native socket API
   [I-D.ietf-hip-native-api] that applications can use to establish and
   manage connections.  New applications can implement this API to get
   full advantage of HIP.  However, in most cases, legacy (i.e., non-HIP
   aware) applications [I-D.ietf-hip-applications] can use HIP through
   the traditional IPv4 and IPv6 socket APIs.

   The idea is that when a legacy IPv6 application tries and obtains a
   remote host's IP address (e.g., by querying the DNS) the DNS
   respolver passes the remote host's ORCHID (which was also stored in
   the DNS) to the legacy application.  At the same time, the DNS
   resolver stores stores the remote host's IP address internally at the
   HIP module.  Since the ORCHID looks like an IPv6 address, the legacy
   application treats it as such.  It opens a connection (e.g., TCP)



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   using the traditional IPv6 socket API.  The HIP module running in the
   same host as the legacy application intercepts this call somehow
   (e.g., using an interception library or setting up the host's routing
   tables so that the HIP module receives the traffic) and runs HIP (on
   behalf of the legacy application) towards the IP address
   corresponding to the ORCHID.  This mechanism works well in almost all
   cases.  However, applications involving referrals (i.e., passing of
   IPv6 addresses between applications) present issues, to be discussed
   in Section 3 below.  Additionally, management applications that care
   about the exact IP address format may not work well with such
   straigthforward approach.

   In order to make HIP work through the traditional IPv4 socket API,
   the HIP module passes an LSI (Local Scope Identifier), instead of a
   regular IPv4 address, to the legacy IPv4 application.  The LSI looks
   like an IPv4 address, but is locally bound to an ORCHID.  That is,
   when the legacy application uses the LSI in a socket call, the HIP
   module intercepts it and replaces the LSI with its corresponding
   ORCHID.  Therefore, LSIs always have local scope.  They do not have
   any meaning outside the host running the application.  The ORCHID is
   used on the wire; not the LSI.  In the referral case, if it is not
   possible to rewrite the application level packets to use ORCHIDs
   instead of LSIs, it may be hard to make IPv4 referrals work in
   Internet-wide settings.  IPv4 LSIs have been succesfully used in
   existing HIP deployments within a single corporate network.


3.  The HIP BONE Framework

   An overlay typically requires three types of operations: overlay
   maintenance, data storage and retrieval, and connection management.
   Overlay maintenance operations deal with nodes joining and leaving
   the overlay and with the maintenance of the overlay's routing tables.
   Data storage and retrieval operations deal with nodes storing,
   retrieving, and removing information in or from the overlay.
   Connection management operations deal with the establishment of
   connections and the exchange of lightweight messages among the nodes
   of the overlay, potentially in the presence of NATs.

   The HIP BONE framework uses HIP to perform connection management.
   Data storage and retrieval and overlay maintenance are to be
   implemented using protocols other than HIP.  For lack of a better
   name, these protocols are referred to as peer protocols.

3.1.  Peer ID Assignment and Bootstrap

   Nodes in an overlay are primarily identified by their Peer IDs.
   (Note that the Peer ID concept here is a peer-layer protocol concept,



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   distinct from the HIP-layer node identifiers.  Peer IDs may be long,
   may have some structure, and may consist of multiple parts.)
   Overlays typically have an enrollment server that can generate Peer
   IDs, or at least some part of the Peer ID, and sign certificates.  A
   certificate generated by an enrollment server authorizes a particular
   user to use a particular Peer ID in a particular overlay.  The way
   users and overlays are identified and the format for Peer IDs are
   defined by the peer protocol.

   The enrollment server of an overlay that were to use plain public
   keys as Peer IDs could just authorize users to use the public keys
   and HITs associated to their nodes.  This works well as long as the
   enrollment server is the one generating the public/private key pairs
   for all those nodes.  If the enrollment server authorizes users to
   use HITs that are generated directly by the nodes themselves, the
   system is open to a type of chosen-peer-ID attack.

   However, in some cases it is impractical to have the enrollment
   server generate public/private key pairs for devices.  In these
   cases, the enrollment server simply generates Peer IDs whose format
   is defined by the peer protocol used in the overlay.  Since HIP needs
   ORCHIDs (and not any type of Peer ID) to work, hosts in the overlay
   will transform their Peer IDs into ORCHIDs, for example, by taking a
   hash of the Peer IDs or taking a hash of the Peer ID and the public
   key.  That is a similar process to the one a host follows to generate
   a HIT from a public key.  In such scenarios, each host will need a
   certificate (e.g., in their HIP base exchanges) provided by the
   enrollment server to prove that they are authorized to use a
   particular ORCHID in the overlay.  Depending on how the certificates
   are constructed, they typically also need to contain the host's self-
   generated public key.  Depending on how the Peer IDs and public keys
   are attributed, different scenarios become possible.  For example,
   the Peer IDs may be attributed to users, there may be user public key
   identifiers, and there may be separate host public key identifiers.
   Authorisation certificates can be used to bind the different types of
   identifiers together.

   Bootstrap issues such as how to locate an enrollment or a bootstrap
   server belong to the peer protocol.

3.2.  Connection Establishment

   Nodes in an overlay need to establish connection with other nodes in
   different cases.  For example, a node typically has connections to
   the nodes in its finger table.  Nodes also need to establish
   connections with other nodes in order to exchange application-layer
   messages.




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   As discussed earlier, HIP uses the base exchange to establish
   connections.  Therefore, a node uses an I1 packet to establish a
   connection with another node in the overlay.  Nodes in the overlay
   forward I1 packets in a hop-by-hop fashion according to the overlay's
   routing table towards its destination.  If the overlay nodes have
   active connections with other nodes in their finger tables and if
   those connections are protected (typically with IPsec ESP), I1
   packets may be sent over protected connections between nodes.
   Alternatively, if there no such an active connection but the sending
   peer node has a valid locator for the next hop, the I1 packets may be
   forwarded directly, in a similar fashion to how I1 packets are today
   forwarded by the HIP RVS service.

   Since HIP supports NAT traversal, a HIP base exchange over the
   overlay will perform an ICE offer/answer exchange between the nodes
   that are establishing the connection.  In order to perform this
   exchange, the nodes need to first gather candidate addresses.  Which
   nodes can be used to obtain reflexive address candidates and which
   ones can be used to obtain relayed candidates is defined by the peer
   protocol.

3.3.  Lightweight Message Exchanges

   In some cases, nodes need to perform a lightweight query to another
   node.  In this situation, establishing a connection using the
   mechanisms in Section 3.2 for a simple query would be an overkill.  A
   better solution is to forward a HIP message through the overlay with
   the query and another one with the response to the query.  The
   payload of such HIP packet is integrity protected.  Nodes in the
   overlay forward this HIP packet in a hop-by-hop fashion according to
   the overlay's routing table towards its destination, typically
   through the protected connections established between them.


4.  Advantages of Using HIP BONE

   Using HIP BONE, as opposed to a peer protocol, to perform connection
   management in an overlay has a set of advantages.  HIP BONE can be
   used by any peer protocol.  This keeps each peer protocol from
   defining primitives needed for connection management (e.g.,
   primitives to establish connections and to tunnel messages through
   the overlay) and NAT traversal.  Having this functionality at a lower
   layer allows multiple upper-layer protocols to take advantage of it.

   Additionally, having a solution that integrates mobility and
   multihoming is useful in many scenarios.  Peer protocols do not
   typically specify mobility and multihoming solutions.  Combining a
   peer protocol including NAT traversal with a separate mobility



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   mechanism and a separate multihoming mechanism can easily lead to
   unexpected (and unpleasant) interactions.


5.  Relation of HIP BONE with P2PSIP

   At IETF 71, the P2PSIP WG will decide whether or not HIP will be
   included in the solution standardized by the WG.  The following are
   two of the most obvious potential outcomes:

   1.  the WG decides to use HIP to implement connection management.

   2.  the WG decides not to use HIP.  However, the peer protocol
       standardized by the WG is kept functionally and specification
       wise reasonably modular so that the HIP community can use the
       peer protocol minus the connection management and NAT traversal
       modules to experiment with HIP-based overlays.  Note that, at
       present, this is the case with several peer protocols.


6.  Architectural Considerations

   Architecturally, HIP can be considered to create a new thin "waist"
   layer on the top of the IPv4 and IPv6 networks; see Figure 3.  The
   HIP layer itself consist of the HIP signalling protocol and one or
   more data transport protocols; see Figure 4.  The HIP signalling
   packets and the data transport packets can take different routes.  In
   the HIP BONE, the HIP signalling packets are typically first routed
   through the overlay and then directly (if possible), while the data
   transport packets are typically routed only directly between the end
   points.


      +--------------------------------------+
      |    Transport (using HITs or LSIs)    |
      +--------------------------------------+
      |                 HIP                  |
      +------------------+-------------------+
      |      IPv4        |       IPv6        |
      +------------------+-------------------+

                       Figure 3: HIP as a thin waist



      +------------------+-------------------+
      |  HIP signalling  |  data transports  |
      +------------------+-------------------+



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                       Figure 4: HIP layer structure

   In HIP BONE, the peer protocol creates a new signalling layer on the
   top of HIP signalling.  It is used to set up forwarding paths for HIP
   signalling messages.  This is a similar relationship that an IP
   routing protocol, such as OSPF, has to the IP protocol itself.  In
   the HIP BONE case, the peer protocol plays a role similar to OSPF,
   and HIP plays a role similar to IP.  The ORCHIDs are used for
   forwarding HIP packets according to the information in the forwarding
   tables.  The peer protocols are used to exchange routing information
   based on Peer IDs and public keys, and to construct the forwarding
   tables.

   In HIP BONE, the HIP usage of public keys and deriving ORCHIDs
   through a hash function can be utilised at the peer protocol side to
   better secure routing table (i.e. finger table) maintenance and to
   protect against chosen-peer-ID attacks.

   The HIP BONE allows quite a lot of flexibility how to arrange the
   different protocols in detail.  Figure 5 shows one potential stack
   structure.


      +-----------------------+--------------+
      | peer protocols        |     media    |
      +------------------+----+--------------+
      | HIP signalling   |   data transport  |
      |                                      |
      +------------------+-------------------+
      | NAT    | non-NAT |                   |
      |                  |                   |
      |      IPv4        |       IPv6        |
      +------------------+-------------------+

                Figure 5: Example HIP BONE stack structure


7.  Security Considerations

   TBD.


8.  Acknowledgements

   TBD.






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9.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not contain any IANA actions.


10.  Normative References

   [RFC4843]  Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix
              for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers
              (ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-base]
              Moskowitz, R., "Host Identity Protocol",
              draft-ietf-hip-base-08 (work in progress), June 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-native-api]
              Komu, M., "Native Application Programming Interfaces for
              SHIM Layer Prococols", draft-ietf-hip-native-api-01 (work
              in progress), March 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-dns]
              Nikander, P. and J. Laganier, "Host Identity Protocol
              (HIP) Domain Name System (DNS) Extensions",
              draft-ietf-hip-dns-09 (work in progress), April 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rvs]
              Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
              Rendezvous Extension", draft-ietf-hip-rvs-05 (work in
              progress), June 2006.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-mm]
              Henderson, T., "End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the
              Host Identity Protocol", draft-ietf-hip-mm-05 (work in
              progress), March 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-mmusic-ice]
              Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
              (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address  Translator (NAT)
              Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols",
              draft-ietf-mmusic-ice-16 (work in progress), June 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-behave-rfc3489bis]
              Rosenberg, J., "Session Traversal Utilities for (NAT)
              (STUN)", draft-ietf-behave-rfc3489bis-06 (work in
              progress), March 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-esp]
              Jokela, P., "Using ESP transport format with HIP",



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              draft-ietf-hip-esp-06 (work in progress), June 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-applications]
              Henderson, T. and P. Nikander, "Using the Host Identity
              Protocol with Legacy Applications",
              draft-ietf-hip-applications-01 (work in progress),
              April 2007.


Authors' Addresses

   Gonzalo Camarillo
   Ericsson
   Hirsalantie 11
   Jorvas  02420
   Finland

   Email: Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com


   Pekka Nikander
   Ericsson
   Hirsalantie 11
   Jorvas  02420
   Finland

   Email: Pekka.Nikander@ericsson.com


   Jani Hautakorpi
   Ericsson
   Hirsalantie 11
   Jorvas  02420
   Finland

   Email: Jani.Hautakorpi@ericsson.com















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