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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 RFC 4784

   Internet Draft                                           C. Carroll,
                                                      Ropes & Gray LLP*
   Document:                                                  F. Quick,
   draft-carroll-dynmobileip-cdma-05.txt                  Qualcomm Inc.
   Expires: September 2005                                   March 2005


                             Verizon Wireless
                       Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update
                                    for
                           cdma2000(R) Networks



Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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        http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt
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Abstract

   The Verizon Wireless Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update procedure is a
   mechanism for distributing and updating Mobile IP (MIP) cryptographic
   keys in cdma2000(R) networks (including High Rate Packet Data which
   is often referred to as 1xEV-DO).  The Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update
   (DMU) procedure occurs between the MIP Mobile Node (MN) and RADIUS
   AAA Server via a CDMA2000(R) Packet Data Serving Node (PDSN) that is
   acting as a Mobile IP Foreign Agent (FA).

   cdma2000(R) is a registered trademark of the Telecommunications
   Industry Association (TIA).

   * This document was developed while at Verizon Wireless.

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Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [1].

Table of Contents

   1. Introduction...................................................3
   2. Basic Dynamic MIP Key Update Mechanism.........................3
      2.1 RSA Encrypted Key Distribution.............................3
      2.2 Mutual Authentication (1X).................................4
      2.3 Encrypted Password Authentication..........................7
   3. Dynamic MIP Key Update Advantages over OTASP...................8
   4. Detailed DMU Procedure Description and Requirements............9
      4.1 RSA Public Key Cryptography................................9
      4.2 Other Public Key Algorithms...............................10
      4.3 Why no Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)?...................10
      4.4 Cryptographic Key Generation..............................10
      4.5 MIP_Key_Data Payload......................................11
      4.6 RSA Key Management........................................12
      4.7 RADIUS AAA Server.........................................13
      4.8 MN (Handset or Modem).....................................15
      4.9 PDSN / Foreign Agent (FA).................................17
      4.10 Home Agent (HA)..........................................18
      4.11 DMU Procedure Network Flow...............................19
   5. DMU Procedure Failure Operation...............................23
   6. cdma2000(R) HRPD/1xEV-DO Support..............................26
      6.1 RADIUS AAA Support........................................26
      6.2 MN Support................................................27
      6.3 Informative: MN_Authenticator Support.....................28
   7. Security Considerations.......................................29
      7.1 Cryptographic Key Generation by the MN....................29
      7.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attack..................................29
      7.3 RSA Private Key Compromise................................29
      7.4 RSA Encryption............................................30
      7.5 False Base Station/PDSN...................................30
      7.6 cdma2000(R) 1X False MN...................................30
      7.7 HRPD/1xEV-DO False MN.....................................30
      7.8 Key Lifetimes.............................................30
      7.9 Network Message Security..................................30
   8. Verizon Wireless RADIUS Attributes............................31
   9. Verizon Wireless Mobile IP Extensions.........................32
   10. Public Key Identifier and DMU Version........................33
   11. Conclusion...................................................37
   12. Formal Syntax................................................37
   13. Appendix - Cleartext-Mode Operation..........................40




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1. Introduction

   The Verizon Wireless Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update procedure is a
   mechanism for distributing and updating Mobile IP (MIP) cryptographic
   keys in cdma2000(R) 1xRTT (1X) [2] and High Rate Packet Data (HRPD) /
   1xEV-DO networks [3].  The Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update (DMU)
   procedure occurs between the Mobile IP Mobile Node (MN) and the home
   RADIUS [4] (or Diameter [5]) Authentication, Authorization and
   Accounting (AAA) Server via a CDMA2000(R) Packet Data Serving Node
   (PDSN) that is acting as a Mobile IP Foreign Agent (FA).  (In this
   document we use the acronym AAAH to indicate the home AAA server as
   opposed to a AAA server that may be located in a visited system.)
   This procedure is intended to support wireless systems conforming to
   Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) TR-45 Standard IS-835
   [6].  DMU, however, could be performed in any MIP network to enable
   bootstrapping of a shared secret between the Mobile Node (MN) and
   RADIUS AAA Server.

   The DMU procedure utilizes RSA Public key cryptography to securely
   distribute unique MIP keys to potentially millions of cdma2000(R) 1X
   and HRPD/1xEV-DO Mobile Nodes (MN) using the same RSA Public key.

   By leveraging the existing cdma2000(R) 1X authentication process, the
   Dynamic Mobile IP Key Update process employs a mutual authentication
   mechanism in which device-to-network authentication is facilitated
   using cdma2000(R) 1X challenge-response authentication and network-
   to-device authentication is facilitated using RSA encryption.

   By utilizing RSA encryption, the MN (or MN manufacturer) is able to
   pre-generate MIP keys (and the CHAP key) and pre-encrypt the MIP keys
   prior to initiation of the DMU procedure.  By employing this pre-
   computation capability, the DMU process requires an order of
   magnitude less computation during the key exchange than Diffie-
   Hellman Key Exchange.

2. Basic Dynamic MIP Key Update Mechanism

   The DMU procedure is basically an authentication and key distribution
   protocol which is more easily understood by separately describing the
   mechanism's two functional goals: 1) encrypted key distribution and
   2) mutual authentication.

2.1 RSA Encrypted Key Distribution

   By utilizing RSA Public Key Cryptography, MNs can be pre-loaded with
   a common RSA Public (encryption) key (by the MN manufacturer) while
   the associated RSA Private (decryption) key is securely distributed
   from the MN manufacturer to each service provider.  Alternatively, a
   service provider can generate its own RSA Public/Private key pair and


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   only distribute the RSA Public key to MN manufacturers for pre-
   loading of MNs.

   During the manufacturing process, the MN manufacturer pre-loads each
   MN with the RSA Public key.  When the MN is powered-up (or client
   application initiated), the MN can pre-generate and encrypt MIP keys
   for distribution to the Home RADIUS AAA Server during the DMU
   process.  Alternatively, the MN manufacturer can pre-generate MIP
   keys, encrypt the MIP key payload, and pre-load the MN with multiple
   encrypted MIP key payloads to enable the DMU procedure.

   During the initial registration process (or when the AAA requires MIP
   key update), the MN: 1) generates the appropriate MIP keys, CHAP key,
   and authentication information, 2) uses the embedded RSA Public key
   to encrypt the payload information, 3) and appends the payload to the
   MIP Registration Request.  The Registration Request is sent to the
   Mobile IP Foreign Agent (FA) via the cellular Base Station (BS) and
   Packet Data Serving Node (PDSN). When the RADIUS AAA Server receives
   the encrypted payload (defined as MIP_Key_Data later), the AAA Server
   uses the RSA Private key to decrypt the payload and recover the MIP
   keys.

              MN                 BS/PDSN/FA                 AAA
              --                 ----------                 ---
               |                     |                       |
       ------------------            |              -------------------
      |  RSA Public Key  |           |             |  RSA Private Key  |
      |  Pre-loaded by   |           |             |  Pre-loaded by    |
      |  Manufacturer    |           |             |  Service Provider |
       ------------------            |               -------------------
               |  Registration Request,                      |
               |  (MIP keys), RSA    |                       |
               |  Public Key         |                       |
               |-------------------->|                       |
               |                     |  Access Request, (MIP keys),
               |                     |  RSA Public Key       |
               |                     |---------------------->|
               |                     |              -------------------
               |                     |             |  Decrypt MIP      |
               |                     |             |  Keys using RSA   |
               |                     |             |  Private Key      |
               |                     |              -------------------

                 Figure 1.  RSA Encrypted Key Distribution

2.2 Mutual Authentication (1X)

   Mutual authentication can be achieved by delegation of the MN/device
   authentication by the RADIUS AAA Server to the cdma2000(R) 1X Home


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   Location Register (HLR) and its associated Authentication Center (AC)
   [7], while the MN utilizes RSA encryption to authenticate the RADIUS
   AAA Server.

   MN/device authentication via an HLR/AC is based on the assumption
   that the MN's Mobile Station (MS) has an existing Authentication Key
   (A-key) and Shared Secret Data (SSD) with the cdma2000(R) 1X network.
   When MS call origination occurs, the AC authenticates the MS.  If
   authentication is successful, the BS passes the Mobile Station
   Identifier (MSID) (e.g. Mobile Identification Number (MIN)) to the
   PDSN.  The "Authenticated MSID" is then included in the RADIUS Access
   Request (ARQ) message [4] sent from the PDSN to the RADIUS AAA
   server.  Because the RADIUS AAA server stores the MSID associated
   with an MN subscription, the RADIUS AAA server is able to authorize
   MN access if the "Authenticated MSID" matches the RADIUS AAA MSID,
   i.e. the RADIUS AAA server is delegating its authentication function
   to the cdma2000(R) 1X HLR/AC.

   RADIUS AAA Server authentication (by the MN) is enabled by including
   a random number (AAA_Authenticator) in the encrypted payload sent
   from the MN to the RADIUS AAA Server.  Only the possessor of the
   proper RSA Private key will have the ability to decrypt the payload
   and recover the unique AAA_Authenticator.  If the MN receives the
   correct AAA_Authenticator (returned by the RADIUS AAA Server), the MN
   is assured that it is not interacting with a false Base Station (BS).


























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           MN           BS/PDSN/FA         HLR/AC          AAA
           --           ----------         ------          ---
    ------------------     |                 |      -------------------
   |  RSA Public Key  |    |                 |     |  RSA Private Key  |
   |  Pre-loaded by   |    |                 |     |  Pre-loaded by    |
   |  Manufacturer    |    |                 |     |  Service Provider |
    ------------------     |                 |      -------------------
            |  Global Challenge              |              |
            |<-------------|                 |              |
            |              |                 |              |
            |  Auth_Response                 |              |
            |------------->|                 |              |
            |              |  Auth_Response  |              |
            |              |---------------->|              |
            |              |          ------------------    |
            |              |         |  IS-2000         |   |
            |              |         |  Authentication  |   |
            |              |          ------------------    |
            |              |   Auth_Success  |              |
            |              |<----------------|              |
            |     ------------------         |              |
            |    |  BS forwards     |        |              |
            |    |  Authenticated   |        |              |
            |    |  MSID to PDSN    |        |              |
            |     ------------------         |              |
            |              |                 |              |
            |  Registration Request          |              |
            |  (MIP keys, AAA_Authenticator),               |
            |  RSA Public Key                |              |
            |------------->|                 |              |
            |              |  Access Request, MSID,         |
            |              |  (MIP keys, AAA_Authenticator),
            |              |  RSA Public Key                |
            |              |------------------------------->|
            |              |                 |     -------------------
            |              |                 |    |  Check MSID,      |
            |              |                 |    |  Decrypt AAA_-    |
            |              |                 |    |  Authenticator    |
            |              |                 |     -------------------
            |             Access Reject, AAA_Authenticator  |
            |              |<-------------------------------|
        Registration Reply, AAA_Authenticator               |
            |<-------------|                 |              |
    ------------------     |                 |              |
   |  Check AAA_-     |    |                 |              |
   |  Authenticator   |    |                 |              |
    ------------------     |                 |              |
                      Figure 2. Mutual Authentication



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2.3 Encrypted Password Authentication

   Because cdma2000(R) A-key/SSD authentication is not available in
   1xEV-DO or a particular cdma2000(R) 1X network may not support A-key
   authentication, the DMU procedure also includes a random number
   (MN_Authenticator) generated by the MN (and/or pre-loaded by the
   manufacturer), which enables the RADIUS AAA Server to optionally
   authenticate the MN (in 1XEV DO network only).

   The MN_Authenticator is transmitted from the MN to the Home AAA
   Server within the RSA-encrypted MIP_Key_Data payload to prevent
   interception and possible re-use by an attacker.  Ideally, the
   MN_Authenticator is utilized as a One-Time Password, however, RSA
   encryption allows the MN_Authenticator to possibly be re-used based
   on each Service Provider's key distribution policy.

   When the encrypted MIP keys are decrypted at the Home RADIUS AAA
   Server, the MN_Authenticator is also decrypted and compared with a
   copy of the MN_Authenticator stored within the Home RADIUS AAA
   Server.  The Home RADIUS AAA Server receives a copy of the
   MN_Authenticator out-of-band (not using the cdma2000(R) network)
   utilizing one of numerous possible methods outside the scope of the
   standard.  For example, the MN_Authenticator MAY be: 1) read out by a
   Point-of-Sale provisioner from the MN, input into the subscriber
   profile, and delivered along with the Network Access Identifier
   (NAI), via the billing/provision system to the Home RADIUS AAA
   server, 2) verbally communicated to a customer care representative
   via a call, or 3) input by the user interfacing with an interactive
   voice recognition server.  The out-of-band MN_Authenticator delivery
   is not specified in this document to maximize the Service Provider's
   implementation flexibility.

   It is possible for an unscrupulous provisioner or distribution
   employee to extract the MN_Authenticator prior to the DMU procedure,
   however the risk associated with such a disclosure is minimal.
   Because the HRPD/1xEV-DO MN does not transmit a device identifier
   during the initial registration process, an attacker, even with a
   stolen MN_Authenticator, cannot correlate the password with a
   particular MN device or NAI, which is typically provisioned just
   prior to DMU procedure initiation.

   The MN_Authenticator is typically generated by a random/pseudorandom
   number generator within the MN.  MN_Authenticator generation is
   initiated by the MN user, however it may be initially pre-loaded by
   the manufacturer.  When the MN_Authenticator is reset (i.e. a new
   MN_Authenticator is generated), all MIP_Data_Key payloads using the
   previous MN_Authenticator are discarded and the MN immediately re-
   encrypts a MIP_Key_Data payload containing the new MN_Authenticator.
   The MN_Authenticator MUST NOT change unless it is explicitly reset by


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   the MN user.  Thus, the MN will generate new MIP_Key_Data payloads
   using the same MN_Authenticator until the MN_Authenticator is
   updated.
                                         -------------------------
                                        |  User-initiated         |
                                        |  MN_Authenticator[x]    |
                                        |  Generation             |
                                         -------------------------
                                                    |
                                                    v
    -----------------------------        ------------------------------
   |  Manufacturer               |      |  Delete MN_Authenticator[y], |
   |  MN_Authenticator[y]        |----->|  Store  MN_Authenticator[x]  |
   |  Generation**               |      |  in MN                       |
    -----------------------------        ------------------------------
                                                    |
                                                    v
                                         -------------------------
                                        |  Delete MIP_Key_Data    |
                                        |  Payloads based on      |
                                        |  MN_Authenticator[y]    |
                                         -------------------------
                                                    |
                                                    v
    -----------------------------        -------------------------
   |  KEYS_VALID state and       |      |  Generate MIP_Key_Data  |
   |  committed, delete          |----->|  Payloads based on      |
   |  MIP_Key_Data Payload       |      |  MN_Authenticator[x]    |
    -----------------------------        -------------------------
                 ^                                  |
                 |                                  v
    -----------------------------        -------------------------
   |  DMU MIP_Key_Data           |      |  Store MIP_Key_Data     |
   |  Delivery                   |<-----|  Payload                |
    -----------------------------        -------------------------

     Figure 3. MN_Authenticator and MIP_Key_Data Payload State Machine

   **Note: Manufacturer pre-load of MN_Authenticator is not essential
   since the MN_Authenticator is typically generated by the MN. However,
   manufacturer pre-load may reduce the provisioner burden of accessing
   a device such as a modem to recover the MN_Authenticator for entry
   into the Serivce Provider provisioning system.

3. Dynamic MIP Key Update Advantages over OTASP

   The DMU procedure has numerous advantages over the current Over-the-
   Air Service Provisioning (OTASP) [8] procedure including:



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      *  In DMU, MIP key distribution occurs directly between the MN and
         AAA Server at the IP Layer.  This eliminates the need for an
         interface between the OTAF and RADIUS AAA server.

      *  DMU Supports MIP key distribution for cdma2000(R) 1X and
         HRPD/1xEV-DO MN.  OTASP only supports cdma2000(R) 1X MIP key
         distribution.

      *  DMU facilitates MIP key distribution to an MN in a Relay-mode
         MS.  OTASP only delivers the MIP keys to the MS.  For example,
         OTASP cannot delivery MIP keys to a Laptop MN interfacing with
         an MS modem.

      *  Pre-encryption of MIP_Key_Data allows the DMU procedure to be
         an order of magnitude faster than Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange.

      *  In DMU, an MN manufacturer can pre-generate MIP keys, pre-
         encrypt the MIP key payload, and pre-load the payload in the
         MN.  Thus, an MN with limited processing power is never
         required to use RSA encryption.  An OTASP device is always
         forced to perform computationally expensive exponentiations
         during the key update process.

      *  In DMU, the MN is protected against Denial-of-Service (DOS)
         attacks in which a false BS changes the MIP key for MNs in its
         vicinity.  OTASP Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange is vulnerable to a
         false BS DOS attack.

      *  DMU utilizes mutual authentication.  OTASP Diffie-Hellman Key
         Exchange does not utilize mutual authentication.

4. Detailed DMU Procedure Description and Requirements

   The Verizon Wireless Dynamic Mobile IP Update procedure is a secure,
   yet extremely efficient mechanism for distributing essential MIP
   cryptographic keys (e.g. MN-AAAH key and MN-HA key) and the Simple IP
   CHAP key.  The DMU protocol enables pre-computation of the encrypted
   key material payload, known as MIP_Key_Data.  The DMU procedure
   purposely avoids the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
   Certificates, greatly enhancing the procedure's efficiency.

4.1 RSA Public Key Cryptography

   RSA Public Key encryption and decryption MUST be performed in
   accordance with RFC 2313 [9] PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5.
   DMU MUST support RSA with a 1024-bit modulus by default.  DMU MAY
   also support 768-bit or 2048-bit RSA depending on the MN user's
   efficiency or security requirements.  RSA computation speed-ups using



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   a public RSA exponent which is small or has a small number of nonzero
   bits (e.g. 65537) are acceptable.

4.2 Other Public Key Algorithms

   DMU does not preclude the use of other Public key technologies.  The
   protocol includes a Public Key Type field that defines the type of
   encryption used.

4.3 Why no Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)?

   DMU is designed to maximize the efficiency of Mobile IP (MIP) key
   distribution for cdma2000(R) MNs.  The use of a Public key
   Certificate would improve the flexibility of the MIP key update
   process by allowing a Certificate Authority (CA) to vouch for the RSA
   Public Key delivered to the MN.  Unfortunately, the use of a Public
   Key Certificate would significantly reduce the efficiency (speed and
   overhead) of the MIP key update process.  For instance, each MN must
   be pre-loaded with the CA's Public Key.  During the MIP key
   distribution process, the network must first deliver its RSA Public
   Key (in a Certificate) to the MN.  The MN must then use RSA to
   decrypt the Certificate's digital signature to verify that the
   presented RSA public key is legitimate.  Such a process significantly
   increases the number of exchanges, increases air interface overhead,
   increases the amount of MN computation, and slows the MIP key update
   process.

   Aside from the operational efficiency issues, there are numerous
   policy and procedural issues that have previously hampered the
   deployment of PKI in commercial networks.

   On a more theoretical basis, PKI is likely unnecessary for this key
   distribution model.  PKI is ideal for a Many-to-Many communications
   model such as within the Internet where many different users
   interface with many different Websites.  However, in the cellular/PCS
   Packet Data environment, a Many-to-One (or few) distribution model
   exists in which many users interface with one wireless Carrier to
   establish their Mobile IP security associations (i.e cryptographic
   keys).

4.4 Cryptographic Key Generation

   The DMU procedure relies on each MN to randomly/pseudo-randomly
   generate the MN_AAAH key, MN_HA key, and Simple IP CHAP key.  Each MN
   MUST have the capability to generate random/pseudo-random numbers in
   accordance with the guidelines specified in RFC 1750 Randomness
   Recommendations for Security.




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   Although it may be more secure for the network to generate
   cryptographic keys at the RADIUS AAA server, client cryptographic key
   generation is acceptable due to the significant efficiency
   improvement in the update process via pre-generation and pre-
   encryption of the MIP keys.

4.5 MIP_Key_Data Payload

   MIP cryptographic keys (MN_AAAH key and MN_HA key) and the Simple IP
   CHAP key are encapsulated and encrypted into a MIP_Key_Data Payload
   (along with the AAA_Authenticator and MN_Authenticator).  The
   MIP_Key_Data Payload is appended to the MN's MIP Registration Request
   (RRQ) as a MIP Vendor/Organization-Specific Extension (VSE) (See IETF
   RFC 3115 [10] Mobile IP Vendor/Organization-Specific Extensions).
   When the PDSN converts the MIP RRQ to a RADIUS Access Request (ARQ)
   message, the MIP_Key_Data Payload is converted from a MIP
   Vendor/Organization-Specific Extension to a Vendor Specific RADIUS
   Attribute (VSA).

   Upon receipt of the RADIUS Access Request, the RADIUS AAA Server
   decrypts the MIP_Key_Data payload using the RSA Private (decryption)
   key associated with the RSA Public (encryption) used to encrypt the
   MIP_Key_Data payload.  The MIP_Key_Data is defined as follows:

   MIP_Key_Data = RSA_Public_Key [MN_AAAH key, MN_HA key, CHAP_key,
   MN_Authenticator, AAA_Authenticator], Public_Key_ID, DMUV

   Where:

      MN_AAAH key = 128-bit random MN / RADIUS AAA Server key
         (encrypted)

      MN_HA key = 128-bit random MN / Home Agent (HA) key (encrypted)

      CHAP_key = 128-bit random Simple IP authentication key (encrypted)
         Note: the Simple IP CHAP key is not the same as the AT-CHAP key
         used for A12 Interface authentication [11].

      MN_Authenticator = 24-bit random number (displayed as an 8 decimal
         digit number).  (To be used for 1xEV-DO networks.) (encrypted)

      AAA_Authenticator = 64-bit random number used by MN to
         authenticate the RADIUS AAA Server. (encrypted)

      DMU Version (DMUV) = 4 bit identifier of DMU version.

   Public Key Identifier (Public_Key_ID) = PKOID, PKOI, PK_Expansion,
   ATV



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   Where:

      Public Key Organization Identifier (PKOID) = 8-bit serial number
         identifier of Public Key Organization (PKO) that created the
         Public Key.

      Public Key Organization Index (PKOI) = 8-bit serial number used at
         PKO discretion to distinguish different Public/Private key
         pairs.

      PK_Expansion = 8-bit field to enable possible expansion of PKOID
         or PKOI fields. (Note: Default value = 0xFF)

      Algorithm Type and Version (ATV) = 4-bit identifier of the
         algorithm used.

   Note: If 1024-bit RSA is used, the encrypted portion of the payload
   is 1024 bits (128 bytes) long.  With the 28 bit Public Key Identifier
   and 4 bit DMUV, the total MIP_Key_Data payload is 132 bytes long.

4.6 RSA Key Management

   The wireless Service Provider or carrier MUST generate the RSA
   Public/Private key pair(s).  An organization within the Service
   Provider MUST be designated by the Service Provider to generate,
   manage, protect, and distribute RSA Private keys (to the RADIUS AAA
   Server) and Public keys (to the MN manufacturers) in support of the
   DMU procedure.

   Each RSA Public/Private key pair, generated by the wireless carrier,
   MUST be assigned a unique Public Key Identifier in accordance with
   Section 9.

   RSA Private keys MUST be protected from disclosure to unauthorized
   parties.  The Service Provider organization with the responsibility
   of generating the RSA Public/Private key pairs MUST establish a RSA
   key management policy to protect the RSA Private (decryption) keys.

   RSA Public keys MAY be freely distributed to all MN manufacturers
   (along with the Public Key Identifier).  Because one RSA Public key
   can be distributed to million of MNs, it is acceptable to distribute
   the RSA Public key (and Public Key Identifier) to MN manufacturers
   via e-mail, floppy disk, or a Website.  The preferred method is to
   simply publish the RSA Public key and associated Public Key
   Identifier in the DMU Requirements document sent to each MN
   manufacturer/OEM.

   When public keys are distributed, the public keys MUST be protected
   against alteration. If an invalid public key is programmed into a


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   terminal, the terminal may be denied service because DMU cannot be
   performed successfully.

   RSA Private keys MAY be loaded into the RADIUS AAA server manually.
   Access to the RADIUS AAA Server RSA Private keys MUST be restricted
   to authorized personnel only.

   The wireless Service Provider MAY accept RSA Private key(s) (and
   Public Key Identifier) from MN manufacturers or other Service
   Providers that have preloaded MNs with manufacturer-generated RSA
   Public keys.  One Service Provider MAY negotiate an agreement with
   another Service Provider in which both Service Providers share and
   protect each other's RSA Private keys.

4.7 RADIUS AAA Server

   The RADIUS AAA Server used for DMU MUST support the DMU Procedure.
   The AAA Server MUST support RSA Public key cryptography and maintain
   a database of RSA Private (decryption) keys indexed by the Public Key
   Identifier.

   Delivery of the RSA Private key(s) to a AAA Server from the MN
   manufacturer(s) is outside the scope of this documents.  However, RSA
   Private key(s) delivery via encrypted e-mail or physical (mail)
   delivery is likely acceptable.

   Access to the RADIUS AAA Server MUST be limited to authorized
   personnel only.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support 1024-bit RSA decryption.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST maintain a database of RSA Public/Private
   key pair indexed by the Public Key Identifier.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support the RADIUS attributes specified in
   Section 8.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support a subscriber specific MIP Update
   State Field.  When the MIP Update State Field set to UPDATE KEYS (1),
   the RADIUS AAA Server MUST initiate the DMU procedure by including
   the MIP_Key_Request attribute in an Access Reject message sent to the
   PDSN.  The MIP Update State Field MAY be set to UPDATE KEYS (1) by
   Service Provider's Billing/Provisioning system based on IT policy.
   Upon verification of MN-AAA Authentication Extension using decrypted
   MN_AAA key, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST set the MIP Update State Field
   to KEYS UPDATED (2).  Upon verification of the MN-Authentication
   Extension on a subsequent RRQ/ARQ, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST set the
   MIP Update State Field to KEYS VALID (0).



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   Note that the inclusion of a vendor-specific attribute in the Access
   Reject message is not consistent with section 5.44 of [4].  A RADIUS
   AAA server that supports DMU SHOULD NOT include a vendor-specific
   attribute if the corresponding Access Request message was not
   received from a DMU-compliant PDSN.  This use of Access Reject is
   strongly discouraged for any future work based on this document.
   Future work should consider the use of Access-Challenge to carry this
   vendor-specific attribute.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST maintain a MIP Update State Field, for
   each subscription, in one of three states (0 = KEYS VALID, 1 = UPDATE
   KEYS, 2 = KEYS UPDATED).

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST decrypt the encrypted portion of the
   MIP_Key_Data payload using the appropriate RSA Private (decryption)
   key.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST check the MN_AAA Authentication Extension
   of the DMU RRQ using the decrypted MN_AAA key.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST include the AAA_Authenticator in the
   Access Accept as a Vendor-Specific RADIUS Attribute.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support the MN_Authenticator options
   specified in Section 6.1.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST comply with DMU Procedure failure
   operation specified in Section 5.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support manual hexadecimal entry of MN_AAA
   key, MN_HA key and Simple IP CHAP key via the AAA GUI for each
   subscription.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST provide a mechanism to validate the
   MIN/IMSI.  When the MIN/IMSI validation is on, the RADIUS AAA Server
   MUST compare the MIN/IMSI sent from the PDSN with the MIN/IMSI in the
   AAA subscription record/profile. If the MINs or IMSIs do not match,
   the RADIUS AAA Server MUST send an Access Reject to the PDSN/FA.  The
   Access Reject MUST NOT contain a MIP Key Data request

   When the "Ignore MN_Authenticator" bit is not set, the RADIUS AAA
   Server MUST check whether MN_AuthenticatorMN = MN_AuthenticatorAAA.
   If the MN_Authenticators do not match, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST
   send an Access Reject to the PDSN/FA.  The Access Reject MUST NOT
   contain a MIP_Key_Data request.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST include its PKOID (or another designated
   PKOID) in the MIP_Key_Request RADIUS Attribute.



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   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST compare the PKOID sent in the MIP_Key_Data
   RADIUS Attribute with a list of valid PKOIDs in the RADIUS AAA
   Server.  If the PKOID is not valid, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST send
   an Access Reject to the PDSN with the "Invalid Public Key" Verizon
   Wireless RADIUS Vendor Specific Attribute (VSA).  Note: the same
   RADIUS attribute may be assigned a different Vendor identifier.

   Note that the inclusion of a vendor-specific attribute in the Access
   Reject message is not consistent with section 5.44 of [4].  A RADIUS
   AAA server that supports DMU SHOULD NOT include a vendor-specific
   attribute if the corresponding Access Request message was not
   received from a DMU-compliant PDSN.  This use of Access Reject is
   strongly discouraged for any future work based on this document.
   Future work should consider the use of Access-Challenge to carry this
   vendor-specific attribute.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST support delivery of the MN-HA key using
   3GPP2 RADIUS VSAs as specified in 3GPP2 X.S0011-005-C. The 3GPP2 VSAs
   used are the MN-HA Shared Key (Vendor-Type = 58) and MN-HA SPI
   (Vendor-Type = 57).

   The RADIUS AAA Server SHOULD always accept an Access Request from a
   CDMA2000(R) Access Node (AN) for a particular subscriber when the
   UPDATE KEYS (1) and KEYS UPDATED (2) states are set.  In the KEYS
   VALID (0) state, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST check the Access Request
   normally.

   The RADIUS AAA Server MUST reject an Access Request with the
   MIP_Key_Data RADIUS Attribute while the RADIUS AAA Server is in the
   KEYS VALID state, i.e., the AAA MUST NOT allow an unsolicited key
   update to occur.

4.8 MN (Handset or Modem)

   The MN manufacturer MUST pre-load the Wireless Carrier RSA Public key
   (and Public Key Identifier).

   The MN manufacturer MUST pre-generate and pre-load the
   MN_Authenticator.

   The MN MUST support 1024-bit RSA Encryption using the pre-loaded RSA
   Public key.

   The MN MUST support MN_AAA, MN_HA, and CHAP random/pseudo-random key
   generation (in accordance with RFC 1750).

   The MN MUST support random/pseudo-random AAA_Authenticator and
   MN_Authenticator generation (in accordance with RFC 1750).



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   Upon power-up of an MN handset or launch of the MN client, the MN
   MUST check whether a MIP_Key_Data payload has been computed.  If no
   MIP_Key_Data payload exists, the MN MUST generate and store a
   MIP_Key_Data payload.  The MN MUST maintain at least one pre-
   generated MIP_Key_Data payload.

   The MN MUST construct the MIP_Key_Data payload in accordance with
   Section 4.5.

   The MN MUST initiate the DMU Procedure upon receipt of a MIP
   Registration Reply (RRP) with the MIP_Key_Request Verizon Wireless
   Vendor/Organization-specific Extension (VSE).

   Upon receipt of an RRP including the MIP_Key_Request, the MN MUST
   check the PKOID sent in the MIP_Key_Request.  If the MN has a Public
   key associated with the PKOID, the MN MUST encrypt the MIP_Key_Data
   payload using that Public key.

   The MN MUST have the capability to designate one Public key as the
   Default Public key if the MN supports multiple Public keys.

   The MN MUST insert the Verizon Wireless MIP_Key_Data VSE (or another
   Organization-specific MIP_Key_Data VSE) after the Mobile-Home
   Authentication Extension, but before the MN-AAA Authentication
   Extension.  The MIP_Key_Data Extension must also be located after the
   FA Challenge Extension if present.

   Note:  The order of the extensions is important for interoperability.
   After the FA receives the Access Accept from the RADIUS AAA server,
   the FA may strip away all MIP extensions after the Mobile-Home
   Authenticator and, if this occurs, it is not necessary for the HA to
   process the DMU extensions.  Other compatibility problems have also
   been identified during testing with FAs from various vendors who
   place extensions in various locations.  Explicit placement of the
   extensions eliminates these issues.

   Upon initiation of the DMU Procedure, the MN MUST compute the MIP
   authentication extensions using the newly-generated temporary MN_AAA
   and MN_HA keys.  Upon receipt of the AAA_Authenticator MIP Extension,
   the MN MUST compare the AAA_AuthenticatorMN (sent in the encrypted
   MIP_Key_Data payload) with the AAA_AuthenticatorAAA (returned by the
   RADIUS AAA Server).  If both values are the same, the MN MUST
   designate the temporary MN_AAA, MN_HA key, and the Simple IP CHAP key
   as permanent.  The MN MUST set its MIP Update State field to KEYS
   VALID.

   The MN MUST support reset (re-generation) of the MN_Authenticator by
   the MN user as specified in Section 6.2.



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   The MN MUST enable the MN user to view the MN_Authenticator.
   MN_Authenticator (24-bit random number) MUST be displayed as an 8
   decimal digit number as specified in Section 6.2.

   The MN manufacturer MUST pre-load each MN with a unique random 24-bit
   MN_Authenticator.

   Upon reset of the MN_Authenticator, the MN MUST delete all
   MIP_Key_Data payloads based on the old MN_Authenticator and generate
   all subsequent MIP_Key_Data payloads using the new MN_Authenticator.
   (until the MN_Authenticator is explicitly re-set again by the MN
   user).

   The MN MUST support manual entry of all cryptographic keys such as
   the MN_AAA, MN_HA, and Simple IP CHAP key.  MN MUST support
   hexadecimal digit entry of a 128-bit key.  (Note: certain Simple IP
   devices only enable ASCII entry of a password as the CHAP key.  It is
   acceptable for future devices to provide both capabilities, i.e.
   ASCII for a password or hexadecimal for a key.  The authors recommend
   the use of strong cryptographic keys.)

   The MN MUST support the Verizon Wireless MIP Vendor/Organization-
   Specific Extensions specified in Section 9.

   The MN MUST update the RRQ Identification field when re-transmitting
   the same MIP_Key_Data in a new RRQ.

   The MN MUST comply with the DMU Procedure failure operation specified
   in Section 5.

   The RSA Public Key MAY be stored in the MN flash memory as a constant
   while being updatable via software patch.

4.9 PDSN / Foreign Agent (FA)

   The PDSN MUST support the Verizon Wireless RADIUS Vendor Specific
   Attributes (VSA) specified in Section 8 and the Verizon Wireless MIP
   Vendor/Organization-Specific Extensions (VSE) specified in Section 9.

   The PDSN MAY support the RADIUS VSAs specified in Section 8 and the
   MIP VSEs specified in Section 9 using another Organization
   identifier.

   Upon receipt of an Access Reject containing the
   MIP_Key_Update_Request VSA, PDSN MUST send an RRP to the MN with the
   MIP_Key_Request VSE.  The PDSN MUST use the RRP error code = 89
   (Vendor Specific) and MUST not tear down the PPP session after
   transmission.



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   Upon receipt of an Access Reject containing the AAA_Authenticator
   VSA, the PDSN MUST send an RRP with the AAA_Authenticator MIP VSE.
   The PDSN MUST use the RRP error code = 89 (Vendor Specific) and MUST
   NOT tear down the PPP session after transmission.

   Upon receipt of an Access Reject containing the Public Key Invalid
   VSA, the PDSN MUST send an RRP with the Public Key Invalid MIP VSE.
   The PDSN MUST use the RRP error code = 89 (Vendor Specific) and MUST
   NOT tear down the PPP session after transmission.

   Note that the inclusion of a vendor-specific attribute in the Access
   Reject message is not consistent with section 5.44 of [4]. A PDSN
   that supports DMU MUST accept an Access Reject message containing a
   vendor-specific attribute.  This use of Access Reject is strongly
   discouraged for any future work based on this document. Future work
   should consider the use of Access-Challenge to carry this vendor-
   specific attribute.

   Upon receipt of an RRQ with the MIP_Key_Data VSE, the PDSN MUST
   convert the RRQ to an ARQ with the MIP_Key_Data VSA.  The PDSN MUST
   send the ARQ to the RADIUS AAA server.

   The PDSN/FA MUST comply with the DMU Procedure failure operation
   specified in Section 5.

   The PDSN/FA MUST include the PKOID from the Access Reject
   MIP_Key_Update_Request VSA in the MIP_Key_Request MIP VSE sent to the
   MN.

4.10 Home Agent (HA)

   The HA MUST support the Verizon Wireless MIP Vendor/Organization-
   Specific Extensions (VSE) specified in Section 9.  (Note: the HA may
   not encounter a DMU MIP extension if the FA strips away all
   extensions after the Mobile-Home authentication extension.)

   The HA MAY support the MIP VSEs specified in Section 9 using another
   Organization identifier.  (Note: the HA may not encounter a DMU MIP
   extension if the FA strips away all extensions after the Mobile-Home
   authentication extension.)

   The HA MUST support delivery of the MN-HA key from the Home RADIUS
   AAA server using 3GPP2 RADIUS Vendor-Specific Attributes (VSA) as
   specified in 3GPP2 X.S0011-005-C.  The 3GPP2 VSAs used are the MN-HA
   Shared Key (Vendor-Type = 58) and the MN-HA SPI (Vendor-Type = 57).






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4.11 DMU Procedure Network Flow

   This section provides a flow diagram and detailed description of the
   process flow involving the Dynamic Mobile IP Update procedure process
   within the IS-2000 network.

           MN                              PDSN/FA         AAAH
           --                              -------         ----
    ---------------------                     |     -------------------
   |  1: RSA Public Key  |                    |    |  RSA Private Key  |
   |  Pre-loaded by      |                    |    |  Pre-loaded by    |
   |  Manufacturer       |                    |    |  Service Provider |
    ---------------------                     |     -------------------
         ---------------------------------------------------------
        |  2: MS/BS: IS-2000 Call Origination and Authentication  |
        |  3: MN/PDSN/FA: PPP Session Establishment               |
         ---------------------------------------------------------
           |  4: Registration Request (RRQ)   |             |
           |--------------------------------->| 5: Access Request w/MSID
           |                                  |------------>|
           |                                  |    --------------------
           |                                  |   | 6: MIP Update State|
           |                                  |   | is UPDATE KEYS   |
           |                                  |    --------------------
           |                        7: Access Reject with   |
           |                        MIP_Key_Update_Request  |
           |                        RADIUS Attribute        |
           |                                  |<------------|
           |  8: Registration Reply (RRP)     |             |
           |  with MIP_Key_Request MIP        |             |
           |  Vendor/organization-specific    |             |
           |  extension                       |             |
           |<---------------------------------|             |
    -------------------                       |             |
   |  9: MN generates  |                      |             |
   |  MIP_Key_Data     |                      |             |
   |  using temporary  |                      |             |
   |  MIP keys         |                      |             |
    -------------------                       |             |
           |  10: RRQ with MIP_Key_Data       |             |
           |  Vendor/organization-specific extension        |
           |--------------------------------->|  11: Access Request
           |                                  |  w/MSID
           |                                  |  and MIP_Key_Data
           |                                  |  RADIUS attribute
           |                                  |------------>|

                   Figure 4. DMU Procedure Flow (part 1)



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           MN                              PDSN/FA         AAAH
           --                              -------         ----
           |                                  |             |
           |                                  |    -------------------
           |                                  |   |  12: decrypt      |
           |                                  |   |  MIP_Key_Data,    |
           |                                  |   |  verify MN-AAA    |
           |                                  |   |  authentication   |
           |                                  |   |  extension, set   |
           |                                  |   |  MIP Update State |
           |                                  |   |  = KEYS UPDATED |
           |                                  |    -------------------
           |                        13: Access Reject with  |
           |                        AAA_Authenticator       |
           |                        RADIUS Attribute        |
           |                                  |<------------|
           |  14: Registration Reply (RRP)    |             |
           |  with AAA_Authenticator MIP      |             |
           |  Vendor/organization-specific    |             |
           |  extension                       |             |
           |<---------------------------------|             |
    ----------------------                    |             |
   |  15: verify          |                   |             |
   |  AAA_Authenticator,  |                   |             |
   |  store temporary     |                   |             |
   |  MIP keys as         |                   |             |
   |  permanent keys      |                   |             |
    ----------------------                    |             |
           |  16: RRQ                         |             |
           |--------------------------------->|  Access Request
           |                                  |  w/MSID
           |                                  |------------>|
           |                                  |    --------------------
           |                                  |   |  17: verify MN-AAA |
           |                                  |   |  authentication    |
           |                                  |   |  extension, set    |
           |                                  |   |  MIP Update State  |
           |                                  |   |  = KEYS VALID    |
           |                                  |    --------------------
           |                                  Access Accept |
           |                                  |<------------|

                   Figure 4. DMU Procedure Flow (part 2)








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           MN           PDSN/FA         AAAH                HA
           --           -------         ----                --
           |               |              |                  |
           |               |  18. Registration Request (RRQ) |
           |               |-------------------------------->|
           |               |              19: Access Request |
           |               |              |<-----------------|
           |               |              | Access Accept    |
           |               |              | with MN-HA key   |
           |               |              |----------------->|
           |               |              |        -------------------
           |               |              |       |  verify           |
           |               |              |       |  mobile-home      |
           |               |              |       |  authentication   |
           |               |              |       |  extension        |
           |               |              |        -------------------
           |               |    20. Registration Reply (RRP) |
           |               |<--------------------------------|
           |          RRP  |              |                  |
           |<--------------|              |                  |

                   Figure 4. DMU Procedure Flow (part 3)

   Each step in the Figure 4 DMU Process is described as follows:

      1. Each RSA Public/Private Key pair MUST be generated in
         accordance with RFC 2313.  Each Public/Private key pair MUST be
         assigned a unique Public Key Identifier (PKOID) by its creator.

         If the Service Provider does not generate the Public/Private
         Key pair and deliver the RSA Public Key to the MN manufacturer
         for pre-installation in the MN, the MN manufacturer MUST
         generate the RSA Public/Private Key pair (using a 1024-bit
         modulus) and pre-load all MNs with the RSA Public (encryption)
         key.  The MN manufacturer MUST distribute the RSA Private
         (decryption) key, in a secure manner, to the appropriate
         service provider(s).  It is acceptable for the MN manufacturer
         to distribute the same Private (decryption) key to multiple
         service providers.

      2. Assuming that the cdma2000(R) 1X MN has been provisioned with
         an A-key and SSD, the cdma2000(R) 1X MS initiates a call
         origination and authenticates itself to the IS-2000 network.
         Upon IS-2000 authentication success, the BS sends the
         "authenticated" MSID (e.g. MIN) to the PDSN.

      3. The MN and PDSN establish a PPP session.

      4. The MN sends a MIP Registration Request (RRQ) to the PDSN.


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      5. The PDSN converts the MIP RRQ into a RADIUS Access Request
         (ARQ) message, includes the MSID in the ARQ, and forwards the
         ARQ to the Home RADIUS AAA server.

      6. The RADIUS AAA Server compares the authenticated MSID (sent
         from the PDSN) with the MSID in its subscriber database
         (associated with the NAI).  If the AAA MIP Update State Field
         is set to UPDATE KEYS (1), the RADIUS AAA Server rejects Packet
         Data access and orders a MIP key update.

      7. The RADIUS AAA Server sends an Access Reject (code = 3) message
         to the PDSN with the MIP_Key_Update_Request RADIUS VSA.

      8. The PDSN converts the Access Reject to a MIP Registration Reply
         (RRP) with a MIP_Key_Request MIP VSE and sends the RRP to the
         MN.  RRP Code = 89 (Vendor Specific).

      9. The MN sets the MN MIP Update State = UPDATE KEYS.  If the MN
         has no pre-generated and pre-encrypted the MIP_Key_Data
         payload, the MN MUST generate the MN_AAA key, MN_HA key, Chap
         key, MN_Authenticator, and AAA_Authenticator in accordance with
         RFC 1750.  Except for the Public Key Identifier, all generated
         values MUST be encrypted using the pre-loaded RSA Public
         (encryption) key.  The newly generated MN_AAATEMP Key and
         MN_HATEMP MUST be used to calculate the MN-AAA and Mobile-Home
         Authentication Extensions for the current RRQ.  Note: the MN
         MAY pre-compute the MIP_Key_Data payload by checking whether a
         payload exists during each MN power-up or application
         initiation.

      10. The MN sends the RRQ with MIP_Key_Data MIP VSE to the PDSN.

      11. The PDSN converts the RRQ to a RADIUS ARQ with MIP_Key_Data
         RADIUS VSA and forwards the ARQ to the home RADIUS AAA Server.
         The MSID is included in the ARQ.

      12. The RADIUS AAA Server compares the authenticated MSID (sent
         from the PDSN) with the MSID in its subscriber database
         (associated with the NAI).  If MSIDPDSN = MSIDAAA, the RADIUS
         AAA server, using the Public Key Identifier, determines the
         appropriate RSA Private key and decrypts the encrypted portion
         of the MIP_Key_Data payload.  The RADIUS AAA Server verifies
         the MN-AAA Authentication Extension Authenticator using the
         decrypted MN_AAA key.  If successful, the RADIUS AAA Server
         updates the subscriber profile with the decrypted MN_AAA key,
         MN_HA key, and CHAP key.  The RADIUS AAA Server sets the AAA
         MIP Update State Field to KEYS UPDATED (2).



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      13. The RADIUS AAA Server sends an Access Reject with
         AAA_Authenticator RADIUS VSA to the PDSN.

      14. The PDSN converts the Access Reject to a MIP RRP with
         AAA_Authenticator MIP VSE.  RRP Code = 89 (Vendor Specific).

      15. If AAA_AuthenticatorMN = AAA_AuthenticatorAAA, the MN assigns
         MN_AAATEMP to MN_AAA key and MN_HATEMP to MN_HA key (MN MIP
         Update State = KEYS VALID).  Otherwise, the MN discards the
         temporary keys.

      16. The MN initiates a new RRQ which is converted to an ARQ by the
         PDSN and forwarded to the RADIUS AAA Server.

      17. The RADIUS AAA Server verifies the MN-AAA Authentication
         Extension and sets the AAA MIP Update State Field to KEYS VALID
         (0).  The RADIUS AAA Server sends an Access Accept to the
         PDSN/FA.

      18. The PDSN/FA sends the RRQ to the Home Agent (HA).

      19. The HA sends an Access Request to the RADIUS AAA Server.  The
         RADIUS AAA Server sends an Access Accept to the HA with the
         MN_HA key.  The HA verifies the Mobile-Home Authentication
         Extension using the MN_HA key.

      20. The HA sends an RRP to the PDSN/FA which forwards the RRP to
         the MN.  RRP Code = 0 (Success).

5. DMU Procedure Failure Operation

   To improve the robustness of the DMU Procedure to account for
   interruptions due to UDP message loss, RRQ retransmission, or MN
   failure, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST maintain a MIP Update State
   Field, for each subscription, in one of three states (0 = KEYS VALID,
   1 = UPDATE KEYS, 2 = KEYS UPDATED).















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           MN           PDSN/FA         AAAH               HA
           --           -------         ----               --
    ----------------       |       ----------------         |
   |  MN state =    |      |      |  AAAH state =  |        |
   |  KEYS VALID    |      |      |  UPDATE KEYS   |        |
    ----------------       |       ----------------         |
           | (A) RRQ       |              |                 |
           |-------------->|  ARQ         |                 |
           |               |------------->|                 |
           |               AR(Key_Update) |                 |
     (B) RRP (Key_Update)  |<-------------|                 |
           |<--------------|              |                 |
    ----------------       |              |                 |
   |  MN state =    |      |              |                 |
   |  UPDATE KEYS   |      |              |                 |
    ----------------       |              |                 |
           | (C) RRQ (MIP_Key_Data)       |                 |
           |-------------->|  ARQ (MIP_Key_Data)            |
           |               |------------->|                 |
           |               |       ----------------         |
           |               |      |  AAAH state =  |        |
           |               |      |  KEYS UPDATED  |        |
           |               |       ----------------         |
           |               AR (AAA_Auth)  |                 |
        (D) RRP (AAA_Auth) |<-------------|                 |
           |<--------------|              |                 |
    ----------------       |              |                 |
   |  MN state =    |      |              |                 |
   |  KEYS VALID    |      |              |                 |
    ----------------       |              |                 |
           |  RRQ          |              |                 |
           |-------------->|  ARQ         |                 |
           |               |------------->|                 |
           |               |       ----------------         |
           |               |      |  AAAH state =  |        |
           |               |      |  KEYS VALID    |        |
           |               |       ----------------         |
           |               |          AA  |                 |
           |               |<-------------|  RRQ            |
           |               |------------------------------->|
           |               |              |            ARQ  |
           |               |              |<----------------|
           |               |              |  AA             |
           |               |              |---------------->|
           |               |              |            RRP  |
           |               |         RRP  |<----------------|
           |<-----------------------------|                 |

          Figure 5.  DMU Failure Call Flow with MN and AAA States


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   Each step in Figure 5 is described as follows:

      1. If (A) is lost, the MN retransmits (A).  The RADIUS AAA server
         expects (A).  If the AAA server is in the UPDATE KEYS state,
         the RADIUS AAA Server sends AR with MIP_Key_Update_Request VSA
         and the PDSN/FA sends (B).

      2. If (B) is lost, the MN retransmits (A).  The RADIUS AAA server
         expects (C).  If it receives (A), the RADIUS AAA Server sends
         AR with MIP_Key_Update_Request VSA and the PDSN/FA retransmits
         (B).

      3. If (C) is lost, the mobile retransmits (C).  The RADIUS AAA
         server expects (C) and updates the MIP keys appropriately. The
         RADIUS AAA server transitions to KEYS UPDATED and commits the
         MIP_Key_Data.  The RADIUS AAA Server sends the AR with
         AAA_Authenticator VSA and the PDSN/FA replies to the MN with
         (D).

      4. If (D) is lost, the mobile retransmits (C) using the same key
         data sent previously.  The RADIUS AAA server expects (A) using
         the same keys.

         a. If the RADIUS AAA server receives (C) with the same keys it
            received previously, it retransmits the AR with
            AAA_Authenticator VSA and the PDSN replies with (D),
            containing the AAA_Authenticator.

         b. If the RADIUS AAA server receives (C) with different keys
            than it received previously, the RADIUS AAA Server sends AR
            with MIP_Key_Update_Request VSA, the PDSN/FA retransmits
            (B), and the RADIUS AAA server transitions to UPDATE KEYS.

         c. If the RADIUS AAA server receives (A) which fails
            authentication using the keys sent in (C), the RADIUS AAA
            Server sends AR with MIP_Key_Update_Request, the PDSN/FA
            retransmits (B), and the RADIUS AAA server transitions to
            UPDATE KEYS.

      5. Once the PDSN/FA receives (A), forwards the ARQ to the RADIUS
         AAA server, and the MN-AAA Authenticator is verified using the
         MN_AAA key, the RADIUS AAA Server transitions to the KEYS VALID
         state and the DMU process is complete.

   The AAA DMU state machine is described in Figure 6.





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                               --------------
        --------------------->|  KEYS VALID  |---------------
       |  Auth success using   --------------   Need Key     |
       |  MIP_Key_Data                          Update       |
       |                                                     |
       |            Auth failed (invalid keys)               |
       |            or RRQ with different MIP_Key_Data       |
       |           ---------------------------------         |
       |          |                                 |        |
       |          |                                 v        v
    ----------------                              ---------------
   |  KEYS UPDATED  |                            |  UPDATE KEYS  |
    ----------------                              ---------------
       |       ^  ^                                 |
       |       |  |                                 |
        -------    ---------------------------------
   RRQ with same           Got MIP_Key_Data
   MIP_Key_Data

               Figure 6. RADIUS AAA Server DMU State Machine

6. cdma2000(R) HRPD/1xEV-DO Support

   Because the DMU Procedure occurs at the IP Layer, the DMU Procedure
   supports MIP key distribution in either the cdma2000(R) 1X or
   HRPD/1xEV-DO network.  Because the cdma2000(R) HRPD/1xEV-DO network
   does not provide Radio Access Network (RAN) authentication, the DMU
   Procedure is more susceptible to a false MN attack (than in an
   cdma2000(R) 1X network with CAVE RAN authentication).  For this
   reason, the DMU Procedure has the capability to optionally support
   device-to-network authentication using the MN_Authenticator.

   The method of MN_Authenticator delivery to the RADIUS AAA server is
   outside the scope of this document, allowing Service Providers the
   flexibility to determine the most efficient/least intrusive procedure
   to support MN authentication during the DMU Procedure.

6.1 RADIUS AAA Support

   The RADIUS AAA server MUST support three MN_Authenticator options:

   1. Ignore MN_Authenticator

      Depending on other potential authentication/fraud prevention
      options (outside the scope of the DMU Procedure), the RADIUS AAA
      Server MUST have the capability to ignore the MN_Authenticator.
      For example, when the RADIUS AAA Server decrypts the MIP_Key_Data
      payload, the AAA Server silently discards the MN_Authenticator.



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   2. Pre-Update Validation

      Prior to updating a subscription profile with the delivered MIP
      keys, the RADIUS AAA Server MUST compare the MN_AuthenticatorMN
      (delivered via the encrypted MIP_Key_Data payload) with the
      MN_AuthenticatorAAA (possibly delivered via the Service Provider
      customer care or billing/provisioning system).

   3. Post-Update Validation

      After the DMU Procedure is complete, the RADIUS AAA Server stores
      the delivered MN_AuthenticatorMN and waits for delivery of the
      MN_AuthenticatorAAA (via Customer Care, IVR, or some other
      unspecified process).  Once the MN_Authenticator is delivered to
      the RADIUS AAA Server, the AAA MUST compare the MN_AuthenticatorMN
      (delivered via the encrypted MIP_Key_Data payload) with the
      MN_AuthenticatorAAA.  If the Authenticators match, the RADIUS AAA
      Server authorizes access and final update of the MIP keys.

6.2 MN Support

   The Mobile Node (MN) MUST store the 24-bit MN_Authenticator.

   The MN MUST display the MN_Authenticator as an 8 decimal digit number
   (via LCD display on a handset or via a GUI for a modem).  If the MN
   resides within a handset, the user MAY display the MN_Authenticator
   using the following keypad sequence:  "FCN + * + * + M + I + P +
   RCL".  Otherwise, the MN MUST display the MN_Authenticator via the
   device's GUI.

   The MN MUST have the capability to reset the MN_Authenticator.  In
   other words, the MN MUST have the capability to randomly/pseudo-
   randomly generate a new 24-bit MN_Authenticator in according with RFC
   1750 upon user command.  The reset feature mitigates possible
   compromise of the MN_Authenticator during shipment/storage.  If the
   MN resides within a handset, the user MAY reset the MN_Authenticator
   using the following keypad sequence:  "FCN + * + * + M + I + P + C +
   C + RCL".  Otherwise, the MN MUST reset the MN_Authenticator via the
   device's GUI.

   The MN manufacturer MAY pre-load the MN with the MN_Authenticator.
   For example, by pre-loading the MN_Authenticator and affixing a
   sticker with the MN_Authenticator (8 decimal digit representation) to
   the MN (e.g. modem), the point-of-sale representative does not have
   to retrieve the MN_Authenticator from the MN interface.

   [Optional] The MN MAY maintain a separate primary and secondary queue
   of MN_Authenticator/MIP_Key_Data Payload pairs.  When the MN user
   resets the primary MN_Authenticator, the MN discards the primary


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   MN_Authenticator (and any associated MIP_Key_Data Payload) and
   assigns the MN_Authenticator in the secondary queue as the primary
   MN_Authenticator (and assigns any associated MIP_Key_Data Payloads to
   the primary queue).  This feature enables the user/provisioner to
   reset the MN_Authenticator and immediately initiate the DMU procedure
   without losing the MIP_Key_Data Payload pre-encryption advantage.
   Upon MN_Authenticator transfer from the secondary to primary queue,
   the MN MUST generate a new MN_Authenticator and associated
   MIP_Key_Data Payload for the secondary queue.  The MN MUST check both
   the primary and secondary MN_Authenticator/MIP_Key_Data Payload
   queues upon power-up or application initiation.  The MN MUST maintain
   at least one MN_Authenticator/MIP_Key_Data Payload pair in each
   queue.

6.3 Informative: MN_Authenticator Support

   MN authentication using the MN_Authenticator gives the service
   provider the maximum flexibility in determining how to deliver the
   MN_Authenticator to the RADIUS AAA Server.  The method of
   MN_Authenticator delivery is outside the scope of this document.

   However, to provide some context to how the MN_Authenticator may
   support MN authentication/fraud prevention in the HRPD/1xEV-DO
   environment, we describe the following possible provisioning
   scenario.

   When a subscriber initially acquires their HRPD/1xEV-DO device and
   service, the point-of-sale representative records the subscription
   information into the billing/provision system via a computer terminal
   at the point-of-sale.  The billing/provisioning system delivers
   certain information to the RADIUS AAA Server (e.g. NAI, MSID, ESN)
   including the MN_Authenticator which the point-of-sale representative
   retrieves via the MN device's display.  In the case of a modem, the
   manufacturer may have pre-loaded the MN_Authenticator and placed a
   copy of the MN_Authenticator on a sticker attached to the modem.  The
   point-of-sale representative simply copies the 8 decimal digit value
   of the MN_Authenticator into the customer profile.  Once the MN is
   loaded with the proper NAI and powered-up, the MN initiates the DMU
   Procedure with the RADIUS AAA Server.  The RADIUS AAA Server compares
   the MN-delivered MN_Authenticator with the billing system delivered
   MN_Authenticator.  If the authenticators match, the RADIUS AAA Server
   updates the subscriber profile with the delivered MIP keys and
   authorizes service.  If the Post-Update option is enabled within the
   RADIUS AAA Server, the RADIUS AAA Server tentatively updates the
   subscription profile until it receives the MN_Authenticator via the
   billing/provision system.

   As another option, the Service Provider MAY use an IVR system in
   which the HRPD/1xEV-DO subscriber calls a provisioning number and


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   inputs the MN_Authenticator.  The IVR system then delivers the
   MN_Authenticator to the RADIUS AAA Server for final validation and
   Packet Data Access.

7. Security Considerations

   The DMU Procedure is designed to maximize the efficiency of MIP key
   distribution while providing adequate key distribution security.  The
   following provides a description of potential security
   vulnerabilities and their relative risk to the DMU Procedure:

7.1 Cryptographic Key Generation by the MN

   Because the MN is required to properly generate the MN_AAA, MN_HA,
   and CHAP key, the MN must perform cryptographic key generation in
   accordance with accepted random/pseudo-random number generation
   procedures.  MN manufacturers MUST comply with RFC 1750 [12]
   guidelines and Service Providers SHOULD ensure that manufacturers
   implement acceptable key generation procedures.  The use of
   predictable cryptographic keys could be devastating to MIP security.
   However, the risk of not using acceptable random/pseudo-random key
   generation is minimal as long as MN manufacturers adhere to RFC 1750
   guidelines.  Furthermore, if a key generation flaw is identified, the
   flaw appears readily correctable via a software patch, minimizing the
   impact.

7.2 Man-in-the-Middle Attack

   The DMU procedure is susceptible to a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
   attack, however such an attack appears relatively complex and
   expensive.  When AKA is deployed within cdma2000(R) 1X, the MITM
   Attack will be eliminated.  The risk of an MITM Attack is minimal due
   to required expertise, attack expense, and impending cdma2000(R) 1X
   mutual authentication protection.  If a particular cdma2000(R) 1X
   network does not support A-key authentication, the MN_Authenticator
   MAY optionally be used.

7.3 RSA Private Key Compromise

   Because one RSA Private key may be associated with millions of MNs
   (RSA Public Key), it is important to protect the RSA Private key from
   disclosure to unauthorized parties.  Each MN manufacturer MUST
   establish adequate security procedures/policies regarding the
   dissemination of the RSA Private key.  RSA Private keys SHOULD be
   distributed to legitimate cdma2000(R) service providers only.  It is
   acceptable for a MN manufacturer to distribute the same RSA Private
   key to multiple service providers to enable MIP key update.  However,
   each service provider MAY generate their own RSA Public/Private key
   pair and require the MN manufacturer to include their own RSA Public


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   key in a specific software patch if compromise of the RSA Private key
   is a significant concern.

7.4 RSA Encryption

   Several vulnerabilities have been identified in certain
   implementations of RSA, however they do not appear applicable to the
   DMU Procedure.

7.5 False Base Station/PDSN

   The MN appears to be protected against a False BS denial-of-service
   (DOS) attack, since only the proper RADIUS AAA server can recover the
   AAA_Authenticator.  This method of preventing a false base station
   attack assumes security of the network messaging between the AAA and
   the serving system, as discussed in 7.9.

7.6 cdma2000(R) 1X False MN

   The cdma2000(R) 1X network appears adequately protected against a
   false MN by IS-2000 challenge-response authentication.  If DMU is
   used outside the cellular domain, equivalent authentication
   procedures are required for the same level of security.

7.7 HRPD/1xEV-DO False MN

   The 1xEV-DO RADIUS AAA Server MAY optionally authenticate the MN
   using the MN_Authenticator to prevent a fraudulent MN activation.

7.8 Key Lifetimes

   There is no explicit lifetime for the keys distributed by DMU.

   The lifetime of the keys distributed by DMU is determined by the
   system operator through the RADIUS AAA server.  The MN_AAA and MN_HA
   key lifetimes can be controlled by initiating an update as needed.

   Furthermore, the DMU process is protected against false initiation
   because the MN cannot initiate DMU.  This makes it unworkable to
   provide an explicit lifetime to the MN, since the MN cannot take any
   action to renew the keys after expiration.

7.9 Network Message Security

   The security of the MN-HA keys delivered from the RADIUS AAA server
   to the MIP home agent requires confidentiality for network messages
   containing such keys.  The specification of security requirements for
   network messages is the responsibility of the operator, and is
   outside the scope of this document. (Note that similar considerations


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   apply to the distribution of Shared Secret Data, which is already
   transmitted between nodes in the ANSI-41 network.)

   If DMU is used outside the domain of a cellular operator, RADIUS
   security features MAY be used, including the Request-Authenticator
   and Response-Authenticator fields defined in [4] and the Message-
   Authenticator attribute defined in [13].

8. Verizon Wireless RADIUS Attributes

   Three new RADIUS Attributes are required to support the DMU Procedure
   and are specified as follows:

   Type: 26
   Length: >9
   Verizon Wireless Enterprise/Vendor ID: 12951

   MIP_Key_Update_Request:
   ----------------------

   The Home RADIUS AAA Server includes this attribute to indicate that
   MIP key update is required.

   Vendor-Type = 1
   Vendor-Length = 3 bytes
   Vendor-Value= PKOID of the RADIUS AAA Server

   MIP_Key_Data:
   ------------

   Key data payload containing the encrypted MN_AAA key, MN_HA key, CHAP
   key, MN_Authenticator, and AAA_Authenticator.  This payload also
   contains the Public Key Identifier.

      Vendor-Type = 2
      Vendor-Length = 134 bytes
      NOTE: Vendor-Length depends on the size of the RSA modulus.  For
         example, when RSA-512 is used, Vendor-Length = 70 bytes.
      Vendor-Value= 128 byte RSA encryption payload (when 1024-bit RSA
         used) which contains encrypted MN_AAA key, MN_HA key, CHAP key,
         MN_Authenticator, and AAA_Authenticator.
      The four (4) byte Public Key Identifier is concatenated to the
         encrypted payload.

   AAA_Authenticator:
   -----------------

   The 64-bit AAA_Authenticator value decrypted by the Home RADIUS AAA
   Server.


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      Vendor-Type = 3
      Vendor-Length = 10 bytes
      Vendor-Value= decrypted AAA_Authenticator from Home RADIUS AAA
         Server.

   Public Key Invalid:
   ------------------

   The home RADIUS AAA Server includes this attribute to indicate that
   the Public key used by the MN is not valid.

      Vendor-Type = 4
      Vendor-Length = 2 bytes
      Vendor-Value= none.

   Note:  An Organization may define RADIUS VSAs using their own
   Organization identifier.

9. Verizon Wireless Mobile IP Extensions

   Three Verizon Wireless Mobile IP Vendor/Organization-Specific
   Extensions (VSE) (RFC 3115), required to support the DMU Procedure,
   are specified as follows:

   Type: 38 (CVSE-TYPE-NUMBER)

   Verizon Wireless Vendor ID: 12951 (high-order octet is 0 and low
   order octets are the SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Code
   of the Vendor in the network byte order, as defined by IANA).

            0          7 8         15 16                     31
            ---------------------------------------------------
           |    Type    |  Reserved  |        Length           |
            ---------------------------------------------------
           |                 Vendor/Org-ID                     |
            ---------------------------------------------------
           |   Vendor-CVSE-Type      |   Vendor-CVSE-Value ... |
            ---------------------------------------------------

        Figure 7.  Critical Vendor/Organization Specific Extension

   MIP_Key_Request:
   ---------------

   The Home RADIUS AAA Server includes this extension to indicate that
   MIP key update is required.

      Length = 7


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      NOTE: The RFC 3115 Editor has stated that the Reserved field is
         not included in the length determination.
      Vendor-CVSE-Type = 1
      Vendor-CVSE-Value= PKOID sent in the RADIUS MIP_Key_Update_Request
         attribute.

   MIP_Key_Data:
   ------------

   Key data payload containing encrypted MN_AAA key, MN_HA key, CHAP
   key, MN_Authenticator, and AAA_Authenticator.  This payload also
   contains the Public Key Identifier.

      Length = 138
      NOTE: Length depends on the size of the RSA modulus. For example,
         when RSA-512 is used, Length = 74 bytes.
      Vendor-CVSE-Type = 2
      Vendor-CVSE-Value= 128 byte RSA encryption payload (when 1024-bit
         RSA used) which contains encrypted MN_AAA key, MN_HA key, CHAP
         key, MN_Authenticator, and AAA_Authenticator.
      The four (4) byte Public Key Identifier and DMUV is concatenated
         to the encrypted payload.

   AAA_Authenticator:
   -----------------

   The 64-bit AAA_Authenticator value decrypted by the Home RADIUS AAA
   Server.

      Length = 14 bytes
      Vendor-CVSE-Type = 3
      Vendor-CVSE-Value= decrypted AAA_Authenticator from the Home
         RADIUS AAA Server.

   Public Key Invalid:
   ------------------

   The Home RADIUS AAA Server includes this extension to indicate that
   the Public key used by the MN is not valid.

      Length = 6 bytes
      Vendor-CVSE-Type = 4
      Vendor-CVSE-Value= none.

   Note:  An Organization may define VSEs using their own Organization
   identifier.

10. Public Key Identifier and DMU Version



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   The Public Key Identifier (Pub_Key_ID) is used during the Dynamic
   Mobile IP Update (DMU) procedure to allow the RADIUS AAA Server to
   distinguish between different Public keys (which may be assigned by
   different manufacturers, service providers, or other organizations).
   The Public Key Identifier consists of the PKOID, PKOI, PK_Identifier,
   and ATV fields.  The DMU Version field enables subsequent revisions
   of the DMU procedure.

              ----------------------------------------------
             | PKOID  |   PKOI  | PK_Expansion | ATV | DMUV |
              ----------------------------------------------
              0      7 8      15 16          23 24 27 28  31

                 Figure 8. Public Key Identifier and DMUV

   Each Public Key Organization (PKO) MUST be assigned a Public Key
   Organization Identifier (PKOID) to enable the RADIUS AAA Server to
   distinguish between different Public keys created by different PKOs
   (see Table 1).

   If a Service Provider does not provide the MN manufacturer with a
   (RSA) Public key, the manufacturer MUST generate a unique RSA
   Public/Private key pair and pre-load each MN with the RSA Public key
   (1024-bit modulus by default).  The manufacturer MAY share the same
   RSA Private key with multiple Service Providers as long as reasonable
   security procedures are established and maintained (by the
   manufacturer) to prevent disclosure of the RSA Private (decryption)
   key to an unauthorized party.

   The Public Key Organization Index (PKOI) is an 8-bit field whose
   value is defined at the discretion of the PKO.  For example, a device
   manufacturer MAY incrementally assign a new PKOI for each
   Public/Private key pair when the pair is created.

   The PK_Expansion field enables support for additional PKOs or
   expansion of the PKOI.

   The DMU Version field allows for DMU Procedure version identification
   (see Table 2).

   The Algorithm Type and Version (ATV) field allows for identification
   of the Public Key algorithm and version used (see Table 3).









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          Table 1.  Public Key Organization Identification Table

   PKOID    Public Key                 PKOID    Public Key
   (HEX)    Organization (PKO)         (HEX)    Organization (PKO)
   -----    ------------------         -----    ------------------
   00       RESERVED                   40       Sanyo Fisher Company
   01       RESERVED                   41       Sharp Laboratories of
                                                America
   02       RESERVED                   42       Sierra Wireless, Inc.
   03       RESERVED                   43       Sony Electronics
   04       RESERVED                   44       Synertek, Inc.
   05       RESERVED                   45       Tantivy Communications,
                                                Inc.
   06       RESERVED                   46       Tellus Technology, Inc.
   07       RESERVED                   47       Wherify Wireless, Inc.
   08       RESERVED                   48       Airbiquity
   09       RESERVED                   49       ArrayComm
   0A       Verizon Wireless           4A       Celletra Ltd.
   0B       AAPT Ltd.                  4B       CIBERNET Corporation
   0C       ALLTEL Communications      4C       CommWorks Corporation,
                                                a 3Com Company
   0D       Angola Telecom             4D       Compaq Computer
                                                Corporation
   0E       Bell Mobility              4E       ETRI
   0F       BellSouth International    4F       Glenayre Electronics
                                                Inc.
   10       China Unicom               50       GTRAN, Inc.
   11       KDDI Corporation           51       Logica
   12       Himachal Futuristic        52       LSI Logic
            Communications Ltd.
   13       Hutchison Telecom (HK),    53       Metapath Software
            Ltd.                                International, Inc.
   14       IUSACELL                   54       Metawave Communications
   15       Komunikasi Selular         55       Openwave Systems Inc.
            Indonesia (Komselindo)
   16       Korea Telecom Freetel,     56       ParkerVision, Inc.
            Inc.
   17       Leap                       57       QUALCOMM, Inc.
   18       LG Telecom, Ltd.           58       QuickSilver Technologies
   19       Mahanagar Telephone Nigam  59       Research Institute of
            Limited (MTNL)                      Telecommunication
                                                Transmission, MII (RITT)
   1A       Nextel Communications,     5A       Schema, Ltd.
            Inc.
   1B       Operadora UNEFON SA de CV  5B       SchlumbergerSema
   1C       Pacific Bangladesh         5C       ScoreBoard, Inc.
            Telecom Limited
   1D       Pegaso PCS, S.A. DE C.V.   5D       SignalSoft Corp.



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   PKOID    Public Key                 PKOID    Public Key
   (HEX)    Organization (PKO)         (HEX)    Organization (PKO)
   -----    ------------------         -----    ------------------
   1E       Pele-Phone                 5E       SmartServ Online,
            Communications Ltd.                 Inc.
   1F       Qwest                      5F       TDK Corporation
   20       Reliance Infocom Limited   60       Texas Instruments
   21       Shinsegi Telecomm, Inc.    61       Wherify Wireless, Inc.
   22       Shyam Telelink Limited     62       Acterna
   23       SK Telecom                 63       Anritsu Company
   24       Sprint PCS                 64       Ericsson
   25       Tata Teleservices Ltd.     65       Grayson Wireless
   26       Telecom Mobile Limited     66       LinkAir Communications,
                                                Inc.
   27       Telstra Corporation        67       Racal Instruments
            Limited
   28       Telus Mobility Cellular,   68       Rohde & Schwarz
            Inc.
   29       US Cellular                69       Spirent Communications
   2A       3G Cellular                6A       Willtech, Inc.
   2B       Acer Communication &       6B       Wireless Test Systems
            Multimedia Inc.
   2C       AirPrime, Inc.             6C       Airvana, Inc.
   2D       Alpine Electronics, Inc.   6D       COM DEV Wireless
   2E       Audiovox Communications    6E       Conductus, Inc.
            Corporation
   2F       DENSO Wireless             6F       Glenayre Electronics
                                                Inc.
   30       Ditrans Corporation        70       Hitachi Telecom (USA),
                                                Inc.
   31       Fujitsu Network            71       Hyundai Syscomm Inc.
            Communication, Inc.
   32       Gemplus Corporation        72       ISCO
   33       Giga Telecom Inc.          73       LG Electronics, Inc.
   34       Hyundai CURITEL, Inc.      74       LinkAir Communications,
                                                Inc.
   35       InnovICs Corp              75       Lucent Technologies,
                                                Inc.
   36       Kyocera Corporation        76       Motorola CIG
   37       LG Electronics, Inc.       77       Nortel Networks
   38       LinkAir Communications,    78       Repeater Technologies
            Inc.
   39       Motorola, Inc.             79       Samsung Electronics Co.,
                                                Ltd.
   3A       Nokia Corporation          7A       Starent Networks
   3B       Novatel Wireless, Inc.     7B       Tahoe Networks, Inc.
   3C       OKI Network Technologies   7C       Tantivy Communications,
                                                Inc.
   3D       Pixo                       7D       WaterCove Networks


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   PKOID    Public Key                 PKOID    Public Key
   (HEX)    Organization (PKO)         (HEX)    Organization (PKO)
   -----    ------------------         -----    ------------------
   3E       Research In Motion         7E       Winphoria Networks, Inc.
   3F       Samsung Electronics        7F       ZTE Corporation
            Co., Ltd.

   Note: 80 through FF will be assigned by the PKOID administrator
   (TBD).

                           Table 2.  DMU Version

                        DMU Version    DMU Version
                           Value
                        -----------    -----------
                        00             RFC XXXX
                        01             TBD
                        02             TBD
                        03             TBD
                        04             TBD
                        05             TBD
                        06             TBD
                        07             Cleartext Mode

                   Table 3.  Algorithm Type and Version

                        ATV      Public Key Algorithm
                        Value    Type and Version
                        -----    --------------------
                        00       Reserved
                        01       RSA - 1024
                        02       RSA - 768
                        03       RSA - 2048
                        04       TBD
                        05       TBD
                        06       TBD
                        07       TBD

11. Conclusion

   The Dynamic Mobile IP key Update (DMU) Procedure enables the
   efficient, yet secure, delivery of critical Mobile IP cryptographic
   keys.  The use of cryptographic keys, hence the bootstrapping of such
   MIP keys using the DMU Procedure, is essential to commercial delivery
   of Mobile IP service in CDMA 2000 1xRTT and HRPD/1xEV-DO networks
   networks or other networks that utilize Mobile IP.

12. Formal Syntax



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   None.

References


   1  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
      Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Internet Engineering Task Force, March
      1997

   2  TIA/EIA/IS-2000 Series, Revision A, Telecommunications Industry
      Association, March 2000

   3  TIA/EIA/IS-856, cdma2000 High Rate Packet Data Air Interface
      Specification, Telecommunications Industry Association, November
      2000

   4  Rigner, C, et al., "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
      (RADIUS)," RFC 2865, IETF Network Working Group, June 2000.

   5  Calhoun, P, et al., "Diameter Base Protocol," RFC 3588, IETF
      Network Working Group, September 2003.

   6  TIA/EIA/IS-835-A, cdma2000 Wireless IP Network Standard,
      Telecommunications Industry Association, May 2001

   7  ANSI/TIA/EIA-41-D-97, Cellular Radiotelecommunications Intersystem
      Operations, Telecommunications Industry Association, December 1997

   8  ANSI/TIA/EIA-683-B-2001, Over-the-Air Service Provisioning of
      Mobile Stations in Spread Spectrum Systems, Telecommunications
      Industry Association, December 2001

   9  B. Kaliski. PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5.  RFC 2313,
      Internet Engineering Task Force, March 1998.

   10  G. Dommety, K. Leung. Mobile IP Vendor/Organization-Specific
      Extensions. RFC 3115, Internet Engineering Task Force, April 2001

   11  TIA/EIA-IS-634-A, Interoperability Specifications (IOS) for
      cdma2000 Access Network Interfaces, Telecommunications Industry
      Association, August 2001

   12  D. Eastlake, 3rd, S. Crocker, and J. Schiller.  Randomness
      Recommendations for Security.  RFC 1750, Internet Engineering Task
      Force, December 1994.

   13  C. Rigney, W. Willats, and P. Calhoun.  RADIUS Extensions.  RFC
      2869, Internet Engineering Task Force, June, 2000.



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Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Jeffrey Dyck (Qualcomm), James Willkie (Qualcomm), Jayanth
   Mandayam (Qualcomm), Marcello Lioy (Qualcomm), Michael Borella
   (CommWorks), Cliff Randall (CommWorks), Daniel Cassinelli
   (CommWorks), Edward Dunn (CommWorks), Suresh Sarvepalli (CommWorks),
   Gabriella Ambramovici (Lucent), Semyon Mizikovsky (Lucent), Sarvar
   Patel (Lucent), Peter McCann (Lucent), Ganapathy Sundaram (Lucent),
   Girish Patel (Nortel), Glen Baxley (Nortel), Diane Thompson
   (Ericsson), Brian Hickman(Ericsson), Somsay Sychaleun (Bridgewater),
   Parm Sandhu (Sierra Wireless), Iulian Mucano (Sierra Wireless), and
   Samy Touati (Ericsson) for their useful discussions and comments.

Author's Addresses

   Christopher Carroll*
   Ropes & Gray LLP
   Fish & Neave IP Group
   One International Place
   Boston, MA 02110
   Phone: 617-951-7756
   Email: Christopher.Carroll@ropesgray.com
   *formerly with Verizon Wireless

   Frank Quick
   Qualcomm Incorporated
   5775 Morehouse Drive
   San Diego, CA 92121 USA
   Phone: 858-658-3608
   Email: fquick@qualcomm.com




















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13. Appendix - Cleartext-Mode Operation

   DMU supports a cleartext mode for development testing where DMUV = 7.
   The MIP_Key_Data payload will assume the same size as if RSA 1024-bit
   encryption were applied to the payload.  In this mode, the
   MIP_Key_Data RADIUS Attribute and MIP Vendor Specific Extension will
   be 134 bytes and 138 bytes in length respectively.  Thus, in
   cleartext mode, the payload MUST consist of 48 bytes of keys (MN_AAA,
   MN_HA, and CHAP key), 8 byte AAA_Authenticator, 3 byte
   MN_Authenticator.  The next 69 bytes will be padded with "0" bits.

   MIP_Key_Data = MN_AAAH key, MN_HA key, CHAP_key, MN_Authenticator,
   AAA_Authenticator, Padding (69 bytes), Public_Key_IDi, DMUV

   Where:

      MN_AAA key = 128-bit random MN / RADIUS AAA Server key.

      MN_HA key = 128-bit random MN / Home Agent (HA) key.

      CHAP_key = 128-bit random Simple IP authentication key.

      MN_Authenticator = 24-bit random number.

      AAA_Authenticator = 64-bit random number used by MN to
         authenticate the RADIUS AAA Server.

      Padding = 69 bytes of 0's.

      DMU Version (DMUV) = 4 bit identifier of DMU version.

   Public Key Identifier (Pub _Key_ID) = PKOID, PKOI, PK_Expansion, ATV

   Where:

      Public Key Organization Identifier (PKOID) = 8-bit serial number
         identifier of the Public Key Organization (PKO) that created
         the Public Key.

      Public Key Organization Index (PKOI) = 8-bit serial number used at
         PKO discretion to distinguish different Public/Private key
         pairs.

      PK_Expansion = 8-bit field to enable possible expansion of PKOID
         or PKOI fields. (Note: Default value = 0xFF)

      Algorithm Type and Version (ATV) = 4-bit identifier of the
         algorithm used.



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Notices

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).  This document is subject
   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.





































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