[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]

Versions: 00 01 02 03 draft-ietf-v6ops-rogue-ra

IPv6 Operations                                                 T. Chown
Internet-Draft                                 University of Southampton
Intended status: Informational                                 S. Venaas
Expires: January 15, 2009                                        UNINETT
                                                           July 14, 2008


           Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisement Problem Statement
                     draft-chown-v6ops-rogue-ra-01

Status of this Memo

   By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
   applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
   have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
   aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 15, 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

Abstract

   When deploying IPv6 networks, whether IPv6-only or dual-stack,
   routers are configured to use IPv6 Router Advertisements to convey
   information to on link nodes that enable them to autoconfigure on the
   network.  This information includes the implied default router
   address taken from the observed source address of the Router
   Advertisement (RA) message.  However, in some networks 'bogus' RAs
   are observed, which may be present due to misconfigurations or



Chown & Venaas          Expires January 15, 2009                [Page 1]


Internet-Draft      Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisements           July 2008


   possibly malicious attacks on the network.  In this draft we
   summarise the scenarios in which rogue RAs may be observed, and we
   present a list of possible solutions to the problem.  The goal of
   this draft is to present a framework around which solutions can be
   proposed and discussed.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Bogus RA Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  Administrator misconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.2.  User misconfiguration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.3.  Malicious misconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Methods to Mitigate against Rogue RAs  . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1.  Manual configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  Secure Neighbor Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.3.  Introduce RA snooping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.4.  Use the Router Preference Option . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.5.  Rely on Layer 2 admission control  . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.6.  Use host-based packet filters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     3.7.  Use an 'intelligent' deprecation tool  . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.8.  Wait before using new advertisements . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.9.  Add a Default Gateway Option to DHCPv6 . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Other considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   8.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   9.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 10



















Chown & Venaas          Expires January 15, 2009                [Page 2]


Internet-Draft      Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisements           July 2008


1.  Introduction

   The Neighbor Discovery protocol [6] describes the operation of IPv6
   Router Advertisements (RAs), which are used during the IPv6
   autoconfiguration process, whether stateful (via DHCPv6 [1] or DHCPv6
   Light [2]) or stateless (as per RFC4862 [7]).  In either case, the
   default router address is drawn directly from the source address of
   the RA message.  In contrast to IPv4, there is no DHCPv6 option to
   configure a default gateway address.

   In observing the operation of deployed IPv6 networks, it is apparent
   that there is a problem with undesired or 'bogus' IPv6 Router
   Advertisements (RAs) appearing on network links or subnets.  By
   'bogus' we mean RAs that were not the intended configured RAs, rather
   RAs that have appeared for some other reason.

   The problem with rogue RAs is that they can cause partial or complete
   failure of operation on an IPv6 link.  As such they are an
   operational issue for which solution(s) are required, and for which
   best practice needs to be conveyed.

   In the next section, we discuss the scenarios that may give rise to
   rogue RAs being present.  In the following section we present some
   candidate solutions for the problem, some of which may be more
   practical to deploy than others.


2.  Bogus RA Scenarios

   There are three broad classes of scenario in which bogus RAs may be
   introduced to an IPv6 network.

2.1.  Administrator misconfiguration

   Here an administrator incorrectly configures RAs on a router
   interface, causing incorrect RAs to appear on links and hosts to
   generate incorrect IPv6 address or other information.  In this case
   the default gateway may be correct, but a host might for example
   become multi-addressed, possibly with a correct and incorrect address
   based on a correct and incorrect prefix.  There is also the
   possibility of bad lifetime information being configured.

   In the case of a Layer 2 VLAN misconfiguration, RAs may 'flood' to
   unintended links, causing hosts or more than one link to potentially
   become incorrectly multiaddressed, with possibly two different
   default routers available.





Chown & Venaas          Expires January 15, 2009                [Page 3]


Internet-Draft      Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisements           July 2008


2.2.  User misconfiguration

   In this case a user's device 'accidentally' transmits RAs onto the
   local link, adding an addition default gateway and prefix
   information.  This is typically seen on wireless (though sometimes
   wired) networks where a laptop has been used as a home gateway (e.g.
   a 6to4 gateway) and has then been attached to another network with
   the gateway configuration still active.  A not infrequent cause here
   is the Windows Internet Connection Sharing service (ICS) which turns
   a host into a 6to4 gateway; this can be a useful feature, unless it
   is run when not intended.  We have had reports that hosts may not see
   the genuine RAs on link due to host firewalls, and then turning on a
   connection sharing service and 6to4 as a result.

   There are also reported incidents in enterprise networks of users
   physically plugging Ethernet cables into the wrong sockets and
   bridging two subnets together, causing an problem similar to VLAN
   flooding.

2.3.  Malicious misconfiguration

   Here an attacker is deliberately generating RAs on the local network
   in an attempt to perform some form of denial of service or man-in-
   the-middle attack.


3.  Methods to Mitigate against Rogue RAs

   In this section we present a summary of methods suggested to date for
   reducing or removing the possibility of rogue RAs being seen on a
   network.

3.1.  Manual configuration

   The default gateway can usually be manually configured on a device.
   This is of course a resource intensive solution, and also prone to
   mistakes in itself.

3.2.  Secure Neighbor Discovery

   The SEND [3] protocol provides a method for hosts and routers to
   perform secure Neighbor Discovery.  At present there are very few
   SEND implementations available, and SEND is perceived as a complex
   protocol to deploy.  It is also likely that not all scenarios will be
   able to use SeND, for various reasons.






Chown & Venaas          Expires January 15, 2009                [Page 4]


Internet-Draft      Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisements           July 2008


3.3.  Introduce RA snooping

   It should be possible to implement 'RA snooping' in Layer 2 switches
   in a similar way to DHCP snooping, such that RAs observed from
   incorrect sources are blocked or dropped, and not propagated through
   a subnet.  One candidate solution in this space called RA-Guard [8]
   has recently been proposed.  This type of solution has appeal because
   it is a familiar model for enterprise network managers, but it can
   also be used to complement SeND.

   It is interesting to note that the Windows ICS that runs a 6to4
   gateway also starts an IPv4 DHCP service, so any snooping solution is
   mitigating against both these issues.

   This type of solution may not be applicable everywhere, e.g. in
   environments where there are not centrally controlled switches.

3.4.  Use the Router Preference Option

   RFC4191 [4] introduced router preference options, such that an RA
   could carry one of three router preference values: High, Medium
   (default) or Low. Thus an administrator could use High settings for
   managed RAs, and hope that 'accidental' RAs would be medium priority,
   and that hosts implemented this optional protocol.

3.5.  Rely on Layer 2 admission control

   In principle, if a technology such as IEEE 802.1x is used, devices
   would first need to authenticate to the network before being able to
   send or receive IPv6 traffic.  Ideally authentication would be
   mutual.  This may mitigate against a malicious attacker, but doesn't
   address the misconfiguration issues.

3.6.  Use host-based packet filters

   In a managed environment hosts could be configured via their
   'personal firewall' to only accept RAs from trusted sources.
   However, the problem is then pushed to keeping this configuration
   maintained and correct.  If a router fails and is replaced, possibly
   with a new Layer 2 interface address, the link local source address
   in the filter may be incorrect and no network exists to push the new
   information to the host.

   Also, hosts could potentially be configured to discard 6to4-based RAs
   in a managed enterprise environment.






Chown & Venaas          Expires January 15, 2009                [Page 5]


Internet-Draft      Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisements           July 2008


3.7.  Use an 'intelligent' deprecation tool

   It could be possible to run a daemon on a link (perhaps on the router
   on the link) to watch for incorrect RAs and to send a deprecating RA
   with router lifetime of zero when such an RA is observed.  The KAME
   rafixd is an example of such a tool, which has been used at IETF
   meetings with some success.  Whether or not such a tool is the
   preferred method, monitoring a link for observed RAs seems prudent
   from a network management perspective.  Some such tools exist
   already, e.g. ndpmon.

3.8.  Wait before using new advertisements

   It might be possible, in generally static networks, to configure an
   option such that any new RAs that are seen are not acted upon for a
   certain period, e.g. 2 hours.  This might allow time for a
   misconfiguration or accidental RA to be detected and stopped, before
   hosts use the data in the RA.  Of course this would add delays where
   genuine new RAs are required, while new hosts appearing on a network
   would still be vulnerable (or be unable to configure at all).

3.9.  Add a Default Gateway Option to DHCPv6

   It may be possible to define a new Default Gateway Option for DHCPv6
   that would allow network administrators to only have hosts use DHCPv6
   for default gateway configuration in managed networks.  While such an
   option could be defined, its ramifications remain unclear.  In the
   absence of RAs, other configuration information would also be
   missing, e.g. on-link prefix information.  Of course, it may be that
   an RA is still required to inform the host to use DHCPv6, and that
   may introduce a Catch-22 unless hosts are configured directly to only
   use DHCPv6.

   An advantage of DHCPv6 is that should an error be introduced, only
   hosts that have refreshed their DHCP information since that time are
   affected, while a rogue RA will most likely affect all hosts
   immediately.  DHCPv6 also allows different answers to be given to
   different hosts.

   One objection to introducing such an option is that DHCPv6 in itself
   is not a secure protocol, and it is also of course subject to
   misconfigurations, accidental or otherwise.  Comparing the threat
   model for rogue RAs and rogue DHCPv6 servers is an interesting
   exercise in itself.  Use of Authenticated DHCP is currently minimal
   and thus the (lack of) security is just pushed to another place,
   albeit one that site administrators are more familiar and (rightly or
   wrongly) comfortable with.




Chown & Venaas          Expires January 15, 2009                [Page 6]


Internet-Draft      Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisements           July 2008


4.  Other considerations

   There are other general observations that have been made.

   One is that it would generally be prudent for network monitoring or
   management platforms to be able to observe and report on observed
   RAs, and whether unintended RAs (possibly from unintended sources)
   are present on a network.  Further, it may be useful for individual
   hosts to be able to report their address status, e.g. this could be
   useful during an IPv6 renumbering phased process as described in
   RFC4192 [5].

   The second is how readily a host can recover from bad configuration
   information, e.g. considering the '2 hour rule' of Section 5.5.3 of
   RFC4862 (though this applies to the prefix lifetime not the router
   lifetime).  We should ensure that methods exist for a network
   administrator to correct bad configuration information on a link or
   subnet, and that OS platforms support these methods.  At least if the
   problem can be detected, and corrected promptly, the impact is
   minimised.

   A comment has been made that in the case of 6to4 being run by a host
   on a subnet that is not administratively configured with IPv6, some
   OSes or applications may begin using IPv6 to the 6to4 host (router)
   rather than IPv4 to the intended default IPv4 router.  Mitigating
   against this condition can also be seen to be important.


5.  Conclusions

   In this text we have described scenarios via which rogue Router
   Advertisements (RAs) may appear on a network, and some measures that
   could be used to mitigate against these.

   While SEND perhaps offers the most robust solution, implementations
   are not widely available, and the solution is perceived as complex
   (parallels can possibly be drawn with Authenticated DHCP in terms of
   likely deployment).  Adding a new DHCPv6 Default Gateway Option would
   allow configuration by DHCP, and be a method that IPv4 administrators
   are comfortable with (for better or worse), but such an option would
   have significant impacts elsewhere, and in any event one must
   recognise that the security risk is then simply shifted elsewhere.

   Further feedback on the solutions is certainly welcome.  In the
   meantime, perhaps the simplest initial step would be for RA snooping
   to be defined and deployed for Layer 2 devices, in such a way that
   can address (shared) wireless as well as wired networks.  One draft
   proposal in this space, RA-Guard, has recently been published [8].



Chown & Venaas          Expires January 15, 2009                [Page 7]


Internet-Draft      Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisements           July 2008


   Alternatively, certain switch platforms can already implement a form
   of snooping by the administrator configuring Access Control Lists
   (ACLs) that block RA ICMP messages that might be inbound on 'user'
   ports.  A cleaner solution is desirable though.

   This topic has also highlighted that some DHCPv6 on-link prefix
   option may be useful for some scenarios, caused in part by the change
   of the 'default on-link' rule.  This should be seen as independent of
   whether DHCPv6 is extended to add a Default Gateway Option, which is
   another open question at this time.

   The material presented here is relevant to the IETF dhc and v6ops
   working groups, but the text is labeled as v6ops due to its
   operational issue focus.  Should new DHCP features be defined as a
   result, we assume these would be presented within the dhc working
   group.


6.  Security Considerations

   There are no extra Security consideration for this document.


7.  IANA Considerations

   There are no extra IANA consideration for this document.


8.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks are due to members of the IETF IPv6 Operations and DHCP WGs
   for their inputs on this topic, including but not limited to Iljitsch
   van Beijnum, David Malone, Tony Hain, Christian Huitema, Remi Denis-
   Courmant, Chip Popoviciu, Dave Thaler and Tatuya Jinmei.


9.  Informative References

   [1]  Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., and M.
        Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
        RFC 3315, July 2003.

   [2]  Droms, R., "Stateless Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
        Service for IPv6", RFC 3736, April 2004.

   [3]  Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
        Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.




Chown & Venaas          Expires January 15, 2009                [Page 8]


Internet-Draft      Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisements           July 2008


   [4]  Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and More-
        Specific Routes", RFC 4191, November 2005.

   [5]  Baker, F., Lear, E., and R. Droms, "Procedures for Renumbering
        an IPv6 Network without a Flag Day", RFC 4192, September 2005.

   [6]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, "Neighbor
        Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, September 2007.

   [7]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless Address
        Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.

   [8]  Van de Velde, G., Levy-Abegnoli, E., Popoviciu, C., and J.
        Mohacsi, "IPv6 RA-Guard (draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-00)",
        July 2008.


Authors' Addresses

   Tim Chown
   University of Southampton
   Southampton, Hampshire  SO17 1BJ
   United Kingdom

   Email: tjc@ecs.soton.ac.uk


   Stig Venaas
   UNINETT
   Trondheim  NO 7465
   Norway

   Email: venaas@uninett.no


















Chown & Venaas          Expires January 15, 2009                [Page 9]


Internet-Draft      Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisements           July 2008


Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
   contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
   retain all their rights.

   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.


Intellectual Property

   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information
   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
   found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
   http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at
   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.


Acknowledgment

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).





Chown & Venaas          Expires January 15, 2009               [Page 10]


Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.129c, available from https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/