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Versions: 00 draft-ietf-lamps-cms-shakes

Internet-Draft                                                   Q. Dang
Intended status: Standards Track                                    NIST
Expires: 29 April 2018                                     P. Kampanakis
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                         29 October 2017

             Use of the SHAKE One-way Hash Functions in the
                   Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)

             <draft-dang-lamps-cms-shakes-hash-00.txt>


Abstract

   This document describes the conventions for using 2 one-way
   hash functions called SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 in the SHA3 family with
   the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS).

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 April 2018.

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1.  Introduction

   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS] is used to digitally
   sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message contents.
   This specification describes the use of the SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
   specified in [SHA3] as 2 new hash funcitons with the CMS. In addition,
   this specification describes the use of these 2 one-way hash functions
   with the RSASSA PKCS#1 version 1.5 signature algorithm [PKCS1] and the
   Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] with the CMS
   signed-data content type.

1.1.  ASN.1

   CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [ASN1-B], using the Basic
   Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
   [ASN1-E].

1.2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [KEYWORDS].

2.  Message Digest Algorithms

   One-way hash functions are also referred to as message digest
   algorithms.  This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
   implementations that support SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 [SHA3].

   Digest algorithm identifiers are located in the SignedData
   digestAlgorithms field, the SignerInfo digestAlgorithm field, the
   DigestedData digestAlgorithm field, and the AuthenticatedData
   digestAlgorithm field.

   Digest values are located in the DigestedData digest field and the
   Message Digest authenticated attribute. In addition, digest values
   are input to signature algorithms.

   Output lengths of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are always 256 and 512 bits
   respectively in this specification. The object identifiers
   for these 2 one-way hash functions are as follows:

      hashAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
          us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 }

      id-SHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 11 }



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      id-SHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs 12 }



   When using the id-SHAKE128 or id-SHAKE256 algorithm identifier, the
   parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL but absent. Again, the output
   lengths are fixed as 256 and 512 bits respectively.

3.  Signature Algorithms

   This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
   implementations that support 2 SHAKE one-way hash functions
   with the RSASSA PKCS#1 version 1.5 signature algorithm [PKCS1] and
   the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [DSS] with the
   CMS signed-data content type.

   Signature algorithm identifiers are located in the SignerInfo
   signatureAlgorithm field of SignedData. Also, signature algorithm
   identifiers are located in the SignerInfo signatureAlgorithm field of
   countersignature attributes.

   Signature values are located in the SignerInfo signature field of
   SignedData. Also, signature values are located in the SignerInfo
   signature field of countersignature attributes.

3.1.  RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHAKEs

   The RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 is defined in [PKCS1].  When RSASSA PKCS#1
   v1.5 is used in conjunction with one of the SHAKEs one-way hash
   functions, the object identifiers are:

      sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
          us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 }

      id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-SHAKE128 ::= { sigAlgs x }

      id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-SHAKE256 ::= { sigAlgs y }

   Note: x and y will be specified by NIST.


   The algorithm identifier for RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 subject public keys
   in certificates is specified in [PKIXALG], and it is repeated here
   for convenience:




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      rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
          us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 }

   When the rsaEncryption id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-SHAKE128 or id-
   rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-SHAKE256 algorithm identifier is used,
   AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST contain NULL.

   When the rsaEncryption algorithm identifier is used, the RSA public
   key, which is composed of a modulus and a public exponent, MUST be
   encoded using the RSAPublicKey type as specified in [PKIXALG].  The
   output of this encoding is carried in the certificate subject public
   key. The definition of RSAPublicKey is repeated here for
   convenience:

      RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
         modulus INTEGER,           -- n
         publicExponent INTEGER }   -- e

   When signing, the RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm generates a
   single value, and that value is used directly as the signature value.

3.2.  ECDSA with SHAKEs

   The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
   [DSS]. When ECDSA is used in conjunction with one of the SHAKE one-
   way hash functions, the object identifiers are:

      sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
          us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 3 }

      id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 ::= { sigAlgs x }

      id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256 ::= { sigAlgs y }

   Note: x and y will be specified by NIST.



   When using the id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE128 or id-ecdsa-with-SHAKE256
   algorithm identifier, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL but
   absent.


   The conventions for ECDSA public keys is as specified in [PKIXECC].
   The ECParameters associated with the ECDSA public key in the signers
   certificate SHALL apply to the verification of the signature.




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   When signing, the ECDSA algorithm generates two values.  These values
   are commonly referred to as r and s.  To easily transfer these two
   values as one signature, they MUST be ASN.1 encoded using the ECDSA-
   Sig-Value defined in [PKIXALG] and repeated here for convenience:

      ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
          r  INTEGER,
          s  INTEGER }

4.  Message Authentication Codes with SHAKEs

   This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS
   implementations that support the KMAC specified in [KMAC]
   as authentication code (MAC).

   KMAC algorithm identifiers are located in the AuthenticatedData
   macAlgorithm field.

   MAC values are located in the AuthenticatedData mac field.

   The object identifiers for KMACs with SHAKE128 and SHAKE256 are:

      hashAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)
          us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 2 }

      id-KmacWithSHAKE128 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs x }

      id-KmacWithSHAKE256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { hashAlgs y }

      Note: x and y will be specified by NIST.

   The variables N and S in this specification for KMAC are emply strings.
   L, an integer representing the requested output length in bits, is
   256 or 512 for KmacWithSHAKE128 or KmacWithSHAKE256 respectively
   in this specification.


   When the id-KmacWithSHAKE128 or id-KmacWithSHAKE256 algorithm identifier
   is used, the parameters field MUST be absent; not NULL but absent.

5.  Security Considerations

   Implementations must protect the signer's private key. Compromise of
   the signer's private key permits masquerade.

   When more than two parties share the same message-authentication key,
   data origin authentication is not provided. Any party that knows the
   message-authentication key can compute a valid MAC, therefore the
   content could originate from any one of the parties.




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   Implementations must randomly generate message-authentication keys
   and one-time values, such as the k value when generating a ECDSA
   signature. In addition, the generation of public/private key pairs
   relies on random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random
   number generators (PRNGs) to generate such cryptographic values can
   result in little or no security. The generation of quality random
   numbers is difficult. RFC 4086 [RANDOM] offers important guidance in
   this area, and NIST SP 800-90 [SP800-90s] series provide acceptable
   PRNGs.

   Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms may become
   weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
   computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular
   cryptographic algorithm will reduce. Therefore, cryptographic
   algorithm implementations should be modular allowing new algorithms
   to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should be prepared to
   regularly update the set of algorithms in their implementations.

6.  Normative References

   [ASN1-B]   ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation
              One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T
              Recommendation X.680, 2015.

   [ASN1-E]   ITU-T, "Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.

   [CMS]      Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, September 2009.

   [DSS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
              Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature Standard,
              version 4", NIST FIPS PUB 186-4, 2013.

   [HMAC]     Krawczyk, H., "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message
              Authentication", RFC 2104.  February 1997.

   [KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [PKCS1]    Moriarty, K., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
              "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2"
              RFC 8017, November 2016.



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   [PKIXALG]  Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
              Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, April 2002.

   [PKIXECC]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.

   [SHA3]     National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
              Department of Commerce, "SHA-3 Standard - Permutation-
              Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202,
              August 2015.
   [SP800-90s]National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              SP 800-90A,B & C.

7.  Informative References

   [RANDOM]   Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.


Appendix A  ASN.1 Module

   TBD

Appendix B  Acknowledgement

This document is just an update of Russ Housley's draft:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-housley-lamps-cms-sha3-hash-00
This document replaced SHA3 hash functions by SHAKE128 and SHAKE256
as the LAMPS working group agreed.


Authors' Addresses

   Quynh Dang & Kampanakis
   NIST
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD 20899

   Email: quynh.Dang & Kampanakis@nist.gov

   Panos Kampanakis
   Cisco Systems

   Email: pkampana@cisco.com





















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