[Docs] [txt|pdf|xml|html] [Tracker] [Email] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Nits]
Versions: 00 01 02
Individual Submission C. Dannewitz
Internet-Draft University of Paderborn
Intended status: Informational T. Rautio
Expires: September 15, 2011 VTT Technical Research Centre of
Finland
O. Strandberg
Nokia Siemens Networks
B. Ohlman
Ericsson
March 14, 2011
Secure naming structure and p2p application interaction
draft-dannewitz-ppsp-secure-naming-02
Abstract
Today, each application typically uses its own way to identify data.
The lack of a common naming scheme prevents applications from
benefiting from available copies of the same data distributed via
different P2P and CDN systems. The main proposal presented in this
draft is idea that there should be a secure and application
independent way of naming information objects that are transported
over the Internet. The draft defines a set of requirements for such
a naming structure. It also presents a proposal for such a naming
structure that could relevant for a number of work groups (existing
and potential), e.g. PPSP, DECADE and CDNI. In addition, today's
P2P naming schemes lack important security aspects that would allow
the user to check the data integrity and build trust in data and data
publishers. This is especially important in P2P applications as data
is received from untrusted peers. Providing a generic naming scheme
for P2P systems so that multiple P2P systems can use the same data
regardless of data location and P2P system increases the efficiency
and data availability of the overall data dissemination process. The
secure naming scheme is providing self-certification such that the
receiver can verify the data integrity, i.e., that the correct data
has been received, without requiring a trusted third party. It also
enables owner authentication to build up trust in (potentially
anonymous) data publishers. The secure naming structure should be
beneficial as potential design principle in defining the two
protocols identified as objectives in the PPSP charter. This
document enumerates a number of design considerations to impact the
design and implementation of the tracker-peer signaling and peer-peer
streaming signaling protocols.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 15, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
Contributions published or made publicly available before November
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
than English.
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Naming requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Basic Concepts for an Application-independent Naming Scheme . 6
3.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. ID Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Security Metadata Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Examples of application use of secure naming structure . . . . 9
4.1. Secure naming for P2P applications . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Secure naming use in DECADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Secure naming for CDNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
1. Introduction
Today's dominating naming schemes in the Internet, i.e., IP addresses
and URLs, are rather host-centric with respect to the fact that they
are bound to a location. This kind of naming scheme is not optimal
for many of the predominant users of todays Internet like P2P and CDN
systems as they are based on an information-centric thinking, i.e.,
putting the information itself in focus. In these system the source
of the information is secondary and can constantly change, e.g. new
caches or P2P peers becomes available. It also common to retrieve
information from more than one source at once.
For any type of caching solution (network based or P2P) and network
based storage, e.g. DECADE, a common application independent naming
scheme is essential to be able to identify cached copies of
information/data objects.
Many applications, in particular P2P applications, use their own data
model and protocol for keeping track of data and locations. This
poses a challenge for use of the same information for several
applications. A common naming scheme for information objects is
important to enable interconnectivity between different application
systems, such as P2P and CDN. To be able to build a common P2P
infrastructure that can serve a multitude of applications there is a
need for a common application independent naming scheme. With such a
naming scheme different applications can use and refer to the same
information/data objects.
It is possible to introduce false data into P2P systems, only
detectable when the content is played out in the user application.
The false data copies can be identified and sorted out if the P2P
system can verify the reference used in the tracker protocol towards
data received at the peer. One option to address this can be to
secure the naming structure i.e. make the data reference be dependent
on the data and related metadata.
An additional reason to introduce a common naming scheme for
information objects is caching. When data are named in a host-
centric way, as is done today, it is not always identify that copies
of the same information object are available in multiple hosts. With
location independent identifiers for information objects this becomes
much easier.
This document enumerates and explains the rationale for why a common
naming structure for information/data objects should be defined and
used by a wide range of applications and network protocols. Examples
of WGs (and potential WGs) where we think a new standard for naming
of information/data objects should be valuable includes PPS, DECADE
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
and CDNI. For P2P systems the main advantage is probably in the
definition of a protocol for signaling and control between trackers
and peers (the PPSP "tracker protocol") but also a signaling and
control protocol for communication among the peers (the PPSP "peer
protocol") might have benefits from a common and secure naming
scheme. In DECADE one key feature would be that different
applications can easily share the same cache entries. It should also
be valuable for cooperative caching, e.g. CDNI.
2. Naming requirements
In the following, we discuss the requirements that a common naming
scheme has to fulfill.
To enable efficient, large scale data dissemination that can make use
of any available data copy, identifiers (IDs) have to be location-
independent. Thereby, identical data can be identified by the same
ID independently of its storage location and improved data
dissemination can then benefit from all available copies. This
should be possible without compromising trust in data regardless of
its network source.
Security in an information-centric network (including P2P, caching,
and network-based solutions) needs to be implemented differently than
in host-centric networks. In the latter, most security mechanisms
are based on host authentication and then trusting the data that the
host delivers. In e.g. a P2P system, host authentication cannot be
relied upon, or one of the main advantages of a P2P system, i.e.,
benefiting from any available copy, is defeated. Host authentication
of a random, untrusted host that happens to have a copy does not
establish the needed trust. Instead, the security has to be directly
attached to the data which can be done via the scheme used to name
the data.
Therefore, self-certification is a main requirement for the naming
scheme. Self-certification ensures the integrity of data and
securely binds this data to its ID. More precisely, this property
means that any unauthorized change of data with a given ID is
detectable without requiring a third party for verification.
Beforehand, secure retrieval of IDs (e.g., via search, embedded in a
Web page as link, etc.) is required to ensure that the user has the
right ID in the first place. Secure ID retrieval can be achieved by
using recommendations, past experience, and specialized ID
authentication services and mechanisms that are out of the scope of
this discussion.
Another important requirement is name persistence, not only with
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
respect to storage location changes as discussed above, but also with
respect to changes of owner and/or owner's organizational structure,
and content changes producing a new version of the information.
Information should always be identifiable with the same ID as long as
it remains essentially equivalent. Spreading of persistent naming
schemes like the Digital Object Identifier (DOI) [Paskin2010] also
emphasizes the need for a persistent naming scheme. However, name
persistence and self-certification are partly contradictory and
achieving both simultaneously for dynamic content is not trivial.
From a user's perspective, persistent IDs ensure that links and
bookmarks remain valid as long as the respective information exists
somewhere in the network, reducing today's problem of "404 - file not
found" errors triggered by renamed or moved content. From a content
provider's perspective, name persistence simplifies data management
as content can, e.g., be moved between folders and different servers
as desired. Name persistence with respect to content changes makes
it possible to identify different versions of the same information by
the same consistent ID. If it is important to differentiate between
multiple versions, a dedicated versioning mechanism is required, and
version numbers may be included as a special part of the ID.
The requirement of building trust in an information-centric system
combined with the desire for anonymous publication as well as
accountability (at least for some content) can be translated into two
related naming requirements. The first is owner authentication,
where the owner is recognized as the same entity, which repeatedly
acts as the object owner, but may remain anonymous. The second is
owner identification, where the owner is also identified by a
physically verifiable identifier, such as a personal name. This
separation is important to allow for anonymous publication of
content, e.g., to support free speech, while at the same time
building up trust in a (potentially anonymous) owner.
In general, the naming scheme should be able to adapt to future
needs. Therefore, the naming scheme should be extensible, i.e., it
should be able to add new information (e.g., a chunk number for
BitTorrent-like protocols) to the naming scheme. The need for such
extensions is stressed by today's variety of naming schemes (e.g.,
DOI or PermaLink) added on top of the original Internet architecture
that fulfill specialized needs which cannot be met by the common
Internet naming schemes, i.e., IP addresses and URLs.
3. Basic Concepts for an Application-independent Naming Scheme
In this section, we introduce an exemplary naming scheme that
illustrates a possible way to fulfill the requirements posed upon an
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
application-independent naming scheme for information-centric
networks. The naming scheme integrates security deeply into the
system architecture. Trust is based on the data's ID in combination
with additional security metadata. Section 3.1 gives an overview of
the naming scheme in general with details about the ID structure, and
Section 3.2 describes the security metadata in more detail.
3.1. Overview
Building on an identifier/locator split, each data element, e.g.,
file, is given a unique ID with cryptographic properties. Together
with the additional security metadata, the ID can be used to verify
data integrity, owner authentication, and owner identification. The
security metadata contains information needed for the security
functions of the naming scheme, e.g., public keys, content hashes,
certificates, and a data signature authenticating the content. In
comparison with the security model in today's host-centric networks,
this approach minimizes the need for trust in the infrastructure,
especially in the host(s) providing the data.
In an information-centric network, multiple copies of the same data
element typically exist at different locations. Thanks to the ID/
locator split and the application-independent naming scheme, those
identical copies have the same ID and, hence, each application can
benefit from all available copies.
Data elements are manipulated (e.g., generated, modified, registered,
and retrieved) by physical entities such as nodes (clients or hosts),
persons, and companies. Physical entities able of generating, i.e.,
creating or modifying data elements are called owners here. Several
security properties of this naming scheme are based on the fact that
each ID contains the hash of a public key that is part of a public/
secret key pair PK/SK. This PK/SK pair is conceptually bound to the
data element itself and not directly to the owner as in other systems
like DONA [Koponen]. If desired, the PK/SK pair can be bound to the
owner only indirectly, via a certificate chain. This is important to
note because it enables owner change while keeping persistent IDs.
The key pair bound to the data is thus denoted as PK_D/SK_D.
Making the (hash of the) public key part of ID enables self-
certification of dynamic content while keeping persistent IDs. Self-
certification of static content can be achieved by simply including
the hash of content in the ID, but this would obviously result in
non-persistent IDs for dynamic content. For dynamic content, the
public key in the ID can be used to securely bind the hash of content
to the ID, by signing it with the corresponding secret key, while not
making it part of ID.
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
The owner's PK as part of the ID inherently provides owner
authentication. If the public key is bound to the owner's identity
(i.e., to its real-world name) via a trusted third party certificate,
this also allows owner identification. Without this additional
certificate, the owner can remain anonymous.
To support the potentially diverse requirements of certain groups of
applications and adapt to future changes, the naming scheme can
enable flexibility and extensibility by supporting different name
structures, differentiated via a Type field in the ID.
3.2. ID Structure
The naming scheme uses flat IDs to support self-certification and
name persistence. In addition, flat IDs are advantageous when it
comes to mobility and they can be allocated without an administrative
authority by relying on statistical uniqueness in a large namespace,
with the rare case of ID collisions being handled by the
applications. Although IDs are not hierarchical, they have a
specified basic ID structure. The ID structure given as ID = (Type
field | A = hash(PK) | L) is described subsequently.
The Authenticator field A=Hash(PK_D) binds the ID to a public key
PK_D. The hash function Hash is a cryptographic hash function, which
is required to be one-way and collision-resistant. The hash function
serves only to reduce the bit length of PK_D. PK_D is generated in
accordance with a chosen public-key cryptosystem. The corresponding
secret key SK_D should only be known to a legitimate owner. In
consequence, an owner of the data is defined as any entity who
(legitimately) knows SK_D.
The pair (A, L) has to be globally unique. Hence, the Label field L
provides global uniqueness if PK_D is repeatedly used for different
data.
To build a flexible and extensible naming scheme, e.g., to adapt the
naming scheme to future changes, different types of IDs are supported
by the naming scheme and differentiated via a mandatory and globally
standardized Type field in each ID. For example, the Type field
specifies the hash functions used to generate the ID. If a used hash
function becomes insecure, the Type field can be exploited by the P2P
system in order to automatically mark the IDs using this hash
function as invalid.
3.3. Security Metadata Structure
The security metadata is extensible and contains all information
required to perform the security functions embedded in the naming
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
scheme. The metadata (or selected parts of it) will be signed by
SK_D corresponding to PK_D. This securely binds the metadata to the
ID, i.e., to the Hash(PK_D) which is part of the ID. For example,
the security metadata may include:
o specification of the hash function h and the algorithm DSAlg used
for the digital signature
o complete PK_D (not only Hash(PK_D))
o specification of the parts of data that are self-certified, i.e.,
authenticated via the signature
o hash of the self-certified data
o signature of the self-certified data signed by SK_D
o all data required for owner authentication and identification
A detailed description and security analysis of this naming scheme
and its security properties, especially self-certification, name
persistence, owner authentication, and owner identification can be
found in the GIS paper Secure Naming for a Network of Information
[Dannewitz_10].
4. Examples of application use of secure naming structure
This section contains a number of examples how a secure naming
system, as outlined in this draft, could be used by different types
of applications.
4.1. Secure naming for P2P applications
From an P2P application perspective the main advantage of a secure
naming structure for a P2P infrastructure is that multiple P2P
applications can have common access to the same data elements.
Another benefit of application-independent naming is that locally
available and cached copies can easily be located. The secure naming
also enables that data can be verified even if it is received from an
untrusted host.
For example, when an application like BitTorrent [WWWbittorrent] uses
self-certifying names, the user is guaranteed that the data received
is actually the data that has been requested, without having to trust
any servers in the network (e.g., the tracker) or the peers that
provide the data.
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
This means that BitTorrent's validation of the data integrity can be
improved significantly using the presented secure naming structure.
Currently, a standard BitTorrent system has no means to verify the
integrity of the torrent file and consequently of the data. The
torrent file (see Figure 1) contains the SHA1 hashes of the content
pieces (pieces in Figure 2). However, anyone can modify a torrent
file to bind different content to this file. If the torrent file
gets modified, the user has no means any more to verify the integrity
of the data. Modification of the torrent affects only to info_hash
value, which is SHA1 hash calculated from the torrent's info field
(see figure). The info_hash is respectively used for torrent session
identification in different software entities (e.g. in trackers).
After changes in the torrent's info field, the torrent is referring
to different torrent session that is carrying a forged content.
Additionally if, the tracker allows insertion of several torrents
with the same name - delivers forged data (consistent with the forged
torrent file), a user could effectively be tricked into downloading
forged content which would falsely be identified as being correct by
the BitTorrent client. On the other hand, the torrent referring to a
forged content can be also modified to point to, another,
"convenient" tracker by modifying the announce field in the torrent,
and the outcome would be the same from user perspective. I.e., in
the current BitTorrent system, a user has no guarantee that the
downloaded content actually matches the expected/correct content.
+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
| announce | info |
+---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
Figure 1: Basic structure of the BitTorrent torrent file
+-----------+--------------+-------------+------------+-------------+
| name | piece length | pieces | length | path (opt) |
+-----------+--------------+-------------+------------+-------------+
Figure 2: Structure of info field in torrent file
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
+-----------+--------------+-------------+------------+-------------+
| name | piece length | pieces | length | path (opt) |
+-----------+--------------+-------------+------------+-------------+
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
| h | DSAlg | PK_D |
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
| certified pieces | ID | signature |
+----------------------+----------------------+---------------------+
Figure 3: Structure of Secure naming enabled info field in torrent
The secure naming structure presented in this draft can provide a
simple solution for this problem by securely binding the content of
the torrent file to the name/ID of the torrent file. This can be
done by extending the torrent file to include the above described
security metadata information, as it is seen in Figure 3. In
practice, during the torrent file creation, an object owner would
store information about utilized algorithms (h - hash function and
DSAlg - digital signature algorithm), the public key (PK_D),
specification of signed data and ID into the torrent's info field,
and will sign the combination of the secure metadata and the piece
hash values (pieces in the torrent's info field) with the private key
(SK_D). The generated signature will also be included in the
extension part of the info field (signature).
After the content of the extended torrent is created, the respective
torrent file ID would be generated according to the rules described
in Section 3. As defined in that section, ID contains three
different fields, namely Type, A and L. In the case of BitTorrent,
Type field would carry on information about used hash function to
generate field A from PK_D, and also structure of the field L. If,
for example, L has name and version of the distributed file, Type
field should tell that by including strings "Name" and "Version" in
it. The next one, field A, includes hash values of the used PK_D
(method defined in Type). And finally the proposed BitTorrents ID
field L, can take in name and version of the distributed file.
According to the description and by using separators - (within one
field) and _ (between fields) the torrent file name could look, for
example, like: HashMethod-Name-Version_HashofPK_Filename-
Fileversion.torrent.
Consequently, whenever a user knows the ID of the content/torrent
file and retrieves the torrent file, she/he can now open the torrent
with the secure naming supported BitTorrent client. The client
verifies the integrity of the torrent file by comparing PK_D in
secure metadata and field A in the ID, in addition, conformance of ID
in the torrent name and ID in the metadata is verified. With respect
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
to the secure metadata the signature and actual data is compared
also. Once these three are verified, the client can download the
data pieces, and can use the BitTorrent's included (and now secured)
hash(es) to verify the integrity of the received data. As a result,
the user can be sure that the correct content was retrieved.
4.2. Secure naming use in DECADE
DECADE WG is specifying requirements for a protocol concerning
accessing data in a network storage and resource control of said
data. A key aspect in accessing data in a network storage is the way
the data is referenced. This naming draft has outlined a naming
structure that can be utilized to enhance the reference to include
additional features. The secure naming structure tries to fulfill
several design targets and requirements, however not all are
necessarily the priority requirements for the DECADE scope.
The DECADE storage is used by individual and uncoordinated entities,
thus the naming of the data must be collision free. Also when a user
accesses data the name should point to the correct data. With no
entity to keep track of used names for data, one potential approach
is to use large enough identifier designed with statistically
collision free random properties. One obvious identifier alternative
is to base it on the hash of the content.
The basic requirement for naming in DECADE is that the data
identifier is tied to the hash of the content and that it is taken
from a large enough flat namespace. In this way, wherever the same
data is stored, the same name identifier can be used. Someone
accessing the data can verify that the content is correct based on
relationship between data and identifier. Other requirements can be
included to further enhance the meaning and capability of the data
reference identifier. Additional naming requirements could be:
o self-certified name for verifying content owner (owner of Pk/Sk
keys), the self-certification can be used for building trust about
data publisher
o solution for persistent identifier names for dynamic (changing)
data
o potentially way to identify content owner, this typically requires
trusted third party certifier.
This draft specifies several requirements that would be useful for
the DECADE protocol, the main requirement is hashing of data into the
identifier name. Depending of data use (like enhanced security
properties) other secondary requirements will be beneficial for
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
additional functionality.
4.3. Secure naming for CDNs
The use of common naming within a CDN is not the challenge, it is the
common naming between end users and the CDN or between CDNs that can
be feasible. A common naming enables use of numerous caching points
and CDNs as the same data can be referenced in the same way. The
same data can depending of popularity be available in multiple
location like caches and CDNs. The population of the resources
(caches and CDNs) can be efficient if a common naming of data is
used. The interaction between CDNs to 'negotiate' data population of
caching resources would benefit from a common data reference model.
The security features of the naming scheme also helps the CDN
provider trust the data it is accessing and providing. The CDN
interaction is potentially in the scope of the CDNI WG BOF.
5. Conclusion
The main proposal presented in this draft is idea that there should
be a secure and application independent way of naming information
objects that are transported over the Internet. The draft defines a
set of requirements for such a naming structure. It also presents a
proposal for such a naming structure that could relevant for a number
of work groups (existing and potential), e.g. PPSP, DECADE and CDNI.
Specifically for the PPSP WG the secure naming structure is proposed
for consideration as common reference ID structure. For any P2P
streaming application to have fair and multitude of data access, it
is essential to have a common naming structure that is suitable for
many different needs. The common naming is probably best displayed
in the tracker protocol case but potential benefit in the actual
streaming protocol case has to still be identified. The secure
binding of reference ID to the actual content is manifested in the
end user peer possibility to check correct data reception in regard
to the used ID.
The naming structure has been implemented in the 4WARD project
prototypes and has been released as open source (www.netinf.org).
The naming structure is also available through a public NetInf
registration service at www.netinf.org. Three NetInf-enabled
applications have also been published, the InFox (Firefox plugin),
InBird (Thunderbird plugin), and a NetInf Information Object
Management Tool, all available at the www.netinf.org site.
Continued work on defining a common naming structure for information
objects is carried out in the SAIL project. More information is
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
available at the www.sail-project.eu site.
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no requests to IANA.
7. Security Considerations
There are considerations about what private/public key and hash
algorithms to utilize when designing the naming structure in a secure
way.
8. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank all the persons participating in the Network
of Information work packages in the EU FP7 projects 4WARD and SAIL
and the Finnish ICT SHOK Future Internet 2 project for contributions
and feedback to this document.
9. Informative References
[Dannewitz_10]
Dannewitz, C., Golic, J., Ohlman, B., and B. Ahlgren,
"Secure Naming for a Network of Information", 13th IEEE
Global Internet Symposium , 2010.
[Koponen] Koponen, T., Chawla, M., Chun, B., Ermolinskiy, A., Kim,
K., Shenker, S., and I. Stoica, "A Data-Oriented (and
beyond) Network Architecture", Proc. ACM SIGCOMM , 2007.
[Paskin2010]
Paskin, N., "Digital Object Identifier ({DOI}?) System",
Encyclopedia of Library and Information Sciences , 2010.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[WWWbittorrent]
Cohen, B., "The BitTorrent Protocol Specification",
http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0003.html , 2008.
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft ppsp-secure-naming March 2011
Authors' Addresses
Christian Dannewitz
University of Paderborn
Paderborn
Germany
Email: cdannewitz@upb.de
Teemu Rautio
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
Oulu
Finland
Email: teemu.rautio@vtt.fi
Ove Strandberg
Nokia Siemens Networks
Espoo
Finland
Email: ove.strandberg@nsn.com
Borje Ohlman
Ericsson
Stockholm
Sweden
Email: Borje.Ohlman@ericsson.com
Dannewitz, et al. Expires September 15, 2011 [Page 15]
Html markup produced by rfcmarkup 1.128b, available from
https://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcmarkup/