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Versions: 00 01
Network Working Group M. Dempsky
Internet-Draft OpenDNS, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track February 26, 2010
Expires: August 30, 2010
DNSCurve: Link-Level Security for the Domain Name System
draft-dempsky-dnscurve-01
Abstract
This document describes DNSCurve, a protocol extension that adds
link-level security to the Domain Name System (DNS).
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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described in the BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Base-32 Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Encoding Public Keys in Name Server Names . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Nonce Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. DNSCurve Expanded Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Streamlined Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. TXT Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. UDP and TCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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1. Introduction
DNSCurve adds link-level security to the Domain Name System (DNS).
It includes a key distribution mechanism compatible with today's name
server software and registry services, and two packet formats: a
simple streamlined format requiring minimal space and processing
overhead and a mostly backwards-compatible format intended for use
with strict firewalls and DNS proxies.
DNSCurve packets include a cryptographic MAC (aka authenticator) to
provide integrity and availability. Clients can be confident that
verified responses came from the appropriate server and were not
forged by a blind or even sniffing attacker, while servers can be
confident that responses will not be replayed against other
unintended clients. Additionally, DNSCurve packets are encrypted to
provide some confidentiality.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Overview
DNSCurve uses Curve25519XSalsa20Poly1305, a particular combination of
the Curve25519, Salsa20, and Poly1305 primitives as described in
[naclcrypto]. In particular, it is a cryptosystem featuring 256-bit
public and secret keys, 192-bit nonces, and 128-bit authenticators.
Each DNSCurve client and server has a secret key and a corresponding
public key. DNSCurve servers distribute their public keys by
encoding them in name server names embedded in standard DNS NS
records (as described in Section 4), while DNSCurve clients
distribute their public keys by including them in their query
packets. (Additional mechanisms for key distribution like DNSSEC's
trust anchors and DLV are possible, but not defined by this
document.)
When a DNSCurve client is about to send a DNS query to a name server,
if the client knows a DNSCurve public key for that name server, it
MAY instead use that public key along with its own DNSCurve secret
key and a nonce to protect its query in a "cryptographic box" as
described in [naclcrypto]. The client then encodes this
cryptographic box along with the nonce and its own public key as an
expanded DNSCurve query packet, which it sends to the DNSCurve server
instead of the original DNS query.
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Upon receiving a DNS query packet, a DNSCurve name server should
first treat the packet as a DNSCurve query packet by extracting the
client's DNSCurve public key, nonce, and boxed query and trying to
open the box using the extracted public key and its own secret key.
However, if this fails (i.e., the packet is not formatted as an
expanded DNSCurve query packet or the box's authenticator is
invalid), then the server responds to the packet as a normal DNS
packet.
Assuming the unboxing succeeds, then the server discovers the
client's original query packet. To send a response, the server
chooses a nonce extension to append to the client-chosen nonce, and
protects its response packet in a cryptographic box using the extend
nonce and same keys used to unbox the client's DNS query. The server
then encodes this cryptographic box as an expanded DNSCurve response
packet, which it sends to the DNSCurve client instead of the original
DNS response.
Meanwhile, the DNSCurve client waits for an expanded DNSCurve
response packet. If it receives a non-DNSCurve response packet, an
expanded DNSCurve response packet with an invalid nonce (i.e., not an
extension of its original nonce) or an invalid cryptographic box
(i.e., cannot be opened using the same keys and the extended nonce),
then it discards the packet and continues waiting. Once it receives
a valid expanded DNSCurve response packet, it opens the cryptographic
box to discover the server's original DNS response.
3. Base-32 Encoding
Sometimes DNSCurve communicates arbitrary byte strings inside domain
names. While the DNS protocol is 8-bit safe for names and labels
(except for case-insensitive handling of ASCII alphabetic
characters), many tools have trouble with arbitrary characters in
domain names, in particular domain registrar software. To cope with
this limitation, DNSCurve encodes byte strings using a set of safe
alphanumeric characters.
In DNSCurve's base-32 encoding, a byte string is interpreted as a
number in little-endian form. Each 5-bit sequence of this number,
from least significant to most significant, is encoded as one of the
standard "digits" "0123456789bcdfghjklmnpqrstuvwxyz". A final
sequence of fewer than 5 bits is zero-extended before encoding.
Decoders MUST accept "BCDFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ" as synonyms for
"bcdfghjklmnpqrstuvwxyz".
For example, the two-byte string with bytes {0x64,0x88} (i.e.,
{100,136} decimal) is interpreted as the integer 0x8864 (i.e.,
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34916). The bits 1000100001100100 of this integer are divided into
5-bit parts 00100, 00011, 00010, 00001, which in turn are encoded as
"4", "3", "2", "1". The original string is therefore encoded as the
string "4321".
N.B., this is not the same encoding as defined in [RFC4648]. In
particular, the byte string is chunked into 5-bit sequences
differently, and a different alphabet is used. The first allows
DNSCurve public keys to be encoded slightly more compactly (see
Section 4), and the second helps to further prevent false positives
when searching for base-32 encoded strings in domain names.
3.1. Examples
+-------------------------------------------+------------------+
| Byte string | Base-32 encoding |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------+
| {} | "" |
| {0x88} | "84" |
| {0x9f,0x0b} | "zw20" |
| {0x17,0xa3,0xd4} | "rs89f" |
| {0x2a,0xa9,0x13,0x7e} | "b9b71z1" |
| {0x7e,0x69,0xa3,0xef,0xac} | "ycu6urmp" |
| {0xe5,0x3b,0x60,0xe8,0x15,0x62} | "5zg06nr223" |
| {0x72,0x3c,0xef,0x3a,0x43,0x2c,0x8f} | "l3hygxd8dt31" |
| {0x17,0xf7,0x35,0x09,0x41,0xe4,0xdc,0x01} | "rsxcm44847r30" |
+-------------------------------------------+------------------+
4. Encoding Public Keys in Name Server Names
DNSCurve public keys are encoded in name server names as a 54-byte
label consisting of the magic string "uz5" followed by the first 51
bytes of the base-32 encoding of the public key. (Curve25519 public
keys are actually 255-bit integers in little-endian, so the 52nd byte
of the base-32 encoding will always be "0".)
When a DNSCurve client is searching a name server name for a DNSCurve
public key, it MUST check every label for an encoded public key. If
multiple public keys are found, the left-most label MUST be chosen.
String comparison with "uz5" MUST be performed case-insensitively.
5. Nonce Generation
For every request, DNSCurve clients generate a 96-bit nonce, and for
every response, DNSCurve servers generate a 96-bit nonce extension.
Nonces MUST be unique for distinct packets for the same client-server
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key pair. A simple way to achieve this is to choose a unique nonce
for each packet and for each retransmission. Additionally, servers
MUST use a non-zero nonce extension (because nonces are zero extended
in query packets). However, subject to these constraints, clients
and servers may generate nonces however they choose.
Two recommended ways to generate a 96-bit nonce or nonce extension
are
1. a 64-bit counter (starting at 1) followed by a 32-bit random
number and
2. a 64-bit timestamp (e.g., nanoseconds since 1970) followed by a
32-bit random number.
In either case the 64-bit value MUST NOT decrease even if the
software restarts or the system clock jumps backwards.
If multiple clients or multiple servers share a DNSCurve secret key,
then they MUST make sure no two separate clients or servers generate
the same nonce. A simple way to achieve this is to use nonce
separation; e.g., if two servers share a DNSCurve key pair, one
server could use only even nonces and the other could use only odd
nonces.
6. DNSCurve Expanded Formats
DNSCurve defines two expanded formats: "streamlined" and "TXT". Each
includes a format for expanded queries and a format for expanded
responses. DNSCurve clients may send DNSCurve expanded queries using
whichever format it chooses, but they are encouraged to use the
streamlined format when possible. A DNSCurve server MUST support
DNSCurve expanded queries in either format and MUST send expanded
responses using the corresponding format.
6.1. Streamlined Format
An expanded query packet in streamlined format has the following
bytes:
o 8 bytes: the magic string "Q6fnvWj8".
o 32 bytes: the client's DNSCurve public key.
o 12 bytes: a client-selected nonce for this packet.
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o A cryptographic box containing the original DNS query packet.
An expanded response packet in streamlined format has the following
bytes:
o 8 bytes: the magic string "R6fnvWJ8".
o 12 bytes: the client's nonce.
o 12 bytes: a server-selected nonce extension.
o A cryptographic box containing the original DNS response packet.
Note that this streamlined response format does not repeat the
client's query name, and in particular does not repeat the client's
public key. However, it does repeat the client's nonce.
6.2. TXT Format
The "TXT" format receives its name from the fact that expanded query
and response packets in this format appear to casual inspection to be
standard DNS packets with two possible exceptions: 1) the query name
may exceed 255 bytes and 2) the total packet may exceed 512 bytes.
When encoding an expanded query packet in TXT format, a DNSCurve
client MUST create a DNS standard query packet with the AA, TC, RD,
RA, Z, and RCODE bits cleared, a single entry in the question
section, and no records in the answer, authority, or additional
records sections. The one question MUST ask for Internet-class TXT
records for the query name constructed from the concatenation of the
following labels:
o One or more labels, each label except the last being exactly 50
bytes, with the last label being at most 50 bytes. The
concatenation of these labels is the base-32 encoding of a 96-bit
client-selected nonce for this packet followed by a cryptographic
box containing the original DNS query packet.
o One 54-byte label: the client's DNSCurve public key, encoded as
described in Section 4, except with the magic string "x1a" instead
of "uz5".
o Zero or more additional labels specifying the name of the zone
served by this server; i.e., the owner name of the relevant NS
record.
A DNSCurve server SHOULD be lenient in decoding expanded query
packets in TXT format. In particular, it MUST allow the RD bit to
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either be set or clear, MUST allow records in the answer, authority
records, and additional records sections, and MUST allow any labels
to follow the DNSCurve public key in the query name. However, it
MUST discard packets with the QR bit set.
When encoding an expanded response packet in TXT format, a DNSCurve
server MUST create a DNS standard response packet copying the ID, RD
bit, and questions section from the expanded query packet, setting
the AA bit, leaving the TC and RA bits cleared and Z and RCODE values
set to 0, containing one record in the answer section, and no records
in the authority records or additional records section. The record
in the answer section MUST be an Internet-class TXT record for the
query name from the questions section with a TTL of 0. The RDATA of
this record is the 96-bit server-selected nonce extension followed by
a cryptographic box containing the original DNS response packet,
encoded as a sequence of one or more strings of at most 255 bytes in
standard DNS TXT RDATA format.
Similarly, a DNSCurve client SHOULD be lenient in decoding expanded
response packets in TXT format. In particular, it MUST allow the
server to alter the case of the query name when repeating it in the
questions section.
7. UDP and TCP
If a normal DNS response packet is larger than 512 bytes then the
server replaces it by an explicitly truncated packet. The client
then tries again through TCP. Servers are not required to support
TCP if no responses are above 512 bytes; clients are permitted to try
TCP only if the server has explicitly indicated truncation.
DNSCurve does not require TCP support from servers that were not
already supporting TCP. If the original DNS response packet is at
most 512 bytes then the server is permitted to send the expanded
response packet as a UDP packet. DNSCurve clients are required to
set aside a 4096-byte buffer for receiving a UDP response packet.
If the original DNS response packet is larger than 512 bytes then it
is replaced by an explicitly truncated packet and the truncated
packet is protected by DNSCurve. In this case the client tries again
by TCP, sending its DNSCurve query packet through TCP and receiving
the DNSCurve response through TCP.
TCP is considerably more expensive for clients and servers than UDP
is, and TCP has no protection against denial of service, so server
administrators are advised to stay below 512 bytes if possible.
DNSCurve adds some denial-of-service protection for UDP but cannot do
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anything to help TCP.
If a protected DNS query includes an EDNS0 OPT record, then the
payload size field refers to how large the original DNS response
packet can be before encoding as a DNSCurve response packet. Clients
MUST reduce the payload size they advertise to account for overhead
from encoding the response as an expanded response packet. If a
server builds a response within the payload size limit, but then
cannot fit the encoded response in 4096 bytes, it MAY silently
discard the response.
Even when DNSCurve transactions take place over UDP, they may still
be vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks due to spoofed IP
fragments if response packets are large enough to require IP
fragmentation. Therefore, servers SHOULD try to keep response
packets within the path's MTU limits.
8. Security Considerations
The security of the Curve25519XSalsa20Poly1305 cryptosystem and its
underlying cryptographic primitives is discussed in [naclcrypto]. In
summary, it is designed to meet the standard notions of privacy and
third-party unforgeability for a public-key authenticated-encryption
scheme using nonces.
DNSCurve only provides link-level security between a client-server
pair. It does not attempt to ensure end-to-end security for queries
and responses relayed by untrusted DNS proxies and caches.
DNSCurve clients are free to choose whether or not to use DNSCurve on
a per query basis; e.g., a client may decide to fallback to standard
DNS after a few failed DNSCurve queries. Of course, DNSCurve cannot
make any security guarantees for transactions that do not use
DNSCurve, so clients are encouraged to use DNSCurve if possible.
DNSCurve adds some confidentiality by encrypting DNS packet contents
but does not attempt to hide the length of the original DNS packet
nor the source or destination of the packet. Additionally, the TXT
format requires clients to reveal the zone they are querying.
9. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
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10. Acknowledgements
The DNSCurve protocol was first introduced by Dan Berstein. Thanks
also to Adam Langley and George Barwood for their contributions to
early DNSCurve implementations.
Much thanks for feedback regarding this draft from George Barwood,
Sjoerd Langkemper and Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[naclcrypto]
Bernstein, D., "Cryptography in NaCl", March 2009.
11.2. Informative References
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
Author's Address
Matthew Dempsky
OpenDNS, Inc.
410 Townsend St, Suite 250
San Francisco, CA 94107
US
Phone: +1 415 680 3742
Email: matthew@dempsky.org
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