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Network Working Group                                        B. Deutsch
INTERNET-DRAFT                                    Independent Submitter
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: February 25, 2019                              August 24, 2018

            Client Application Layer Encryption
          draft-deutch-lamps-client-app-encrypt-00

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Experimental protocol for the Internet
   community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
   Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official
   Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status
   of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document
authors. All rights reserved.

Abstract

   The protocol for Client Application Layer Encryption offers
   organizations a method of securely providing users data with very
   few authentication steps.  This protocol makes use of X.509 public
   key infrastructure and SHOULD NOT be implemented without transport
   layer security.  The protocol described below helps to ensure that
   response messages may only be read by the intended recipient.

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Table Of Contents

Abstract  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
  1.1  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
  1.2  Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
  1.3  Roles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
  1.4  Goals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
  1.5  Motivation   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
  1.6  Strengths and Weaknesses   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
2.  Security Considerations   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
3.  IANA Considerations   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
4.  Communication Patterns  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
  4.1  Initiation  . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
  4.2  Standard Request   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
  4.3  whoami Request  . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
  4.4  Server Revocation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
  Normative   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
  Informative   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
Appendix A: UML Flow Diagrams   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
  A.1  Initiation   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
  A.2  Standard Request   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
  A.3  whoami Request   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
Appendix B: Example Requests and Responses  . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
  B.1  Initiation   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
  B.2  Standard Request   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
  B.3  whoami Request   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
Full Copyright Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
Intellectual Property Statement   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22

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1. Introduction

   This protocol offers a way to reduce the number of network
   communications that must occur for a system to have confidence in
   the identity of the requester and reduces the risk in the case of
   impersonation.  This was designed with application programming
   interfaces in mind.

1.1 Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

1.2 Abbreviations

   CN: Common Name [RFC4514]
   CSR: certificate signing request [RFC5280]
   DN: Distinguished Name [RFC4514]
   GUID: Globally Unique IDentifier [RFC4122]
   IaaS: infrastructure as a Service
   OU: Organizational Unit [RFC4514]
   PaaS: Platform as a Service
   SAN: subject alternative name [RFC4514]
   SaaS: Software as a Service
   TLS: transport layer security [RFC5246]

1.3 Roles

   resource owner: The party with rights to the data.

   resource server: The object housing the data.

   authorization server: The server that fulfills certificate
   signing requests and catalogs them for validation.  All calls to
   this device should be over TLS with mutual certificate exchange
   [RFC5246].

   client: The object requesting the data.

   edge device: The object open to anonymous traffic, terminates TLS
   [RFC5246], brokers authentication, performs authorization, then
   forwards data.

   origination server: The object that performs processing of the
   request that results in the response.

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1.4 Goals

   Minimize exposure of client credentials and data.  A client can be
   authorized and returned a token or other sensitive information with
   confidence that it cannot be intercepted, even by an internal bad
   actor.  To do this the authorization server must either be a signing
   authority or have permission to submit certificate signing requests
   to a signing authority [RFC5280].  The client certificate properties
   may act as a vehicle for personally identifying information to be
   passed to the origination server.  The private key SHOULD NOT be
   exported from the client device and therefore the CSR may contain
   device properties.

1.5 Motivation

   Organizations have increased the number of individuals with access
   to subvert trusted systems with the increase in subcontracting
   information services i.e. SaaS, PaaS, IaaS, etc; as well as contract
   workers.

   When users' information is unencrypted is it vulnerable to
   exploitation.  By reducing the occurrences of client data being
   unencrypted we reduce the opportunity for attack.

1.6 Strengths and Weaknesses

   This provides a mechanism for user credentials that may be valid
   for an undefined period of time.  Made possible because the
   credentials themselves, the private key [RFC5280], never exists
   outside the users' (resource owners') device.

   The true proof of identity is in the ability of the client to read
   the response message.  Which makes this mechanism ideal for GET
   requests but unsuitable for POST, PUT, or DELETE unless accompanied
   by a secondary authentication mechanism.

   If an attacker captured the CSR then they would be in a
   position to build a response the client would accept, however the
   attacker would also have to impersonate the edge device in order to
   impersonate the authorization and origination servers.  Conversely,
   if an attacker impersonates the edge device without the CSR on file
   then any response would appear malformed.

   Because these certificates are not used in TLS negotiation the
   client is not required to share it at the device layer.  This
   allows the credentials to be owned exclusively by the application
   within the clients' device, reducing the opportunity for another
   application running on the same device to steal the private key
   or impersonate the organization's application to the authorization
   server by reading their response.

   To mitigate risk of attacks some error messages must simulate
   successful responses reducing feedback to legitimate consumers with
   malformed requests.

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2. Security Considerations

   This document defines a protocol for authenticating and authorizing
   users for access to protected data and the secure delivery of
   responses.

3. IANA Considerations

   No IANA considerations

4. Communication Patterns

   The following sections describe the various transactions that make
   up this protocol.

4.1 Initiation

   For this flow the client is also the resource owner, and the
   authorization server is also both resource server and origination
   server.

   The client must use a method acceptable to the edge device to prove
   their identity [RFC6749] [RFC7617], preferably initial registration.
   At the conclusion of this proving the client should have packaged
   their CSR and sent it to the edge device.

   The edge device shall then forward the identity information with the
   CSR and the cipher used for the TLS to the authorization server.

   The authorization server shall store the CSR in association with the
   user identity and return a response of the GUID of the CSR record
   encrypted by a certificate generated from the CSR using the cipher
   negotiated between the client and the edge device.  This cipher is
   used to ensure it is one the client knows, to be sure it is one that
   the resource server knows; the edge device and resource servers
   should be configured to maintain the same list (remember in this
   flow the resource server is also the authorization server).

   The edge device shall then return the encrypted response to the
   client.

   The client must decrypt the response with their private key
   [RFC5280] used to generate the CSR and store the GUID and key for
   future use.

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4.2 Standard Request

   For this flow the client is also the resource owner.  These
   credentials are sufficient if this Request is a read only operation
   or a create that produces data that is only usable after the client
   has read the response (proving that they are the resource owner),
   such as token generation where the token is returned in the response
   payload body or a request to a processing queue which must be
   followed by an execution call using the queue identifier from the
   response.  These credentials should be supplemented by a secondary
   mechanism if this request is expected to result in any data changes.

   The client shall send their GUID with the request to the edge
   device.

   The edge device should forward the GUID to the authorization
   server in the form of a validation request.  The edge device may
   forward the request to the origination server without performing
   this step, which would be bad practice because it increases the
   opportunity for capture, message replay, and in that case the
   origination server would need to call the authorization server
   increasing its client list and therefore attack surface.

   The authorization server shall reply to the validation request with
   a client certificate generated by the CSR associated with the GUID.
   The certificate should only be valid long enough to fulfill the
   request.

   If the edge device receives a response from the validation call to
   the authorization server that is not a client certificate then the
   edge device should return an object large enough to be mistaken for
   an encrypted response to the untrusted client.  If authentication is
   successful then the edge device should then forward the client
   request with the certificate and the negotiated cipher to the
   origination server without the GUID.

   If an internal bad actor captured a request with the client's
   certificate or GUID and used it to send a request then they would be
   unable to read the response.  Additionally, the certificate should
   have an extremely short validity period in which this request would
   be valid.

   The origination server should validate the certificate by issuer,
   subject, and expiration.  No CRL is required as the certificate
   validity should only ever be long enough for one request.  This
   enables the origination server to perform fine grained
   authentication with high confidence without any external calls.  The
   origination server may be or make calls to the resource server(s)
   providing the certificate and not the cipher, aggregating data as
   required.  The identity of the certificate is taken from the SAN if
   present; wherein the CN is the resource owner, the DC is the
   organization of the servers, and any OUs represent allowed scope(s).

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   The absence of the cipher informs any resource server(s) that their
   response should not be encrypted by the user's certificate.  This
   request should be over TLS and should use mutual certificate
   exchange [RFC5246] because the client's certificate in this request
   is not for authentication, it is present as a form of query.  These
   requests are from the origination server to the resource server(s)
   as evidenced by the origination server's need to read the response.

   The origination server shall encrypt the response intended for the
   client using the client's certificate and the cipher provided by the
   edge device ensuring that only the client is able to decrypt it. The
   origination server then returns this response to the edge device.

   The edge device shall forward the response to the client.

   The client shall use their private key to decrypt the response.

   If the request is captured between the client and the edge device
   then a message replay is possible, however the response could only
   be read by the real client.  If a request is captured between the
   edge device and the origination server then a message replay is
   possible only until the certificate expires and again, could only
   be read by the real client.  The flow should use TLS throughout to
   prevent the request from being read between hops.

4.3 whoami Request

   For this flow the client is also the resource owner and the
   authorization server is also both resource server and origination
   server.

   The client makes a request to the edge device using their GUID.

   The edge device receives the request and forwards the GUID to the
   authorization server with the negotiated cipher.

   The authorization server generates a certificate for the client
   that expires immediately, encrypts the certificate using itself
   and the specified cipher, and then returns this as the response to
   the edge device.  If the GUID is not known then an response
   consisting of a random salt large enough to be reasonably mistaken
   for an encrypted payload should be returned to the edge device with
   a HTTP 200 code [RFC7231], this is intended to prevent a dictionary
   attack from mapping out valid GUIDs.

   The edge device forwards the response to the client.

   The resource owner must then decrypt the response to read it.

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4.4 Server Revocation

   In the event that a set of credentials are compromised then the
   authorization server may be required to revoke them.  The resource
   owner may be required to perform a new initiation to regain access
   to their account.

References

   Normative

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Level", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
              Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

Informative

   [RFC4122]  Leach, P., "A Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN
              Namespace", RFC 4122, July 2005.

   [RFC4514]  Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
              (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
              RFC 4514, June 2006.

   [RFC5751]  Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
              Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification",
              RFC 5751, January 2010.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, October 2012.

   [RFC7231]  Fielding, R., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1):
              Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, June 2014.

   [RFC7617]  Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
              RFC 7617, September 2015.

   [WSD]      WebSequenceDiagrams software is provided by Hanov
              Solutions Inc., of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.
              <https://www.websequencediagrams.com>

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Appendix A: UML Flow Diagrams

   Each section of this appendix corresponds to the same numbered sub
   section of this document under section 4.  The text between the
   section heading and the flow graphic represents the flow in
   sudo-code [WSD].  The diagrams have been simplified from the
   sudo-code in order to fit this document format.

A.1 Initiation

    title Initiation

    note over client:
        generate key
        generate CSR
    end note
    client->edge device: Registration+CSR
    edge device->+authorization server: ID+CSR+cipher
    note over authorization server:
        store CSR
        generate GUID
        encrypt GUID
    end note
    authorization server-->-edge device: encrypted GUID
    edge device-->+client: encrypted GUID
    note over client:
        decrypt response
        store GUID
    end note

[client]-------------------------------------------------------[client]
               ||                            ^
          registration                       :
             and csr                        GUID
               ||                        encrypted
               \/                            :
[edge device]---------------------------------------------[edge device]
                      ||             ^
                      ID             :
                      CSR           GUID
                    cipher       encrypted
                      ||             :
                      \/             :
[authorization server]---------------------------[authorization server]

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A.2 Standard Request

    title Standard Request

    client->edge device: request+GUID
    edge device->authorization server: GUID
    note over authorization server: generate certificate from GUID CSR
    authorization server-->edge device: certificate
    edge device->origination server: request+certificate+cipher
    note over origination server:
        certificate validation
        authorization
    end note
    opt if origination server is not resource server
        origination server->resource server: server request+certificate
        resource server-->origination server: server response
    end
    note over origination server: encrypt response
    origination server-->edge device: encrypted response
    edge device-->client: encrypted response
    note over client: decrypt response

[client]-------------------------------------------------------[client]
             ||                                          ^
           Request                                       :
            GUID                                     encrypted
             ||                                       response
             \/                                          :
[edge device]---------------------------------------------[edge device]
               ||      ^      ||                       ^
              GUID     :      ||                       :
               || certificate ||                       :
               \/      :      ||                       :
[authorization server]--------||-----------------[authorization server]
                              ||                       :
                            request                    :
                          certificate              encrypted
                            cipher                  response
                              ||  ___________________  :
                              || |optional/          | :
                              || |~~~~~~~~           | :
                              || |if the origination | :
                              || |server is not the  | :
                              \/ |resource server    | :
[origination server]-------------|-----------------[origination server]
                                 |      ||     ^     |
                                 |    server   :     |
                                 |   request+  :     |
                                 | certificate :     |
                                 |      || encrypted |
                                 |      ||  response |
                                 |      \/     :     |
[resource server]----------------|-------------------|[resource server]
                                 |___________________|

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A.3 whoami Request

    title whoami Request

    client->edge device: GUID
    edge device->authorization server: GUID+cipher
    note over authorization server:
        generate certificate
        encrypt response
    end note
    authorization server-->edge device: encrypted response
    edge device-->client: encrypted response
    note over client: decrypt response

[client]-------------------------------------------------------[client]
               ||                               ^
              GUID                              :
               ||                           encrypted
               ||                            response
               \/                               :
[edge device]---------------------------------------------[edge device]
                      ||                    ^
                     GUID                   :
                    cipher              encrypted
                      ||                 response
                      \/                    :
[authorization server]---------------------------[authorization server]
                          |              ^
                          |_generate and_|
                            encrypt cert

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Appendix B: Example Requests and Responses

   Each section of this appendix corresponds to the same numbered sub
   section of this document under section 4.  These examples contain
   elements which fulfill the requirements described above and may be
   met by other means.

B.1 Initiation

   The below private key is used to generate the below examples and can
   be used to execute the client decryption commands:

      -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
      Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
      DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,7F58E7878FA4D4A8

      98MDLxjgMW5W71ZADD1CG2VeAMG/vxmIqpF+2japv831iSh4WC5LJfPXfKXp+nQ5
      L74+xDt1fRSKuPfnBqPnok1lZrMqK+WtW83FSxA0wm5Rvfsa9ECSoMJP24z5roAd
      +ipyn3v47Vmlu6gjk1wmgj2hT2LnkrwvXh6CGKc2AjA3xQieGKyzB6/m2hMc6A5z
      nVwhwJi4Fc4J/Zs9+J/4KUFbSdobrs5Ej4iexWWTGfzVDjOmRaObol6gxldiGDH3
      1khUSpJutOjnisiWUVkjUos9AvFi8QISeodiQr5AMCrYGVY0N5BN35hv/mqJHT3g
      AH25psCwaT1P44qYu6CQSRkRxOE2CmJIhPvsPjC9uOx8zois3ICwCUZLUpkwsL7o
      DfnucGNPpS5aIJenno5Cy8aY5E0BXN/m5OxLfciWAp4Sv2Fg55TKDLaysIcHNy9G
      J56SD2QJEoF7s9LbUykGutlBOI1ozWxyhMK2ku/DjB0lQTncUaibWJ5Y3Bw1uVVe
      8GL3HAoR8G+aos8ESy/0vcaEHmTM4iqXKZcRELvlGJ+HqCSalLVgf8XaLMNPq+8l
      qTEHPGPVpo5BQRLCavg21hd38nBmFHQFyB5X6jQcAhBuhf8Ns12Na72V4OHyXtKD
      hB/qfrdQukkAhCRRGFbsc3iOwM/OkUwv/z/w1NikP6Z9jhTQIC/RF/86CGAEyfdQ
      1FC+wsDgkbmKaQIWoyqdrHiXiLI2htMSJ4aeJufjFvH86PhZiEi0gUKpkFqi58ix
      0kfoiUO3oAEPKAoZvGDlRN+/x89hjccqmOFoKDxckUaKphTzuJwepQDNaRkPSNKd
      d6yjD4nB9Bjnbp1bwR/iy7OCA33lRangFuUFq6gsZsj54Ioi8MOZ8aox0GdrM8so
      eWexF7od+L6/zBh43WHE0vMDjOUX8QgkCXWF1mhP0Yd13uLsddaUeYtjDJp44t2y
      pb8FdnfA5IS7xMyNz2XIBZJOtqSGrWvPR9o/xloZiuNBOzmns6wmz3ZGznZddVex
      s9nM2VoPdrPe8n4bxuTRXPyGvATDdY8czqZh8/STGX5PPmCvRA1ilWrN1sP844mq
      QSv1swG+bnDIgAZS9D7DR5pq5Ed18Zby5g6l0uUwEDQeIonMsRwHErQtB2X3rMX+
      lHg35WKHTRjPk6kcGWWcRuBkHmKSug4qDqjbQZLNaBA9v2XxB5CuoJ8yFMGRz8oO
      phflxeJWA8w185UPQ9Sm8m/S6nP5NjdO4XUzzhJ7Ue/+Um2XrghRfY1+mGDo+B5a
      PPvKf2VetChVXIpFew1fZWfQuZGluJTHdb1J7lG2Q9rKrLY7ty0P+gMQs8by8nwm
      XYgJiqXnzr15u005JQpXhkfJ1B4x+0K5q1vVJNenlvLa40r+/wU8tNFEV9cgBtPm
      B4+Zikt+FD2A1uU+9wCOBanXE/xCN95oTCH06FMiv8j/qzh9+c7DnNxPQ8rvCQf1
      dH8A1kMxgOJ9zIfuZMmAUMQmI3t5qh4oGT8RycWa/e1JeMxiMqpOSY7cwH5UyzpM
      /8ZrWLpPo7CYnTvK4LaMBzhvu6mxp348dNR8qmxIkmH7rcqXyPu+BVwTpt/2pXVe
      -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

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B.1.1 Client Registration Request

   The client generates a private key:
      openssl genrsa -des3 -out privkey.key 2048

   Then generate a certificate from the key to designate the expected
   properties:
      openssl req -key privkey.key -out client.crt -new -x509

   Then generates a CSR from the key and certificate:
      openssl x509 -x509toreq -in client.crt -out client.req -sha256
      -signkey privkey.key

   The request from the client to the Edge Device:

     POST /registration HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     Content-Type: application/pkcs10

     -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
     MIICrzCCAZcCAQAwajELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgMAkNBMRUwEwYDVQQH
     DAxEZWZhdWx0IENpdHkxHDAaBgNVBAoME0RlZmF1bHQgQ29tcGFueSBMdGQxGTAX
     BgNVBAMMEEJlbmphbWluIERldXRzY2gwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAw
     ggEKAoIBAQCpJMQQY1gzANViIIreVQvIlp2mw1ASUixRJp4SGPHpsaNJfvHcZBWl
     zBfVfh960OsC1NasUs69WQIPeuJAYELdOXYox2J+5DSN/g3X8p3CXMrVd7xpArpx
     q6uxevEtMP1kx4X8VC7nJsEPJO1lFhwTixWuUQv5xWL5qGuATafmtRvbBWNBMRa8
     55HCKIcQkx4i0/DMREm0P/7fYRfuwYUWf3KJfkuCnwhbmxvFI0PDQfw/q+UhpobV
     arxZS++S6jlMdaKh7tHLOLpfHdrLr8uaNlOB3weF6C2EGDxlzB0v3xEmdxVL7Ch6
     GBZ7y3amfydZ5FOK1SD3lgWWYMm/6E5tAgMBAAGgADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC
     AQEAUnKJBIenLImXFBl7J3GwL948KPbKnuc7HRex0TmSo4G7fN7RxIo+6uZEgFG0
     met55u+5uepVyGYnph2tgwO7hYUnUA5Zl4fzJeNmXljBAfBUQ4DYhi6R5yCpzU1C
     wJOSyWWujPPUvfsRnT5kbk7LBvHKqntZ8+s3mbUtVVb80VsaWvOzDZerS6K+OXnY
     YpV4oqZOmhraYDDtFuGVWBYJNspZwjNHTXJjhgR0u+xhnX8PugIoULIan/SmFkt/
     6pvIjgOBX1NbBQo4B8S1F+l6R9CShEX6UCALkd+9BhHXDDiTZZara1YshpOEFr9W
     qMHUCVVDTcYZomsqQqU/wKF8Hg==
     -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----

Deutsch         Client Application Layer Encryption           [Page 13]


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B.1.2 Edge Registration Request

   The request forwarded to the authorization server with the cipher:

     POST /registration HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     Content-Type: application/pkcs10
     Cipher: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA

     -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----
     MIICrzCCAZcCAQAwajELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgMAkNBMRUwEwYDVQQH
     DAxEZWZhdWx0IENpdHkxHDAaBgNVBAoME0RlZmF1bHQgQ29tcGFueSBMdGQxGTAX
     BgNVBAMMEEJlbmphbWluIERldXRzY2gwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAw
     ggEKAoIBAQCpJMQQY1gzANViIIreVQvIlp2mw1ASUixRJp4SGPHpsaNJfvHcZBWl
     zBfVfh960OsC1NasUs69WQIPeuJAYELdOXYox2J+5DSN/g3X8p3CXMrVd7xpArpx
     q6uxevEtMP1kx4X8VC7nJsEPJO1lFhwTixWuUQv5xWL5qGuATafmtRvbBWNBMRa8
     55HCKIcQkx4i0/DMREm0P/7fYRfuwYUWf3KJfkuCnwhbmxvFI0PDQfw/q+UhpobV
     arxZS++S6jlMdaKh7tHLOLpfHdrLr8uaNlOB3weF6C2EGDxlzB0v3xEmdxVL7Ch6
     GBZ7y3amfydZ5FOK1SD3lgWWYMm/6E5tAgMBAAGgADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC
     AQEAUnKJBIenLImXFBl7J3GwL948KPbKnuc7HRex0TmSo4G7fN7RxIo+6uZEgFG0
     met55u+5uepVyGYnph2tgwO7hYUnUA5Zl4fzJeNmXljBAfBUQ4DYhi6R5yCpzU1C
     wJOSyWWujPPUvfsRnT5kbk7LBvHKqntZ8+s3mbUtVVb80VsaWvOzDZerS6K+OXnY
     YpV4oqZOmhraYDDtFuGVWBYJNspZwjNHTXJjhgR0u+xhnX8PugIoULIan/SmFkt/
     6pvIjgOBX1NbBQo4B8S1F+l6R9CShEX6UCALkd+9BhHXDDiTZZara1YshpOEFr9W
     qMHUCVVDTcYZomsqQqU/wKF8Hg==
     -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----

Deutsch         Client Application Layer Encryption           [Page 14]


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B.1.3 Registration Response

   After generating the GUID that identifies the record it shall be
   encoded using the client certificate:
      openssl smime -encrypt -binary -aes-256-cbc -in response.txt
      client.crt

   Resulting in the encrypted response [RFC5751]:

      HTTP/1.1 200 OK
      Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8
      MIME-Version: 1.0
      Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7m"
      Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-mime;
      smime-type=enveloped-data; name="smime.p7m"
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

      MIICCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcDoIIB/DCCAfgCAQAxggGTMIIBjwIBADB3MGoxCzAJBgNV
      BAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTEVMBMGA1UEBwwMRGVmYXVsdCBDaXR5MRwwGgYD
      VQQKDBNEZWZhdWx0IENvbXBhbnkgTHRkMRkwFwYDVQQDDBBCZW5qYW1pbiBEZXV0
      c2NoAgkAondW3eFlchkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEACddDSDsbQ5D+eMwSqpNa
      XHQOI1nWEYBDTx294ub67XV8ZxKGnMi/zMlSvdsNTlhXhz5/TjN8vwGF7v30znXM
      4fvUXQpCOps8APG5y3tWe8I7XPTKsTtaJymCDAoBokLIIFfjgMo6Yh3qDZ53PSdG
      wN2WxDlhAFyob6lX2WTPzh5RlCSmbWwEt3AnZqshHxLs8uk7ci3BU9Coizw3lVBh
      vcH5hH6A8ad1bE4y+s3SRrPqTag4/CXz/LXC9i5WrMbXqVz6yKnH1CgkX4k0NMbe
      DqjHnsUV7M1TuHfb+NFI329bOQKofqIIVseq4S7rIzpbrEsDehPZt5kwMxTOttUX
      YzBcBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHQYJYIZIAWUDBAEqBBCZc4CRchSYISroxg0r6twPgDCK
      WSrODqmsS8zckitZgLcftiZ2hsGbmCUiq5pUwZdEBmMzGJIIl4w+mLmTYuhKOHU=

   The client decrypts the response:
      openssl smime -decrypt -binary -aes-256-cbc -in response.enc -out
      response.txt -inkey privkey.key
      Enter pass phrase for privkey.key: password

      bec6dc7e-6562-4b1c-b308-6c352e6f8404

B.2 Standard Request

   A request to some other services with this added protection.

B.2.1 Standard Client Request

   The request to some service:

     GET /resource HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     CALE-GUID: bec6dc7e-6562-4b1c-b308-6c352e6f8404

Deutsch         Client Application Layer Encryption           [Page 15]


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B.2.2 Edge Validation Request

   The authentication request to the authorization server:

     GET /validate HTTP/1.1
     Host: authority.example.com
     CALE-GUID: bec6dc7e-6562-4b1c-b308-6c352e6f8404

B.2.3a Authorization Validation Response

   Create the signed certificate with minimally applicable validity:
      openssl ca -config openssl.cnf -startdate 180731190800Z -enddate
      180731190810Z -keyfile ca.key -cert ca.crt -in client.req -out
      ./client.crt -notext

   A successful response from the authorization server:

      HTTP/1.1 200 OK
      Content-Type: application/x509

      -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
      MIIEfDCCA2SgAwIBAgIRAOaxLLnaTZDrituxMDU+EwowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAw
      czELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgMAkNBMRUwEwYDVQQHDAxEZWZhdWx0IENp
      dHkxFDASBgNVBAoMC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMQswCQYDVQQLDAJJVDEdMBsGA1UEAwwU
      YXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbiBzZXJ2ZXIwHhcNMTgwNzMxMTkwODAwWhcNMTgwNzMxMTkw
      ODEwWjBqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzELMAkGA1UECAwCQ0ExFTATBgNVBAcMDERlZmF1
      bHQgQ2l0eTEcMBoGA1UECgwTRGVmYXVsdCBDb21wYW55IEx0ZDEZMBcGA1UEAwwQ
      QmVuamFtaW4gRGV1dHNjaDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEB
      AKkkxBBjWDMA1WIgit5VC8iWnabDUBJSLFEmnhIY8emxo0l+8dxkFaXMF9V+H3rQ
      6wLU1qxSzr1ZAg964kBgQt05dijHYn7kNI3+DdfyncJcytV3vGkCunGrq7F68S0w
      /WTHhfxULucmwQ8k7WUWHBOLFa5RC/nFYvmoa4BNp+a1G9sFY0ExFrznkcIohxCT
      HiLT8MxESbQ//t9hF+7BhRZ/col+S4KfCFubG8UjQ8NB/D+r5SGmhtVqvFlL75Lq
      OUx1oqHu0cs4ul8d2suvy5o2U4HfB4XoLYQYPGXMHS/fESZ3FUvsKHoYFnvLdqZ/
      J1nkU4rVIPeWBZZgyb/oTm0CAwEAAaOCARIwggEOMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwDgYDVR0P
      AQH/BAQDAgWgMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcDAjAdBgNVHQ4E
      FgQUSxqn9ioM+4Im9NWszrg3xvB3Xt4wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU8/02wa7539I+EYiE
      mgMYyLFLHfwwZAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEWDBWMCgGCCsGAQUFBzAChhxodHRwOi8vY2Eu
      c2FtcGxlLmxhbi9jYS5odG1sMCoGCCsGAQUFBzABhh5odHRwOi8vb2NzcC5jYS5z
      YW1wbGUubGFuOjkwODAwLAYDVR0fBCUwIzAhoB+gHYYbaHR0cDovL2NhLnNhbXBs
      ZS5sYW4vY2EuY3JsMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQDM1uhIypvCU+w0ZyW4fTXg
      Zmpp/S3HoFvthVYVfnI5fhUumntFtRQHGyi468qH1Q79UGXW3wnx4Mz//2xQamRu
      ACv16+pDXlMxrNJPk5udSHyweqESiaQS1wYqkMsVKx7Sk2AMH8c8cWoUZkBB62ZG
      rQMAT0XHP9l/b7qnqNmgS/YkFNfl7uK1FTWLSzGUfVSoFD6YAtLpP0jfgZy+hy69
      eG5dRrkagxT22tK9+o+DFSGMhsIQI++UDMypCRjyFQgmWXMj4DW1olZz7u90eQCT
      WfSkZ+Elpp19Xmboki4KVriVJm2zMZN/1+sxcWpLe2BHAxb3V+erkwNMt+wog/kS
      -----END CERTIFICATE-----


B.2.3b authentication Validation Error

   An unsuccessful response from the authorization server:

      HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden

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B.2.3c Edge Device Erroneous Response

   A successful appearing response designed to prevent dictionary
   attack from mapping real user GUIDs (mocking B.2.7).

      HTTP/1.1 200 OK
      Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8
      MIME-Version: 1.0
      Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7m"
      Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-mime;
      smime-type=enveloped-data; name="smime.p7m"
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

      QXQgdmVybyBlb3MgZXQgYWNjdXNhbXVzIGV0IGl1c3RvIG9kaW8gZGlnbmlzc2lt
      b3MgZHVjaW11cyBxdWkgYmxhbmRpdGlpcyBwcmFlc2VudGl1bSB2b2x1cHRhdHVt
      IGRlbGVuaXRpIGF0cXVlIGNvcnJ1cHRpIHF1b3MgZG9sb3JlcyBldCBxdWFzIG1v
      bGVzdGlhcyBleGNlcHR1cmkgc2ludCBvY2NhZWNhdGkgY3VwaWRpdGF0ZSBub24g
      cHJvdmlkZW50LCBzaW1pbGlxdWUgc3VudCBpbiBjdWxwYSBxdWkgb2ZmaWNpYSBk
      ZXNlcnVudCBtb2xsaXRpYSBhbmltaSwgaWQgZXN0IGxhYm9ydW0gZXQgZG9sb3J1
      bSBmdWdhLiBFdCBoYXJ1bSBxdWlkZW0gcmVydW0gZmFjaWxpcyBlc3QgZXQgZXhw
      ZWRpdGEgZGlzdGluY3Rpby4gTmFtIGxpYmVybyB0ZW1wb3JlLCBjdW0gc29sdXRh
      IG5vYmlzIGVzdCBlbGlnZW5kaSBvcHRpbyBjdW1xdWUgbmloaWwgaW1wZWRpdCBx
      dW8gbWludXMgaWQgcXVvZCBtYXhpbWUgcGxhY2VhdCBmYWNlcmUgcG9zc2ltdXMs
      IG9tbmlzIHZvbHVwdGFzIGFzc3VtZW5kYSBlc3QsIG9tbmlzIGRvbG9yIHJlcGVs
      bGVuZHVzLiBUZW1wb3JpYnVzIGF1dGVtIHF1aWJ1c2RhbSBldCBhdXQgb2ZmaWNp
      aXMgZGViaXRpcyBhdXQgcmVydW0gbmVjZXNzaXRhdGlidXMgc2FlcGUgZXZlbmll
      dCB1dCBldCB2b2x1cHRhdGVzIHJlcHVkaWFuZGFlIHNpbnQgZXQgbW9sZXN0aWFl
      IG5vbiByZWN1c2FuZGFlLiBJdGFxdWUgZWFydW0gcmVydW0gaGljIHRlbmV0dXIg
      YSBzYXBpZW50ZSBkZWxlY3R1cywgdXQgYXV0IHJlaWNpZW5kaXMgdm9sdXB0YXRp
      YnVzIG1haW9yZXMgYWxpYXMgY29uc2VxdWF0dXIgYXV0IHBlcmZlcmVuZGlzIGRv
      bG9yaWJ1cyBhc3BlcmlvcmVzIHJlcGVsbGF0Lg==

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B.2.4 Edge Forwarded Request

   The request to some service:

     GET /resource HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     CALE-PEM: "MIIEfDCCA2SgAwIBAgIRAOaxLLnaTZDrituxMDU+EwowDQYJKoZIhvc
     NAQELBQAwczELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgMAkNBMRUwEwYDVQQHDAxEZWZhd
     Wx0IENpdHkxFDASBgNVBAoMC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMQswCQYDVQQLDAJJVDEdMBsGA1U
     EAwwUYXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbiBzZXJ2ZXIwHhcNMTgwNzMxMTkwODAwWhcNMTgwNzMxM
     TkwODEwWjBqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzELMAkGA1UECAwCQ0ExFTATBgNVBAcMDERlZmF
     1bHQgQ2l0eTEcMBoGA1UECgwTRGVmYXVsdCBDb21wYW55IEx0ZDEZMBcGA1UEAwwQQ
     mVuamFtaW4gRGV1dHNjaDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKk
     kxBBjWDMA1WIgit5VC8iWnabDUBJSLFEmnhIY8emxo0l+8dxkFaXMF9V+H3rQ6wLU1
     qxSzr1ZAg964kBgQt05dijHYn7kNI3+DdfyncJcytV3vGkCunGrq7F68S0w/WTHhfx
     ULucmwQ8k7WUWHBOLFa5RC/nFYvmoa4BNp+a1G9sFY0ExFrznkcIohxCTHiLT8MxES
     bQ//t9hF+7BhRZ/col+S4KfCFubG8UjQ8NB/D+r5SGmhtVqvFlL75LqOUx1oqHu0cs
     4ul8d2suvy5o2U4HfB4XoLYQYPGXMHS/fESZ3FUvsKHoYFnvLdqZ/J1nkU4rVIPeWB
     ZZgyb/oTm0CAwEAAaOCARIwggEOMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgWgMB0
     GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcDAjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUSxqn9ioM+4Im9
     NWszrg3xvB3Xt4wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU8/02wa7539I+EYiEmgMYyLFLHfwwZAYIKwY
     BBQUHAQEEWDBWMCgGCCsGAQUFBzAChhxodHRwOi8vY2Euc2FtcGxlLmxhbi9jYS5od
     G1sMCoGCCsGAQUFBzABhh5odHRwOi8vb2NzcC5jYS5zYW1wbGUubGFuOjkwODAwLAY
     DVR0fBCUwIzAhoB+gHYYbaHR0cDovL2NhLnNhbXBsZS5sYW4vY2EuY3JsMA0GCSqGS
     Ib3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQDM1uhIypvCU+w0ZyW4fTXgZmpp/S3HoFvthVYVfnI5fhUumnt
     FtRQHGyi468qH1Q79UGXW3wnx4Mz//2xQamRuACv16+pDXlMxrNJPk5udSHyweqESi
     aQS1wYqkMsVKx7Sk2AMH8c8cWoUZkBB62ZGrQMAT0XHP9l/b7qnqNmgS/YkFNfl7uK
     1FTWLSzGUfVSoFD6YAtLpP0jfgZy+hy69eG5dRrkagxT22tK9+o+DFSGMhsIQI++UD
     MypCRjyFQgmWXMj4DW1olZz7u90eQCTWfSkZ+Elpp19Xmboki4KVriVJm2zMZN/1+s
     xcWpLe2BHAxb3V+erkwNMt+wog/kS"
     Cipher: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA

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B.2.5 Aggregation Request

   A request from the origin server to another resource server:

     GET /aggregate HTTP/1.1
     Host: origin.example.com
     CALE-PEM: "MIIEfDCCA2SgAwIBAgIRAOaxLLnaTZDrituxMDU+EwowDQYJKoZIhvc
     NAQELBQAwczELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxCzAJBgNVBAgMAkNBMRUwEwYDVQQHDAxEZWZhd
     Wx0IENpdHkxFDASBgNVBAoMC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMQswCQYDVQQLDAJJVDEdMBsGA1U
     EAwwUYXV0aG9yaXphdGlvbiBzZXJ2ZXIwHhcNMTgwNzMxMTkwODAwWhcNMTgwNzMxM
     TkwODEwWjBqMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzELMAkGA1UECAwCQ0ExFTATBgNVBAcMDERlZmF
     1bHQgQ2l0eTEcMBoGA1UECgwTRGVmYXVsdCBDb21wYW55IEx0ZDEZMBcGA1UEAwwQQ
     mVuamFtaW4gRGV1dHNjaDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAKk
     kxBBjWDMA1WIgit5VC8iWnabDUBJSLFEmnhIY8emxo0l+8dxkFaXMF9V+H3rQ6wLU1
     qxSzr1ZAg964kBgQt05dijHYn7kNI3+DdfyncJcytV3vGkCunGrq7F68S0w/WTHhfx
     ULucmwQ8k7WUWHBOLFa5RC/nFYvmoa4BNp+a1G9sFY0ExFrznkcIohxCTHiLT8MxES
     bQ//t9hF+7BhRZ/col+S4KfCFubG8UjQ8NB/D+r5SGmhtVqvFlL75LqOUx1oqHu0cs
     4ul8d2suvy5o2U4HfB4XoLYQYPGXMHS/fESZ3FUvsKHoYFnvLdqZ/J1nkU4rVIPeWB
     ZZgyb/oTm0CAwEAAaOCARIwggEOMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgWgMB0
     GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcDAjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUSxqn9ioM+4Im9
     NWszrg3xvB3Xt4wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAU8/02wa7539I+EYiEmgMYyLFLHfwwZAYIKwY
     BBQUHAQEEWDBWMCgGCCsGAQUFBzAChhxodHRwOi8vY2Euc2FtcGxlLmxhbi9jYS5od
     G1sMCoGCCsGAQUFBzABhh5odHRwOi8vb2NzcC5jYS5zYW1wbGUubGFuOjkwODAwLAY
     DVR0fBCUwIzAhoB+gHYYbaHR0cDovL2NhLnNhbXBsZS5sYW4vY2EuY3JsMA0GCSqGS
     Ib3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQDM1uhIypvCU+w0ZyW4fTXgZmpp/S3HoFvthVYVfnI5fhUumnt
     FtRQHGyi468qH1Q79UGXW3wnx4Mz//2xQamRuACv16+pDXlMxrNJPk5udSHyweqESi
     aQS1wYqkMsVKx7Sk2AMH8c8cWoUZkBB62ZGrQMAT0XHP9l/b7qnqNmgS/YkFNfl7uK
     1FTWLSzGUfVSoFD6YAtLpP0jfgZy+hy69eG5dRrkagxT22tK9+o+DFSGMhsIQI++UD
     MypCRjyFQgmWXMj4DW1olZz7u90eQCTWfSkZ+Elpp19Xmboki4KVriVJm2zMZN/1+s
     xcWpLe2BHAxb3V+erkwNMt+wog/kS"

B.2.6 Aggregation Response

   A response from a resource server to the origin server:

      HTTP/1.1 200 OK

      {"foo": "bar"}

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B.2.7 Origination Response

   The encrypted response from the origination server that will be
   passed back to the client by the edge device:

      HTTP/1.1 200 OK
      Content-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8
      MIME-Version: 1.0
      Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7m"
      Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-mime;
      smime-type=enveloped-data; name="smime.p7m"
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

      MIIB6wYJKoZIhvcNAQcDoIIB3DCCAdgCAQAxggGTMIIBjwIBADB3MGoxCzAJBgNV
      BAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTEVMBMGA1UEBwwMRGVmYXVsdCBDaXR5MRwwGgYD
      VQQKDBNEZWZhdWx0IENvbXBhbnkgTHRkMRkwFwYDVQQDDBBCZW5qYW1pbiBEZXV0
      c2NoAgkAondW3eFlchkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAJYwQ+oFA8nm4sp/crwHi
      BY1+oVwqnygrXu4aZibJBA5qXQPYYVKGmjgZ1HnvtgWPdV4EW0b3FHbhI71fvalQ
      HI3g7Jl9bcyNP0kSt4XmuAZzKrVRktBcEbhP9ePqAoH5S0u4vhwtKMZ/rt0BUPwY
      ZQxVAQo7HQDL00+LHu2nGAbVinszn/5bQrJ7CTHO72ecs7m9DBJmaOT+ZT8toEpI
      9zOvE4Z6AsqbbrthvIAApWfNBLYxm6fgy+5XeYPdwNnaAOMC0XXEWolp1/Suchzf
      f84z7ayH8Xx6cP5mZQe/LH5KT4CvfxwsfhzVkMJkUOKyU7uxA+6B6lqm3t1mgIwy
      EjA8BgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHQYJYIZIAWUDBAEqBBA7pyAHv3GrWkoZc5fiYkBLgBBL
      JQYQttSM00rzK3y5X/sA

B.3 whoami Request

B.3.1 Client whoami Request

   The request to some service:

     GET /whoami HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     CALE-GUID: bec6dc7e-6562-4b1c-b308-6c352e6f8404

B.3.2 Edge whoami Request

   The request forwarded to the authorization server with the cipher:

     GET /whoami HTTP/1.1
     Host: server.example.com
     CALE-GUID: bec6dc7e-6562-4b1c-b308-6c352e6f8404
     Cipher: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA

Deutsch         Client Application Layer Encryption           [Page 20]


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B.3.3 Authorization whoami Response

   Generate the certificate that expires immediately:
      openssl x509 -req -days 0 -in client.req -CA ca.crt -CAkey
      ca.key -CAserial file.srl -out client.pem

   The certificate is encrypted with itself using the cipher:
      openssl smime -encrypt -binary -aes-256-cbc -in client.pem
      client.pem

      HTTP/1.1 200 OK
      MIME-Version: 1.0
      Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7m"
      Content-Type: application/x-pkcs7-mime;
      smime-type=enveloped-data; name="smime.p7m"
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

      MIIGogYJKoZIhvcNAQcDoIIGkzCCBo8CAQAxggGWMIIBkgIBADB6MHMxCzAJBgNV
      BAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIDAJDQTEVMBMGA1UEBwwMRGVmYXVsdCBDaXR5MRQwEgYD
      VQQKDAtleGFtcGxlLmNvbTELMAkGA1UECwwCSVQxHTAbBgNVBAMMFGF1dGhvcml6
      YXRpb24gc2VydmVyAgMAhkkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAEggEAGbGnIDFMlf28nPpc
      lN7RPb8Ok03T+wESUVDi3Pl9WEiE5BlV00jFPPZYJtatelJt7HOjK0b6Irz5ZHJ6
      nzZ3xUN1nOOGPl8E/zffxfmVwBX6mh9jLZSZcPoorM58vUT1a0ci4euMH8pLQ+lZ
      t1K+iV9bLm7Bg/xqumyhjrMq+lb5+0a3ZanhLk1LVNG6FrgG7a15pKX+t7hzWtjA
      uLSqovn4Jr3tOGGyB9nDoRoWxBYqMlluNenqBgNiLD22DlTMD1iD/NCDEOGq5h5v
      3v+LD1NV8yrbRF/dx/GWkH3hl8uiiBaZkGqRI09D10CpuIK2lTsrrqcJyMmiG+8n
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      iKy/Y/VS1WySNETNKeUgj4uOpZqwVvhGkQYYeZVjYXrrWlyN6B4pmFXLNl5hoOsM
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      vfDAVEgFkFTRn/aLM7nzMgQkythzJS46S878HJ18plTpRJTARtpW9uqllNwh6LnL
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      uXOmwlJyBuclZSEgsgMVVswn/R8x0pIiVW96YU5H+P59bguP5hLnSFvFhLhDades
      bG8sRC7dAW87ZHFOGO315872wVsUw0fjGwgLcF6BJ4CtDM/DD2dhV090225gXVCT
      HOlRqS6MekpUqBmw1nooGvR1hCqeQA==

Deutsch         Client Application Layer Encryption           [Page 21]


INTERNET-DRAFT          Expires: 17/02/2019                    Aug 2018

Author's Address

   Benjamin Deutsch

   Email: spreakenze@gmail.com

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Deutsch         Client Application Layer Encryption           [Page 22]


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